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A  TREATISE 


OX  THE 


LAW    OF    TRIALS 


IN    ACTIONS 


CIVIL  AND  CRIMINAL 


By  SEYMOUR  D.   THOMPSON,   LL.  D. 


IN   TWO   VOLUMES 
VOL.  I 


CHICAGO 
T.   H.  FLOOD  S:  COMPANY 

1889 


r 

T5n%t 


KntcTcd  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1  *>'-?,  by 

SEYMUUK    1).  TIIO.MrSON, 
In  the  oilice  of  tbe  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Wablungion. 


^ 


To  Herr  GUSTAF  EDW.  FAHLCRANTZ, 

V.  HARADSHOFDIXG,  ADVOCATE,  &c., 

OF  STOCKHOLM,  SWEDEN. 

Sir, — I  ask  leave  to  dedicate  this  work  to  you,  in  recognition 
of  the  efforts  which  you  have  made,  through  various  published 
writings,  to  reform  and  improve  the  system  of  trials  in  your  own 
country,  and  especially  to  inculcate  the  obligation  of  speaking  the 
truth  in  forensic  controversies.  That  a  distinguished  Swedish 
advocate,  after  investigating  the  English  S3'stem  of  trial  by  jury, 
should  recommend  its  adoption  to  his  countrymen,  cannot  but  be 
regarded  as  a  compliment  to  the  English-speaking  race.  And  yet, 
while  naturally  partial  to  the  institutions  of  my  own  great  and 
prosperous  country,  I  feel  that  it  would  not  be  becoming  in  me  to 
offer  the  suggestion  that  the  jury  system  of  your  country  would  be 
improved  by  adopting  ours.  A  system  of  jury  trial  which  has 
been  found  suitable  to  our  institutions  and  habits  of  thought, 
might  be  so  out  of  keepmg  with  the  ways  of  thinking  of  your 
countrymen,  that  it  would  not  work  well  if  transplanted  into  your 
country.  But,  allowing  that  this  is  so,  you  have  certainly  shown 
that  your  jury  system,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  is  not  without 
serious  defects;  and,  for  having  drawn  the  attention  of  your 
countrymen  to  those  defects,  you  are  entitled  to  their  sincere 
thanks,  whether  or  not  you  have  suggested  the  most  expedient 
remedy.  Your  struggle  in  behalf  of  the  principle  that  mere 
formalism  and  technicality  ought  to  be  expelled  from  the  courts 
of  justice  and  the  truth  established  there  instead,  is  deserving 
of    universal    sympathy;     and  if  you  shall  not  succeed  in  im- 

(iii) 


609S34 


IV  DEDICATION. 

pressing  tho^e  views  upon  your  countrynicu  in  your  owu 
lifetime,  your  fate  will  be  no  worse  than  that  of  Bcnthani,  who, 
having  spent  his  lifetime  in  a  like  struggle,  died  without  seeing 
the  fruition  of  his  hopes,  })ut  whost'  wiitings  have,  siuee  his 
death,  eonfcssedly  shed  an  intiueucc  upon  the  jurisprudciiee  of 
his  eountry,  surpassing  that  of  any  other  man.  If  you  are  thus 
*'  equalled  with  him  in  fate,"  so  may  you  be  "  e<]ualled  with  him 
in  renown  !  "  * 

One  who  has  traveled  in  your  eountry  and  who  has  every- 
where observed  the  pride  of  honesty  whieh  animates  the  Swedish 
people,  can  scarcely  understand  how  it  is  that  you  need  courts 
of  justice  at  all.  Several  hundred  thousand  of  your  countrymen 
have  made  homes  in  America.  They  are  among  our  most  honest, 
industrious,  peaceful  and  law-abid]""»g  citizens.  "Would  that  we 
had  more  of  them  I  It  is  not  to  be  su))})osed  that  a  feeling  of 
discontent  with  the  institutions  of  their  nati\(»  land  has  caused 
them  to  seek  homes  in  our  country.  Their  presence  among  us 
is  rather  to  be  ascribed  to  that  natural  overflow  which  the  New 
"World  has  received  from  the  overcrowded  po))ulations  of  the 
Old. 

Your  wi'itings  \vA\r  iin})ressed  me  with  certain  strong  jioints  of 
resemblance  })etwecn  your  jury  system  and  ours.  Your  nacmd, 
when  the  panel  is  full,  is  composed  of  twelve  men;  and,  I  believe 
the  jury  of  all  the  northern  nations  of  luu'ope  is  composed  either 
of  twelve  men,  or  of  a  multiple,  or  an  ali(iuot  part  of  that  mimber. 
Y''our  naemcU  if  I  correctly  understand  you,  has  the  power,  con- 
sidered as  mere  powei-,  of  judging  of  the  law  as  w»ll  as  of  the 
facts,  and  of  overruling  the  judge,  by  an  unanimous  vote,  ui)on 
the  whole  case,  or  upon  any  question  which  arises  therein,  whether 
it  be  a  question  of  law  or  a  question  of  fact.  The  extravagant 
coneeptions  of  liberty  and  of  popular  right,  with  which  our  Amer- 
jcau  republic  commenced  its  career,  invested  juries,  iu  several 


DEDICATION.  V 

States  of  the  Union,  with  the  same  power;  and  under  the  con- 
stitutions of  some  of  the  American  States,  as  you  will  see  by 
looking  through  the  following  pages, ^  juries  in  criminal  cases  are 
invested  with  the  power  of  judging  of  the  law,  of  deciding  the 
law  in  opposition  to  the  decision  of  the  judge,  and  even  of  declar- 
ing acts  of  the  legislature  to  be  null  and  void,  because,  in  their 
opinion,  contrary  to  the  constitution,  which  is  the  fundamental 
or  organic  law.  The  jurisprudence  of  those  States  has  thus  un- 
wisely invested  twelve  ignorant  men,  hastily  gathered  too-ether, 
with  the  power  of  setting  aside  the  law  of  the  land  and  of  declar- 
ing acts  of  the  legislature  null  and  void.  When  I  tell  you  that 
such  a  state  of  things  exists  in  several  of  the  most  Droo-ressive 
States  of  the  American  Union,  you  will  of  course  believe  me  ; 
but  you  will  none  the  less  be  surprised  that  a  people  Avho  have 
the  reputation  of  possessing  the  practical  sense  of  the  American 
people  could  have  descended  to  such  foWy.  You  must  further 
understand  that  the  jury  which  is  clothed  with  this  extraordinary 
power  is  not  composed  of  men  of  the  highest  probity,  chosen  by 
the  electors  for  a  term  of  years,  as  is  the  case  with  your  Swedish 
jury,  but  that  it  is  composed  of  men  who  are  selected  for  the 
purpose  of  a  single  trial,  —  frequently  of  talesmen,  gathered  to- 
gether from  the  court  idlers  who  happen  to  be  standing  around,- — 
and  that  those  who  happen  to  have  intelligence  enough  to  have 
read  the  newspapers  and  to  have  formed  or  expressed  an  opinion 
about  the  case  which  is  to  be  tried, ^  are  for  that  reason  iueliixible 
and  are  rejected  upon  challenge;  so  that  the  jury  which  reallv 
tries  the  case  is  often  composed  of  the  most  ignorant  men  who 
can  be  found  in  the  community.  When  you  consider  that  this 
body  of  twelve  dolts,  selected  because  they  are  ignorant  of  the 
facts  of  the  case  about  to  be  tried,  no  matter  how  notorious  those 

J  Post,  §  2140,  et  seq.  ?  Post,  §  70,  et  seq. 

-  Tales  de  circumstantibus:  post,  §  23. 


VI  DEDICATION. 

facts  may  have  becu,  are  entni.slecl  with  the  power  of  judging  of 
the  hnv  agaiu.st  the  opiuion  of  the  presiding  judge,  and  even  in 
opposition  to  the  ^Supreme  Court,  you  will  at  U'ast  eonelude, — 
however  nuuh  you  may  be  impi'essed  in  fa\()r  of  the  English 
system  of  trial  by  jury, —  that  there  is  one  feature  of  our  Amer- 
ican system  which  you  cannot  recommend  to  }our  countrymen. 
Your  Swedish  jury,  much  to  their  credit,  when  the  judge  brings 
in  his  decision,  founded  upon  a  record  which  they  have  not  had 
the  opportunity  of  reading,  exercise  the  mere  otlice  of  nodding 
their  heads.  But  not  so  with  our  American  jury.  They  not  un- 
frecpiently,  in  viohition  of  the  plain  obligation  of  the  oaths  which 
they  have  taken,  decide  the  case  in  opposition  to  the  law  as  ex- 
pounded to  them  by  the  judge  in  his  instructions,  and  bring  in 
verdicts  which  have  the  result  of  turning  the  worst  criminals 
loose  u\)on  the  comnuinity  to  repeat  their  crimes. 

It  is  true  that,  in  a  majority  of  American  jurisdictions,  juries 
are  not  invested  with  the  power  of  judging  of  the  law,  except  in 
so  far  as  they  have  the  power,  in  criminal  trials,  of  bringing  iu 
a  verdict  of  not  guiltv  contrarv  to  the  law  as  expounded  bv 
the  judge,  which  verdict  cannot  l)e  set  aside,'  —  the  nuixim  of 
the  English  law.  embodied  in  all  our  American  constitutions, 
))eing  that  no  one  shall  ])v  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or 
limb  for  the  same  offense.  lUit  in  all  American  jurisdictions 
they  are  nevertheless  invested  with  this  j)ower  to  the  extent  that 
the  verdict  of  a  jury  which  is  even  ])rocure(l  by  bribery  or  cor- 
ruj)tiou,  if  it  be  ;i  verdict  of  ac(|uitt:il,  cannot  be  set  aside,  but 
is  forever  conclusive.  With  this  excei)tion,  in  a  majority  of 
American  jiuisdictions,  juries  aic  not,  even  in  ciiminal  trials, 
judges  of  the  law,  but  are  bound  to  accept  the  law  as  expounded 
to  them  by  the  judge  in  his  instructions. 

•  Po8l,  §  2133,  ct  seq. 


DEDICATION.  vii 

But,  although  they  may  not  be  judges  of  the  law,  they  are,  in 
many  American  jurisdictions,  judges  of  the  facts,  in  a  manner  so 
conclusive  that  the  judge  is  not  permitted  to  advise  them  as  to 
the  weight  of  the  evidence,  or  as  to  the  credibility  of  the  witness, 
or  even  to  intimate  to  them  his  opinion  upon  any  Cjuestion  of  fact.^ 
It  is  true  that  this  is  not  the  rule  in  the  Federal,  and  in  some 
of  the  State  courts  ;  but  it  is  the  rule  in  many  of  fhe  State  juris- 
dictions that  the  slightest  intimation  from  the  bench,  of  an 
opinion  as  to  how  the  jury  should  find  an  issue  of  fact,  or  as  to 
the  weight  or  probative  force  of  any  evidence  which  has  been 
delivered  to  them,  is  sufficient  to  authorize  a  court  of  appeal  to 
reverse  the  judgment.^  The  twelve  common  men,  thus  selected 
haphazard  from  the  community  to  sit  as  jurors  in  the  particu- 
lar trial,  who  have  perhaps  never  sat  in  a  trial  before,  who  find 
themselves  discharging  an  office  new  and  strange  to  them,  sur- 
rounded by  strange  scenes,  like  children  attending  for  the  first 
time  at  school,  —  are  by  that  law  conclusively  presumed  to  be 
able  to  discriminate  properly  upon  all  questions  of  fact,  to  detect 
the  true  from  the  false  in  the  testimony  delivered  by  the  Avitnesses, 
to  weigh  the  evidence  impartially,  —  and  all  this  without  any  aid 
or  assistance  from  the  bench,  beyond  instructing  them  in  certain 
general  rules  which  they  are  told  they  may  or  must  apply  in 
determining  the  weight  to  be  attached  to  the  various  elements  of 
the  evidence. 

But  unfortunately  many  of  these  rules  which  the  judf^e  is 
authorized,  and  even  required  on  request  of  one  of  the  parties, 
to  give  to  the  jury  to  aid  them  in  weighing  the  evidence,  are  not 
rules  of  common  sense,  but  are  rules  which  have  been  filtered 
down  to  us  from  the  impure  fountains  of  the  scholastic  jurispru- 
dence of  the  middle  ages.     They  come  to  us  in  the  form  of  what 

I  Post,  §§  1037,  2287,  et  seq.  2  p^^gt,  §j<  2420.  2421. 


Vlli  DEDICATION. 

are  called  presinnptioi^s:  and  so  it  is  that  in  many  case?  the  jury 
are  instructed  by  the  court  that  f/te  law  presumes,  or  draws  a  cer- 
tain conclusion  of  fact  from  a  certain  other  fact,  although,  in  tho 
case  before  the  jury,  viewed  in  conjunction  with  its  surroundinijs, 
an  ordinary  man,  proceeding  in   accordance  with  his  experience 
and  conscience,  would  not   draw  such  conclusion,  but  the  re- 
verse.    Among  those  so-called  presumptions  is  the  prcsuini)tion 
that  a  man  intends  the  natural  and  ordinary  consequences  of  his 
own  acts.^     This  is  sometimes  in  accordance  with  experience  and 
and  sometimes  contrary  to  experience.    A  man  does  many  things 
unguardedly    and  accidentally,  without  intending  or  expecting 
the   natural  and  ordinary  consequences  of  what  he  does.     An- 
other of    these  so-called  presumptions  arises   generally  in  trials 
for  murder,  and  it  is  that  malice  is  presumed  from  the  unjustiti- 
able  use  of  a  deadly  weapon.'     The  use  of  the  word  unjustifiable, 
and  the  language  in  which  the  courts  expound  this  presumption 
to  juries,''  deprive  it  of  much  of  its  objectionable  meaning;   but 
even  as    thus  expounded,   it  is  sometimes  in    accordance    with 
experience  and  sometimes   contrary  to  it.     A  man  very  often 
uses  a  deadly  weapon  in  lethal  combat  when  he  is  not  justified  in 
using  it,  and  yet  when  the  jirinciples  of  tho  common  law  do  not 
impute  malice  to  him.     He  often  uses  it  in  that  heat  of   passion 
which  the  common  law  to    some  extent  indulges,  out  of   respect 
to  tho  infirmities  of  human  nature.     This  our  law  concedes;  and 
it  would  therefore  seom  that   all  the  circumstances  surrounding 
an  act  imputed  as  a  crime  ouirht  to  be  submitted  lo  the  jury  for 
their    free    and    conscientious   verdict  as    to  what   the  accused 
intended,  without    throwing  an  artificial   presumi^tion  into  the 
scale  against  him.     Another  of  these  so-called  j)resumptions  is 
that  which  ascribes  guilt  of  the  crime  of  larceny  to  the  recent, 

>  Post,  §  2528.  *  Post,  §  2531.  '  Post,  §  2682. 


DEDICATION.  IX 

unexplained  possession  of  stolen  goods. ^  Suppose  that  a  thief 
Averc  to  secrete  an  article  of  stolen  goods  in  your  house,  that 
it  should  be  found  there  soon  after  the  fact  of  the  larceny, 
and  that  you  should  not  deign  to  offer,  or  should  not  have 
the  power  of  offering,  an  explanation  as  to  how  it  came  there,  — 
the  fact  of  its  beino;  found  there  without  vour  offeringr  an  ade- 
quate  explanation^  would,  under  the  operation  of  this  infamous 
principle,  require  a  jury  to  convict  you  of  larceny,  to  brand  you 
with  infamy,  and  to  send  you  to  the  penitentiary  to  undergo  a 
term  of  penal  servitude. ^  Such  a  consequence  might  not  result 
in  the  case  of  a  man  of  standing  in  the  community,  who  could 
throw  his  good  character  into  the  scale  as  evidence  in  his  behalf;  ^ 
but  without  doubt,  under  its  operation,  many  obscure  persons  of 
indifferent  character  have  been  convicted  and  sent  to  the  peni- 
tentiary, in  my  country,  for  larcenies  which  they  never  com- 
mitted. 

These  artificial  presumptions  have  no  other  effect  than  to  dis- 
turb and  obscure  the  judgment  of  juries  in  dealing  with  the  evi- 
dence. Instead  of  dealing  with  the  evidence  in  the  natural  way, 
according  to  their  conscience  and  experience,  they  are  impressed 
by  this  lesson,  which  they  receive  for  the  first  time  from  the 
bench,  that  they  arc  to  decide,  not  according  to  common 
sense,  but  according  to  legal  sense,  —  according  to  some  artificial 
standard  of  sense  which  they  but  dimly  understand,  —  and  they 
are  thus  driven  in  many  cases  to  decide  wrongly.  The  view 
which,  in  the  following  pages,  I  have  endeavored  to  inculcate  is, 
that  the  jury  must  be  freely  allowed  to  determine  the  truth ;  that 
they  must, not  be  fettered  by  artificial  rules  and  presumptions; 
that  the  whole  brood  of  so-called  presumptions  of  law,  except 
those  conclusive  presumptions  which  rest  upon  grounds  of  -pub- 

^  Post,  §  2534,  et  seq.  ■  Post,  §  2oi\.  3  Post,  §  2538. 


X  DEDICATION. 

lit-  i)olicy,  and  Kaving  to  their  cliu'  ollicc  tlioso  which  the  hiw 
rai.<es  in  order  to  lix  the  l)urden  of  proof, —  is  an  heretical  hrood 
which  should  he  extir])ated  from  the  hiw ;  and  that  the  grounds 
on  whieh  tlie  hiw  raises  those  presumptions  should  he  regarded 
as  mere  evidentiary  cireumstanccs,  to  be  considered  hy  the  jury 
for  what  they  are  worth. 

If  ]  understand  you  ariirhl,  you  are  strugglin<r  against  similar 
artificial  rules  of  evidence,  inherited  from  the  Ciennan  scholastic 
jurisprudence.  In  this  struggle  in  bciialf  of  truth  and  against 
blind  and  unreasoning  technicality  in  the  administration  of 
justice,  it  is  my  happy  fortune  to  be  able  to  join  hands  with 
you. 

You  thus  perceive  that  our  American  system  of  jury  trial  is  not 
a  homogeneous  system ;  that  while  we  attempt  to  invest  juries,  on 
the  one  hand,  with  the  extravagant  jjower  of  judging  of  the  law, 
and  with  the  conclusive  power  of  judging  of  the  facts,  we,  on  the 
other  hand,  hamper  their  intelligence  and  conscience  with  arti- 
ficial rules  which  interfere  with  their  free  judgment  as  to  the 
facts.  But  we  have  done  more  tiian  this.  Our  American 
judges  have  shown  themselves  cai)able  of  attenuatcnl  retincments, 
which  would  move  laughter  in  the  law  courts  of  London.  It  is 
a  canon  of  Anglo-American  criminal  law  that  every  person  is  pre- 
sumed to  be  innocent  until  he  is  proved  to  be  guilty  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt.  The  phrase  "reasonable  doubt  ''  is  one  of  the 
simplest  and  mo.-t  ea-ily  understood  phia<c^  in  our  language. 
And  yet  our  American  judges,  in  their  chaigcs  to  juries,  have 
endeavored  to  improve  it  l)y  a  variety  of  deHnitions:  paraphras- 
ing it,  lengthening  it,  shortening  it,  and  twisting  it  around  from 
side  to  side,  and  some  of  them  landing  in  the  c-onclusioit  that 
common  sense  is  not  a  guide  on  this  question !  '     I  have  found  a 

'  Pi'ft,  LMSl'. 


DEDICATION.  XI 

great  number  of  decisions  upon  the  meaning  of  these  two  sim- 
ple words,  and  have  been  obliged  to  devote  many  pages  to  a 
discussion  of  the  hair-drawn  conceptions  which  those  decisions 
present.^ 

But  the  manner  in  which  we  treat  our  juries  in  other  respects 
is  not  at  all  in  keeping  with  the  extravagant  powers  with  which 
we  have  clothed  them.  In  capital  cases,  and  in  many  jurisdic- 
tions in  other  cases  of  felony,  we  lock  them  up  in  charge  of  a 
sworn  officer,  from  the  time  when  the  evidence  is  submitted  to 
them  for  their  decision  until  they  return  into  court  with  their 
verdict.^  These  twelve  men  who,  in  one  juridical  conception, 
occupy  almost  the  position  of  demigods,  are  now  made  pris- 
oners, though  worshiped,  like  the  Abuna  of  Abyssinia. 
Moreover,  while  we  invest  them  with  the  exclusive  power  of 
judging  of  the  facts  without  the  aid  of  the  judge,  we  withhold 
from  them  in  many  instances  those  sources  of  natural  evidence 
which  every  right-minded  and  conscientious  man  would  seek  in 
endeavoring  to  solve  the  disputed  questions  of  fact  which  are 
committed  to  him.  If  a  crime  has  taken  place,  and  they  inad- 
vertently and  without  the  consent  of  the  court,  visit  the  scene 
wdiere  it  took  place,  their  verdict  is  avoided  and  a  new  trial  must 
be  had.-"^  Nay,  even  a  law  book,*  a  county  map,^  or  a  deposition  ^ 
which  has  been  read  in  the  case,  if  accidental!}'  found  in  the  jury 
room,  will,  in  some  of  the  narrow  conceptions  of  American 
jurisprudence,  have  the  dreadful  effect  of  vitiating  their  verdict; 
and  extravagances  or  improprieties  in  argument,  which  Avould  be 
thought  trivial  if  the  argument  were  addressed  to  the  judge, 
will  require  the  granting  of  a  new  trial  if  addressed  to  the  jury." 

1  Fost,  §  24G1,  et  seq.  «  Post,  §  2588. 

2  Post,  §  2548,  et  seq.  6  Post,  §  2578. 

3  Post,  §§  1)04,  2C05.  '  Post,  §  9C3,  et  seq. 
*  Post,  §  258G. 


Xll  PEDICATIOX. 

In  the  (liscussious  of  the  following  pagos,  whcrcviT  I  have 
encountered  these  conceptions,  I  have  written  of  llu-ni  with  that 
freedom  which  the  .sul)ject  seenicl  to  doscrvc.  If  I  have  not 
always  Avrilton  wisely  concerning  them,  I  have  at  least  written 
faithfully.  If  what  I  have  thus  written  could  deserve  of  my 
countrymen  some  small  share  of  the  approbation  which  similar 
efforts  on  your  part  have  deserved  at  the  hands  of  your  King 
and  Country,  I  should  be  more  than  satisHetl. 

I  am,  with  the  highest  respect,  your  obliged  friend  and  servant, 

Seymour  I).  Thompson. 


PREFACE. 


This  is  an  attempt  to  sketch  the  leading  outlines  of  a  trial  be- 
fore a  jury,  or  before  a  judge  sitting  as  a  jur}^  from  the  im- 
paneling of  the  jury  to  the  signing  and  filing  of  the  bill  of  ex- 
ceptions. The  effort  of  the  author  has  been  to  aid  the  judge  and 
practitioner  in  the  work  of  getting  a  jnry,  of  examining  the 
witnesses,  of  presenting  the  documentary  evidence,  of  arguing 
the  case  to  the  jury,  of  instructing  the  jury,  and  of  attending  to 
the  custody  and  conduct  of  the  jury,  to  the  delivery  and  reception 
of  the  verdict,  to  the  motion  for  ncAv  trial,  and  to  the  bill  of 
exceptions.  By  far  the  most  important  subjects  which  have 
undergone  discussion,  and  those  which  have  received  the  greatest 
attention  and  the  greatest  space,  relate  to  the  examination  of 
witnesses  and  to  the  instruction  of  juries. 

At  the  threshold  of  the  latter  subject  lies  the  constantly  re- 
curring question  of  the  relative  province  of  the  court  and  jury. 
This  subject  has  been  discussed  in  thirty-three  chapters,  in  con- 
nection with  a  great  variety  of  questions.  In  these  chapters  the 
author  has  not  only  considered  what  questions  are  questions  of  law 
for  the  decision  of  the  judge  and  what  are  questions  of  fact  for 
the  jury,  but  he  has  also  discussed  the  manner  in  which  ques- 
tions for  the  decision  of  the  jury  should  be  submitted  to  them ; 
giving  a  great  variety  of  precedents  of  instructions  on  questions 
'ikely  to  arise  in  trials  civil  and  criminal,  all  of  which  have 
met  with  distinct    approval    in    appellate  courts    on    appeal  or 

(xiii) 


XIV  PREFACE. 

crriM-.  Those  :irc  followed  hy  six  chapters,  trcatiiii;  of  the 
general  rules  which  ohtaiii  with  reference  to  the  manner  ol"  in- 
structing juries.  So  nuuh  space  was  thus  consumed  in  what  the 
author  judged  to  be  a  sutiicient  treatment  of  the  subject  of  tho 
relative  province  of  court  and  jury  and  of  the  manner  of  in- 
structing juries,  that  it  became  necessary,  in  order  to  avoid  ex- 
panding the  work  into  three  volumes,  to  limit  the  treatment  of 
the  tinal  title,  bills  of  exceptions,  to  a  mere  outline  sketch. 

Some  years  ago  the  author  iHil)lishcd  a  small  work  on  the 
theory  of  instructing  juries  ^  wliich  nut  with  considerable 
favor  at  the  hands  of  the  bench  and  bar.  That  work  beinff 
now  out  of  )irint,  so  much  of  it  as  was  deemed  ap[)ropriate 
to  this  discussion  has  been  preserved  in  the  present  work. 
In  order  to  a  complete  discussion  of  the  leading  incidents  of  a 
trial,  it  also  l)ccanie  necessary  to  traverse  some  ground  which 
was  gone  over  in  a  })revious  work  written  in  ]iart  by  the  present 
writer.  ^  Under  an  arrangement  with  the  pul)lisher  of  that  work 
and  with  Mr.  Merriam,  my  learned  co-author,  some  matter 
•was  drawn  from  it  for  use  in  these  pages.  The  matter  drawn 
from  these  two  works  has  been,  as  far  as  practicable,  condensed, 
restated,  re-arranged,  and  brought  down  to  the  present  time  by 
the  citation  of  more  recent  decisions. 

In  several  States  there  exists  a  system  nnder  which  the  judge 
submits  special  interrogatories  to  juries,  requiring  of  them  special 
findings  of  fact  on  particular  matters  raised  by  the  evidence.  It 
was  thought  best  to  have  a  chapter  detailing  the  jn-actice  under 
such  statutes  written  ])y  a  prartitioiicr  lisiiig  in  a  state  where  such 
a  system  is  in  vogue.  The  chapter  on  the  special  findings  of 
juries  was  accordiuLrly  contributed  by  "\V.  W.   Thornton,  Es(i., 

'  "Chnruiim  tlie.Iurv."     St.  Louis:  2  Thompson  riiid  Morriam  on  Juries. 

Puhlislnd  by  tho  Central  Law  Journal      The  same  publisiicr. 
Company. 


PREFACE.  XV 

of  Crawforclsville,  Indiana.  The  three  chapters  on  motions  for 
new  trial  were  contributed  by  Eugene  McQuillin,  Esq.,  of  the 
St.  Louis  bar.  Both  of  these  writers  are  favorably  known  to 
the  profession  as  contributors  to  the  law  magazines.  In  their  con- 
tributions to  the  present  wr)rk  they  have  examined  and  cited  a 
great  many  statutes  and  judicial  decisions;  and  it  is  confidently 
believed  that  their  contributions  will  prove  useful  and  satisfac- 
tory to  the  profession. 

It  is  customary  for  law  writers  to  apologize  to  the  profession 
for  the  character  of  their  work.  If  an  author  is  conscientious 
and  capable,  no  one  can  know  and  feel  the  deficiencies  of  his 
work  as  much  as  he  knows  and  feels  them  himself.  There  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  perfection  in  a  legal  treatise,  and  this  is  es- 
pecially true  of  American  law  books.  Our  law  is  the  result  of 
the  enactments  of  nearly  fifty  independent  legislatures  and  of 
the  judgments  of  more  than  fifty  independent  judicial  tribunals. 
Our  reported  case- made  law  is  being  turned  out  at  the  rate  of  more 
than  thirteen  thousand  cases  a  year.  On  nearly  every  subject 
which  can  engage  the  pen  of  a  legal  writer  he  is  oppressed  with 
a  multitude  of  decisions ;  and  it  is  within  the  bounds  of  literal 
truth  to  say  that  there  is  scarcely  any  subject  in  the  American 
law  on  which  contradictory  decisions  cannot  be  found.  An 
author  who  attempts  to  struggle  with  this  superabundant  mass 
of  material  will  finally  conclude  that  all  effort  must  stop  some- 
where. Even  while  he  is  writing,  new  decisions  on  the  sub- 
jects which  engage  his  attention  are  multiplving  in  such  numbers 
that  he  cannot  hope  to  retrace  his  steps  and  gather  them  all  up 
and  fit  them  into  their  proper  places.  At  last  he  finds  that  the 
edifice  which  his  ambition  has  attempted  to  build,  thouijh  to  the 
inexperienced  eye  it  may  seem  symmetrical  in  its  general  outline, 
and  even  stately  in  its  appearance,  must  forever  remain  unfin- 
ished. 


XV  i  PREFACE. 

The  subject  of  this  work  is  :i  very  wide  one.  Nearly  every  title 
iu  the  law  can  be  touched  upon  or  hinted  at  in  a  work  on  trials. 
If  one  who  is  expert  in  the  art  of  war  were  to  write  a  technical  his- 
tory, iu  fullness  of  detail,  of  a  ])attU'  by  land,  of  a  naval  l)attle,  and 
of  a  siesre,  it  would  be  found  that  he  had  written  a  history  of  the 
art  of  war.  The  gathered  skill  and  preparation  of  years,  in  the 
enirinccr,  the  ordnance,  the  quartermaster,  the  commissary  de- 
partments, and  in  the  more  general  work  of  discipline  and  drill, — 
are  often  expended  in  a  single  battle,  nay,  even  in  a  single  charge. 
It  is  so  in  the  practice  of  the  law.  The  gathered  learning  and  ex- 
perience of  a  i)rofessional  life  time  may  be  called  into  requisition 
in  a  single  forensic  struggle.  The  hi.story  of  a  trial,  if  written  by 
a  competent  hand  and  in  fullness  of  detail,  must  therefore  be  iu 
a  large  measure  a  history  or  description  of  the  law  itself. 

If  the  author  of  the  present  work  has  not  treated  of  evcrvthing 
which  might  be  supposed  to  be  germane  to  so  great  a  subject, 
his  apology  is  that  he  could  not  treat  of  everything  in  two  vol- 
umes. An  examination  of  the  index,  containing  1214  titles,  will 
convey  a  hint  to  the  reader  of  the  number  and  variety  of 
subjects  which  have  been  drawn  into  the  di.scussion.  It  has  been 
found  necessarv  to  examine  ncarlv  sixteen  thousand  adjudged 
cases,'  ami  to  state,  condense  and  arrange  the  doctrine  of  these 
adjudications  iu  a  text  embracing  214(!  pages,  divided  into  82  chap- 
tors  and  2 139  sections. ^  So  that,  what  was  originally  intended 
for  treatment  in  a  single  volume  has,  notwithstanding  efforts  at 
condensation  in  some  of  its  parts,  been  expanded  into  two  vol- 
umes of  much  moif  than  tlu"  usual  size.  And  yi.-t  some  subjects, 
which    might    jn'operly  be  imjudcd    in  a    work  on  tiial-,   iiave 


1  Tlie  exact  uumbor  is  \r>/.3i.  end  of  each  chapter  .niul  article,  thus 

2  111  iiuinl>eriu<;  the  sections  inter-      reducing  the  real,  from  tlie  apparent 
vals    liave  been  purposely  left  at  the      nuiulter    ,  (2828),  to  that  above  stated.. 


PREFACE,  XVil 

scarcely  been  touched  upon  ut  all.  Very  little  attempt  has  been 
made  to  deal  with  minor  or  collateral  matters.  But  such  as  this 
work  is,  it  is  given  to  the  profession  in  the  confident  belief  that 
it  will  in  some  measure  lighten  their  labors. 

THE  AUTHOR. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


TITLE.    I. 


IMPANELING  THE  JURY, 

Chapter      I.  Of  Juries  and  the  Qualification  of  Jurors. 

Chapter  II.  Of  Selecting,  Drawing  and  Summoning  the 
Panel ;  and  herein  of  Special  Venires  and 
Talesmen.  ...... 

Chapter  III.  Of  Challen2;es. 


Paqes. 
l-U 


12-27 
28-79 


Article      I.  Challenges  to  the  Array.     ....  28-36 

Article    II.  Peremptory  Challenges.      ....  36-46 

Article   III.  Challenges  for  General  Disqualification.         .  46-50 
Article   IV,  Challenges  for  Disqualification  in  respect  of 

the  Particular  Case.        ....  61-79 

Subdivision  l.  Challenges  Grounded  on  Consanguinity,  Affinity, 

Interest,  Affection.            ....  .'51-«0 

Subdivision  2.  Challenges  Grounded  on  Bias,  Prejudice,  Scruple, 

Opinion.       ......  61-79 


Chapter  IV.  Of  the  Details  of  Practice  in  Challenging  and 


Impaneling. 


80-130 


Article      I.  Challenging,  Impaneling,  Swearing.      .  .  80-109 

Article    II.  Objections  ami  the  Waiver  and  Review  of  the 

same 109-130 


(xix) 


XX  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

TITLE     II. 

CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  THE  TRIAL. 

Pages. 

Chapteu  v.  Of  the  Preservation  of  Order  and  the  Pun- 
ishment of  Coutempts 131-160 

CuAPTKu      VI.  Of  Compulsory  Process  against  Witnesses.     .  lGl-190 

CuAPTKK    VII.  Enforcing  the  Stipuhitions  and  Admissions 

of  Counsel 101-201 

Chapteu  VIII.   Of  other  Subjects  of  Judicial  Conduct  and 

Control 202-211 

TITLE     IIL 

OPENING  THE    CASE   AND    PRESENTING  THE   EVIDENCE. 
Chapteu  IX.  Of  the  Right  to  Open  and  Close.    .         .       213-244. 

Aktici.e       I.  In  Oriliuary  Actious.  ....  213-225 

Article     II.  In  Special  Proceedlujrs     ....  225-239 

Article   III.  Certain  Special  Rules.      ....  240-244 

Chapteu  X.  Of  the  Opening  Statement..  .  .        245-251 

Chapter  XI.  Excluding   Witnesses    from    the    Court 

Room 252-259 

Chapter        XII.  Of  the  Privilege  of  AVitnesscs.         .         .       2G0-287 
Chaiter      XIH.  Prcliminar}'   Questions  of   Fact   for   the 

Judge 288-305 

Chapter       XIV.  Control  of  the  Court  over  the  Examina- 
tion of  Witnesses 300-326 

Chapter        XV.   Incidents  of  the  Direct  Examination.       .       327-351 
Chapter       X\1.  C)f  the  Use  hy  Witnesses  of  Memoranda 

to  refresh  Recollection.  .       352-366 


TABLE    OF   CONTEXTS. 


XXI 


Chapter     XVII.  Of  the  Cross-Examination. 


Pages. 
367-422 


Article      I.  In  General.  ..... 

Article     II.  American  Rule  of  Strict  Cross-Examination 
Article   III.  Questions  Affecting  Credibility. 

Chapter   XVIII.  Of  the  Re-Examination. 

Chapter      XIX.  Of  Indirect  Impeachment. 

Chapter        XX.  Of  Direct  Impeachment. 

Chapter      XXI.  Corroborating  and  Sustaining  Witnesses 

Chapter    XXII.  Of  tlie  Examination  of  Experts. 

Article      I.  Direct  Examination. 
Article     II.  Cross-Examination. 

Chapter   XXIII.  Of  the  Accused  as  Witnesses. 
Chapter    XXIV.  Of  the  Unsworn   Statement  of   the  Ac 

cused.         ..... 

Chapter     XXV.  Objections  to  Evidence  and  Exceptions 

to  the  Rulings  thereon. 

Article      I.  Tenders  of  Evidence. 

Article     II.  Objections  to  Evidence  and  Exceptions. 

Article   III.  Striking  out  and  withdra wins:. 


3G7-382 
SS2-395 
395-422 

423-428 
429-446 
447-460 
401-493 
494-522 

494-516 
517-522 

523-536 
537-546 

547-587 

547-557 

557-580 
580-587 


Chapter    XXVI.   Of  the  Production  and  Use  of  Books  and 
Papers.       ...... 

Article       I.  Discovery  and    Inspection.  .  .  , 

Subdivision  1.  Under  the  Federal  Statute. 
Subdivision  2.  Under  the  Statute  of  New  York. 


588-643 


58S-60G 


5fS-595 
595-006 


xVrticle     II.   Notice  to  Produce  and  Secondary  Evidence.  60G-G43 

Subdivision  l.  Notice  to  Produce.  ....  606-619 

Subdivision  2.  Secondary  Evidence  of  Lost  Instruments.         .  6rJ-623 


Article  III.   Use  of  Books  and  Papers  at  tlie  Trial. 


623-643 


XXU  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

Pages 
Chapter  XXVII.  Of  Natural  Evidence.     ...       644-701 

Article       I.   luspcctiou  of  rcrsons  aud  Thiugs  iu  Court: 

Trial  by  luspectiou.        ....  644-6G4 

Article     II.    View  of  Thius:?!  out  of  Court.      .  .  .  ClU-701 


TITLE     IV. 

ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL. 

Chaptku  XXVIII.   Of  the  Right  of  Argument  Generally.    .  702-719 
Chapti:u     XXIX.   Of  the  Right  to   Argue   Questious    of 

Law  to  the  Jury 720-733 

Chapter       XXX.  Abuses  of  the  Right  of  Argument.         .  734-798 


TITLE    Y. 

PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY:  QUESTIONS  OF  LAW  AND 

FACT. 

Chapter         XXXI.  General  Rules 800-815 

Article      I.  Questions  of  Law  for  the  Court.         .          .  800-808 

Article     II.  Quostious  of  Fact  for  tlie  Jury.     .          .  809-816 

Chapter       XXXII.  Existence  and  Interpretation  of  Laws, 

Ordinances,  Rules  and  Customs.     .  81G-823 
Chapter     XXXIII.  Interpretation  of  Private  "Writings.     .  824-850 
Chapter      XXXIV.  Verbal  Speech :  Oral  Contracts.         .  851-857 
Chapter        XXXV.  Existence  and  Terms  of  Express  Con- 
tracts   858-887 

Chapter      XXXVI.   Implied  Promises 888-004 

Chapter    XXXVII.  S.-iles  of  Personal  Property.                   .  905-923 

Airmir       I.  What  Questions  for  the  rouit  :im(1  whnt  fur 

the  Jury          .         .            ...  905-919 

Article     II.  Precedfuts  of  Instructions  to  .lurio.     .           .  91Ii-923 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 


XXIU 


Chapter  XXXVIII.  Warranties  in  Sales  of  Chattels. 
Chapter     XXXIX.  Negrotiable  Instruments.     . 


Chapter 
Chapter 


Chapter 


XL.  Payment:  Accord  and  Satisfaction. 
XLI.  Statute  of  Limitations:    Bankruptcy 
New  Promise  and  Part  Payment  to 
Revive  Barred  Debt. 
XLII.  Insurance.  .... 


Article      I.  Fire  Insurance. 

Article    II.  Life  and  Accident  Insurance. 

Article  III.  Marine  Insurance. 


Chapter 
Chapter 
Chapter 
Chapter 
Chapter 

Chapter 
Chapter 

Chapter 
Chapter 

Chapter 


XLIII. 

XLIV. 

XLV. 

XLVI. 

XLVII. 

XLVIII. 
XLIX. 

L. 
LI. 

LII. 


Intent.       ..... 

Autliority :  Agency  :  Ratification. 
Alteration  of  Written  Instruments. 
Possession.         .... 

Waiver:  Abandonment:  Laches:  Ac 

quiescence.     .... 
Identit}':    Resemblance.     . 
Place:  Locality:  Boundarj^:  Identity 

of  Land.         .... 

Notice.       ..... 

Description :    Qualitj' :    Characteriza 

tion.       .         .         ,         ,         . 
Reasonableness. 


Article      I.  Reasonable  Time. 
Article    IL  Reasonable  Things. 


Pages. 
924-932 
933-954 
955-963 


96-4-969 
970-999 

970-989 
989-992 
993-999 

1000-1016 
1017-1028 
1029-1038 
1039-1056 

1057-1070 
1071-1075 

1076-1091 
1092-1105 

1106-1115 
1116-1159 

1116-1145 
1U5-1159 


Chapter 


LIII.  Malicious  Prosecution. 


1160-1203 


Article      I.  "What  Questions  for  the  Judge  and  what  for 

the  Jury ilGO-1184 

Article    II    Jury  how  Instructed  in  such  Actions.  .       1184-1203 


XXIV 


TABLE    OF    CONTEXTS. 


CHAPTEU 


LIV.  Neirliffence. 


Article 


I.  What  Questions  for  tlio  Court  aiul  what  for 
the  jury.  .... 

Article    II.  Precetlciits  of  Iiistruciious. 
Subdivision   1.  General  Principles. 
Sdbpivision   2.  Injuries  to  Children. 
SrBDivisioN   3.  Master  and  .Serv.int. 
SCBDivisiON  4.  Municipal  Corporations. 
Subdivision  5.  Carriers  of  Passengers. 
Subdivision   6.  Travelers  at  Railway  Crossings. 
Subdivision   7.  Trespasses  on  Hallway  Tracks.    . 
Subdivision  8.  Railway  Injuries  to  Domestic  .\nlmals. 
Subdivision  9.  Railway  Fires. 
Subdivision  10.  Mi^scellaneous. 


Pages. 
120-1-1316 


1204-1252 
12oJ-131<; 

1252-1257 
1257-12C0 
12C0-1263 
1263-1281 
1281-1299 
129'.1-13M 
1304-1306 
130fi-1309 
1310-1311 
1312-1316 


Chapter  LV.  Carriers  of  Goods  and  other  Bailees.    .   1317-1374 

Article      I.  Burden  of  Proof  and  doctrine  of  Prima  Facie 
Case  iu  Actions  against  Carriers  and  other 


Bailees.  ..... 

Article    II.  Precedents   of  Instructions  iu  such  Actions 

Chapter  LVI.  Nuisance  and  Obstruction. 

Chapter  LVII.  Fraud.        ..... 

Article      I.  In  General.        ..... 

Article    II.  Misrepresentation  and  Deceit. 

Subdivision  1.  "What  Questions  for  Court  and  what  for  Jury 
Subdivision  2.  Precedents  of  Instructions. 


Article  III.  Fraudulent  Conveyances.     . 

Chapter         LVIII.   Lilicl  and  Slander. 

Article      I.  What  Questions  for  the  Court  and  what  for 
the  Jury.         ...... 

Article     II.  Precedents  of  Instructions  in  such  .Vet Jons. 


1317-1368 
1368-1374 

1375-1105 
1406-1451 

U06-1413 
1414-U35 

1414-1419 
1420-1435 

1435-U51 
1452-1471 


Chapter 


LIX.   Measure  of  Daniapfcs. 


Article       I.  What  Questions  for  tlie  Court  and  wiiat  for 
the  .Iiirv. 


1452-14C8 
1468-1471 

1472-1503 

147L'-1477 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 

Pages. 

Article    II.  Precedents  of  lDStmctiou.s.          .          .           .  1477-1503 

SCBDivisiON  1.  In  Actions  for  Injuries  to  Person  and  Character.  1477-1492 

Subdivision  2.  In  Actions  for  injuries  to  Property  Kiglits.          .  ]-i9-2-150$ 

Chapter  LX.  Of  the  Power  of  Juries  as  Judges  of 

the  Law 1504-1531 

Chaptek           LXI.  Matters  of  Crime.       ....  1532-1577 

Article      I.  "What  Questions  for  the  Court  and  what  for 

the  Jury 1532-15C1 

Article      II.  Precedeuts  of  Instructions  as  to  Particular 

Crimes.           ......  1501-1577 

Chapter          LXII.  Of  Nonsuits.      .....  1578-1594 

Chapter        LXIII.  Directiusf  the  Verdict 1595-1627 


TITLE    YI. 

CH. URGING  THE  JURY. 

Chapter         LXIV.  Invading  the  Province  of  the  Jury.     .   1628-1659 
Chapter  LXV.  Elements  of  the  Charge.     .         .         .   16C0-1691 

Chapter         LXVI.  Of  Requests  for  Instructions.     .         .   1692-1724 
Chapter       LXVII.  Of  Written  Instructions.     .         .         .    1725-1736 

Chapter    LXVIII.  Of  the  Appellate   Review  of  Insti'uc- 

tions.      ......    1737-1758 

Chapter        LXIX.  Cautionary  Instructions  as  to  Weigh- 
ing  Evidence 1759-1900 

Article      I.  Cautions  as  to  Probative  Value  of  Various 

Kinds  of  Evidence.  ....  1759-1812 

Article    II.  As  to  the  Presumption  of  Innocence  and  tlie 

Doctrine  of  Keasouable  Doubt.  .  .  1S13-1854 

Article  III.  As  to  Circumstantial  Evidence.     .  .  .  1854-1877 

Article  IV.  As  to  Certain  Other  Presumptions.         .  .  1877-1960 


XXVI 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


TITLE     VII. 

CUSTODY   AND   CONDUCT  OF   THE  JURY. 

Pages. 

Chapteu  LXX.   Of  the  Conduct  of  the  Jury.       .          .   10O1-19.3-4 

Cii.vrxER  LXXl.  Of  Books  and  Papers  in  the  Jury  Hoom.  rj35-1902 
CiiAPTEK      LXXII.  Of  Improper  Methods  of  Arriving  at 

the  Verdict 19G3-1972 

Chapter     LXXIII.   Of  the  Misconduct  of  Juries  as  Ground 

of  New  Trial  .  ,         .         .    1973-1995 

TITLE     YIII. 

THE   VERDICT. 

Chapter  LXXIV.  Delivery  and  Reception  of  the  Verdict.  1996-2000 

Chapter  LXXV.  Of  General  Verdicts.          .                   .  2001-2005 

Chapter     LXXVI.  Of  Special  Verdicts 200G-2019 

Chapter  LXXVII.  Of  Special  Findings  of  Juries.  .         .  2020-204-1 

TITLE     IX. 

I^IOTIONS    FOR   NEW   TRIAL. 

Chapter  LXXVIII.  Of  the  Motion  in  General.  .  .  204.5-2069 
Chapter  LXXIX.  Time  of  Making  the  Motion.  .  .  2070-2US0 
Chapter       LXXX.  Manner  of  Making  the  Motion.  .  2081-2102 


TITLE    X. 


BILLS  OF  EXCEPTIONS. 

CnAPTEK     LXXXI.  Form  and  Sul)stance  of  the  Bil!  .   2103-2124 

Chaptkr  LXXXII.  Taking    P^xccptions:     Signing,    Filing 

and  Amendinor  the  Bill.  .         .  2125-2146 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


Abbey  v.  Dewey,  25  Pa.  .St.  413.    p.  1417. 
Abbev  V.  Kingsland,  10  Ala.  355;  «.  c.  44  Am. 

Doc.  491.    \>.  310. 
Abbott  V.  Abbott,  51  Me.  575.    pp.  1077,  10S5. 
Abbott  V.  Pearsou,  130  Mass.  191.    p.  63S. 
Abbott  V.  People,  86  N.  Y.  460.    p.  78. 
Abbott  V.  Semple,  25  111.  107.    p.  1060. 
Abel  r.  Illinois  &c.  K.  Co.,  59  111.  131.    p.  1229. 
Abel  V.  Kennedy,  3  G.  Greene  (la.),  47.    pp. 

19.55.  1994. 
Aberi^TOinbie  v.  Bradford,  16  Ala.  550.    p.  1439. 
Abraliams  r.  Swauu,  18  W.  \a.  274.    p.  597. 
Abruin.s  v.  Carlisle,  18  .•^.  C.  24.5.    p.  2073. 
Abrains   v.  People,  6  Hua  (X.  Y.),  491.    p. 

1.560. 
Achey  v.  State,  64  Ind.  SG.    pp.  114, 1074. 
Aclitenhageu  v.  Waterlown,  18  Wis.  331.    pp. 

1225,  1233. 
Aclvurly  v.  Parkinson,  3  Maule  &  S.  425.    p. 

16(1. 
Ackbartr.  Lausiug,  48  How.  Pr.  374.    p.  1210. 
Acklen  v.  Hickman,  63  Ala.  494.    p.  365. 
Ackley  v.  People,  9  Barb.  (X.  Y'.)  509.    p.  761. 
Acti>n  r.  Dooley.  16Mo.  Apn.44I.     p.  2003. 
Acton  V.  Kuowles,  14  Ohio  St.  18.    p.  1140. 
Adal  V.  Zangs,  41  Iowa,  541.    p.  922. 
Adam's  Case,  3  Keb.  51.    p.  177. 
Adams  v.  Ashby,  2  Bibb  (Kv.),  237.    pp.  2093, 

20'jt;. 
Adams  V.  Betz,  1  Watts  (Pa.), 425.    p.  827. 
Adams  v.  Carlisle,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  146.    p. 

1224. 
Adams  v.  Cosby,  48  Ind.  153.    p.  2038. 
Adams  V.  Davis,  16  Ala.  748.     ]>.  862. 
Adams  v.  Farnsworth,  15  Grav  (Mass.),  423. 

p.  .560. 
Adams  V.  Frye,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  105.    p.  1031. 
Adams  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  70  X.  Y.  166. 

)>.  4.56. 
Ailains  V.  Helm,  .55  Mo.  463.    pp.  9.56, 1712. 
AilamS  t\  Holmes,  48  Iml.  299.    p.  2029. 
Adams  v.  Kellv,  Kv.  A  M.  157.    p.  360. 
Adams  f.l\'enne<lv, 90 Ind.  318.    pp.  161f>,  1647. 
Adams  v.  McFarlane,  65  Me.  143.     p.  1633. 
Adani'^  v.  Xantucket,  11  Allen  (Mass.),  203. 

pp.  1747,  17.56. 
Adams  v.  People,  47  111.  .376;  s.  c.  Horr.  & 

Tlioin)).  Ca-.  Self-Def.  208.     pp.  1520,  1906. 
Adams  r.  Itoberts,  2  How.  (U.   S.)4S6.    pp. 

1638.  16S6. 
Adams  v.  Kobinson,  Go  Ala.  587.    ]).  337. 
Adams  r.  Kobinson,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  462.    p. 

19 !. 
Adams  r.  Rockwell,  16  Weud.  (X.  Y'.)  285.    p. 

1080. 
Adams  v.  State,  6  Ark.  497.    p.  109. 
Adams  v.  State,  11  .Vrk.  4(j6.    p.  103. 
Adams  v.  State,  22  (in.  417.    )>.  17.53. 
Adams  v.  State,  65  Ind.  565.    pp.  1574, 1694. 
Adams  r.  State,  25  Oil.  St.  534.    p.  1741. 
Adams  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  412.    pp.  1555,  1557, 

1.5.5S,  1741,  1851. 
Adams  v.  Stringer,  78  Ind.  180.    p.  1006. 


Adams  r.  Wheeler,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  199.    p. 

1443. 
Adams  v.  Woods,  S  Cal.  315.    p.  2057. 
Adams  v.  Younir,  44  Oh.  Si.  80;  s.  c.  4  X.East. 

Hep.  599.    p.  i'311. 
Adams,  Ex  parte,  25  Miss.  883.    pp.  132, 152, 

1.53. 
Adams'  Express  Co.  v.  Haynes,  42  111.  89.    p. 

1364. 
Adams'  Express  Co.  v.  King,  3  111.  App.  316. 

p.  1364. 
Adams'  Express  Co.  v.  Stettaners,  61  111.  134. 


pp.  1321,1345,  136.5. 
Ldr  "'  ' 


Adcock  v.  Marsh,  8  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  360.    pp. 

14.59,  1462. 
Addem.-  i:  Saver,  89  111.  432.    p.  1735. 
Addingtou  v.  Etheridge,  12  Gratt.  (Va.)  436. 

J).  827. 
Addison  v.  State,  48  Ala.  478.    pp.  321,  372, 

1775. 
Ad  kins  r.  Hill.  Cowp.  283.    p.  839. 
Adkius  r.  Williams,  23  Ga.  222.    p.  1905. 
Adler  r.  Couwav  County,  42  Ark.  488.    pp. 

2129,  2137. 
.^tna  Life  Ins.  Co.  r.  France,  94  U.  S.  561. 

11.  991. 
Agau  V.  McManus,  11  Johns.  (X.  Y'.)  ISO.    p. 

948. 
Agate  I'.  Morrison,  84  X.  Y.  672.    p.  307.   • 
Asrawau  Bk.  v.  Strever,  18  X.  Y.  502;  s.  c.  16 

Barb.  (X.  Y.)  82.    p.  939. 
A  hern  r.  Bovce,  19  ^lo.  App.  552.    p.  893. 
Aheru  r.  Collins,  39  iMo.  146.    pp.  1195,1198, 

1481. 
Ablraau  v.  Mever,  19  Xeb.  66.    pp.  1411, 1437. 
Ahreus  v.  State  I'.ank,  3  S.  C.  401.    p.  1608. 
Aiken  v.  Mendenhall.  25  Cal.  213.    p.  392. 
Aikln  V.    State,  35  Ala.    399.    pp.  17,  18, 19, 

1670. 
Ainsworth  r.  Huchins,  52  Vt.  5.54.    p.  326. 
Aiscough,  Ex  parte,  2  P.  AVms.  591.    pp.  646, 

647. 
Aitkin  V.  Young,  12 Pa.  St.  15.    pp.  1698, 1702. 
Akers  r.  Demond,  103  Mass.  322.    p.  .569. 
Alabama  &c.   11.  Co.  v.  Kidd,  35  Ala.  209.    p. 

1374. 
Albany  Citv  Bank  v.  Schcrmerhorn,  9  Paige 

(X.  Y.),372.    p.  145. 
Albee  v.  Havden.  25  Minn.  267.    p.  192. 
Albert   r.    lileeker   Street    K.    Co.,  2   Daly 

(X.  Y.),3S'.>.    p.  1210. 
Albertson   r.  Chicago  &c.   R.    Co.,  48  Iowa, 

292.    p.  1257. 
Albiu  r.  Lord,  39  X.  H.  196.    pp.  1007,  1047. 
Albrecht  v.  Walker,  73  111.  69.    p.  63. 
Aloock  V.  Uoval  Exchange  Ins.  Co.,  13  Ad.  & 

El.  (N.  S.)  292.     p.  otij. 
Alcott    i:    Hostou   vVc.    Mill   Co.,    11    Cash. 
(Mass.)  91.     p.  19.54. 

Alden  V.  Minneaiiolis,  24  Minn.  255.    p.  1265. 
Alden  v.   Pearsou,  3  Grav  (Mass.),  342.    pp. 

1321,  1345. 
Alder  c.  SaviUc,  5  Taunt.  454.    p.  19SS. 


(xxvii) 


XX\  111 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


AUlorman  r.  French,  1  Pick.  (^lass.)  1.    pp. 

14»;f..  I4i;7. 
Al'K'nuan  v.  Pooplo,  4  :Mlrli.  414.    p.  2S3. 
Aldruh  r.  IHinh.-un.  Hi  111.  404.    p.  ir:.'.. 
Aldrich  f.  llowanl,  7  U.  1.  t-7;  s.  c.  a  U.  1.246. 

I.,  i.m. 
Af.lritlire  v.  Mardoff.  32  To\-.  lOy    p.  2070. 
Ak'scn  r.  Aleson,  2  \.vi\  ")7i;.     pp.  <UG,  (i4S. 
Ali'xamlor  r.    iriircLliuld.   7  Man.  &  G.  lOCl. 

pp.  !t;!7.  IM4,W.'>. 
AlfxandiT  V.  DiMiavoaux,  5;^  Cal.  6G.l;s.  c. 

.V,t("al.  47i>.    p.  1'.'-. 
Ali'xaiKlor  I".    bunn.Slml.    122.    pp.  110,  120, 

145.  I'.Hrt-,.  I'.MS. 
Ali-\an.ii"r  v.  Diiiton.  .'i^  X.  II.  282.    p.  029. 
Al''xaiulcr  r.  Giuihucr,  14  U.  I.  13.    pp.  1719, 

1738. 
Alf'xaiuler  v.  Ganlncr,  1  Ding.  N.  Cas.  671. 

p.  111(1. 
AK'xander  v.  llarrlsnn,  3S  ^lo.  2.1?.    p.  l.TOi^. 
AloxandiT   r.   .Jnmosou,  o  liiuu.   (I'a.)   2.J3. 

pp.  I'.m,  1937. 1".i42. 
Ak'xan.ior  r.  Knox,  7  Ala.  rm.    p.  2fio. 
Alexander  r.  Mount  Stcrlinj?,  71  111.  366.    p. 

1247. 
Alexander  r.  Oshkosh,  T,  Wis.  277.    p.  S^t. 
Alexander  r.  tJoulhc\ ,  .i  IJaru.  &  Aid.  247.    p. 

11. i6. 
Alexander  v.  State.  21  Tex.  App.  407.    p.  1762. 
Alexander  r.  Thomas,  25  lud.  268.    pp.1477, 

1'.164. 
Alexandria  v.  Hrockett,  1  Craach  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)505.     p.  35. 
Alford  i:  Mneeut.  ."iS  Mich.  .555.    p.  .521. 
Alfred  1-.  Fitzjame*.  3  Esp.  3.    pp.  8&«,  S95. 
Alfreil  i:  SUHi\  37  Miss.  2'.ii;.     pp.  73,  76. 
Alfred  r.  Slate,  3  Swan  fTenn.),  .381.    )).  70. 
Aljrer  v.  M.Trilt,  16  la.  121.     pp.  2074,2073,2100. 
Alper  v.  Thompson,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  453.    pp. 

1943,  194*;. 
Alpheri  t:  State,  25  Miss.  584.    pp.  1856, 1860, 

1863, 1864. 
Alpier  V.  Steamer  Maria,  14  Cal.  167.    p.  60. 
Alimmbra  &c.  Water  C^o.  r.  Richardson,  73 

Cal.  f.98;  s.  c.  14  Tac.  Uep.  379.    p.  2U38. 
Allan  r.  Wanamakcr,  31  N.  .1.  L.  370.     p.  1671. 
Allard  v.  Smith,  2  .Mete.  (Kv.)  •2!)7.    p.  19(;3. 
Allen  V.  Alilrlch,  29  X.  H.  63.    pp.  1915,  1923, 

2021. 
Allen  V.  Allen.  ,38  Wis.  202.    p.  1010. 
Allen   r.  Ulunl,  2   Woodlj.  &  M.  (U.S.)  121. 

pp.  1917,  1976,  1977. 
Allen  V.  IMdin.-.  6  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  333.     p.  40.3. 
Allen  f.  IJond,  112  Ind.  323;  14  X.  E.  Rep.  492. 

p.  2093. 
Allen  1'.  Charleston  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  5 

Grav  (Mass.),  384.    p.  974. 
Alleni'.  fowan,  28  I'.arh.  (X.  Y.)  99.    p.  1441. 
Allen  f.  Davidson,  16  Ind.  416.     p.  20.30. 
Allen  V.  Ferguson,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.)  13.    pp. 

»«,  2010. 
Allen  f.  Gali)ln,  9  Rarb.  (N.  Y.)  246.    p.  830. 
Allen  V.  Gillum,  16  Ind.  234.     p.  2101. 
Allen  V.  Grav,  II  Conn.  93.    p.  160. 
Allen  v.Grlpper,  2Cromii.  &  J.218.    p.  1020. 
Allen  r.  Ilancock,  16  VI.  iiO.     p.  1224. 
Allen  V.  FIUI,  16  Cal.  Hi.     p.  2086. 
Allen  V.  St.ite,  73  Ala.  23.     p.  2129. 
Allen  r.  Slate,  31  (Ja.  2iU.     p.  4. 
Allen  V.  Slate,  61  (;a.  W,.     p.  1974. 
Allen  V.  Stale,  .34  In>l.  461.    |ip.  5,  G. 
Allen  V.  Slat--,  1  T.x.  App.  314.     p.  1.360. 
Allen  r.  stall-,  16  Tex.  App.  237.    p.  KW. 
Allen  V.  Wlllard,37  I'a.  St.  374.     p.  1225. 
All-m  r.  Woodson.  .30  Ga.  .33      p.  16.3:!. 
Allen,  Matter  of,  13  Ulatchf.  (U.  S.j  271.    p. 

171. 
Allender  r.  Chicago  &c.  U.  Co.,  37  Iowa,  264. 

pp.  1207,  1294. 


Allcwny  r.  Rowdcn,  2  Show.  422.    pp.  96. 112. 
Allis  r.  Leonard.  38  N.  Y.  288.     i>p.  1643,  1740. 
.Mlison  t'.  Com.,  \0  I'a.  .St.  17.     pp.  73,  78. 
Allison  V.  Stale,  43  HI.  37.     p.  r-'lii. 
Allvn    V.  l!<)>t(tn  .Se.  11.  Co.,  103  Mass.  77. 

i>p.  1224,  12  .0. 
Al-op  r.  .Matrlll,  4  Dav  ^Conn.V  42.    p.  1750. 
Alspaugh  V.  15en  Franklin,  The,  51  lud.  271. 

p.  2108. 
Alston  I'.  Manning.  Chase's  Dec.  460.    p.  14. 
Altman  v.  Wlueier.  18  .Mich.  240.     p.  1741. 
Al\  ord  V.  Collins,  20  Pick.  418.     p.  362. 
Ambrose  V.  McDonald,  53  Cnl.  28.    pp.  191, 

192. 
Amlis  r.  mil,  13  Mo.  App.  .385.    pp.  lill.  1112. 
American  r.  IMmperi.  73  III.  228.     p.  1646. 
American  Co.  f.   Bradford,  27  Cal.  360.    p. 

2030. 
American  Contract  Corp.  r.  Cross,  S  Bush 

(Kv.),472.     p.  11,34. 
American  i:.\.  Co.  v.  Parsons,  44  111,312.    p. 

p;7o. 
American  Exchange  Hank  c.  Inloes,  7  Md. 

380.     in).  827.  1410,  1436. 
American  Express  Co.  r.  Milk,  73  111.  226, 

p.  1370. 
Amerlc:'.n    Express  Co.  r.  Sands,  .35  Pa.  St. 

1411.     pp.  I:;.'.',  j:U3,  1314,  1313,  1361. 
American  lus.  Co.  v.  liutler,  70  Ind.   1.    p. 

1647. 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter.  1  Pet.  511,    p.  14. 
American  lus.  Co.  f.  Mahone,  56  -Miss.  180. 

pp.  11.8.3. 
Amerii-au  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith,  19  Mo.  App.  627. 

p.  971. 
American  Life  Ins.  Co.  r.  Uoscnagle,  77  Pa. 

St.  .307.     p.  i;j2. 
American  Traus.  Co.  r.  Moore,  5  Mich.  3G8. 

p.  1669. 
Ames  r.  (iilmore,  .39  Mo.  .349.    p.  1447, 
Amcv  J".  Long.  9  East,  473;  a.  c.  6  Esp.  116;  1 

Camp.  16.    )ip.  180,273,278,331. 
Amherst  r.  Hadley,  1  Pick.  (.Mass.)  38.    pp. 

110,  11'.),  122. 
Amick  V.  U'llarc,  C  Blackf,  (Ind.)  258.    p. 

P!70. 
Amidon  r.  (iaff.  24  Ind.  128.     p.  2036. 
.Vmis  r.  Steamlii)atLoulsa,9Mo.  629.    p.lUl. 
Ammarat   i:  Turnpike,  13  Serg.  &  R.  '>Pa.) 

210.     p.  1087. 
Ammermaii  c.  Crosbv,  26Tnd.  4.31.    p.  1197. 
Ammerman  r.  Teeter.  4'.t  111.  402.     p.  1768. 
Amory  r.  Fellows,  3  Mass.  21.».     pp.  328.  3.^1. 
Amos  r.  Hughes,  1  Mood.  &  U.  464.    jip.  218, 

219.  224. 
Amsbv  i:  Dlckhonse.  4  Cal.  102.    p.  1982. 
Anarchists.  Case  of  the.  122  III.  1  ;  s.  c.  12  N. 

East.  Hep.  865.     pp.  63.  124.  130. 
Ancell  i:  t^ape  Glr.irdeau.  48  .Mo.  SO.     p.  20,3,5. 
Anchor  Line  v.  Daier,  68  lU.  369.    pp.  1332, 

13i;-l. 
Anderson  v.  Bock,  13  How.  (U.  S.)  323.    p. 

10-17. 
Anderson  c.  Chicago  Marine  &  Fire  Inx.  Co., 

21  111.602.     p.  lOi).'). 
An<ler«on  v.  Dunn,  6  Wheat.  (U.S.)  204.    p. 

P.O. 

Andi-rson  r.  Green,  46Ga.361.    pp.  1084,  1998. 
Ander-on  v.  Il.all.  ^7  N.  C.  381.     p.  1H3. 
An.ler^ion  v.  Hubble,  93  Ind.  570.     pp.  2036, 

2043. 
AndiTson  c.  Keller.  67  Ga.  .38.    pp.  1171.  1176. 
Ander-on  f.  Kln>;heloe,  30  .Mo.  520.     pp.  1642, 

An<ler8on  v.  McPlkc,  86  Mo.    293.    pp.  794, 

1116. 

Anderson  t'.  Morris.  12  Wis.  6S9.    p.  1060. 
An. lemon  v.  Uoiuc  .^tc.  U.  Co.,  .34  X.  Y.  334. 
p.  577. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


XXIX 


Anderson  v.  Royal  Exchange  Assurance  Co., 

7  Kust,  :iS.    p.  9V)5. 
Audersou  v.  Kussell,  34  Mich.  109.    pp.  462, 

775. 
Anderson  v.  State,  5  Ark.  4U.    ji)>.  20,  HO. 
Anderson  r.  State,  14  Ga.  70'J.    i'i>.  Oil,  G7,  113, 

123,  124,  1634. 
Anderson  v.  ."^tate,  42  Ga.  9.    p.  I.'n9. 
Anderson  v.  State,  63  Ga.  675.    j).  68. 
Anderson  v.  Stale,  28  Ind.  22.    pp.  1902,  1905. 
Ander.son  v.  Stale,  104  Ind.  467.    pp.  1564, 1776, 

1S02,  1803,  ]'.M)(). 
Anderson  r.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  447.    p.  16S0. 
Anderson  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  312.    \).  1777. 
Anderson  v.  Walter,  34  Mich.  113.    p.  376. 
Anderson  v.  Wasatch  &c.  K.  Co.,  2  Utah,  51S. 

p.  81. 
Anderson  v.  AVhite,  27  111.  57.    p.  201. 
Anderson  liridge  Co.  v.  Applegate,  13  Ind. 

39;^.    p.  607. 
Andrea  v.  Thatcher,  24  Wis.  471.    p.  1734. 
Andreas  v.  Ketcliani,  77  111.  377.    p.  1647. 
Andrews  v.  Andrews,  2  Johns.   Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

109 ;  s.  c.  Coleman's  Cases  (X.  Y.),  119.    p. 

170. 
Andrews  v.  Durant,  IS  X.  Y.  496.    p.  1494. 
Andrews  v.  Fo.ster,  17  \t.  556.     pp.  888.  894. 
Andrews  v.  Fr\  e,  104  Mass.  234.     pp.  287,  527. 
Andrews  v.  Graves,  1  Dillon  C.  C.  (U.   S.) 

108.     pp.  807,  1756. 
Andrews  v.  ICeteham,  77  111.  377.    p.  1652. 
Andrews  v.  Marshall,  26  Tex.  212.    p.  1672. 
Andrews  v.  Mile.<,  15  Week.  Dig.  290.    ]>.  1559. 
Andrews  v.  I'arker,  48  Tex.  94.    p.  1641. 
Andrews  v.  I'ond,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.)  77.    pp.  SS4, 

886,  950. 
Andrews  r.  Runyau,  65  Cal.  629.   pp.  1640, 1691. 
Andrews  v.  Siiiitliwiek,  20  Tex.  111.    p.  1668. 
Andrews  v.  Tinsley,  I'J  Ga.  303.    )>.  1942. 
Andrews  v.  Towiiseud,  14  Week.  Ditr.    (X. 

Y.)243.     p.  598. 
Andrews,  In  re,  5  C.  B.  226.    pp.  132,  152. 
Angell  V.  Rosenburg,  12  Mich.  241.    p.  336. 
Angelo  V.  I'eople,  96  111.  209.    p.  789. 
Annelly  v.  Sansure,   12  S.  C.  48S.    p.  192. 
Annesley  v.  Aug.'esea,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  1348. 

p.  467. 
Annis  v.  Pcoi)lc,  13  Mich.  511.    pp.  540,  542, 

543. 
Anon.,  Anderson,  272.    p.  112. 
Anon. ,.35  Ala.  226.    ]<]<.  646.  649,  650. 
Anon.,  1  Browne  (Penn.),  121.    p.  32. 
Anon.,  1  Browne  (Penn.),  200.    p.  20. 
Anon.,  2  Dall.  (U.  S.^  382.    p.  25. 
Anon.,  Dean  &  .S,  33.3.    pp.  646,  643. 
Anon.,  Dver,  177.  h.  pi.  (34).    p.  3). 
Anon.,  1  bver,  37.  b.  pi.  45.    p.  1931. 
Anon.,  2  Dver,  176.  a.  pi.  (27).    p.  59. 
Anon.,  3  Dver,  300.  b.  (35).    p.  29. 
Anon.,  1  Hill  (S.  C.),251.    p.  259. 
Anon.,  2  Hill  (X.  Y.),375.    p.  2080. 
Anon.,  1  Jotins.  (X.  Y.)  314.    p.  7. 
Anon.,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  196.    p.  19. 
Anon.,  I  Salk.  152.     p)).  97,  101,  102. 
Anon.,  2  Freem.  (Miss.)  107.    p.  918. 
Anon.  (2  cases),  2  Salk.  66.5.    pp.  667,  1330. 
Anon.  r.  Anon.,  23  Beav.  273 :  s.  c.  22  Beav. 

481.     p.  319. 
Ansehicks  v.  State, 6  Tex.  App.  524.    pp.  1564. 

1990,  1995. 
Aii.sou  r.  Ballev,  Bnl.  X.  P.  276.    p.94S. 
An.sou  V.  Dwight,  18  la.  241.     p.  62. 
Anson  v.  Ins.  Co.,  23  la.  ■>^4.     p.  977. 
Anthony  c.  J5arlliluw,  69  .Mo.  186.    yy.  1708. 
Anthony  r.  Gilbert,  4  Blackf.  (lud.)  349.    p. 

1479.  * 

Anthony  r.  Smith,  4  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  ,503.    pp. 

516,  I'..(i6. 
Anthony  v.  Stinson,  4  Kan.  221.    p.  1780. 


Antisdel  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  26  Wis.  145. 

p.  1308. 
Apperson   r.  Logwood,  12  Heisk.    (Tenn.) 

262.    p .  70. 
Applebv    r.    Firemen's  Fund   Ins.    Co.,   45 

Barb.  (X.  Y.)  4.54.     p.  98.i. 
Applegate  r.  Bovles,  10  Ind.  4^5.     p.  108. 
Apideton  r.   Xantucket,  121   Mass.  161.    p. 

1379. 
Apthorp  f.  Comstock,  2  Paige  (X.  Y.),482. 

p.  351. 


Arbuckle  v.  Biedcrnian,  94  Ind.  169.    p.  2090. 
Lrchiljal  " 
p.  1473. 


Archil>ald   v.  Davis,  4  Jones  L.  (X. 


SS 


133. 


Archibald  v.  Thomas,  3  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  289.    p. 

886. 
Arding  v.  Flower,  8  Term  R.  534.    p.  188. 
Argent  v.  Darrell,  2  Salk.  648.    p.  60. 
Argotsinger  v.  Vines,  85  X.  Y.  308.    p.  1044. 
Armistead's   Case,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  657.    pp. 

67,  69,  70,  74,  75. 
Armleder  v.  Lieberman,  33  Oh.  St.  77.    pp. 

1906,  1912,  1913. 
Armour?;.  Ilahu,  4  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  (U.  S.)  433. 

p.  1239. 
Armsbv  v.  People,  2  Thomp.  cS:  C.  (X.  Y.)  157. 

p.  47. 
Arud  V.  Amiinff,  53  Md.  192.    p.  26i. 
Arnold  v.  Arnold,  20  Iowa,  273.    ;>.  106. 
Arnold  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  300:  s.  c.  44  Am.  Rep. 

480.    p.  13;j. 
Arnold  v.  Xorton,  25  Conn.  92.    p.  1096. 
Arnold  v.  Skaggs,  35  Cal.  684.    pn.  2095,  2098. 
Arnold  v.  State,  23  Ind.  170.    p.  1827. 
Arnold  v.  A\'altz,  53  la.  706;  s.  c.  36  Am.  Rep. 

248.     p.  817. 
Arrington  v.  Cherrv,  10  Ga.  434.    pp.  1748, 

1760. 
Arrowsmith  v.  Durell,  14  La.  Ann.  849.    p. 

1042. 
Arthur  i:  Commissioners,  67  Ga.  221.    p.  237. 
Arthur  v.  Wallace,  8  Kan.  270.    ]>p.  1451,  2041. 
Artope  V.  Goodall,  53  Ga.  318.    pp.  477, 481. 
Artz  V.  Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.,  34  la.  153.    p.  1300. 
Artz  t-.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  284.    p. 

575. 
Arundel!  v.  Phillips,  10  Yes.  145.    p.  1442. 
Asay  r.  Hay,  89  Pa.  St.  77.    pp.  310,  312. 
Asbury  Ins.  Co.  r.  ^^■arren,  66  Me.  523.    p.  64. 
Ash  r.  Marlow,  20  Oh.  119.    pp.  1163, 1170, 1181, 

1186. 
Ash  V.  Savage,  5  X.  H.  545.    p.  1442. 
Ash  V.  Stale,  56  Ga.  583.    p.  123. 
Ashbury  r.  Flesher,  II  Mo.  6iii.    p.  899. 
Ashby  r.  Bales,  15  Mees.  &  W.  589.    pp.  214, 

222  224. 
Ashing  V.  Miles,  16  Ind.  320.    pp.  215,  224. 
Ashlock  r.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  14.    p.  178S. 
Ashtou  1-.  Thompson,  28  Minn.  330.    p.  2070. 
Ashworthr.   Ins.  Co..  112  :\Iass.  422.    p.  981. 
Ashwcrth  v.  Kittridge,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  193. 

pp.  783,  784. 
Ash  worth  r.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  182.    p.  1695. 
Askew  c.  Reynolds,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  (X.C.)  367. 

ji.  1441. 
Aspiuwall  V.  Knox  Countr,  IS  Ind.  372.    p. 
2111.  ■  ^ 

Astley  V.  Cn.pron,  S9  Ind.  167.    p.  2043. 
Astley  I-.  Youugc,  2  Burr.  S07.    p.  795. 
Atchcson  V.  Kveritt,  Cowp.  389.    p.  3,30. 
Atcliisou  V.  McCuUoch,  5  Watts   (Pa.).  13. 

p.  1063. 

Atchison  v.  Morris,  11  Fed.  Rep.  5S2.    p.  183. 

Atchison  v.  State,  77  Teuu.   (13  Lea)  275.    p. 

1631.  ^ 

Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Blackshirc.  10  Kan. 

477.     pp.  373,  374,  375,  376,  397,  1502, 
Atciiison  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cone,  37  Kan.  567;  s.  c. 
15  I'ac.  Rep.  499.    p.  2032. 


XXX 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


AtchUon  itc.  II.  Co.  r.   Frauklin.  2:!  Knn.  7."). 

p.  f*-.'. 
Atchl-jon  &c.  R.  Co.  f.   Pluukctt,  25  Kan.  is^. 

J.,  io.n. 
Atfhison  Ac.  K.  Co.  r.  St.infoni,  12  Kan.  351. 

p|).  5«s,  1221,  1311. 
Atchison  \c.  R.  Co.  r.  Thul,  20  Kan.  4t'^.    p. 

C&l. 
Atfliison  t^o.  Ti.  Co.  r.  Thul.  .T2  Kan.  25.') ;  «.  c. 

40  .\in.  Hip.  4!>1.     p.  1779. 
Atchl.-on  iVc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  19  Kan.  335. 

p.  2110. 
Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Washburn,  5  Neb.  1 17. 

p.  134S. 
AtluTioii  r.  John.eon,  2  X.  H.  31.    p.  1044. 
Athcrioii  f.  Sugar  Creek  &c.  Co.,  67  lud.  334. 

p.  1621. 
At  kins  r.  Barnwell,  2  East,  505.    pp.  897,  SOS, 

eoit. 

Atkins  V.  Nicholson,  31  Mo.  4.SS.    p.  1670. 

Atkins  r.  State,  60  Ala.  45.    p.  69. 

Atkins  V.  State,  16  Ark.  66S.    pp.  65,  350,  1944, 

105;:. 
Atkinson  r.  Allen.  12  Vt.  G19.    p.  f.O. 
Atkinson  r.  Lester,  2  111.  4U7.    p.  It^iO. 
Atlanta  r.  Perdue,  53  Ga.  <iOS.    )>.  J240. 
Atlanlic&c.  U.Co.  i'.  Avres,53Ga.  12.    p.  1229. 
Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  "Dunn,  10  Oil.  St.  162. 

I).  14ti6. 
Atlas  Miniup:  Co.  v.  Johnson,  23  Mich.  36. 

pp.  40,  SI,  82. 
Atlec  r.  Shaw,  4  Ycates  (Pa.),  230.    p.  25. 
Atty.-Geu.  v.  Fadtion,  1  Price,  4U3.    p.  r,52. 
Atty.-Gen.  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  91.    i)p.  4U, 

416. 
Attv.-Gen.  r.  TTitchrock,  11  Jnr.  47S.    p.  390. 
Alt  V. -Gcii.  r.  Lo  Merchant,  2  T.  R.  203u.    p. 

612. 
Atty.-Gen.  v.  Parsons.  2 Mccs.  AW-  23.    p.  25. 
Attv.-Geu.  V.  Plate  Glass  Co.,  1  Austr.  30.    p. 

7S3. 
Atwater  v.  Schenck.  9  AVls.  160.    p.  1072. 
Atwell  V.  ^liller,  t!  Md.  11.    p.  013. 
Atwooil  V.  (  lark,  2  Me.  240.    p.  1122. 
AtwoocI  V.  (  Knnvall,  2S  Mich.  :«0.    p.  1133. 
Atwood  V.  Dearborn,  1  ^VUeu  (Mass.;,  4S3.    p. 

471. 
Atwood  V.  Emery,  1  Com.  Bench  (N.  s.)  110. 

p.  1122. 
Atwood  V.  Reliance  Tr.insportatlon  Co.,  9 

Watts  (Pa.),l>7.     p.  1346. 
Atwood  r.  Scott,  tX)  Ma?s.  177.    p.  16S. 
Atwood  c.  Small,  1  ."Man.  .t   Kvl.  246.    p.  1584. 
Atwood  I-.  Weenis,  W  U.  S.  183.     p.  101. 
Auidfiirainp  v.  Sinitli,  00  Iml.  328.    p.  570. 
Aii^ur  Steel  &c.  Co.  v.  Whlttler,  117  Mass. 

451.    p.  01 18. 
Aul<l  V.  Hepburn,  1  Crauch  C.  C.  122.    p.  215, 

222. 
Auir'savlnps  Hank  r.  Anil. 80  Mo.  199.    p.  .551. 
Ault  v.  Sloan,  4  la.  .10^.    p.  169S. 
Auitman  v.  Theirer.  31  Iowa,  272.    p.  931. 
Aurora  v.  Bltucr,  100  Ind.  306.     pp.  1208,  1271, 

1272. 
Aurora  v.  Cobb,  21  Ind.  49-2.    pp.  215,  219,  220, 

222,385,451. 
Aurora  i-.  (.illott,  .'iO  111.  134.     p.  1207. 
Aurora  v.  Ililliiiiin, '.mi  HI  62.     ji.  310. 
Aurora  Br.nicli  K.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  13  111.  .5S5. 

|.I>.  1224,  1314. 
Aurora  Fire  Iiis.  Co.  r.  Johnson,  40  Ind.  315. 

pp.  210S,  2123. 
Austen  v.  Baker,  12  Mod   2.10.    p.  3020. 
Au-tin  r.  Au-Iln.  45  W's.  .V23.   j).  713. 
Austin  r.  fox,  tio  «.a.  5.'>i.     p.  .57. 
Austin  f.  Great  Western  It.  Co.,  3  Best  &  S. 

327.    p.  120-i. 
Austin  V.  Holland,  09  X.  Y.  .571.     p.  1101. 
Ausiiu  r.  Keating,  21  Mo.  Ai>|i.  .30.     ]>.  *}3. 


Austin    f.  Manchester  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  Com. 

Bench,  4.54.     p.  I(i0.5. 
Austin  V.  Uol)ertson,  25  Minn.  431.     p.  554. 
Austin  V.  State,  42  Tex.  a55.    ji.  1010. 
Austin  V.  Talk,  Jo  Tex.  104.     pp.  1070.  20C5. 
Aveline,  E>tai.'  of.  53  Cal.  250.     p.  2056. 
Avereil  r.  Itradv.  JO  (ia.  523.     p.  1008. 
Avery  i-.  A<lam>.  t.'.i  Mo.  608.     ii.  611. 
Avery  i:  Chaioiian,  02  I"wa,  144.    p.  1429. 
Averv  v.  Cleinons,  18  Conn.  306.    \t.  10ti2. 
Avery  i-.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  199.    p.  2,53. 
Aves'on  v.  Kinnaird.6  East,  118.    p.  407. 
.\wde  f.  Dixon,  (i  Kxch.  htSO.     p.  1033. 
Axlell  i:  Warden.  7  Neb.  IsO.     pp.  -JldO.  JlOl. 
AvcrigK  f.  New  York  &c.  K.  Co.,  30  N.  J.  I.. 

400.     p.  1.58>-.. 
Aver  I'.  Austin,  C  Pick.  (Mass.)  225.    pp.  210, 

221. 
Avers  r.  Metcalf.  39  111.  307.    p.  81. 
xVvers  f.  State,  88  Ind.  27.5.    p.  1777. 
Avers  v.  State.  21  Tex.  .\pp.  SOil.  |ip.  1700, 1736. 
Avers  V,  Watson,  113  I'.  S.  .504.    p.  lost. 
Avlett  V.  Jewell,  2  W.  Bl.  1209.    pp.  1064, 10C6, 

1000. 
Aviiiar  V.  Beers,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  705;  s.  c.  17 

Am.  Dec.  538.     ji.  i«0. 
Avrault   r.  Chamberlain,  33  Barb.   (X.  Y.) 

"220.     p|).  214,  221 .  222,  247,  240,  .UT.  88,5. 
Ayrcs  v.  Barr,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  286.    p.  5. 
Ayres  v.  Hull,  5  Kans.  410.    p.  003. 

B. 

B.  V.  L.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  DIv.  639.    pii.  04fi.  050. 
Bnbcock  r.  Chicago  .%c.  R.  Co..  72  Iowa,  rj7; 

s.  c.  28  X.  W.  Kep.  044.    i>.  i:{12. 
Babcock  v.  Eckler,  24  X.  V.  623.    p.  410. 
Babcockr.  People,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  347.    pp. 

100,  528. 
Babson  v.  Rockport,  101  Mass.  93.    pp.  1209, 

1210. 
Bacchus  V.  State,  IS  Tex.  App.  15.    p.  lotu?, 
B.nckus  V.  (tallentlnc.  70  Ind.  367.    p.  2136. 
Backus  V.  Tavlor,  84  Ind.  503.     p.  Ilii3. 
Bacon  v.  Brown,  3  Bibb  (Ky.),  35.    p.  020. 
Bacon  v.  Charlton,  7  Cush".  (Mass.;  5>1.    p. 

407. 
Bacon  v.  Towne,  4  Cash.  (Mass.)  239.    pp. 

110:5,1190. 
Badgelt  i:  Jordan,  32  Ark.  1.54.    p.  2a'>5. 
Badjrley  v.  Decker,  44  Barb.  (X.  Y.;  577.    p. 

1401. 
Badlainr.  Tucker,  1  Pick. (Mass.)  389.    p.  1442. 
Baehler  i'.  Consolidated  Ranch  Co. ,31  Kan. 

502.     p.  20 K'. 
B.'igby  i:  Kniberson,  79  Mo.  139.    p.  2055. 
H!ig;r  r.  Jerouie,  7  Mich.  145.     j).  14:'.s. 
Hagiev  V.  Ludlow,  41  \  l.  42.'..     p.  1247. 
Baglev  r.  Peddle,  5  Saudi.  S.  C.  uN-  V.)  192. 

).:  871. 
Baierr.  l5crberlch,S5Mo.50;  a.c.  13  Mo.  App. 

.587.     pi>.  .500.  2018. 
Baikle  i'.  Cliandless,  3  Camp.  19.    jip.  1242, 

1214. 
Bailey  v.  I'.eck.  21  Kan.  402.    p.  1905. 
Bailey  c.  Bodenham.  10  Com.  15.  (N.  s.)  288; 

».  c.  .53  L.  .J.  (C.  P.)  ■2.'i2.     It.  044. 
B.illev  c.  Dean. 5  Barb.  (N.   Y.)297.    p.  1470. 
iSalley  r.  t;ibbs,  0  .Mo.  45.     p.  808. 
Bailey  v.  Hvde,  3  Ciiin.  40.'5.    p.  1407. 
Bailey  f.  Jov,  l:!2  .Mass.  3;50.     pp.  2,  3. 
Bailey  v.   Kimball,  26  X.  11.  351.    pp.   158G, 

1003. 
Bailey  v.  Laudlngham.  .52  la.  41.5.    p.  2093. 
I'.allcv  i:  Macaul.iv, .[  i).  B.  815.     p.  118. 
Hailey  c.  Pool,  13  4i-.m1.  I,.  iN.C.)  404.     p.  400. 
li.iilcv  V.  Porter.  14  M.-c>.  .v  W.  4«o.     p.  045. 
f.allev  V.  State,  0  Tex.  .\]i\}.  08.     pp.  4bl,  482. 
Builey  V.  Tavlor,  11  Conn.  531.    j).  IttJO. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXXI 


Bailey  V.  Trumbull,  31  Conn.  5S1.    pp.  55, 11,3. 
Baillie  i".  Inchiquiu,  1  Esp.  435.    p.  yti7. 
Bain  v.  Dorau,  54  Pa.  St.  1-24.    p.  1698. 
Bain  v.  State,  74  Ala.  38.    p.  lS3'.t. 
Bainbricige  v.  State,  30  Oh.  St.  '165.    p.  1910. 
Bainbridge  t:  Wilcox,  1  Baldw.  (U.  S.)  536. 

p.  1131. 
Baird  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  55  la.  121.    p. 

•->036. 
Baird  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  61  la.  359.    p. 

2(42. 
Baird  v.  Cochran,  4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  397.    p. 

265. 
Baird  v.  Dalv,  68  X.  Y.  547.    p.  385. 
Baird  v.  Mavor,  74  X.  Y.  3S2.    p.  2. 
Baird  v.  Plauque,  1  Fost&  Fin.   344.     p.  1098. 
Baird  v.  State,  38  Tex.  599.    p.  127. 
Balicmau  v.  Rose,  14  V/end.  (X.  Y.)  110.    pp. 

449, 450,  455,  456. 
Balier  v.  Hrinson.  9  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  201.    pp. 

l:-!22, 1345,  1347,  1348,  1350,  1352. 
Baljer  v.  Harris,  1  \Vinst.  (X.  C.)  277.    pp.  35, 

76, 125, 127. 
Baljer  v.  Joseph,  16  Cal.  173.     pp.  435,  460, 

2094,  2095, 
Baker  v.  Lvman,  53  Ga.  339.    pp.  215,  239. 
Baker  v.  Madison,  62  Wis.  137.     pp.  741,  748, 

769. 
Baker  v.  Pendergast.  32  Oh.  St.  494.    p.  2091. 
Baker  v.  Portland,  58  .Me.  r.)9.    pp.  1209, 1210. 
Baker  v.  Robiii-ou,  49  111.  299.    p.  1669. 
Baker  v.    Simmons,  29  Barb.    (X.   Y.)   198. 

p.  1917. 
Baker  v.  St.  Paul,  8  Minn.  491.    p.  1012. 
Baker  v.  State,  15  Ga.  498.    p.  67. 
Baker  r.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  52.5.    pp.  89,  93. 
Baker  v.  Slate,  4  Tex.  App.  223.    pp.  24, 118, 

1904. 
Baker  r.  State,  69  Wis.  32;  s.  c.  33  X.  W.  Rep. 

52.     pp.  247,  323, 433,  745,  749. 
Baker  r.  SteamerMilwaukee,  14Ia.214.  p.  32. 
Baker  v.  Swan,  32  Md.  355.    p.  1044. 
Baker  r.  Trotter,  73  Ala.  277.    p.  346. 
Baker  r.  Wilford.  Kirbv  (Conn.), 235.    p.  145. 
Baker  r.  Youni;,  44  111.  44.    pp.  1490,  1496. 
Balbo   r.  People,  19  IIuu  (X.  Y.),  424;  s.  c. 

80  X.  Y.  484.     pp.  63,  70,  77,  78. 
Balch  r.  Patten,  45  Me.  41.    p.  890. 
Balding  v.  State   (Tex.),  9  S.  W.  Rep.  579. 

pp.  75,  116. 
Baldnev  v.  Ritchie,  1  Stark.  333.    p.  615. 
Baldwin  v.  Blauchard.  15  Minn.  189.    p.  1741. 
Baldwin  v.  Bricker,  86  Ind.  221.    p.  781. 
Baldwin  v.  Gregg,  13  Mete.  (.Mass.)  253.    p. 

793. 
Baldwin  r.  Peet,22  Tex.  70S.    pp.  1436, 1437, 

1439.  1444. 
Baldwin's  Appeal,  44  Conn.  37.    p.  729. 
Bales  V.  State,  63  Ala.    30.    pp.  70,    75,  99, 

121. 
Ball  V.  Carley,  3  Ind.  577.    pp.  1945, 1954, 1955, 

1974. 
Ball  r.  Farley,  1  South.  Rep.  (Ala.)  253;  «.  c. 

81  Ala.  .288.     p.  345. 

Ball  r.  l{av,  L.  U.  8  Ch.  467.    pp.  1394, 1395. 
Ballance  v.  I'nderhill,  4  111.  453.    p.  330. 
Ballard  v.  Ballard,  5  Rich.  I..  495.    p.  354. 
Ballard  v.  Lockwood,  1  Daly    (X.  Y.)   153. 

p.  346. 
Ballard  r.  State,  43  Oh.  St.  431.    p.  15.50. 
Ballentine  v.  State,  48  Ark.  4.5.    p.  210;^. 
Ballinger  v.  Elliott,  72  .V.  C.  596.    p.  188. 
Ballstun  Spa  Bank  v.  Marine  Bank,  18  Wis. 

4ii0.    p.  151. 
Balsley  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  119  111.  68; 

s.  c.  8  X.  Ea.«t.  Kep.  859.    p.  1311. 
Baltimore  v.  Marriott.  9  .Md.  160.    p.  1225. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  i:  Barnum,  79  Ind.  261. 

p.  2113. 


Baltimore  Ac.   R.  Co.    v.  Boyd,  47  Md.  32. 

p.  1682. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Boyd,  10   Atl.  Rep. 

315;  s.  c.  7  Cent.  Rep.  435.    pp.  725,  736. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradv,  32  Md.  333. 

p.  1364. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Christie,  5  AV.  Va. 

325.     p.  106. 
Baltimore    &c.     R.   Co.    v.    Fifth    Baptist 

Church,  108  U.  S.  317;  s.  c.  2  Sup.  C.  Rep. 

719.    p.  1399. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  w.'Fryer,  30  Md.  47.    p. 

V2M. 
Baltimore  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Kemp,  61  Md.  74. 

p.  1485. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lansing,  53  Ind.  229. 

)>.  1501. 
Baltimore  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonnell,  43  Md. 

.534.     )>.  1231. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  i'.  McWhinnev,  36  Ind. 

436.     p]>.  215,  219. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R. 

Co.,  17  W.  Va.  812.    p.  56. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Polly,  14  Gratt.  (Va.) 

447.    i).673. 
Baltimore  &e.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowan,  104  Ind.  88. 

pp.  2009,2037,  2039. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Strickler,  51  Md.  47. 

p.  1262. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  10  Md. 

76.    p.  334. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheeling,  13  Gratt. 

(Va.;  40.    p.  150. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wightman,  29  Gratt. 

(Va.)431.    p.  1236. 
Baltimore  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.   Wilkinson,  30  Md. 

224.    p.  1229. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Woodruff,  4  Md.  242. 

p.  1646. 
Bamberger  i\  Griener,  18  Iowa,  477.    p.  931. 
Bamberger  r.  Terry,  10.>  U.  S.  40.    pp.  2,  3. 
Bancroft    v.  Boston    &c.  R.  Co.,  11   Allen 

(Ma.-^s.),  34;  s.  c.  97  Mass.  275.    p.  1235. 
Bancroft  r.  Grover,  23  Wis.  463.    p.  1072. 
Bancroft  c.  Sheehan,  21  Huu   (X.  Y.),  550. 

pp.  308,  310. 
Banghart    r.  Flummerfelt,    43    X^.  J.  L.  28. 

p.  201. 
Bangs  c.  Snow,  1  Mass.  181.    pp.  220,  221. 
Bank  i:  Barry.  20  Md.  287.    p.  819. 
Bank  r.  Bovkin,  9  Ala.  320.    p.  966. 
Bank  r.  Brown,  Dudley  (Ga.),  69.    p.  361. 
Bank  v.  Eitemiller,  14  Bradw.  UH-)  22.    p. 

1681. 
Bank  v.  Evans,  51  Mo.  335.    p.  1055. 
Bank  r.  Klingensmith,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  523. 

II.  1023. 
Banks  i:  Lades,  39  Mo.  406.    p.  2056. 
Bank  v.  Sawyer,  33  Ohio  St.  339.    p.  878. 
Bank  v.  Slemmons,  34  Oh.  St.  142.    p.  403, 
Bank  c.  Zorne,  14  S.  C.  444.    p.  364. 
Bank  of  Alabama  v.  McDade,  4  Port.  (Ala.) 

252.     p.  1443. 
Bank    of  (.'tiarleston  v.  Emerich,  2  Sandf. 

(X.  Y.)718.     p.  749. 
Bank  of  Columbia  r.  Lawrence,  1  Pet.  (U. 

S.)  578.     pp.  942,  'Mi. 
Bank    of  Commerce    v.   Chambers,  14   Mo. 

App.    152.     p.  940. 
Bank  of  Commerce   v.  Ginocchio,   27   Mo. 

App.  (!61.     p.  1222. 
Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Hoeber,  11  Mo.  App. 

475.     p.  1(X;8. 
Bank  of  Commerce,  Appeal  of,   44  Pa.  St, 

423.     pp.  952,  953. 
Bank  of  Genessee  v.  Patchin  Bank,  19  X.  Y. 

312.     p.   1022. 
Bank  of  Georgetown  v.  Gearv,  5  Pet.  {\J.  S 

99.    p.  192. 


XXXll 


TABLE    or    CASES. 


Bank  of  Kontuckv  r.  Ailams  Express  Co.,  93 

I'.  S.  174.     i)|>.  liMS,  lAW.  li'M. 
Bank  of  .Missouri  v.  Merchants'  Bank,  10  Mo. 

l.a.    i>.  .')<''('. 
Bank  of  Mouroo  r.  Culver,  2  lUll  (X.  Y.), 

33-2.    l>.  tvi:. 
Bank  of  N.  Y.  r.  Bauk  of  Ohio,  29  X.  Y.  619. 

!>.     10-.'3. 
Bank  of  Plttsbarsr  v.  Xeal,  22  How.  (U.    S.) 

Hi.    11.  '.i.'>n. 
Bank  of  Tleasanl  Hill  v.  WllL*.-l>Mo.  275.    p. 

5:.l. 
Bank  of  U.  S.  r.  Davis,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  5.W.    I).  1022. 
Bank  of  U. .»;.  v.  \Vagjreiier,9  Pet.  (U.S.)  378. 

1>1>.  8?t>.  S87. 
Bank  of  Ullca  r.  Illllard,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  419. 

Bank  of  Utica  r.  Mcr?eran,  3Barb.  Cli.  (X. 

Y.l  ."v2S.     1).«'7<;. 
Bankanl  r.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  .  Co.,  34  Md. 

Ilt7.    p.  728. 
Bank."  r.  .\nierican  Tract  Societv,  4  .Sandf. 

CU.  (X.  Y.)  438.     pp.  VM,  19.5. 
Banner  Tobacco  Co.  r.  Jeulsou,  4S  Micli.4.")'j. 

pp.2«31,  203S. 
Banning  v.  Banning,  12  Oh.  St.  167.    pp.  21(!, 

230. 
Bannister  r.  Alderman,  111  Mass.  261.    p.  32(i. 
Baradough  v.  Johnson,  8  Ad.  &  El.  9'.t.    i). 

1012. 
Bart)er  r.  Es«fcX.  27  Vt.  62.    p.  1225. 
Barber  r.  Fo.\.  2  .Saund.  136.    p.  889. 
Barber  r.  Murrlam,  11  .Vllcu  (Mass.),  322.    p. 

497. 
Barber  r.  State,  13  Fla.  675;  s.  c.  1  Greeu  Cr. 

L.  Hep.  723.     pp.  88,  540,  r>ll,  1805, 18IK). 
Barblshire  v.  Parker,  6  Ea.-t,  2.    i>.  940. 
Barbofs  Case,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  12.33.    p)).  68.  S3. 
Barljour  v.  .iVrcher,  3  Bibb  (K v.) ,  8.    pi).  1912, 

1913. 
Barbour  r.  FuUertou,  36  Pa.  St.  lO.i.    p.  938. 
P.iirbour  r.  Kee,  7  Mo.  App.  587.     p.  737. 
Barclav  r.  Bailev,  2  C'aiiii>.  .")27.    ]».  939. 
Bardeii  i\  Brisci'.o,  30  Mi<-h.  2.V).     |ip.  718,  719. 
Bare  r.  Hoffman,  79  Pa.  ^t.  71.    p.  697. 
Barlield   r.  Imp^on.l  ,Sin.  &  M.  (Miss.)   326. 

p.  108. 
Barker  r.  Bell,  46  Ala.  216.    p.  lOOS. 
Barker  c.  Bell,  49  Ala.  2>*1.     p.  2.'>. 
Barker  v.  Blount,  63(;a.  423.    pp.  370,573. 
Barker  r.  Hinc,  54  Ind.  .542.     p.  50. 
Barker  r.  People,  3  Cow.  (X.  V.)  6.''6,   p.  1578. 
Barker  r.  Perrv,  67  la.  146.    pp.  651,(^)3. 
Barker  r.  Savage,  45  X.  Y.  191.     p.  1305. 
Barker  !•.  Mate,  4.>i  Ind.  163.    j>.  1646. 
Barker  r.  Tn.v  &<■.  K.  Co.,  27  Vt.  780.      p.  892. 
Barkiev  r.   Tajip.  b7  Ind.  25.     ]>.  2015. 
B.'irkow  r.  .'ganger,  47  Wis.  500.  iip.  2034,  2041. 
Barksdiill    r.  Xew  Orleans  &c.  U.  Co.,  33  La. 

Ann.  180.     pp.  1233,  12.34. 
Barlow  r.    State,  2  ISlackf.  (Ind.)   114.    pp. 

low;,  1912,  1977,  1983.  I'.'M. 
Barlow  r.  Steel,  6.")  Mo.  611.    p.  193. 
T'.arnabv  r.  State,  KHi  Ind.  .539.     pp.  2042.  2143. 
Barnard  i-.  HackliaU'.  52  Wis.  593.    p    BS2. 
Barnes  r.  Barber,  «i  111.  401.     p.  2053. 
P.arnes  f    Brown,  69  X.  C.  439.     p.  956. 
Barnes  v.  Harris,  7  Cu.xli.  f.Ma'S.)576.   p.  272. 
P.arnes  r.  Hedbv,  2  Taunt.   184.    p.  8>9. 
Barnes  v.  Martin,  15  Wlr..  240.    \\.  762. 
Barnes   r.  Mavor  of  Mobile,  19  Ala.  707.    pp. 

816,  1507. 
Barnes  r.  Xewton,  46  Iowa,  .567.    pp.  115, 1249. 
P.arms  r.  Perliie,  12  X.  Y.  18.     p.   1739. 
Barnes  r.  .State,  41  Tex.  312.    p.  18."w. 
Barn.s  r.  Webb,  1  Tvler  (Vt.),  17.     p.  1467. 
Barnes  .-.   Wllllains,'  11  Wheat.   (U.  S.)  415. 

pp.  2008,  2009. 


Barnes,  Ex  parte,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.),  133.    p. 

178. 
Barnett  r.  Allen.  3  Hurl.  &  X.  376.    p.  1507. 
Barnett  r.  Eaton,  (i2  .Mis>    768.    p.  1917. 
Barnett  r.  Kearv.  Kd  Ind.  9.5.    p.  2043. 
iSarnett  r.  rotate,  liiolnd.  171.    p.  1709. 
Barnewall   r.  Cliurch,  1  Calues  (X.  Y.),217. 

p.  993. 
Baiuev  «•.  Grinin.2  X.  Y.  365.     pp.  1439,  1444. 
Barney  t:  People.  22  111.  160.    p.  107. 
Baron's    r.    Anderson,  37  Kan.  399;  15  Pnc. 

Hep.  226.     p.  20S4. 
Barough  r.   wliitc,  4  Barn.  &  Cres.  325.    p. 

9:58. 
Barr  r.  Armstronir,  56  Mo.  577.    pp.  1647, 1668. 
Barr  c.  Stale,  10  i  e\.  App.  Ml.    p.  18.55. 
Barrara  c.  State,  42  Tex.  392.    j).  1778. 
Barreda  r.  Silsbee,  21  How.  (L  .  S.)  147.    p. 

8.50. 
Barrett    v.  Indianapolis   &c.  R.  Co.,  9  Mo. 

App.  226.     p.  1(117 
Barrett  v.  Keniii,  7  I'ing.  332.    p.  297. 
Barrett  r.  Loun,  8  Irish  L.  331 ;  8.  c.  1  Irish  L. 

439.    p.  95. 
Barrett   r.  Pritchard,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  612.    p. 

909. 
Barrett  v.  St.  .Tnsci>h.  53  Mo  290.    p.  1243. 
Barrett  v.  State,  1  Wl>.  17.5.     p.  1904. 
Barretto  j.  Boughtou,  5  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  181. 

p.  88<'). 
Barrlck  v.  Austin,  21  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  241.    p. 

1023. 
Barren r. Baltimore, 7 Pet.  (U.S.) 243.  p.  1578. 
Barrow  f.  Paxton,  5  Johns.  (X.  Y.)258.     p. 

1443. 
Barrow  r.  Roliichaux,  15  La.  Ann.  70.    p.  1588. 
Barrows  r.  Keene,  15  R.  I.  484;  8.  c.  8  Atl. 

Hei).  713.     p.  2101. 
Barry  r.  Citv  of    Lowell,  8  Allen  (Mass.), 

127.    p.  1266. 
Barrv  i:  Ilolfmau,  6  Md.  79.    p.  875. 
Barry  c.  (HI<j,  .56  Mo.  117.    pp.  1055,  1077,  1078. 
BjirrVmore  r.  Tavlor.  1  F^sj).  326.     ji.  6:V.t. 
Itarstow  /•.  Berlin,  31  Wis.  ;5.57.    pp.  120'.i,  1247. 
Barstow  r.  Marsh,  4Cirav  (Mass.),  165.    pp. 

2136,  2141. 
P.arstow  r.  Spracue,  40X.  H.  27.  pp.  2021,2027. 
Bartel  i:  Tleman.  55  In.i.  438.      p.  2114. 
Bartelott   / .  International  Bank,  119  111.  259. 

pp.  1214,  lfi21,  162.5. 
Bartliet  r.  E^lebene,  5  La.  Ann.  315.    p.  2.5. 
Bartlioiomew  r.  J;icksou,  20  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 

28.     p)i.  88;l,  898. 
Bartholcnnew  r.  Langsdale,  85  Ind.  278.    p. 

2090. 
Bartiiolonicw  v.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  25  la. 

518.     p.  1670. 
Bartlett  r.  Uoyt,  33  X.  H.  151.    pp.  292,358, 

5611. 
Bartlett  r.  Pittsburgh  Ac.  R.  Co.,  94  Ind.  281. 

p.  2039. 
Bartlett  r.  Smith,  11  Mccs.  &  W.  483.    jip.  289, 

290,  293,295.  1739. 
Bartlett  t:  State.  28  Ohio  St.  669.    ji.  108. 
Bartlett    i:  Tarbeil,  12  Allen   (Mass.),  123. 

p.  &54. 
Bartlev  v.  Phillips,  13  West.  Rep.  792.    p.  2062. 
Bartlev  r.  Williams.  6»!  Pa.  St.  329.    p.  1681. 
Bartlliig  i:  Belirends,  20  Xeb.  211.    p.  17.56. 
Bartiingr.  I'.ehrends  (Xeb.),  29  X.  W.  Hop. 

472.     p.  16sl. 
Barlling  f.  Jamison,  44  Mo.  141.    pp.  2047, 

2060. 
Barton  r.  P'.rickson,  14  Xeb.  164.    p.  .57. 
Barton  v.  Hohuee.  16  la.  2.52.     pp.   1961,  1968, 

1993. 
Barton  r.  Murrain.  27  Mo.  22.5.    p.  fill. 
Barton  r.  Quiuu,  Battv  (Irish  Hep.),  552.    p. 
112. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXXlll 


Barton  v.  Springfield,  110  Mass.  131.    p.  1209. 
Barton r.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  52 Mo.  253.    pp. 

1207,  1212,  1236,  1296. 
Bartow  r.  Murrv,  2  NT.  J.  L.  97.    p.  19. 
Barwick  v.  English  Joint  Stock  Bank,  L.  R. 

2  Excll.  259.     p.  1022. 
Basking  v.  Shannon,  3  X.  Y.  310.    p.  1440. 
Bas.sr.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  Wis.  450.    p. 

1283. 
Bass  V.  Elliott,  105  Ind.  517.    p.  2051. 
Bass  V.  Irwin,  49  Ga.  436.    p.  1997. 
Bass  V.  State,  6  Baxter  (Tenn.),  579.    p.  128. 
Bass  V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  62.    p.  1564. 
Bas.s  c.  AValsli,  39  Mo.  192.    pp.  9(i7,  913,  920. 
Bas(*ett  V.  Glover,  No.  3895,  St.   Louis  Ct.  of 

App.     p.  869. 
Bassett  v.  Salisbury  Man.  Co.,  28  N.  H.  438. 

p.  1915. 
Bassett  v.  St.  Joseph,  53  Mo.  290.    p.  1280. 
Bassham  r.  State,  3S  Tex.  622.    p.  391. 
Bast  r.  Alford,  20  Tex.  226.    p.  1702. 
Batchelder  v.  Moore,  42  Cal.  412,    p.  1.37. 
Batdorff  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  61 1'a.  St.  179.    pp. 

396,  398,  443,  560. 
Bate  V.  Lewis,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  316.  p. 

108. 
Bate  Ref.  Co.  v.  Gillett,  24  Fed.  Rep.  697.    p. 

167. 
Batemani-.  Phillips,  4  Taunt.  157.    pp.  275, 

589. 
Bateman  v.  Ruth,  3  Daly  (N.  Y.),  378.    p. 

1209. 
Bates  V.  Bates,  19  Tex.  124.    p.  84. 
Bates  V.  Couklin,  10  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  389.    p. 

914. 
Bates  V.  Dehaven,  10  Ind.  319     p.  838. 
Bates  r.  Gage,  49  Cal.  126.    p.  2084. 
Bates  r.  Holladv,  No.  3864,  St.  Louis  Court 

of  Appeals,  M"S.    p.  399. 
Bates  v.  State,  19  Tex.  122.    pp.  17,  22. 
Bates  r.  Todd,  1  Mood.  &  R.  106.    p.  1367. 
Bateson  v.  Clark,  37  Mo.  31.    p.  2107. 
Batman  v.  Megowau,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  548.    p. 

2U8'). 
Batre  r.  State,  11  Ala.  119.    pp.  ^lOS,  1517. 
Batten  r.  State,  80  Ind.  395.    p.  551. 
ISattersbv  v.  Aljbott,  9  Cal.  565.    p.  1637. 
Batterf^oii  v.  State,63Ind.531.    pp.  1950,  1964. 
Battin  r.  Taggert,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  74.    p.  1075. 
Battishill  V.  Humphrey  (Mich.),  31  N.  W. 

Rep.  894.    p.  250. 
Batturs  i\  Sellers,  5  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  117.    p. 

925. 
Bander  v.  Tvrrel,  59  Cal.  99.    p.  2085. 
Baum  V.  Fryrear,  85  Mo.  151.    p.  1598. 
Baum  V-  Stephens,  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  411.    p. 

926. 
Baumeier  v.  Autlau  (Mich.),  31  N.  W.  Rep. 

88,S.    p.  379. 
Ilaumgardner  v.  Buruham,  93  Pa.  St.  88.    p. 

868. 
Hawser  v.  Lane,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  311.    p.  1291. 
Baxter  v.  Nurse,  0  Man.  &  G.  939.    p.  1137. 
Baxter  r.  People,  8  111.  368.    pp.    1706,  1976, 

l'.i88,  1997, 
Baxter  v.  Putney,  37  IIow.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  140. 

p.  4. 
Baxter  r.  Second    Avenue  R.  Co.,  3  Robt. 

(N.  Y.)  510.     ))p.  1209,  1223. 
Bay  r.  Sullivan,  30  Mo.  191.    p.  1708. 
Bayard  v.  Holtniau,  4  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  450. 

p".  1445. 
Bavless  v.  Davis,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  206.    p.  1755. 
Kayley  v.  Buckland,  1  Excli.  1.    p.  193. 
Baylis  r.  Lawrence,  11  Ad.  &  El.  920.    p.  1454. 
Havlis  V.  Lucas,  Cow]).  112.    p.  29. 
Baylis  V.  Stout,  49  Mich.  215.    p.  174L 
l!a"vna;d  r.  Eddiugs,  2  Strobh.  Law  (N.  C), 
374.    p.  1078. 


Bavoajon  v.  Criswell,  5 Martin  (N.  s.)  (La.), 

232.     p.  25. 
Bays  V.  Hunt,  60  Iowa,  252.    pp.  317, 1468. 
Baysinger  v.  Peo]jle,  115  111.  420.    i).  772. 
Beach  v.  Covillaud.  2  Cal.  237.    p.  328. 
Beach  v.  Frankenberger,  4  W.  Va.  718.    p. 

1313. 
Beach  v.  Vandenburg,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  361. 

p.  898. 
Beal  V.  Finch,  II  X.  Y.  128.    pp.  552,  553. 
Beal  V.  Niciiole,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  262.    pp.  383, 

387  391   394 
Beal'r.  Stone,  22  la.  447.    pp.  2088,  2089,  2090. 
Beale  r.  Newton,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  405.    p.  215. 
Beall  r.  Campbell,  1  How.  (Miss.)  24.    p.  128. 
Beall  V.  Mann,  5  Ga.  456.    p.  1748. 
Beals  v.  Beals,  20  Ind.  163.    p.  2071. 
Beals  V.  Guernsey,  6  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  446.    p. 

1442. 
Bean  r.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  60.    p.  1779. 
Bear  River  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Boles,  24  Cal.  351.    p. 

2086. 
Beardslee  i\  Richardson,  11  Wend.  (X.  Y.) 

25.    1).  1321. 
Beardsley  v.  Littell,  14  Blatchf.  (U.S.)  102. 

p.  592. 
Beardsley  v.  Wildman,  41  Conn.  515.    pp.  428, 

440. 
Bearse  v.  Ropes,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.),  331.    pp. 

1322, 1346, 1356. 
Beasley  v.  Evans,  35  Miss.  192.    p.  964. 
Beasley  r.  State,  71  Ala.  328.    p.  .541. 
Beason  r.  Southard,  10  N.  Y.  236.    p.  1173. 
Beatie  v.  Butler,  21  Mo.  313.    p.  1092. 
Beatson  v.  Skene  5  Hurl.  &  N.  838.    p.  1461. 
Beattie  r.  Hill,  60  Mo.  72.    p.  1641. 
Beattv  V.  Gilmore,  16  Pa.  St.  463.    p.  1225. 
Beatty  v.  Hatcher,  13  Oh.  St.  115.    p.  236. 
Beatty  I'.  Lycoming  County  Ins.  Co.,  52  Pa. 

St.  456.    p.  986. 
Beatty  v.  Mason,  30  Md.  409.    p.  1045. 
Beaubien  v.  Cicott,  12  Mich.  459.    j).  356. 
Beauchamp  v.  Saginaw  M.  Co.,  50  Mich.  163. 

p.  2051. 
Beauchamp  v.  State,  6   Blackf.    (Ind.)   299. 

pp.  89,91,489,  1571,1890. 
Beaulieu  v.  Parsons,  2   Minn.   37.    pp.  177, 

313. 
Beaulieu  v.  Portland  Co..  48  Me.  291.    pp. 

1216,  1602,  1604. 
Beaurain  v.  Scott,  3  Camp.  388.    p.   160. 
Beaver  i:   Taylor,  1   WaU.  (U.  S.)  637.    pp. 

1671, 1755. 
Beavers  v.  State,  58  Ind.  531.    p.  1860. 
Beazan  v.  Mason  Citv,  58  Iowa,  234.    p.  1268. 
Beazley  r.  Reid,  68  Ga.  386.    p.  1454. 
Bebee  f.  People, 5  Hill(X.  Y.),  32.    pp.1902, 

1905. 
Beck  V.  Bellamy,  93  X.  C.  129.    p.  192. 
Beck  V.  Cole,  16  Wis.  95.    p.  585. 
Heck  V.  Ferrara,  19  Mo.  30.    p.  1609. 
Beck  i\  Haas,  31  Mo.  App.  180.     p.  908. 
15eck  r.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  223.    pp.  119, 120. 
Beckdolt  V.  Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.,15X. 

E.  Rep.  686.     pp.  2036,  2038. 
Becker  r.  Hecker,  9  Ind.  497.    p.  868. 
Beckman   v.  Richardson,  28   Kan.  648.     p. 

2067. 
Beckman  i-.  Shousc,  5  Rawle  (Pa.),  179.    pp. 

11.55,  1321,  1345. 
Beckwilh  v.  Beckwith,  22   Oh.  St.  180.    p. 

109(1. 
Beckwith  v.  Philby,  6  Barn.  &  Cres.  635.    p. 

1175 
Beckwith  v.  AYindsor  Manf.  Co.,  14  Conn. 

594.     p.  886. 
Bedard  r.  Bouville,  57  Wis.  270.    p.  S39. 
Hedell  r.  farll,  33  N.  Y.  .581.    p.  308. 
Bedell  i:  Russell,  Ry.  &  M.  293.    p.  21T. 


3a 


XXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Bedford    r.    Flowers,    11   llnniph.    (Tonn.) 

Boiirord  r.  Kallmad  Co.,  46  Mo.  4S7.     p.  1311. 
BedfonI  \f.    K.  ('i>.   v.  Kaliibolt.  IfJ  Ind.  Sol. 

pp.  l-.'(>4,  l-.'SC,  2(141. 
Bi'illtiKlU-l.l  r.  Aslili'V.Crow.  Ellz.741.     p.  886. 
Bi'doe  r.  .\lpi'.  W.  Join's,  U*;.     p.  lltl»7. 
Bedwell   t:  Bodwull,   77  Ala.   587.    pp.   1740, 

21-2;t. 
Beehe  r.  Bull,  12  Wend.  .')04.     p.  565. 
Beebei-s,  Kx  parte.  2   Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)    127. 

pp.  Iti6,  Kill. 
Becrh  r.  Curie,  LI  Mo.  105.    p.  1613. 
Beeclier  v.  Derby  Bridge  Co.,  24  Couii.  491. 

p.  1246. 
Beedv  r.  Macombcr,  47  Me  451.    p.  1010. 
Beekiiiau  r.   Wright,  11   Johns.  (N.  \.)  442. 

p.  l'.H)2. 
Beeniun  r.  Buck,  3  Vt.  .53-    V-  W7. 
Beenis  r.  t'hleago  &c.  R.  Co., 56  la.  150.    pp. 

2054,2076. 
Beeuis  r.  Chicago  &c.  H.  Co.,  67  Iowa,  440. 

p.  1261. 
Beer  v.  Ward,  Jacob,  77.    p.  277. 
Beers  r.  Beer.*,  4  Conn.  .53.5.    p.  43. 
Beers    r.   Hoiisatonic  H.  Co.,  ID  Conu.  566. 

pp.  1208,  1212.  ]^.>4,  1227.  1255. 
Beerv  v.  United  .''States,  2  Colo.  186.     p.  14. 
Beesi'ton  r.  Collver,  4  Hlng.  IWX    p.  1137. 
Bepg  r.  Hegg,  .'i6  Wis.  5:U.     )>.  1072. 
Behvmer  c.  State,  tt.i  Ind.  140.    p.  lC.f)8. 
Belalr  t. Chicago  &c.  11.  Co., 43  la.  674.  p. 1262. 
Belch  I-.  Uallroad  Co.,  is  Mo.  .Kj.p.SO.     p.  343. 
Belcher  r.  I'rittlc,  4  Moore  A:  .S.  2'J5;  s.  c.  10 

King.  408.     p.  1643. 
Bclden  r.  Gray,  5  Fla.  504;  s.  c.  3  Fla.  110. 

p.  884. 
Belden  v.  I.amb,  17  Conn.  441.    p.  886. 
Belfast  Nat.  llank  f.  llurrhnan,  68  Me.  522. 

J. p.  102'.i,  1031,  1033. 
Belfa.st  iVc.  U.  Co.  r.  Kevs,  0  11.  L.  Cas.  556; 

8.  c.  8  Jur.  (N.  6.)  367.    j>.  ll.V>. 
Belger  v.  Dlu.sniore,  51  N.  Y.  166.    pp.  1360, 

1365. 
Belkln  f.  Rhodes,  76  Mo.  643.    p.  2144. 
Belknap  v.  Godfrey,  22  Vt.  288.    p.  1060. 
Bi-lknap  r.  W.ii<ic"ll.  21  X.  11.  1<5.    pp.  215, 

216,  218,  ■:]'.*,  230,  23:5. 
Bell  r.  Cunnnings,   3   Snccd    (Tenn.),   275. 

p.  10»)'.i. 
Bell  V.  (iolding,  27  Ind.  173.     j).  838. 
Bell   r.  Graham.  1  Xolt  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  278. 

p.  1161. 
Bell  r.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo.  .'JO.    pp. 

1207, 1208. 
Bell  I-.  Hartley, 4  Watts&s.  (Pa.)  32.    p.  1044. 
lU-ll  r.  n<)\yanl,4  Mil.  117.     p.  113. 
Bell    I-.  Ingcstrc,  v>4   Kng.  C.  L.  317;  s.  c.  12 

Ad.  &  Kl.  (N.  .s.)  317.     p.  876. 
Bell  i:  Keefe,  12  La.  Ann.  340.    p.  620. 
Bell  r.  .Morrison,  1  IVl.  (f.  .S.)  351,     p.  066. 
Bell  r.  Newton,  4  K.  1).  Smith,. V.t.     p.  WM. 
Hell  r.  (Milo.Vc.  H.C0..25  I'n.SI.  161.     p.  1379. 
Bell   r.  IM.rs.in,  1  la.  21.     p.  1060. 
Bell  I-.  I'rewllt.  62  III.  361.     p|).  385,  387,  389, 
Bell  >•.  Ueed,4  Blun.  (I'a.)  127.    pp.  1322, 1345, 

1:{.'>8. 
I!<dl  r.  Ulnker,  2'.l  Ind.  267.     p.  2107. 
Ilcll  r.  S<oll,5Mo.  212.     p.  1618. 
I{«ll  r.  Sliutz,  IMCal.  449.     p.  341. 
Hell  r.  .StJitu,  44  Ala.  .3'.«.     pp.  69,  2-57. 
Bell  V.  SlJile,  cital  51  Ala.  30.    p.  31. 
Hell  V.  State,  59  Ala.  5'..     p.  16. 
Bell  r.  .'*tato,  10  Ark.  .'".36.     p.  108. 
Hell  r.  Stale,  57  Md.  12o.    j..  72.'). 
Bell  V.  State.  17  Tex.  App.  538.    pp.  1095, 1696, 

1744. 
Bell  i:  State,  21  Tex.  App.  270.    p.  1695. 
Bdi  t'.  Troy,  35  Ala.  184.    vp- 1~^>  X'U. 


Bell  V.  Ursnrv,  4  LItt.  (Kv,)  834.    p.  1198. 
Hell  r.  Warden,  Wllles,  'iiH.     pp.  1145,  1147. 
Hell  I-.    Woodward,  46  X.    H.    315.    pp.  848^ 

1076. 
Hellefontalno&c.  H.  Co.  r.  Hunter,  33  Ind. 

3l'>.    p.  12.30. 
Heller  r.  Schiilt/,  44  -Mich.  529;  «.  c.  38  Am. 

Kep.  280.     p.  132S. 
Hellett,  Ex    parte,  1  Cox  Chan.    Cas.    297. 

p.  647. 
Bellows  r.  .Vngnsta  Bank,  2  Mason  (U.  S.), 

31.    pp.  2013,  jdU. 
H.llows  i:  tJalliip.  Klrby  (Conn.),  166.    p.  113. 
Hellow.s  r.  Week.-,  41  VI.  .V.M».    p.  SI. 
Helo  f.  Wren,  6  Tex.  (>8<>.     pp.  1469,  1471. 
Helote  r.  state,  :i(i  .Miss.  97.    p.  IWI2. 
Heltr.  Hell,  I  llarr.  .V  Mell.  (Md.)  109.    |).  1008. 
Helt  r.  lioude,  31  .Mo.  1J8.    jip.  .s,V2,  1682. 
Helt  V.  Marriott,  9  Gill  (Md.),  ;J31.     pp.  a06, 

15;H!,  1604.     . 
Helt  c.  I'eople,  97  III.  461.    p.  .•«, 
Helton  r.  Baxter, . "18  X.  Y.  411;  a.  c.  54  X.  Y. 

245.     p.  I2<r.t. 
Benils  f.  Phelps.  41  Vt.  1.     p.  869. 
Benawav  r.   Conyne,  3  Chand.    (Wis.)   214. 

pp.  94." 253. 
Bender  v.  Sherwooil,  21  Ind.  167.     l>.  2a59. 
Benedict   i:  Klanigan,  13  S.   C.  50ti;  s.  c.  44 

Am.  Kep-  583.     p.  779. 
Iknedict  c.  Kond  du  Lac,  7  Cent.  L.  J.  258; 

s.  c.  6  Ueporter,  7'.»9.     p.  1247. 
Beneyldes  estate,  14  Tex.  App.  378.     p.  1679. 
Benhain  r.  Carey,  11  Wend.  (X.  V.)83.    pp. 

1746,  17.54. 
Benhain  r.  Rowe,  2  Cal.  387.    p.  214. 
Benjamin  i-.  Kllinger,  SO  Ky.  4<2.    p.  618. 
Benjarano  r.  Slate.  6  Ti-x.  Apj).  26.).    j>.  115. 
Benner  c.  I'orter,  9  How.  (V.  ».)  235.    p.  14. 
Bennett  r.   Agricultural  Insurance  Co.,  51 

Conn.  504.     p.  833. 
Bennett  c.   Baker,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  399. 

pp.  19f4,  I'.HWi,  1984. 
Bennett  r.  Black,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  .39.     p.  1195. 
Bennett  f.  Com.,  8  Leigh  (Va.),  745.    pp.  1902, 

190-J. 
Bennett  r.  Eyerctt,  3  R.  T.  152.    pp.  904,  966. 
Bennett  v.  Fall,  20  .Ma.  60.5.     p.  .',09. 
Bennett  r.  K(>rd,47  Ind.  2t;4.     p.  1006. 
Bennett  r.  Hol.ro,  72  (  al.  178.     p.  2099. 
Bennett  r.  Howarrl,  3  Day  (Coun.),  219.    p. 

191.3. 
Bennett  t'.  Lockwood,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  223. 

p.  1221. 
Bennett  r.  Matthews,  40  How.  I'r    (N.   Y.) 

42S.     pp.  110,  117,  123. 
Bennett  r.  O'Brien,  37  III.  2.50.    pp.  1322,  1324. 
Bennett  i-.   Railroad   Co.,  102   U.  S.  577.    p. 

1312. 
Ben  nett  r.  .State,  3  Ind.  167.     p.  1982. 
Bennett    f.  SUitc,   1    Humph.    (Teun.)    399. 

p.  1992. 
Bennett  c.  .«Jtato,  Mart.  &  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  133. 

p.  20. 
Bennett  v.  Watson,  3  Manlo  &  S.  1.     p,  164. 
Benolst  f.  Miirrin,  4S  Mo.  48,    p.  I.W.), 
Bensley  r.  Atwdl,  12  Cal.  231.    11.  S74. 
Benson  r.  Clark.  1  Cow.  (N.  V.)  2.W.     p.  1915. 
Benson  r.  Fish,  6. Mi-.  HI.     p|..  19441.945. 
Benson  r.  McCoy,  3f.  Ala.  716.     p.  1701. 
Bent  r.  I'lilllirick,  Hi  Kan.  191.     p.  2027. 
Benll.y  c.  Kleming,   I    Com.    11.479.     p.  1983. 
Ilenlle'vr.  Klckabaugli.<i2  I'a.  SI.  281.     p.  1413. 
ItontleV  r.  Sill.  3.5  III.  414.     i>.  Umi.'). 
Bentley  v.  Smith.  3  Smltii  (K.  B.),  17.    p.  2013. 
Bentoti  t>.  Central   U.  Co.,  42  Iowa,  192.    p. 

12:J9. 
Benton  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,. 55  lown,  496. 

p.  1487. 
Beutou  i:  Lindell,  10  Mo.  .557.     p.  2055. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXXV 


Benton  v.  State,  30  Ark.  328.    pp.  18, 115,  67C, 

1948. 
Benton  t'  Sntton,  1  Bos.  &  P.  24.    p.  1142. 
Benton  r.  Thornhill,  7  Taunt.  149.    p.  1442. 
BiMluillard  r.  IJartlett,  19  Kan.  382.    p.  1021. 
Bcnloll  r.  Berdell,  80  111.  fi04.    p.  448. 
Bltk  c.  Chicago  &c.  U.  Co.,  50  Wis.  419.    p. 

1G48. 
Bergh's  Case,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  (N.  s.)  26C. 

pp.  145, 172. 
BcrkL'v  V.  Judd,  22  Minn.  287.  pp.  299,  344. 
Berkley  r.  Kolics,  i:i  Mo.  App.  502.     )).  2108. 
Berksliire    Wcjokai  Co.    v.   Proctor,  7  Cush. 

(Mass.)  417.    p.  1095. 
Bernliard  v.  Washington  Life  Ins.   Co.,    40 

Iowa,  442.    1).  16«2. 
Bernhardt  r.  Bensselaer  &c.  11.  Co.,  32  Barb. 

(N.  Y.)  166.     p    1211. 
Bernstein  v.  Humes,  78  Ala.  134.    p.  802. 
Berrv  r.  Billings,  47  Me.  328.    p.  1684. 
Berry  r.  Cooi)er,  28  Ga.  543.    pp.  1321, 1344, 

1345,  1347. 
Berrv  r.  Da  Caste,  L.  B.  1  C.  P.  331 ;  s.  c.  35  L. 

J.  (0.  1'.)  191.     p.  1477. 
Berry  r.   De  Witt,  27  Fed.  Rep.  723.    p.  2051. 
lierry  v.  Drvdcn   7  Mo.  324.    pp.  807. 1617. 
Berry  r.  Hardinan,  12  Ahi.  604.    p.  1758. 
Berry  r.  .Jourdan,  11  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  67.     pp. 

3.53,355. 
Berry  v.  Kenncv,  5  B.  Monr.  (Kt.)  122.    p.  6. 
Berry  v.  8inger,"l0  Ark.  484.    j).  2122. 
Berrv  i\  State,  10  Ga.  511.    pp.  728,  739,747, 

752,  1509,  16:;7,  1902, 1905, 1906,  2049. 
Berrv  r.  .^tale,  8  Tex.  App.  51.5.     p.  1680. 
Berrvhill  v.  Kirchner,  96  Pa.  St.  489.    p.  779. 
Berscli    v.   State,  13   Ind.  434.    pp.  409, 1945, 

1956,  1974. 
Bersclie  r.  Globe  Mutual  Fire  Ins.    Co.,  31 

Mo.  ,546.     pp.  978,  979,  989. 
Bertody  r.  Ison,  69  Ga.  317.    pp.  215,  239. 
Bertraud  ■.,•.  Morrison,  Breese  (III.),  175.    p. 

2009. 
Bertrand  v.  Tavlor,  32  Ark.  470.    pp.  218,  219. 
Besford  v.  Saunders,  2  II.  Bl.  116.    p.  966. 
Besleirel  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  14 Abb.  Pr. 

(N.  s.)  29.    p.  122.5. 
Bessich   v.  Coggill,  Palmer    (K.  B.),559.    p. 

889. 
Bcsson  V.  Southard,  10  N.  Y.  236.    pp.  1179, 

1198. 
Best  c.  Allen,  30  111.  34.    p.  1495. 
Bethel  v.  Bethel,  92  Ind.  318.    p.  1621. 
Bethel's  Case,  1  Salk.  533.    p.  152. 
Belts  f.  Francis,  30  N.  .J.  B.  1.52.    p.  1002. 
Belts  V.  Jack.son,6  Wend.    (X.  Y.)  173.    p. 

1,585. 
r>etts  r.  State,  66  Ga.  508.    p.  258. 
Hevan  r.  Cullen,  7  Pa.  St.  281.    pp.  1130, 1131. 
Bevan  r.  Ilavden,  13  la.  122.     p.  1705. 
Bevan  r.  Lewis,  3  Eng.  Ch.  377.    p.  878. 
J?evan  r.  Waters,  1  Mood.  &  M.  235.    p.  275. 
Beverly  r.  Burke,  9  Ga.  440.    pp.  1047, 1632 
Bevin  v.  Powell,  83  Mo.  365;  s.  c.  11  Mo.  App. 

216.     1).  2055. 
Blagi  r.  Howes,  66  Cal.  469.    pp.  2084,   2099. 
Biard  r.  Trimble,  Cooke  (Tenu.),289.  p.  1671. 
Bilib  r.  Reid,  3  Ala.  88.     p.  128. 
Bihl.ins  r.  Noxon,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  207.    p. 

1611. 


Bickford  v.  Dane,  58  N.  H.  185.    p.  902. 
liekford 
p.  1021. 


Bickford  v.  Meuier,  36  Hun 


p.  902. 
(N.   Y.), 


446. 


Bickliani  v.  Smith,  62  Pa.  St.  45.    p.  560. 
Bickley  v.  Com.,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  572. 

p.  lt!4. 
Bidault  r.  Wales,  19  Mo.  36;  s.  c.  20  Mo.  5.50. 

p.  1416. 
Bierbach  r.  Goodyear  Rubber  Co.,  54  Wis. 

208.    p.  1769. 


Bigclow  V.  Reed,  51  Me.  325.    p.  1210. 
Bigelow  V.   Rutland,  4    Cush.   (Mass.)    24';. 

pp.  1209, 1224. 
Bigelow  r.  Sprague,  140  Mass.  425.    p.  54. 
Riggers  r.  Pace,  5  Ga.  171.    p.  1599. 
Biggs  V.   Barry,  2  Curt.  C.  C.    (U.   S.)  259. 

pp.  1971,1989. 
Biggs  l:  Lloyd  (Cal.),  11  Pac.  Rep.  831.    pp. 

2,3. 
Biggs  i\  Mcllvain's  E.xecutrix,  3  A.  K.  Marsh. 

(Ky.)360.    p.2i:il. 
Biggs,  Ex  parte,  64  N.  C.  202.    pp.  145, 146, 151, 

1.59, 161. 
Bigler  r.  Pinkncy,  SOX.  Y.  636.    p.  2016. 
Biglow  V.  Stearnes,  19  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  39.    p. 

160. 
Bilanski  v.  State,  3  Minn.  427.    pp.  1903, 1906. 
Bill)erry  v.  :M(>bley,  21  Ala.  277.    p.  316. 
Billjrougli  r.  Metropolis  Ins.  Co.,  5  l>uer  (N. 

Y.),587.     p.  978. 
Biles  r.  Holmes, 11  Ired.L.  (X.  C.)  16.   p. 1207. 
Bill  V.  Norwich,  39  Conn.  222.    p.  1249. 
Bill  V.  People,  14  111.  432.    p.  728. 
Bill  V.  State,  29  Ala.  34.    pp.  17,  19,  129. 
Billings  r.  Billings,  2  Cal.  107.    p.  1438. 
P.illinirs  V.  McCov,  5  Neb.  187.     p.  1716. 
Billini,'-s  r.  Stale,"  107  Ind.  54.     p.  2051. 
P.illingslev  r.  Bunce,  28  Mo.  547.    p.  1436. 
I'.illis  V.  State,  2  McCord  (S.  C),  12.    pp.  56, 

118. 
Bills  r.  Ottumwa,  35  la.  107.    p.  1738. 
Bills  V.  Stanton, 63  111.  51.     p.  2053. 
Bills?'.  State,  59  Ind.  15.    p.  164. 
Bills  i:  Vose,  27  X.  11.  215.    pp.  217.  218. 
Biulield  r.  State,  19  X.  W.  Rep.  607;  s.  c.  15 

Neb.  484.     p.  1861. 
Bingham  v.  Foster,  37  la.  339.    p.  1994. 
Bingham  r.  Guthrie,  19  Pa.  St.  418.    p.  192 
Bingham  r.   .Supervisors,  8  Minn.  441.    pp. 

194,  195,  198,  324. 
Bingham,  In  re,  32  Yt.  329.    p.  137. 
Binns  r.  State,  46  Ind.  311.    pi).  1790. 1847. 
Biuns  r.  State,  66  Ind.  426.  pp.  1569, 1571, 1860, 

1861,  1863. 
Birch  V.  Benton,  26  Mo.  153.    pp.  807, 1617. 
Birchard  v.  Booth,  4  ^Vis.  67.    pp.  1965, 1966, 

19(i7. 
Bird  r.  Appleton,  1  East,  111.     pp.  2009,  2013. 
Bird  V.  Great    Xorthern    R.  Co.,  28   L.  J. 

(Kxch.)3.    p.  1237. 
Bird  V.  Higginson,  2  Ad.  &  El.  160.    p.  217. 
Bird  V.  Lanius,  7  Ind.  615.    p.  2124. 
Bird  V.  State,  14  Ga.  43.    pp.  20,  27. 
Bird  r.  State,  50  Ga.  .5S.5.    p.  542. 
Bird  r.  State,  107  lud.  154.    pp.  1757,  1803, 

1804. 
lUrdsall  v.  Russell,  29  N.  Y.  220.    p.  1035. 
Blrdsongr.  State,  47  Ala.  68.    pp.  51,  115. 
Birge  r.  Gardiner,  19  Conn.  507.    p.  1232. 
Blrkbeck  r.  Tucker, 2  Hall  (X.  V.I,  121.  p.  615. 
Bischof  r.  Cotfelt,  6  Ind.  23.     p.  1747. 
Bischoffsheim   v.  Brown,  29  Fed.  Rep.  34L 

I)p.  591,  5'.^2. 
Bishop  r.  Bishop,  13  Ala.  47.5.    p.  869. 
Bishop  r.  Oliambre,  Mood,  .t  M.  116.    p.  1031. 
Bishop  r.  Georgia,  9  Ga.  121.    p.  1984. 
Bishop  V.  Mugler,  33  Kan.  145.    pp.  1996, 1999, 

2000. 
l?ishop  r.  O'Connell,  56  Mo.  158.    p.  1440. 
Bishop  V.  Ransom,  39  Mo.  417.    pp.  2051.2056. 
Bishop  c.  Redmond,  S3  Ind,  157.    i>.  2039. 
Bishop  r.  Shillito,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  329u.    pp. 

908,  909. 
Bishop  c.  Spining,  38  Ind.  143.    pp.  505,  508, 

509,  1780. 
Bishoi)  V.  State,  9  Ga.  121.    pp.  70, 103. 
Bishop  V.  State,  9  Ga.  260.    p.  398. 
Bishop  r.  State,  43  Te.\.  390.    pp.  1635,  1674, 

1690, 1743,  1746. 


X\.\\  1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Bishop  r.  Williams,  IS  III.  mi.    y.  S<;9. 
Bliiliop  of  l)urliain    v.  Itcaumoiit,  1   Cnmp. 

207.    p.  474. 
Bishop  of  Mcath  r.  jrarquls  of  Winchester, 

SlMiig.  N.  C.  1S>.    1).  -I'M. 
Blssfll  r.  Drak.-.  I'.i  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  66.    p.  «U». 
BKhsoM    f.  Flr.-t  Nat.   Jlauk,  G'J  I'a.   St.  415. 

p.  11)-::?. 
Bissoll  c.  Ilopliins.aCovv.  (N.  Y.)  lOfi.   p.  1442. 
Blssrll  r.  Price,  Iti  111.  408.     pp.  )Sti7,  Vili'X 
Blr-sill  r.  l{v;m,  23111.  fiDC.     pp.  M,  S3. 
lUssell  r.  siaiT,  32  Mleli.  2W.     p.  407. 
15l.--ill,  Matur  of,  40  Ml>s.  63.     (i.  152. 
Hissot  f.  btate,  53  IikI.  40^.     pp.  UM,  1008. 
Blvins  r.  Mate,  11  .\ik.  4:)j.     pp.  106,  IS'JO. 
Blxbo  r.  State,  t!  Oh.  eti.     ii.  40. 
BI.\1)V  r.  Car-kacldon,  70  la.  7-V..    p.  1708. 
Blxbv  r.  Carskaddou  (la.),  2'J  N.  W.  Kcp.  626. 

1).  23(!. 
Blatehfordr.   r)o(1.2r.arn.  &  Aid.   179.  pp. 

1172,  IL^O,  lisj.  lis.t. 
Black  f.  CoorKh,  3  l.iit.  (Kv.)  226.    p.  265. 
Black  r.  Dajr^.v.  1:5  IikI-  :W3.   p.  2100. 
Black    r.   tioixlrlch   Transportatlou   Co.,  55 

Wis.  310.     pp.  1344,  1360. 
Black  r.  Jones,  GE.xch.  213;  s.c.  2  L.J.  Exch. 

152.     p.  1740. 
Black  f.  Rogers,  7">  Mo.  441.      p.  102. 
Black  V.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  369.  pp.  1S47, 1861, 

18»M. 
Black  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  124.  pp.  l&Vt,  1880. 
Black  1.  State,  42  Tex.  377.    pp.  72.76. 
IMack  V.  Stale,  9  Tex.  App.  Sli.    i>.  m. 
Blackhurn  v.  15call,28  Md.  208.    p.  .'■)82. 
Blackliurn  r.  Crowder,  110  Intl.  127.     p.  2101. 
I'.laikliurn  f.  IIa\>,4<'olilw.(Tenn.)227.  p.  42. 
Blackliurn  v.  State,  71  Ala.  310;  «.  c.   46  Aiu. 

l{eii.  323.     pp.  540,  541,  1S05. 
Blackliurn  r.  Mate,  44  Tex.  457.    p.  1606. 
Blaiketer  r.   llou.se,  67   Ind.   414.     pp.   1694, 

1011. 
Blacklnjrton  v.  .Johnson,  126  ^Ma.'ss.  21.    p.  as3. 
Blackledge  v.  Plue,  28  Ind.  466.   pp.  214,  221, 

222. 
Blackinau  v.  "Welsh,  44  Mo.  41.     p.  1042. 
Blackwellr.  Hamilton,  47    Ala.   472.     p.   336. 
Blackwell  v.  State,  67   (ja.  76;  s.   c.  44  Am. 

Uep.  717.    p.  267. 
Blade  r.  Xoland,  12  "Wend.  (N.  Y.)  173.    p. 

620. 
Blair  V.  Lvnch   (X.  Y.),  11  Xorth  East.  Rep. 

947  ;  8.  c.  :«  llun.  663.     p.  863. 
Blair  r.  Pelliam,  IH  .Mass.  420.     p.  661. 
Blake  r.  Blossom,  15  .Me    304.     p    1012. 
Blake  r.  Davis,  20  Oh.  231.     p.  200l». 
Blake  v.  Irish,  21  Me.  450.     p.  1758. 
Blake  f.  Lane,  5   Jones  E(j.  (N.  C.)  412.    p. 

1061. 
Blnke  v.  I-anvon,  6  T    R.  221.     p.  «)1. 
Blake  r.  .Midland  R.  Co., 21  L.  J.  (t^.  B.)  2,37. 

pp.  1473,  l.WH. 
Blake  f.  MUlspaugh,  1   Johns.    (X.   Y.)  316. 

p.  r,S. 
Bluker.    Powell,  26   Kan.   320.     pp.  3<i7,  372, 

376,718. 
Blake  r.  Sawn  In,  10  Allen    (Mas-s.),  340.     p. 

1709. 
Blake  r.  St.  Lonis,  40  Mo.  569.    p.  1246. 
P.lake  f. Tucker,  12  V(.  39.     p.  1072. 
Itlake  r.  White.  13  X.  II.  272      p.  :M6. 
Bl.'ikelv  r.  I'.eniiecke,  .50  Mn.  193.     )..  8-25. 
Bl.ikeiiian    r.    Itlakem.in,  31    Miun.  390.      p. 

Blakev  V.  Porter,  1  Tannt.  .384.  p.  .580. 
Blakevr.  Saunders,  0  Mo.  742.  j>.  1611. 
Blalock  V.  Phillip-..  3-*  »;a  216.  p.  1020. 
Blanc  r.  Kluinpkc.20  Cal.  IVl.  p.  1378. 
Blanchard  r.  Brown,  1  Wallace  Jr.  (U.  S.) 
309;.    p.  38. 


Blanchard  v.  I'ratt,  37  111.  243.     p.  1773. 
Bland  c.  (I'Hagan.t^  N.  (".471.     j).  2129. 
lUand  r.  State,  4  Tex.  Ai>p.  15.     p.  1S17. 
Bland Ingr.  .Sargent,  30  S.  H.  239.     p.  1088. 
Blaney  r.  Fludley.  2  Blaekf.   (Ind.)    338.     p. 

2111. 
Blaneyr.  Pclton  (VI.),  13  Atl.   Rep.  564. 

925. 
Blatchlcy  r.  Coles,  6  Colo.  s»2.     p.  2ia5. 
Bleecker  r.  Carroll,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  V.)  82.   p. 

ir,ti. 
Blemer  r.  Peojde.  76  111.  265.     p.  21 
lUenkinsop  t.  Clavton,  1  J.  B.  Moure,  S28.    p. 

014. 
Blesch  r.  Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.,  48  Wie.  168.    p. 

2o:i-t 
Blew  f.  Hoover,  30  Ind.  4.50.     p.  2042. 
Blewett  r.  Ualn.'ird,  1  Stra.  70.     p.  8«>. 
lilight  r.  Fisher.  Pel.  C,  C.  41.     pp.  144.  188. 
Blight  r.  Schenck.  10  Pa.  St.  28!).     p.  874. 
JSIlss  I-.  Bralnard.  4-.'  X.  H.  255.     p.  1C,8. 
Blizzard  r.  Apjikgate,  77  lud.   516.    i)p.  316, 

319,  726. 
Blizzard  r.  Blizzard,  48  Ind.  540.    p.  2114. 
Blizzard  r.  Phebus.  35  Ind.  284.     p.  2107. 
P.loch  r.  l'rlce,2l  Mo.  App.  14.     p.  344. 
Block    V.   Uoruian,  51   Mo.  31.    p.  967. 
P.lock  r.  State,  loo  Ind.  3.")7.    p.  103. 
Blocker  r.  State.  0  Tex.  App.  270.    p.  1832. 
Blodgett  r.  Farmer, 4 1  X.  11.  4(t3.     i..  344. 
Blood   V.  Tvuesborough,   103  Ma.sb.  5o9.     p. 

1200. 
Blood  r.  Whitman,  3  Plnnev  (Wis.),. 54;  s.  e. 

3  {'hand.  (Wis.  -  54.     p.  2007. 
Bloodirood  V.  Bruen,  8  X.  Y.  :J62.     p.  967. 
Bloodworth  v.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  614.    p. 

110. 
Bloomlngton  r.  Read,2  Bradw.  (111.)  542.    p. 

1247. 
Blossom  V.  Barrett,  37  X.  V.  434.     p.  49.3. 
Blossom  r.  Dodd,  43  \.  Y.  264.     p.  i;i65. 
Blount  r.  /Ink,  55  Mo.  455.     p.  2121. 
Bhinmntle  r.  Fltcliburg  K.  Co.,  127 Mass.  822; 

ft.  c.  20  Alli.  I,.  J.  iVI.     p.  11.5.5. 
Blunt  r.    IJltle,   3  .Mason    (U.  S.),  112.    pp. 

1195,  1107,  1108. 
Blunt  r.  Sl.Mte,  0  Tex.  App.  234.     p.  376. 
Blvr.  Haverhill.  110  Mass.  .520.     p.  1209. 
P.lvdenburg  r.  .lohnson,  9.\bb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N. 

V.)  4.V.I.     p.  2075. 
Blv.lenburgr.   Welsh,  Bald.  (U.  S.)  331.    p. 

1410. 
Blvih  V.  Birmingham  Waterworks,  11  Exch. 

784.     pp.  1207,  12.')2. 
Boar   r.  MeUormlck,  1   Scrg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  160. 

p.  018. 
Board  \c.  r.  Eperson,  50  Ind.  27.5.     p.  2042. 
Board  of  Com.    v.   Montgomery,    109  Ind.  69. 

p.  2108. 
Boardman   r.  Beckwilh,   18  la.  292.    p.  2073. 
Boanlman   r.    Klbbe,   10  Cush.    (Mass.)   545. 

p.  324. 
Boardman  v.  Xcw  Hampshire  *c.  Ins.  Co.,  20 

N.  II.  .551.     p.  074. 
Boardman  r.   NVeslchesler   Fire   Ins.  Co.,  54 

Wis.  3(H.     pii.  67:!.  f.o.'.. 
Boardman  c.  U  oo.l.  3  VI.  570.     i)p.  67.  82. 
lioardman    r.  Woodman,  47   N.  H.    120.     pp. 

22.S,  471,  406,  498. 
Boatmen's   savings   Bank  f.  Overall,  16  Mo. 

Apj).  510.     pp.  1445,  1027. 
Borldb-  c.  State,  .5-2  .Ma.  305.     p.  1646. 
Iloddlnglon  r.  .Schleneker.4  Barn.  *  Ad.  7.52. 

p.  044. 
Bodge  I-.  FoHs,  30  X.  H.  406.     p.  110. 
Boihvell   c.   Swan,  3  Pick.  (Moss.)  .376.     pp. 

146r,,  1467. 
Bnette  r.  Landa,  22  Tex.  IM.     p.  1986. 
Bogart  f.  Brown,  5  Pick.  (Mass.)  \K    p. 616. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXXVU 


Bogenschutz  v.  Smith  (Ky.),  1  S.  W.  Rep.  578. 

p.  1239. 
Boggs  V.  State,  io  Ala.  30.    p.  51. 
Boggs  V.  State,  8  Iml.  463.    p.  5C1. 
BogKS  r.  Thoinpson,  13  Xeb.  403.    p.  385. 
Bogle  V.   Kreitzer,  46   Pa.  St.  465.    pp.  456, 

1668. 
Bohanan  v.  Hans,  26  Tex.  450.    p.  .563. 
Bohanaa  r.  State,  15  Nel).  212.    ]).  20j6. 
Bolianan  r.  Slate,  IS  Xelj.  .57.    p.  73. 
Boies  V.  Hartford  &c.  II.  Co.,  37  Conn.  272. 

p.  1321. 
Bolan  r.  Peeplcs.l  Brev.  (S.  C.)  109.    p.  1750. 
Boland  r.  Gillett,  44  Wis.  329.    i).  2067. 
Bolaud  V.  Greenville  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Rich.  L. 

368.     p.  118. 
Boland  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  484. 

pp.  1232,  lo'.ib,  l.i99. 
Bolcliow  V.  Sevmour,  17  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  107.    p. 

8o9 
Bold't  V.  Budwig,  19  Neb.  739.    pp.  1469, 1470, 

1490. 
Boldt  v.  State  (Wis.),  35   X.  AV.  Rep.  935. 

p.  57. 
Bolen  ('.  State,  26  Oh.  St.  371.    p.  .528. 
Boles  V.  State,  24  Miss.  445.    p.  129. 
Boles  r.  State,  13  Siued.  &  M.  (Miss.)  398. 

pp.  81,82,  129. 
Boles  r.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  422.    p.  1564. 
Boiling  V.  Mavor,  3  Rand.  ( Va. )  .577.    pp.  2008. 
Bqlling  v.  Petersburgli,    3  Rand.  (Va.)  563. 

p.  JOU. 
Bolhnan,  Ex  parte,  4  Cranch  (U.  S.),  75.    p. 

178. 
Bolton  V.  Corporation  of  Liverpool,  3  Sim. 

467.    p.  27i;. 
Bomar  v.  Maxwell,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  621. 

!>.  rioi. 

Bomgardner  v.  Andrews,  .55  la.  638.    p.  505. 
Bonaparte  v.  Camden   &c.  R.  Co.,  Baldw. 

vl'.  >.)220.     )).  1578. 
Bond  c.  Clark,  35  Vt.  577.     I).  927. 
Bond  v.  Kpley,  4S  la.  600.     pp.  2074,  2080, 2100. 
Bond  r.  Frost,  8  La.  Ann.  297.    p.  1366. 
Bond  r.  Hall,  8  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  14.    p.  1668. 
Bond  f.  Pacheco,  30  Cal.  533.    i).  2057. 
Bond  c.  Pcopl  •,  ,;9  111.  26.     pp.  1646,  1647. 
ISond  V.  Wabash &c.  R.  Co.,  67  la.  712.    p. 2082. 
Bond    r.   Warren,  8  Jones  L.    (X.   C.)   191. 

p.  1642. 
Bone  r.  McGinlev,  7  How.  (Miss.)  671.    p.  5. 
lionesteel  r.  Lynde,  8  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  226. 

I..  278. 
Bonlield  r.  Smith,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  519.    p.  217. 
Bunliaiii    V.  Iowa  &c.   Ins.  Co.,  25  la.   328. 

p.  2038. 
Bonham  v.  Mills.  .39  Oh.  St.  534.    p.  2. 
Boniiell  r  Clianiberlin,  26  Conn.  487.    p.  957. 
Bonnell  r.  Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.,  30  X.  J.  Law, 

189.     p.  1303. 
Bonnell  c.  ./aeohs,  36  Wis.  59.    p.  713. 
Bonney  v.  Morrill,  .'>2  Me.  2.52.    p.  827. 
Bonney  c.  Morrill,  57  Me.  374.     p.  192. 
Booby  r.  State,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  111.    pp.120, 

1914,  1919,1992. 
Booker  r.  State,  76  Ala.  22.    pp.   1710,  1798, 

1799,  1800. 
Booker  f.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  564.    pp.433, 

435. 
Boon  r.  State,  1  Ga.  618.     pp .  42,  46,  67,  68,  69, 

72,  97. 
Boon  V.  Weathered,  23  Tex.  675.    pp.    455, 

458. 
Boone  v.  Pnrtiell,  28  Md.  607.    p.  585. 
Boone  r.  Kidgway,  29  N.  I.  Eij.  543.    j).  583. 
Booraem  c.  Wlicider,  12  N't.  311.     p.  188. 
Boorman  r.  Atlantic  &.C.  R.  Co.,  17  Hun  (X. 

Y.),  555.     )).  182. 
Booth  V.  Com.,  16  Gratt.  (Va.)  519.    p.  11. 


Booth  r.  Hall,  6  Md.  1.    p.  324. 
Booth  r.  Hvnes,  54  111.  363.     p.  17.50. 
Booth  V.  Millns,  15  Mees.  &  W.  669.    p.  215. 
Boots  r.  Canine.  94  Ind.  408.    p.  1674. 
Boots  V.  Griffith,  97  Ind.  241.     p.  2027. 
Borden  v.  Fitch,  5  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  121.    p.  160. 
Borden  v.  Fowler,  14  Ark.  471.    l>.  1067. 
Boren  v.  State  (Tex.),  4  S.  W.  Rep.  463.    p. 

48. 
Borgraefe  v.  Supreme  Lodge,  22  Mo.  App. 

127.    p.  1627. 
Borkheim  v.  Insurance  Co. ,  38  Cal.  623.    p. 

199. 
Borland  r.  Barrett,  76  Va.  128.    pp.  1022, 1978. 
Borrekins  v.  Bevin,  3  Uawle  (Pa.),  2:5.    )).  925. 
Borrowscale  v.  Bosworth,  98  Mass.   34.    p. 

2060. 
Borst  r.  IJoecker,  6  Johns.  332.    p.  49. 
Bosborough  v.  State,  8  Crim.  Law  Mag.  751; 

s.  c.  21  Tex.  App.  672.    p.  427. 
Bosley  v.   Chesapeake  Ins.   Co.,  3  GiU  &  J. 

(Md.)  473  n.     p.  1983. 
Bosley  V.  Farquar,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  61.    pp. 

1910, 1911. 
Bosse  r.  Thomas.  3  Mo.  App.  472.    p.  2003. 
Bostick  V.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  126.    p.  308. 
Bostock  V.  State,  61  Ga.  635.    p.  676. 
Boston  V.  Baldwin,  139  Mass.  315.    p.  55. 
Boston  r.  Biunev,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  1.    p.  89L 
Boston  v.  Bobbins,  116  Mass.  313.    p.  1934. 
Boston  r.  Tileslon,  11  Mass.  468.    p.  5.5. 
Boston  R.   Co.  v.   Dana,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  83. 

pp.  890, 1966,  1982. 
Boston  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ripley,  13  Allen  (Mass.), 

421.    p.  1003. 
Boston  Mill  Corp.  v.  Bulfinch,  6  Mass.  299. 

p.  1044. 
Bostwick  V.  MahafFy,  48  Mich.  342.    p.  1011. 
Boswell's  Case,20  Graft.  (Va.)860.    p.  1879. 
Bosworth  V.  Barker,  (i5  Ind.  .595.    ji.  1726. 
Bosworth  r.  Swansey,  10  Mete.  (Mass.)  363. 

pp.  1210, 1224. 
Boisford  r.  Yates,  25  Ark.  282.    p.  127. 
Bottenberg  r.  Nixon,  97  Iml.  106.    p.  .563. 
Bottorff  c.  Shellon,  79  Ind.  98.     p)i.  1726,  1728. 
Bottum  V.   Moore,  13  Daly  (X.  Y.),  464.    p. 

1125. 
Boucher  v.  Xew  Haven,  40   Conn.  456.    p. 

1249. 
Boucicault  V.  Fox,  5  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  87.    p. 

1585. 
Bouldin  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  624.    p.  1560. 
Bourke  v.  James,  4  Mich.  336.    jj.  1148. 
Bourne  v.  Seymour,  16    Com.  Bench,  336. 

p.  917. 
Bourreseau  i:  Detroit  Evening  .Journal  Co. 

(Mich.),  6  West.  Rep.  151.    )).  307. 
Bowan   r.   Chicago    \c.   li.   Co., 85  Mo.  533. 

p.  1309. 
Bowden  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  56.    \\  1744. 
Bowditch  V.  Boston,  101  V.  S.  16.    p.  1605. 
Bowditch  V.  Soltyk,  99  Mass.  136.    pp.  819, 

1507. 
Bowen  v.  Lazalere,  44  Mo.  383.    pp.  1598, 1600. 
Bowen  V.  Xew  York   &c.    R.  Co.,  18    X.  Y. 

408.     p.  1236. 
Bowen  v.  Pollard,  71  Ind.  177.    p.  1709. 
Bowen  v.  Spears,  20  Ind.  146.    pp.  219,221, 

222. 
Bowen  r.  State,  108  Ind.  411.    p.  2088. 
Bowen  r.  State.  3  Tex.  App.  617.    p.  1990. 
Bowens  r.  Benson,  .57  Mo.  26.     p.  1056. 
Bower  r.  Larl,  18  Mich.  378.    p.  1670. 
Bowers  r.  .lewell,  2  N.  H.  543.    p.  1031. 
Bowers  r.  Mavo,  32  Minn.  241.    p.  376. 
Bowers  c.  Ross,  55  Miss.  213.    p.  20<!4. 
Bowers  c.  State,  29  Oh.  .St.  542.    pp.  300,  301. 
Bowers   r.   Thomas,  62  Wis.  480.    pp.   1426, 

1427,  1662,  1664. 


XXWlll 


TABLE    OV    CASES. 


Bowon-  Savlnijs'  IJank   r.  Hichnrds,  3   linn 

(N.  v.),  330 ;  «.  0.  G  Thoiiip.  &  C.  (X.  Y.)  r.'.t. 

p.  145 
Bowie  V.  Bralio,  3  Huor  (N.  Y.),  35,    pp.  1041, 

liM4. 
Bowlor  V.  State,  U  Miss.  .^71.    pp.  1833, 1842, 

184:;. 
Bowl.T  r.  ^Vaslllnc•ton,  fii  Mo,  302,    ji,  1!>60. 
llowlini^     £•,    I'unniKiuwcaltli,   7!>     Ky.    ()04. 

p.  4I-.4. 
BowlluK  I'.  Krujr,  .v.  Mo.  44f>.    p.  1747. 
BuWMiai)  f.  Chicago  &c.  U.  Co.,85  Mo.  533. 

p.  ]:<<i7. 
Bowman  r.  State,  41  Tex.  417.     pp.  30,  CO,  116. 
Bowman  f.  Welliir,  :!'.•  111.  41(!.     |..  I'.ll. 
Bowman  r.  \Vooil.-i,  1  Ci.  Greeno  (Iowa),  441. 

pp.  78:!,  784. 
Bowman,  In  re,  7  Mo.  .\pp.  .^63.    pp.  1'23.  124, 
Bowno  r,  A\  Itt,  111  Wcml.  (X,  Y.)  47."),    p.  48. 
Boxley  r.  Carney,  14  Iml.  17.     i>.  ."itil. 
Boyco  r.  .Vn.ler.-ion.2  I'et.  (C.  S  )  150.    i>.  1:U2. 
Bovce   r.  California  A:e.  Stage  Co.,  25  Cal. 

460.     pp.  icoe,  im:i,  ItWl?. 
Bovcc  I-.  \.nko.  17  S.  C.  481,    p.  218. 
Bovce  r,  t<mitll,  H!  Mo.  317.     p.  iOtS. 
Boyd  r.  .\n.l.rson,  lui  In<l.  217.     p.  2058. 
BoVfl  I-.  Banli.'J.")  Iow;i,  2.">.'>.     p.  338. 
Bovtl  r.  Blai.sdell,  15  Ind,  73.    p.  2141. 
Bovd  r.  Brotliersou,  10  Wend.   (X.  Y.)  93. 

p".  818. 
Bovd  r.  llurlbut,  41  Mo.  204,    p.  966, 
Boyd  r.  Mclvor,  11  Ala.  822.    i)p.  1408, 1637. 
Bovd   r.  -Mexico  SoiUliern  Bank,  67 -Mo.  537. 

pp.  1132,1133. 
Bovd  r.  Sanfonl,  14  Kan.  280.     p.  2097. 
Boyd  V.  fitate,  17  tia.  I'.M.     pp.  111.  58.5, 
Bo'vden  r.  Moore,  5  Ma.ss.  365.     )).  17.t4, 
BoVdston  V.  Giltacr,  3  Ore,  113.    pp.  1656, 

1833. 
Bover  r.  Rllcv,  41  Iowa,  14,     p.  903, 
Boyintrton  i-,'state,2  Tort.  (.Ma.)  100,    p.  9. 
Bo'vkin    r.  I'crrv,  4  Joues  L,   (X.    U,)  325. 

p",  icits, 
Bovlan  r.  Meeker,  23  X.  J.  L,  274,    p.  1008. 
Bovle  r.  People,  4  Colo.  176.     p.  .58. 
BoVnton  r.  iIolme.-»,:iS  111,  59.    p.  1750, 
Bovntou  r,  Trumlnill,  45  X.  H.  408,    pp.  1963, 

l!Wi5. 
Bovnton  r.  Vezle,  24  Me.  286.     p.  915, 
Bracegirdlc  i:  Bailev,  1  Fost.  &  Fin,  536, 

p.  384. 
Braekett  v.  Morse.  23  Vt.  354.    p.  892. 
Bradliurv    v.  Cony,  62    Me.  223.    pp.    1922, 

l'.>2:i,  lit69. 
Brafll.urv  v.  Falmonth,  18  Me.  181.    p.   1249. 
Bradliiirv  v.  Idalio  &c.  Co.,  10  Pac.  llep.  620. 

)..  2036' 
Bradee   r.    Brownlleld,  9  Watt»   (Pa.),  124. 

].|'.4<;7.47l,  472. 
Bradford   r.    I'earson,  12  Mo.  71.     pp.   1673, 

1671,  K.79. 
Bradford  r.  School  Tp.,  107  Ind,  280.   p,  2082, 
Bradford  r.   Sonlli   Carolina  U.  Co.,  t  Uich. 

L,  (.>.  (.',)     pp.  201,  840. 
Bradfr>rd  r.  State,  15  Ind,  347.     pp.  4S,  73,  12'3, 

VJM,  I  IKK). 
Bradlev  c.  Andre.M.H,  30  Ala.  80.     p.  2119. 
Bradley  r.  P.radley,  45  Ind.  67,     pp.   26,  1912, 

2li2;i,  •2034,  2041. 
Braillev  r.  (Jamp,  Klrhy  (Conn,),  77.     pp. 

Hi'.k;.  iio;j. 
Bradley  f.  Clark,  1  Cush,   (Mass.)  293,    pp. 

215,  241. 
Bradleyr.  Fisher,  13  Wall.    (U.  S.)   33.'..    p. 

Hi". 

Bradley  r.  Oljear,  10  X.  II.  477.     p.  .103. 
Bradley  r.  State,  i'.l  Ind.  4'.>2.     pp     Ivj',,   1827, 
Brn<llev  I-.  We«t,  60  .Mo.  .•>'.».     p.  1708. 
Bradley,  E.\  i>arte,  48  Ind.  54<J.     p.  2o82. 


Bradley,  Kx  parte,  7  Wall,    (I'.  S.)    376,     pp. 

1.511,  1.5'.t. 
llradshaw  v.  Bradshaw,  1   liuss.  &   Mvl,  358. 

I..  277. 
Brailsliaw  r.  Coml.s,  lf>2  III.  429.    p,  32:5, 
Itradshaw  r.  Ihil>l>ard,  6  III.  :i'.lo.     ]ip.  5S,  113. 
Brad>liaw  I-,  M:ivlleld,24  Te\     481,     p.    1667. 
Brad.shaw  r.  Stale,  lit  .Neb.  (>44.     p.  2078. 
Bradshaw  r.   State,  22  X,    W,   Bep.  361,     pp, 

709.  745,  746. 
Bradshaw  r,  Yates,  67  Mo.  221.     p.  1410. 
Hradstreet  v.  Iluutlngtou,  5  Pet,  (U,  S.)  402. 

p.  1044. 
Bra.lstreut,  Ex  parte,  4  Pet.  (IT.  S.)   102.    p. 
'       2132. 
Bradt  r.  Uomniel.  26  Minn.  605.     p.  1984. 
Bradwav  v.   Waddell,  1(5  Ind.   170,     pp.1726, 

1728,  lt30. 
Brady  r,  American  I*rlnt  Works,  119  Mass. 

98.     J).  1934. 
Brady  i:  Com,,  11  Bush  (Kv,),  282.    pii.  1871, 

187'2 
Brady  v.  Felsll,  54  Cal.  181.     p.  20.57. 
Brady  v.  Steamboat  Highland  Marv,  17  Mo. 

461,     p.  12'.i'.i. 
Bragg  r.  Town  of  Brailford,  33  Vt,  3.5.    p,  892. 
Brainard  /■.  Stiipliin,  C.  Vt.  '.i.    p.  1072, 
Brake  r.  Slate,  4  Itaxt.  (Tenn.)  361.     ii    1923. 
Brakelield  r.  State,  1  Sueed  (Tenn,),  215.    p. 

73, 
Brakcn  r.  Martin, 3  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  55.  ji.  1044. 
Brakken  r.  .Minneapolis  Ac.  11.  Co.,  29  .Minn. 

41.     jip.  670,  (»). 
Bramin  c.  Bingham,  26  X'.  Y.  4&3.     p.  340. 
Bramlette  r.   Stale,  21   Tex.   App.  611.    pp. 

1680,  1817. 
Bramwell  v.  Lucas,  2  Barn.  &  Cress,  745,    p. 

272. 
Branbnrry  v.  Cocktleld,  2  McMuU,    L,  274. 

p.  1190. 
Branch  r.   Dawson  (Minn.),  30  X^   W.  Rep. 

545.     p.  95. 
(Sranch  r.  Doane,  17  Conn.  403.     p.  1750. 
Itranch  c.  Palmer,  («  (;a.  211.     y.  tM3. 
liranch  /■.  Stale,  41  Tex.  622.     i<.  1.5;!7. 
Kranch  r.  Walker,  '.t2  N.  ('.  69.     p.  102. 
Branch  Bank  r.  Moseley.  lit  Ala.  '222.   p.  2119. 
Brandin  c.  Grannis,  1  Conn,   402u.     pp.  1902, 

llHMi. 
Brandon   r.    People,  42  X,   Y.  265,     pp.  413, 

524,  .526,  .529,  .5:!o,  534,  5:i5. 
Brandreth's  Case,  32  How,  St,  Tr.  7.5.5.    pp, 

45,  87,  88,  03,  105. 
Brandt  I-.   Klein,   17  John.s.    (X,    Y,)  335,     p. 

275. 
Brandt  v.  (3gden,   1   .Johns,    (X,    Y,)  1.56,    p. 

1(114. 
Branford  r.  Freeman,  1  Kng.  Law  &  Eq.  444. 

p.  21.5. 
Branger  r.  Bntlrick.  28  Wis.  450,     p.  2f)64. 
Branham  c.    Brown,  1    Itailey   (S,   C),  262. 

p.   1.588, 
Brann   r.   Camiibell,    86    Ind.    510.     pp.  *67, 

468. 
Br.innock   c.  Bouldin,5   Ired,    L.  (X.   C;  61. 

p.  :{51. 
Brarinon  r.  May,  42  Iml.  02.     Pp.  2039,  2063. 
Branson    r.  Canrthcrs,  49  Cal.  374.     pp,  570, 

707. 
Branson  r.  Turner.  77  Mo.  489.     p.  1129. 
Braiistetter  r.  Diirnnigh,  81  Ind.  .527.   j).  1756. 
Ilrantlev  r.  Carter,  2<;  ^Ilss   2.S2      p.  1747. 
Itranlley  r.  W.-st,  27  Ala.  542      j).  860. 
Brashears  r.  Stale,  5S  Md.  r<i\.\.     p.  1H08. 
Bratton  r.  Brvan,  1  .\.  K.    .Marsh,    (Ky.)  212. 

p.  118. 
Bravo  r.  Slate,  20  Tex.  App.  188.     p.  1746. 
Brnv  r.  Iladwen,  5  Maiile  &  S.  68.    p.  944. 
Brav  r.  State,  41  Tex.  660.     pp.  107,  1835. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


XXXIX 


Brardon  v.  Goalman,  1  Monr.   (Ky.)    115. 

p. "307. 
Bravton  v.  Dexter,  12  Atl.  Rep.  132.    p.  2060. 
Brayton  v.  Freese,  1  lud.  121.    p.  lOfiO. 
Brazier  v.  State,  44  Ala.  387.    pp.  4,94. 
Brazleton  v.  State,  11  Ueportcr,  291.    p.  58. 
Breading  v.    Dubarry,  14    Serg.   &.    11.    27. 

p.  1131. 
Breclieisen  i\  Coffev,  15  Mo.  App.  80.    p.  825. 
Breck  v.  Blanctiard',  27  X.  H.  100.    p.  1985. 
Breck  r.  Cole,  4  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  79.    p.  1068. 
Breckenkainp  v.  liees,3  Mo.  App.  585.    pp. 

793,  8UK. 
Breeding  r.  .State,  11  Tex.  257.    p.  11. 
Breedlove  v.  Bundy,  96  Ind.  319.     pp.  311, 

1719. 
Breese  v.  State,  12  Oh.  St.  146.    pp.  1669, 1679. 
Breeze  v.  Doyle,  19Cal.  101.    p.  2015. 
Brehm   v.   Great  Wej^tern  R.  Co.,  34  Barb. 

(X.  Y.)  256.     pp.  1207,  1236,  1237,  1238. 
Breniian  v.  Cilv  of  St.  Louis  (Mo.),  2  S.  AV. 

Rep.  481.     p.  747. 
Breunan  r.  security  Life  Ins.  Co.,  4  Daly 

(N.  Y.),  296.     pp.  222,  224,  235. 
Brennau    v.   State,  33  Tex.   286.    pp.  9,  121, 

1995. 
Breniian  v.  Tracv,  2  Mo.  App.  540.    pp.  1180, 

1186. 
Brennan  r.  Wallace,  25  Cal.  108.    p.  1015. 
Brenner  r.  llerr,  8  Pa.  St.  106.    p.  955. 
Brentlinger  v.  Hutchinson,  1  "Watts   (Pa.), 

46.    p.  1063. 
Brenzer  v.  Wightman,  7  Watts  &  S.  (P.a.)  264. 

pp.  942,  943. 
Bressler  r.  People,  117  111.  422;  s.  c.  8  Crlm. 

L.  ]Mag.  466.    pp.  438,  441,  1765,  1801,  1865, 

1869,  1870. 
Bret  V.  J.  S.,  Cro.  Eliz.  755.    p.  889. 
Brewer  r.  Craig,  18  N.  J.  L.  214.    p.  891. 
Brewer  v.  Crosby,  11  Gray  (Mass.),  29.     p. 

396. 
Brewer  r.  Jacobs,  22  Fed.  Rep.  217.    pp.  118, 

2071. 
Brewer  v.  Opie,  1  Call  (Va.),  212.    p.  2017. 
Brewer  v.  ^alt  Assn.,  47  Mich.  526.    p.  912. 
Brewster  v.   Doaue,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  537.    p. 

642. 
Brewster  r.  Thompson,  1  X.  J.  L.  32.    p.  1982, 

1985. 
Briant  v.  Fowler,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)    562.    p. 

1929. 
Briant  r.  Russell,  2  X.  J.  L.  107.    p.  5. 
Bricker  r.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  83  Mo.  391. 

1>.  2002. 
Brieklev  v.  Weghorn,  71  Ind.  497.    pp.2014, 

2113. 
Bridge  r.  Eggleston,  14  Mass.  245.    p.  1982. 
Bridge  r.  Grand  Junction  R.  Co.,  3  Mee.  & 

W.  246.     p.  1221. 
I'.ridu-.'  i:  Wellington,  1  Mass.  219.    p.  328. 
Bridger  c.  Ashville  &c.  U.  Co.  (S.  C),  3  S. 

E.  Uei>.  860.     )).  1234. 
Bridgers  r.  Uridwrs,  69  X.  0.451.    p.  551. 
Bridges  r.  Xorth  London  R.  Co.,L.  R.  7  H. 

L.21:!.     pi).  1208,  1212,  1216. 
Bridges  v.  Sheldon,  7  Fed.  Rep.  19.    i>.  188. 
Bridges  v.  Smyth,  8  Bing.  29;  s.  c.  1  Moore  & 

S.  93.     ]).  796. 
Bridgetou   i\    Jones,   34  Mo.    472.    pp.  967, 

969. 
Brig  Cadmus  r.  Matthews,  2  Paine  C.  C.  229. 

p.  821. 
Brig  Collenberg,  1  Black   (U.  S.),   170.    p. 

1:542. 
Briggs  V.  A  Light  Boat,  7  Allen  (Mass.),  287. 

p.  910. 
Briggs  V.  Byrd,  12  Ircd.  L.  (X.  C.)  377.    p.  119. 
Briggs  r.  Georgia,  15  Vt.  t!l.     p.  117. 
Briggs  c.  Hall,  4  Leigh  (Va.),484.    p.  1003. 


Briggs  V.  Matsell,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  156.    p. 

186. 
Briggs  r.  Morgan,  3   Phillimore,  325;  s.    c.l 

Eng.  Ecc.  490;  2  Hagg.  Con.  324.     pp.  646, 

648. 
Briggs  V.  Oliver,  4  Hnrl.  A  C.  403;  s.  c.  35  L. 

J.  (Exch.)  163;14L.  T.  (N.  S.)  412;14  Week. 

Rep.  6.08.    I).  1222. 
Briggs  r.  Parkman,  2  Mete.  (Mass.)  2.^8.    pp. 

1442,  1443. 
Brljiga  V.  Vanderbilt,  16  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  222.    p. 

1610. 
Brigg.s  r.  Wheeler,  16  Hun   (X.  Y.),583.    pp. 

43;i,  435. 
Bright  V.  Wilson,  7  B.  Mon.    (Ky.)  123.    pp. 

2095,  2097. 
Brill  V.  Flagler,  23  Wend.   (X.  Y.)  354.    p. 

627. 
Brill  V.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  572.    pp.  113. 119, 

123. 
Brinklev  v.  Brinkley,  47  X.  Y.  40.    p.  151. 
Brinklev  r.  State,  54  Ga.  371.    pp.  30,  31. 
Brinkley  v.  State,  58  Ga.  296.    pp.  123,  124. 
Brinkceter  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  67.    pp.  1538, 

1889. 
Brlntall  v.  Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  Vt.  665. 

p.  1334. 
Brlsbau  r.  Boyd,  4  Paige  (X.  Y.)  17.    p.  HOC. 
Brister  v.   State,  26  Ala.  107.    pp.  40,  1978, 

1979. 
Bristol  V.  Spragne,  S  Wend.  (X.  Y'.)  423.    pp. 

1103,  1104. 
Briston  v.  Wright,    Doug.   (Mich.)    665.    p. 

1615. 
Bristow's  Case,  15  Graft.  (Va.)  634.    pp.  Ill, 

122,  123. 
Brittain  v.  ^Ulen,  2  Dev.  L.  (X.  C.)  120.    pp. 

56,  57. 
Britton  V.Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.,  43  Am.  Rep. 

749.     p.  1293. 
Britton  v.  Cunningham,  107  Mass.    347.    p. 

1210. 
Britton  v.  Fox,  39  Ind.  .369.    p.  1997. 
Britton  r.   Turner,  6  X.  H.  481 ;  s.  c.  26  Am. 

Dec.  713.    p.  893. 
Broad  v.  Ham,  5  Bing.  (X.  C.)  722.    pp.  1164, 

1199. 
r.roadwell  v.  Swigcrt,  7  B.  3Ion.   (Ky.)  39. 

p.  1223. 
Brock  V.  Gale,  14  Fla.  .523.    p.  1154. 
Brockbank  v.  Whitehaven  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Hurl. 

&  X.  834.    p.  1235. 
Brockett  v.  Xew  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  13 

Fed.  Rep .  156.    p.  583. 
Broder  v.  Saillard,  2  Ch.  Div.  692.    pp.  1386, 

1394,  1395. 
Broniage  r.  Prosser,  4   Barn.  &  Cres.  247. 

pp.  795,  1457,  1460,  1462. 
Bron.son  v.  Green,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)  238.    p.  2097. 
Bronson  v.  Kensey,  3  McLean  (U.  S.),  180. 

p.  593. 
Bronson  v.  Metcalf,  1  Disney  (Oh.),  21.    p. 

1944,  19.55. 
Bronson  r.  People,  32  Mich.  34.     pp.  110,113. 
Hronson    v.   Southbury,   37  Conn.    199.    pp. 

1209,  1232. 
Bronson  v.  Tuthill,  1  Abb.  Dec.  (X.  Y.)  206. 

p.  621. 
Brook  V.  Montague.  Cro.  Jac.  90.    p.  795. 
Brookband  r.  State,  55  Ind.  169.    pp.  489,  490, 

2129. 
Brooke  v.  Townshend,  7  Gill  (Md.),16.    p. 

227. 
Brooker  i\  Weber,  41  Ind.  436.    pp.  2030, 2032. 
Brooklyn  v.  Patchin,  8  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  47.    pp. 

69S,  (i99. 
Brooks  V.  Allen,  62  Ind.  405.    p.  1036. 
Brooks  c.  Barrett,  7  Pick.   (Mass.)   W.    pp« 

219,  228,  229. 


xl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Rrooka  v.  nrnvn,  35  111.  3M.    p.  50. 

Hrooks  f.  Hntfnlo  Ac.  11.  Co.,  25  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 

»•*<).    ]>.  ItVH. 
Hrooks  r.  Elgin,  6  GUI   (Md.),  254.    1)11.034, 

lt.V>. 
IJrooks  f.  Fnrwcll,  4  Fed.  Roil  16t>.     p.  188. 
Brooks   r.  Missouri,  124  V.  >.  3iM;  ».  c.  8  S.  C. 

Hon.  443.     p.  2(»7S. 
Rrooks   f.  Mitoholl.OMeos.  &  W.  l.V    p.  038. 
Hrooks  f.  Morjcan, .')  Ircd.  (X.  C".)  481.    p.  l.V.i. 
Hrooks  r.  IVrrv,23  Ark.  .iJ.    p.  70."). 
Hrooks  ,-.  Powers,  l.->  .Mass.  244.    p.  1442. 
Hrooks  r.  Hojul,  13  Johns.    (X.   Y.)  380.     pp. 

88'.i.  8'.t8,  SifX 
Hrooks  i:  Somervillo,  106  Mass.  271.    pit.  1247, 

l»»o,  i(!o:{. 
Hrooks  c.  standard  Flrolns.  Co.,  11  -Mo.  App. 

;i.V).    p.  828. 
Brooks  f.  Warwick,  2  SUirk.  389.    pp.  1169, 

1181. 
Rrooks  r.  AVlnicr.  20  Mo.  .'103.    p.  1440. 
Hrooinlleld  v.  Suiilh.  1   Mees.   &  W.  542.    p. 

131!1. 
Rrottiorton  r.  .Tones.  Hill  &  Dcnlo  Supp.  {X'. 

V.)  171.     p.  li'.(ii). 
Hromvor  r.  Hill.  1  .''andf.  S.  C.  (X.  Y.)  630.   p. 

1(H>8. 

Hrow  r.  State,  103  Tnd.  133.    p.  754. 
Hroward  c.  Do^K'^tt,  2  Fla.  49.     p.  8.'J6. 
Hnnvn  r.  Ail.iiiis  Kxpress  Co.,  15  W.  Va.  812. 

pp.  1322,  1:14."),  1:547,  1348,  1350 
Hrown   I-.  Atililsoii  &c.  li.  Co.,  1  Pac.   Rep. 

WIS.     p.  12:!'.l 
Hrown  c.  Atchlsou  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Kau.  1.    p. 

KV21. 
Hrown  v.  Autrcy  (Ga.),  3  S.  E.  Rep.  669.     p. 

111. 
Hrown  r.  Hccknall,  5  Jones  Eq.  (X\  C.)  423. 

p.  1im;i 
Hrown  v.  Howen,  30  X.  Y.  520.    p.  1750. 
15rown   f.   Hrown,   1   Uang.  Ecc.  523;  s.c.   3 

Kiijr.  Fee.  22'.l.     i>.  i;4(>,  C48. 
Hrown  c.  Hrown,  8  Mote.    CMass.)   573.    pp. 

834,  M-.i. 
Hrown  r.  Hurrus,  8  Mo.  26.     pp.  312,  313,  318, 

-.iSA.  718. 
Hrown   r.  Central  Pac.  U.   Co.,  12  Pac.  Rep. 

512.     p.  20:54. 
Hrown  r.  Clienowortli,  51  Tcx.  469.    p.  .3. 
Hrown  r.  Clarke,  4  How.  (C.  S.)  4.    p.  213:5. 
Hrown  I-.  Cockerell,  :53  Ala.  3S.     p.  1670. 
Jirown  r.   Coin.,  2  Luifjli   (Va.),  769.     pp.  69, 

74. 
Hrown.  r.  Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.).  711.    p.  7. 
Hrown  r.  Com.,  73  Pa.  St.  322.     p.  1.5. 
Hrown    c.  ConKdon,.'»0  Conn.  302.    p.  1979. 
I'.rown  r.  Connrlly,  5  Hlackf.  (lud.)  390.     pp. 

llT'.i,  ll.s:;. 
ISrowii   ;•.   Covenant  Mut.  Life  Tub.   Co.,  86 

.Mo.  51.    |i.  \iyi\x. 
Hrown  r.  Ka-tcrn  R.  Co.,  11  Cush.  (Mas.s.) 

97.     PI'.  lO'.il,  lO'.t.-.,  VMV,. 
Hrown  r.  KIIkoII.  2  .M.l.  7.').     pp.  1109,  1(>46. 
Hrown    f.  Fsinonde,  Irish  Rep.,  4    Kri.  630. 

p.  'X,. 
Hrown   v.  European  Ac.  R.  Co.,  58  Me.  384. 

pp.  1226,  12:52,  1603,  1604,  1605. 
Hrown  r.  Kvans,  18  F.-d.  Rep.  .56.     p.  2068. 
P.rown  r.  FIteli.  :53  N.  J.  I-.  41s.     p.  833. 
Hrown  r.  (Jay.  3  Me.  126.     p.  1090. 
Hrown  r.  (JennnK.  1  W<'nd.(X.  V.)  115.    p.  141. 
Hrown  !•.  (irlimiiH,  11  oii.  .^t.  :52'.t.     p.  2:50. 
Hrown  I-    Hannil.al   Ae.  R.  Co.,  GG  Mo.  688. 

pp.  1484,  1770,  1772. 
Hrown  r.  Hntlon.9  Ired.  ^X.C.)319.    p.  825. 
Hrown  f.  Home  .^nvhiKs  Hank,  5  Mo.  App.  1. 

Hrown  r.  Hnjcer,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  305.    p.  827. 
Brown  v.  Hughes,  1  Foot.  A  Fin.  299.    p.  635. 


Hrown  r.  Isboll,  11  Ala.  1009.    p.  1669. 
I5rown  i-.  Jones.  46  Harli.  (X.  Y.)  400.     p.  363. 
Hrown  r.  Kellar,  40  III.  81.    p.  146. 
Brown  r.  Kirk,  2(i  .Mo.  App.  .524.     p.  871. 
Brown  r.  Klrkpalrlck,  5  S.  C.  267.     pp.  218, 

Brown    r.   Lacrosse    G«8   Co.,   21    WU.  61. 

PI'.  117,  120. 
Brown  V.  Leulirs.  1   Bradw.  (111.)  74.    p.  450. 
Brown  r.  Lvnn.  :!1  I'a.  .St.  510.     p.  1:50.5. 
Brown    v.    McCounel,    1     Bibb     (Kv.),    265. 

p.  1910. 
Hrown    r.    McCorralck,    23    Mo.    App,    181. 

p    10.')1. 
Brown  1-.  Mc(;raw,  14  Pet.  (F.  .«.)479.     p.aw. 
Brown  V.  .Mel.elsli,  71  la.  381 ;  a.  c.  32   X.  W. 

Kep.  38.'>.     I'.  2IMI8. 
Brown  r.  Milwaukee  &C.  R.  Co., 22  Minn.  105. 

p.  1226. 
Brown  r.  Missouri  Ac  R.  Co.,  13  .Mo.  App. 

462.    p.  810. 
Hrown   r.  Missouri    Ac.  R.  Co.,  6t  Mo.  630, 

p.  1298. 
Hrown  V.  Mooers,6  Grav  (Mass.), 451.    p.  471, 
Brown   f.  Muuclc   Xat^  Hank,  Ho  lud.  323. 

p.  21118. 
Hrown  v.  Murray.  Hy.  A  >r.  254      p.  246. 
Hrown  r.  Xew  York  Ac.  R.  Co.,  32  X.  J.  597. 

p.  497. 
Hrown  r.  Pavson.  6  X.  H.  443.    p.  272. 
15rowu  r.  People,  9  111.  4:59      n.  1700. 
Hrown  f.    People,   8  Hun   (X.   Y.),   662    p. 

413. 
Brown  r.  Perkins,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 89.    pp. 

326.  425,  ,566.  14S(». 
Brown  I-.  Ralston,  4  Rand.  (Va.)  .516.    p. 2008, 

2(K(',». 

Brown   i\  Heed.  79  Pa.  St.  370 ;«.  c.  21  Am. 

Kep.  75.     p.  12.50. 
Brown  r.  Richardson,  20  X.  Y.  474.    p.  553. 
Brown  c.  Ulley,  22  111.  4.').     p.  1442. 
Brown  V    Rose,  .').'>  la.  7:54.     p.  211.54. 
Brown  r.  State,  52  Ala.  ;545.     p.  11:5. 
Brown   f.  State,  23  Ga.  439.    pp.  117,  .^57,  977, 

l'.>84. 
Brown  v.  State,  58  Ga.  212.    ])p.  541,  .542. 
Brown  V.  State,  (K)  (in.  210.    pp.  540,  729,  747, 

1806. 
Brown  r.  State,  16  Ind.  496.    p.  .5. 
Brown  i\  Stale,  6  Blaekf.  (Ind.)  .561.     p.  5. 
Brown  c.  State,  24  Ind.  Il:l.     )•.  4X5. 
Brown  (•   State,  71  Ind.  470.     p.  297. 
Brown  r.  State,  7ii  Ind.  577.     pp.  70,  74,  115. 
Brown  r.  State,  :i2  Miss.  4:5:1.     p.  17.'<5. 
Brown  r.  State,  :>1  .Miss.  424;  a.  c.  10  Cent.  L. 

.1.  :576.     pi>.  115    116. 
Brown  r.  State,  tW  .Miss.  447.     p.  122. 
Brown  c.  state,  2  Tex.  App.  115.     p.  1765. 
Brown   c.   .state,  3  Te.\.    App    296.     pp.  263, 

2.55. 
Hrown  r.  Stale,  6  Tex.  App.  286.     p.  1679. 
Brown    r.   State,  2;5  Tex.  li«5.     pp.  1(^55,  1855, 

Brown  v.  Stale,  .38  Tex.  482.     pp.  1903,  1905. 
Brown   1:   Swlnefonl,  44    Wis.    1h-2.     pp.  244, 

6.V5,  714.  728,  7:5H,  712.  717,  7.V2,  762. 
Hrown    r.   Thorndlke,  l.'i    Pick.  (Mass.)  388. 

p.  1008. 
Hrown  r.    Waha«h   Ac.   R.   Co.,  18   Mo.  App. 

.568.     pp.  U.V),  1:168. 
Brown  .f.    Warner,  2  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  39. 

p.  km;. 
Hrown  V.  Waterman,   10  Cush.   (Masu.)  117. 

p.  1321. 
Brown  1:  Welghtman  (.Mich.), 20  X.  W.  Rep. 

9H.      p.  .561. 
Brown  r.  Wheeler,  18  Conn.  IW.     p.  .58. 
Brown  v.   Wlllev,   42   Pa.   St.   205.     I'p.    1077. 
Hrowu'H  Case,  9  Leigh  ( Vn.i.  6.14      )..  :i49. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


xli 


Brown's  Lessee  v.  Galloway,  Pet.  C.  C.  (U 

S.)  294.     p.  572. 
Browne  v.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  68  Mo.  133.    p.  1708 
Brownell  v.   Flagler,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  282.    p 

1223. 
Brownell  r.  McEwen,  5  Denio   (N.  Y.),  367 

pp.  1983,  1985. 
Brownell  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  47  Mo.  240.    p 

2(»02. 
Brownfield    v.    Brownfleld,   43   111.  147.    p 

167(1. 
Brownfleld  r.  Brownfield.  12  Pa.  St.  136.    p 

l(t84. 
Browning  v.  ITlght,  78  Ind.  277.    p.  1709. 
Browning  r.  State,  30  Miss.  657.    p.  1840. 
Browning  v.  State,  33  Miss.  48.    p.  1857. 
Browning  v.   state,  1  Tex.  App.  96.    p.  1744. 
Browning  r.  \Vall)urn,  45  Mo.  477.    p.  1611. 
Brownlee  v.  Hare,  64  Ind.  311.    pp.  2:59,  2112. 
Brownlee  v.  Hewitt,  1  Mo.  App.  360.    p.  735. 
Bruas's  Appeal,  55  Pa.  St.  294.    p.  882. 
Brubaker  f.  Olieson,  36  Pa.  St.  519.    pp.  851, 

852,  855. 
Bruce  v.  Barnes,  20  Ala.  219.    p.  239. 
Bruce  v.  Sims,  34  Mo.  246.    pp.  1608, 1661. 
Bruce  v.  State,  87  Ind.  450.    p.  2142. 
Bruce  v.  Ulerv,  79  Mo.  322.    pp.  1489, 1494. 
Bruce  i'.   AVe^itcott,  3  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  374.    p. 

1034, 
Brucli  V.  Carter,  32  N.  J.  L.  554.    p.  1645. 
Brucker  r.  State,  16  Wis.  333.    p.  1904. 
Brun  V.  Duinav,  2  Mo.  102.    p.  20.50. 
Bruner  r.  State,  58  Ind.  159.    p.  1574. 
Bruner  v.  Marcuui,  50  Mo.  405.    pp.  2,  3. 
Brun  skill  v.  Giles,  9  Bing.  13.     pp.  110,  1975. 
Brusberg  r.  Milwaukee  &C.  R.  Co.,  55  Wis. 

106.     p.  1668. 
Brush  V.  Keeler,  34  Conn.  499.    p.  1749. 
Bryan   v.  Cliicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  63  la.  464.    p. 

1666. 
Brvau  r.  Courscy,  3  Md.  61.    p.  324. 
Bryan   v.  Forsyth,  19  How.   (U.  S.)  334.    p. 

819 
Bryan  v.  Harrison,  76  N.  C.  360.    p.  42. 
BrVan  v.  Slate,  4  Iowa,  349.    p.  4. 
Bryan  r.  United  States,  1  Black  (U.  S.),  140. 

p.  1671. 
Brvan  v.  Walton,  20  Ga.  480.    p.  310. 
Bryant  v.  Biddeford,  39  Me.  193.    p.  1247. 
Bryant  r.  Crosby,  40  Me.  9.    p.  1705. 
Bryan  t  v.  Kelton,  1  Te.x.  415.    pp.  1441, 1445. 
Bryant  r.  Moore,  26  Me.  84.    p.  1(j25. 
Bryant  v.  Peters,  3  Ala.  170.    p.  t49. 
Bryant  r.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  144.    p.  ]a')5. 
Bryant  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  107.    p.  1679. 
Bryne  r.  Hoodie.  2  Hurl.  &  C.  722;  s.  c.  33  L. 

J.  (Exch.)  13.     ]).  1222. 
Bryorly  i:  Clark,  48  Tex.  345.    p.  2064. 
Bubaker  v.  Taylor,  76  Pa.  St.  83.    p.  394. 
Buchanan  v.  Reynolds,  4  W.  Va.  681.    p.  1983. 
Bucher  r.  .Jarratt,  3  Bos.  &  Pul.  143.     p.  608. 
Buclinian  r.  Siati',  59  I  ml.  1.     jip.  164,  176. 
Buck  r.  Mallory,  24  Miss.  170.     pp.  128. 
Buckingham  c.  Smith.  23  Conn.  453.    p.  967. 
Buckland   r.  Adams  Expres.s  Co.,  97  Mass. 

125.     p.  13(S. 
Buckland  v.  Conway,  16  Mass.  396.    p.  193. 
Buckley  v.  Artcher,"21  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  585.    p. 

1412. 
Buckley  r.  Garrett,  47  Pa.  St.  205.    p.  984. 
Buckley  v.  (iuildliauk,  Cro.  .Jac.  678.    p.  886. 
Buckley  v.  Knai)]),  48  Mo.  152.    pp.  560,  762, 

1291. 
Buckley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  IS  Mich.  121.    p.  1374. 
Buckley  v.  State, <i2  .Miss.  705.    pji.  1801,  1803. 
Bucklin  v.  State,  20  Oh.  18.    p.  476. 
Buckniiuster  >•.  Perry,  4  Mass.  593.    p.  228. 
Bncknal    v.   Rolston,    Prec.    in     Chan.  285. 

p.  1440. 


Budd  V.  Brooke,  3  Gill  (Md.),  198.    p.  875. 
Budd  r.  Falrnianer,  5  Carr.  &  P.  78.    p.  927. 
Budd  V.  Hiler,  27  N.  J.  L.  43.    p.  890. 
Budd  V.  Hoffheimer,  52  Mo.  297.    p.  1667. 
Buddicum    v.   Kirk,  3  Cranch   (U.   S.),  293. 

p.  568. 
Buddy  V.  Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  Mo.  App. 

206.     pp.  1322,  1345. 
Budlong   V.  Xostrand,  24  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  25. 

]j.  433. 
Buel  V.  People,  78  X.  Y.  492.    p.  17.58. 
Buesching  r.  St.  Louis  tias  Light  Co.,  73  Mo. 

219;  s.  c.  6  Mo.  App.  85;  6  Cent.  L.  J.  458. 

pp.  1222,1223,1226,1261. 
Buessnieyer    v.  Stuckenburg,   33    Mo.    546. 

p.  560. 
Buettingcr  r.  Hurley,  34  Kan.  585.    p.  205L 
Bute  r.  Turner,  6  Taunt.  338.    pp.  1411,  1417. 
Buffington  r.  Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  246. 

p   1607. 
Buffington  r.  Cook,  35  Ala.  312.    p.  1637. 
Buford  v.  :McGetchie,  60  Iowa,  298.    p.  HO. 
Buford  V.  State,  44  Tex.  525.    p.  1.560. 
Buhol  r.  Boudousquie,  8  Mart.  (n.  S.)  (La.) 

425.    p.  13. 
Buie  V.  Caryer,  75  N.  C.  .559    p.  462. 
Buie  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  455.    pp.  118,  120. 
Bulen  V.  Granger,  58  Mich.  274  ;  s.  f.  29  X.  W. 

Rep.  718.     pp.  1622,  1676, 1945. 
Bulkeley  v.  Keteltas,  6  X.  Y.  387.    pp.  1180, 

1188. 
Bulkeley   v.    Smith,   2   Dner   (X\    Y'.),  271. 

pp.  1181,  1198. 
Bull   i-.  Com.,  14  Gratt.   (Va.)  613.    pp.  557, 

1983. 
Bull  V.  Loyeland,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  9.    pp.  265, 

Bull's  Case,  14  Gratt.  (Va.)  613.    p.  19&5. 
Bullard  V.  Boston  &c.  Co.  (X.  H.),5  Atl.  Rep. 

16.    p.  747. 
Bullard  v.  Pearsall,  53  X.  Y.  230.    p.  357. 
Bullard    V.  Randall,  1    Gray  (Mass.),  605. 

p.  1022. 
Bullard  r.  Spoor,  2  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  430.    p.  82. 
Bullard  V.  State,  38  Tex.  504.    pp.  6,  85. 
Bullard  r.  Stone,  67  Cal.  477.    p.  1708. 
Bullard  J-.  Wil.-ion,5  Mart.  (x.  s.)  (La.)  196; 

s.  c.  3  Cond.  .505.    p.  (j42. 
Bulliner  r.  Peoi)le,  95  111.  394.    pp.  258,  729, 

747,  766,  ISO),  1925,2078. 
Bullis  r.   Drake   (Xeb.),  29  X.  AV.  Rep.  292. 

pp.  709,  744,  74.5. 
Bullitt  V.  Musu'iaye.  3  (ull  (:\rd.),31.    p.  le46. 
Bullnor  v.  I'eoide.  95  111.  394.     p.  754. 
Bullock  r.  Coon.  9  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  30.     p.  330. 
Bulloch  V.  Smith,  15  (ia.  395.    pp.  728,  739,747. 
Bulloch  r.  State,  10  (;a.  47.     p.  1634. 
Bullock  v.  Xarrott,  49  111.  65.     p.  861. 
Bullock  r.  Xeal,  42  Ark.  278.     pp.   2o6,  2144. 
Bullock  V.  Wilson,  2  Port.  (Ala.)  436.    p.  1.382. 
Bunibury  ;■.  Bumbury,  2  Beavan,  173.   p.  276. 
Bunce  v.  Beck,  43  Mo.  266.    p.  834. 
Bunch  V.  Hurst,  3  Des.   Eq.  (S.   C.)  273.    p. 

622. 
Bunch  v.  State,  14  Ark.  .544.    p.  1.50. 
Bundy  v.  Hyde,  50  X.  H.  116.    pp.    305,  322, 

.561,"5(>3. 
Bunker  I'.  Shed,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  1.50.    p.  r,42. 
Bunn  r.  Croul,  10  Johns.  (X.  Y".)   239.    pp. 

1723,  1915. 
Bunn  V.  Hoyt,  3  Johns.  (X.  Y'.)  2.55.   pp.  1912, 

1996. 
Bunny  i\  Poyntz,  4  Barn.  &  Ad.  .5(>8.    p.  915. 
Buntain  i\  IJaily,  27  111.  409.    p.  560. 
Buntiu  r.   Rose,  16  lud.  209.    pp.  2025,  2032, 

2040. 
Burchard  r.  P>ooth,  4  Wis.  67.    p.  762. 
Bunkhalter   r.   Coward,  16  S.    C.   435.    pp. 

44,  218,  219,  220,  242. 


xlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Burden  f.  People,  26  Mich.  162.    pp.   50,  Ml 
Biirdlck  r.  Hunt.  43  Ind.  3^-2.     y.  438. 
r.unlliu'  f.  (Jrand  IxxIk*'.  37  .\ln.  47S.     p.  57. 
Burdltt  r.  Swonsou.  17  Tox.  4S'.».     p.  1394. 
Bunlsal  r.  Diivk-.-*,  58  Mo.  138.     p.  204it. 
Burdus  r.   Sliorler,  Baruos'  Notes,  222.    p. 

17y. 
Burfev  i-.  St.ito.  3  Tex.  .\pp.  519.    pp.  20, 124. 
Burgert  r.  ISorchert,  59  .>!.>.  SO.     i>.  1440. 
Burnfs  V.  I^uiglev,  C  Scott   (N.  U.),518.     p. 

li>84. 
Burgos  r.  Wlckhain,  10  Jur.  (x.  8.)  92.    p.  994. 
BurgeBd  f.  Buuuctt,  20  Week.  Hop.  720.    p. 

63:1. 
Burgess  r.  Lijuglev,  5  Mau.  &  Gr.  722.    i>p. 

im>,  19<57. 
Burgett  r.  Hurgott.  43  Ind.  7S.     pp.  119t!,  16'.»4. 
Burtfott  f.  Teal.  '.H  liul.  2r>0.     !>.  2012. 
Burgliaus  v.  Calhouu,   t>    Watts   (Pa.),  210. 

p.  '.'t!5. 
Burhani  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  56  Mo.  330. 

l>p.  12.i.i,  130«). 
Burliauis  t:  Sandford,  19  Wcud.  (N.  Y.)  417. 

p.  li;»7. 
Burk  i:  Andls,  98  Ind.  70.    p.  257. 
Burk  f.  Clark,  8  Fla.  9.    p.  108. 
Burk  f.  Com.,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Kv.)  C75.    p. 

I'.tas. 
Burk  V.  Lewi.*,  6  Madd.  29.    p.  279. 
Burk  r.  State, 27  Ind.  430.    i).  74. 
Burk  c.  State,  2  Har.  .S:  J.  (Md.)  426.    p.  26. 
Burk  r.  Adams,  80  .Mo.  504.    p.  873. 
Burke  r.  Broadway  &c.  K.  Co.,  49  Barb.  (X. 

Y.)  529.     1).  1232. 
Burke  v.  Broadway  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  How.  Pr. 

iN.  Y.)  239.     p.  12-25. 
Burke  t\  Lee,  76  Va.  386.    pp.  825,  828,  1597. 
Burke  f.  Maxwell,  81  Pa.  St.  139.    p.  1646. 
Burke  r.  Southea.stern  U.  Co.,  L.  R.  5  C.  P. 

Ulv.  1.     i>.  1374. 
Burke  r.  State,  72  Ind.  392.    p.  2077. 
Burke  r.  State,  15  Tex.  Ai>p.  I."*,     p.  1737. 
Burke  r.  Webb,  2  N.  Y.  Week.  Dig.  679.    p. 

1723. 
Burkhaltor  v.  Edwards,  16  Ga.  .503.    p.  446. 
Burkhanl    i-.  State,   18  Tex.   App.   599.    pp. 

1679,   1680,  1684. 
Burkhart  r.  State,   18  Tex.  App.  599.    p.  798. 
Burle.wn  r.  Burlesou,  2-*  Tex.  383.     p.  2028. 
Burling  r.  Patterson,  9l'arr.  &  P.  570.  p.  362. 

;urllngan)c   v.  Hurl 
142.     pp.  lls-2,  11«7 


Burllngamc   v.  Kurllugame,  8  Cow.    (N.  Y.) 


■"•(&. 


Burllngauie  v.  Burllngamc,  18  Wis.  285.    p. 

13. 
Burliniiame  r.  Central  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  Fed. 

Uep.  7116.     p.  20(M. 
Burhngame  c.  Corwee,  12  All.  Rep.  234 ;».  C. 

5  .New  Eng.  Ui-p.  664.     pp.  2094,  2096. 
Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dob.son,  17  Neb.  450. 

p.  21IHI. 

Burlington  &c.  R.   Co.  r.  Sater,  1  la.  421.    p. 

1.588. 
Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Schluatz,  14  Neb. 

421.     l'.  1608. 
Bnrlock  r.  SInipe,  17  Pac.  Rep.  19.    p.  2084. 
Barn  r.  Phelp-.,  1  Stark.  94.    j).  1003. 
Burnell  >:  .\.w  York  &c.   R.  Co.,  45  X.  Y.  181. 

pp.  1321,  i:W5. 
Burnett  c.  Phalon,2I    IIow.   Pr.   (X.  Y.)  lOO. 

1>.  2.S0. 
Burney  r.  Hall.  24  Ga.  50.5.     p.  3.'>6. 
Burni-y  r.  .siatc,  21  Tex.  .\pp.  .572.     p.  18iH). 
Burnham  v.  ilattleld,5  lilackf.  (lud.)  21.    p. 

4:w. 
Burnham  v.  Morrlssev,  11  Gray  (MasH.),  226. 

pp.  I.VJ,  KUV 
Burnham  r.  Smith.  11  Wis.  258.    p.  100. 
Burnlev  i-.  Rlre,  21  Tex.  171.     p.  2W7. 
Burus  r.  Barenlleld,  84  Ind.  43.     pp.  406,  408. 


Hums   f.   Burns,  4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  295.    p. 

ltH)8. 

Burns  v.  Elba,  32  Wis.  605.    ji.  1247. 

Burns  r.  North  Chicago  &c.  Co..  60  Wis.  .541. 

pp.  1704,  211.37. 
Burns  r.  Paine.  8  Tox.  150.    pp.  1906,198.1. 
Hums  i:  Sutherland,  7  Pa    St.  103.    p.  1698. 
liurns  r.  Wilson.  1  Mo.  Anp.  179.     i).  1723. 
Uurntr.tger  r.     McDonalu,    31   lud.   277.    p. 

2108. 
lUiron  r.  Konman,  1  Kxrh.  760.    p.  25. 
Burr  r.   ralmor,  23  \  I.  244.     p.  2<i91. 
Hurr  c.  Todd,41   I'.i.  SI.  212.     pp.  870,  1414. 
ISurr  r.  Williams,  Jn  Ark.  172.     p.  8;». 
Iturr  Trial  of,  ciY-./  pp.  21.  27.  61,  ti;i,  67,  68,  69, 

72,  73,  7.").  76,  21."),  261,  265,  2Jil,  lOoO. 
Burrell  r.  Nlcliolson,  1  .Mood.  A  Rob.  3f»4.     p. 

217. 
Burrell  r.  State,  18  Tex.  713.     pp.  W,  115,  471, 

1575,  1855. 
Biirriss  c.  Hlalr,  61  Mo.  133.    p.  82.5. 
Burrill    r.   Phillips,   1  tJall.    (U.  S.)  360.    pp. 

14."),  I'.hh;. 
Burrill  r.  Waterlown  Kank,  51  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

1115.     p.  Ii;i3. 
Burrow  r.  l.angl.'V,  in  Md.  248.     p.  8-21. 
lUirrough  r.  .Marliii,  2  (amp.  112.     p.  :i54. 
Kurrough,-<  r.  Hunt,  13  linl.  178.-   p.  219. 
Burrow  r.  Kagland,  6   Humph.    (Tenn.)  484. 

p.  1,589. 
Burrows  r.   Eric  R.  Co.,  63  X.  Y.  556.    p. 

1236. 
Burrows  v.  Gallup,  32  Conu.  493.    p.  1110. 
Burrows  v.    Stebblus,    26  Vt.   659.     pp.   907, 

1446. 
Burrows  v.    I'nwiu,   3  Car.  &   P.  310.    pp. 

l.-ilMi,  1951. 
Burrows  i\  Whltakor.  71  N.  Y.  291.     p.  912. 
iSurson  I-.  Huntington.  21  Mlrh.  41.5.     )>.  Iti63. 
Burson  c.    Mahonoy,     6  Haxt.    (Tenn.)   304. 

jip.  705,  706. 
Burt  c.  Gwinn,  4   Ilarr.  &    J.  (Md.)   507.     p. 

1W2. 
Burt  r.  Cassetv,  12  .Ma.  734.    p.  873. 
Burt  r.  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.,  115  .Mass.  1.   pp. 

2114,211.5. 
Burt  I-.  I'anjaud.  9l>  U.  S.  180;  s.  c.  18  .Viu.   L. 

Reg.  660.     jip.  lol,  115. 
Burt  c.  .'^latc,  2  ! « »li.  Si.  394.     p.  3.><2. 
Hurt  r.   Wigglosworth.  117  Mass.  302.     p.  2<A. 
Hurtlno  /•.  Stale,  18  (;a.  534.     p.  1913. 
Burtuelt,  .Matterof,  8  Daly   (N.  Y.),363.     p. 

602. 
Burton  i:  Drlggs,  20  Wall.  (U.  S.)  115.   p.  623. 
Burton  i:  Fulton,  49  Pa.  St.  151.     p.  1404. 
Burton  r.  (;rav,  10  Lea   (Tonn.)  .580.     p.  2065. 
Burton  i:   Grllllths,   11   .Mees.  &  W.   817.    p. 

1141. 
Burton  r.  .Merrick,  21,  Ark.  Xu.     p.  1747. 
Burton  r.    riummer,  2   Ad.   \K1.  341;«.   c.  4 

Nov.  iV:  Man.  31.').     iip.  :}54,  360. 
Burton   I-.    Wilkes,  66   N.   C.  604.    pp.    1938, 

193.1.  1917.  r.i.vi. 
Busboe  i:  Finn,  1  Oh.  St.  409.     p.  886. 
Bush  r.  Brown.  4.i  1ml.  .')73.     p.  1006. 
Bush  f.  Biickmgliam,  2  Vontr.  8:1.     n.  885. 
Bush  ('.  Durham.  15  I  ml.  '2.')2.     p.  1742. 
Bush  I'.  Geneva,  3  Tliomp.  ."t  ('.  4ii9.     p.  1249. 
Bush  r.  .lack-on.  24  Ala.  273.     p.  :m. 
Bush  f.  .lohnston,  23  Pa.  ."^t.  209.     p.  1225. 
Bush  r.  Kontuckv,  107  V.   S.  110.     i).  8. 
Bush  c.  Miller,  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  481.     p.  1321. 
Bush  f.  .Sialon.  4  Ind.  .')2-».     )>.  576. 
Bushe  r.  Bavon-.  10  Mo.  .\pp.  579.     p.  20.5.5. 
Bu.shoe  i:  Wright.  1  IMnn.  (Wl».)  101.  p.  1920. 
Busholl  r.  .starling,  3  Keb.  322.     p.  160. 
Bushell's  Case,  Vaugh.  13.5.    pp.  1181,  1605, 

1507.  1512. 
Buslck  r.  State.  19  Ohio,  193.     p.  121. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xliii 


Buswcll  V.  Ptoby,  3  X.  11.  467.     p.  927. 
ISutclier  r.  Andrews,  Carthew,  44C.    p.  889. 
HutclnT  r.  Coats,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  340.     p.  168. 
IJutcluT  V.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  C.  li.  13. 

]).  1151. 
Butcher  r.  Vaca  Val.  R.  Co.,  67  Cal.  518;  s.  c. 

8  Pac.  Rep.  174.     p.  1312. 
r.iitler  V.  Doniian,  68  Mo.  29S.    p.  1028. 
P.utler  V.  I$ensoii,  1  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  526.    p.  365. 
Butler  V.  Butler,  3  Day  (Conn.), 214.    p.  328. 
Butler  V.  Cams,  37  Wis.  61.    p.  '662. 
Butler  V.  Cbic.at,'(>  &e.  R.  Co.,  71  la.  206;  s.  c. 

32  N.  W.  Kei>.  262.     p.  2036. 
Butler  v.  Ileanc,  2  Camp.  415.    p.  1364. 
Butler  V.  Hopper,  1  Wash.  0.  C.  (U.  S.)  499. 

p.  2010. 
Butler   V.    Kelsey,    15   Johns.    (X.    Y.)   177. 

p.  1197. 
Butler  V.  Knip:ht,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  109.    p.  192. 
I'.utler  V.  Lawsou,  72  Mo.  227.    p.  2056. 
Butler  r.  Bee,  19  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  383;  s.  c. 

32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  75.    p.  643. 
Butler  V.  People,  2  Col.  T.  295.    pp.  145,  146, 

147,  150. 
Butler  r.  St.  Louis  Life  Ins.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  93. 

Pl>.  500,  501,. 502. 
r'.utler  r.  State,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  511.     p.  825. 
Ituller  r.  State,  97  Ind.  378.    p.  63. 
I'.uller  r.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  48.    p.  1635. 
I'.utkr  r.  Truslo\v,55Barb.  (N.Y.)293.    p.  484. 
liutler  r.  Vassault,  40  Cal.  74.    p.  2097. 
Butler    riiiversitv  r.  Conrad,  94    Ind.  353. 

pp.  20S2,  2102. 
Butt  r.  Tut li ill,  10  la.  583.     pp.  1984,  1994. 
Butterlield   r.   Forrester,   11   East,  60;  s.  c. 

2  Thorn  p.  Xej;.  1104.     pp.  1210,  1227. 
Butterlield  v.  Gilchrist  (Midi.),  5  West.  Rep. 

744.     p.  307. 
Buttertield  r.   Klaber,  .52  How.  Pr.   (X.  Y.) 

255.    1).  1390. 
Butterworth  v.  Pecare,  8  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  671. 

!>.  326. 
Butterworth  v.  Stags,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  Cas. 

2'.il.    II.  147. 
Button  r.  Dnwnham,  Cro.  Eliz.  643.    p.  886. 
Button  i\  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  18  X.  Y.  248. 

I).  1225. 
Buttrani  r.  Jackson,  32  Ga.  409.    p.  1632. 
Butts  V.  Bilke,  4  Price,  240.    p.  2008. 
Ituxton  r.  Edwards,  134  Mass.  567.    p.  1096. 
Buzzell  V.  Laconia  Man.  Co.,  48  Me.  113.    p. 

1224. 
Buzzell  /•.  Snell,  25  X.  H.  474.    pp.  215,  218, 

219,222.224,241. 
Byars  ;-.  Mt.  Vernon,  77  IH.  467.    pp.  119, 120. 
Bylngtou  c.  McCadden,34  la.  216.    p.  1669. 
Byles  r.  Colier,  5t  Mich.  1.    i).  912. 
Byne,  Ex  [larte,  1  Ves.  &  B.  316.    p.  188. 
Bvnuin  V.   Bvnuni,  11  Ired,  L.  (N.   C.)   632. 

p.  1698. 
Bvraui  r.   Galbraith,  75  Ind.    134.    pp.  2034, 

2037,  2(13'. I,  2043. 
Bvrd  r.  (  liase,  10  Ark.  602.     p.  891. 
Byrd  r.  state,  1  How.  (Miss.)  163.    pp.  4,  8. 
Bvrkct  r.  Monohon,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  83.    pp. 

1463,  Ut'A. 
Byrne  v.  Byrne,  3  Tex.  336.    p.  833. 
Bvriie   V.  .Minneapolis  &c.   R.  Co.,  29  3Iinu. 

200.    p.  20.iO. 
Byrne  i\  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  N.  E.  Rep 

539;  s.  c.  36  Hun  (N.  Y.),  647;  83  X.  Y.  620. 

p   1230. 

C. 

Cabiness  v.  Martin,  3  Dev.  L.  (X.  C.)  454.    p. 
1199. 

Cnblncs  f.  Martin,  4  Dev.  L.  (X.  C.)  106.   p. 
423. 


Cable  V.  State,  8  Blackt-  'Tid.)  531.  p.  95. 
Cabot  r.    Windsor,   1  Allen  (Mass.),  546.    p. 

917. 
Cabrera^  Ex.  parte,  1  Wash.  C.  C.   (U.   S.) 

232.    p.  178. 
Cade  V.  Hatcher,  72  Ga.  359.    p.  321. 
Cadogan  v.   Keunett,   Cowp.  435.    pp.   1440, 

1442,  1443. 
Cadwaller   v.    Grand    Trunk  Co.,   9  Lower 

Canada  Rep.  169.      pp.  1151,  1154. 
Cady  V.  Xorton,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  236.    p.  329. 
Cahill  r.  Kalamazoo  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  2  Dougl. 

(Mich.)  124.     p.  1585. 
Cahill  f.    London  &c.   R.  Co.,  10  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

154;  .9.  c.  7  Jur.  (N.  S.)  1164.     p.  1155. 
Cahoon  v.  Marshall,  25  Cal.  197.    p.  917. 
Cahoon  v.  Ring,  1  Cliff.  (C.  C.)  592.    p.  827. 
Cain  V.   Cain,  IB.   Mon.  (Ky.)  213.    pp.119, 

1182,  1992. 
Cain  V.  Goda,  84  Ind.  209.    p.  2090. 
Cain    V.    Guthrie,    8  Blackf.    (Ind.)   409.    p. 

1129. 
Cain  V.  Ingham,  7  Cow.   X.  Y.  478.    pp.  53, 

117,  123. 
Cairnes  r.  Bleecker,  12  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  200.  p. 

1131. 
Calder  v.  Moran,  49  Mich.  14.    p.  1011. 
Calder  &c.  Co.  v.  Pilling,  14  Mees.  &  W.  76. 

p.  1283. 
Caldwell  v.  Caldwell,  Smith  (X.  IL),  239.    p. 

119. 
Caldwell  r.  Dickson,  26  Mo.  60.    p.  827. 
Caldwell  r.  Greeley,  5  Xev.  258.    p.  2099. 
Caldwell  v.  Henrv,  76  Mo.  254.    p.  1430. 
Caldwell  v.  Irvine.  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  108. 

p.  109. 
Caldwell  v.  McWilliams,  55  Ga.  99.    p.  194. 
Caldwell  r.  Xew  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  47 

X.  Y.  282.     pp.  310,  1237.  1346. 
Caldwell  v.  Run3-an,  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  184. 

p.  1343. 
Caldwell  v.  State,  34  Ga.  10.    p.  41. 
Caldwell  r.  Stale,  12  Tex.  App.  3.58.    p.  110. 
Caldwell  v.  State,  41  Tex.  86.    pp.  51,  66, 103. 
Caldwell  v.  Stei)hens,  57  Mo.  589.    p.  1647. 
Caldwell  Co.  v.  Crockett  (Tex.),  4  S.  W.  Rep. 

607.    p.  4. 
Calhoun  v.  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.)  477.    p. 

122. 
Calhoun  c.  Williams,  32  Gralt.  (Va.)  19.    p.  48. 
Calkins  r.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  336.    p.  788. 
Calkins  i:  State,  21  Wis.  501.    p.  2060. 
Callahan  r.  Bean,  9  Allen  (Mass.),  401.    pp. 

1224,  1232. 
Callahan  r.  Caffarata,  39  Mo.  136.    pp.  1189, 

1194.  1195,  1200,  1480. 
Callahan  i:  Mvers,  89  111.  566.    p.  910. 
Callahan  i-.  Warne,  40  Mo.  132.    pp.  1217, 1226, 

1598. 
Callaway  Co.  Court  v.  Craig,  9  Mo.  846.    p. 

967. 
Callender's  Case,  Whart.  St.  Tr.  688.    pp.  67, 

721. 
Callis  V.  Tolson,  6  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  80.    p.  561. 
Calllson  r.  Smith,  20  Kan.  28.    pp.  375,  381, 

386. 
Callowav  V.  Varner,  cited    in    Jacques    r. 

Hortoh,  76  Ala.  244.    p.  356. 
Calthorp  r.  Xewton,  Cro.  Jac.  647.    p.  20. 
Calvert  c.   Fitzgerald,  Litt.   Sel.  Cas.   (Kv.) 

3S8.     p.  361. 
Calvert  v.  State,  91   Ind.  473.     pp.   2o77,  2142. 
Calye's  Case,  8   Coke  Rep.  63.     p.  1155. 
Caiiibridire  Sav.   Inst.  v.  Littlctield,  6  Cash. 

(Mass.)  213.     p.  966. 
Camden  r.  Dorenius,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  515.   pp. 

560,561,942,2115. 
Camden  &c.  It.  Co.  v.  Bauldauf,  16  Pa.  St.  67. 

pp.  1321,  1345,  1348,  1365. 


xliv 


TAIJI.K    OF    (ASKS. 


Canidi'ii  A(\   R.  Co.    ,-.    Ilclknap,  21    \\\-tu\. 

vN.  V.I  a54.     i>.  1740. 
Canu-ntn  c,  lUarkinan,  30  >rich.  Iii8.     p.  X>1. 
CniiuTon  I-.  .Mouigomerv,  13  Scrg.  &  It  cTii. ) 

12-<.     |..  a;*, 
rnimnm  r.  Watson.  40  Ml.<s.  IDI.     p.  1748. 
(amp  r.  Brown,  48  ln«l.  575.    pp.  21t<,  21'.t,  '2ti. 
Camp  c.  n<.-<lan,43  Mo.  5'.)1.     pp.    lUW,  liDI'J. 
tamp  r.  riiilllps,  42  (;a.  •->><■".•.     p.  1(!74. 
(.'aiiipau  r.  Dowev,'.)  Mit'li.  ;?81.     p.  385. 
Camplii'll  r.  Allen,  <U  .Mo.  5S1.     p.  lOtW. 
fainpboll  r.  IJccketl.  8  Oli.  .St.  210.     pp.  1722, 

1723. 
CampboU  f.  Cainiiboll,  Co  Barb.   (X.    Y.)  044. 

p.  Itoo. 
Campbell  i:  Campbell,  m  Wis.  90.     p.  1703. 
Campbell  r.  Com.,  84  Pa.  St.  187.     p.  126. 
Campbell  v.  Couover,  26  111.  64.    pp.  2071, 

2073. 
Campbell   i-.  Dntrli,  .'^fi  Inil.  ,'>04.     p.  2o39. 
Campbell  v.  Fiankem,  •;.")  Intl.  591.     p.  2030. 
Campbell   i-.    Hunt,  104    lud.   210.     pp.  2059, 

210^.'. 
Campbell  r.  .lobnson,  3  Del.  Ch.  94.    p.  182. 
Campbell  f.  Jones,  41  Cal.  515.    p.    2062. 
Campbell  r.  Kearney,  45  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  87. 

p.  1209. 
Campbell  v.  Klncai<i,3  T.  B.  :Mon.  (Ky.)  560. 

p.  i;.4. 
Campbell  r.  >filler,  1  Mart.  (La.)  (N.  S.)614. 

p.  1984. 
Campbell  r.  Xew  England  Lite  Ins.  Co.,  98 

Mass.  381 ;    g.   <:    1    Big.   L.   Ins.   Gas.  229. 

pp.  991.1411.1417. 
Campbell  v.  O'Brien,  9  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  204. 

p.  ir.H. 
Campbell  v.  O'XcUl,  64  Pa.  St.  290.     p.  803. 
Campbell  v.  Peuusvlvauia  11.  Co.  (Pa.), 2  Atl. 

Rep.  480.     p.  1239; 
Campbell  I'.  People,  109  111.  riGo.   pp.  1691, 1688, 

17'.H,. 

Campbell  i:  Uenwick,  2  Bradf.  (X.  Y.)  80. 

p.  8'M. 
Campbell  r.  Roberts,  66  lia.  733.     p.  629. 
Campbell  v.  Russell,  1:59  Mas.s.  278.     p.  340. 
Campbell  r.  Skldmore.  1  Tex.  475.    ]>.  1995. 
Campbell  r.  State,  23  Ala.  44.     pp.  264,444,804, 

1506. 
Campbell  v.  .State,  29  Ala.  46.     p.  1970. 
Campbell  I'.  State,  3S  Ark.  498.     )>.  20'.t8. 
Campbell  r.  State,  48  (ia.  353.     pp.  11,  15,  83. 
Campbell  r.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  3:5.     p.  1744. 
Campbell  r.  State,  42  Tev.  .591.     p.  313. 
Campbell  v.  Strong,  Hemp.  C.  C.  (C.  S.)  265. 

p.  124. 
Campbgll  v.  Thrclkeld,  2  Dana  (Kv.),  425.  p. 

1198. 
Campbell  v.  Webster,  2  Man.  G.  &  Sc.  253. 

p.  947. 
Campbell  v.  Wilson,  3  Rast,  294.     p.  101.3. 
(;anal  Co.  r.  Bonham,  9   Watt.-i  &  S.  (Pa.)  27 

p.  1087. 
Canceml  r.  People.  H  X.    Y.  128;  «.   f.  7  -Vbb. 

Pr.  (N.  Y.    271.     pp.  4.  5,  6,  75,  88. 
Candler  I-.  Ilaiiimniid,  29  (Ja.  493.     p.  20i>9. 
Camller   r.    Haiiimoiid.  2:!  <ia.   493.     pp.  108, 

2iKi3,  2075. 
Canlleld  r.  Xortln-rn  R.  Co.,  18  Barb.  (  X.  Y.; 

rm.   p.  1367. 

Cannon   c.  Alsbiirj-,  1   A.   K.    .Marsh.    (Kv.) 

76.     pp.  1977. 
Cannon  i:  Bullock,  26  (la.  431.     p.  1977. 
Cniiiion  f.  Peebles,  4  Ircd.  L.  (N.  V.)  204.     p. 

1440. 
Cannt.n  r.  State,  57  Miss.  147.    p.  121. 
Cannon  r.  Stnte,  3  Tex.  31.     pp.  1990,  1902. 
Cannon  c.  State,  5  Tex.  .\pp.  :M.     p.  127. 
Cannon.  In  re,  47  Mich.  1^1.     p.  188. 
Cautwell  r.  State,  18  i)h.  st.  477.     p.   19o3. 


Capo   (ilrardeau   \o.  Co.    r.   Brulhl,  51   Mo. 

141.    p.  81U. 
Capebarl  r.  Stewart, '.>o  X.  ('.  101.     p.  27. 
I    (ai'erlon  c.  Nickel,  4  W.  Va.  137.     p.  35. 

Capital    Bank    r.    Armstrong,  (12  Mo.  60.     pp. 
I        lo3t,  1037,  UWI7,  KU.l. 

I    Capital   .Ve.  Bank    i.  Hentv,5   C.  P.  Dlv.  514. 
p.   14.13. 
C.irbrev  r.  Willis,  7    Alien    ,  Mass.),  364.     pp. 
I       104.),  11, W. 
I    Cardwell  r.  Strotlier,  Lilt.  Sel.  Cas.  429;».  c. 

12  .\m.  Dee.  32ii.     p.  889. 
!    Careaga  r.  Feriiald,  i>i;  Cal.  ;i.M.     p.  2084. 
Carew  c.  Howard,!  Root  (Conn.),  323.     pp. 

112,  119. 
Carey  i:  Chicago  \c.  R.  Co.,  61  Wis.  71.     p. 

1717. 
Carev  r.  McDougald,  7  (Ja.  84.     p.  1023. 
Carev  v.  HIcbmond.  92  Ind.  2.')9.    p.  372. 
Carlss  r.  Taiter.sall,  2  Man.  &  ii.  890.     p.  1031. 
Carl  r.  Knott,  It;  la.  379.     p.  ^5^. 
Carland   j-.   Cunningbam,  37  Pa.   St.  228.     p. 

607. 
Carleton  v.  People,  10  Mleli.    2:>0.    pp.    816, 

1507. 
Carlin  v.  Chicago  \c.    ii.  Co.,  37  Iowa,  316. 

pp.  1224,  12:1,-). 
Carlisle  i:  Hill,  I'J  Ala.  3;iS.    pp.  1669,  1076, 

1681. 
Carlisle  r.  Sheldon,  3S  Vt.  419.    pp.  1.12.),  1928, 

1932,  1978. 
Carlioii   1-.   Baldwin,   22  Tex.  724.     pp.  1439, 

1444. 
Carllon  r.   Badi.  22  \.  II.  .Vi9.     p.  1377. 
Carman  r.  Newi'll,  1  Denio  (X.   V.),  2."i    p.  53. 
Carmarthen  c.  Kvans,  lo  .Mi-es.A  W.  274.    pp. 

95,  96. 
Carmichael,   In  re,  36  .Via.  514.     p.  375. 
Carnal  r.    Peoide,   1    Park.   Cr.  (X.    Y.)  272. 

pp.  87,  J8,  96,  lIKl. 
Caring  c.  Lilclilleld,  2  Mich.  .340.     |).  762. 
Games  c.  Pratt.  15  .Vbb.  Pr.  (N.  s.)  3:17 ;«.  c. 

36  \.  Y.  Sui.er.  ;5til.     p.  3lti. 
Carpenter  r.  .Vmbro-^an,  2o  111.  170.     p.  334. 
Carpenter  r.  Bennelt.  4  Kla.  2S4.     p.  ■V>4. 
Carpenter  r.  Blake. 2  Laiis.  (.\.  Y.;  2n<J.     pp. 

504,505,  51.'). 
Carpenter  r.  Blake,  10  IIuu  (X.  Y.),  053.    p. 

449. 
Carpenter  r.  Dame,  lolnd.  125.     p.  128. 
Carpenter  r.  Kastern  Transportation  Co.,  71 

X.  V.  547.    i>.  514. 
Carpenter  r.  (ialloway,  7:t  Iml.  418.    p.  2o41. 
Carpenti-r  r.  (;rjiliain.'42  Mich.  191.     p.  912. 
Carpenter  r.  (iwynn,  :J5  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  395.    p. 

1012. 
Carpenter  r.  Miles,  17  B.  Mon.  (Ky.  )602.    p. 

951. 
Carpenter  f.  Xlxon,  5  Hill  (X.   Y.),26o.     pp. 

4.59,  .526. 
Carpenter  r.  Peojile,  64  N.  Y.  48.3.     i).  31. 
(Carpenter  v.  I'eople,  8   Barb.  (X.  \.)  693.     p. 

816. 
Carpenter  r.  Pierce,  13  X.  H.  403.     p.  17.52. 
Carpenter   estate,  4    How.  (MIsu.)  1(>3,  106. 

p.  4. 
Carpenter  f.    llz,  4  (Jralt.  ( Va.  1  270.     p.  .552. 
"Carpenter  r.  SI  111  well   11  N.  Y.  61.     p.  17o,5. 
Carpentler  r.  Tbiirslon,  24  Cal.  26S.     p.  827. 
Carpiie  r.  London  »Ve.  R.  Co.,  5  g.  B.  (49.   pp. 

1236,  12:17. 
Carr  r.  ("rain.  7  Ark.  241.     p.  1.585. 
Carr  c.  Ivlw.irdr.,  1  Mo.  1:17.     p.  2o55. 
Cam-.  Moore,  41  \.  H.  i:il.     )>.  :197. 
Carr  v.  siaie,5   '\'i'\.  App.  1.5:1.     p.  1744. 
Carr  r.  Stale.  41   Tev.  .54.1.     p.  1732. 
Carr  r.  Tbotnas,  :U  Ind.  29-2.     n.  2108. 
Carrlco  r.  .Motiee,   1    Dana  (Ky.),  6.     pp.289, 
294,  1506. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xlv 


Carrlco  v.  Meldrum,  1  A.  K.    Marsh.   (Ky.) 

224.    p.  119.5. 
Carrier  ^•.  Dorrancc,  19  S.  C.  .W.    p.  1329. 
Carrifcan  v.  Ina.  Co.,  122  Mass.  298.    p.  981. 
Carrinffton  v.  Brunts,  1  McLean   (U.  S),  174. 

p.   106(1. 
Carriugton  v.   Ilaucock,  23  Mo.  App.  299.    p. 

2064. 
Carrington  v.   Hutson,  28  Hun   (N.  Y),  371. 

p.  183. 
Carrington  ?•.   Parilic  Mail  S.  S.   Co.,  1  Cal. 

475.     pp.  1747,  1756. 
Carroll  v.  Beuicia,  40  Cal.  390.    p.  560. 
Carroll  v.  IJohan,  43  Wi.s.  218.    p.  2037. 
Carroll  r.  Bowler,  40  Ark.  168.    p.  2110. 
Carroll  v.  Gillion,  33  Ga.  530.    p.  1045. 
Carroll  r.  Hangartner,  66  Wis.  511.    p.  2100. 
Carroll  r.   Minnesota   &C.  K.   Co.,  13  Minn. 

93(1.    p.  1235. 
Carroll  r.  .More,  ,30  AVi."?.  574.    p.  2100. 
Carroll  r.  Paul,  16  Mo.  226.    p.  1618. 
Carroll  r.  Paul,  19  Mo.  102.    pp.  325,  1708. 
Carroll  r.  Boherts,  23  Ga.  492.    p.  1634. 
Carroll  r.  Sanders,  38  Ark.  216.    p.  2128. 
Carroll  v.  State,  23  Ala.  28.    p.  1548. 
Carroll  v.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  315.    p. 

116. 
Carroll  r.  State,  5  Neb.  31.    pp.  77,  78,  676. 
Carroll  v.  Upton.  3  N.  Y.  272.    p.  942. 
Carroll,  Will  of,  50  Wis.  437.    p.  2026. 
Carson  r.  Cross,  14  la.  463.    p.  2097. 
Carson  r.  Cumniings,  69  Mo.  325.    p.  1607. 
Carson  r.  Henderson,  34  Kan.  406.    i).  2093. 
Carson  v.  State,  50  Ala.  J34.    pp.  69,  70,  1733. 
Carson  v.  Watson,  4  Phila.  (Pa.)  88.    p.  1938. 
Carter  v.  Baker,  1  Sawyer  (U.  S.),  512.  p. 

17S0. 
Carter  r.  Bennett,  4  Fla.  284.    pp.  561, 1698. 
Carter  i\  Bennett,  6  Fla.  214.    pp.  289,  1506. 
Carter  v.  Carter,  101  Ind.  451.    p|).  738,  770. 
Carter  r.  Connell,  1  Whart.  (Pa.)  392.    p.  338. 
Carter  v.  Ford  Plate  Glass  Co.,  85  Ind.  180. 

1>I).  1906,  1974. 
Carter  v.  Holman,  60  Mo.  498.    p.  2109. 
Carter  r.  Jones,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  281 ;  s.  c.  6 

Carr.  &  P.  64.    i)p.  217,  219. 
Carter  r.  State,  56  Ga.  463.    pp.  31,  103,  576, 

l'.»05. 
Carter  v.  Prior,  8  Mo.  App.  577.    p.  2094. 
Carter  r.  State,  2  Ind.  617.    pp.  727,  733,  783, 

1515,  1520. 
Carter  r  State,  8  Tex.  App.  372.    p.  115. 
Carter  v.  Thurston,  58  N.  II.  105.    p.  342. 
Carter  v.  Toussalnt,  5  Barn.  &  Aid.  255.    p. 

914. 
Carter  r.  Whallev,  1  Barn.  &  Aid.  11.    p.  1100. 
Carthage  f.  I'.uckher,8  Bradw.  (111.)  l.")2.    p.  .3. 
Carthage  Turiip.  Co.  r.  Andrews,   102  lud. 

138.     i)|).  497,  1482. 
Cartright  r.  Clopton,  25  Ga.  85.     p.  244. 
Cartwright  r.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  483;  s.  c.  49 

Am.  Pep.  826.     p.  795. 
Cartwright's  Case,  114  Mass.  230.    p.  132. 
Caruthers  v.  Crockett,  7  Bea  (Tenu.),  91.    p. 

2065. 
Carver  r.  Carver,  44  Ind.  265.    p.  2123. 
Carver  r.  Carver,  97  Ind.  497.    pp.  1619,  1647. 
Carver  v.   Compton,  51    Ind.  451.    jip.  2057, 

2101. 
Carver  v.  Jackson,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  1.    pp.  1703, 

2114. 
Carv  r.  SUcox,  5  Ind.  370.    p.  1997. 
Casat  r.  State,  40  Ark.  511.     p.  119. 
Caseo  Bank  r.  Keene,  .53  Me.  103.    p.  1758. 
Case  r.  Hannahs,  2  Kan.  490.    ]).  1.585. 
Case  r.  Illinois  &e.  11.  Co.,  38  la.  581.    p.  PJ69. 
Case  r.  Weber,  2  Ind.  108.    p.  1642. 
Cases  of  the  County  Judges,  3  Hughes  (U. 

S.),576.    p.  8. 


Casevr.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Abb.  X.  C. 

(N.'Y.)  104.    p.  1232. 
Casev  V.  State,  37  Ark.  67.    p.  75. 
Casey  v.  State,  20  Neb.  138.    p.  2002. 
Casey  v.  State,  8  Crim.  L.  Mag.  597.    pp.  1860, 

1864. 
Casev  V.  State,  25  Tex.  .380.    p.  150. 
CaskV  V.  Haviland,  13  Ala.  314.    p.  1702. 
Cason  V.  Tate,  8  Mo.  45.    p.  2060. 
Caspar  v.  O'Brien,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.;  (X.  S.) 

402.    p.  339. 
Caspari  r.  First  German  Church,  12  Mo.  App. 

293.     p.  1410. 
Cass  V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen  (Mass.), 

448.    p.  1321. 
Cassaday  v.  Magher,  85  Ind.  228.    p.  1756. 
Cassard  v.  Hinnian,  6  Duer  (X.  Y.),  695.    p. 

603. 
Cassedv  v.  Stockbridge,  21  Vt.  391.    p.  1247. 
Cassldy  r.  Conwav,  25  Pa.  St.  240.    p.  1079. 
Castauedo  r.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  .582.    p.  30. 
Caster  v.  Thoniason,  19  Ala.  721.    p.  949. 
Castle  V.  Bullard,  23  How.  (U.  S.)  172.    pp. 

1.585,  1698,  1706,  1756. 
Castle  V.  Candee,  16  Conn.  224.    p.  938. 
Castle  r.  State,  75  Ind.  147.    p.  1852. 
Castleman  v.  Sherry,  42  Tex.  59.    p.  1784. 
Castor  V.  Bavingtoii,  2  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  505. 

p.  392. 
Castro  V.  Gill,  5  Cal.  40.    p.  1982. 
Caswell  V.  Hill,  47  X.  II.  407.    p.  1007. 
Catawissa  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  49  Pa.  St.  186. 

p.  1223. 
Cathell  V.  Goodwin,  1  Ilarr.  &  G.  (Md.)  470. 

p.  947. 
Catlen  v.  Guntcr,  11  X.  Y.  368.    p.  885. 
Catlin   V.  Valentine,  9   Paige  (X.   Y.),  575. 

p.  1405. 
Cato  V.  State,  9  Fla.  163.    pp.  108,  1698. 
Cattell  r.  Dispatch  Pub.  Co.,  88  Mo.  356;  s.  c. 

15  Mo.  Ai)p.  587.     p.  2080. 
Catterlin    r.   City  of  Frankfort,  87  Ind.  46. 

pp.  1913,  19S1. 
Catton  r.  Simjison,  8  Ad.  A  El.  136.    p.  1032. 
Candler  v.  Petit,  2  Hall  (X.  V.),  315.    p.  1198. 
Caughev  v.  Smith,  47  X.  Y.  244.    i).  891. 
Cavan  v.  Els  worth,  45  Ga.  283.    p.  312. 
Cavanah  v.  State,  56  Miss.  299.    pp.  21, 25, 750, 

784. 
Cave  V.  Mountain,  1   Man.   &  G.  260;  s.  c.  1 

Scott  (X.  R.)  132.    p.  1142. 
Cave  V.  State,  41  Tex.  182.     p.  1&55. 
Caw    V.   People,  3  Xeb.  357.    p)).   1672,  1746, 

1902,  1906,  1913. 
Cavkcndoll,  Ex  parte,  6  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  53.    p. 

1983. 
Cay  wood  r.  Timmons,  31  Kan.  394.    p.  912. 
Cazeuove  r.  British  Ins.  Co.,  3  Big.  Ins.  Cas. 

202.    p.  1417. 
Cecil  r.  Beaver,  28  la.  242.    p.  873. 
Cecil  Bank  c.  Barrv,  20  Md.  287.    pp.  819, 1.507. 
Celton  V.  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.,  67  Pa.  St.  211. 

p.  1321. 
Center  r.  Spring,  2  la.  393.    pp.  1161, 1163, 1167, 

1170,  1171,  1181,  1196. 
Center  Turnpike  Co.   r.   Smith,  12   Vt.  212. 

p.  890. 
Central  &c.  Corp.  v.  Lowell,  15  Grav  (Mass.), 

106.    p.  325. 
Central  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Craig,  .59  Ga.  185.    p.  2056. 
Central  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Twentv-lhird  Street  R. 

Co.,  .53  How.  Pr.  4.5.     )..  182. 
Central  Bank  r.  Allen,  16  Me.  41.    p.  610. 
Central  Bank  v.  St.  John,  17   Wis.  157.    pp. 

219,  713. 
Central  Bank  r.  Tjivlor,  2  Cranch  C.  0.  (U. 

S.)  427.     p.  592. 
Central  Branch  &c.    R.  Co.  f.  Andrews,  30 

luiu.  590.    pp.  373,  374. 


Xl\  1 


TABLi:    or    CASES. 


Central    Rrldgc    Corp.    r.    nutU-r,    2    Grav 

(Mass.\l;w.    p.  131".i. 
Central  Nat.  IJaiik  c.  Arthur,  2  Sweeny  (N. 

Y.  .  m.    p.  isi. 
Central  Nat.  JJauk  r.  Wlilto,  37  N.  Y.  Supor. 

2H7.     i>.  l5'2. 
Central  U.  Co.  r.  Dixon.  42  On.  .■?27.    p.  123i. 
Central  U.  Co.  r.  Ilmc-s,  111  iJa.  203.    p.  1670. 
Central  1£.  Co.  r.  Mllcliell.W  lia.  173.    pp.  59, 

775. 
Central  K.  Co.  r.  Moire,  24  X.  J.  L.  824.    p. 

1566. 
Central  U.  Co.  r.  SanKcr,  15  Gratt.  (Va.)  231. 

p.  16t!2. 
Central  Cnion  Tel.  Co.  r.  State,  110  In.l.  20<!. 

p.  2112. 
Cenlralla  r.  Krousc.  tVt  111.  10.    p.  1246. 
Cliadlioiirn  c.  Franklin,  5  Urav  (Mass.),  312. 

pp.  310,  19S2,  l<tS5. 
Chaffee  r.  lulled  States,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.)  51G. 

p.  aw. 

Chanin  r.  Lynch,  11  Va.  L.  J.  508.     pp.  14C0, 

14)11. 
Chalmers  r.  Shackell,  6  Car.  it   1'.  475.    pp. 

\Ul'>,  14G0. 
Chalmers  r.  Whittemore,  22  Minn.  305.    pp. 

1020,  l'.^-'2. 
Chamber  r.  Hiitc.her,  82  Ind.  50S.    p.  2039. 
Chamberlain  r.  Knliel(1.43  N.  II.  35(i.     p.  1377. 
ChamlH-rlaiu  f.  Fuller,  50  Vt.  247.     p.  1120. 
Cliaiubcrlaiu     r.    Ma.stersou,     20    Ala.    37G. 

p.  i;mo. 
Chamberlain  i-.  Porter,  0  Minn.2(M).     i>p.  1483, 

1G08. 
Chamberlain  r.  WlUson,  12  Vt.  401.    pp.261, 

2X3. 
Chamberlain,  Ex  parte,  4   Cow.  (N.  Y.)  49. 

1>.  150. 
Chamberlin   r.  P.rown,  2  Doug.  (Mich.)  120. 

p.  688. 
Chamberlin  r.  MrCartv,  63  111.  262.    p.  2066. 
Chambi-rliii  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  K.  Co.,  7  Wis. 

425.     p.  1225. 
Chamberlin  v.  Smith,  1  Mo.  482.     p.  1600. 
Chambers  r.  Greenwood,  68  X.  C  274.    pp. 

768.  775.  770. 
Chambers  r.  Hill.  34  Mich.  523.     pp.  348,  3.50. 
Chamber.'*  r.  Ma.-nn,  5  < '.  15.  (N.  8.)  59.    p.  192. 
Chambers  r.  McGlvcron,  33  .Mo.  202.    ji.  1600. 
Chambers  r.  P.-opb-,  U>:>  111.  415.     p.  1801. 
Chainliers  r.  ltubcv,47  .Mo.  00.    j).  OtMi. 
Chambers  r.  SlK.rl,  70  .Mo.  204.    p.  1028. 
Chance  r.  Ilini-,  (!  (  onn.  231.    p.  328. 
Chaneu    i:  Dwlianapolls  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  Ind. 

472.     )ip.  451.  ]'.Mil. 
Chandelor  r.  I.opu.-,  Cro.  .I.ir.  4.    i>.  926. 
Chandler  r.  Alli.-oii,  lo  .Mich.  4C.0.     p.  388. 
Chandler  r.  IJarker,  2  Ilarr.  (Del.)  387.     pi>. 

VMH,  lOfiC. 
Chandler  r.  IJarrctt.  21  La.  Ann.  .58.    p.  1780. 
Chandler  r.  Fulton,  10  Tex.  2.    ]>.  1754. 
Chandler  r.  Garr,  s  Mo.  4.'H.     i).  1613. 
Chandler  r.  Horn. .2. Mood.  \Kob.  423.   p.  257. 
Chaniiler  r.  Keubotl.  83  111.  130.    p.  63. 
Chandler  r.  Thompbon,  30  Fed.  Uep.  38.    p. 

2092. 
Chandler  r.  Von  noeder,24  How.  (U.  S.)  227. 

|.p.  2»8, 1.506. 
Chaney  r.  .state,  31  Ala.  342.     p.  17. 
Chapin  r.  flapp,  2*.)  Ind.  614.     p.  2033. 
Chaplnr.  Lapliam,20l'|ek.  (Ma-<s.)467.  p. 364. 
Chapin  I-.  I'otlcr.  I   Hill.  (N.  V.)  3«'.6.     ji.  S.'.4. 
Chaplin  V.  llonvr^.  1  Kasl,  102.    pp.  912013. 
(;hapllne  f.  KobfrtMon.  44  Ark.  2<r2.     pp.  2,  3. 
Chapman  r.  Callahan,  6<'>  Mo.  'i'.r>.    p.  1)>07. 
Chapman    v.   Cawrey,  50  111.  517.     pp.   1105, 

ll'''.t.  \H)1,  16.V1. 
Cbapman  r.  ChlcuKO  Ac.  R.  Co.,  26  Wis.  295. 
pp.  1404,  1722. 


Chapman  r.  Cofttes,  26  Iowa,  288.    p.  325. 
Chapman  r.  Coflln,14  Grav  (Mass.),  454.    p. 

306. 
Chapman  r.  Colbv .  47  Mleh.  46.     p.  1058. 
Chapman   r.  I'oolev,  12  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  654. 

pp.  471.671. 
fhapman  c.  Dodd,  10  Minn.  350.    p.  1485. 
Capman  r.  Krie  I!.  Co.,  M  N.  Y.  579      p.  1758. 
Chapman  r.   Kean<-,  3  Ad.  &  Kl.   193;  «.  c.  4 

N.v.  .t  M.  607.     p.  044. 
Chapman    r.    .Maeutcliln,    1    Craw.    *    Dl.\. 

(Irish)  Clr.  ]1\.     p.  20. 
Chapman  r.  .McCormlck,  66  .V.  Y.   470.     pp. 

1703.  1717,1710. 
Chapman  t:  Murcli,  10  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  290.     p. 

026. 
Cha|>nian  r.  Welles,  Klrbv  (Conn.),  132.    p. 

11*.  177. 
Chappel  r.  Spencer.  23  Harb.  (N.  Y.)  584.    p. 

1032. 
Cha|ipell  r.  Allen,  38  Mo.  213.     p)).  1638,  1C83, 

16,S5. 
Chappel!  r.  Stale.  71  Ma.  322.    pp.  540,545,546. 
Charles  r.  Malolt,  6.-.  liul.  1S4.     p.  20C4. 
Charles  r.  Mllb-r,  3t;  .Ma.  141.     !>.  324. 
Charles  r.  Patch ,  87  Mo.  4,'iO.    jip.  1.598.  1600. 
Charleston    Ins.  Co.  v.  Corner.  2  Gill  i.Md.), 

411.     pp.  ,S10,  094. 
Charlotte  r.  (^houteau,  33  Mo.  194;  «.  c.  25  Mo. 

4(k5.     j.p.  810. 1507. 
Charnock'sCasc.3Salk.81;  «.  <•.  Holt,  133;  12 

How.  St.  Tr.  137S.     p.  41. 
Chartered  \   .Merc.iiilllc  Hank    of   India    r. 

Dickson,  L.  It.  3  P.  C.  .574.     p.  1144. 
Chase  r.  Kvov,  ."iS  Cal.  34S.     p.  200!t. 
Chase  r.  Ilorton.  143  Mass.  118.     ]..  1(VJ7. 
Chase  r.  .Jennliips.  3S  .Me.  44.     p.  54. 
Chaser.    People,  40  111.   352.     pp.    11,117,120. 

122,  188:1. 
Chase  r.  Ualston,  30  Pa.   St.   5.39.    pp.    1444, 

1446.  1447. 
Chase  r.  Slate.  46  Miss.  683.     P.  81. 
Chase,  Trial  of,  cited  pp.  67.  1505.  1514. 
Chalaui|ua  Co.  IJank  r.  White,  23   N.  Y.  847. 

JI.  2(18(1. 
Chatham  Uank  r.  Retts,  9  llosw.  (N.  Y.)  652. 

ji.  88.5. 
Cheatham  v.  Riddle.  12  Tex.  112.     j).  1767. 
Cheek  v.  Aurora.  92  Ind.  107.     p.  1  7.56. 
Cheek  r.  Slate.  .35  Ind.  492.     p.  1940. 
Cheesebrough   f.    Parker,   25    Kan.   .VJe.     p. 

2IK'.2. 
Chelton  »•.  State.  45  Md.  .56.5.     pp.  412.  X\\. 
Chemical  Nat.  Hank  r.  Kohner,  .58  IInw.  Pr. 
(N.    V.)2G7;».   .-.  8   Daly  (N.    V.),  5.lo.     p. 
1023. 
Cheiiervr.  Goodrich,  98  Mass.  224.    p.  I4A9. 
Chenevr.  Arnold,   18  Uarb.   (X.   Y.)43J.    p. 

324.  ■ 
Chenev  r.    Holgate.    Tlravt.   (Vt.)  171.      pp. 

1064, '1965.  10»m;,  l'.H?7,  J9«7.' 
Cherrv  r.  Sla<le.  3  Miirph.  (X.  C.)  82.    p.  1081. 
CherrV  r.  Stale,  6  Fla.,  670.     y.  171. 
Cherrv    r.    Sween\,  1    Craneii    t.  I'.    (U.S.), 

.53(1.  ■  pp.  1010.  lok'.. 
Chesapeake  tVc.  Can.'il  Co.  c.    Knapp.O   Pet. 

M'.  S.  ).'.41.     p.  1644. 
Chesapeake   .tc.  R.    Co.    r.    Patton,  9  W.  Vn. 

61H.     pp.  124.125. 
Chesapeake  Rank  r.   Swatii,  29  Md.  483.     p. 

821. 
Chesapeake    Clnh   r.   Stale.  tKJ   Md.   446.    p. 

262. 
Cheslevr.  Chcslcy,  37  X.  II.  2-»!».     pp.  215,217, 

218,  2"lO, 'i^•<. 
Chess  f.  ChesH.l  Penn.  41.     p.  479. 
Chester  f.  Kakerslleld  Town  Hall  Assn.,  64 

Cal.  42.     I..  r.-M. 
Chester  V.  Rgwcr,  65  Cal.  46.     i>.  256. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xlvii 


Chester  r.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  702.    p.  laW. 
Chevarrio  r.  State,  17  Te.\.  App.  ,300.    ]..  1744. 
Chew  V.  Morton,  10  Watts  (Pa.), 321.    p.  1080. 
Chews  V.  Driver,  1  N.  J.  L.  ICO.    j).  1991. 
Cliiai)ella  I-.  lirown,  14  La.  Ann.  18'J.    p.  358. 
Chicago  r.  r.ixin,  84  111.  82.    p.  1240. 
Chicago  r.  Crooker,  2  Bradw.  (111.)  279.    pp. 

124(5,  1249. 
Chicago  r.  Dermody,  61   111.   431.    pp.  1924, 

1925. 
Chicago  r  Fowler,  fiO  111.  322.    p.  1249. 
Chicago  I-.  Gavin,  1 1'.radw.  (111.)  302.    p.  1247. 
Chicago  r.  Hesing,  83  111.  104.     p.  1747. 
Chicago  r.  Ji>lin.-::on,  53  111.  91.     p.  1247. 
Chicago  r.  Langlass,  t;6  111.  ;561.    p.  1249. 
Chicago  V.  IMajor,  18  111.  349.    p.  1'224. 
Chicago  V.  McCartv,  75  111.  (•>02.    i).  1249. 
Chicago  r.  McCJivin,  78  111.  347.    pp.  721, 1246. 
Chicago  V.  Murpliv,  84  111.  224.    p.  1249. 
Chicago  (-.Rogers;  61  111.  188.    p.  1997. 
Chicago  r.  Starr's  Administrator,  42  111.  174. 

Pl>.  1233, 1234. 
Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Abels,  60  Miss.  1017. 

Iip.  1322.  1344,  1345, 1347,  1365. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  111.  344.    pp. 

64, 1(12,  3.53. 
Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Austin,  69  111.  429.    p. 

1305. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Avery,  109  111.  314.    pp. 

KWT,  1706. 
Chicago  tVcc.  R.  Co.  v.  Becker,  76  111.  25;  s.  c. 

84  111.483.     pp.  1232,  1234. 
Chicago  &c.  It.  Co.  v.  Bell,  70111.  102.    p.  1299. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bert,  69  111.  3SS.    p.  1774. 
Chicago  &c.  li.  Co.  v.  Blake,  116  111.  168.    p. 

1.500. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bonilleld,  104  111.  223. 

p.  1207. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  i'.  Bragonier,  13  Bradw. 

(111.)  467.    ])p.  758,  781. 
Chic'ago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Buttolf,  66  111.  347.    pp. 

64,  102. 
Chicago  &o  R.  Co.  V.  Coss,  73  111.  394.    p.  1235. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Danierell,  81  111.  450;  s. 

c.  3  Cent.  L.  J.  768.    p.  1230. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dewey,  26  111.  25.5.    p. 

1235. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickinson,  74  111.  249. 

p]>.  1332, 1334. 
Chicago  &c.  It.  Co.  v.  Dimick,  96  111.  42.    pp. 

2(1(13,  2071. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Dooling,  95  111.  202.    p. 

17.50. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Elmore,  07  111.  177.    pp. 

12,53,  1300. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Flagg,  43  111.  364.    p. 

1284. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co  r.  George,  19  111.  510.    pp. 

12m;,  l(i7(i. 
Chicago  itc.   R.  Co.   r.   Gregory,  58  111.  272. 

pp,  1224.  1673. 
Chicago  &c.    It.   Co.  V.   Gretzner,  46  111.  76. 

pp.   1299,  13(10. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Grillin,  68  111.  499.    p. 

16,53. 
Chicago  &C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ilalc,  S3  111.  361.    p. 

1497. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hatch,  79  111.  138.    p. 

1300. 

Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ilazzard,  26  111.  378. 

pp.  1224, 1284. 
Chicago  Ac.   It.  Co.  v.  IIutchinHOu  (111.),  11 

N.  East.  Rep.  a5,5.     1)]..  1230,  1231. 
Chicago  &c.  it.  Co.  v.  Ingersoll,  65  111.  399. 

p.  642. 
Chicairo  &c,.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacob.s,  63  111.  178.    pp. 

129:1,  130(1. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lambert,  10  Xorth  East 

Rep.  219 ;  s.  c.  119  111.  256.    p.  496. 


Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Lee,  68  111.  578    p 

1300. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Lewis,  109  111.  121.    pp 

1619,  1621,  1622,  1672,  1673,  1674. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  LiddeU,  69  111.  639.    p 

359. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Marseilles,  107  111.  313 

p.  2061. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McKean,  40  111.  218.    p 

1300. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McLallen,  84  111.  109, 

Ijp.  821,  1146. 
Chicago  &c.  It.  Co.  v.  McMahon,  1(j3  111.  485, 

p.  618. 
Cliicago  &C.  R.  Co.  v.  Michie,  83  111.  427.    p 

1298. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda,  108  111.  577. 

p.  1240. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Morrissey,  18  Am.  & 

Eng.  R.  Cas.  47.    p.  1482. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Moss, 60  Miss.  1003.  pp 

1322,  1345,  1347. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  71  lU.  601.    p 

1232. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Northern  Line  Packet 

Co.,  70  111.  217.    pp.  1332,  1362. 
Chicago  &.C.  R.  Co.  v.  Ostrauder,  15  X.  E 

Rep.  227.     pp.  2041,  2043. 
Chicago  Ac.  It.  Co.  v.  Parks,  IS  111.  464.    p 

1292. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Payne,  49  111.499.    p 

1682. 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Pennell,  110  111.  437, 

pp.  1310,1311. 
Chicago  Ac.  11.  Co.  v.  Pondrom,  51  111.  333 

p.  1235. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Randolph,  53  111.  510, 

pp.  1229,  1295,  1298. 
Chicago  Ac.   It.   Co.  v.  Rung,  104   111,   641 

)).  1750. 
Chicago  Ac.  It.  Co.  v.  Scales,  90  111.  5s9.    p 

1295. 
Chicago  Ac.   It.  Co.  v.  .Scott,  42  111.  132.    p 

1374. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Stumps,  69  111.  409.    p 

1232. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Sykes,  96  111.162.    p 

1482. 
Cniicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Townsdin,  36  Kan.  78 

s.  c.  15  Pac.  Rep.  889.    p.  2037. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Triplett,  38  111.  4S2.    p 

1300. 
Chicago  &i'.  R.  Co.  v.  Utlev,  38  111.  410.    pp 

KW.1, 1(178. 
Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Van    Patten,  64  IE 

510.    p.  1:500. 
Chicago  Ac.  It.  Co.  v.  Young,  62  111.  238.    p 

1211. 
Chicago  Packing  Ac.  Co.  v.  Tilton,  86  111.  547 

pp.  821,822,  1147. 
Child  V.  Morlev,  8  T.  R.  013.    p.  ,>*98. 
Childers  v.  Deau,    4    Rand.    (Va.)    406.    p 

886. 
Childress  v.  Ford,  10  Smed.  A  M.  (Miss.)  25 

p.  121. 
Childs  r.   State,  76    Ala.  93.    pp.  1768,  1769, 

1770,  1771. 
Chiles   c.   Smith,  13  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)  460.    p 

2080. 

Chiles  V.   Wallace,  83  Mo.  8.5.    pp.  l.'>94, 1667, 
Chiivinan  r.  Tucker,  38  Wis.  43.    p.  1662. 
(.'hiiniendale  r.  Masson,  4  Camp.  174.    ]>.  380, 
Chirac  i\  Iteinecker.  2  I'et.  (U.  '*^.)  613.    p 

1669. 
Chltty  r.  Selwvn,  2  Atk.  359.    p.  1143. 
Choate  r.  Crowniushield,  3  Clitf.  (U.  S.)  184. 

pp.  1322,  1.345. 
Choate  r.  Ilathawav,  73  111.  518.    p.  2053. 
Choen  v.  State,  85  lud.  209.    pp.  2108,  2109. 


xlviii 


TABLE    UF    CASES. 


Choice  r.  State,  31  Gn.  424.    pp.  341.  498,  1635, 

1T*|. 
Cholston  f.  Cholston,  31  C,a.  fi-25.     p.  1917. 
Choiuiuotto  f.  Bariida,  -28  Mo.  491.    pp.  1642, 

1)'>4(;. 
Cliouteau  r.  Jnplterlron  Works.  83  Mo.  73. 

1..  HtU. 
Clioiitiau  r.  I'iorro,  0  Mo.  .3.     p.  T>1. 
Chouti-ati  r.  UUv.  1  Minn.  l'.>2.     p.  in«">i>. 
Choiitonii  r.  .'^oarcv,  8  .Mo.  733.     pp.  328,  804. 
Clioiiliaux  f.  I.cacb,  18  Pa.  bt.  224.    pp.   865, 

l.Vi^i,  1315. 
Chc.wu  f.  rarrott,  14  C.  1\.  (n.  8.)  74.    p.  192. 
Chrlfit  r.  State,  21    Ala.  37.     p.  128. 
Christie  r.  (;ripgs,2  Camp.  79;  s.  c.  Tbonip. 

Carr.  raj.s.  IM.     pp.  12;!(i.  12;J7,  1285, 1293. 
Christie  r.  State,  44  1  n<l.  4il8.     p.  5o. 
Chrlbtlne  r.  W  liltehill,  10  Serg.  &  11.   (Pa.) 

212.     !>.  19to. 
Chrlstv  r.  .M  ver.s,  21  Mo.  112.    pp.  1980,  2121. 
Chrlsiv  f.  Snillli,801n(l.  .'■73.     p.  2(i71. 
Chiilil)'  r.  Klannagau,  6  Carr.  &  P.  431.    pp. 

14f.3.  1404, 14t;8. 
Chnl'l)  r.  Westlev,  6  Carr.  A  P.  436.    p.  1468. 
Chureh  f.  Cliureh,  cited  Sir  T.  liaym.  260. 

p.  889. 
Chureh  r.  (ioodln.  22  Kan.  527.    p.  2069. 
Chiirelilll  r.  ClMirehlll,  12  Vt.  061.    p.  53. 
Churehill  r.  Lee.  77  N.  C.  341.     i>p.  219,236. 
Churohwell    r.  Kogers,  llardlu   (Ky.),  182. 

p.  214. 
Chute  r.  State,  19  Minn.  271.    pp.  363,  679. 
Clcelv  r.  State,  13  Siiie.l.   &  M.    (Miss.)   202. 

pp.'lSS;?.  1S42,  18^13,  1857. 
Clllev  r.  IJartlett,  19  N.  II.  312.    pp.  1921,  1923. 
Cincinnati  r.  Walls,  1  Ohio  St.  222.     i..  891. 
Cineiniiatl  ite.    U.   Co.   r.   Cliironi,    113  Imi. 

4011 ;  8.  c.  15  X.  E.  Uep.  524.     ]<.  2i«8. 
Clnelnnatl  \c.  R.  Co.  c.   Eaton,  1)4   Ind.  474; 

».  r.  48  Am.  Pep.  179.     p.  14&5. 
Clnelnnatl  \e.  U.  Co.   r.  .Marcus,  38  111.  219. 

pj..  ll.'il.  11.54. 
Clnelnnatl  .V<-.  U.  Co.   r.   Pontius,   19  Oh.  St. 

22!.     p.  1.374. 
Cincinnati  Jfcc.  R.  Co.  r.  Spanler,  85  lud.  171. 

p.  1482. 
Clrcf.  Klghtor,  11  La.  Ann.  140.    pp.  1983, 

19ai. 
Citizens'  Bank  r.  Adams,  91  Ind.  280.     p.  ,^76. 
Citizens'   Pank  r.   Strauss,  20  La.  Ann.   736. 

pp.  11,85,  12'.i. 
Citizens'  Ins.   Co.  v.  Marsh,  41   Pa.  St.    387. 

p.  997. 
Cltv  f.  Habcock,  3  WaU.  (U.  S.)   240.     p.  2050. 
CltvlSank  f.  Kent,  57   <;a.  285.     pp.211,  254, 

.3^2,  1727,  1702,  1776,  lKt7. 
Cltv  Pauk  f.  McChcauey,  20  N.   Y.  240.    p. 

Ji<i.5. 
CItyPankf.   Perkins,  29  X.   Y.  5.54.     p.  1023. 
Cltv  Pnuk  of  New  II:ivou  f.  Perkins,  4  IJosw. 

(.V.  V.)  4211.     ji.  liiit. 
Cltv  Council  f.   Haywood,  2  Nott  &  McC. 

(S.  C. )  3ii."<.     p.  ."^28. 
Cltv  of  Atchison   v.   Bvrncs,   22  Kan.   05.     p. 

*2<t51. 
City  of  Columbus  r.   Dabn,  30  Ind.  .TKi.     p. 

3»5. 
Cltv  of  Indianapolis  r.  Murphy,  91   Ind.   382. 

p'.  lliv. 
City  of  Mattoon  I-.   Fallln,   113  111.  249.    pp. 

1214,  162.-.. 
Cltyof  Norwich, The,  4  Ben.  (U.  S.)  271.    pp. 

1*14.1.300. 
Cltv  of    .St.   Louis   r.    Kruln,  9Mo.  App.  690. 

p'.  747. 
Cltv  of  .St.  Lonls  r.  St.   Louis   U.  Co.,  14  Mo. 

Api'.221.     I..  H-21. 
Cltv  of  St  Loul8  r.  Wcbcr,  44  Mo.  647.    p.    ' 

K21.  i 


12.     P.  46 
(N.  v.). 


Clatlln  f.   Bacre,  28  Uun  (X.  V.},  2i>4.    pp. 

214,210. 
Clailin  V.  Meyer,  75  N.  Y.260;  t.  c.  11  JoneB 

&  Sp.  1.    pp.  121,   13:«'.,  1337,  l:«7,  lOol. 
Clallln  f.  Ros>enlper>.'.  42  M...  439.    p.  1440. 
Claggetf.  Force,  1    l»ana  i  Ky.  >,  429.     p.  106. 
Clair  V.    People,  8  Cniu.   L.' Mag.    184.    pp. 

1867,  1870,  187-J. 
Clantoii  f.  Stale,  13  Tex.  App..l39.     p.  66. 
Clanton   r.  Stale,  2ii   Tex.  App.  016.    ji.  1745. 
Clapp  r.  Broniagbau,  9  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  530.     p. 

1037. 
Clapp  r.  Clapj.,  137  Mass.  183.    p.  1962. 
Clapp  r.    Minneapolis  \c.  H.  Co.,  86  Minn.  6; 

a.  r.  2'.iX.  \\  .  K.  p.  ;!4o.    p.  1711. 
Clapp  I-.  Tirr.ll,  2ti  Pick.  247.    V.  1447. 
Claiip  r.  W11-...I1,  5   Den.    (N.  Y.)  280.    p.  486. 
Clardl  r.  Callcunt,  24  Tex.  170.     p.  343. 
Clare  v.  People,  9  Colo.  122.     pp.  1807,  1870. 
Clareinoiitf.  Carlton,  2  X.  11.369.    p.  1078. 
Clark   r.  Allen,  11  It.  I.  439;  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep. 

4%.     p.  9111. 
Clark  V.   Barnwell.  12   How.  (I'.  S.)  272.    pp. 

1321,  1322,  1345,  1:U0,  1348.  1349,  1356. 
Clark  V.  liiKlnw,  10  Me.  246.     ]>.  338. 
Clark  r.  lioiicl,  29  ln<i.  5.S5.     p.  47o. 
Clark  r.  Carter,  12  (i:i.  .5o0.     pp.  1983,1984. 
Clark  r.  Chambers,  3  t^   B.  Div.  327;  i.  c.l 

Cent.  L.  .J.  11  ;  17  .\lb.  L.  .J.  50.5.     p.  1210. 
Clark  V.  Child.  60  Cal.  b".    p.  1750. 
Clarke.   Clark,  t;5  N.  C.  t;55.    ii.  417. 
Clark  V.  Collins,  15  N.  .1.  L.  473.     pp.  124,128. 
Clark   r.  Conwav,  23  Mo.  4;i8.    pp.  60o,  603. 
Clark  r.  Corintli,  41  M.  449.    p.  1249. 
Clark  r.  Crane,  57  Cal.  629.     pj..  2085,  2086. 
Clark  r.  Davis,  7  Tex.  5.50.  p.  128. 
Clark  )■.  Field,  42  Mich.  342.     lip.  318,  342. 
Clark  r.  Fitch,  2  Wend.  (  N.    V.^  401.     p.  I49I. 
Clark  r.   Fletcher,   1   Alien    (Mass.),  53.     p. 

625. 
Clark  V.  Fletcher,  96  Pa.  St.  416.     p.  1103. 
Clark  r.  llammerle,  27  Mo.  55.     pp.  1088,  1689, 

1093. 
Clark  V.  nannibal  Ac.  R.  Co., 36  ,Mo.  202.    pp. 

1598,  1C(H),  1021,  1024.  1008. 
Clark  f.  Houghton,  12  (Jray  (Mass.),  38.    p. 

628. 
Clark  r.  Ins.  Co.,  40  X.  II.  3.33.    p.  978. 
Clark  f.  Lamb,  8  Pick.   (Mass.)   415.     p.  2003. 
Clark  r.  Lowell,  1  .Mien  (Mass.>,  18o.    p.  739. 
Clark   r.  .Mav,  2  tirav  (  Mass.),  440.     p.  100. 
Clark  r.  .McKlvv,  11  Cal.   ]rA.     p.  1750. 
Clark  r.  Missouri  Ac.  R.  Co.,  36  Kan.  850;  «. 

C.  11  I'.ic.    Rep.  1311.     p.  2027. 
Clark  r.  Mix,  15  Conn.  1.5:{.     p.  628. 
Clarke.  Molvneux.Ji;  Week.  K'ep.  104.  p.  1480. 
Clark  I-.  Muiivaii,22  Pick.  410.     p.  108<>. 
Clark  1-.  Xew  York,  24  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  838. 

p.  1737. 
Clark  v.  Pageter,  45  111.  241.    p.  1750. 
Clark  r.  P.-ople,  Breese  (III.),  206.     p.  150. 
Clark  r.  Ralls,  71  la.  189;  t.  c.  32  N.  W.  Rep. 

327.     p.  2028. 
Clark  V.  R.indall,  9  Wis.  13.'..    p.  192. 
Clark  r.  Read,  5  X.  .1.  L.  4S0.     p.  l'.»8a. 
Clark  r.  Ree^e.  :Vi  Cal.  S'X     pp.  2X2.  5'29. 
Clark  r.  Reinigcr.Oi;  la.  .507.     p.  377. 
Clark  f.  Rii-s.1.3  Walls  fPa.  .21.     p.  11.39. 
Clark  f.  SIgoiirncv,  17  Conn.  511.    p.  9t'>5. 
Clark  r.  Spence,  l(i  Watts  (Pa.),;«5.   pp.  1.321, 

i;tW,  1345. 
Clark    r.  St.  Louis  Ac.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  440. 

11.  1:M3. 
Cliirk  r.  State,  78  Ala.  474.    pp.  632,  633. 
Clark  f.  Stat<',  4  Ind.  1.50.    p.  :WL 
Clark  f.  Slate,  Wl  Iii-I.  .514.     p.  .52.5. 
Clark  r.  Stale,  12<»hlo,  48.3.     p.  1780. 
Clark  r.  Slate,  b  Tex.  App.  ;!.50.    pp.  1880. 1884. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xlix 


Clark  r.  Steamboat  Mound  Cltv,  9  Mo.  146. 

J).  1584. 
Clark  r.  Stronsp,  11  Xev.  76.    p.  20f>9. 
Clark  V.  Torritory,  1  Wash.  (Terr.j  61.  p.  118. 
Clark  V.  Union  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  40  N.  H. 

333.    p.  974. 
Clark  V.  Van  Vranken,  20  Barb.  (X.  Y.),  278. 


pp.  ye,  118. 

Crar 


Clark  V.  Vorce,  15  AVend.  (X.  Y.)  193.    p.  580. 
Clark  V.  Vorce,  19  Wend.   (X.  Y.)  232.    p. 

1671. 
Clark  V.  "Whittaker,  18  Conn.  543.    pp.  1943, 

1945,  la-ie. 
Clark  Xat.  Rank  r.    Bank,  57  X.  Y.  126;  s.  c. 

52  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  503.    p.  102.J. 
Clarke   v.  Arden,  16  C.  B.  227;   s.  c.  1  Jur. 

(N.  S.)  710;  24  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  162.     p.  1748. 
Clarke  v.  Dntcher,  9  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  674.    pp. 

9(W,  1671,1747. 
Clarke  v.  Goode,  6  J.  J.  Matsh.  (Ky.),  637. 

pp.  86,  93. 
Clarke  i-.  Kitchen,  52  Mo.  316.    p.  1683. 
Clarke  v.  Kownslar,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  617.    p. 

1669. 
Clarke  v.  Marriott,  9  Gill   (Md.),    331.    pp. 

822,  1507. 
Clarke  v.  Kochester  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  570. 

p.  1343. 
Clarke  v.  State,  35  Ga.  75.    p.  1890. 
Clary  v.  Clary,  2  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  78.    pp.  460, 

498,  499. 
Clason  V.  Bird,  2  Brev.  (S.  C.)  370.    p.  1586. 
Claussen  v.  I. a  Franz,  1  la.  226.    p.  32. 
Clay  V.  Xotrebe,  11  Ark.  654.    p.  2122. 
Clay  V.  Kobinson,  7  W.  Va.  350.    pp.  239,  476. 
Clav  r.  Willan,  1  n.  Bl.  298.    pp.  1337,  1361. 
Clayards  v.  Dethick,  12  Q.  1).  439.    p.  1210. 
Clayes  v.  Ferris,  10  Vt.  112.    pp.  .308,  309,  718. 
Clayton  v.  Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.,  67  la.  238.    p. 

673. 
Clayton  v.  School  Dlst,  20  Kan.  256.    p.  2101. 
ClaVtor  t'.  Anthony,  6  Band.  (Va.)285.    pp. 

289,  305,  1506. 
Cluau'e  f.  llvden,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  73.    p.  56. 
Clealand  r.  Walker,  11  Ala.  1059.    p.  1733. 
Cleave  v.  Jones,  7  E.vch.  421.    pp.  296,  1599, 

1739. 
Clegg  v.  Waterbury,  88  Ind.  21.    p.  2027. 
Clem  V.  State,  33  Ind.  418.    pp.  73,  124. 
Clem  V.   State,  42  Ind.  422.    pp.  1515,    1656, 

1682,  1808,  1852. 
Clemcnce  v.  Auburn,  66  X.  T.  334.    p.  1586. 
Clemence  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  366. 

p.  1221. 
Clement  v.  McConnell,  14  111.  154.    p.  1125. 
Clement  i:  Spear,  56  Vt.  401.    p.  1921. 
Clement,  The,  2  Curt.   (U.  S.)  363.    pp.499, 

.500,  .501. 

Clements  v.  Benjamin,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  299. 

1>.  1.585. 
Clements  v.  Maloney,  55  Mo.  352.    pp.1468, 

1469,  1490,  1609,  1615. 
Clerks'   Savings    Bank    v.  Thomas,  2  Mo. 

A  PI).  367.     p.  2080. 
Cleveland  v.   Sims,  60  Tex.  1.53;  s.  c.  6  S.  W. 

Hep.  634.    p.  2093. 
Cleveland  v.  Spier,  16  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  399.    p. 

1210. 
Cleveland  v.  St.  Paul,  18  Minn.  279.    p.  1249. 
Cleveland  tVc.  R.  fo.  v.  Crawford,  24   Oh.  St. 

631.    p.  1304. 
Cleveland  &g.  R.  Co,  v.  Curran,  19  Oh.  St. 

1.    v\K  129S,  1374. 
Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Elliot,  28  Oh.  St.  340. 

p.  1230. 
Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  X^ewcll,  104  Ind.  264; 

«.  c.  3  X.  Fast.   Hep.  836.     pp.  1751,  2U41. 
Cleveland  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Perkins,  17  Mich. 

296.    p.  ii2. 


Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stanley,  7  Oh.  St.  155. 

p.  38. 
Cleveland  Paper  Co.  i-.  Banks,  15  Xeb.  20; 

s.  r.  IG  X.  \V.  Rep.  8:J3.     pp.  745,  747,  20J1. 
Clews  V.  Bank,  106  X.  Y.  398;  s.  c.  11  X.  East. 

Rep.  814.    p.  251. 
Clifford  V.  Drake,  14  Bradw.  (111.)  75;  s.  c. 

110  111.135.    ]).  360. 
Clifford  r.  Hunter,  3  Car.  &  P.  16;  s.  c.  Mood. 

&  M.  103.     p.  384. 
Clifford  V.  Parker.  2  Man.  &  G.  910.    p.  1031. 
Clifton  V.  State,  53  Ga.  241.    p.  129. 
Chfton  V.  United  States,  4  How.  (U.  S.)  212. 

p.  2003. 
Cline  V.  Brav,  1  Ore.  89.    p.  1985. 
Clingan  v.  Miicheltree,  31  Pa.  St.  25.    p.  1008. 
Clintock    V.  Emick  (Ky.),  7  S.  W.  Rep.  903. 

p.  925. 
Clinton  v.  Englebrecht,  13  AVall.  (U.  S.)  434. 

pp.  14, 112. 
Clinton   r.  McKenzie,  5  Strobh.  (S.  C.)  36. 

pp.  309,  383. 
Clinton   v.  Rowland,  24   Barb.   (X.  Y.)  634. 

p.  585. 
Clinton  v.  State,  13  Oh.  St.  27.    pp.  409,  414. 
Clinton    Xat.  Bank    v.  Graves,   48   la.  229. 

p.  2073. 
Cliquot's   Champagne,  3   Wall.  (U.  S.)  114. 


pp.  305,  547. 
^lo 


4a 


Cloonr.  Gerry,  13 Grav  (Mass.), 201.  pp.1171, 

11:2,  1180. 
Clore's  Case.  8  Graft.  (Va.)606.    pp.  65,  69,72. 
Close  V.  Samm,  27  la.   503.    pp.  679,  680,  681, 

687. 
ClotworthT  r.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Mo.  220. 

pp.  1297, '1483. 
Clough  V.  Patrick,  37  Vt.  421.    p.  340. 
Clough  V.  State,  7  Xeb.   320.    pp.  Ill,  113, 114, 

119,  120,  311,  385, 1709,  1714,  1999. 
Cloves  V.  Thaver,  3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  564.    p.  282. 
Cluck  v.  State,  40  Ind.  263.    pp.  73, 1950. 
Cluggage  r.  Duncan,  1  berg.  &R.  (Pa.)lll, 

p.  1064. 
Cluggage  V.    Swan,   4  Binn.  (Pa.)  150.    pp. 

19(56,  1983. 
Clum  V.  Smith,  5  Hill  (X.  Y),  560.    p.  1985. 
Cluskey  v.  St.    Eouis,  50  Mo.  89.    pp.  1715, 

1724. 
Clyde  V.  Rogers,  24  Hun  (X.  Y.),  145.    pp. 

605,  606. 
Clymer  v.  Dawkings,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  674.    pp. 

1706,  1708,  1739. 
Coal  Run  Coal  Co.  v.  Jones  (111.),  6  West. 

Rep.  uol.    ji.  1653. 
Coale  V.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo.  230.    p. 

1311. 
Coates  V.  Hopkins,  34  Mo.  135.    p.  376. 
Coates  r.  Railroad  Co.,  (il  Mo.  38.    p.  1311. 
Coates  V.  Sangstou,  5  Md.  121.    pp.  1124, 1693, 

1698. 
Cobb  V.  Fogalman,  1  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  440.  pp. 

1668,    1674. 
Cobb  r.  Griffith  &c.  Co.,  12  Mo.  App.   130.    p. 

315. 
Cobb  V.  Griffith  &c.   Co.,  87  Mo.  90.    pp.  819, 

820. 
Cobb  V.  Krutz,  40  Ind.  323.    pp.  .577,  2051. 
Cobb  V.  Page,  17  Pa.  St.  469.    p.  880. 
Cobb  r.  Standish,  94  Me.  198.    )>.  12o9. 
Cobb  V.  State,  27  Ga.  648.    jip.  314,  749. 
Cobb  r.  State,  3  S.  E.  Kep.  628.     i>.  2076. 
Cobb  r.  Wallace,  5  Coldw.  iTenu.)  539.    PD, 

8t;i,1126.  *^*^ 

Cobbeit  1-.  Hudson,  1  El.  &  Bl.  11 ;  s.  c.  17  Jar. 

488.     pp.  257,  T9(). 
Col)l»ett  V.  Hudson,  15  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  s.)  988; 

s.  <•.  14  Jur.  982.    ji.  796. 
Cobbetl,  In  re,  17  Q.  15.    187.    p.  152. 
Coble  1-.  State,  31  Oh.  St.  100.    p.  459. 


TAiu.i:  OF  casp:s. 


CoblelRh  I-.  Ptorcc,32  Vt.788.    pp.  10B8,  1069. 
Cobiira    t:    llollle,   3   Mel.  (Muss.)    \ii.    p. 

Coliuni  r.  Mnrrav,  2  Mo.   2.%.    pp.  21,W,  2131. 
Cobiirn  r.  <>.lell,»>  N.  II.  .Mo.    j.p.  2t;i.  28;t. 
C'oiluto  Hank  r.  IJcrrv,  52  Me.  2y3.     p.  S25. 
Coolutlio  ItHiik  t'.  Ujk3kcU,  51  X.  il.  IW.    pp. 

1(^2.  UirX 
Cochlin    r.  Peoplo.03  111.  410;  s.   c.   10   Uc- 

portcr,  422.    pp.  19«5,  ^I'S. 
Coi'linowor  v.  Cocliuower,  27  lud.  253.     p. 

2m:. 

Coclirnu  r.  Dlnsmoic,  49  N.  Y.  249.    pp.  IWS, 

135y. 
Cochran  r.  Dodd,  16  Ind.  476.    p.  2107. 
Cochran  r.  Mate,  tVl  (ia.  731.    p.  114. 
Cochran  r.  State,  7  Humph.   (Teun.)  544.    p. 

liHPT. 

Cochran  v.  Street,  1  Wash.    (Va.)   79.    pp. 

WSA,  1'."*;. 
Cochran   .-.  Toher,  14  Minn.   3S5.    pp.   1118, 

1124,  1174, 12l>>. 
Cochrane  v.  Halsev,  2a  Minn.  52.    p.  2072. 
Cock  f.  State,  8  Tex.  .\p|'.  av.t.     p.  116. 
Cockburu  r.  A.shlaud  Lumber  Co.,  54  Wis. 

619.    p.  hViS. 
Cocker  v.  Franklin  Ac.  Co.,  3  Sumn.  (U.  S.) 

53".     pp.  1122, 1124.  1125. 
Cockle  V.  Flack,  93  U.  8.  .344.    p .  S85. 
Cockrell  v.  McQuinu,  4  T.  B.  Mon.  (K}'.)  63. 

p.  1082. 
Cockshott  r.  Bennett,  2  T.  R.  763.    p.  889. 
Codding  V.   Wood,  112  Fa.  St.  371.    pp.  852, 

854. 
Codv  V.  Hou^h,  20  111.  43.    p.  614. 
CodV  V.  .'^tate,  3  ]k)W.  (.Ml(<8.)  27.     p.  121. 
Coffee  r.  Groover,  2ii  Fla.  W.     p.  199S. 
Cotfeen  v.  .McCord,  &5  Ind.  Mi.     p.  2042. 
Coffelt  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  436.    p.  1777. 
Coffett  V.  Wise,  62  Ind.  451.    p.  1006. 
Conin  ».  Anderson,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  395.    p. 

489. 
Collin  r.  Cltv  Council,  26  la.  535.    p.  20.'>4. 
Collin  V.  (■(>illn,4  Mas.~.  2.    pj).  1.50."),  1515. 
Collin  V.  Gephart,  lo  la.  2.56.     pji.  I'.i4»,  194.5. 
Collin   V.    Vincent,   12  Cash.  ^.Maso.;   98.    p. 

3.53. 
CoK'an  r.  Ebden,  1  Burr.  3S:}.    jip.  1986, 1987, 

l;l8".t,  2001. 
Cogburn  f.  Spence.  15  .\la.  .549.    p.  9<')6. 
CoKswell  V.  State,  49  Ga.  103.    pi>.  1976, 1977, 

1988. 
Cohea  r.  State,  il  Tex.  App.  153.    p.  308. 
Cohen  r.  Dupout,  1  .'iandf.  S.   C.  (>'.  Y.)  260. 

p.  loai. 
Cohen  V.  Kvler,  27  Mo.  122.    p.  891. 
Cohen    V.    Jjobert,  2  Strobh,  L.   (S.    C.)  410. 

p.  P.<23. 
Cohen  V.  Slate,  .50  Ala.  108.     pp.  1740,  1839. 
Cohen  V.  Slate,  II  T.\.  Al>p.  337.     p.  1.56(». 
Cohen  V.  Trowliridu'e,  6  K;in.  3.><.5.    p.  2130. 
Cohen,  Matter  «>f ,  fi  (  al.  494.    p.  1.52. 
Cohn,  Kx  parte,  .5.5  fal.  I'.i3.     p.  1.52, 
Cohol  V.  .\llen.  37  la.  449.     p.  2093. 
Cohron  r.  .stale,  20  «,a.  7.53.  pp.  118,  1912,  1934. 
Colt  <•.  Planer,  4  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  8.)  (X.  Y.)  140. 

p.  891. 
Colt  r.  Waples,  1  Minn.  134.    p.  17.50. 
Coker  r.  HirRe,  10  Ga  .336.     ]>.  1391. 
Coker  r.   Haves  16   Kla.  .3«V8.     ).p.  \W\.  1984. 
Coker  v.  Stale, 20  Ark.  .53.     pp.  I'.KW,  1'.k)7,  1982. 
Coker  f.  Slate,  7  Tex.  Apj..  8;i.     p.  30. 
Colby  f.  Heaver  Dam,  31  \ViH,  28.5.     p.  1249. 
Colcheeter  r.  Hrrx.ke,  7  Q.  H.  337.     p.  1221. 
Colo  r.  Itovd,  47  .Mich.  W.     p.  2037. 
Colo  r.  Crawford.  iV>  Tex.  124.    |>.  20'27. 
Colo  v.  CurtlH,  16  .Minn.  182.     pp.   116.{,  1186, 

ll-ff. 
Colo  1-.  Daviee,  1  Ld.  Uaym.  724.    p.  1440. 


Colo  V.  DrIskell,  1  RIackf.  (Ind.)  16.  p.  2106. 
Cole  V.  Cioodwin,  19  Wentl.  (\.  V.)  251.  p.  1365. 
Colo  V.  llebb,  7  Gill  &  J.  (.Md.)  20.    pp.  1507, 

15116. 
Cole  V.  1IIII.'<,  44  X.  II.  227.     p.  1029. 
CkIo  r.  .leshup,  10  X.  V.  IW.     p.  tU2. 
Colo  V.  Perrv,  6  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  5S4.    p.  Jll. 
Colo  V.  Spann,  13  Ala.  637.     li.  1733. 
Colo  f.  Swan,  4  ij.  tireeno  (la.),  32,    i>p.  106, 

1917, 1918,  pi'.il.  • 

Cole  r.  While,  26  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  511.     p.  1441. 
Colee  I-.  Stale,  75  Iiid.  .511.     iip.  2107,  212:1. 
Coleman  c.  (  Ii-mmiiis,  23  (al.  245.    p.  822. 
Coleman  r.  Dobbins,  8  Intl.  1.56.     p.  561. 
Coleman  c.  (aiuiore,  49  Cal.  340.     p.  2o87. 
Coil-man    r.    Ilagermnn,  MS.,  died   6    Cow. 

(X.  V.)  .564.      p.  6'J. 
Coleman  c.  Moodv,  4  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.")  1.    pp. 

696,  l'.»28,  l'.i3il,  I'.iTii.  I'.i75,  2062. 
Coleman  i:  People,  65  X.  Y.  81.     p.  298. 
Coleman  r.  l{oberl-i,  1  Mo.  y7.    p.  888. 
Coleman   v.   Soiitlicasteru  K.  Co.,  4  Hurl.  A 

Colt.  699.     p.  1232. 
Coleman  r.   Stale,  59  Ala.  52.     pp.  1820,  1861, 

1862,  1864,  18«!5. 
Coleman  r.  SI  ale,  28  Oa.  23.     p.  1984. 
Coleman  c.  Sta(e,  .5'i  .Mi>s.  484.     ]>.  66. 
Coleman  c.  Wolcott,  4  Day  (Coun.)  388.    p. 

291. 
Colgan  r.  Ayniar,  Labor  Supp.  (N.  Y.)  27.    p. 

854. 
Cr.Ilajran  v.  I?nriis,  57  Mo.  449.    p.  1009. 
Colletl  v.  Smilh,  143  Mass.  473.     p.  1112. 
Collier  c.  Idlev.  1   Hradf.  (X.  Y.  j  9.5.    p.  1.589. 
Collier  V.  Xokes,  2  Car.  ,t  Kir.  1012.    p.  636. 
Collier  r.  Simpson,  6  Car.  &  P.  73.    pp.QlS, 

782,  7S;l. 
Collier  c.  Stale.  20  Ark.  36.     pp.  119,  120,  1982. 
Collier  f.  Swinnev,  13  Mo.  478.     p.  1.5'.t3. 
Colling  r.  Stale,  21)  Tex.  .\pp.400.    p.  1784. 
Collins   f.   Albany  Ac.   U.   Co.,   12  Barb.  (X. 

V.)492.    p.  1223. 
Collin.s  r.  Hardlni,'.  65  Mo.  496.    pp.  1980,  2128. 
Collins  r.  Benburv,  5  Ired.   (X.  C.)  118.    p. 

8i5u 
Collins   r.   Bennett,  46  X.  Y.  490.    pp.   1318, 

1322, 13-25. 
Collins   v.    Boston     Ac.    U.    Co.,    lo   Cush. 

(Mass.)  .VMi.     |>.  IKVi. 
Collins  V.  Hrush,  9  Wend.  (X.   Y.)   198.    p. 

1411. 
Collins  r.  Cave,  9    .Inr.  (N.  s.)  297;  s.  c.  4 

Hurl.  &X.22.5.     p.  :«1. 
Collins  V.  Council  Bluffs,  32  Iowa,  .324.      p. 

Collins  r.  Evans,  5  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  804.    p. 

14P.I. 
Collins  V.  Frost,  .54  Ind.  242.    p.  19.37. 
Collins  t'.  .Mack,  31  Ark.  6S.5.     p.  i:U. 
C«dllns  r.  Magli<e,  32  Ind.  268.     p.  -2069. 
Collins  f.  I'eople,  48  111.  14.5.     j..  ,.5. 
Collins  r.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  38.    p.  1.5»K). 
Collins  f.  Slate,  6  Tex.  App.  7'2.       ii.  -JO-.tS. 
Collins  V.  Stephenson,  8  Grav  (>las».),  438. 

p.  *.»7. 
Collins  Man.  Co.  v.  Marcv,  25  Conn.  242.    p. 

1109. 
Collver  r.  Pennsylvania   U.    Co.    (X.  J.),  6 

All.  Hep-   137.     (i.  l-r.'.i. 
Color.'Klo  SprlngH  v.  Ilewilt,  3  Colo.  275.    p. 

KW. 
Cobiuitt  V.  Thomas,  8  Oa.  2.58.    p.  1713. 
C<dt  r.  Kves,  12  Conn.  243.     i>p.  13,  43. 
Colt  r.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  R.  (X.  Y.;  611.  pp. 

17,  26. 
Colt   V.  Sixth    Ave.  U.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  671.    p. 

1608. 
Colton  V.  Cleveland  Ar.  U.  Co.,  67  Pa.  .St.  2n. 

pp.  1345,  l:(47,  1348,  1356,  1359. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


li 


Colloii  V.  James.  1  T?arn.  &  A'il.  12S.    p.  1171. 
Columbia  V.  Harrison,  2  Treadw.  (S.  C.)  213. 

p.  ShS. 
Columbia  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  2  Pet.  (N. 

S.)2.').     p.  805. 
Columl)ia  Inn.  Co.  v.  Lawrence,  10  Pet.  (U. 

.S.)  507.     pp.  974,982. 
Columbus  V.  Dahn,  80  Ind.  330.    p.  528. 
Coluinbua  v.  Goulchins,  7  Ga.   139.    pp.  5r^, 

124. 
Columbus  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Powell,  40  Ind.  37. 

p.  2034. 
Colviu  V.   I'.urnet,  2    Hill   (N.   Y.),  620.    p. 

1625. 
Colwell  V.  Brower,  75  111.  517.     pp.  216,  231. 
Com.  V.  Addis,  1  Bro.  (Penn.)  285.    p.  45. 
Com.  V.   Anlhcs,  5   Gray  (Mass.),  185.    pp. 

1450,  1508,  1516. 
Com.    V.   .\u.stln,  7  Gray    (Mass.),  51.    pp. 

727,  728,  733. 
Com.  V.  Kannon,97  Mass.  214.    p.  171. 
Com.    V.  Barney,  10    Gush.  (Mass.)  480.    p. 

1087. 
Com.  V.   Biirrv,  9  Allen   (Mass.),   276.    pp. 

1630,  1636.  1768. 
Com.  V.  Bean,  111  Mass.  438.    p.  418. 
Com.  v.  Billinj^s,  97  Mass.  407.     p.  4.')0. 
Com.  V.  Bonner,  97  Mass.  .587.    p.  525. 
Com.  V.  Boston  &c.  K.  Co.,  3  Cush.  (Mass.) 

25.    pp.  56,  57. 
Com.  V.  Bosworth,  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  397.    p. 

467. 
Com.  r.  Braynard,  Thacli.  Cr.  Cas.  146.     pp. 

181.277,2S4. 
Com.    V.   Brown,  14  Gray   (Mass.),  419.    p. 

351. 
Com.  V.  Brown.  121  Mass.  69.    pp.  647,  783. 
Com.  ('.  Bruce,  79  Fvv.  .560.     p.  1088. 
Com.  v.  Burcher,  2  Bob.  (Va.)-826.    p.  48. 
Com.   r.  Burroughs  (Mass.),  13  North  East 

Kep.  884.     p.  51). 
Com.  V.  Buzzell,  6  Pick.  153.    p.  105. 
Com.  r.  Cain,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  7.     p.  416. 
Com.  I'.   Campbell,  7  Allen  (Mass.),  543.    p. 

297. 
Com.    r.  Carey,2  Brcwst.  (Pa.)404.    p.  1833. 
Com.  r.  Carson,  3  Phila.  219.    p.  23. 
Com.  v.  Carter,  2  Va.  fas.  319.    p.  48. 
Com.  Certain  Intoxicating  Liquors,  107Mass. 

216.     p.  43. 
Com.  i\   Chauncey,  2  Ashm.  (Pa.)  90.    p.  19. 
Com.  V.  Choate,  105  ISIass.  451.    p.  299. 
Com.   I'.  Cliurchill,  11  Mete.   (Mass.)  538.    p. 

4.V). 
Com.  r.  Cobb,  14  Grav  (Mass.),  257.    p.  1816. 
Com.  r.  Cook,  6  Serg.\t  K.  (Pa.)  .577.    p.  1905. 
Com.  r.  Costlev,  US   Mass.  1.     pp.  1709,   1808, 

1819,  1821,2114,  2115. 
Come.   Crans.  3Pa.    L.   .1.  449 ;  .s.  c.  2  Clarke 

(Pa.  L.  .J.),  180.    pp.  171.  172. 
Com.  V.  Cullins,  1  Mass.  116.    p.  1,566. 
Com.  c.  Culver,  12ii  Mass.  464.     p.  297. 
Com.  r.  Cumiinirliani,  11)4  .Mass.  545.    p.  1073. 
Com.  r.  Cunningham,  6  Gratt.  (Va.)  695.     p. 

48. 
Com.  r.  Dailey,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  80.    p.  6. 
Com.  r.  Dandridge,  2  Va.   Cas.  408.    p]>.   143. 

148. 
Com.  V.  Davis,  11  Grav  (Mass.).  4.    p.  845. 
Coin.  v.  l)earl)orn,  109  Mass.  368.     p.  304. 
Com.   r.  Deskins,  4   Leigh  (Va.),  6a5.     j).  187. 
Com.  r.  Donovan,  13  Allen   (Mass.),  571.    ii. 

111.5. 
Com.  V.  Dorsev,  103  Mass.  412.    pj).  8,  42. 
Com.  V.  Doriis",  los  Mass.  488.    p.  1911. 
Com.  V.  Drew,  4  Mass.  391.     pp.  189(J,  1982. 
Com.  r.  Kddy,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  ,5*5.    p.  1878. 
Com.    V.  Eastman,    "l  Cush.   (Mass.)   189.     w. 

303. 


Com.  r.  Kalon,  8  Phila.  428.    p.  26. 

Com.  V.  Edgerly,  10  Allen  (Mass.),  184.    pp. 

.300, 1943. 
Com.  r.  Emmons,  98  >Iass.  6.     p.  814. 
Com.  V.  Kerrigan,  4«  I'a.  St.  386.    pp.  290.  302. 
Com.  r.  Fisher,   15  Phila.  (Pa.)  .387.    p.  1798. 
Com.   r.  Fitzgerald,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  297.    p. 

4J5. 
Com.  V.  Fitzpatrick,  3  Clark  (Penn.\  .520.    p. 

98 
Coni.  V.  Flanagan,  7  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.)   415. 

pp.  72,  119.  123. 
Com.  V.  Kord,  130  Mass.  64;  «.  c.  39  Am.  Rep. 

426.     pp.  3.53,  .360.  361,  365,  449. 
Cora.  V.  Fox,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  585.    pp.364, 

1574. 
Com.  V.  Franklin.  133  Mass.  .569.    p.  1379. 
Com.  V.  Frazier,  2  Brewst.  (Pa.)  490.    p.  92. 
Com.  V.  Gallagher,  126  Mass.  54.    pp.  396,  400, 

473. 
Com.  V.  Galligan,  113  Mass.  202.    p.  1784. 
Com.    1-.  Gee.  6  Cush.   (Mass.)  174.    pp.  87, 

103. 
Com.  V.  Green,  17  Mass.  515.    pp.  2060,  2061. 
Com.  V.  Green.  1  Ashm.  (Pa.)  289.    p.  19. 
(!om.  V.  Greenlaw.  119  Mass.  2i»8.    p.  21.36. 
Com.  V.  Goldstein,  114  Mass.  272.    p.  608. 
Com.  V.  Gross,  1  .Vshm.  (Pa.)  281.    pp.  65, 114. 
Com.  r.  IIailstock,2  Gratt.  (Va.)  .564.    p.  72. 
Com.  V.  Haines,  15  Phila.  363.     p.  19&5. 
Com.  f.   Halev,  13  AUeu   (Mass.),  587.    pp. 

363.  .366. 

Com.  V.  Hammond,  2  Maine,  33.    p.  879. 
Com.  V.  Harlow,  110  Mass.  411.    pp.  787,  788, 

1808. 
Com.  V.  Harmau,  4  Pa.  St.  269.    pp.  1816, 1836, 

1860,  18(;i,  1863,  1875,  1876. 
Com.  i\  Harris,  101  Mass.  29.    p.  1388. 
Com.  r.  ilartzell,  40  Pa.  St.  462.     ]>.  90. 
Com.   V.    Haskell,  2   Brewst.    (Pa.;  491.    pp. 

215,  226. 
Com.  V.  Hawkins,  3  Grav  (Mass.),  463.    pp. 

437,  439. 
Com.  V.  IlelmondoUer,  4  Gratt.   (Va.)  536. 

p.  48. 
Com.  r.  Hill,  4  .Mien  (Mas.s.),  591.    p.  60. 
Com.  V.  Hill,  14  Mass.  2ii7.     p.  .332. 
Comer  r.  llimes,  -lO  Ind.  482.     p.  2037. 
Com.  r.  Horton.  2  (iray  (Mass.).  354.    p.  ,300. 
Com  V.  Howe.  13  Gray  (Mass.),  26.    p.  287. 
Com.  i\  Hudson,  11  ("irav  (Mass.),  64.     p.  443. 
Com.  r.  Hughes,  5  Kand".  (Va.)  655.     p.  74. 
Com.  c.  Hughes,  11  I'liila.  430.    \t.  124. 
Com.  i:  Hunt,  4  Gray  (.Mass.),  421.    p.  414. 
Com.  r.  Hussey,  13  Mass.  221.    pp.  .52.  119. 
Com.  r.   Ingraham,  7  Grav  (Mass.),  46.    pp. 

468,472.  ■  ^^ 

Com.  V.  James.  99  ^lass.  438.    pp.  41.  204. 
Com.  V.  Jeffs,  131  Mass.  5.    pp.  3t>3,  365,  366. 
Com.  V.  Jenkins,  10  Gray   (Mass.),   489.    p. 

484.  ^ 

Com.  t>.  Jenkins,  Thach.  Crlm.  Cas.  118.    p. 

1952.  ^ 

Com.  V.  Joliffe,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  585.   pp.  45,  68. 
Com.  r.  Jennings,  121  Mass.  47      p.  111.5. 
Com.  v.  Jones,  1  l>eigh  (Va.),598.     p.  123. 
Com.   V.    Kautfuian,   1    Phila.    (Pa.)  534.    p. 

19.'2. 
Com.  V.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.),  49(5.    pp.  67. 

75,  88.  67.^J. 
Com.   V.    Knapp.   10  Pick.  (.Mass.)  477.      pp. 

1.505.  l.">06,  l.-)U7. 
Com.  fT  Kiieeland,  20  Pick.  206.    p.  1694. 
Com.  r.  Landis,  12  Phila.  (Pa.)  .576.   ji.  1924. 
Com.  f.  Laniian,  13  .\lleu  (.Mass.)  563.    pp. 

364,  .523.  ^*^ 
Com.  r.  Lenox,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  249.    p.  71. 
t;om.  r.  Leonard,  4  .\.  East.  Kep.  96;  »■.  <•.  140 

Mass.  473.     p.  1848. 


TA15LE    OF    CASES. 


Com.  r.  Lofiher.  17  Scrg.  &  U.  (Pa.)  155.   pp. 

(il.  fi3.  05,  «7,  ".'>. 
Com.  i\  hfvv,  •>  Wheel.  Or.  C'a.  i-ie.     p.  878. 
(.oiii.  r.  Lliiptinl,  6  Serg.  &  It.  (I'a.)  305.     p. 

:U). 
Com.  r.  Livermore,  4  Grav  (Mass.),  18.    pp-. 

5ti.  M. 
Com.   r.  Lvnos  (Ma.-'s.^  :?  New    Eng.   Ilep. 

Sit ;  *.  ,-.  u-i  Mii.-i.s.  r.77.     p.  •i'.ia. 
Com.    r.   Marrow,;!   lJn'\v>l.  (i'a.)   40'2;  «.  c. 

glib    itoiH.    Com.   V.  .Marra,  8  Pbila.    (I'a.) 

44U.     pp.  4.').  87,8.1,  114,  l'.i"t7. 
Com.  1-.  Mc-Affc,  li»S  .Ma>s.  4.58.     p.  1574. 
Com.    r.  .McAllister,  2   Watts  (Fa.),  UK),    p. 

11(17. 
Com.  I-.   McC;ml,   1    Va.    Cas.   271.    pp.  rJ07, 

I'.tOS. 
Cm.  r.  MoDowell,  Sfi  Pa.  .'^t.  377.     p.  803. 
Com.  r.  MeKlhaiiv,   111    Mass.   431*.     pp.  88, 

imo,  20<;i.  •2o7'.>. 

Com.  r.  MclJortv,  114  Mass.  209.     p.  1892. 
Com.  V.  McKif,  1  (iray  (Mass.  i,  (>1.     p.  1848. 
Com.    V.  Merriam,  14'  Pick.  (Mass.)   618.     p. 

3in». 
Com.   f.   Messliiger,    1  IMnu.    (Pa.)    273.     p. 

tWJ. 
Com.  r.  :\niUT,  4  Plilla.  210.    p.  19. 
Com.  r.  Mooiu'v,  110  Mass.  90.     p.  431. 
Com.   V.  Moore,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  194.     p.  449. 
Com.   c.   Moore,  143  Mass.  136;  s.  c.  9  North 

East.  Rep.  S81.     p.  .V.i. 
Com.  r.  .Mor>:aii,  1(17  Mass.  199.    p.  525. 
Compton  c.  (■iis>a<la,  54  Ga.  74.     p.  1634. 
Com.  r.  Mullen,  97  Mass.  .54.).     ]>.  531. 
Com.  c.  Miilliiis.  2  Allen  (Mass. ),  295.     p.  519. 
Com.    r.   .Miirphv,   10  Grav  (Mass.),  1.    pp. 

722,  727.  728. 
Com.  f.  Newton,  1   Grant  Cas.  458.     pp.  151. 

171,  172.  18;"). 
Com.  I..  Nii-liols,  114  Mass.  28.5.  pp.  299,  524. 
Com.  V  O'Neil,  fi  (Jrav  (.Mass.),  343.  p.  58. 
Com.  r.  Parker,  2  Pick".  (Mass.)  549.  p.  19. 
Com.  V.  Pease,  137  Mass.  .57(;.  pp.  1801,  1802. 
Com.  r.  Phelps,  11  (irav  (.Mass.),  73.  p.  336. 
Com.  r.  Pii-.r,  120  Mass".  18.5.  p.  91. 
Com.   V.  Pollard,   12    Mete.    (Mass.)   22.'5.    p. 

1.5.58. 
Com.  r.  I'orter,  4  Grav  (Mass.),  423.     p.  104. 
Com.  V.  Porter,  10  Mete.  (.Mass.)  263.    pp.  725, 

726,  1.5(1.5,  1520. 
Com.  r.  Powers,  lOi)  Mass.  .353.    p.  204. 
Com.  I-.  Pratt,  126  Mass.  462.     p.  28:?. 
Com.  r.  Price,  10  Gray   (Mass.),  472.    pp.  288, 

209,  527. 
Com.  r.  Oaks,  113  Mass.  8.     p.  1.388. 
Com.  r.   Kieil,  l(;rav,472.     p.  55. 
Com.  V.  Kei<l,  8  Ptilla.   (Pa.  )  3S.5.     ]).  71. 
Com.  r.  lieid,  1  Leg.  Gaz.  Hep.  (Pa.)  182.    pp. 

3;{0,  646. 
Com.    V.   Uevnolds,   122   Mass.    4.54.     pp.  624, 

528. 
Com.    V.   Uevnolds,   14   Gray  (Mass.),  87.     p. 

18.5. 
Com.  r.  Hlcketson,  5  Mete.    (Mass.)   412.     p. 

310. 
Com.  r.  Higgs,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  377.    p.  845. 
Com.  r.  K<ililiison.  1  (Jrav,  555.     p.  204. 
Com.  V.  Uol.v,  12  Pl(;k.  (ilass.)  496.     pp.  1921, 

1926,  I'.CIO,  i9S2. 
Com.  r.  Itogers,  7  Mctc.    (Mass.)  500.     pp.  88, 

Ki,  312,  17H0. 
Com.   r.  Kock,  10  Gray  (Ma88.),4.    bj).  1508, 

1516, 
Com.  r.  Uvnn,  5  Mass.  90.    p.  55, 
< 
Co 

110. 

Com.  V.  Scolt,  123  Mass.  2.39.     pp.  710,  745.  787, 
788.  791.  793. 


Oom.  r.  Uvnn,  5  Mass.  90.    p.  ^5. 

r;om.  V.  Jacket  I,  22  Pick,  f  Mass.)  394.    p.  376. 

L'om.    V.   .^allager,  3  Clark  (Pciin.),   li7.     p. 


Com.  r.  .Scott,  123  Maes.  418.     p.  2060. 

l'om.  V.    .'^elfrldge,   Morr.    A    Thomp.  Caa. 

.SelfDef.  2.     p|..  1.V19,  KW. 
Com.  V.  Miaw,  7  .\m.  Law  Iteg.  2S9.     p.  5. 
Com.  f.  t^haw,  4  (  ush.  «..Mass.    6W.     p.  282. 
Com.    t'.   h>heplierd,    1     Alleu    (Mass.),   576. 

p.  3a3. 
Com.  r.  ."^heplierd.  6  Hinn.  (Pa.)  282.     p.  585. 
Com.  r.  ."^lierr\ ,  \\  hart,  on  Mom.  481.     p.  65. 
Com.  r.  Shields,  2  Hush    (Kv.),  81.     pp.   1904, 

1907,  1981. 
Com.  V.  Skeggs,  3   Hush   (Ky.),  19.     pp.  1983, 

1984. 
Com.  f.  Smith,  6  Cush.  SO.     p.  1.388. 
Com.  r.  smith,  2  Grav  (.Mass.).  516.     p.  264. 
Com.  f.  Sniilli,  1(12  Mass.  144.     p.  1.5.36 
Com.    f.    .'^nelling,    15     Pick.     (Mass.)    321. 

p.  1720. 
Com.  r.  .stt-nrns,  10  Mote.  2.57.     p.  299. 
Com.  r.  .stelililii>,8Grav  (Mass. ;, 492.    j).  1.535. 
Com.  V.  .'^tepli.ii,  4  Leigh  (N'a.),  679.     p.  124. 
Com.  r.  Stochr.  ln'.i  Mass.  3t>5.     p.  304. 
Com.  r.  Sldw.U,  9  Mite.  (Mass. ). 572.     p.  111. 
Com.  r.  stuai-i,  2  Va.  Cas.  329.     p.  144. 
Com.  V.  ."^turtivant,  117  Mass.  139.     p.  784. 
Com.  f.  Thompson,  4    Phila.    (Pa.)  216.    pp. 

49,  117. 
Com.  r.  Thrasher,  11   (irav  (Mass.),  55.    pp. 

58,  73,  !Kt,  103.  3(1(1. 
Com.  r.  Thurston,   7   J.    .L    Marsh.    (Kv.)  62. 

p.  265. 
C^om.  V.  Tuckerman,   lo  Gray   (Mass.),  198. 

p.  297. 
Com.    I'.  Tuev,  8  Cush.    (Mass.)  1.     pp.  1666, 

18.53. 
Com.  r.  Tnrner,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  19.     p.  304. 
Com.  f.  Tuttle,  12  Cush.  (.Mass.)  402.     p.  1816. 
Com.  r.  Twitchell,   1  IJrewst.  (I'a.)  551.     pp. 

27,  4.5,91,  (H7. 
Com.  c.  Twomhlv,  10  Pick.  (.Mass.)  480n.     pp. 

65,  85. 
Com.    V.    Walden,    3  Cush.    (.Mass.)  558.     p. 

1.537. 
Con),  r.  Walsh,  124  Mass.  32.     pp.  30.  42. 
Com.  V.  Warrin,  143  Muss.  .5(18.     p.  111,5. 
Com.  V.  Wehsler,  5Ciish.  (Mass.)  ■2!t5     pp.  62, 
(>4,t;.5,  67,   72.  K-i,  515,   675,   1788,    1793,1800, 
1808,    IS20,    1821,  1822,    1847,   1860,  1861,  1863, 
18(i5,  18(i9,   1886. 
Com.    r.  Welsh,  4   Gray  (M.'iss.).6S3.     p.  444. 
Com.   <-.  Wevmouth,  2  .Mien  (.Masn.i,  144.     p. 

2075. 
C'om.   f.  Wilson,   1   (Jray   (Mass.),  3,37.     pp. 

484,  738. 
Com.   V.   WInnemore,  1    Rrewst.   3.56;  «.  c.  2 

Hrewst.  37.S.     pp.  10.  11,  K\. 
Com.ti.  Worcester, 3  Tick.  (Mas8.)462.     p.  69. 
Com.  r.  Woreeslir,  144  .Mass.  .5><.     p.  789. 
Com.  r.Wiirmh'y,8(;rall.  (Va.)  712.     p.  1918. 
Com.  I'.    Wright.   1    Cush.    (.^lass.)    46.     pp. 

VMA,  \'.*W. 
Com.  I-.  York,  9  Meic,  (Mass.)  93.     p.  1817. 
Com.  /Immcrinan,  1  ('ranch  C.   C.  (U.  8.)  47. 

pp.  721,72.5.  1916, 
Comhs  V.  Slanghler,  Hard.  (Ky.)  62.     p.  86. 
Comhs  r.  Smith.  7.s  .Mn,  32.     p.'l(t,5Vt. 
Comhs  r.  Winehesl.r,  39  N.  11.  13.     p.  397. 
Comfort  r.  i;i-.nl.cls.  11  fa,  St.  13.     p,  St6«l. 
Comforl  r.  Spragiie.itl  .Minn.  4<K5      p.  1024 
Commander  r.   Slate 

6:1,  69. 
Cominurclal  Hank  r. 

.324. 
Commercial     Itank   i 

(.\.  '\     94.     II.  :<28. 
Commercial   Itank  v. 

1025. 
Commercial   Itank  e. 


2(i:t.    p)>.  .5(;'.i,  .57(1.  <u:!. 


6(1  Ala.  1.     pp.   35,  61, 

Clark,  28    Vt,  .325.    p. 

HughCM,     17    Wcud. 

,Iones,  18  Tex.  812.     p. 

Union    Hank,  11   N'.  Y. 


TAl'.LE    OF    CASES. 


liii 


Commissioners  v.    Bacon,  9G  Ind.    31.    pp. 

12«i»,  12T2. 
Comniissioners  r.  Clark,  94  U.  S.  278.  p.  160-2. 
Cominissioncra  v.  Craft,  (j  Kan.  145.    p.  37.5. 
ConiuiiSiiioners    v.   Kniiuereou,  95    Inii.  573. 

p.  l-.'sO. 
Commissioners  v.   Lcmly,  85  X.  C.   341.    p. 

5U1. 
Commissioners    of   iscaufort   v.  Dancan,   1 

Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  234.     p.  16*58. 
Common  Council    of  Alexandria  v.  Brock- 

ett,  -2  Crancli  C.  C.  13.     p.  1147. 
Compton  r.  Candless,   3  Camp.  19.    p.   1244. 
Company  of  Carpenters  v.  Hayward,  Dougl. 

(Midi.)  .360.     p.  288. 
Compton  V.  Lepras,  24  La.  Ann.  259.    p.  30. 
Compt.tn   V.    Wilder,  40  Ohio  St.  130.    p.  188. 
Coinstock  V.  Davis,  51  .Mo.  569.    p.  1584. 
Comstock  r.  iladlynie  Ecc.  Soc.,8  Conn.  254. 

pp.  214,  218,  22.S. 
Comstock  V.  Savajre,  27  Conn.  284.    p.  959. 
Comstock    V.  Smith,  7  Johns.   (X.    Y.)  87. 

p.  900. 
Comstock  V.  State.  14  Neb.  205.    p.  775. 
Conard  v.  I'aciiic  Ins.  Co.,  B  Pet.  (U.  S.)  262. 

p.  2114. 
ConastcT  v.  State,  12  Lea  f  Tenn.),  436.    p.  73. 
Couaw  ay  v.  Slielton,  3  Ind.  334.    p.  1646. 
Concord"  Kailroad  i'.   Greely,    17  N.   H.  47. 

p.  1107. 
Condit  r.  Baldwin,  21  X.  Y.  219.    pp.  886,  887. 
Cone   V.  State,  13  Te.x.  App.  483.    pp.  1-60, 

1861. 
Congar  v.  Chamljerlain,  14  Wis.  258.  p.  927. 
Conkev  v.  Xortliern  Bank,  6  Wis.  447.  p.  95. 
Conklinr.  Hill,  2  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  6.  p.  J964. 
Conklin  v.  Hinds,  16  Minn.  4.=i7.  pp.  2070,  2073. 
Conklin  v.  Keokuk  (Iowa),  35X.  W.  Rep.  444. 

p.  56. 
Conlin  v.  San  Francisco  &c.  R.  Co.,SGCal. 

406.    p.  1669. 
Conn  V.  Ferree,  60  Mo.  17.    p.  1590. 
Conn  V.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  391.    p.  762. 
Conn.  Mat.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  89  IIL  516. 

p.  521. 
Conn.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schaefer,  94  U.  S. 

457.     p.  9'.a. 
Counaghan  v.  People,  88  111.  460.    pp.  1828. 

1832. 
Connecticut  &c.  R.  Co.  i-.  Baxter,  32  Vt.  805. 

p.  863. 
Connehan  v.  Ford,  9  Wis.  240.    p.  1014. 
Conner  v.  Belden,  8  Dalv  (X.  Y.),257.    p.  195. 
Conner  I'.  lioutli,  7  How.  (>nss.)  176.    j).  847. 
Conner  v.  Stanley,  67  Cal.  315.    p.  339. 
Connor  v.  State,  25  Ga.  515.     pp.  23,  331. 
Conner  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  1.    pp.  1708, 

18,55. 
Connett  v.  Chicago,  114  111.  233.    p.  193. 
Connolly  v.  Boston,  117  Mass.  64.    p.  1210. 
Connor  v.  Giles,  7i)  Me.  132.     p.  1604. 
Connor  i'.  Marion,  112  Ind.  517 ;«.  c.  14  X.  E. 

Hep.  488.     p.  20.52. 
Connor  v.  Slate,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  137.  p.  1671. 
Connor  v.  Winton,  8  Ind.  316.    p.  1983. 
Connors  t'.  People.  50  N.  Y.  240.    pp.  524,526, 

.5-.'9. 531.  • 

Conover  r.  Mlddlelown,  42  X.  J.  L.  382.    p. 

1208. 
Conrad  v.  Griffey,  16  How.  (U.  S.)  38.     pp. 

432. 489.  ' 

Coniadt  v.  Clauve,  93  Ind.  476.    p.  1709. 
Conrov  /•.  Twentv-tlilrd  Street  R.    Co.,  .52 

How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  39.    p.  1209. 
Conroy  v.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,  62  Mo.  35.    i). 

1211. 
Conse<ina  r.  Willinir.s,  Pet.  C.    C.    (U.    S.1 

225.     ).|i.  SIO,  1,5(17,  1644. 
Coustautiue  1-.  Foster,  57  111.  36.    p.  2077. 


Conoway  v.  We.iver,  1  Ind.  263.    p.  2111. 
Continental  Impiovcment  Co.  v.   Stead,  95 

r.  S.  161.    p.  1304. 
Continental    Insurance    Co.  v.    Ilorton,  28 

Mich.  173.     p.  342. 
Coutinenial  Life  Ins.  r.  Volger,  89  Ind.  572; 

s.  c.  46  Am.  Hep.  185.    p.  991. 
Converse  c.  Warren,  4  la.  1.58.    p.  845. 
Conway  v.  Callahan,  121  Mass.  165.    p.  2136. 
Conwav  v.  Clinton,   1  Utah  T.  215.    pp.  47, 

69,75,  76,  115,  262,344. 
Conwell  V.  Pninplirev,  9  Ind.  135.    p.  838. 
Conyars  v.  Field,  61  Ga.  258.    p.  398. 
Conver  r.  Bovd,  55  Ind.  166.    p.  693. 
Cook  V.  Barkiey,  2  X.  J.  L.  16i).    p.  1467. 
Cook  r.   Bradlev,  7  Conn.  57;  s.  c.  IS  Am. 

Dec.  79.     pp.  889,  897. 
Cook  V.  Brown  (Mich.),  29  X.  W.  Rep.  4^    p. 

1708. 
Cook  V.  Castner,  9  Cush.   (Mass.)  266.    pp. 

119,1982. 
Cook  V.  Corn,  1  Tenn.  (Overt.)  349.    p.  274. 
Cookf.  Duvall,9  c;ill(Md.),400     p.  1705. 
Cook  r.  Fincli,  19  Minn.  407.     p.  2099. 
Cook  V.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  67  Cal.  369.      p.  869. 
Cook  V.  Green,  6  X.  J.  L.  (1  Halst.)  109.    pp. 

1722, 1916. 
Cook  V.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  63  Mo.  397.    pp. 

12J9,  15il8. 
Cook  V.   Harrington,  St.  Louis  Ct.  of  App. 

Xo.  4007.     p.  .571. 
Cook  V.  Hunt,  24  111.  536.    p.  476. 
Cook  V.  Martin,  29  Conn.  63.    pp.  966,  967. 
Cook  V.  McChristian,  4  Cal.  23.    p.  1015. 
Cook  r.  Mix,  11  Conn.  4.32.    pp.  294,  328,  804. 
Cook  V.  -Aloselev,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  27S.    p.  926. 
Cook  V.  Xethercote,  6  Carr.  &  P.  741.    p.  257. 
Cook  V.  Hitter,  4  E.  D.  Smith  (X.  Y.),  254.    p. 

728. 
Cook  V.  State,  11  Ga.  53.    p.  1849. 
Cook  c.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  96.     p.  18.55. 
Cook  V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  511.    p.  1746. 
Cook  f.  Syplier,  3  la.  484.     pp.  1981, 1994. 
Cook  V.  Walker,  3')  Ga.  519.     p.  1197. 
Cook  V.  Walters,  4  la.  72.    pp.  1006,  1910. 
Cook's  Case,  13  IIow.  St.   Tr.  318;  s.  c.  Skin. 

82.     pp.  45,  ,52,  68,  88,  102,  105. 
Cook's  Lessee  v.  Carroll,  6  Md.  104.    p.  827. 
Cooker.  Curtis,  6  Harr.  &  J.   (Md.)  93.    p. 

483. 
Cooke  V.  Forbes,  L.  R.  5  Eq.  166.    p.  1400. 
Cooker.   Lalauce  &c.  Co.,  29  Hun  (X.  Y.). 

641.     p.  657. 
Cooker,    folate  Xat.  Bank,  52  X.   Y.  96.    p. 

1023. 
Cool  i\  Roche,  15  Xeb.  24;  s.  c.  17  X.  W.  Rep. 

119.     p.  385. 
Cool  V.  Snover,  38  Mich.  562.    p.  359. 
Coolbroth  r.  Purinton,  29  Me.  469.    p.  846. 
Cooley  c.  State,  38  Tex.  636.    pp.  87,  88,  89,  93. 
Coombs  r.  Hibberd,  43  Cal.  453.     p.  2ii64. 
Coombs  r.  Pariiigton,  42  .Me.  332.    p.  1223. 
Coon  r.  Knapp,  8  N.  Y.  4ii2.     p.  842. 
Coon  r.  State,  13  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  246.    p. 

349. 
Cooney  r.  Burt,  123  Mass.  579.    p.  2137. 
Cooney  v.  Furlong,  66  Cal.  520.   pp.  2062,  2036. 
Coons  V.  Chambers,  1  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (X.  Y.) 

439.     p.  875. 
Coo|>er  c.  Barton,  3  Comp.  5n.    p.  1328. 
Coojier  r.  Central  R.   Co.,  44  Iowa,  134.    pp. 

12.54,  1786. 
Cooper  r.  Curtis,  ,30  Me.  488.    p.  1023. 
Cooper    r.   Johnson,  81    Mo.  483.     pp.    1202, 

1480,  1(>84. 
Cooper  V.  Martin,  4  East,  76.    p.  895. 
Cooper   c.    Pittsburg  ^:c.   R.   Co.,  24  W.   Va. 

37.     pp.  12>;i. 
Cooper  V.  Slate,  59  Miss.  19.    p.  66. 


liv 


TAIU.K    OF    CASKS. 


Cooper  f.  State,  59  Miss.  2B7.    p.  »".l. 
Coopir  f.  State,  1(5  Ohio  St.  :i-2S.     y\<.  74,  Ti",.  76. 
foopiT  c.  Slate.  It;  Tf\.  Apii.  :i41.     p.  lV>.'i. 
CoopiT  I-.  Wuklev,  Mood.   &   Mulk.  248.     pp. 

21S.  -Jill. 
Cooper  i:  ^Valdron,  50  Me.  80.     pp.  1603, 1005, 

li;-.'.'.. 
Coopor.  Ill   re,  32   Vt.  253.    pp.    182,   13S,  141, 

15'i,  IJX  1.57. 
Cope  f.  Thames  Dock  Co.,  2  Car.  &  K.  757. 

1..  KW. 
Copolnnd  v.  Copelaiul.  28  Me.  525.     p.  1748. 
Copi-laiid  r.  UaU,  21  Me.  93.     pp.  852,  854,  855, 

85ti. 
Copeland  v.  Xt>w  EiiRland  Ins.  Co.,  22  Pick. 

(Slass.)  i;W.    p.  I(i22. 
Copeland  r.    Wadlelgh,  7  Me.   141.    pp.   1748, 

174V». 
Copeland  r.   Watt.*,  1  Stark.  95.    pp.  275,  277. 
Copenhaven  t-  State,  14  On.  22.     pp.  46,  97. 
Copp  I-.  Iphain,  3  N.  H.  l.V.i.    p.  2(«. 
Corliitt  j-.CorlM'tt,3  (amp.  3K.     p.  242. 
Corl.ctl  r.  Gibson,  16  IJlatchf.  (U.  S.)  334.   p. 

Pi'.". 
Corlictt  r.  .Jol),5  Nev.  201.    p.  2099. 
lorhett  f.  Swift,  6  Xcv.  194.     p.  2ii62. 
Corliv  r.  Hutler,  55  .Mo.  3'.i8.     )>.  l<'.i;9. 
Corhv  r.  Tavlor,35  Mo.  447.     p.  l.">94. 
Cordellr.   IJrldge,  9  Allen   (Mass.),  3.55.     p. 

892. 
Cordell  r.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  19  Alb.  L.  J. 

l.U.     p.  1230. 
Cordova  r.  State,  6  Tc.v.  App.  207.    pp.  19, 

22. 
Coriiinar.  Exeter.  13  Me.  328.     p.  344. 
Corlev  r.  McKcag,  9  Mo.  Ai.)).  .38.     p.  793. 
Cornt-liti.x    c.  Applelon,  22   \Vis.  G.35.     p.  1227. 
Cornelius  r.  IJoucher,  1  HI.  12.     p.  108. 
Cornelius  r.  Gibcrson,  25  \.  .1.  I,.  1.     p.  1042. 
Cornelius  v.  Mollov,  7  Pa.  St.  293.     p.  1419. 
Cornelius  f.  State,  12  Ark.  782.    pp.  85,  1982, 

unio. 
Cornelius  r.    Van  Slyck,  21   Wend.    (X.  Y.) 

70.     1).  141)9. 
Cornell   r.  I5arnes,26  Wis.  47.3.    pp.  397,  563. 
Corning  v.  Corning,  6  N.  Y.  104.    i>.  449. 
Corning  v.  Troy  Iron  Factory,  44  X.  Y.  577. 

p.  ItMW. 
Cornish  v.  Graff,  36  Hun   (X.  Y.),  160.    pp. 

17-22, 1723. 
Cornl-sJi  f.  Territory  (Wvo.),    3  Pac.    Uep. 

793.     pp.  im-1,  18.i4. 
Corninan  v.  K:i>l<'rn  Counties  11.  ("o.,  4  LIurl. 

*  N.  7S1.     pp.  12111.  Vrin. 
Corpf  r.  OviTlon,  10  lUng.  252.     p.  895. 
Cortland    t'ountv   r.    Ilerlilnier    County,   44 

X.  V.  22.     pp.  344.  345. 
Corwin  r.  Wallacr.  17  la.  .378.    p.  892. 
C'orv  r.  SII(t)X,  6  Ind.  .5K7.     p.  705. 
Corv  V.  SlW-ox,  6  Ind.  .39.     p.  7h7. 
Corvell  r.  Cain.  16  <-al.  567.     p.  1141. 
CorVfll   V.   Hannibal   Ac.  U.  Co.,  82  Mo.  441. 

p.' 1308. 
Cf.rvcil   r.    Stone,  62  Ind.  307.    pp.  126,  129, 

17i>9.  2089. 
Cn-groye  f.  Ogden,  49  X.  Y.  22.5.     p.  1233. 
Co^sart  r.  Stati-.  14  Ark.  .5:{8.     p.  160. 
Costello  f.  Landwehr,  28   Wis.  622.     p.  1207. 
Costello  r.  Svra<-u»e  &c.  II.  Co.,  <i5  Barb.  {X. 

Y.)H2.     p.  1232. 
Cooler   »•.    .Merest,   3  Ilrod.  A  Hlng.  272.     pp. 

J921.  19,55. 
Costlgan  f.  Cuvb-r,  21  X.  Y.  134.     ]>,  90, 
CoHllv   r.  Stair,  19  Ga.  614.     pp.  Hy.  122,  124. 
Cothran   r.  Fors\  lb,  <;m  Ga.  560.     pp.  2r.>,  312. 
Cotbran  v.  Slate, ».»  Miss.  .541.     pp.  15.58.  16«W, 

ItJSI. 
Colbren   f.  Connaughton,  24    Wis.    134.     p. 

20(H. 


Coltb-    V.    Cottle,  6   .Me.    140.     pp.  1921,  1929, 

i'.i;4. 

Cotton  f.  Iluldi'kopcr,  2  Pa.  149.     p.  1197. 
Cotton  r.  Uulb'dgi',33   Ala.  lU.     p.  704. 
Cotton   r.   .^tato,  31    Miss.   .5o4  ;  ».  c.  Ilorr.  & 

Tbomp.   Cas.   Self  Uef.   310.     pp.  175,  1539, 

1.510. 
Cotton  r.  Stat.',  32  Tex.  626.     pp.  76.  116, 1555, 

1.567,  1.569,  1.57I.  1575,  1888,  1891. 
Cotton    r.    Wo.mI,  S  C.    H.  (.n.  b.)  563;  S.  0.  1 

Tbomp.  X.-g.  3t;4.     i>.  1220. 
Cottri-ll  i:  Xlxon,  Ur.i  Inil.  379.     p.  2010. 
CottrlU  I-.  CranuT,  .59  Wis.  2:11.     p.  2037. 
Coizbausen  r.  Simon,  47  Wis.  lO^l.     p.  2030. 
Cou<b    r.    Briles,   7  J.  J.    Marsh.  (Kv.)  257. 

I..  891. 
Couch   r.  Charlotte  Ac.  R.  Co.,  22  S.  C.  557. 

p.  310. 
Coudv  r.  St.  Louis  Ac.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  79.    pp. 

8ii.'i(;i9. 

Cougblin  r.  People,  18  111.  266.     pp.  1668.1671. 
Coulter   I-.  American   Ac.   Co.,  56  X.  Y.  585. 

pp.  443,  446. 
Coulter  r.  Weed  Sewing  Machine  Co.,  3  Lea 

(Tenn.).  115.     pp.  2.  3. 
Count  Conigsmark's  Case,  9  How.  St.  Tr.  12. 

PI".  44.  11(5. 
Counts   I-.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  450.     pp.  1855, 

18.i(i. 
County  Court  r.   (;rlswold,    58  Mo.    175.    p. 

1107." 
Coursen  r.  Ely,  37  HI.  340.    p.  1314. 
Coursln  c.  Pi'nusvlvaula  Ins.  Co.,  46  Pa.  St. 

323.     p.  984. 
Courtney  r.  Baker,  3  Denio  (X.  Y.),  27.     pp. 

169,  is:i,  184. 
Courtov  r.  Dozier,  20  Ga.  369.    p.  1016. 
Courtwrlgbt  r.  Strickler,  37  la.  :«2.    p.  67. 
Coveney  i-.  Tannabill  1  llill  (X.  Y.),33.      pp. 

272,  275. 
Coyey  i:  Hannibal  Ac.  R.  Co.,  86  Mo.  636.    p. 

810. 
Covilland  r.  Tanner,  7  Cal.  38.    p.  ,5.59. 
Cowall  r.  Altebul.  40  Ark.  172.     p.  206. 
Cowglll  i:  Wooden,  2  IJlackf.  (Ind.)  332.    p. 

29. 
Cowles  r.  Bacon,  21  Conn.  451.     p.  lfi<59. 
Cowlesr.  Chicago  Ac.  K.  Co.,  32  la.  515.    pp. 

l'.H4,  1'.I93. 
Cowles  r.    Hayes,    71    X.    C.    23ti.     pp.    358, 

I9.')n. 
Cowles  V.  State,  .50  Ala.  iM.     p.  :J62. 
Cowley  r.   People,  83  N.  V.  4m;  g.  c.  38  Am. 

Kep.'464.     p.  507. 
Cowlin  r.  Cook,  Latch.  151.     p.  11.39. 
Cowper's  Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1108.   "p.  46. 
Cowperthwaite  r.  .Jones,  2  Dall.    (U.S.)  66. 

pp.  i;h;3.  19<l5.   • 
Cox  r.  Baker.  113  Ind.  62;  t.  c.  14  X.  E.   Rep. 

740.     1..    ^071. 
Cox  i:  l-ieedlev.  .13  Pa.  St.  124.     p.  827. 
Cox  V.  IIaine-«."2  X.  .1.  L.  b87.     p.  19. 
Cox  r.  Ilutelilns,  21  Ind.  219.     p.  2101. 
Cox  r.  Lee,  L.  It.  4  Exeh.  284.     p.  14.53. 
Cox  r.  Moss,  ,53  Mo.  432.     p.  2<M9. 
Cox  r.  People,  lO'.t  111.  4.57.     p.  1675. 
Cox  v.  People.  19  Hun  (X.  ^.),4:«);  «.  c.  80  N. 

Y.  .5(K).     pii.  15,  32,  78.  HI,  20<;2. 
Cox  V.  Halellir.'.  105  Ind.  :{74.     p.  2089. 
Cox   V.  Slate,  7  Tex.  App.  I.     p.  1903. 
Cox  V.  Sloul,  85  Ind.  422.     p.  56:1. 
Cox  v.  SIralssi-r,  62  III.  H.S6.     p.  1940. 
Cox  r.  Tvler.  6  Xeb.  297.     p.  20<iO. 
Cox  r.  \anderkleed,21  Ind.  164.     p.  1479. 
Cox  f.  Viekers.  ;C)  Ind.  27.     ji.  219. 
Cox  r.  We.-ieiiester  Turnpike  Road,  33  Barb. 

(N.  Y.  1  411.     p.  12<)!l. 
Cox  r.  Wlrrall.  (To.  .lac.  193.    p.  1191. 
Cox  V.  Wolcolt,  27  Pa.  St,  154.     p.  HHW. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Iv 


•Coxe  V.  England.  fi5  Pa.  St.  212.    p.  628. 
Coyle  r.  Gorman,  1  Pliila.  (Pa.)  326.    p.  1971. 
Cozzeiis  V.  Gilli-sjiie,  i  Mo.  82.     p.  560. 
Cozzen.s  v.  Hifc'gin»   1  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (X.  Y.) 

451.     p.  661. 
Crabtree  v.  Clark,  20  Mc.  337.    p.  1029. 
Crabtrec    v.   Haf,aubough,  25  111.  233.    pp. 

455,  1776,  1914,  1915. 
Cral)lree  v.  llorton,  4  Munf.   (Va.)  59.    p. 

IIM. 
Crabtree  v.  Kile,  21  111.  180.    p.  1498. 
Cralilree  r.  State,  3  Sneed  (Tenu.),  302.    pp. 

HW4,  1965,  V.m,  1992. 
Craft  V.  Com.,  24  Gratt.  (Ta.)  602.    pp.  16, 18, 

48. 
Craft  r.  Com.  80  Ky.  349.     ]>.  4G4. 
Crahau  v.  Balmcr's  E.xr.,  7  JVlo.  App.  585.    p. 

758. 
Craig  V.  Andrews,'7  Iowa,  17.    pp.  881,  882. 
Craig  r.  Elliott,  4  Ribb.  272.    p.  113. 
Craig  r.  Fenn,  Car.  &  M.  43.    p.  5(}. 
Craig  V.  Grant,  6  Mich.  447.    p.  443. 
Craig  r.  Mayor  of  Allegheny,  53  Pa.  St.  477. 

p.  1107. 
Craig  V.  Xoblesville  &c.  R.  Co.,  98  Ind.  109. 

p.  498. 
Craig,  r.  Mississippi  Mills,  12  5Io.  Ajip.  585. 

p.  2064. 
Craig  V.  Rohrer,  63  111.  32.5.    pp.  419,  432. 
Craig  V.  Scdalia,  63  Mo.  417.    p.  1247. 
Craig  V.   Ward,  9   Johns.    (N.    Y.)   197.    p. 

1442. 
Craige  r.  Sprague,  12  AVend.  (N.  Y.)  41.    p. 

351. 
Craighead  v.  Peterson,  72  X.  Y.  279;  s.  c.  28 

Am.  Rep.  150.    p.  346. 
Craighead  r.  Wells,  21  Mo.  404.    p.  1668. 
Crail  V.  Crail,  6  Pa.  St.  480.    ]).  1698. 
Craln  v.  Cohvell,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  384.   p.  948. 
Crain  v.  llilligross,  21  liul.  210.    i).  1588. 
Crain  v.  Wright,  .Sfi  Hun  (N.  Y.),  74.    p.  872. 
Cramer  r.  Hurliiigton,  42  la.  ;515.    ji.  .55. 
Cran  v.  Hendricks,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  569.     p. 

586. 
Cranburue's  Trial,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  222.    p. 

60. 
Crauch  v.  White,  1  Bing.  (New  Cas.)  414.    p. 

1339. 
Crandall  r.  People,  2  Lans.  (X.  Y.)  212.    pp. 

747,  755. 
Crandall  v.   People,  2  Lans.  (X.  Y.)  309.    p. 

787. 
Crane  v.  Dygert,  4  Wend.  (X.  Y.)675.    pp. 

32,  34. 
Crane  v.  Morris,  6  Pet.  (F.  S.)  598.    p.  1585. 
Crane  r.  Reeder,  25  Mich.  304.    p.  2032. 
Crane  v.  Sayre,  6  X.  J.  L.  110.    p.  1906. 
Crane  r.  Timberlake,  81  Mo.  431.    i).  1440. 
Crane,  Ex  i)arte,5  Pet.  (U.  S.)  190.     j).  214. 
C'ranmorr.  Crawlev,  1  X.  J.  L.  43.    i).  29. 
Cravens  v.  Wilson, "48  Te.\.  324.    p.  1672. 
Crawford  r.   lierrv,  6  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  63.    i). 

9ii4. 
Crawford  v.  Bertliof,  1  X.  J.  Eq.  4.58.    p.  424. 
Crawford    v.  Branch   Bank,  7   Ala.  205.    p. 

1060. 
Crawford  v.  Martin,  19  Ind.  370.    p.  2101. 
Crawford  v.  Powell,  10!  Ind.  421.     ]<.  2052. 
Crawford  v.  State,  12  (;a.  142.    )>p.  ;!14,  16.33. 
Crawford   v.  State,   15  Tex.  .\pii.  501.    p.  761. 
Crawford  r.  State,  21  Tex.  Ai>p.  454.    p.  16U6. 
Crawford  v.   State,  2  Yerg.  (Teuu.)   111.     p. 

1992. 
Creamer  v.  Bates,  49  Mo.  525.    p.  892. 
Creamer  v.  Perrv,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  332.    i>. 

949. 
Creamer  r.  Pirp,  91  Ind.  366.     p.  213S. 
Creary  c.  Com.,  29  l"a.  St.  323.     )>.  1902. 
Creed"  v.  Fisher,  9  E.xch.  472.    pp.  37,  U77. 


Creed  v.   Lancaster  Bank,  1  Oh.  St.  1.    p. 

1446. 
Creed  v.  People,  81  111.  568.    pp.  1795,  1800, 

1801. 
Creek  t-.  State,  24  Ind.  151.    pp.  1906,  1931. 
Creelman  f.  Marks,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  281.    p. 

1617. 
Creevv  v.  Carr,  7  Car.  &  P.  64.    p.  384. 
Cregier  v.  Bunton,  2  Strobh.  L.   (S.  C.)  487. 

p.  42. 
Cremer   v.  Portland,  36  "SVis.  92.    pp.    1209, 

1247. 
Crenshaw  v.  Jackson,  6  Ga.  509.    p.  570. 
Crerar  v.  Sodo,  Mood.  &  M.  85.    p.  219. 
Creryv.  Pollard,  14  Allen   (Mass.),  284.    p. 

639. 
Crews  V.  People,  120  III.  117;  11  X.  East  Rep. 

404.    p.  1846. 
Crews  V.  Ross,  44  Ind.  81.    p.  2102. 
Crisman  v.  McDonald,  28  Ark.  9.    p.  1708. 
Crissev  r.  HestonviUe  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Pa.  St. 

73.    "pp.  1207,  1212. 
Crist  V.  Erie  R.  Co.,  1  Thomp.  &  C.  (X.  Y.) 

435.     p.  1210. 
Crist  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  361.    p.  1743. 
Criswell  v.  Altemus,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  581.    p. 

1043. 
Crocker  v.  Hoffman,  48  Ind.  207.    pp.  1910, 

1911. 
Crocker  v.  Xew  Loudon  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  Conn. 

249.     p.  1292. 
Crockett  v.  State,  52  Wis.  211 ;  s.  c.  12  Cent. 

L.  J.  479.    p.  1903. 
Crockett  v.  Young,  1  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  241. 

p.  1023. 
Crofoot  V.  Bennett,  2  X.  Y.  2.58.    p.  912. 
Croft  v.  State, 6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  317.  p.  1669. 
Crole  v.  Thomas,  17  Mo.  329.    p.  1681. 
Cronin  v.  Delavan,  .50  AVis.  375.    p.  1676. 
Crook  V.  Williams,  8  Pa.  St.  345.     p.  1417. 
Crooker  v.  Appleton,  25  Me.  131.    p.  1025. 
Crookshank  v.   Kellogg,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  256, 

p.  1»U7. 
Cropp  v.   Hambleton,  Cro.  Eliz.  48.    p.  1128. 
Cropsey    v.  Averill,  8    Xeb.    157.    pp.    428, 

436. 
Cropsey  r.  Wiggenhorn,  3  Xeb.  108.    p.  2051. 
Crosbv"  V.  Boston,  118  Mass.  71.    pp.   1247, 

1249.' 
Crosby  v.  Hungerford,  59  la.  712.    p.  2028. 
Crosby's  Case,  3  Wils.  188.    pp.  132, 152. 
Cr<jss"f.  Barnett,  65  Wi.s.  431.     p.  1010. 
Cross  V.  Eglin,  2  Barn.  t"c  Ad.  106.    p.  917. 
Cross  1-.  Garrett,  35  Iowa,  480.     p.  776. 
Cross  r.  Hall  4  .>Id.  426.     p.  1750. 
Cross  V  Moullon,  15  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  470.    p. 

85. 
Cross  V.  Pearson,  17  Ind.  612.    pp.  240, 1742. 
Cross  V.  State,  68  Ala.  476.    pp.  754,  755,  762. 
Cross  r.  State,  78  Ala.  430.    p.  3. 
Cross  r.  State,  11  Tex.  A))p.  84.    p.  727. 
Crossman  r.  Ililltown  Turnpike  Co.,  3  Grant 

Cas.  (Pa.)  225.     p.  849. 
Croswell  I-.  Craue,7   Barb.    (X.    Y.)  191.     p. 

891.    • 
Crotty  r.  Wyatt,  3  Brawdw.    (111.)   388.     pp. 

202,"  1996. 
Crouch  /•.  (ireat  Xorthern  R.  Co.,  11  Ex.  742; 

s.  c.  :U  Eng.  I,.  >\:  Kq.  .573.     ]>.  1156. 
Croucli  V.   Martin,  3   lUackl.  (Ind.)   2,56.    p. 

2001. 
Crouch  r.  Miller,  5  Humph.  (Tenn.)  586.    p. 

893. 
Crounse  r.  Filch,  6  Abb.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  (X.  Y.) 

18.5.    p.  41<i. 
Crow  r.  Bovd,  17  Ala.  51.    p.  890. 
Crow  r.  Marshall,  15  Mo.  499.    p.  316. 
Crow  r.  State.  14  Tex.  12.     p.  1.50. 
Crowe  c.  People,  92  111.  231.    p.  1213. 


Ivi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Crowd!  V.  Western  U.  V.ank,  3  Oh.  409.    pp. 

Crov   <'\oulsvnie&..   U.    Co.,  97  Ind.  126. 

pp.  iOSli,  21U4.  „-   ,„. 

Crov  ,-.  State.  32  Iiul.  3S4.    PP.  HS,  120. 
Crozier  r.  Gauo.  1  Hi>'l'  (I^>-^'.2f ;    P;  ^O^l- 
Cruce  v.  Stale,  59  Ga.  !?3     pp.  -i'.  *»•  ^^l-.    ,90 
Crugcr  V.  Hudson  &c.  K.  Co.,  12  N.  \.  UO- 

Cr'uiksha.k  ..  Co^^gswell.  26  111.  366.    p.  1060. 
CruU  r.  Keener.  18  HI.  b.^.    p.  ll'60- 
Crunie  r.  Wilson.  104  In-i.  5^3.    p.  2051 
Cnunley  ,-.  Adkins  12  Id  f^.    V-19U 
Crumley   r.   Hickman,  92  Ind.  38!>.  pp.  2107, 

Ci^umi."i-"Lambert.  L.  R.  3  Eq.  409.    pp.  1383, 

ijqi 

Crump  r.  Thomas,  85  X.  C..272.    p.  2. 
Crumi)   r.  United  States  Mining  Co.,  7  Gratt. 

CrSefr.  Williams,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.)  345. 

Cr^iitchlicld  v.  Richmond  &c.  R.  Co.,76N.  C. 
320.     pp.  1635,  1636, 176S. 

Cullacott  V.  Mining  Co.,  6  Pac.  Rep.  ill.    P- 

cX>n  V.  Soars.  112  Mass.  299^    P-  892 
Oulyer  r.  Parish,  21  Conn.  40^.     V-f\ 
Cumberland  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  btate,  45  Md.  -.1. 

Ctunireriand  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  State.  37  Md.  156.   1 

CumSmd  Coal  &c.  Co.  v.  Scally,  27  Md. 

Cumin^';-''^od,  44  HI.  «6.    PP.  13^  1323^ 
Cummerford  v.    McAvoy,  15  111.  311.     pp. 

cSh?.Shand5Hurl&X^95     P.822. 
Cumuiings  v.  Crawford,  b8  111.  3li.    PP-  i-'^i, 

Cuinmings  v.  Chandler,  26  Me.  453.    pp.  1672, 

Cuntmingsr.  Denny,4Mo.  App.602.    p^2112. 
Cunimings  r.  (ianu.  52  Pa.  St.  481-    P-  53- 
Cu.nmings  v.  (i.H,  «  Ala   .%2.     p.  649. 
Cummiugs  r.  Henry,  10  Ind.  109.     p.  849 
Cun.mingsi;.  No.v^'^.J^'  ^•^^«^''•'f;  .Yl,?^^' 
Cummings  v.  Parks,  2  i^\\}^\    iy ''V  1588 

Cummings  v.  1'«.vl'-r,  24  Minn  429.    V'^^f- 
Cummings  v.  Wyman,  10  Mass.  464.    P- 10^/ 
Cummins  v.   Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.  "i. 

Cummi'ns^Crawford  88  111.  312     p  1542. 
Cummins  v.  Presley,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  31.-).    p. 

Cummins  v.  Seymour. 79  Ind.  491 ;  s.  c.  41  Am. 
Cum;;s;^n.!''Slr,l  wend.  (N.y.)  457. 

Cuneo\-.Bessonl.63Ind.524     p.  1780 
Cunnlugliam  v.  Ashbrook,  20  Mo.  o.53.    pp. 

Cunnlngt>ai"  v.  Cambridge  Savings  Hank. 
cSS:^;tf^.Kr.^orn,HWend.(N.V.) 
Cunningham  r.  Gallagher.  61  Wis.  170.  pp. 
Cnmlngham    r.   Iludson     River   P.ank,   21 

c..)i;;;i^iia;n^.:'KmjJii^}.-.6.^i6i5. 

Cunningham   v.    Pulton.  6  la.    St.  .«...    p. 

Cunningham  v.  Stf^SV-^Tef" ^P,'^"  i^p 
Cunningham  v.  Mate.  1.    re.\.  App.  »».     P 

1(580. 


P- 


P- 


Cunningham   r.  State.  20  Tex.  App.  162. 

Cuniiingham  v.   Wells,  16  Mo.   App.  78. 

•'144 
Curd  v.  Lackland.  49  Mo.  4,54.    p.  H-17. 
Curl  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  63  Iowa,  41  <. 

1''90. 
Curl  r.  Watson, 25  Iowa,35.    p.  324. 
Cuik'y  V.  com.:  84  Pa  St.  151      pp.  30   70.  75. 
Cnrran  r.  Connery,  5  limn.  (Pa.)  4s8.     pp. 

ciirran  r.  Warren  &c.  Man.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  153. 

Cumin's  Ca's'e."  7  Gratt.  ( Va.)  619.    P.  123. 
Currier  r.  Hank  of  Louisville, 6  Cold,  (lenn.) 

Currier"..Towe.  32  Mo.  203     pp.  l«Of.  i|;61- 
Currier  r.  Lowell,  16  l^k.  (Mass.)  1.0.    p. 

Curry  r.  Com.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Pjck.  (Mass.)  535. 

Currv^r^'Currv,  114  Pa.  St.  367.    p.  PH. 
Currv  r.  Porter,  125  Mass.  94.    p.  1.41. 
(.'urrV.  r.  State.a  Neb.  545.    p.  (.  • 
Currv  i-   State. -^  Nel).  412.    p.  l.<»9. 
Curtis  V.  Detroit  &c.  R.  Co..  27  Wis.  160.    p. 

CurUs  V.  Mundv.  3Met.  (Mass.)  405.    p.  1093. 
Curtis  r.  Kay,  37'Barb.  (N.  Y.)  69.    p.  449 
Curtis   V.  Railroa.l  Co.,  18  N.  ^  .  53o.     P- jf  3. 
Curtis  r.  Railroa.l  Co    20  Mich.  28.    p.  342 
Curtis  r.  Rochester  Sec  H- f'o.,  l'^^- ^-534. 

s.  c.  Thoinp.  Carr.  Pass    188.    P-  12.5,. 
Curtis  r.Spittv,  3  l{arn.&  Aid.  lfe;2.     V-^^^- 
Curtis  V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co..  20  Minn.  2h.    p. 

Curl?;  .-.  State.  36  Ark.  284.    pp.  727.  728,  733. 

Curtis  r.  Treat,  21  Me.  525.    P-  891. 

Curtis  V.   Wheeler.  1   Mood.  &  M.  493.    pp. 

Curtis:  e'x  parte.  3  Minn  274.    pp.  144   146. 
Curzon  v.  Edmondson,  6  Mees.  &  ^\  .  2.io.    p. 

ensiling  V.  P.abcock,38  Me.  452^^    P- 1060. 
Cushman  v.  Klannagan,  50  Tex.  389.    p.  i. 
Cusiek  V.  N'c  rwieh,  40  Tonn.  375.     p.  1249. 
Custiss  V.  Georgetown  Tp.  Co.,2Cranch  C 

Cuihrdl  rlVMln.reiSi  Ind.  375.    p.  584. 
Culler  .•.  Callison.  72  HI.  116.    P- 1"J'-  „g. 
Cutler  V.  cutler.  43  Vt.  660.    pp.  1983, 1987. 
Cutler  r.  Dixon.  4  Coke,  14b;  s.c.  Dyer,  2SB. 

CuileVV.   Estate  of  Thomas,  24  Vt.  647.    p. 

ciiuer  V.  Hurlbut.  29  Wis  162.    P;  1586. 
Cutler  r.  Smith.  .57  HI   256     p.  m5. 
Cutler  r   Stale,  42  Ind.  244.     p.  168. 
Cutsinger  r^ebeker.  58  Ind.  401.    p.  2076. 
Cutter  f.  Pool.  54  How.  Pr.  (N.\.)  311.    P- 

Cuy'ler  v.  Sandford,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  225.    p. 

Cz^ecii  V.  General  Steam  Nav.  Co..  L.  R.  3  C. 
P.  14.     pp.  1326. 1327. 


D.  M.  Force  Mfg.   Co.  v.  Horton,  74  111.  310. 

I>i'cosfa  r.  .Jones.  Cowp.  729.    P- 319. 

Da  Lee  f.  Rlaekburn,  11  Kan.  190.     pp.  386, 

Dald  r.  Wilwankee  City  R.    Co.,  27  N.  W. 

D^dmafr.'nammel,45  Wis.  466.     pp.  217, 

Daflev   r.  Gaines,  1    Dana   (Ky.),  529.     pp 
63,  2095. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ivii 


Dailev  V.  Green,  15  Pa.  St.  118.    p.  631. 
Dailev  v.  (i rimes.  27  Md.  440.    p.  309. 
Dailev  r.  State,  28  Ind.  283.     p.  489. 
Dailv'f.  State,  10  Ind.  536.     u.  1520. 
Dakin,  Matter  of,  4  Hill  (X.Y.),  42.    p.  14fi. 
Dakota  Ter.  r.  People,  1  Dak.  470.    p.  1953. 
Dalln-  V.  Snuffer,  57  Mo.  296.    p.  1053. 
DaleV.  Golds,  5  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  490.    p.  943. 
Dale  r.  Hall,  1  \Vils.  2S1.     pp.  1322,  1346. 
Dale  V.  Radcliffe,  25  Barb.   (N.  Y.)   333.    p. 

1060. 
Dalrymple  v.  Hanson,  1  Cal.  125.    pp.  1586, 

1605. 
Dalrvmple  v.  AVilliams,  63  X.   Y'.   361.    pp. 

1986,2064. 
Dalton  V.  Bank  of  St.  Louis,  54  Mo.  106.    p. 

10.53. 
Dalton  V.  Bethlehem,  20  N.  H.  506.    p.  1794. 
Dalton  V.  Landahn,  30  Mich.  349.    p.  891. 
Dameron  r.  ."State,  8  Mo.  494.    p.  1562. 
Damon  c.  Brvant,  2  Pick.  411.    p.  377. 
Damon  r.  Osljorn,  1  Pick. (Mass.)  476.    p.  909. 
Damon  v.  Sciluate,  119  Mass.  66.    p.  1209. 
Damont  r.  New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.,  9  La. 

Ann  441.     p.  1236. 
Damon  v.  Lyons,  44  Iowa,  276.    p.  1266. 
Dan  V.  Brown,  4  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  483.    p.  1009. 
Dana  I'.  Tucker,  4  .Johns.   (X.  Y.)  487.    pp. 

1964,  1966,  1967,  1982,  1984. 
Dance  V.  McBride.  43  la.  624.    pp.  396,  401, 

402, 453. 
Dane  v.  Treat,  35  Me.  19S.    p.  307. 
Danforth  v.  Evans,  16  Vt.  538.    p.  881. 
Danforth  v.  State,  75  Ga.  614.    p.  1509. 
Daniel  v.  Foster,  49  Ga.  303.    p.  2067. 
Daniel  v.  Frost,  62  Ga.  697.    pp.  110, 1917. 
Daniel  v.  Guv,  23  Ark.  50.    pp.  119,  120. 
Daniel  v.  Johnson,  29  Ga.  207.    p.  1670. 
Daniel  v.  Metropolitan  Ac.   K.   Co..  L.  R.  5 

H.  L.  45.     p.  I2I5. 
Daniels  v.   Davidson,  16  Ves.  1249;  s.  c.  17 

Ves.  433.    p.  1052. 
Daniels  t\  Hudson  River  Ins.  Co.,  12  Cush. 

(Mass.)  416.     pp.  974,  976,  977,  978. 
Daniels  v.  McGinnls,  97  Ind.  549.    p.  2005. 
Daniels  v.  People,  21  111.  439.    p.  1013. 
Daniels  v.  Shields,  3S  111.  197.    pp.  20.50,  2051. 
Danielson  i'.  Dyckman,  26  Mich.  169.   p.  1741. 
Danks  r.    Rodeheaver,  26  \V.    Va.  274.    pp. 

2051,  2127,2128. 
Danlev  v.  Edwards,  1  Ark.  437.    p.  1669. 
Dansbv  v.  State,  34  Tex.  392.    p.  1917. 
Danseyr.  liichardsou,  3  El.  &  Bl.  144;  s.   c. 

25  Ens.  L.  &  Eq.  76.     p.  1340. 
Danville  Bank  v.  Waddill,  3  Gratt.  (Va.)  433. 

pp.  1983.  1985. 
Danville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  2  Mete.  (Ky.) 

119.     p.  1473. 
Darbv  v.  Ouseley,  36  Eng.  Law  and  Eq.  518. 

pp.  247,  250. 
Darbv  r.  Ouselev,  1  Hurl.  &  X.  I ;  s.  c.  2  Jur. 

(X.  s. )  497 ;  25  L.  J.  Exch.  227.     p.  635. 
Dare  v.  Gearv,  Anib.  375.     p.  841. 
Dare  v.  Ogdcn,  1  X.  J.  L.  91.    pp.  1985,  1986. 
Dargan  v.   Waddill,  9  Ired.  L.   (X.   C.)  244. 

p.  1394. 
Dailend  i\  Rosencrans,  56  Iowa,  122.    p.  310. 
Darling  f.  Dodge.  .36  Me.  370.     pp.   835,1685. 
Darling  v.  WrsI,  51  la.  259.     p.  2040. 
Darling  v.  Williams,  35  Oh.  St.  61.     p.  1548. 
Darnell  v.   iState,   15  Tex.  App.  70.    pp.  1679, 

2(191. 
Darrah  v.  Steamboat  Lightfoot,  17  Mo.  276. 

p.  2130. 
Darrancc  v.  Preston,  18  la.  396.  pp.  1919,  2100. 
Dascomb   r.   Buffalo  &c.  R.  Co.,   27   Barb. 

(X.  Y.)221.     pp.  1207,  1211. 
Dasslerr.  Wisley,  32  Mo.  498.    pp.  806,  1506, 

1667. 


Dauchy  v.  Goodrich,  20  Vt.  127.    p.  1069. 
Dauutley  r.   Hyde,  6  Jur.  133.    p.  1722. 
Dave  V.  State,  22  Ala.  23.    p.  453. 
Davenport  v.  Commonwealth,  1  Leigh  (Va.), 

585.    p.  725. 
Davenport  v.  Cummings,  15  la.  219.  pp.  1956, 

1957,  1994. 
Davenport  v.  Harris,  27  Ga.  68.    p.  585. 
Davenport  v.  Ogg,  15  Kan.  363.    p.  257. 
Davenport  Gas  Co.  v.   Davenport,  13  la.  229. 

pp.  55,  126. 
Daves,  Matter  of,  81  N.  C.  72.    pp.  151. 
David  r.  Mason,  4  Pick.   (Mass.)  156.    p.  214. 
Davidson  v.  Graham,  2  Oh.  St.  131.    pp.  1326, 

1345,  1347,  i:548,  13.50,  1352,  1374. 
Davidson  v.  Henop,  1  Cranch  C.   C.  280.    p. 

219. 
Davidson  v.  Isham,  9  X.  J.  Eq.  ISO.    pp.  1384, 

ISSO,  1405. 
Davidson  v.  Overhulser,  3  la.  196.    p.  310. 
Davidson  v.  Lallande,  12  La.  Ann.  826.    pp. 

358,  383. 
Davidson  v.  Peck,  4  Mo.  438.    p.  560. 
Davidson  v.  People,  90  IlL  221.    pp.   11, 122, 

Davidson  v.  Manlove,  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  346. 

p.  1923. 
Davidson  v.  Stanley,  3  Scott  X.  R.  49;  s.  c.  2 

Man.  &  Gr.  721.    p.  1643. 
Davie  v.  Terrill,  63  Tex.  105.    p.  335. 
Davies  v.  Evans,  6  Carr.  &  P.  619.    p.  223. 
Davies  I'.   Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W.  546;  s.  c.  6 

Jur.  954;  12  L.  J.   (Exch.)   10;  2    Thomp. 

Neg.  1105.     pp.  1023,  1210,  1221,  1229.  1305. 
Daviess  v.  Arbuckle,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  525.    pp. 

215,  217,  240. 
Daviess  Co.   Sav.  Ass.  v.  Sailor,  63  Mo.  24; 

s.  c.  3  Cent.  L.  J.  488.    p.  1023. 
Davis  V.  Allen,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  466.    pp.  57, 

119. 
Davis  V.  Amev,  2  Grant Cas.  (Pa.)  412.  p.  968. 
Davis  V.  Brown,  67  Mo.  313.    i).  1747. 
Davis  V  Byrd,  94  Ind.  525.    p.  257. 
Davis  I'.   Capper,  10  Barn.  &  Cr.  28;   s.   c.   5 

Man.  &  Ry.  53.    p.  1142. 
Davis  V.  Charles  River  &c.  R.  Co.,  11  Cush. 

(Mass.)  506.    p.  1011. 
Davis  V.  Davis,  7  Harr.  &  J.   (.Md.)   30.    pp. 

1507,  1596. 
Davis  c.  Detroit  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  Mich.  105.    p. 

1226. 
Davis  V.  Elliott,  15  Gray  (Mass.), 90.    p.  1698. 
Davis  i\  Kairclough,  63* Mo.  61.    ]>.  1668. 
Davis  V.  Field,  .56  Vt.  426.    pp.  353.  360,  362. 
Davis  r.  Fish,  1  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  406.    pp. 

1914,  1997. 
Davis  r.  Foster,  68  Ind.  238.    p.  1726. 
Davis  r.  Franke,    33  Gratt.   (Va.)  425.    pp. 

435,  476,  478. 
Davis  r.  Garrett,  6  Bing.  716.    p.  1365. 
Davis  V.  Guarnieri,  15  X.  East.  Rep.  350.    p. 

2049. 
Davis  V.   Hardy,  6   Barn.   &  Crcs.    225.    p. 

1584. 
Davis  V.  Hardy,    76  Ind.  272.    pp.   415,  431, 

1642,  1783,  178.i. 
Davis  V.  Hill,  75  X.  C.  224.    pp.  736,  737,  739. 
Davis  V.  Hunter,  7  Ala.  135.    p.  62. 
Davis  c.  Kenaga,  51  111.  170.    pp.  1125,1131. 
Davis  r.  Keves,  112  Mass.  436.    p.  567. 
Davis  V.  Lowman,  9  Ga.  54.    p.  1919. 
Davis    r.  Mason,  4  I'ick.  (Mass  )  156.    p.  22L 
Davis  i\  Melvin,  1  Ind.  136.    p.  329. 
Davis  V.  Michigan  &c.  K.  Co.,  22  111.  278.    p. 

1151. 
Davis  r.  Miller,  14  Gratt.  (Va.)  1.    p.  1597. 
Davis  v.  .^loore,  13  .Me.  424.    p.  909. 
Davis  ('.  Xeligh,  7  Xeb.  84.    p.  385. 
Davis  c.  Pattou,  19  Md.  128.    p.  725. 


1  \'  i  i  i 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Davis  r.   People,  19  111.  74.    pp.  11,  118,  V21, 

1<):!0. 
Davis  r.  PoopK',  SS  111.  :V)0.     pp.  1.5:5!),  1,"U1. 
l)avi>  r.  IVopli',  lU  111.  Sti.     p.  ItvtO. 
l>a\  is   r.  I'eveler,  C>o  Mo.   IS'J.     pp.  31(!,  1102, 

1711. 
Davis  r.  President  &.c.  of  Menasha,  21  AVIs. 

4!tl.    p.  2060. 
Davis  V.  Reamer,  105  Iiul.  318.    p.  2030. 
Davis  V.  Itoby,  &i  Me.  430.    pp.  306,  308. 
Davi-s  V.  Kussell,  5  Hing.  354.    p.  1175 
1  ).a\  is  V.  Sawyer,  133  Ma.*s.  289.    pp.  1384,  I30C. 
|)a\  is  V.  Scripps,  2  Mo.  187.    p.  2053. 
Da\  is  r.  Stale,  33  Ga.  08.    p.  747. 
Davis  r.  Slate.  38  Md.  15.     p.  460. 
Davis    c.  Mate,  .35  Ind.  496;  s.  c.  0   Am.  Kep. 

760.     P11.   408,  5(12,  ,503,  508,  500,  517,  519,  520, 

1780,  1007,  1931,1981. 
Davis  r.  State,  15  Oh.  72.    pp.  1903, 1904. 
Davis  V.  State,  25  Oh.  St.  360.     p.  19. 
Davis  V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  58S.    p.  46.5. 
Davis  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  91.    p.  100,5. 
Davis  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  6:54.    pp.  6,  85. 
Davis  r.  State,  13  Tex.  Ai)p.  11.    p.  1537. 
Davis   V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  645.    pp.1679, 

1706,  1707. 
Davis  r.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  202.    p.  1756. 
Davis  V.  State,  43  Tex.  IsO.    p.  198.5. 
Davis  r.   Stewart,  8  Fed.    Kep.  803;  s.  c.    3 

McCrary  (U.  S.),  174.    p.  1416. 
Davis  r.  Town  of  Farmingham,  42  Wis.  425. 

pp.  2025,  2028,  2030,  2036,  2037. 
Davis   V.   Wabash    &c.   K.  Co.,  89   Mo.  340; 

s.  c.  1  S.  AV.  Hep.  327 ;  13  Mo.  App.  449.    pp. 

1318,  1322,  11545, 1347,  11549,  1357. 
Davis  V.  Wilson,  65  111.  527.    p.  204. 
Davis  r.  Zumwalt,  1  App.  Civ.  C.  C.  .507.    p. 

2076. 
Davison  v.  Jersey  Com))any   Associates,  71 

N.  V.  333.    p.  2. 
Davison  v.  People,  90  111.  221.    p.  124. 
Davison's  Case,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  129.    pp. 

134,  152. 
Dawes  v.  Cope,  4  Binn.  258.    p.  1444. 
Dawson  i:  Coffman,  28  Ind.  220.    p.  2091. 
Dawson  v.  Horan,51  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  540.     p.  4. 
Dawson    v.  Lambert,  8  Gill  (Md.),  216.     p. 

1670. 
Dawson  v.  Manchester  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Hurl.  & 

N.  10:57.     p.  1237 
Dawson  v.  Bailwav  Co.,  76  Mo.  514.    p.  1368. 
Dawson  v.  Shillock,  20  Minn.  180.    p.  2083. 
Dawson  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  K.  Co.,  76  Mo.  514. 

p.  1150. 
Dawson  v.  State,  29  Ark.  116.    p.  18. 
Dawson  V.  State,  62  Miss.  241.    pp.  17S7, 1790. 
Dav  V.  Com.,  3  Gratt.  (Va.)  6:50.    p.  48. 
Day  r.  Crawford,  13  Ga.  .508.    pp.   1771,  1773. 
Day  r.  Henry,  104  Ind.  324.    p.  20:58. 
Dav  V.  Moore,  13  Grav  (Mass.),  .522.    p.  309. 
Day  V.  Owens,  5  Midi.  .520.    p.  1283. 
Day  V.  Uidlev,  16  Vt.  48.    pp.  1:521, 1332-,  1345. 
Dav  V.  Roth,  18  N.  Y.  448.     p.  1011. 
Day  f.  Savadge,  Hob.  85.    p.  55. 
Day  V.  Sharp,  4  Whart.  (Pa.)  :539.    p.  .5.50. 
Davr.  Stale.  21  Tex.  A|ip.  213.     p.  1744. 
Dav  V.  State,  63  (Ja.  667.     p.  660. 
Dav  r.  Slate,  13  Mo.  422.     )).  448. 
Dav  r.  Stickucv,  14  Allen    (Mass.),   2,55.    p. 

:;d7. 
Dav  r.  Woodworth,  13  How.  (U.  S.)  363.    p. 

•-'14. 
Davharsh  v.  Knos,  5  \.  Y.  .581.    pp.   110,  111. 
I);i'vli.n  r.  Monroe,  47  Mieh.  105.     ]>.  1050. 
Davton  r.  Matr,  10  Oh.  St    584.     p.  26. 
D.iicon  c.  Shreve,22\.  .J.  L   176.     ]).  1914. 
Deakers  r.  Temple,  41  Pa.  St.  2:54.     p.  14.50. 
Dean  c.  ("orbetl.  51  N.  Y.  Super.  (10  J.  &  S.) 

103.     pp.  368,  1625. 


Dean  r.  Erskine,  18  X.  H.  81.    p.  827. 
Dean  r.  Sweeney,  51  Tex.  242.     p.  3. 
Dean  i-.  Toppiu,"l30  Mass.  517.     p.  958. 
Dean  of  St.  Asaph,  Case  of,  cUed.    p.  1521. 
Doane  c.  Aveling,  1  Rob.  Kcc.  279.    pp.  646, 

651. 
Dearmond  i\  Dcarmond,  10  Ind.  191.    p.  53. 
Deaver  v.  Riee,2  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  260.    p.  622. 
De  Bardelabeu  v.  State,  50  Ala.  179.    p.  124. 
De  Benedetti  i:  Maudlin,  1  Hilt  (N.  Y.),  213. 

p.  1225. 
De  15ernard  V  r.  Harding,  8  Exch.  822.    p.  901. 
De  Bow  r.  People,  1  Denio  (X.  Y.),  9.     p.  819. 
Debuvs  V.  MoUere,  2  Mart.  (N.  S.)  (La.)  625. 

p.  20. 
Decker  v.  Brvant,  7  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  18:5.    p.  585. 
Decker  r.  House,  30  Kan.  614     p.  2050. 
Decker  v.  Matthews,  12  X.  Y.  313.     pp.  1740, 

1956. 
Dedric  r.  Hopsen,  62  Iowa,  562.    p.  264. 
Deere  r.  Plant,  42  Mo.  60.    p.  1600. 
Deerly  i".  Duchess  of  Mazarine,  1  Salk.  116; 

s.  c.  2  Salk.  646;  1  Ld.  Raym.  147.    p.  1747. 
De  Foe  ;•.  People,  22  Mich.  224.    i)p.  545,  1806. 
Deford  v.  Rcvnolds,  36  Pa.  St.  325.    pp.  1098, 

1102. 
De  Forrest  v.  Strong,  8  Conn.  513.    p.  886. 
De  France  v.  De  France,  34  Pa.  St.  385.    pp. 

305,  803. 
Defrese  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  53.    p.  303. 
Deggs  V.   State,  7  Tex.  App.  359.    pp.   17%, 

1707. 
Degraff  v.  Ilovev,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  120. 

p:  641. 
Degraffenreid  v.  Thomas,  14  Ala.  681.    pp. 

203, 1506. 
De  Graw  v.  Prior,  60  Mo.  56.    p.  1042. 
Deickman  r.  McCormick,  24  Mo.  596.    p.  1611. 
Deigr.  INIorehead  (Ind.),  UXorth.  East.  Kep. 

458;  s.  c.  110  Ind.  451.     p.  81. 
Dejarnette  v.  Com.,  11  Rejjorter,  6.53;  s.  c.  75 

Va.  867.     pp.  64,  73,  74,  725. 
De  La  Mar  r.  Ilurd.  4  Colo.  422.    p.  2130. 
Delamater  v.  People,  5  Laus.  (X.  Y.)  632.    p. 

524. 
Delaney  v.  Xoble,  3  X.  J.  Eq.  441.    p.  424. 
Delanev  v.  Regulators,  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  403. 

p.  160: 
Delano  r.  Goodwin,  48  X.  H.  203.    p.  1007. 
Delany  I".  Robinson,  2  AVhart.  (Pa.)  503.    p. 

962. 
Delaplane  v.  Crenshaw,  15  Gratt.  (Va.)  457. 

pp.  721,  725. 
Delaware  Ins.  Co.  v.  Winter,  38  Pa.  St.  187. 

p.  905. 
De  Leon  v.  White,  9  Tex.  598.    p.  1438. 
Delooherv  r.  State,  27  Ind.  .'^21.    p.  .523. 
1)0  Lome' r.  Pease,  19  Ga.  220.    pp.312,  313. 
Deliihi  r.  Lowerv,  74   Ind.  .520;  s.   c.   39  Am. 

Kep.  08.    i)p.  561,  2115,  2116. 
Del  Valle  v.  Str.   Richmond,  27  La.  Ann.  90. 

p.  11.54. 
Delvee  r.  Boardman,  20  la.  446.     j).  20.54. 
Demaree  r.  Stale,  45  Ind.  200.     ji.  50. 
Demarest  v.  llardham,  34  X.  J.  Kcj.  409.    p. 

1403. 
Dement,  Ex  parte,  53  Ala.  389.    p.  176. 
De  Medina  v.  Owen,  3  Car.  &  K.  626.    p.  639. 
Demerritt  r.  Randall,  116  Mass.  .331.    p.   379, 
Deming  c.  Hurlburl,  2  D.  Chip.  (Vt.)   45.    p. 

117. 
Deming  v.  Foster,  42  X.  H.  165.    pp.  851,  852, 

>.)27. 
Dempsev  i:  Mayor  &c.,  10  Daly  (X.  Y.),  417. 

p|..  21126,  2027.' 
Demiisev  r.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  429.    pp.727, 

720,  785. 
Den  r.  .McAllister,  7  X.  .1.  L.  46.    p.  1082. 
Den  1-.  Woodward,  4  X.  J.  L.  122.    p.  700. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


lix 


Den  Blaker's  Executrix  v.   New  Jersey  &c. 

R.  Co.,  7  Rep.  6-JG.    p.  ]'230. 
Den  d.  Hopper  v.  Demarest,  21  X.  J.  L.  526. 

p.  215. 
Denison  v.  Wertz,  7  Serg.   &  R.   (Pa.)   372. 

p.  826. 
Denman  v.  Baldwin,  3  N.  J.  L.  045.    p.  5. 
Denn  v.  Clark,  1  X.  J.  L.  446.    p.  53. 
Denn  v.  Evaul,  1  X.  J.  L.  283.    pp.  25,  34. 
Denn  v.  Pissant,  1  X.  J.  L.  220.    p.  82. 
Dennerline  r.  Gable,  73  Ina.  210.    p.  2110. 
Denney  v.   Booker,  2  Bibb    (Ky.),  427.    pp. 

215,  220. 
Denning  V.  State,  22  Ark.  131.    p.  171. 
Dennis  v.  Alexander,  3  Pa.  St.  60.    p.  912. 
Dennis  v.  Crooks,  23  Mo.  App.  532.    p.  854. 
Dennis  v.  Eckhardt,  3  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  390, 

pp.  13S5, 1390. 
Dennis  v.  Huvck,48  Mich.  620;  s.  c.  42  Am 

Rep.  479.     p."  1329. 
Dennis  v.  State,  103  Ind.  142.    p.  2079. 
Dennison  r.  Collins,!  Cow.   (X'.  Y.)  111.    p 

1931. 
Dennison  v.  Genesee  Circuit  Judge,  37  Mich 

285.     pp.  2059,  2066. 
Dennison  v.  Phoenix  Co.,  52  Iowa,  457.    p 

981. 
Dennison  r.  Powers,  35  Vt.  39.    p.  1917. 
Denny  r.  Hutcheson,  1  Bibb   (Ky.),576.    p 

109. 
Denny  v.  Wickliffe,  1    Mete.  (Ky.)  224.    p 

2097. 
Dennv  v.  "Williams,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  1.    pp 

919,1600,1603,1606. 
Denslow  i'.  Fowler,  2  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  592.    p 

589. 
Densmore  v.  State,  67  Ind.    306.    pp.  1837, 

1844. 
Dent  V.  Hancock,  5  Gill  (Md.),  127.    p.  725. 
Dent  V.  Hertford,  2  Salk.  645.    pp.  112, 113. 
Dent  V.  King,  1  Ga.  200.    p.  1915. 
Dent  V.  Miles,  4  Mo.  419.    p.  1618. 
Denton    i*.  Bate,   1  Swan   (Tenn.),  279.    p. 

497. 
Denton  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  la.  161.    pp. 

1356,  1359,  1360. 
Denton  V.  Lewis,  15  la.  301.    pp.  1964,  1965. 
Denton  v.  Noyes,  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.)    296.    p. 

147. 
Denver  r.  Capelli,  3  Col.  235.    pp.  2130,  2131. 
Denver  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Olsen,  4  Col.  239.    p.  816. 
De  Paus  v.  Kaiser  (Ga.),  3  S.  E.  Rep.  25.    p. 

2076. 
Depi)e  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  la.  592.     p. 

1964. 
Depevster  v.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.,  2  Caines 

(N."Y.),85.     p.  17.00. 
De  Priest  v.  State,  68  Ind.  569.    p.  1913. 
Deputy  V.  Betts,  4  liarr.  (Del.)  3.52.    p.  1060. 
Derl)v  r.  Gallup,  5  Minn.  119.     p.  197. 
DeUidder  v.  McKnight,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  294. 

pp    852,  912. 
Derosia  c.  Winona  &c.  R.  Co.,  18  Minn.  133. 

pp.  1124,  12.53,1374. 
Dea   Art  t'.  Leggett,  5  Duer  (X.  Y.),  156.    p. 

1639. 
De  Schawnberg  v.  Buchanan,  5  Carr.  &  P. 

343.     p.  927. 
Desclie  i\  Gi'es,  .56  Md.  135.     p.  3. 
DeSobry  v.  DeLaistre,  2  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  192. 

p.  819. 
Des  Rochers,  Ex  parte,!  McAIl.  (U.  S.)  08. 

p.  178. 
Dessaunier  v.  Murphy,  33  Mo.  191.    p.  1054. 
Detroit  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Barton,  61  Ind.  293.     p. 

203(). 
Detroit  &c.  R.  Co.  i\  Van  Steinbersr,  17  Mich. 

99.     pp.  376,  388,  1208,  1212,  1219,  1224. 
Deupree  v.  Deupree,  49  Ga.  325.    p.  1633. 


Devenbagh  v.  Devenbagh,  3  Paige  (X.  Y.), 

554.     pp .  646,  648, 650. 
Dever  v.  Aikin,  40  Ga.  423.    p.  1750. 
Devereux  v.  Barclay,  5  Barn.  &  Aid.  702.    p. 

1157. 
Devereux  v.  Burgovne,  5  Ired.   Eq.  (X.  C.) 

351.    p.  1061. 
Devizes  v.  Clark,  3  Ad.   &  El.  506.    pp.  1505, 

1507,  1515. 
Devlin  V.  Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.,  87  Mo.  545.    p. 

1315. 
Devlin,  Ex  parte,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  287.    p. 

152. 
Devollv.  Brownell,  5  Pick.    (Mass.)  448.    p. 

265. 
Devries  v.  Havgood,   63  X.  C.  53.    p.  728. 
Devries  v.  Phillips,  63  X.  C.  53.    pp.  775,  779. 
Dew  V.  McDivitt,  17  Am.  L.  Reg.   623;  s.  c. 

31  Ohio  St.  139.     pp.  60,  98,  102,  126. 
Dewar  v.  Purdav,  4  X.  &  M.  633 ;  s.  c.  3  Ad. 

&  El.  166 ;  1  H.  &  W.  227.     p.  1584. 
Dewart  v.  Clement,  48  Pa.  St.  413.    p.  1418. 
Dewdney  v.  Palmer,  4  Mees.  &  W.  664.    p. 

327. 
Dewees  v.  Hudgeons,  1  Tex.  192.    p.  1698. 
Dewev  v.  Detroit,  15  Mich.  307.    p.  1246. 
De  Witt   V.  Denms,  30  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  131. 

p.  161. 
De  Witt  V.  Pierson,  112  Mas.s.  8.    p.  1003. 
Dewitt  V.  Prescott,  51  Mich.  298.    pp.  609,  613, 

628. 
De  Wolf  V.  Rabaud,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  476.    p. 

1585. 
Dexter  v.  Syracuse  &c.  R.  Co.,  42  X.  T.  326. 

p.  1154. 
Dey  r.  Dunham,  2    Johns.    (X.  Y'.)   182.    p. 

1093. 
Deyo  V.  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  9.    p. 

1605. 
Dias  V.  Merle,  1  Paige  (X"".  Y.),  494.    p.  634. 
Dias  V.  State,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  20.    p.  1902. 
Dibble  v.  Brown,  12  Ga.  217.    pp.   1151,  1154, 

11.55. 
Dibble  V.  Rogers,  13  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  536.    p. 

lOSO. 
Dicas  V.  Lawson.  1  Cromp.  M.  &  R.  934.    p. 

169. 
Dick  V.  Phillips,  41  Hun  (X.  Y.),  603.    p.  602. 
Dickens  v.   Xew  York  &c.   R.    Co.,  I  Abb. 

App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  504.    p.  1212. 
Dickens  v.  State,  30  Ga.  383.    p.  1509. 
Dickens   v.    Williams,  2  B.  Mour.  (Ky.)  374. 

p.  926. 
Dickenson  v.  Breeden,  25  111.  186.    p.  622. 
Dickenson  v.  Cook,  17  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  332.    p. 

1442. 
Dickenson  i\  Dickenson,  25  Gratt.  (Va.)  321. 

p.  1102. 
Dickenson   v.  Fitchburg,  13  Gray  (Mass.), 

546.    p.  518. 
Dickenson  v.  Lott,  29  Tex.  173.    p.  966. 
Dickenson  v.  Lovell,  35  X.  H.  9.    p.  809. 
Dickenson  v.  Maynard,  20  La.  Ann.  66.    p. 

1197. 
Dickenson  v.  Shee,  4  Esp.  67.    p.  391. 
Dickenson's  Case,  3  Harr..  (Del.)  517.  p.  188 
Dickerson    i;.    Burke,  25  Ga.  225.    pp.    728 

747. 
Dickerson  v.  Dickerson,  50  Mich.    37.    pp 

2031,2038. 
Dickerson  v.  Johnson,  24  Ark.  251.    pp.  166S 

1674. 
Dickerson  f.   Seelye,  12  Barb.  (X.  Y.)99.    p 

1367. 
Dickey  f.  Johnson,  13  Ired.    (X.  C.)  150.    p 

158.5. 
Dickev  r.  Maine  Tel.  Co.,   46  Me.   483.    p 

1224. 
Dickey  v.  Malechi,  6  Mo.  177.    pp.  560,  561. 


Ix 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Dickev  r.  Tennison,  27  Mo.  3T3.    p.  1107. 
Dickiiis   i\  Beale,  10  How.   (U.  S.)  572.    p 

942. 
Dickinson  r.  Valpv,  10  Barn.  &  Cres.  128.    p 

IKX). 
Dickinson.  In  re,  58  IIow.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)260.    p 

2t)5. 
Dickson  v.  Rose,  87  Tnd.  103.    p.  2126. 
Dickson   i:  81iarrctio,  7  La.  Ann  54.    p.  461 
Diefenback  r.  Stark,  50  ^Vis.  462.    p.  852. 
Digard  r.  Micnaud.  2  Hob.  (La.)  3S7.    p.  1084 
Dikenian  r.  l'arrish,6  Pa.  St.  211.    p.  1047. 
Dill  r.  Lawrence,  10  N.  East.  Rep.  573;  s.  c 

109Ind.  564.     j..  IHSI. 
Dill  r.  OTerrcll,  (!it  Ind.  .500.    p.  1474. 
Dillard  r.  Parker,  25  Ark.  503.    p.  2122. 
Dille  r.  Lovels,  37  Oh.  St.  415.    p.  218. 
Dille  r.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  617.    pp.  705,  707, 

708,  709. 
Dillin  V.  People,  8  Mich.  357.    pp.  316,  582. 
Dillon  r.  Ander.son,  43  N.  Y.  231.    p.  346. 
Dillon  i:  Bell,  9  Ind.  320.     p.  433. 
Dillon  V.  C'ockroft,  90  X.  Y.  649.    p.  200. 
Dillon  V.  McRae,  40  Ga.  107.    p.  1713. 
Dills  V.  State,  59  Ind.  15.    p.  176. 
Dilworth  v.  Com.,  12  Gratt.  (Va.)   689.    pp. 

85,  120,  2062. 
Diniick  v.   Downs,  82    111.  570.    pp.  308,  449, 

450. 
Ditcham  v.  Chivis,  4  Bin.c.  706.    p.  1611. 
Ditmars  v.  Com.,  47  Pa.  St.  335.     ]t.  1646. 
Dittman  r.  Repp,  50  Md.  516.    p.  l:;87. 
Dively  v.  Cedar  Falls,  21  la.  565.    p.  55. 
Divenv  r.  Elmira.  51  N.  Y.  507.     j).  55. 
Diversv  V.  Will,  2  111    216.    p.  .328. 
Dix  V.  Akers,  30  Ind.  431.    p.  2089. 
Dixon    V.  Duke,  85   Ind.  434.    pp.  825,  2007, 

2008,2010,2011. 
Dixon  r.  Graham,  16  la.  310.    p.  2075. 
Dixon  V.  Haley,  16  111.  145.    p.  891. 
Dixon  V.   Richard,  3  How.  (Miss.)  771.    p.  5. 
Dixon  V.  State,  3  la.  41.    p.  1534. 
Dixon   r.   State,  13  Fla.  636.    pp.  1726,  1727, 

1730,1731,173.5. 
Dixon  V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  530.    pp.  81,  91, 

92. 
Dixon  V.  Vale,  1  Car.  &  P.  278.    p.  283. 
Dixon  V.  Yates,  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  313.    p.  915. 
Doak  V.  Snapp,  1  Coldw.    (Teuu.)    180.    p. 

Doati  V.  State,  26  Tnd.  40.5.    p.  1181. 

Doane  v.  Badger,  12  Mass.  65.     pp.  889,  898. 

Doane  v.  Eddy,  16  Wend.   (X.  Y.)  523.    p. 

1441. 
Doane  t).  Glenn,  21  Wall.  (IT.  S.)  33.    p.  568. 
Doane  v.  Lockwood,  15  111.  490.    p.  1621. 
Dobbins  r.  Oswalt,  20  Ark.  619.    p.  705. 
Dobbs  r.  State,  55  Ga.  272.    p.  163. 
Dobree  v.  Eastwood,  3  Car.  &  P.  250.    p.  944. 
Dobson  V.  Blackmore,  9  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  991. 

p.  1404. 
Dobson  V.  Finley,  8  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  495.    p. 

848. 
Docks  V.  Stone,  13  Minn.  434.    p.  415. 
Dodd  V.  .Moore,  91  Ind.  .522.    p.  1803. 
Dodd  I'.  Moore. 92  Ind.  397.     p.  489. 
Dodge  V.  Dunham,  41  Ind.  187.    i>.  308. 
Dodge  V.  (iavlord,  53  Ind.  365.    p.  1647. 
Dodge  V.  Israel,  4  Wash.  C  C.  (U  S.)  323.    p. 

630. 
Dodge  V.  .Janvrin,  59  X.  IT.  16.    p.  866. 
I>odge  V.  Prople,  4  Neb.  220.     p.  M. 
Dodge  f.  Pope,  93   lud.   480.     pp.   2048,2052, 

207 1. 
Dodge  V.  Rogers,  9  Minn.  22.3.    p.  1706. 
Dodson  V.  Weutworlh,  4  .Man.  it  G.  1080.    p. 

1020. 
Doe  c.  Benjamin,  9  Ad.  &  El.  664.    p.  1663. 
Due  :;.  Braynu,  5  Com.  Buucb,  655.    p.  215. 


Doe  r.  D.ivies,  10  Q.  B.  314.    p.  1739. 

Doe  r.  Earl  of  Egremont,  2  Moody  &  Rob.  386, 

p.  277. 
Doe  c.  Gooch,  3  Barn.  &  Aid.  664.    p.  886. 
Doe  r.  Jauncey,  8  Carr  &  P.  99.    p.  272. 
Doe  r.  Makepeace,  8  Blackf.   (Ind.)  575.    p. 

2117. 
Doe  V.  Paine.  4  Hawks  (X.  C),  64.    p.  1746. 
Doe  V.  Perkins,  3  T.  R.  739.    p.  2003. 
Doe  V.  Rliodes,  U  Mees.  &  W.  600.    p.  1135. 
Doe  V.  Snowd  jn,  2  W.  Bl.  1224.    p.  1135. 
Doe  V  Spence,  6  East,  120.    p.  1135. 
Doer.  Turford,  3  Barn.  &  Ad.  898.    p.  642. 
Doe  i:  Ulph,  66  Eng.   C.  L.  208;  s.  c.  13  Q.  B. 

204.    p.  1124. 
Doe  r.  Watkins,  7  East,  551.    p.  1135. 
Doe  d.  Bather  v.  Brayne,  5    Com.    Bench, 

655.     p.  242. 
Doe  d.  Courtail  v.  Thomas,  9  Barn.  &  Cress. 


288.    p.  27S. 

1.  Lewis  v. 
242. 


Doe  d. 


Lewis,  1  Carr.  &  K.  122.    p. 


Doe  d.  Pill  V.  Wilson,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  .323.  p. 

242. 
Doe  d.  Tucker  v.  Tucker,  Mood.  &  M.  536.    p. 

242. 
Doe  d.  Warren  r.  Bray,  Mood.  &  M.  166.    p. 

242. 
Doe  d.  Welsh  v.  Langfield,  16  Mees.  &  W. 

497.    p.  1333.     . 
Doe  d.  Wollaston  i'.  Barnes,  1  Mood.  &  Rob. 

386.     p.  242. 
Doebling  v.  Loos,  45  Mo.  1.50.    p.  1669. 
Doering  v.  Stale,  49  Ind.  .56.    p.  1646. 
Doggett  V.  Jordan,  2  Fla.  .541.    pp.  876, 1726. 
Doggett  V.  Richmond  &c.  R.  Co.,  78  X.  C.  305. 

p.  1221. 
Doggett  V.  Sims,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  909.    p.  2067. 
Doherlv  v.  Lincoln,  114  Mass.  362.    pp.  2136, 

2137,  2141. 
Dohertv  v.  Waltham,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  596. 

p.  124S. 
Dolan  i:  .Etna  Ins.  Co.,  22  Hun  (X.  Y.),  396. 

p.  1947. 
Dolan  V.  People,  64  X.  Y.  485.    pp.  30,  31,  32.. 
Dolan  r.  State,  40  Ark.  454.    p.  73. 
Dole  c.  Er.skine,  37  N.  II.  317.    p.  123. 
Dole  f.  Tliurlow,  12  Mete.  (Mass.)   157.    pp. 

828,  1739. 
Doles  V.  State,  97  Ind.  5.55.    pp.  1918,  1981. 
Doll  c.  stale,  15  Nortli  East.  Hep.  293.     p.  78. 
Doll,  Ex  parte,  7  Phila.  (Pa.)  595.    pp.  139, 

171. 
DoUner  v.  Williams,  29  Ga.  743.    p.  1670. 
Dolloff  V.  Stimi)son,  33  Me.  546.   pp.  113,  2062. 
Dolz  c.  Morris,  10  Hun   (X.   Y.),201.    p.  500. 
Dominguez  »".  Mascotti  (Cal.),  15  Pac.  Rep. 

773.     p.  2084. 
Donahoe  r.  state,  12  Tex.  App.  297.    p.  311. 
Donahoe  v.    Wabash  &c.  R.   Co.,  83  Mo.  543. 

PI).  1257,  12.58,  12.59. 
Donahue  v.  Windsor  County  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  56 

Vt.  .ni.    1).  982. 
Donaldson  y.  Boston,  16  Gray  (Mass.), 508. 

p.  1249. 
Donaldson  v.  Means,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.)  109.    p. 

948. 
Donaldson  t-.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn. 

293.  pp.  1226,  1235. 

Donaldson   r.  Mississippi  &c.  R.  Co.,  18  la. 

280.     p.  1229. 
Doni-lson  v.  Taylor,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  390.    pp. 

294,  583. 

Donnell  v.  Jones,  13  Ala.  490.    p.  321. 
Donnelly  f.  Stale,  26  .N.    J.  L.  602.     ]..  1841. 
Donner  V.  Palmer,  23  Cal.   40.    pp.  1963,  1967, 

1995. 
Donohoo  r.  State,  .36  Ala.  281.    p.  1669. 
Donohue  v.  People,  56  X.  Y.  208.    p.  525. 


TABLK    OF    CASES. 


Ixi 


Donston  t'.  state,  6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  275.    p.   I 

Doolev  V.  State,  28  Ind.  2.'59.    pp.  1964, 1965. 
Doolittle  r.  State,  9:',  Ind.  272.    p    110. 
Doolv  V.  Jlnnings,  6  Mo.  61.    p.  1600. 
Dooman  i\  Mitchell,  26  Ga.  472.    p.  1670. 
Doon  V.  Donaher,  113  Mass.  151.    p.  616. 
Doorman  r.  Jenkins,  2  Ad.  &E1.  261.   pp.  1242, 

1245,  1246. 
Dorau  v.  Shaw,  3  T.  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  415.    pp. 

1984, 1991. 
Dore  V.  Billings,  26  Me.  56.    p.  960. 
Uorgan  v.  State,  72  Ala.  17.3.    pp.  4.3, 1770. 
Dorlaud  v.  Cunningliam,  66  Cal.  484.    p.  2064. 
Dorlon  v.  Brooklyn,  46  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  604.    p. 

124S. 
Dorniandyt'.  State  Bank,  3  Bradw.  (111.)  236. 

p.  294. 
Dorrr.  Fenno,  12Pick.  (Mass.)  521.    pp.  1753, 

1964,  1965,  1966,  19S3,  1989. 
Dorr  V.  New  Jersey  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  11  N.  Y. 

485.     pp.  1348,  1349. 
Dorr  V.  Swartwout,  1  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  179. 

p.  966. 
Dorr  V.  Tremont  Bank,  120  Mass.  3.59.    p.  218. 
Dorr  V.  Tremont  Bank,  128  Mass.  849.    p.  326. 
Dorr,  Ex  parte,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  104.    p.  178. 
Dorsev    v.  Construction   Co.,   42  Wis.    583. 

p.  2025. 
Dorsey  v.  Eagle.  7  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  321.    p.  821. 
DorseV    v.    Phillips  &c.    Co.,    42    Wis.    583. 

p.  1210. 
Doss  V.  Birks,  11  Humph.   (Tenn.)  431.    p. 

329. 
Doss  V.  Com.,  1  Gratt.  (Va.)  5.57.    p.  234. 
Doss  V.  Missouri  &c.  K.  Co.,  59  Mo.  27.    pp. 

1229,  1297. 
Dosscttr.  Miller,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.),  72.    p.  489. 
Doster  v.  Brown,  2.S  Ga.  24.    p.  728. 
DosttT  V.   Sterling,  .53   Kau.    381.    pp.    2079, 

2101,2102. 
Dotson  1-.  State,  62  Ala.  141.    p.  32. 
Dotty    V.  Strong,    Burnett    (Wis.),   158.    p. 

1K69. 
Doty  ('.  Steinberg,  25  Mo.  App.  328.    p.  1477. 
Doty  r.  Wilson,   14  Johns.  (N.   Y.)   378.    pp. 

889,  900. 
Doub  V.  Barnes,  1  Md.  Ch.  27.    p.  194. 
Doud   V.  Guthrie,  13  Bradw.   (111.)  653.    p. 

668. 
Dougan  tJ.  Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  6  Lans. 

(X.  Y.)  430.     p.  1223. 
Dougherty  r.  Chicago  &c.  Co.,  86  111.  467.    p. 

1236. 
I)<iugherty  v.  Matthews,  35  Mo.  520.    p.  1607. 
Douglas  r.  Corbett,  6  El.  &  Bl.  511.    pp.  1166, 

1172,1176. 
Douglas  V.  Hill,  29  Kan.  527.    p.  703. 
Douglas  V.  Orr,  58  Mo.  573.    p.  2111. 
Douglas  V.  Tansey,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  352.    p. 

449. 
Douglass    V.  Blankenship,  50   Ind.  160.    p. 

2090. 
Douglass  V.  Flynn,  43  Ark.  398.    p.  20.55. 
Douglass   c.   McAllister,  3  Cranch   (U.  S.), 

298.    p.  1739. 
Douglass  V.  Kogers,  4  Wis.  304.    p.  324. 
Douglass  r.  State,  72  Ind.  385.    pp  2107,  2123. 
Douglass  r.  State,  4  Wis.  387.    p.  1381. 
Douglass  r.   Tousey,  2  Weud.    (X.  Y.)  352. 

PI).  1910,  1912. 
Douglass  V.  Trask,  77  Me.  35.    p.  1781. 
Douglass  V.  Whittemore,  32  Vt.  685.    p.  1382. 
Doulon  V.  Clinton,  33  Iowa,  397.    p.  1249.  . 
Dounce  i\  Dow,  64  N.  Y.  411.    p.  1739. 
Dovalina  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  312.    p.  1855. 
Dovey  r.  Hobson,  2  Marsh.  154;  s.  c.  6  Taunt. 

460.    p   110. 
Dowd  V.  Chicopee,  116  Mass.  93.    p.  1247. 


Dowd  V.  Guthrie,  13  Bradw.  (111.)   653.    p. 

1969. 
Dowd  V.  Winters,  20  Mo.  361.    p.  1592. 
Dowda  v.  State,  74  Ga.  12.    p.  714. 
Dowdell  r.  Wilco.\,  64  Iowa,  721.    pp.  708, 

737,  743,  744,  769. 
Dowds  r.  Com.,  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  727.    p.  115. 
Dowell  V.  Gen.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  5  El.  &  Bl. 

195.     pp.  1223,  12.55. 
Dower  v.  Church,  21  W.  Va.  23.    p.  2062. 
Dowling  V.   State,  5  Sm.  &  M.    (Miss.)  664. 

pp.  4,  42,  43. 
Downer  r.  Baxter,  30  Vt.  467.    pp.  1902,  1906, 

1977,  1985,  1990. 
Downer  f.  Church,  21  AV.  Va.  24.    pp.1913, 

1975. 
Downer  v.  Rowell,  24  Vt.  343.    p.  361. 
Downey  v.  Day,  4  Ind.  .531.     pp.  221,  2109. 
Downiug  V.  Bain,  24  Ga.  372.    p.  827. 
Downing  r.   Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  43  la.  99. 

pp.  1278,  1308. 
Downing  v.  Garner,  1  Mo.  751.    p.  2060. 
Downs  V.  Downs,  17  Ind.  95.    p.  2112. 
Downs  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  y.  83. 

p.  1233. 
Dows  V.   Rush,  28  Barb.   (N.  Y.)    157.    pp, 

1698,  1737. 
Dowzelot  V.   Rawlings,  58  Mo.  76.    pp.  794, 

1096,  1097, 1724. 
Dox  V.  Dey,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  a58.    p.  1476. 
Doyal  t'.  State,  70  Ga.  134.    p.  56. 
Dovle  r.  Falconer,  L.  R.  1  P.  C.  328.    p.  142. 
DoVle  V.  Kiser,  6  Ind.  242.    p.  1151. 
Dozier  v.  Jerman,  30  Mo.  216.    pp.  309,  560, 

718. 
Drake  v.  Brander,  8  Tex.  351.    p.  128. 
Drake  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  (la.),  29  N.  W. 

Rep.  804.    p.  1666. 
Drake  v.  Curtis,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  395.    p.  1671. 
Drake  i-.  Farmers'  Uuion  Ins.   Co.,  3  Grant 

Cas.  (Pa  )  325.     p.  983. 
Drake  v.  Newton,  23  N.  J.  L.  111.    p.  1927. 
Drake  v.  Palmer,  4  Cal.  11.    p.  1473. 
Drake  v.  State,  51  Ala.  30.    pp.  87,  89,  90. 
Drake  v.  State,  75  Ga.  413.    p.  663. 
Drake  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  649.    pp.  16, 17, 

89,  93. 
Draper  r.  Ironton,  42  Wis.   696;  s.   c.  5  Re- 
porter, 223.    p.  1247. 
Draper  v.  Jones,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  269.    pp. 

908,  909,  910. 
Draper  v.  Shoot,  25  Mo.  197.    p.  1050. 
Drefahl  v.  Tuttle,  42  la.  177.    p.  2054. 
Dressier  r.  Davis,  7  Wis.  527.    p.  1225. 
Dressier,  Ex  parte,  67  Cal.  257.    p.  165. 
Dreux  v.  Domec,  18  Cal.  83.    p.  563. 
Drew  r.    Ked  Line  Transit  Co.,  3  Mo.  App. 

495.     pp.  1318,  1343. 
Drew  V.  Sixth  Avenue  R.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  49.    p. 

1233.    . 
Drew  v.  Towle,  30  N.  H.  .531.    p.  825. 
Dreyer  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  631.    p.  1855. 
Drevfuss  r.  Thompkius,  64  Cal.  448.    p.  1671. 
Driggs  V.  Burton,  44  Vt.  124.    p.  1180. 
Driggs  V.  Smith,  45  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  447.    p. 

365. 
Drinkout  v.  Eagle  Machine  AVorks,  90  Ind. 

423.    p.  2110. 
Driscoll  V.   Newark  &c.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  367. 

p.  1316.      . 
Driscoll  r.  New  York,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.),  101.    p. 

12(19. 
Driscoll  V.  Troughton,  34  N.  W.  Rep.  497.    p. 

1627. 
Driskell  v.  Parish,  10  Law  Reporter,  395.    pp. 

91,  92,99,  104. 
Driskill  r.  State.  45  Ala.  21.    p.  16. 
Driskill  r.  State,  7  lud.  338.    pp.  65,  66. 
Dritt   V.  Dodds,  35  Ind.  63.    pp.  2108.  2110. 


Ixii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Druidingi'.  Lyon,  7  Mo.  Aiip.  109.    p.  2112. 
Driunnioud  v.  Leslie,  5  Blackf.   (Ind.)    453. 

l>p.  1911,  li>66,  v.m. 
Drury   c.  Urury,  -J  Eden,  39;  s.   c.  Wllmot's 

Opinions,  226'n.     p.  895. 
Drury  c.  White,  10  Mo.  XH.    pp.  1669,  1693. 
Duljlin   *c.  R.   Co.  v.  Slattery,  3  App.  Cas. 

U.V).     ))p.  1207. 1220. 
Du  ISnitz  r.  .Jo^:^up,54  Pal.  US.    p.  2099. 
Duichcr  c.  !*late.  ISOliio,  ;i08.    p.  1.563. 
Duckett  r.  Crider,  11  B.  Mou.  (Ky.)   195.    p. 

17.50. 
Duddiug  V.  Hill,  15  111.  6L    p.  891. 
Dudley  r.  Sumner,  5  Masis.  438.    p.  17.54. 
Dutlv'c.  Thompson  4  E.  D.  Smith,  178.    pp. 

11.5"l,  11.52. 
Dnff  r.  Rudd,  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  177.    p.  11.57. 
Duffee  r.   Mason,  8  Cow.  (V.  Y.)  25.    p.  926. 
Duffv  V.  People,  26  N.  Y.  588.    pp.  1508,  1519. 
Duffv  i\  People,  6  Hill  (X.  Y.),  75.    p.  5. 
Dufiuir  1-.  Central  Pac.  K.   Co.,  67  Cal.  320. 

p.  1(175. 
Dugau  V.  Mahoney,  11  Allen  (Mass.),  572.    p. 

362. 
Dugan  r.  Coolidge,  3  Allen   (Mass.),  555.    p. 

1112. 
Dugle  v.  State,  KjO  Ind.  2.59.    p.  70. 
Duhon  V.  Landry,  15  La  Ann.  591.    pp.  1983, 

1984. 
Dake  v.  Given,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  478.    p.  184. 
Duke  of  Beaufort  v.  Crawshav,  L.  R.  1  C.  P. 

699  ;  s.   c.  35  L.  J.  C.  P.  342.     p.  295. 
Duke  of  Newcastle  v.  Broxtowe,  4  Barn.  & 

Ad.  273;  s.  c.  1  Nov.  &  M.  598.    p.  1748. 
Duke  of  Richmond  v.  Wise,  1   Veutr.  125. 

pp.  1926,  1931. 
Dula  V.  Cowles,  4  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  519.    p. 

I(i68. 
Dula  v.  Cowles,  7  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  290.    p. 

lOiil. 
Dulanev  v.  Rogers,  64  Mo.  201.    p.  925. 
Dulany'v.  Elford,22  S.  C.  304.    p.  877. 
DuDauransr.  First  Division  St.  Paul  &c.  R. 

Co.,  15  Minn.  51.    pp.  1291,  1292,  1485. 
Dullr.  People,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.),91.     p.  43. 
Dumas  v.  Hauler,  30  Ala.  75.    )).  609. 
Dumas  v.  State,  63  Ga.  600.    pp.  51, 103, 123, 

124. 
Dumev  v.  Schoeffler,  20  Mo.  323.    p.  1594. 
Dumsford  v.  Curlewis,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.   702. 

p.  295. 
Dun  i:  Crozier,  17  Ga.  70.    p.  2099. 
Dunl)ar  v.  Briggs,  18  Neh.  94.    p.  930. 
Dunbar    v.   Hollinshead,  10  Wis.   505.    pp. 

2072,  2098,  2099. 
Dunl.ar  v.  Parks,  2  Tyler  (Vt.),  217.    p.  68. 
Dunbar  v.  Williams,  10  Johns.   (N.   Y.)  28. 

p.  889. 
Dunbar  r.  Williams,  10  Johns.   (X.  Y.)  249. 

rii>.  889,  898. 
Dunbier  v.  Dav,12  Xeb.  590;  s.  c.  41  Am.  Rep. 

772.     pp.  133.^,  1340. 
Duncan  v.  Stalcup,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  (N.  C.)440. 

p.  147.5. 
Duncombc  v.  Daniell,  8  Carr.  &  P.  222.    pp. 

247.  248.  1762. 
Diingan  v.  Miller,  .37  N.  J.  Law,  182.    p.  188. 
Dunham  v.  State,  6  Iowa,  245.    p.  151. 
Dunlap   i:  International  Steamboat  Co.,  98 

Mass.  371.     p.  1151. 
Dunlavev  r.  Watson,  38  la.  398.    p.  1994. 
Durilop  'i:  Peter,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  403. 

pp.  215,227. 
Dnnloi>  r.  Wright,  1  Pcake  N.  P.  123.    p.  927. 
Dunn  r.  (irand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  .58  .Me.  189;  s. 

r.    10  Am.  Law  Reg.  (N.  S.)  615.    pp.  1283, 

1284. 
Dunn  i:  Hall,  8  Blackf.  rind.)  32.    pp.  1964, 

J965,  1906,  1967,  1984,  1990 


Dunn  V.  Hannibal  Ac.  R.  Co.,  68  Mo.  270. 

p.  1372. 
Dunn  r.  Hubble,  81  Ind.  489.    i>.  2137. 
Dunn  V.  People,  29  X.  Y.  623.     p.  308. 
Dunn  V.  Petiplc,  1m9  111.  635.    pp.  1690,  1702, 

1820,  1821.  1822,  1828,  1832,  1883. 
Dunn  r.  Rothernell,  112  Pa.  St.  272.    pp.  825, 

828,  1005. 
Dunn  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  600.    p.  60. 
Dunn  V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  560.    pp.  465, 1777, 

Dunn,  In  re,  9  ISIo.  App.  255.    p.  182. 
Duiuiawav  r.  State,  3   Baxt.    (Tenn.)  206. 

pp.  1983, 19'.)2. 
Duiiseth  V.  Wade,  3  111.  285.    pp.  1156,  1322, 

1346,  1365. 
Dupree  v.  State,  33  Ala.  380.    p.  1734. 
Dupree  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  591.    p.  ia55. 
Dupont  V.  Starring,  42  Mich.  492.    pp.  2032, 

2036. 
Durant  v.  Ashmore,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  184. 

pp.  84,  10(»9. 
Durant  v.  Banta,  27  X.  J.  L.  625.    p.  884. 
Durant  v.  Palmer,  29  X.  J.  L.  544.    pp.  1209, 

1225. 
Durant  I'.  People,  13  Mich.  351.    pp.  540,  545, 

180t). 
Durden  v.  State,  32  Ala.  579.    p.  184. 
Durell  V.  Mosher,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  445.    pp. 

68,  74. 
Duren  v.  Getchell,  55  Me.  241.    p.  1412. 
Durfce   V.    Abbott,  50  Mich.  479.    pp.  2025, 

20:'.2. 
Durfee  r.  Eveland,  8  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  46.    pp. 

195fi,  1957. 
Durfee  v.  Moran,  .57  :Mo.  37.    p.  1712. 
Durnford    v.    Clark,  1  Mart.   (La.)  202.    p. 

383. 
Durnford  v.  ^lessiter,  5  Maule  &  S.  446.    p. 

900. 

Durr  V.  State,  .53  Miss.  425.    p.  1907. 
Durrah  v.  State,  44  .Miss.  789.    i)p.  18,  22. 
Durrah  r.  Stillwcll,  59  Ind.  1.39.    p.  1468. 
Durvee  v.  Denuison,  5  Johns.  (N.   Y.)  248. 

p.  948. 
Dusenbury  v.  Hoyt,  53  X.  Y.  521.    p.  966. 
Dushon  V.     Merchants'  Ins.    Co.,  11  Mete. 

(Mass.)  199.    p.  484. 
Dutton  V.  Tracy,  4  Conn.  93.    p.  124. 
Duwar  V.  Speiice,  2  AVhart.   (U.  S.)  211.    p. 

19. 
Dwver  v.  Bassett,  63  Tex.  275.    pp.  1706, 1767. 
Dwver  v.  Dunbar,  5  Wall.   (U.  S.)  318.    p. 

1670. 
Dyas  V.  Hanson,  14  jNIo.  App.  363.    p.  936. 
Dyer  v.  Dver,  87  Ind.  1.     p.  1698. 
Dyer  v.  Jones,  8  Vt.  205.    p.  892. 
Dver  V.  Morris,  4  Mo.  214.    p.  259. 
Dyer  r.  Talcotl,  10  111.  306.    pp.  1224,  1314. 
Dver  V.  Tavlor   (Ark.),7S.  W.  Rep.  258.    p. 

2032. 
Dvgert  V.  Remerschnlder,  32  X.   Y.  629.    p, 

1446. 
Dyson  v.  State,  26  Miss.  362.    p.  108. 


Eagle  Bank  v.  Chapin,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  180. 

p.  610. 
Eagleton  v.  Kingston,  8  Ves.  464.    p.  878. 
Eakin  r.  Morris  Canal  Co.,  24  N.  J.  L.  538. 

p.  1928. 
Eakman  v.  Sheaffer,  48  Pa.  St.  176.    p.  113. 
Eaines  r.  Blackhart,  12  111.  195.    p.  1646. 
Eanu's  v.  Eamcs,  41  X.  11.  177.    p.  347. 
Eames  v.  .Morgan,  ;i7   111.  2(K).     pp.  1421,  1422, 

1423. 
Earbec  v.  Craig,  1  Ala.  607.    p.  827. 
Earl  V,  Dresser,  30  lud.  11.    p.  2141. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixiii 


Earle  v.  Earle,  20  N.  J.  Law,  348.    p.  874. 
Earle  v.  Thomas,  14  Tex.  583.    pp.  J448, 1672, 

16'.)8. 
Earles  v.  Gilham,   U  Pac.  Rep.  586.    p.  2099. 
Earll  V.  People,  73  111.  333.    pp.  1778, 1833, 

184-2,  1843. 
Earll   r.  People,  99  111.  123.    pp.  737,  739,  745. 
Early  v.  Garrett,  2  Barn.  &  Cres.  928.    p.  1419. 
Early  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  248.    p.  190:!. 
Earnest  v.  Express  Co.,  1  Woods   (U.   S.), 

573.    p.  136U. 
Easeley  v.  Moss,  9  Ala.  267.    pp.  1617, 1618. 
Easoii  I'.  Chapman,  21  111.  33.    p.  456. 
Eason  V.  Gestler,  31  la.  475.    p.  2054. 
Eason  v.  Miller,  IS  S.  C.  381.    p.  2074. 
Ea>on  V    Mate,  BBaxter  (Teon.),466.    pp. 

75,  74,  75,  76. 
Ea^t  V.  Chapman,  Mood.  &  M.  47;  s.  c.  2  Car. 

&  P.  570.     pp.  2SS,  1467. 
East  Kingston  r.  Towie,  48  X.  H.  57.    p.  298. 
East  Line  &c.  R.  Co.  f.  Brinl^er  (Tex.),  3  S. 

W.  Rep  99.    !■.  59. 
East  River  Bankr.  Kennedy,  9  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 

543.    p.  854. 
East  Saginaw  City  R.  Co.  v.  Bohn,  27  Mich. 

503.     pp.  1231,  1234. 
East  Tenn.  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Gurlev,"76  Tenn.  46. 

p.  767. 
East  Tennessee  &c.  R.  Co.   v.  Hackney,   1 

Head  (Tenn.),  169.    p.  2065. 
Easterling  v.  State,  30  Ala.  46.    p.  1642. 
Eastes  r.  Daubenspeck,  4  Ind.  617.    p.  2130. 
Eastland  v.  Fogo,  58  Wis.  274.     p.  1013. 
Eastman  v.  Coos  Bank,  1  N.  H.  2^.    p.  1023. 
Eastman  v.  Haward,  30  Me.  58.    p.  891. 
Eastman   v.  Wight,  4  Oh.  St.  156.    pp.  113, 

117. 
Easton  v.  State,  39  Ala.  552.    pp.  148,  150. 
Eastwood  V.  People,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  25. 

pp.  676,693,  1903,  1907. 
Eaton  V.  Caldwell,  3  Minn.  134.    p.  2069. 
Eaton  V.  Com.,  6  Binn.  (Pa.)  447.    p.  19- 
Eaton  V.  Jacobs,  .56  Me.  445.    p.  1048. 
Eaton  V.  Smith,  20  Pick.  (Mass.)  150.    pp.  838, 

844. 
Eberhardt  v.  Sanger,  51  Wis.  72.    pp.  2030, 

2038. 
Eberhart  v.  State,  47  Ga.  598.    p.  125. 
Eberle  v.  St.  Louis  Public  Schools,  II  Mo. 

247.     p.  55. 
Eby  V.  Eby,  5  Pa.  St.  435.    p.  361. 
Eckel  r.  Walker,  48  la.  150.    pp.  2076,  2100. 
Ecker  v.  McAlister,  45  Md.  291.    i)p.  436,  440. 
Eckert  v.  State,  9  Tex.  105.    p.  18,56. 
Eckles  V.  Bates,  26  Ala.  655.    p.  497. 
Eddebuttel  v.  Durrell,  55  Cal.  277.    p.  2089. 
Eddowes  v.  Hopkins,  1  Dougl.  361.    p.  2003. 
Eddy  V.  Caldwell,  7  Minn.  225.    p.  2098. 
Eddy  V.  Chase,  140  Mass.  471.    p.  825. 
Eddy  V.  Gray, 4  Allen  (Mas.s.),  43.5.    p.  425. 
Eddy  t;.  Wilson,!  G.  Greene   (la.),  259.    p. 

1586. 
Edelen  v.  Edelen,  6  Md.  288.    p.  227. 
Edelen  v.  Gough,  8  Gill,  87.    p.  89. 
Edelen  v.  Thompson,  2  Har.  &  G.  (Md.)  3J. 

p.  1999. 
Edeliii  V.  Sanders,  8  Md.  118.    p.  1669. 
Edelinan  v.  Yeakel,  27  Pa.  St.  26.    p.  837. 
Eden  r.  Lingenfelter,  39  Ind.  19.    p.  1950. 
Edgar  v   Snate,  43  Ala.  45.    p.  1733. 
Edgell  r.  Francis.  1  Man.  &  G.  222.    p.  1477. 
Edgell  V.  Hart.  9  N.  Y.  213.    p.  1436. 
Edgerly  r.  Emerson,  23  N.   H.  555;  s.  c.  55 

Am.  bee.  207.    ]).  2049. 
Edgerton  r.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  35  Barb. 

(N.  Y.)389.     p.  1237. 
Edgerton  r.  New   York  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y. 

227.    p.  1284. 
Edgerton  v.  Weaver,  105  111.  43.    pp.  880, 881. 


Edmiston     v.    Garrison,    18    Wis.    594.    pp. 

19b3,  2097. 
Edmiston  v.  Schwartz,  13  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

135.    p.  1941. 
Edmonds  v.  Rowe,  Ryl.  &  M.  77.    p.  330. 
Edmonds  r.  State,  34  Ark.  720.    p.  2090. 
Edmondson  r.  Kite,  43  Mo.  176.    p.  891. 
Edmondson  i\  Machell,  2  T.  R.  4.    p.  1748. 
Edmondson  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  116.    p.  313. 
Edmonson  v.  State.  43  Tex.  230.    p.  164. 
Edmohstone  v.  Hart.shorn,  19    N.  Y.  9.    p. 

571. 
Edmundson  v.  Thompson,  31  L.  J.  (Exch.) 

207  ;  s.  c.  8  Jur.  (N.  s. )  235.    p.  1100. 
Edrington  v.  Kiger,  4  Tex.  89.    p.  1906. 
Edson  V.  Central  R.  Co.,  40  Iowa,  48.    p.  1309. 
Edson  V.  Fuller,  22  N.  H.  183.    p.  966. 
Edwards  v.  Baltimore  Ins.  Co.,  3  Gill  (Md.), 

176.     p.  982. 
Edwards  v.  Carv,  60  Mo.  572.    p.  17.56. 
Edwards  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  399, 

p.  1307. 
Edwards  r.  Currier,  43  Me.  474.    p.  344. 
Edwards  v.  Davis,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  281.    pp, 

889,  897. 
Edwards  v.  Farrar,  2  La.  Ann.  307.    pp.  II, 

64,  85. 
Edwards  v.  Goldsmith,  10  Pa.  St.  43.    p.  841. 
Edwards  r.  Harben,  2  T.  R.  587.    p.  1440. 
Edwards  r.  James,  13  Tex.  52.    p.  2071. 
Edwards  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  44  Mo. 

119.     p.  1308. 
Edwards  v.  Lewis,  16  Ala.  813.    p.  239. 
Edwards  r.  Marcy,2  Allen  (Mass.),  486.    pp. 

924,  925,  926,  928. 
Edwards  v.  Matthews,  16  L.  J.  Exch.  291.    p. 

215. 
Edwaids  V.  Noyes,  65  N.  Y.  125.    p.  622. 
Edwards  v.  Smith,  63  Mo.  119.    pp.  825,  834, 

837. 
Edwards  v.  State,  22  Ark.  253.    p.  725. 
Edwards  v.  State,  53  Ga.  428.    p.  118. 
Edwards  v.  State,  47  Miss.  583.    p.  1700. 
Edwards  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  593.    pp.  1695, 

1696. 
Edwards  r.  Thomas,  66  Mo.  483.    p.  950. 
Edwards,  Ex  parte,  11  Fla.  174.    p.  132. 
Egau  r.  Larkin,  Arm.  M.  &  O.  (Irish.  Exch.) 

403.    p.  292. 
Egbert  v.  McMichael,  9  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  45.    p. 

966. 
Egljert  V.  Peters.  29  N.  W.  Rep.  134;  s.  c.  35 

Minn.  312.     p.  1622. 
Eggers  I'.  Eggers,  57  Ind.  461.    p.  1780. 
Eggler  V.  People,  56  N.  Y.  642.     p.  1758. 
Eggleston  c.  Castle,  42  Ind.  531.    p.  1756. 
Kggleston  v.   Smiley,  13  Johns.  (N.    Y'.).13. 

pp.  .54,  118, 119,  123. 
Eggspieller  v.  Knockles,  58;iowa,  649.    p.  310. 
Egleslon  i\  Knickerbocker,  6  Barb.  (>.  Y.) 

45b.    p.  842. 
p:hle  r.   Judson,  24  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  97.    pp, 

889,  900. 
Ehrgott  V.  Mayor,  96  Ind.  264;  s.  c.  48  Am. 

Rep.  622.     p.  1485. 
Ehrisman  r.  Roberts,  68  Pa.  St.  308.    p.  1438. 
Eich  ('.  Taylor,  26  Minn.  378.    pp.  1906, 1920. 
Eicke  V.  Xbkes,  1  Mood.  &  JI.  303.    p.  275. 
Eicks  V.  Copeland,  53  Tex.  584.    p.  1451. 
Eiland  v.  Radford,  7  Ala.  724.    p.  869. 
Eiland  v.  State,  52  Ala.  322.    pp.  1698,  1733, 

1734. 
Eisemann  v.  Swan,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  668.    p. 

2007. 
Eiscnhart  v.  Slaymaker,  14  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

1.03.    p.  610. 
Ela  V.  Cockshott,  119  Mass.  416.    p.  1714. 
Elain   V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.    34.    pp.    1743, 

1746. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


EUlor  V.  Frcvort,  IS  Xev.  27S.    p.  2099. 
ElikT  r.  Sliinv,  li'  Nov.  7S.     j).  im9. 
Klilred   r.  Ocoiitc  Co.,  :'.:i  UU.  1S3.    p.  1734. 
Eldredge  c.  Folwell,  3  Blackf.  (lud.)  '208.    p. 

liHiO. 

Eldridire  v.  Ilawlev,  1 15  INIass.  410.    p.  814. 
Eldridire  r.  Rowe,"7  111.  91 ;  s.  c.  43  .\iu.  Dec. 

41.     p.  893. 
Elford  r.  Teed.  1  Manic  &  S.  28.    p.  9.39. 
Eljree  Cotton    Cases,    22    Wall.  (U.  S.)  180. 

p.  910. 
Ek'in  r.  Kenwick,  8fi  111.  4P8.    p.  1209. 
Eli/.abcth  Ac.  It.   Co.    v.  Wcdger  (Ky.),13 

Am.  L.  IWg.  (N.  S.)  45.     p.  1343. 
Elkhart  r.  letter,  m  Ind.  130.    pp.  407,  518. 
Elkhart  Jlutual  Aid  Assn.  r.  Haughlou,  103 

Ind.  28(5.     pp.  991,  2110. 
Elkins  V.  Boston  &c.  K.  Co.,  23  X.  H.  275.    p. 

1283. 
Elkins  r.  Enipiro  Transportation  Co.,  81  Pa. 

St.  315.     p.  1360. 
Elkins  v.  Slate,  1  Tex.  App.  .539.    p.  31. 
Elkison  r.  Deliesseline,  2  Wheel.  Crim.  Cas. 

56.     p.  17S. 
EUedge  v.  Todd,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  43.    pp. 

1964,  1966,  1992. 
Ellerbe,  In  re,  4  McCrary  (U.  S.),  449.  p.  171. 
Eliieolt  r.  rearl,lMcLean  (C.  S.),  200;  s.  c.  10 

I'et.  (  U.  S.)  412.     pp.  484,  487,  489. 
Ellicott  r.  Peterson,  4  Md.  476.    p.  1646. 
Elliot  r.  Aiken,  45  N.  II.  35.     p.  1003. 
Elliott  r.  Abbot,  12  N.  H.  549.    p.  1023. 
Elliott   V.  Hamilton  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  13   Gray 

(Mass.),  139.     pp.  974,  976. 
Elliott  i:  Mills,  10  Ind.  368.     pp.  1983,  1990. 
Elliott  r.  l'ier.sol,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.),328.     )>.  .560. 
Elliott  r.  Kevnolds,  16  Pac.  Kep.  698;  s.  c.  38 

Kan.  274.     j).  2031. 
Elliott    /•.  Russell,  92  Ind.  526.    pp.  50S,  584, 

1711.  2090. 
Elliott  r.  Slate,  73  Ind.  11.    pp.  63,  1981. 
Elliott  r.  Sioeks,  67  Ala.  336.    p.  1740. 
Elliott  V.  Woodward,  18  Ind.  1&3.    p.  2091. 
Elliotson  r.  Feetham,  2  Bing.  X.  C.  134.    pp. 

1383,  1391. 
Ellis  V.  Carey,  30  Ala.  725.    p.  1382. 
Ellis  V.  Central  &c.  K.  Co.,  5  Nev.  255.    p. 

2099. 
Ellis  r.  Iowa  City,  29  Iowa,  230.    p.  126. 
Ellis  V.  .Jameson,  17  Me.  235.    p.  1752. 
Ellis  V.  Lindlev, ;«  Iowa,  461.     ]>.  1468. 
Ellis  r.  McPike,  50  Mo.  574.    )).  1685. 
Ellis  r.  Miller,  9  Ind.  210.    p.  561. 
Ellis  r.  Ohio  L.   Ins.  &  Trust  Co.,  4  Oh.  St. 

628.    p.  1586. 
Ellis  V.  Ponton,  32  Tex.  434.    p.  1913. 
Ellis  r.  Thompson,  3  Mees.  &  W.  445.    pp. 

1122, 1124. 
Ells  V.  Slate,  20  Ga.  438.    p.  1633. 
Kllsasserv.  Hunter,  26  Cal.  279.    p.20S6. 
Ellsworth  V.  Central  K.  Co.,  34  N.J.  L.  93. 

p.  1971. 
Elmakerr.  Buckley,  16  Serg.  &  H.  72.    pp. 

m>,  392. 
Klniore  i:  Grymcs,  1  Pet.  (U.    S.)    469.    p. 

15n5. 
I':i  Paso  V.  Causey,  1  Bradw.  (III.)  .531.  p.  1247. 
Elsey  V.   Metcalf,  1  Dcnio    (X.  Y.),323.    p. 

875. 
Elwell  V.  Chambcrlin,31  N.  Y.  611.    pp.214, 

2-.'l,222,  235,  243,  247. 
Klwell  r.  .Martin.  32  Vt.  217.     p.  895. 
Elwood  V.  Bullock,  6  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  8.)  383. 

p.  J2a3. 
Elwood  v.  Dcifendorf,  5  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  398. 

p.  .561. 
Pllwood  V.  Xew  York  &c.  K.  Co.,  4  Hun  (X. 

Y.  ),  808.     )).  1235. 
Elworthy  v.  Bird,  13  Price,  222.    p.  1584. 


Ely  r.  Ely,  6  Gray   (Mass.),  4,59.    pp.   1030, 

1033. 
Ely  r.  Porter,  58  Mo.  158.    pp.  1609,  1614. 
I<:iv  V.  Tallman,  14  Wis.  28.     !>.  1670. 
Ely  r.  Tesch,  17  Wis.  202.     p.  1769. 
Emanuel  v.  Cock,  6  Dana  (Ky.),  214.    p.  1747. 
Embry  v.  Deyinney,  8  Dana  (Ky.),  203.    p. 

2096. 
Emeric  r.  Aharado,  64  Cal.  531.    pp.   2015, 

2085. 
Emerlch  v.  Sloan,  18  la.  139.    pp.  26,  83. 
Emerick  r.  Harris,  1  Binn.  (Pa.)  416.    p.  4. 
Emerson  v.  Coggswell,  16  .Me.  77.    p.  1749. 
Emersciu  r.  Hogg,  2  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  1.    pp. 

830,  1703, 1739. 
Emerson  r.  Joy,  34  Me.  347.    p.  15S6. 
Emerson  v.  Sturgeon,  18  Mo.  170.    pp.  1598, 

1600. 
Emery  v.  Chcslev,  18  X.  H.  198.    p.  1016. 
Emery  v.  Emery,  .54  la.  106.     ]).  2081. 
Emery  c.  Esles.  31  Me.  15.5.     i>.  1912. 
Emery  v.  Owings,  6  GUI  (Md.),  191.    pp.  822. 

825. 
Emery's  Case,  107  Mass.   172.    pp.  261,  268, 

272, 
Emmons  v.  Bishop,  14  111.  152.    pp.  2066,  2080, 

2102. 
Emiioriat'.  Schmidling,33  Kan.  488.    pp.  1271, 

1277. 
Engard  r.  Frazior,  7  Ind.  1.54.    p.  2126. 
Engle  r.  Campbell.  42  Mich.  .565.    p.  854. 
Eiiiile  r.  Jones,  51  Mo.  316.    p.  14<U. 
Eni,'leman  r.  State,  2  Ind.  92.     pp.  1895,  1897. 
English  r.  I.ane,  I  Porter  (Ala.),  328.     p.  869. 
Ennis  v.  Williams,  30  Ga.  691.     p.  1101. 
Enos  r.  Sun  Ins.  Co.,  67  Cal.  621.    ]).  985. 
Ensii^n  v.  Harney,   15  Xeb.  330;  s.  c.  43  Am. 

Hep.  344.     p.  1927. 
Ensminger  r.  Mclntire,  23  Cal.  593.  pp.  1586, 

161)5. 
Epes'  Case,  5  Gratt.  (Va.)  676.    pp.   74,  1909. 
Epiierson  r.  Stale,  22  Te.\.  App,  69t.    ]i.  1.506. 
Epi)S  c.  State,  19  (ia.  102.     i>p.  SC,  124.  1912. 
Epps  r.    State,    1U2  Ind.  539.    pp.   773,   1568, 

1751,  1780. 
E(iuator  Co.  v.  Hall,  106  U.  S.  86.    p.  2066. 
Erben  r.  I.orrillard,  19  X.  Y.  302.    j).  .586. 
Erfool  r.  Consalus,  47  Mo.  2(i9.     p.  1613. 
Erie  r.  Schwingle,  22  Pa.  St.  384.     p.  1225. 
Erie  Preserying  Co.  v.   Miller,  52  Conn.  444. 

]>]t.  .353,  356. 
Erickson  r.  Smith,  2  Abb.  Ai)p.  Dec.  (X.  Y.) 

65.     p.  518. 
Erisman  r.  Walters,  26  Pa.  St.  467.    p.  919. 
Errissman  r    Krrissnian,  25  111.   136.    p.  253. 
Ernst  V.  Hudson  Kiyer  li.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  9.    p. 

1255. 
Erwin  i-.  Bulla,  29  Ind.  95.    p.  1914. 
Erwin  r.  Ingram,  24  X.  J.  I,.  519.    p.  893. 
Erwin  v.  Slate,  29  Oh.  St.  186.     pp.  115,  116. 
Erwin  v.  Yoorhecs,  26  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  127.     p. 

1109. 
Eschbaek  r.  Hurit,  47  Md.  61.    p.  .5.55. 
Esmond  v.  People,  18    Bradw.  (111.)  114.    p. 

198. 
Espy  V.  Fenton,  5  Ore.  423.     p.  891. 
Essex  r.  McPherson,  6t  HI.  349.     pp.  120, 121. 
Estabrook,  Ex  parte,  2  Lowell  (U.   S.),  547. 

p.  1023. 
Estalian  v.  Card,  15  B.  Mou.   (Ky.)  103.    p. 

1455. 
Estate  of  Ayelinc,  .53  Cal.  2.59.    p.  2a56. 
Estate  of  Young,  39  Mich.  429.    p.  854. 
Eslcji  r.  Burke,  19  Ind.  87.     p.  2058. 
Estep  I'.  Estcp,2:nnd.  114.     p.  891.     s 
Estrp  r.  Slate.  9  T(!.\.  App.  3r>6.     j).  253. 
E>tci)  r.  Waterous.ir.  Ind.  140.     ])|>.  118,120. 
Esle  c.  Wilshire,  44  uh.  SI.  636.     )>.  527. 
Eotes  V.  Boothe,  20  Ark.  523.     p.  853. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixv 


Estes  V.  Fry,  22  Mo.  App.  80.    pp.  1449,  1451. 
Estes  V.  Richardson,   6   Nev.    128.    pp.  "5, 

95. 
Etheridge  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  133.    pp.  49, 

50,  H5,  103. 
Etting  V.  Bank  of  United  States,  1]  Wheat. 

(U.  S.)  59.     pp.  838.830,  1(570,  1747. 
Etting  r.  Commercial  Bank,  7  Kob.  (La.)  459. 

p.  1022. 
Etting  V.  Schuylkill  Bank,  2  Pa.  St.  355.  '  p. 

942. 
Eudaly  v.  Eudaly,  37  Tnd.  440.    p.  2029. 
Evans  v.  Boiling,  5  Ala.  550.    p.  G49. 
Evan.s  v.  Carey,  29  Ala.  99.      p.  964. 
Evans   v.  Christopherson,  24  Minn.  330.    p. 

2093. 
Evans  v.  Commercial  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  6  R.  I. 

47.    p.  1751. 
Evans  v.  Eaton,  7  Wheat.   (U.  S.)  356.    p. 

2114. 
Evans  v.  Edmunds,  11  C.  B.  777.    p.  1419. 
Evans  v.  Foreman.  60  Mo.  449.    pp.  1024, 1031, 

1032. 
Evans  v.  Foss,  49  N.  H.  490.    pp.  1906,  1910. 
Evans  v.  Hardeman,  15  Tex.  480.    pp.  1122, 

1123.  : 
Evans  v.  Harris,  19  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  416.    p.  909. 
Evans  V.  Lohr,  3  111.  511.     pp.  2048,  20.51. 
Evans  v.  Mengel,  1  Pa.  St.  (iS.    p.  1668. 
Evans  V.  Rees,  12  Ad.  &  El.  55.     pp.  164, 179. 
Evans  v.  Rudv,  34  Ark.  387.    p.  13G9. 
Evans  v.  Smith,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  363.    p. 
,        450. 

\    Evans  v.  Slate,  7  Ind.  271.    pp.  1902, 1905. 
\  Evans  v.  State,  67  Ind  68.    p.  2089. 
\  Evans  v.  State,  44  Miss.  762;  s.   c.  Horr.  & 
;     Thomp.  Cas.  Self-Def.  329.    pp.  1542,  1548, 
,     1747. 

Evans  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  513.    p.  85. 
,  Evans  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  225.    p.  1680. 
Evans  V.  Walton,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  615;  s.  c.  36  L. 

J.  (C.  P.)  307.    p.  891. 
Evansville  v.  Decker,  84  Ind.  325;  s.  c.  43  Am. 

Rep.  86.     p.  1265. 
Evansville  v.  Martin,  103  Ind.  206.    p.  2073. 
Evansville  v.  Wilter,  86  Ind.  414.    p.  729. 
-  Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Barbee,  74  Ind.  169. 

p.  1308. 
Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cochran,  10  Ind.  560. 

pp.  679,  690,  691. 
Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Dexter,  24  Ind.  411. 

p.  1224. 
Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiatt,  17  Ind.  102. 

p.  1224. 
Evansville  &c.  E.  Co.  v.  Wolf,  59  Ind.  89.    pp. 

1232,  1642. 
Evarts  v.  State,  48  Ind.  422.    p.  21. 
Everet,  Matter  of,  10  Daly   (N.  Y.),  99.    p. 

601. 
Everett  v.  Lusk,  19  Kan.  195.    p.  1090. 
Everett  v.  United  Slates,  6  Porter  (Ala.),  166. 

p.  1022. 
Everett  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  59  Iowa,  243. 

p.  317. 
Evcrhart  t'.  Hickman,  4  Bibb  (Ky.),  341.    p. 

106. 
Evorliart  v.  Hollingsworth,  19  Ind.  138.    i). 

2137. 
Evcrhart  v.  Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.,  73  Ind. 

292 ;  s.  c.  41  Am.  Rep.  .567.    p.  1312. 


Everson  v.  Seller,  105  Ind.  266.    p.  1709. 
Tverts  r.  Ad;i 
889,  898,  899. 


Everts  r.  Adams,  12  Johns.  (N, 


p.  1709. 
Y.)  352. 


pp. 


Every  v.  Smith,  IS  Ind.  461.    p.  561. 

Ewaldt  V.  Farlow,  62  la.  212.    i)p.  2071,  2080. 

Ewart  V.    Cochrane,  7  Jur.  (N.   S.)  925.    p. 

11,58. 
Ewart  r.  Street,  2  Bailey   (S.  C),  157.    pp. 

1322, 1346. 


Ewen  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  Wis.  613.    p. 

1232. 
Ewing  V.  Bailev,  5  111.  420.    p.  2080. 
Ewing  V.  Burnet,  11  Pet.  (U.  s.)  41.    p.  1047. 
Ewing  I'.  Ewing,  4  Ind.  4(i8.     p.  2107. 
Ewing  V.  Gray,  12  Ind.  64.    p.  1438. 
Ewing  V.  McConnell,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 

188.     pp.  2093, 2096. 
Ewing  r.  Peck,  26  Ala.  413.    p.  962. 
Ewing  I'.  Price,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  521.   pp. 

2095   2098. 
Ewing  V.  Runkle,  20  111.  448.    p.  1668. 
Ewing  V.  Sanford,  21  Ala.  157.    p.  1733. 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Tiddy,  67  X.  C.  169.    p. 

1978. 
Exchange  Xat.  Bank  v.  Allen,  68  Mo.  474.    p. 

2052. 
Express  Co.  v.  Kountz,  8  Wall.  (U.  S.)  342. 

p.  1698. 
Everman  v.  Mt.    Sinai    Cemetery  Asso.,  61 

Mo.  489.     pp.  893,  1368. 
Everman  i\  Second  National  Bank,  13  Mo. 

App.  289;  s.  c.  84  jNIo.  408.     p.  1092. 
Eyser  v.  Weissgerber,  2  la.  463.    pp.  825,  861, 

1681, 1683,  1741. 


F.  V.  D.,  4  Swab.  &  Tr.  86.    pp.  646,  649. 
Fiicey  V.  Hurdom,  3  Barn.  &  Cres.  213.    p. 

1145. 
Fagan  v.  Williamson,  8  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  433. 

p.  1750. 
Fagin  v.  Connoly,  25  Mo.  94.    pp.  834,  835. 
Fahey  v.  Harvard,  62  111.  28.    p.  1249. 
Fahnestock  i\  State,  23  Ind.  231.    pp.  65,  73, 

75,  1569,  1571. 
Faiar  r.  State,  3  How.  (Miss.)  422.    p.  2097. 
Fain  v.  Cornett,  25  Ga.  184.    p.  1753. 
Fain  r.  Goodwin,  35  Ark.  109.    pp.  1967, 1984, 

1985,  1995. 
Fairbanks  v.  Hughson,  f  8  Cal.  314.    p.  294. 
Fairljanks  I'.  Kerr,  70  Pa.  St.  86.    p.  1221, 
Fairlianks  v.   Woodhouse,  6   Cal.  433.    pp. 

810,  1.5U7. 
Faircbild  v.  Bascoinb,  35  Vt.  398.     pp.  502, 

503,  .506. 
Faircbild  v.  Bell,  2  Brev.  (S.  C.)  129;  s.  c.  27 

Am.  Dec.  702.    pp.  896,  900. 
Faircbild   v.  California  Stage  Co.,  13  Cal. 

599.     pp.  1236,  1237. 
Faircbild  r.  Case,  24  Wend.  (X.   Y.)  381.     p. 

554. 
Faircbild  r.  Xortheast  Mut.  Life  Ass.,  51  Vt. 

613.    p.  991. 
Faircbild  v.  Snvder,  43  la.  23.    p.  1930. 
Fairfax  v.  New"  York  &c     R.  Co.,  67  X.  Y. 

11;    s.  0.  5  Jones  &  Sp.  516.    pp.   1321,1345. 
Fairfax  v.  Xew  York  &c.    R.  Co.,  73  X.  Y. 

167.     lip.  1321,  134.5. 
Fairman  v.  Oakford,  5  Hurl.  &  N.    633.    p. 

1 137. 
Faitli  V.  Atlanta  (Ga.),  4  South  East.  Rep.  3. 

p.  .55. 
Faldo  r.  GrilHn,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  147.    pp.  1096, 

1097. 
Fallon  r.  Central  Park  R.  Co.,  64  X.  Y.  13. 

p.  1232. 
Falls   Wire  Man.  Co.  r.  Broderick,  12  Mo. 

App.  378.     pp.  825,  831. 
Falmouth  v.  Kol)erts,  9  Mees.  &  W.  469;  s.  c. 

1  Dowl.  (N.  S.)  633.     pp.   112,  113. 
Famulener  v.  Anderson,  15  Oh.  St.  473.    p. 

50. 
Fansbaw  v.  Tracv,  4  Biss.  (U.  S.)  490.    p.  136. 
Fareira  v.  Gal)ell,  89  Pa.  St.  89.    p.  882. 
Farwcll  r.  Warren,  51  111.  468.    p.  1495. 
Farisli  v.  Reigle,  11  Graft.  (Va.)697.    pp.  1236, 

1237. 


5a 


Ixvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Farlev  r.  Bndd,  14  la.  -2?^.    p.  1748. 
Fark'v  r.  Kller,  40  Ind.  3UK    p.  2039. 
FarUV  r.  Pottes,  5  Mo.  App.  2C'2.    p.  855. 
Farlfv  r.  Uauck,  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  554.    pp. 

14(13,  ITtJl. 
Fanner  c.  Darliug,  4  Burr.  1971.    pp.  IICI, 

li;i7. 
Farmer  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  424.    p.  1671. 
Farmers'  Bauk  v.  Bavliss,  41  Mo.  275.    p. 

2(164. 
Farmer's  Bank  r.  Butchers'  Bank,  16  X.  Y. 

125  -.s.c.i  Duer  (N.  Y.),  219;  14  N.  Y.  633;  28 

X.  Y.  i.'S.     p.  1023. 
Farmers'   Bank  r.  Cowan,  3  Abb.  App.  Dec. 

CN.  Y.)  88.     p.  582. 
Farmer's  Bank  v.  Lonergan,  21  Mo.  46.    p. 

607. 
Farmer's  Bank  v.  Smith,  19  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 

115.     ]).  101. 
Farmer's  Bank  v.    Sprigg,    11    Md.  389.    p. 

324. 
Farmer's  Bank  t\  Trov  City  Bank,  1  Dougl. 

(Mich.)  457.    pp.  1022,1021 
Farmers   &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  16  Wend. 

(N.  Y.)  481.    p.  974. 
Farmers'  &c.  Bank  v.  Boraef,  1  Kawle  (Pa.), 

152.     p.  642. 
Farmers    &c.    Bank    v.   Champlaln    Co.,  23 

Vt.  186.     p.  &14. 
Farmers'   &c.  Bank  v.  Whlnfield,  24  AVend. 

(X.  Y.)  420.     pp.  .567,  1936,  1942,  1944. 
Farmers'   &c.  Bank  r.  Young,  36  Iowa,  44. 

pp.  423,  516. 
Farmers'  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bair,  87  Pa. 

St.  124.     pp.  309,  321,  323,  718. 
Farnham  v.  Camden  &c.  K.  Co.,  55  Pa.  St.  53. 

pp.  1318,  1322,  1344,  1345,  1.347,  1356,  1359. 
Farnsworth  v.  Coots,  46  Mich.  177.  p.  2027. 
Farnum  v.  Farnum,  13    Gray    (Mass.),  508. 

p.  416. 
Farquliar  v.  Dallas,  20  Tex.  200.    p.  1698. 
Farquhar  v.  Touey,  5  Ilumuh.  (Tenn.)  502. 

p.  1647. 
Farcmharson    v.  Johnson,  35  Ark.    536.    p. 

2128. 
Farr  e-.   Newman,  4  T.  R.  621.    p.  200". 
Farrah  r.  Keat,  6  Dowl.  470.    p.  169. 
Farrar  v.  Delllinne,  1  Car.  &  K.  580.    p.  1098. 
Farrar  v.  (iilmau,  19  Me.  440.     p.  1023. 
Farrar  r.  lleinrich,  86  Mo.  521.    p.  10.55. 
Farrar  v.  State,  2  oh.  St.  64.    pp.  1925,  1990. 
Farrar  v.  United  States,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  459. 

p.  10.59. 
Farrell  r.  Brennan,  32  Mo.  328.    p.  214. 
Farrell  r.  Ilennesy,  21  Wis.  (532.    p.  1987. 
Farrington  v.  Caswell,  15  Jolins.  (X.  Y.)  430. 

p.  1412. 
Farrington's  Case,  Sir  T.  Jones  222.    p.  38. 
Farrisv.  Cass  Ave.  &c.  R.  Co.,8  Mo.  App.  588; 

s.  c.  80  Mo.  :V25.     p.  1487. 
Farwell  v.  Tillson,  76  Me.  227.    p.  860. 
Fash  V.   Byrnes,  14  Abb.  Pr.  (X*.  Y.)  12.    p. 

1!)20. 
Fasslnow  v.  State,  89  Ind.  235.    p.  18.52. 
Fathcree  v.  Lawrence,  33  Miss.  .585.    p.  829. 
Faulk  i:  State,  .52  Ala.  41(i.     p.  18.50. 
Faulkner   r.  South   PacilJc  Railroad,  61  Mo. 

311.     p.  1123. 
Faulkner  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  115.    p.  1855. 
Favors  v.  Stale,  20  Tex.  App.  156.    p.  1.564. 
Fawcett  v.  Cash.  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  904.     p.  1 136. 
Fawcett,  In  re,  9  Phila.  (Pa.)  217.    p.  ll."». 
Fay  V.  Lovejov,  20  Wis.  407.     p.  886. 
Fav  I'.  Whitman,  loo  Mass.  76.    p.  1381. 
Felix  V.  Slate,  18  Ala.  720.     ii.  1799. 
Felkner  v.  Scarlet,  29  Ind.  154.     )>.  1491. 
Fellenzcr  v.  Van  Valzah,  05  Ind.  128.    p.  2113. 
Fellows  V.  Prentiss,  3  Denio  (X.  Y.),  612.    p. 

852. 


Fellows  t'.  Wise,  55  Mo.  413.    p.  1669. 
Fellows'  Case,  5  Me.  333.    pp.  19,  68,  69, 119, 

1933. 
•Feney  v.  Mazclin,  87  Ind.  226.    p.  2058. 
Fenn  r.  Blanchard,  2  Y'eales  (Pa.),  543.    pp. 

2004,  2008. 
Fenner  v.  Buffalo  &c.  R.  Co.,  44  X.  Y.  505.    p. 

S.374. 
Kent  r.  Toledo  &e.  R.  Co.,  IThomp.  Xeg.  136; 

s.  e,  ,59  111.  349.     j..  1(;22. 
Fenlon  v.  Hiissoll,  6  Mo.  143.    p.  2060. 
Fenwick  i:  Boll,  1  Car.  &  K.  312.     p.  502. 
Fenwick  v.  Parker,  3  Code  Rep.  2.54.    p.  100. 
Fenwick  r.  Reed,  1  Meriv.  114.    p.  279. 
Fergason  r.  (;ill)ert,  16  Oh.  St.  88.     p.  1447. 
Ferguson  v.  Clitford,  37  N.  If.  8(!.    p.  819. 
Ferguson  r.  Davis  Countv,  57  Iowa,  609.    pp. 

1272,  1273,  1280. 
Ferguson  v.  Khrenberg,  39  Ark.  420.    p.  2088. 
Ferguson    r.  Ferguson,  27  Tex.  339.    p.  829. 
Ferguson  v.  Fox,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  83.    p.  1682. 
Ferguson  v.  Ilirsch,  64  Ind.  337.    p.  319. 
Ferguson    r.    Miles,  3  Gilm.    (111.)    358.    p. 

611. 
Ferguson    r.    Rutherford,  7  Xev.  385.    pp. 

376,  385,  387,  392. 
Ferguson  r.  State,  49  Ind.  33.    p.  765. 
Feriter  v.  State,  33  Ind.  283.    pp.  561, 1726. 
Fernandez?:.  Sacramento  &c.  R.  Co.,52Cal. 

45;   4  Cent.  L.  J.  82.     pp.   1208,    1209,   1212, 

1219,  1221,  1227,  1640. 
Fernandez,  In   re,  6  Hurl.  &  X.  717  ;s.  c.  10 

C.   B.  (N.  S.)   3;  30  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  321.     p.  13(5. 
Fero  V.    Uusco,  4  X.  Y.  162.    pp.  1463,  1466, 

1470. 
Ferrell  v.    Adlcr,   2  Swan  (Tenn.),  77.    p. 

2065. 
Ferren    v.    Old    Colony   R.    Co.   (Mass.),  6 

Northeast.  Hep.  (iOS.    p.  1240. 
Ferridav  v.  Selser,  4  How.  (Miss.)  506.    pp. 

.59,  1 15" 
Ferrill  v.  Com.,  1  Duv.  (Ky.)  154.    p.  1566. 
Ferris  v.  Cass  Ave.  R.  C'o.,  80  -Mo.  325;  s.  c. 

S  Mo.  App.  588.     pp.  1257,  1260. 
Ferris  v.  Coover,  10  Cal.  590.     p.  1078. 
Ferris  v.  McClure,  40  111.  99.    p.  210.5. 
Ferris  I'.  People,  35  N.  Y.  125;  s.  c.  31  How. 

Pr.  (N.  Y.)    140;  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  17;  1  Abb. 

Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y'.)  193.    pp.  15,  29,  :V2. 
Person  r.  Wilcox,    19   Minn.  449.    pp.    200, 

1741. 
Fcssenden    v.  Sager,  53  Me.  531.    pp.    1924, 

1975,  2062. 
Festerman  v.   Parker,  10    Ired.  L.  474.    pp. 

851,  852. 
Festner  v.  Omaha  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  Neb.  280. 

pp.  728,  747,  748,  756. 
Fetters   r.   Muncie    Xat.  Bank,  34  Ind.  261. 

p.  219. 
Pick  V.  Cliicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  AVis.  439.    p. 

2036. 
Fick  r.  Mulholland,  48  Wis.  413.    p.  2034. 
Fiedler  r.  Doriii,  ,50  N.  Y.  437.    p.  344. 
Field  c.  Beaumont,  1  Swanst.  209.    p.  275. 
Field   V.    Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  71  111.  4,58.     p. 

1364. 
Field  V.  Davis,  27  Kan.  400.    p.  376. 
Field    V.    Dealley,  10  B.   Mon.  4.    pp.   1754, 

17.-..5. 
Field  r.  Field,  77 X.  Y.  294.    p.  1627. 
Field  V.  Ins.  (.'o.,  3  Md.  245.     p.  993. 
Fi.'ld  r.  Ireland,  21  Ala.  240.     j).  1016. 
Field  r.  TliDmiison,  119  M.-is.^.  151.    p.  .365. 
Field    V.  Zamansky,  9  Bradw.  (111.)  479.    pp. 

(;oM,  610. 
Fiel.l,  K\  i)arte,  1  Cal.  187.    p.  151. 
Fields    r.  (Jlbbs,  1    Pet.  C.  0.  (U.  S.)  155.     p. 

10.50. 
Fields  V.  Ilunter,  8  Mo.  128.    p.  560. 


•    TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixvii 


Fields  V.  State,  52  Ala.  348.    p.  19. 

Fields  V.  State,  6  Cold.  (Tenn.)  5-2.    p.  1G97. 

Fields  V.  Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Mo.  203.    p. 

1647. 
Field's  Estate,  2  Rawle  (Pa.),  351.    p.  966. 
Fife  r.  Com.,  29  Pa.  St.  429.     p.  1839. 
Filori'.New  York&c.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  V.  42;  s.  c. 

59  X.  Y.  356.     pp.  507,  516, 1229,  1295. 
Filmore  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2  Wyo.  94.    p. 

576. 
Finch  V.  Bergins,  89  Ind.  360.    pp.  1642, 1646, 

1783,  1785, 1803. 
Finch  V.  Green,  16  Minn.  355.    pp.  2038,  2094. 
Finch  V.  Kikeman,  10  Ben.  (U.  S.)  301.    pp. 

593,  594. 
Finch  V.  State,  81  Ala.  41.    p.  811. 
Findlevr.  Pruitt,  9Port.  (Ala.)  195.    p.  566. 
Fine  r."  Ropers,  15  Mo.  31.i.    p.  2052. 
Fine  v.  St.  Louis  Public  Schools,  30  Mo.  166. 

p.  55. 
Fine  v.  St.  Louis  Public  Schools,  39  Mo.  59. 

pp.  1642, 1688. 
Fink  V.  Bruihl,  47  Mo.  173.    p.  1.588. 
Fink  V.  Hall, 8  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  437.    pp.  1902, 

1904. 
Finlay  v.  Stewart,  56  Pa.  St.  183.    p.  .309. 
Finley  v.  Hayden,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.   (Ky.)  330. 

pp.  "118, 123". 
Finley  v.  "Woodruff,  8  Ark.  328.    p.  219. 
)    Finley  v.  Nancy  Tyler,  3  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
\       402.    p.  2095. 

\  Finn  v.  State,  5  Ind.  400.    p.  129. 
\  Finney  v.  Allen,  7  Mo.  416.    p.  17.50. 
iFinney  r.    New    Jersey    Steamboat  Co.,  12 
\    Abb.  Pr.  (N.  s.)  (N.  Y.)  1.    p.  516. 
!Finney  v.  State  ,  9  Mo.  634.    p.  2055. 
g^inucaner.  Small,  1  Esp.  315.    p.  1335. 
F|irst  Baptist  Church  v.  Schenectady  &c.  R. 

Co.,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y'.)  79.     p.  1399. 
First   IJaptist  Church  v.  Utica  &c.  R.  Co.,  6 

IJarb.  (N.  Y.)  313.     p.  1399. 
First  Congregational  Church  v.  Muscatine, 

2  Iowa,  69.    p.  150. 
First  Xat.  Bank  v.  Colton,  61    Ind.  153.    p. 

20.58. 
First  Xat.  Bankt'.  Currie,44  Mo.  91.    p.  1685. 
First  Xational  Bank   v.  Dana,  79  X.   Y'.  108. 

p.  839. 
First   Xational  Bank  r.  Decatur,  -50  111.321. 

p.  608. 
First  Xational  Bank  v.  Fricke,  75  Mo.   178. 

pp.  1032, 1033. 
First  Xat.  Bank  v.  Graham,  85  Pa.  St.  91.    p. 

1322. 
First  National  Bank  v.  Murdough,  40  la.  26. 

pp.  2075,  2100. 
Firi^t   Nat.    Itank  v.  Peck,  8  Kan.  600.    pp. 

2024,  2032,  2038. 
Fischer  r.  .Max,  49  Mo.  404.    pp.  1609, 1616. 
Fish  ('.  Cantrell,  2  Heisk.   (Tenn.)  578.    pp. 

1983,  1985,  1992. 
Fish  V.  Chester,  8  Gray  (Mass.),  506.    p.  344. 
Fish  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.Co.,  38  X.  W.  Rep.  132. 

p.  2043. 
Fish  V.  Dodge, 4  Denio  (X.  Y.),  311.    pp.  512, 

1383 
Fish  V.  Smith,  12  Ind.  563.    p.  1915. 
Fish  ('.  Travers,  3  Carr.  &  P.  578.    p.  221. 
Fishel  V.  Lockard,  32  Ga.  632.    p.  1771. 
Fisher  r.  Clement,  10  Barn.  &  Cres .  472.    pp. 

1456,  1457. 
Fisher  v.  Ewing,  30  Ind.  130.    p.  2107. 
Fisher  r.  Filbert,  6  Pa.  St.  61.    pp.  1698, 16M. 
Fislier  v.  Forrester,  33  Pa.  St.  501.    p.  1746. 
Fisher  r.  Hamilton,  49  Ind.  341.    p.  1479. 
Fisher  v.  Larick,  7  Serg.  &  R.  991.    p.  1698. 
Fisher  I'.  Lewis,  69  Mo.  629.    p.  1445. 
Fisher   v.   People,  23  111.  283.    pp.  1520. 1524, 

2043. 


Fisher  r.  Philadelphia,  4  Brcwst.    (Pa.)  395. 

p.  49. 
Fisher  v.  Samuda,  1  Camp.  190.    p.  628. 
Fisher  c.  State,  77  Ind.  42.    p.  1694. 
Fisher  i:  Steyens.  Hi  111.  .397.    pp.  1019,  1024. 
Fisk  V.  Henarie,  14  Ore.  29;  s.  c.  13  Pac.  Rep. 

760.    p.  2063. 
Fitch  V.  Peckam,  16  Vt.  150.    pp.  888,  894. 
Fitch  r.  Railroad  Co..  45  Mo.  322.    p.  1311. 
Fitch  r.  Woodruff  Iron  Works,  29  Conn.  82. 

p.  1058. 
Fitter  v.  Probasco,  2  Browne  (Pa.),  137.    pp. 

140, 160. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Barker,  85  Mo.  13.    p.  200. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Beebe,  7  Ark.  305;  s.  c.  46  Am. 

Dec.  285.    p.  891. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Goff,  99  Ind.  28.    pp.  467, 1698, 

1918. 
Fitzgerald    v.    Jerolaman,   10   Ind.  338.    p. 

1709. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Hayward,  50  Mo.  516.    p.  1689. 
Fitzgerald  v.  McCarty,  55  la.  702.    p.  1666. 
Fitzgerald  I'.  People.  1  Colo.  56.    p.  124. 
Fitzgerald  v.  State,  12  Ga.  213.    p.  1633. 
Fitzgerald  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  294.    p.  1564. 
Fitzharris'  Case,  8  How.  St.  Tr.  436.    p.  44. 
Fitzpatrick  i-.   Harris,  16  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)561. 

pp.  119,  120. 
Fitzpatrick  r.  Papa,  89  Ind.  17.    pp.  563,  2043. 
Flack  V.  Xeill,  22  Tex.  253.    p.  1419. 
Flagg  r.  Worcester,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  69.    pp. 

,57,  1266. 
Flanders  v.  Colby,  28  X.  H.  34.    pp.  1645, 1959. 
Flanders  v.  Cottrell,  36  Wis.  564.    p.  1HH4. 
Flanders  i'.  Dayis,  19  X.  H.  139.    ]i.  1957. 
Flanegan    v.  State,  64  Ga.  53.  pp.  1913,  1924, 
Flannagan   v.  Wilmington,  4  Houst.   (Del.) 

548.    p.  1607. 
Flatter  v.  McDermitt,  25  Ind.  326.    p.  1974. 
Fleckenstein  v.   Dry    Dock    &c.   Co.,  11  X. 

East.  Hep.  950.    p."  1626. 
Fleckner  r.   U.   S.   Bank,  8  Wlieat.     (U.S.) 

338.     pp.  1022.  1023. 
Fleeson  v.  Sayage  S.  M.  Co.,  3  Xev.  15.    pp. 

56,  116,2099. 
Fleet  v.  Hoelenkenip,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  219. 

p.  310. 
Fleetwood  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  1.    p.  1.550. 
Fleetwood  v.  Dorsey  Machine   Co.,  95  Ind. 

491.    iJ.  2028. 
Fleischfresser  v.   Schmidt,  41  Wis.  223.    p. 

1090. 
Fleming  r.  Hayne,  1  Stark.  370.    p.  966. 
Fleming  v.  Liillman,  11  Mo.  App.  104.     p.  966. 
Fleming  v.  State.  11  Ind.  234.    p.  59. 
Flenimingr.  xMulligan,  2  McCord  (S.  C),  17.3. 

p.  886. 
Flamming  v.  Western  Pacific  R.  Co.,  49  CaL 

2.53.     pp.  1207,  1223,  1226. 
Flemmiugtont?.  Smithers,  2  Car.  &  P.  292.    p. 

891. 
Fletcher  v.    Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  484. 

pp.  1228,  1230,  1604. 
Fletcher  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  R.,  1  Allen 

(Mass.),  9.    p.  416. 
Fletcher  v.  Crosbie,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  417.    p. 

380. 
Fleshcr  v.  Hale,  22  W.  Va.  45.    pp.  2062,  2093. 
Fletcher  v.  luirram,  46  Wis.  191.    i).  910. 
Fletcher    r.   Stale,  6  Humph.   (Toun.)  249. 

pp.  86,  104,  1992. 
Fletcher  v.   State.  49  Ind.  124;  s.   c.  19  Am. 

Rep.  673.     PI).  372,  .524,  .525,  526,  .532,  761. 
Flinn   v.   Hcadlam,  9  Barn.  &  Cres.  693.    p. 

974. 
Flinn  v.  Pliila.  &c.   R.   Co.,  I  Houst.  (Del.) 

469.    p.  1298. 
Flint  r.   Commonwealth,    81    Ky.    186.    pp. 

729,  747,  755. 


Ixviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES.' 


Flint  r.  Hill,  11  East,  181.    p.  GDS. 
Flint  r.  Knssi'll,  5  Dill.  (I'.  S.)  l.M.    p.  1394. 
Flood  r.  Mitcliell,  U8  .\.  Y.  bol.     \^.  36.5. 
Flori  r.  St.  Louis,  3  Mo.  Aj.p.  231.    i>.  1600. 
Flournoy  v.  Andrews,  5  Mo.  513.    pp.   1673, 

1674. 
Flower  r.  Allen.  .5  Cow.  6.54.    p.  899. 
Flower  V.  Downs,  6  La.  Ann.  539.    p.  358. 
Flowers  r.  Helm,  29  Mo.  .{24.    p.  17.51. 
Flower  v.  Livingston,  12  Mart.  (La.)  681.    p. 

20. 
Flovd  r.  Bovard,  6  AValts  &  S.  (Pa.)  75.    pp. 

3t>6,  392. 
Flovd  r.  State,  7  Tex.  215.    pp.  150,  268,  284. 
Flovd  r.  Taylor,  12  Ired.  L.   (N.  C.)  47.    p. 

872. 
Flover  r.  Edwards,  Cowp.  112.    p.  886. 
Flvnlr.  IJodenhamer,  80  N.  C.  205.    pp.  294, 

1780. 
Fog^ertr.  Blackweller,  4  Ired.  L.  (N.    C.) 

238.    p.  926. 
Folev  r.  Mason,  6  Md.  37.    p.  821. 
Folger  V.  Chase,  18  Pick.  (Mas.s.)  63.    p.  1022. 
Fotkes  v.  Cliadd,  3  Doug.  157.    p.  .520. 
FoUandsbee  v.  Johnson,  28  Minn.   311.    p. 

315. 
Folsom  ?•.  A])ple  Elver  Log  Driving  Co.,  41 

Wis.  602.     pp.  ,356,  .365. 
Folsom  r.  Apple  River  Log  Driving  Co.,  47 

AVis.  602.     ]).  3.53. 
Folsom  r.  IJrawu,  25  N.  H.  114.    pp.  397, 1982, 

1983, 1985. 
Folsom  r.  Carii,  6  Minn.  420.    p.  891. 
Folsom  r.  Manchester,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  334. 

p.  1982. 
Folsom  V.  Plumer,  43  X.  H.  469.    pp.  851,  852. 
Fonville  r.  Slate,  17  Tex.  Ai)p.  369.    p.  1744. 
Foot  V.  ^Morgan,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  654.    p.  29. 
Footf.  Sabin,  19  Johns.  (N. Y.)  155.    pp.  1585, 

1586. 
Foot  V.  Wiswall,  14  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  .304,    p. 

1207. 
Foote  r.  LaA^Tence,  1  Stew.   (Ala.)  483.    p.  6. 
Foote  r.  Silsby,  1  Blatch.   (U.   S.)  445.    pp. 

1.585,1751. 
Forljes  r.  Howard,  4  R.  I.  364.    pp.  1964, 1967. 
Forbes  V.  Ins.  Co.,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  470.-    p. 

977. 
Forljes  r.  Waller,  25  N.  Y'.  430.    pp.  .344,  345. 
Forbes  r.  AVillard,  37  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y'.)  193. 

p.  151. 
Forbing  v.  Weber,  99  Ind.  588.    pp.  561,  564, 

575. 
Ford  V.  Ford,  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  92.    p.  456. 
Ford  V.  Ford,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  89.    pp.  381, 

1670. 
Ford  v.  Ilennessv,  70  Mo.  580.    p.  1410. 
Ford  V.  Holmes,"  61  Ga.  419.    pp.  1929,  2067, 

2099. 
Ford  V.  Lacev,  30  L.  J.  (Exch.)  351.    p.  1698. 
Ford  v.  McClung,  5  W.  \n.  158.    p.  954. 
Ford  r.  Xiles,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  300.    p.  307. 
Ford  V.  Stale,  71  Ala.  385.    p.  348. 
Ford  r.  Slate,  12  Md.  514.    p.  1983. 
Ford  V.  I'matilla  Countv  (Ore.),  16  Pac.  Rep. 

33.     pp.  .5.5,  112. 
Ford  r.  Whitinarsh,  Hurl.  &  W.  63.    p.  1100. 
Ford  V.  Williams,  13  N.  Y.  .577.    p.  194. 
Fore  V.  Williams,  35  Miss.  533.    p.  1748. 
Forester  v.  (iuard,  1  HI.  44.    p.  1984. 
Foreman  v.  Com.   (Ky.),6  S.  AV.  Rep.  579. 

)>]).  22,  23. 
Forrest  v.  Forrest,  6  Ducr  (X.  Y'.),  102.    pp. 

.571,  ((.39. 
Forrest  r.   ILanson,  1   ('ranch   C.  C.   (L'.  S.) 

63.    p.  1720. 
Forrest  v.   Kissam,  7  Hill   (X.  Y'.),  465.    i>. 

669. 
Forrest  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  232.    p.  1744. 


Forshee  r.  Abrams,  2  Iowa,  571.    pp.  1468, 

1968,  1994. 
Forster  v.  Jurdismi,  11  Last,  104.    p.  948. 
Forsvth  V.  Col  bran,  61  (ia.  278.     p.  739. 
Forsvth  V.  Dooliltle,  110  V.  S.  73;  s.  c.  7  Sup. 

Ct.'Rep.  408.     pp.  511,  17.S2. 
Forsvthe  v.  Ganson,  5  Wend.  (X.  Y'.)  558.    p. 

.582. 
Forsvth  V.  ^Mathews,  14  Pa.  St.  100.    pp.  1438, 

1446,  1448,  1450. 
Forsyth  v.  Van  AVinkle,  9  Fed.  Rep.  247.    p. 

2059. 
Fors  vtho  V.  State,  6  Oh.  19.    p.  13. 
Fort'r.  Collius,  21  Wend.   (X.  Y'.)  109.    p, 

1.585. 
Fort  r.  Whipple,  11  Hun  (X.  Y'.),  586.    p.  1210. 
Fort  Scott   Coal  &c.  Co.  r.  Sweenev,  15  Kan. 

244.     p.  1603. 
Fort  Wavne  r.   De  Witt,  47    Ind.  391.     pp. 

1247,  1-248,  1249. 
Fort   Wavne  iVc.  R.  Co.  r.  Reverie,  110  In(L 

100.     p.  2038. 
Fort  Wortli  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hogsett.  67  Tex. 

685.    p.  1757. 
Fortenl)erry  r.  State,  55  Miss.  403.    pp.  65, 

83. 
Forward  v.  Pitfard,  1  T.  R.27.    pp.  1344, 1346. 
Foshav    V.  Ferguson,  2  Denlo    (N.  Y'.),  617. 

pp.  1163,  1197,  1199 
Foss  V.  Foss,  58  X.  H.  283.    p.  1014. 
Foster  V.  Rerg,  104  Pa.  St.  324.    p.  839. 
Foster  r.  Rerkev,  8  Minn.  351.    p.  1438. 
Foster  v.  Brooks.  6  Ga.  287.    p.  1920. 
Foster  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  84  111.  164.    p. 

17.50. 
Fosters.  Estate  of  Caldwell,  18  Vt.  176.    p. 

927. 
Foster  v.  Foster,  77  AIo.  227.    p.  1626. 
Foster  v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89.    p.   276. 
Foster  r.  Hawden,  2  Lev.  205.    p.  1964. 
Foster  r.  Kirbv,  31  Mo.  496.     p.  4. 
Foster  r.  McDivit,  5  Watts  &  S.  .3.59.     p.  1065. 
Foster  V.  McDonald,  12  Ileisk.  (Tenn.)   619. 

p.  168. 
Foster  v.   McO'Blenis,  18  Mo.  88.    pp.  1943, 

1944,  1954.  19.55,  19.56,  1957,  19.58. 
Foster  r.  Xewbrough,  66  Barb.  (X.  Y'.)  645. 

p.  311. 
Foster  v.  People,  18  Mich.  266.    pp.  283,  404. 
Foster?'.  People,  50  N.    Y.  .598.    p.  1703. 
Foster  r.  Pierce,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  437.    pp. 

283,  527. 
Foster  r.  Pointer,  9  Car.  &  P.  718.    p.  613. 
P'oster  V.  Speed,  32  La.  .\nn.  34.    p.  30. 
Foster  r.  State,  1  Tex.  Apji.  363.    p.  1744. 
Foster  r   State,  8  Tex.  App.  249.    pp.  82,  727. 
Foster  t'  Steele,  5  Scott,  28.    p.  1613. 
Foster  r.  Wallace,  2  Mo.  231.    p.  1441. 
Foster  r.  Woodlln,  11  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  339. 

pp.  1436,  1441. 
Foster's   Case,  13  Abb.    Pr.  (N.   8.)    (X.   Y.) 

372  n.     |>.  129. 
Foster's  Will,  In  re,  U  Mich.  21.    p.  1940. 
Fountain    c.  West,  23  Iowa,  10.    pp.   91,92, 

214,  1468. 
Fourth    National  Bank  i\   Hencheu,  52  Mo. 

207.     )«.  808. 
Fourth  Nat.  Bank  c.  OIncy,  29  X.   W.   Rep. 

513.     p.  1(!22. 
Foust  r.  Com.,  33  Pa.  St.  338.    p.  30. 
P^outs  r.  State,  7  (Jbio  St.  471.    pp.  69,  75. 
Fouty  r.  Morrison,  73  Ind.  3:13.     p.  2112. 
Fowkes  V.  Manchester,  etc.  Ass.  Soc,  3  Best 

.V  S.  <)]7  ;  8.  c  2  J{ig.  Ins.  Cas.  631.    p.  1417. 
FowIe  i:  Alexandria,  11  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  322. 

p.  1622. 
FowIe  c.  Blgelow,  10  Mass.  .379.    pp.  825,  851. 
Fowlc  V.  Stevenson,  1   Johns.  Cas.   110.    p. 

1131. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixix 


Fowler  v.  Brantley,  U  Pet.  (U.  S.)  31S.    p.  950. 
Fowler  v.  Colton,  Burnett  (Wis.),  175;  s.  c.  1 

Finney  (Wis.),  331.    pp-  1%4.  '2095. 
Fowler  v.  Coster,  Mood.  &  M.  241.    p.  239. 
Fowler  v.  Ins.  Co.,  7  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  270.    p. 

2065. 
Fowler  v.  3Iiddlesex,  6  Allen   (Mass.),  92. 

p.  110. 
Fowler  v.  Pierce,  2  Cal.  165.    p.  819. 
Fowler  v.  Smith,  2  Cal.  39.    p.  1670. 
Fowler  v.  State,  85  Ind.  538.    pp.  1515, 1520, 

1525. 
Fowler  t'.  State,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  573.    p.  43. 
Fox  r.  Com.,  1  S.  W.  Kep.  396.    p.  449. 
Fowler  r.  Young,  19  Kan.  150.    pp.  2050,  2073. 
.Fox  V.  Drake,  «  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  191.    p.  899. 
Fox  v.  Glastenburj-,  29  Conn.  204.    pp.  1224, 

1227,  12-28. 
Fox  V.  Hazelton,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  275.    pp. 

112,  1976,  2062. 
Fox  V.  Meacham,  6  Neb.  530.    p.  2071. 
Fox  I'.  Ohio,  5  How.  (U.  S.)  410,  4:i4.    p.  1578. 
Fox  V.  Reed,  3  Grant  (Pa.),  81.    p.  lOfiO. 
Fox  v.  Smith,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  23.    p.  1996. 
Fox  r.  Vanderbeck,  5  Cow.   (X.  Y.)  515.    p. 

1617. 
Fox  v.  Webster,  46  Mo.  181.    p.  1416. 
Fox  r.  Wunderlich,  64  la.  187.    p.  1983. 
Fox  V.  Young,  22  Mo.  App.  386.     p.  2087. 
Fov  r.  Harder,  3  Keble,  805 .     p.  1964. 
Fraedricli  1-.  Fliette,  64  Wis.  184;  s.  c.  25  X. 

W.  Rep.  28.    p.  674. 
Fralich  «.  People,  65  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  48.    pp. 

524,  529. 
Fralick  v.  Presley,  29  Ala.  4.57.    p.  383. 
Frame'v.  Badger,  79  111.  441.    pp.  1637,  1643. 
France  v.  Lucy,  Ry.  &  M.  341.    p.  612. 
Francia  v.  De  Mattos,  Barnes'   Xotes,  223. 

p.  179. 
Francis  I'.  Dubuque  &c.   R.  Co.,  25  la.  60.    p. 

1374. 
Francis  v.  Somerville  Mat.  Ins.  Co.,  25  X.  J. 

L.  78.    p.  979. 
Francklin's    Case,  19  How.  St.  Tr.  625.    pp. 

1505,  1512,  1521. 
Frank  v.  Grimes,  105  Ind.  347.    p.  2030. 
Frank  i-.  Kessler,  30  Ind.  8.    p.  2089. 
Frank  r.  Manny,  2  Daly  (X.  Y.),92.    p.  612. 
Frank  r.  State,  39  Miss.  705.     p.  121. 
Frankenberg  v.  First  Xat.  Bank,  33  Mich.  46. 

p.  2038. 
Frankford  &c.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Philadelphia 

&c.  R.  Co.,  54  Pa.  St.  345.    p.  1210. 
Franklin «;.  Fisk,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  211.    p. 

126R. 
Franklin  v.  McCorkle,  11  Lea  (Tenn.),  190. 

p.  2. 
Franklin  v.  Xational  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mo.  491.    p. 

325. 
Franklin  v.  State,  29  Ala.  14.    p.  1906. 
Franklin  v.  State,  12  Md.  236.    p.  721. 
Franklin  v.   State,  2  Tex.  App.  8.    pp.  119, 

120. 
Franklin  Bank  v.  Steward,  37  Me.  519.    p. 

1022. 
Franklin  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Updegraff,  43  Pa. 

St.  350.    pp.  98:5,  984,  986,  987. 
Franklin  Ins.  Co.  v.  Coates,  14  Md.  285.    p. 

974. 
Franklin    Ins.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Ice  Co.,    36 

Md.  102.    ]).980. 
Franklin  Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Hazzard,  41  Ind. 

116 ;  s.  c.  1:5  .\.m.  Rep.  313.    v.  991. 
Franklin     Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Seflon,  53   Ind. 

380.    p.  991. 
Franz  r.  Ililterbrand,  45  Mo.  121.    p.  1494. 
Fratt  r.  Clark.  12  Cal.  89.    j).  890. 
Frav  r.  Blackburn,  H  Best  &  S.  576.    p.  160. 
Fray  t\  Voules,  1  El.  &  El.  839.    p.  192. 


Frazer  r.  Boss,  66  Ind.  1.    pp.  2042,  2044. 
Frazer  v.  Howe,  106  III.  563.    p.  1213. 
Frazier  v.   Jennison,  42  Mich.  206.    pp.  42, 

715. 
Frazer  v.  Superior  Court,  62  Cal.  49.    p.  2099. 
Frazier  v.  state,  23  Oh.  St.  551.    pp.  74,  7  7. 
Frear  v.  Hardenburg,  5  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  275. 

p.  889. 
Freeh  v.  Phila.  &c.   R.   Co.,  39  Md.  574.    p. 

1225. 
Frederick  v.  Campbell,  14  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

293.     p.  838. 
Frederick  r.  Kinzer,  17  Xeb.  366.    p.  1661. 
Frederickton    Boom  Co.    v.    McPherson,   2 

Hannav  (X.  B.),  8.    p.  60. 
Free  r.  Buckingham,  69  X.  H.  219.  p.    403. 
Freel  r.  State.  21  Ark.  212.    p.  18. 
Freeman  v.  Baker,  2  Xev.  &  Man.  44G.    p. 

926. 
Freeman  v.  Bowman,  25  Ind.  236.    p.  2101. 
Freeman  r.  Camden,  7  ^lo.  298.    p.  1618. 
Freeman  v.  Brenhara,  17  B.  Mon.  603.    pp. 

2134,  2136,  2137. 
Freeman  v.  Lawrence,  11  Jones  &  Sp.  (43  X. 

Y.  Sup.)  2Sf<.     pp.  500,  501. 
Freeman   c.  People,  4  Denio  (X.  Y.),l.    pp. 

38,67,95,98,   103,  11.5. 
Freeman  v.  Ifankins,  21  Me.  446     p.  1750. 
Freeman  v.   Kosher,  13  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  780. 

p.  796. 
Freeman  v.  Wilkerson,  50  Mo.  544.    p.  1712. 
Freeman  v.  State,  11  Tex.  Ai)p.  92.    p.  465. 
Freeze  r.  De  I'uv,  57  Ind.  188.    p.  1709. 
Freltag  c.  Burk;45  Ind.  38.    p,  2089. 
Freligh  v.  Ames,  31  Mo.  253.    p.  705. 
French  i\  Marstin,24  X.  H.  440.    p.  344. 
French  t\  Morrill,  6  X.  II.  46.5.    p.  487. 
French  v.  Smith,  4  Vt.  363.    pp.  117,  1585. 
French  v.  Stanley,  21  Me.  512.    p.  1747. 
French  v.  State,  12  Ind.  670.    pp.  1790,  1793, 

1847. 
French  v.  State,  81  Ind.  151.    p.  2113. 
French  v.  Taunton  Branch  Ry.,  116  Mass. 

537.    p.  1303. 
Freshour  v.  Logansport  &c.  R.  Co.,  104  Ind. 

463.    p.  2104. 
Freto  V.  Brown,  4  Mass.  675.    p.  894. 
Friar  v.  State,  3  How.  (Miss.)  222.    p.  1984.      ' 
Frick  r.  Algeier,  87  Ind.  255.    p.  955. 
Frick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  75  Mo.  542.    p.  1305. 
Friend  v.  Friend,  64  Md.  321.    pp.  825, 1077. 
Friend  i-.  Hamill,  34  Md.  298.    p.  15. 
Friend's  Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  1.    pp.  177,484. 
Frier  v.  Jackson,  8  Johns.   (X.  Y.)  396.    p. 

5.59. 
Fricry  v.  People,  2  Keyes  (X.  Y.),  424;  s.  c.  2 

Abb.  App.  Dec.  (X.  Y.)  215;  54  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 

319.     pp.  15,  29,  32,115. 
Fries  v.  Brugler,  12  X.  J.  L.  79.    p.  261. 
Fries'  Case,  Whart.  St.  Tr.  610,614.    p.  67. 
Frink  r.  Potter,  17  111.  406.    p.  1286. 
Frissell  v.  Relfe,  9  Mo.  859.    p.  1197. 
Front  V.  Williams,  29  Ind.  18.    p.  67. 
Frost  V.  Frost,  33  Vt.  639.     p.  1003. 
Frost  V.  Martin,  29  X.  H.  307.    p.  956. 
Frost  V.   McCarger,  29  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  617.  "  p. 

471. 
Frost  V.  Prvor,  7  Mo.  314.    p.  560. 
Froude  v.  Froude,  3  Thomp.  &  C.  (X.  Y.)  79. 

p.  106. 
Fruberger  r.  Perkins,  66  Ind.  19.    p.  1979. 
Fruin  v.  Crystal  Ry.  Co.,  89  Mo.  397.    pp.  825, 

837. 
Fry  V.  Bank,  11  111.  373.    p.  449. 
Fry  r.  Bennett,  3  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  200:s.  c.  28 

X.  Y.  324.     pp.  208,  214,  218,  220,  375,  739,  741, 

743. 
Frv  ('.  Franklin    Ins.  Co.,  40  Oh.  St.  108.    p. 

831. 


Ixx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Frv   V.  Hardy,  Sir  T.  Joues,  83.    pp.  19G4, 

1967. 
Frv  V.  Hill,  7  Taunt.  397.    p.  1U4. 
FrVe  f.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  94.    p.  21. 
Fudge  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Kan.  146. 

I).  -2075. 
Fugate  V.  Carter,  6  Mo.  267.    pp.  801,  1506, 

1667. 
Fugate  V.  Pierce,  49  Mo.  441.    p.  1050. 
Fugitt  V.  Nixon,  44  Mo.  295.    p.  936. 
Fulclierr.  State,  41  Tex.  233.    p.  1695. 
Fulkerson  v.  Houts,  55  Mo.  301.    p.  2137. 
Fuller  V.  Bean,  34  X.   H.  299.    pp.  907,  908, 

910. 
Fuller  V.  Bradley,  25  Pa.  St.  120.    p.  857. 
Fuller  V.  Coates,  18  Oil.  St.  383.    p.  1705. 
Fuller  i\  Cliicago  Ac.  R.  Co.,  31  la.  211.    pp. 

1964,  1968,  1993. 
Fuller  r.  Harris,  29  Fed.  Rep.  814.    p.  2096. 
Fuller  V.  Hovt,  14  Tex.  49.    pp.  607,  608. 
Fuller  r.  State,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  63.    p.  26. 
Fuller  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  380.    pp.  1777, 

1778. 
Fuller  V.  Wilson,  6  Blackf.   (Ind.)  403.    p. 

1670. 
Fuller's  Case,  14  How.  St.  Tr.  517.    pp.  1504, 

1521; 
Fulmer  v.  Seitz,  68  Pa.  St.  237.    p.  1031. 
Fulton  V.  Ceutral  Bank,  92  Pa.   St.  112.    p. 

1623. 
Fulton  V.  Hanna,  40  Cal.  278.    p.  2085. 
Fulton  Bank  v.  Stafford,  2  Wend.    (N.  Y.) 

483.     pp.  383,  387. 
Fulwciler  r.  St.  Louis,  61  Mo.  479.    p.  55. 
Fuhvider  r.  Ingols,  81  Ind.  414.    pp.  508,  1803. 
Funk  r.  Ely,  45  Pa.  St.  444.     pp.  38.  54. 
Funk  r.  Kincade,  5  Md.  405.    i)p.  549,  550. 
Funk  r.  Slaats,  24  111.  633.    p.  1440. 
Funkhouser  v.  Malleu,  62  Mo.  555.    p.  2055. 
Funkliouser  v.  Pogue,   13  Ark.  295.    p.  81. 
Funkliouser  v.  Wagner,  62  111.  59.    p.  1322. 
Funston  v.  Chicago  &c.  11.  Co.,  61  la.  458. 

pp.  1300,   1303. 
Furbush  r.  Goodwin,  25  X.  H.  426.    p.  567. 
Furlong  r.  (iarrett,  44  Wis.  111.    p.  2030. 
Furlong  r.  Howard,  2  Sell.  &  Lef.  115.    p.  279. 
Furlnnan  v.  Mavorof  Huntsville,  54  Ala.  263. 

p.  1650. 
Furinan  r.  Apiilegate,  23  N.  J.  L.  28.    p.  90. 
Furinan  r.  I'eay,2  Bail.  (S.  C.)  394.    p.  364. 
Furinan  r.  Union  Pae.   R.  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  579; 

s.  c.  9  tent.  Reii.  2!?5.    p.  1330. 
Furnissf.Hone,8  Wend.  (X.Y.)256.    p.  910. 
Furniss  v.  IMereditli,  43  Miss.  1302.    p.  128. 
Furstr.  Second  Avenue  K.  Co.,  72  X.  Y.  542. 

p.  587. 
Furv  r.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  471.    p.  1S17. 
Fyrfe  V.  Beers,  18  Iowa,  4.    p.  1015. 


Gabel  v.  Weisensce,  49  Tex.  131.  p.  343. 
Galdich  v.  People,  40  Mich.  292.  p.  1895. 
Gadsden  r.  Woodward  (N.  Y.  Ct.  of  App.),  8 

X.  Last.  Itcli.  6.'-)3.     p.  265. 
Gaff  r.  Hutchinson,  38  Ind.  341.    p.  2137. 
Gaff  r.  .'Stern,  12  Mo.  App.  115.    p.  1449. 
Gaffney  r.  Peoi)U',  .50  N.  V.  416.    p)).  436,  715. 
Gage  1-.  Parker,  25  Barb.  141.    p.  140'.). 
Gage  V.  Smith,  27  Conn.  70.    ]>.  1046. 
(iage  V.  Wilson,  17  Me.  .378.    jip.  1915, 1916. 
Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41  Ind.  228.     pp.  1207,  1316. 
Gahagan  r.   Boston    &c.    R.    Co.,    I    Allen 

fMass.),  J8'7-     t>-  l-''''i- 
Gaillard  r.  Smart,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  385.    pp. 

19,  1119 
Gair.as    v.    Buford,   1    Dana  (Kv.),  481      p. 

17F'= 

Gaiuas  V.  Com.,  50  I'a.  St.  319.    pp.  3:)9,  416 


Gaines  v.  Saunders,  87  Mo.    557.    pp.  1049, 

1050. 
Gaines  v.  Summers,  39  Ark.  482.    p.  2128. 
Gaines  v.  Union  &c.   Co.,  28  Oh.  St.  418.    p. 

1374. 
Gainey  v.  People,  97  111.  270.    p.  1918. 
Gains  v.  Gains,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  190.    p. 

10(18. 
Gainsford  v.  Grammar,  2  Campb.  9.    p.  273. 
Gaither  r.  Martin,  3  Md.  162.    p.  1646. 
Galbraith  r.  State,  41  Tex,  567.    p.  1763. 
Galbreath   v.  Eichelberger,  3  Yeates  (Pa.), 

515.    p.  264. 
Gale  V.  Belknap   Ins.  Co.,  41  N.  H.  170.    p. 

344. 
Gale  V.  Xew  Y'ork  &c.  R.  Co.,  13  Hun  (X.  Y'.),. 

1.    p.  1976. 
Gale  r.  New  Y^ork  &c.  R.  Co.,53  How,  Pr. 

(N.  Y.)  385.     pp.  1985,  1990. 
Gale  V.  Parks,  58  Ind.  115.    p.  2112. 
Gale  V.  People,  26  Mich.  1.50.    i)p.  534,  .545. 
Gale  V.  Rector,  5  IJradw.  (111.)  481.    p.  783. 
Gale  i\  Shillock  (Dakota),  29  X.  W.  Rep.  66L 

Galena  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Fay,  16  111.  558.    pp.  1224, 

1284,  1286,  1314. 
Galena  A:c.  R.  Co.  v.  Haslam,  73  HI.  494.    pp. 

64,  102,  697. 
Galena  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Jacobs,  20  111.  478.    pp. 

1224,  1314,  1668,  1679. 
Galena  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Welch,  24  111.  32.    p. 

1313. 
Galena  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Y'arwood,  15  111.  568;  s. 

c.  17  111.  509.     pp.  1237, 1286,  1287. 
Galesburg  r.  Highley,  61  111.  287.    p.  1249. 
Gallagher  i\  Baton  Rouge  Hebrew  Congre- 
gation, 34  La.  Ann.  526.    \).  2. 
Gallagher  r.  Goldtrank,  63  Tex.  473.    p.  3. 
Gallagher   r.   People,  120  111.  179;  s.  c.  11  N. 

East.  Rep.  355.     p.  1538. 
Gallagher  v.   State,  3  Minn.  270;  s.  c.  Hor.  & 

Thomp.  Cas.  8elf-I)ef.  720.    p.  1542. 
Gallagher  r.  Williamson, 23  Cal.  331.    p.  272. 
Gallinger   r.  Lake    Shore  Traffic  Co.  (Wis.), 

30  X.  W.  Hep.  790.     p.  747. 
Galloway  r.  State,  25  Ga.  596.    p.  125. 
Gallowav  c.  State,  29  Ind.  4.    p.  1567. 
Gallowav  r.  State,  41  Tex.  289.    p.  1896. 
Galloway  c.  Week,  .54  Wis.  608.     p.  912. 
(ialpin  r.  Wilson,  40  la.  90.     p.  1751. 
(ialvin  r.  State,  56  Ind.  51.    p.  2112. 
Galvinr.  State,  64  Ind.  96.    p.  2089. 
Galvin  v.   State,  6  Coldw.   (Tenn.)    283.    p. 

1992. 
Games  r.  Stiles,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  322.    p.  1644. 
(iammon  v.  Abrams,  .53  Wis.  323.    p.  1648. 
(iainsby  r.  Columbia,  .58  X.  H.  60.    p.  1918. 
Gamwell  r.  Merchants  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Cush. 

(Mass.)  167.     p.  978. 
Gandolfo  v.  State,  11  Oh.  St.  114.    pp.  477, 

1,506, 19.52. 
Gano  r.  Ilarmison,  44  Wis.  323.    p.  2072. 
(Jano  r.  Wells,  36  Kan.  688.    p.  2067. 
Ganson  v.  Madigan,  75  Wis.  144.    pp.  839, 

1072. 
Garard  r.  Iladden,  67  Pa.  St.  82;  s.  c.  6  Am. 

Rep.  412.     p.  12.50. 
Garber  r.  State,  iU  Ind.  219.     pp.  1756,  1776. 
Garcelon  r.  Hampden  F.  Ins.  Co.,  50  Me.  580. 

l)p.  976,977. 
Garcia  r.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  335.    p.  49. 
Garcia  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  120.    p.  1855. 
Garcia  v.  State,  26  Tex.  209.    p.  189B. 
Garden  v.  Creswell,  2  Mecs.  &  W.  319.    p. 

1H8. 
Gardener  r.   Collector,  6  Wall.  (U.  S.)  499. 

pp.  818,819. 
G.irdenhire  i-.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  147.    pp.  17, 

61,  111. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxi 


•Garrtiner  v.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.  R.  (N.  Y.) 

157.     pp.  31,  3-2,  114,  663. 
Gardiner  v.  Tisdale,  2  Wis.  153.    p.  1013. 
Gardner  v.  Boot  her,  31  Ala.  187.    p.  1446. 
Gardner  v.  Clark,  17  Barb.  (N.   Y.)  538.    p. 

1750. 
Gardner  v.  Clark,  17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  538.    p. 

83f>. 
Gardner  v.  Kimball,  58  N.  H.  202.    p.  1943, 
Gardner  v.  Lainbach,  47  Ga.  133.    p.  16.33. 
Gardner  v.  Lanning,  2  N.  J.  L.  651.    p.  57. 
Gardner  v.  Miller,  21  Ark.  398.    p.  2053. 
Gardner  v.  People,  4  111.  84.    pp.  69,  74. 
Gardners.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.    (N.  Y.)   155. 

p.  647. 
Gardners.  Picket,  19  Wend.  186.    pp.1645, 

16.58. 
Gardner  v.  Piscataquis  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  38 

Me.  439     p.  979. 
Gardners.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  265.    p.  1746. 
.Gardner  v.  Towsev,  3  Littell  (Kv.),423.    p. 
'     1096. 
Gardner  r.  Turner,  9  Johns.  CN.  Y.)  260.    p 

33. 
Gardner  r.  Walsh,  5  El.  &  Bl.  32.    p.  1032. 
Garfield    v.  Kirk,  65   Barb.   (N.  Y.)   464.    p. 

397. 
Garfield  v.  Knight's  Ferry  Water  Co.,  14  Cal. 

35.    p.  771. 
Garfield  v.  State,  74  Ind.  60.    pp.  1642,  1783, 

1785,  1827 
Garibaldi  v.  Carroll,  33  Ark.  .ISS.    p.  2135. 
Garland  i\  Wholeham,  26  Iowa,  185.    p.  1479. 
Garland,  Ex  parte,  4  Wall.   (U.  S.)  378.    p. 

148. 
Garlick  v.  Bowers,  66  Cal.  122     p.  1705. 
Garner  v.  State,  5  Lea  (Tenn.),213.    p.  643. 
Garner  ».   State,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  160.    p.  86. 
Garnet  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  605.     p.  i560. 
Garnett  v.  Kirksnian,  33  Miss.  389.    p.  2066. 
Garnett  v.  Woodcock,  6  Maule  &  S.  44;  s  c. 

1  Stark.  475.     p.  940. 
Garrr.  Haskett,  86  Ind.  373.    p.  1157. 
Garr  v.  Selden,  4  N.|Y.  91.    p.  795. 
Garrard  v.  Willet,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  628. 

p.  1198. 
Garrellst'.  Alexander,  4  Esp.  37.    p.  878. 
Garrett  v.  Chambliss,  24  Tex.  618.    p.  1670. 
Garrett  v.  Garrett,  27  Ala.  678.    p.  1689. 
Garrett  v.  HoUowav,  24  Ala.  376.    j).  1669. 
Garrett  v.  Jackson, "20  Pa.  St,  331.    p.  1013. 
Garrett  v.  State,  76  Ala.  18.    p.  65. 
Garrotty  v.  Brazell,  34  la.  100.    pp.  1984, 1986. 

1994. 
Garrison  v.  Pearce,  3  E.  D,  Sinith  (N.  Y.;, 

2.55.    p.  1195. 
Garrison  v.  Portland,  2  Ore.  123.    pp.  55,81- 

90. 
Garrison  r.  State,  110  Ind.  145.    p.  2113, 
Garrison  v.  Wilcoxson,  11  Ga.  154.    p.  703. 
Garthwaite  v.  Tatuni,  21  Ark.  .336.    pp.  60, 70. 
Gartou  v.  Hadsell,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)   508.     p. 

1506. 
Gartside  v.  Orphans'  Benefit  Ins.  Co. ,"62  Mo. 

322.     pp.  993,  994. 
Garver  v.  Dauljenspeck.  22  Ind.  238.    p.  2052. 
Garvin  v.  Williams,  44  Mo.  465;  s.  e.  50  Mo. 

206.    p.  1410. 
Gary  v.  James,  4  Desan.  (S.  C.)  185.    p.  899. 
Garza  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  286.     p.  93. 
Gas  Co.  V.    Wheeling,   8  W,    Va.  323.     pp. 

1681,1682,1708. 
(Jatos  r.  Labeaume,  19  Mo.  17.    pp.  1410,  1437. 
Gates  V.   Lounsbury,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  427. 

p.  344. 
Gates  V.  Madison  County  M.  Ins.  Co.,  2  N.  Y. 

43.     pp.  974,  975. 
Gates  V.  McDaniel,  4  Stow.  &  P.  (Ala.)  69.    p. 

152 


Gates  V.  People,  6  Bradw.  (111.)  383,    p.  145. 
Gates   r.  People,  14  111.  433;  s.  c.   2  Am.  L. 

Keg.  671.     pp.  66,  485,487. 
Gates  V.  Winter,  3  T.  K.  306.    p.  612. 
Gatlifl=  V.  Bourne,  2  Moo.  &  Rob.  100.    p.  25. 
Galling  r.  Newell,  9  Ind.  572.    p.  1129. 
Gatzweiler  v.  Morgan,  51  Mo.  47,     p.  912. 
Gauldin  v.  Crawford,  30  Ga.  674.    p.  20S3. 
Gaunt  V.  F^ynney,  L.  R.  8  Ch.  App.  8.     pp. 

1391    1393    1399. 
Gavan  v.  Ellsworth,  45  Ga.  283.    p.  312. 
Gavet  V.  Manchester   &c.    R.  Co.,   16  Gray 

(Mass.),. 501.     pp.  1229,  1236. 
Gavett  V.    Manchester  &c.    R.  Co.,  IG  Gray 

(Mass.),  501,     p.  1603. 
Gavigan  v.  Scott,  51  Mich.  373.    p.  775. 
Gawtrv  r.  Doane,  51  N.  Y    84.    p.  581. 
Gay  V.  Ardrv,  14  La.  288.    p.  49. 
Gay  V.  Balfou,  4  Wend.  (N.    Y.)  403.    p.  895. 
Gay  V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  128.    p.  1784. 
Gay  V.  Winter,  34  Cal.  153.    pp.  1223,  1225. 
Gayette  v.  Bethuue,  14  Mass.  f>a.    p.  1044. 
GaVnor  v.   Old  Colonv  &c.  R.  Co.,  100  Mass. 

208.     pp.  1208,  1209,  1211,  1212,  1224. 
Gazette  Printing  Co.   v.  Moras,  60  Ind,  154. 

p,  2112. 
Gazzam  v.  Povntz,4  Ala.  374.    p.  1436. 
Geach  v.  Ingall,  14  Mees.   &  W.  95.    pp.  214, 

21.5. 
Gearhart  v.  Jordan.  11  Pa.  St.  325.    p.  85. 
Geary  v.  People,  22  Mich.  220.    pp.  402,  443. 
Geary  I'.  Simmons,  39  Cal.  224.    ]).  1605. 
Geery  v.  Hopkins,  2  Ld.  Raym.  851.    p.  177. 
Geill  V.  Jeremy,  Mood.  &  M.  61.    p.  943. 
Gellatly  v.  Lowery,  6  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  113.    p. 

571. 
Gelpke  v.  Pike,  33  Mo.  163.    p.  1669. 
Gelston  v,  Marshall,  6  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  39a. 

p.  599. 
Gelyin  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  21  Mo,  App. 

273.    p.  1020. 
Center  V.  Morrison,  31  Barb.  (N  Y.)  155,    p 

875. 
Gentry  Co  v  Black,  32  Mo.  542.    p.  1594. 
George  v.  Joy,  19  N.  H.  544.    p.  357. 
George  v.  Norris,  23  Ark.  121.    p.  349. 
George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt.    (Va.)  300,    pp. 

311,469,  718 
George  v.  Stubbs,  20  3Ie.  250.    p.  908. 
George  v.  Surrey,  1  Mood.  &  Malk.  516.    p. 

878. 
George  v.  Taylor,  55  Tex.  97.    p.  2076. 
George  v.  Thomas,  16  Texas,  74.    p.  1080. 
Georgia  v.  Bailford,  3Dall.  (U.  S.)  1.    p.  1508. 
Georgia  r.  llepfood,  45  Iowa,  48.    p.  146S. 
Georgia  Railroad  r.  Hart,  60  Ga.  550.    pp.  54, 

117. 
Gerard  v.  Penswick,  1  Swanst.  533.    p.  634. 
Gere  r.  Murray,  6  Minn.  305.    pp.  1437,  1446. 
Gerhardt  r.  Swaty,  57  Wis.  24.    p.  2032. 
German  Bank  v.  Dunn,  62  Mo.  79.    p.  1025. 
German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smelker,  38  Kan.  285     p. 

2037. 
German  Theological  School  v.  Dubuque,  64 

la.  736.    pp.  661,1266. 
Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davenport  (Pa.'>,  9  Atl. 

Rep.  517.    p.  956. 
Germania  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sherlock,  25  Oh.  St.  33. 

p.  999 
Gerrish    v.  Mace,  9,  Gray   (Mass.),  235.    p. 

1407. 
Gertv  r.  Fitchburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  137  Mass.  77. 

pp:  472,  473. 
Getchell  v.  Hill,  21  Minn.  471.    p.  1780. 
Gettwerth  v.  Teutonia  Ins.  Co.,  29  La.  Ann. 

30.     p.  30. 
Getty  V.  Shearer,  20  Pa.  St.  12.    p.  1031. 
Ghcnn  v.  Proviucetown,  105    Mass.  313.    p. 

1247. 


Ixxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Gholstou  V.  Gholston,  :U  Ga.  625.    p.  1949. 
Gibbous  y.  People,  -21  111.  518.    p.  19U4. 
Gibbons  v.  Wiscousiu  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Wis.  546. 


pp.  16(58  1676. 
Hbl 


Gibbons  r.  Wisconsin  &c.  R.  Co.,  66  Wis.  161 ; 

S.  c.  28  X.  W.  Rep.  170.     p.  1312. 
Gibbs  V.  Dewev,  5  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  503.    p,  1922. 
Glbbs  I'  Lindsiev,13  Vt.  208.    p.  493. 
Gibbs  V.  State,  s'Heisk.  (Tenn.)  72.    p.  48. 
Giblin  r.  McMul'.en,  L.  R.  2  r.  C.  317.    pp. 

1001, 1605. 
Gibson  i'.  American    &c.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  37  X. 

Y.  .580.     p.  9'tO. 
Gibson  r.  Green,  22  Ind.  422,    p.  561. 
Gibson  v  Hatchett,  24  Ala.  201.    p.  583. 
Gibson  v.  Hill,  21  Tex.  225.    p.  1441. 
Gibson  v.  Manlv,  15  111.  140.     \^^.  2079,  2080. 
Gibson  r.  State,  9  Ind.  264.     p.  2094. 
Gibson  r.  .state,  16  Fla.  291,  300.    p.  4. 
Gibson  c.  Stearns,  3  X.  H.  185.   p.  886. 
Gibson  v.  Tong,  29  3Io.  133.    p.  1070. 
Gibson  i:  Williams,  39  Ga.  660.    p.  1977. 
•   Gibson  r.  Wvandotte,  20  Kan.  156.    p.  55, 
Gifford  c.  Clark,  70  Me.  94.    p)).  1978,  19S1. 
Gifford  V.  Peoule,  87  111.  210.    p.  533. 
Gilbart  v.  Dale,  5  Ad.    &  El.  543.    pp.  1332, 

1333. 
Gilbert  v.  Cherry,  57  Ga.  128.    p.  581. 
Gilbert    v.    Henck,   6  Casey   (Pa.),  205.    p, 

1251. 
Gilberts,  Xortii  American  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  23 

Wend.  (X,  Y.)  43.    p.  876. 
Gilbert  v.   People,  1    Denio  (X.  Y'.),41.    p. 

795. 
Gilbert    v.  Rider,  Kirby    (Conn.),   ISO.    pp. 

118,  120. 
Gilbert    v.    Schwenck,   14   Mees.  &.  W.  488. 

p.  891. 
Gilbert  v.  Thompson,  14  Minn.  544.    p.  560. 
'    Gilbert  v.  Woodbury,  22  Me.  246.    p.  1670. 
Gilchrist  v.  Brande,   58  Wis.  184.    pp.  1101, 

1102. 
Gilchrist  v.  Donnell,  53  Mo.  591.    p.  1661. 
Gilchrist  v.  McGee,    9  Yerger  (Tenn.),  455. 

p.  1080. 
Gilchrist  v.  Rogers,  6  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  483. 

p.  1668. 
Gildersleevc  v.   London,    73   X.    Y.  609.    p. 

639. 
Gile  V.  People,  1  Colo.  60.    p.  1726. 
Giles  V.  State,  6  Ga.  276.    VP.  1835,  2007. 
Gilhooly   v.    Washington,   4    X.  Y.   217.    p. 

1003. 
Gill  V.  Cald\vell,  1  111.  (Breese)  28.    p.  329. 
Gill  V.  Clark,  54  Mo.  415.     pp.  1590, 1712. 
Gill  V.  Cubit,  3  Barn.    &  Cres.   466;  s.  c.  10 

Eng.  C.  L.  154.    p.  950. 
Gill  V.  Fauntleroy,  8  B.  Men.  (Ky.)  177.    p. 

1044. 
Gill  V.  McXamee,  42  X.  Y.  44.    p.  561. 
Gill  i:   People,  5  Thomp.  &   C.    (X.  Y.)  308. 

p.  .529. 
Gill  i:  Rochester,  37  Hun   (X.  Y'.).  108.    p. 

1488. 
Gill  r.  Rogers,  37  Tex.  628.    p.  2076. 
Gilleland  c.  Slate,  44  Te.K.  3.50.    pp.  1903,  1990. 
Gillespie  v.  Gillespie,  2  Bibb  (Ky.),  89.    p. 

1755. 
Gillespie  V.  Xewberg,  54  X.  Y',  408.    pp.  1209, 

1225. 
Glllosple  V.  Smith,  29  111.  473.    p.  560. 
Gillespie  v.  State,  8  Yerg.    (Tenn.)  507.    p. 

122. 
Glllctt  V.  Camp,  27  Mo.  .541.    pp.  888,  894. 
Gillctt  V.  .Miller,  108  Ind.  75.     p.  2102. 
Gillette  v.  Morrison,  7  Neb.  395.    p.  312. 
Gillett  V.  Wlmer,  23  Mo.  77.     p.  1770. 
Gilliam  r.  Ball,  49  .Mo.  249.    pp.  1037,  1768. 
Gilliam  1-.  Brown,  43  Miss.  641.    pp    81.  85. 


I   Gilliam  r.  McJankin,  2  So.  Car.  442.    p  152. 
Gillis  V.  Hall,  2  lirewst.  (Pa.j  342.    p.  871. 
Gill  man  v.  Connor,  3  Jebb.  &  Symes,  210.    p 

1142. 
Gilly  V-  State,  15  Tex.  App.  287.    pp.  1696. 
Gilnian  v.  Dcerfleld,  15  Gray  (Mass),  577. 

p.  1209. 
Gilman  v.  Wayne  Circuit  Judge,  21  Mich. 

372.     p.  2059.  ■ 
Gilmanton  v.  Ham,  38  X.  H.  108     pp.  1929. 

1930. 
Gilmer  v.  Higley,  HO  U.  S.  47.    v.  .391. 
Gilmore  v.  American  Central  Ins.  Co.,  67 

Cal.  336.     p.  196. 
Gilinore  v.  Wilbur,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  120;  s.  c. 

22  Am.  Dec.  410.    p.  890. 
Gilmore  r.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,  104  Pa,  St 

275.     p.  581. 
Gillooley  v.  State,  58  Ind.  182.    pp.  118,  120, 

Gilp'atrick  ?•.  Biddcford,  51    Me.    182.     pp. 

1019,  1021. 
Gilpins  v.  Consequa,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

184 ;  s.  c.  i'et.  C.  C.  85.    p\).  307,  308. 
Gilstrap  v.  Felts,  50  :Mo.  428.     p.  2049. 
Ginder  v.  Farnum,  10  Pa.  St.  98.    p.  1413. 
Ginnon  r.  Xew  Y'ork  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Robt.  (N. 

Y.)  26.     p.  1236. 
Girard  v.  Gettig,  2  Binn.  (Pa.)  234.    pp.  1584, 

1586. 
Girardey  v.  Bessnian,  62  Ga.  654.    p.  2067. 
(iirault  i:  Adams,  til  Md.  1.    i>.  313. 
Gist  V.  Iliggins,  1  Bibb  (Ky.),  303.    p.  2106. 
(iist  c.  Loring,  60  Mo.  487.    p.  1608. 
Givens  v.  Brisco,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  532. 

p.  194. 
Givius  r.  Bradley,  3  Bibb  (Ky.) ,  195.    p.  2146. 
Givins  v.    Van  "Studdiford,  86  Mo.  149.     p. 

2139. 
Glacius  V.  Black,  30  X.  Y.  145.    p.  893. 
Gladden  v.    state,  12  Fla.  562.    pp.  1539,  1548. 
Gladden  v.  State,  13  Fla.  623.    pi).  13,  21. 
Gladmou  v.   Railroad  Co.,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

401.    p.  1646. 
Gladwell  v.  Turner,  39  L.  J.  Exch.  31  ;s.   c. 

L.  R.  5  Exch.  59.     p.  944. 
Glantz  r.    South  Bend,    106  Ind.  305.      pp. 

2024,  2052. 
Glascock  c.  Manor,  4  Tex.  7.    p.  2097. 
Glascock  i:  State,  10  Mo.  508.    p.  1114. 
Glasgow  V.  Copeland,  8  Mo.  268.    p.  1600. 
Glasgow  v.  Hobbs,  .52  Ind  239.    p)).  1715,  2028. 
Glasgow  r.  Lindell,  ,50  Mo.  60.     p.  1047. 
Glasgow  r.  Xicholson,25  Mo.  29.     p.  907. 
Glass  V.  Gel  vin,  80  i^Io.  297.     pp.  90s,  920,  1661. 
Glasscock  V.  Gla.sscock,  66  Mo.  627.    p.  1138. 
Glass  Co.  V.  Walcott,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  227. 

p.  890. 
Gla/e  r.  Whitlcv,5  Ore.  164.    pp.  469,  470. 
Gleason  r.  Bremen,  .50  Me.  222.    p.  1224. 
Gleason  v.  Drew,  9  Mo.  79.     p.  1443. 
Gleason  v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  32  Wis.  85. 

p.  1154. 
Glenn  v.  Charlotte  &c.  R.  C.,63  X.  C.  510.    p. 

802. 
Glenn  v.  Clore,  42  Ind.  60.    pp.  459,  570. 
Glenn  v.  Gleason,  61  la.  28.    pp.  385,  388,  390, 

637,  638. 
Glenn  r.  Glcnn,4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  488.    p.  918. 
Glenn  r.  Lelinen,  54  Mo.  45.    p.  1669. 
Glidden  /•.  Towle,  31  N.  II.  147.     p.  1945. 
Glidewell  r.  Daggy,  21  Ind.  95.    p.  2101. 
Globe   Ins.  Co.  v.  Sherlock,   25  Ohio  St.  50. 

p.  91(9. 
Globe   National  Bank  v.  Ingalls,   130  Mass. 

8.     p.  912. 
Globe  Works  v.  Wriglit,  106  Mass.  207.    p.  974. 
Glory  V.  State,  13  Ark.  230.     pp.  :{51,  181L 
Glover  1-.  Duhle,  19  Mo.  300.    p.  1642. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxiii 


Glover  v.  Holbrook,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  155.    p. 

1751. 
Glover  v.  Woolsev,  Dudley  (Ga.) ,  85.    pp.  58, 

118,120. 
Grable  v.  Margrave,  3  Scam.  (III.)   372.    p. 

1491. 
Goben  i\  Goldsberry,  72  Ind.  44.    p.  199. 
Godbold  V.  Blair,  27  Ala.  592.    p.  1733. 
Goddard  v.  Foster,  17  WaU.  (U.  S.)  123.  pp. 

825,  860,  1507. 
Goddard  v.  Gardner,  28  Conn.  172.    p.  273. 
Goddard    v.    Grand    Trunk   K.    Co.,    57  Me. 

202;  s.  c.  2  Am.  Kep.  39.    pp.  1290,  1203. 
Goddard  v.  Williamsou,  72  Mo.  13:      p.  96S. 
Godefroy    v,  Dalton,  6  Bing.    460.    pp.  1242, 

1243,  1244. 
Godfrey  v.  Turnbull,  1  Esp.  371.    p.  1101. 
George^  v.  Huffschuidt,  44  Mo.  179.    p.  1669. 
Goettiug  V.  Biehler,  33  Hun  (Jn.  Y.),500.    p. 

2016. 
Gold  V.   Bissell,  1   Wend.    (X.    Y.)  210.    p. 

1016. 
Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Nat.  Bank,  96  U.  S.  640. 

p.  71. 
Golden  v.  Romer,  20  Hun    (N.  Y.),   43S.    p. 

1321. 
Golden  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  637.    p.  1575. 
Golden  Fleece  &c.  Co.  v.  Cable  &c.  Co.,  15 

Nev.  450.     p.  2099. 
Golden  Terry  3Iining  Co.  v.  Smith,  2  Dak. 

377.    p.  2099. 
Goldev   V.   Pennsylvania   R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St. 

242.  "pp.  1348,  1349. 
Goldins  I'.  Crowle,  Saver,  1.    pp.  1161,  1182. 
Goldiiig  V.  Petit,  27  La.  Ann.  86.    p.  7. 
Goldman  r.  Wolff,  6  Mo.  App.  491.    p.  740. 
Goldsberry  v.  Stuteville,  3  Bibb  (Ky.),  345. 

pp.  214,  215,  221,  240. 
Goldsby  v.  Robertson,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  247. 

pp.  2010,  2124. 
Goldsmitli  r.  Solomons,  2  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.) 

296.    p.  1915. 
Gomer  v.  Chaffee,  5  Colo.  383.    p.  2076. 
Gonsolis  V.  (iearheart,  31  Mo.  585.     p.  1708. 
Gonzales  r.  Gobliner,  68  Cal.  151.    p.  1704. 
Gonzales  r.  New  York    &c.  R.  Co.,  50  How. 

Pr.  (N.  Y.)  126.     p.  1235. 
Gonzales   v.   State,  12    Tex.    App.    657.    p. 

1855. 
Gonzales  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  449.    p.  1898. 
Good  V.  Mylin,  13  Pa.  St.  53S.    pp.  729,  733. 
Goodall  V.  Tricky,  33  Mo.  340.    p.  1670. 
Goodall  V.  State,"l  Ore.  334.    p.  1539. 
Goode  V.  Linecum,  1  How.  (Miss.)  281.    pp. 

1948,  1956. 
Goode    r.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  520.    pp.  1744, 

1902,  1903. 
Goode  r.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  411.    p.  817. 
Goodenow  v.  Snyder,  3  Greene  (la.),  599.    p. 

890. 
Goodfellow  V.  IMeegan,  32  Mo.  280.    p.  1321. 
Goodhaudi'.  Benton,  6  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)4Sl.    p. 

419. 
Goodhue  v.  People,  94  111.  37.    p.  17. 
Goodin,  Ex  parte,  67Mo.  637.    p.  152. 
Goodlittle  d.  Revett  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  498. 

p.  242. 
Goodman  v.  Cotherington,  Sid.  235.    p.  1910. 
Goodman  v.  Harvey,  4  Ad.  &  El.  870.    p.  950. 
Goodman  v.  Kennedy,  10  Neb.  270.    pp.  307, 

426. 
Goodman  v.  Losev,  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  526. 

p.  106G. 
Goodman  v.  Simonds,  20  How.    (U.   S.)  343. 

pp.  950,  1669. 
Goodno  V.  Oshkosh,  28  Wis.  300.    pp.  1249, 

14H3. 
Goodnough  v.    Oshkosh,    24    Wis.  549;  s.  c. 

Goodno  17.  Oshkosh,  28  Wis.  300.    p.  1249. 


Goodnow  V.  Hill,  15  Mass.  589.    p.  316. 
Goodpastor  r.  Voris,  8  Iowa,  335.    p.  214. 
Goodrich  r.  Burdick.  26  Mich.  :V.\    p.  82. 
Goodrich  v.  Davis,  11  Mete.   (Mass.)  473.    p. 

1459. 
Goodrich  v.  Downs,  6  Hill   (N.  Y),  438.    pp. 

1436,  1439. 
Goodridge  v.  Dustin,  5  Mete.  (Mass.)  363.    p. 

lOSO. 
Goodtitle  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  497.    pp.  215, 

217. 
Goodtitle  v.  Thrustout.  2  Stra.  1023.    p.  29. 
Goodwin  v.  Appleton,  22  Me.  453.    p.  1911. 
Goodwin  v.  Blackley,  4  Ind.  438.    jjp.  69,  70, 

76. 
Goodwin  v.  Cloudman,  43  Me.  577.    p.  113. 
Goodwin  v.  Phillips,  Lofft.  71.    p.  1966. 
Goodwin  ?•.  Smith,  72  Ind.  113.    pp.  215,  238. 
Goodwin   i'.  State,  3  Crim.  L.  Mag.  44.    p. 

1879. 
Goodwin   v.  State,  96  Ind.  550.    pp.  505,  508, 

509,  1688,  1705, 1709, 1756,  1780,  1782. 
Goodwine  v.  Crane,  41  Ind.  335.    p.  2113. 
Goodwyu  V.  Cheveley,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  631.    pp. 

1120,  1138. 
Goodwyu  V.  High  tower,  30  Ga.  249.    p.  2099. 
Googins  i\  Gilmore,  47  Me.  9.    p.  1443. 
Gordon  v.  Bowers,  16  Pa.  St.  226.    p.  805. 
Gordon  v.  Inghram,  1  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  152. 

p.  1060. 
Gordon  v.  People,  33  N.  Y.  501.    pp.  65, 1797. 
Gordon  v.  Pitt,  3  la.  385.    pp.  2048,  2058. 
Gordon  v.  State,  48  N.  J.  L.  611.    p.  155S. 
Gore  V.  Brazier,  3  Mass.  523.    p.  1003. 
Gore  V.   Summersoll,  5  Monr.   (Ky.)  513.    p. 

899 
Gorham  v.  Carroll,  3  Litt.  (Ky.)  221.    p.  265. 
GorlKim  V.  Gale,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  739.    p.  192. 
Gorham  r.  Thompson,  Peake  N.  P.  42.    pp. 

1101,  1105. 
Gorham  v.  Upham,  4  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  9. 

p.  1173. 
Gorman  v.  Dierkes,  37  Mo.  576.    p.  1614. 
Gormlev  v.  Laramore,  40  Ga.  253.    pp.  110, 

lis. 
Gortons.  Erie&c.R.  Co.,45N.  Y.  660.   p.  1230. 
Gorton  r.  Hadsell,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  508.    pp. 

289,  1739. 
Goslin  V.  Corry,  7  Man.  &  G.  347.    p.  1663. 
Goss  I'.  Turner,  21  Vt.  440.    pp.  215,  228,  303 
Gott  ('.  Dinsmore,  111  Mass.  45.    p.  1365. 
Gottlieb  V.  Hartman,  3  Col.  53.    p.  505. 
Goudy  i'.  Duncombe,  1  Exch.  430.    p.  1140. 
Gough  V.  Farr,  1  Younge  &  J.  477.    p.  1477. 
Gough  V.  Staats,  13  Wend.    (N.  Y.)  549.    p. 

936. 
Gould  V.  Day,  94  U.  S.  405.    p.  583. 
Gould  t\  Moore,  40  N.  Y.  Super.  (8  Jones  & 

S.)  387.     pp.  728,  747,755. 
Gould  r.  AVard,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  104.    p.  1443. 
Gourley  v.  Allen,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  644.    p.  899. 
Gover  h.  Dill,  3  la.  337.     p.  1670. 
Goyne  v.  Howell,  Minor  (Ala.),  62.    p.  128. 
Grabbenhorst  v.  Nicodemus,  42  Md.  236.    p. 

1003. 
Grace  v.  Adams,  100  Mass.  505.    p.  1365. 
Gracia  y.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  337.    p.  50. 
Gracie  v.  Palmer,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)   699.    p. 

1059. 
Graddy  v.  Hightower,  1  Ga.  253.    p.  2075. 
Gradle  v.  Hoffman,  105  111.  147.    p.  73. 
Gradle  v.  Kern,  109  111.  5.58.    p.  1251. 
Grady  i'.  Early,  18  Cal.  108.    p.  81. 
Grady  r.  Hammond,  21  Ala.  428.    p.  239. 
Grady  v.  American  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  60  Mo.  116. 

1).  1598. 
Grady  v.  Robinson,  28  Ala.   289.    pp.    1096, 

1098. 
Gradv  c.  State,  4  la.  461.    p.  1994. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Graoter  v.  State.  105  Iiui.  272.    pp-  1751, 1812. 
Graff  c.  Pittsburgh  &c.  K.  Co.,  31  Pa.  St.  489. 

p.  294. 
Gragg  i:  VTagncr,  77  X.  O.  246.    pp.  779,  780. 
Graliani  r.  Audt-rsoii,  12  111.  514.    p.  560. 
Graham   i-.  Jiradlev,  5  lluiuph.   (Teun.)  476. 

p.  1750. 
Graham  i:  Davis, 4  Oh.  St.  302.    pp.  307,  1322, 

1344,  1345,  1347.  1349,  1352.1374. 
Graham  r.  Dvster,  2 Stark.  21.    p.  635. 
Graham  v.  Gautier,  21    Tex.    112.    pp.   222, 

223. 
Graham  v.  Ilolligcr,  46  Pa.  St.  55.    p.  1414. 
Graham  v.  Hope,  Peake  X.  P.  154.    pp.  1101, 

1105. 
Graham  r.  Houston,  i  De.v.  L.   (N.  C.)  236. 

p.  17.50. 
Graham  v.  Hunt,  S  B.  Men.  fKy.)  7.    p.  966. 
Graham  r.  Nowlin,  54  lud.  389.    p.  1708. 
Graham  r.  Okiis,  1  Post.  &  Fiu.  262.    p.  612. 
Graham    r.   Pacific  K.  Co.,  66  Mo.  536.    pp. 

129S,  1487. 
Graham  v.  Smith,  25  Pa.  St.  323.    p.  1446. 
Graham  v.  State,  66  Ind.  386.    p.  2052. 
Graham  r.  Trimmer,  G  Kan.  231.     ]>.  47. 
Graham  v.  Van  Dicman's  Land  Co.,  11  Ex. 

101:s.  c.   30  Eug.  L.  &  Eq.  574.     p.  1134. 
Graham,  In  re,  8  JJen.  (U.  S.^  419.    p.  261. 
Grahme's  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  673.    p.  41. 
Grainger  v.  State,  5  Yerg.  (Teun.)  459.    p. 

1548. 
Grammar  v.  Borgam,  27  Iowa,  369.    p.  931. 
Grand  Jurv  v.  Public  Press,  4  Brewst.  (Pa.) 

313.    p.  172. 
Grand  Lodge  v.  Knox,  27  Mo.  317.    p.  1684. 
Grand  ltai)ids  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Boyd,  65  Ind. 

526.    ]).  1293. 
Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Horn,  41  Ind. 

479.     p.  1501. 
Grand  Rapids  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  81  Ind. 

.523.    p.  1308. 
Grand  IJapids    Booming  Co.   v.  Jarvis,  30 

Mich.  308.     p.  128. 
Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Latham,  63  Mo.  177. 

p.  1704. 
Granger  v.  State,    11  Tex.    App.  454.     pp. 

1796, 1797. 
Grannis  v.  Brandon,  5  Day  (Conn.),  260.    p. 

1922. 
Grant  v.  Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  29 

Wis.  125.    ]).  1734. 
Grant  v.  Cropsey,  8  Neb.  205.    p.  1022. 
Grant  v.  Howard  Ins.  Co.,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.).    p. 

978. 
Grant  v.  Merchants  &c.  Bank,  35  Mich.  515. 

p.  912. 
Grant  v.  Moore,  29  Cal.   644.    pp.  1167,  1170, 

1180,  1182,  1188. 
Grant  v.  Newton,  1  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  95. 

pp.  1151.  1152. 
Grant  v.  Reese,  82  N.  C.  72.    p.  2. 
Grant  v.    Sbclton,   3  B.  Mon.   (Kv.)  420.    p. 

2071. 
Grantr.  State,  45  Ga.  477.    p.  16,34. 
(irant  V.  Slate,  3  Te.\.  App.  1.    p.  111. 
Grant   v.    Westfall,  57    Ind.    121.    pp.    2089, 

2090. 
Grantham  v.  Canaan,  38  N.  H.  208.    pp.  961, 

'Mi-2. 
Grattan  v.  Mctroi>olitan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  92  N. 

Y.  274.    p.  039. 
Gratz  V.  Beuner,  13Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  110.    p. 

57. 
Grave  v.  Brlen,  1  Md.  438.    p.  821. 
Graves  v.  Al.sap,  1  Ariz.  Ter.  274.    p.  194. 
(iravfs  r.  (irave!?,45  N.  H.  323.    p.  314. 
(irav<\s  r.  Key,  3  Barn.  &  Ad.  313.    p.   842. 
Gr;ive."  r.  Li'ikc  Sliore  iV:c.  R.  Co.,  137  Mass. 

33.    p.  1361. 


Graves  v.  Monet,  7  Smedes  &  M.  (Miss.)   45. 

pp.  145, 1906. 
Graves  c.  Seoville,  17  Neb.  593.    p.  2052. 
Graves  v.  Sliattuck,  35  N.  H.  257.    pp.  1246, 

1378. 
Graves  v.  Short,  M.  1598;  Cro.  Eliz.  616.    p. 

1936. 
Graves  v.  State,  63  (^a.  710.    p.  1952. 
Gravest'.  State,  12  Wis.  .591.    p.  1896. 
(iraves^'.  Gans,  25  Wis.  41.    p.  1916. 
Grav  c.  Berry,  9  N.  II.  473.  p.  1080. 
Gray  r.  Hurk",  19  Tex.  228.    p.  775. 
Gray  r.  Coan,  4S  la.  424.    pp.  2074,  2080,  2100. 
Gray  v.  Cooper,  65  N.  C.  183.    pp.  423, 424. 
Grav  V.  Grav,  3  Litt.  (Kv.)  465.     p.  585. 
(iray  r.  Ilornheck,  31  Mo.  400.    p.  864. 
Gray  r.  Mol)Q('  Trade  Co.,  55  Ala.  387.    pp. 

1321,  1.345,  ]3.")6,  1300. 
Gray  i\  Missouri  River  Packet  Co.,  64  Mo.  47; 

s.  "<;.  Thomi).  Carr.  Pass.  43.    p.  1299. 
Grav  V.  People,  26  111.  3.    pp.  70,  75. 
Gray  v.  Pullen,  5  Best  &  S.  970.    p.  1218. 
Gray  r.  Reg.,  11  CI.  &  Fiu.  427.    p.  37. 
Gray  v.  State,  55  Ala.  86.    pp.  18,  35. 
Gray  v.  Stivers,  38  Ind.  197.    p.  1726. 
Grayson  r.  Com.,  6  Gratt.  (Va.)  712.    p.  2047. 
Grayville  v.  Whitakcr,  85  111.  4.39.    p.  1247. 
Great  Northern  R.  Co.  v.  Harrison,  23  L.  J. 

(Exch.)  308;  s.  c.  12  C.  B.  576;  26  Eng.  Law- 
it  Eq.  443.     p.  1298. 
Great  Northern  R.  Co.  t'.  Shepherd,  8  Exch. 

30;  s.  c.  7  Eng.  Ry.Cas.  310.    p.  1155. 
Great  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Braid,  1  Moo.  P.  C. 

C.  101 ;  s.  c.  9  .Jur.  (N.  S.)  339;  11  Week.  Rep. 

444.     pp.  1236,  1237,  1698. 
Great  Western  Turnpike   Co.  v.  Loomis,  32 

N.  Y.  127.     pp.  262,  264,  403,409,  .531. 
Greeley  r.  Mausur,  (>4  Me.  211.    pp.  1984, 1993. 
Greely  v.  McNabb,  13  Mo.  597.    p.  1669. 
Green  v.  Akers,  55  Ga.  159.    p.  346. 
Green  r.  Bliss,  12  How.   Pr.  (N.  Y.)  429.    p. 

1985. 
Green  v.  Chelsea,  24  Pick.   (Mass.)   7L    p. 

1012. 
Green  v.  Cochran,  43  la.  545.    pp.  1189, 1198, 

1775. 
Green  v.  Cornell,  1  City  Hall  Rec.  (N.  Y.)  14. 

p.  783. 
Green  v.  Dauby,  12  Vt.  338.    p.  1247. 
Green  v.  Dinglev,  24  ."Me.  131.    p.  1749. 
Green  v.  Drinker,  7  AVatts  &  S.  (Pa.)  440.    p. 

1052. 
Greeu  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.),  333. 

p.  1235. 
Green  r.  Gallagher,  35  Mo.  226.    p.  560. 
Green  v.  (iould,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  465.     p.  462. 
Greenr.  Haiues,  1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)251.    pp.  1122, 

1123. 
Green  v.  Hallenbeck,  24  Hun  (N.  Y.),  116. 

I).  1250. 
Green  c.  Hamilton,  16  Md.  317.    p.  1474. 
Green  r.  Hill,  2  Tex.  465.     p.  817. 
Green  v.  Hill,  4  Tex.  405.     p.  68. 
Greeu  r.  Humphrey,  .50  Pa.  St.  212.     p.  915. 
Green  v.  Slate,  08  Ala.  539.    p.  1535. 
Green  v.  Stale,  17  Kla.  669.    pp.  17,  110,  135, 

107. 
Green  v.  State,  43  Ga.  368.    pp.  16.35, 1701. 
Greeu  v.  State,  .59  Md.  123;  s.  c.  43  Am.  Rep. 

542.    p.  11. 
Green  r.  Telfair,  20  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  11.    p.  1455. 
Greenbaum  v.  lillii.tt,  00  Mo.  25.    p.  889. 
Greentield  v.  Moore,  113  Ind.  597.     p.  2038. 
(ireenlield  r.  People,  ai  N.  V.  75.     p.  17.58. 
Greenlielcl    r.   People,  74  N.  Y.  277.     pp.   69, 

71,  77,  78,  120,  41S,  .l;i3. 
Greenle.uf  r.  Kdes,  2  .Minn.  261.   pp.  1437,1446. 
Greenleaf  v.  llliuuis  iVc.  K.  Co.,  29  Barb.  14. 

I>.  1002. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxv 


Greenleaf  r.  Egan,  30  Minn.  316.     p.  3. 
Greenlee  r.   McDowell,  4  Ired.  Eq.  (N.   C.) 

485.    p.  192. 
Greeuley  v.  State,  60  Ind.  141.    pp.  65,  66, 

1780. 
Greenman  v.  O'Connor,  25  Mich.  30.    p.  576. 
Greenough  v.   Gaskell,   1    Myl,  &  K.  98.    p. 

276. 
Greenup  v.  Crooks,  50  Ind.  410.    pp.  2076, 

2140. 
Greenup  v.  Stoker,  8  111.  202.    pp.  123,  1750. 
Greenwade  v.  Mills,  31  Miss.  464.    p.  1197. 
Greenwalt  v.  Tucker,  10  Fed.  Rep.  884.    pp. 

2075,  2097. 
Greenwell  v.  Greenwell,  2S  Kan.  678.    p.  902. 
Greenwood  v.  Callahjin,  111  Mass.  298.    p. 

1210. 
Greenwood  v.  Harris,  8  Mo.  App.  603.    p.  811. 
Greer  v.  Higgins,  20  Kan.  420.    p.  428. 
Greer  v.  Norvill,  3Hill  (S.   C),  262.    pp.  11, 

86, 129, 130. 
Greer  v.  Nourse,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  527. 

p.  233. 
Greer  v.  Parker,  85  Mo.  107.    p.  1661. 
Greer  v.    State,   53  Ind.    420.    pp.   345,  513, 

529,  1642,  1803. 
Greer  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  179.    p.  112. 
Greff  V.  Blake,  16  la.  222.    pp.  1945,  1956. 
Gregg  V.  Forsyth,  24  How.  (U.   S.)  179.    p 

819 
Gregg  V.  McDaniel,  4  Harr.   (Del.)  367.    p 

1929. 
Gregg  V.  Sayre,  8  Pet.  (U.  S.)  244.    p.  2114. 
Gregg  V.  State.  3  W.  Va.  705.    p.  257. 
Gregory  v.  Adams,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  242.    p 

1210. 
Gregory  v.  Ford,  5  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  473.    p 

1706. 
Gregory  v.  Lincoln,  13  Neb.  352.    pp.  2,  3. 
Gregory  v.  Perkins,  4  Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  50.  pp 

1436,  1441. 
Gregory  v.  Underbill,  6Lea  (Tenn.),  207.    p 

825. 
Gregory  v.  Walker,  38  Ala.  26.    p.  874. 
Gregorys.  "Wells,  Smith  (N.  H.),  399n.    p 

119. 
Greschia  v.  People,   53  111.    298.    pp.    1.544, 

1548, 1574. 
Greta  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  429.    p.  1695. 
Greton  r.  Smith,  33  N.  Y.  245.    p.  1003. 
Gridley  r.  Boggs,  62  Cal.  191.    p.  ,522. 
Griffee  r.  State,  65  Tenn.  (1  Lea)  41.    p.  1907. 
Griffeth  v.  Hanks,  46  Tex.  217.  pp.  1427,  1428. 
Griffin  r.  JIarquardt,  21  N.  Y.  121.    p.  345. 
Griffin  r.  New  Y'ork,  9  N.  Y.  456;  s.  c.  Sel- 

den's  Notes,  223.     p.  1249. 
Griffin  v.  Potter,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  209.    pp. 

888,  895. 
Griffin  v.  Sheffield,  88  Miss.  3,59.    p.  629. 
Griffin  v.  Stadler,  35  Tex.  695.    p.  94. 
Griffin  r.  State,  15  Ga.  476.    p.  67. 
Griffin  v.  Williamstown,  6  W.  Va.  312.    p. 

1246. 
Gritlth  V.  Dayies,  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  502.    p.  273. 
Griffith  V.  Ditteuderffer,  50  Md.  466.    pp.  385, 

388 
Griffith  V.  Eby,  12  Mo.  517.    p.  1414. 
Griffith  V.   McCuUum,  46  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  561. 

p.  1378. 
Griffith  V.  Parton,  59  la.  31.    p.  1748. 
Grithth  V.  Sitgreayes,  90  Pa.  St.  161.    p.  1005. 
Griffiths  V.  Chichester,  14  Eug.  L.  &  Eq.  372  n. 

p.  960. 
Griffiths  V.  Ivery,  11  Ad.  &  El.  322.    p.  1940. 
Griffiths  r.  Kellogg,  39  Wis.  290.    p.  1WJ3. 
Griffiths  V.  Lee,  1  Car.  &  P.   110.     pp.   1332, 

1333, 1334. 
Griggs  r.    Fleckenstein,  14  Minn.    81.    pp. 

1209,  1210,  1315. 


Griggs  V.  Houston  ,  104  U.  S.  553.    p.  1605. 
Grigsby  v.  Fullerton,  57  Mo.  309.     pp.   1669, 

1672." 
Grig.iby  v.  Chappell,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  446. 

p.  1207. 
Grimbaldeston  v.  Anderson,  cited  3  PhiUl- 

niore,  155;  s.  c.  1  Eng.  Ecc.  385.    p.  646. 
Grimes  v.  Bush,  16  Ark.  647.    p.  1067. 
Grimes  v.  Fall,  15  Cal.  63.    p.  607. 
Grimes  v.  Martin,  10  la.  347.    pp.  257, 1705. 
Grimes  v.  State,  63  Ala.  166.    p.  1768. 
Grimm  v.  Gamache,  25  Mo.  41.    p.  560. 
Grinnell  v.   Phillips,  1  Mass.  529.    pp.  1964, 

1966. 
Grinnell  v.  Stewart,  62  Barb.  (N.  Y".)  544. 

p.  1195. 
Gripton  v.  Thompson,  32  Kan.  367.    pp.  1494, 

2036. 
Grissom  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  374.    pp.  70, 

77,  111.  116, 129. 
Griswold  r.  American    Central   Insurance 

Co.,  1  Mo.    App.  97;   s.  c.   70  Mo.  654.    p. 

978. 
Griswold  r.  Bolev,  1  Mont.  545.   pp.  2085,2099. 
Groat  v.  Gile,  51  N.  Y'.  431.    p.  912. 
Groenwelt  v.  Burwell,  1  Salk.  144;  s.  c.  1  Ld. 

Raym.  454.    p.  150. 
Grogan  r.  Adams  Express  Co.  (Pa.),  5  Cent. 

Rep.  298.     pp.  1321.  1344,  1345,  1361. 
Groh  V.  Bassett,  7  Minn.  325.    p.  2072. 
Groll  V.  Tower,  85  Mo.  249.    pp.  1598, 1619. 
Groom  V.  State  (Tex.) ,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  668.    p.  48. 
Gropp  V.  People,  67  111.  154.    pp.  21,  83,  87. 
Groscop  I'.  Ranier,  111  Ind.  361.    p.  2035. 
Gross  t'.  State,  2  Ind.  329.    p.  65. 
Grosse  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  364.    pp.  729, 

747,  753. 
Groye  v.  Brien,  1  Md.  439.    p.  1646. 
Groye  v.  City  of  Kansas,  75  Mo.  672.    p.  1949. 
Groyer  v.  Siins,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  498.    p.  1670. 
Growcock  r.  Hall,  82  Ind.  202.    p.  2039. 
Grube  V.  Nichols,  36  111.  92.    pp.  1638,  1685. 
Grubler  v.  Ryus,  23  Kan.  195.    p.  2051. 
Gruen  v.  Ban'iberger,  25  Mo.  App.  89.    p.  2052. 
Guard  v.  Risk,  11  Ind.  156.    pp.  1477, 1964. 
Guardian  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hogan,  80 

111.  35 ;  s.  c.  22  Am.  Rep.  180.    p.  991. 
Gudgell  V.  Mead,  8  Mo.  53.    p.  1,591. 
Guengerich  r.  Smith,  36  Iowa,  .587.    p.  1479. 
Guenther  v.  Birkicht,  22  Mo.  439.    p.  888. 
Guetig  V.  State,  66  Ind.  94:  s.  c.  .'52  Am.  Rep. 

99.    pp.  73,  75,  77,  508,  509,  1782,  1848,  1879, 

ISSl,  1886. 
Guffee  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  187.    p.  1695. 
Guild    v.  Guild,  15  Pick.   (Mass.)   129.    pp. 

888,  S94. 
Guillaume   v.  Hamburg  &c.  Packet  Co.,  42 

N.  Y.  212.    p.  1157. 
Guitterniann  v.  Liyerpool  &c.  Steamship  Co., 

83  N.  Y.  358.     pp.  498,  499,  502,  503,  507,  509. 
Gulf  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Leyy,  59  Tex.  542;  s.  c.  46 

Am.  Rep.  269.    p.  315. 
Gulf,  C.  &   S.  F.  R.  Co.  V.  Redeker  (Tex.), 

2  S.  ^\\  Rep.  527.    p.  1239. 
Guuu  r.  Gudehus,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  447.    p. 

1060. 
Gunn  r.  Howell,  35  Ala.  144.    p.  1670. 
Gunn  r.  Scoyil,  4  Day  (Conn.),  228.    p.  891. 
Gunter  r.  Astor,  4  J."B.  Moore,  12.    p.  891. 
Gunter  r.  Geary,  2  Cal.  462.    p.  1378. 
Gunter  v.  GranUeville  Man.  Co..  15.  S.  C.  443. 

p.  37. 
Gunter  r.Patton, 2  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  2.=>7.    p.  48. 
Gunter  v.  Watson,  4  Jones  L.   (N.  C.)  455. 

p.  334. 
Gurney  r.  Eyans,  27  L.  J.  Exch.  166.    p.  1097. 
Gullerson  r.  Morse.  58  N.  H.  165.    p.  403. 
Guy  V.  Mead,  22  N.  Y.  162.     pp.  362,  365. 
Guykowsky  v.  People,  2  111.  476.    pp.  117, 122. 


]xxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


H. 

H.  r.  C,  1  Swab.  &  Tr.  605.    pp.  640,  649. 

H.  v.  U.,  3  Swab    &  Tr.  517,  5M;  s.  c.  33  L.  J. 

(P.  M.  &  A.)  159;  34  L.  J.  (P.  M.  &  A.)  12. 

pp.  64 (i,  650. 
Haas  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  41  Wis.  44.    pp. 

•2036,  2037. 
Habcrsliam  v.  "Wetter,  59  Ga.  11,    p.  2063. 
Jiackeiiev,  Matter  of,  21  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

54;  s.  f.'24  X.  Y.  74.     p.  1.53. 
Hacker  v.  Urowii,  81  Mo.  6S.    p.  1626. 
Hackett  V.  Snielsley,  77  111.  109.    p.  1489. 
Hackford  r.  Xew  York  Ac.   R.  Co.,6Lans. 

(N.    Y.)  381 ;  s.  c.  43  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  222. 

p.  1225. 
Hackley  r.  Hastie,  3  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  252.    pp. 

1955,  1958,  I'.mo. 
Hackley  r.  jNIuskegon  Cir.  Judge,  58  Mich. 

4.'i4.     p.  2061. 
Haddock   v.  Bury,    MS.  cited  7   East,  236, 

n.  a.    p.  948. 
Haddrick  v.  Heslop,  12  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  267. 

p.  1164. 
Haderlein  v.  St.  Louis  K.  Co., 3  Mo.  App.  601. 

p.  769. 
Hadjo  V.  Goodeu,  13  Ala.   718.    pp.  454,  455, 

469. 
Hadley  v.  Baxendale,  6  Exch.  341;  s.  c.  18 

Jur.   358;  23  L.  J.    (Exch.)  179.    pp.  1473, 

155S. 
Hadlev  V.  Cliuton  County  Importing  Co.,  13 

Oil.  St.  502.    p.  1419. 
Hadlev  v.  Hadlev  ,  82  Ind.  75.    p.  2029. 
Hadley  v.  Haywood,  121  Mass.  236.    pp.  1998 , 

2002. 
Hagan  v.  Alston,  9  Ala.  627.    p.  150. 
Hageman  v.  Morelaud , :«  Mo.  86.    p.  1593. 
Hager  r.  Hager.  38  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  92.    pp. 

1912, 1913. 
Hagerty  t'.  Scott,  10  Tex.  .525.    p.  1670. 
Hague  V.  State,  34  Mies.  (:16.    p.  1890. 
Ilalin  V.  Fredericks,  30  Mich.  223.    p.  912. 
Halin  I'.  Miller,  60  la.  96.    p.  1975. 
Haigh  V.  Belcher,  7  Car.  &  P.  389.    p.  407. 
Haight  V.  Holley,  3  AVend.  (N.  Y.)  258.    p.  19. 
Haight  v.  Lucia,  36  "Wis.  355.    p.  139. 
Haight  V.  Turner,  21  Conn.  593.    pp.  1983, 

1984. 
Hailes  v.  Marks,  30  L.  J.  Exch.  389;  s.  c.  7 

Hurl.  &  N.  56.    pp.  1172,  1179. 
Hailes  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  94.    p.  1534. 
Haines  r.  Com.,  lOuPa.  St.  317.    p.  46. 
Haines  r.  Haines,  35  Mich.  138.    p.  151. 
Haines  v.  Kent,  11  Ind.  126.    pp.  214,  220,  221. 
Haines  v.  Peoi)le,  97  111.  161.    p.  150. 
Haines  v.  Stouffer,  10  Pa.  St.  363.    p.  1668. 
Haines  v.  Stouffer,  33  Pa.  St.  541.    p.  966. 
Haines  v.  Territory  (Wyo.),  13  Pac.  Rep.  8. 

p.  1801. 
Haines  v.  Welch,  14  Ore.  319.    p.  1109. 
Hair  v.  Little,  28  Ala.  236.    pp.  1651, 1679. 
Hairo  V.  Wilson,  9  Barn.  &  Ores.  634.    p.  1456. 
Hairgrovei'.  Millington,8  Kan. 480.    pp.1941, 

1942,  1962,  2023,  2027,2028. 
Haish  r.  Mundav,  12  Bradw.  (111.)  539.    p.  334. 
Haish  v.  Pavsoii,  107  111.  36.5.    pp.  .505,  .510. 
Halbert  r.  Halbert,  21  Mo.  277.     pp.  851,  1001. 
Haldane  v.  Harvey,  4  Burr.  2489.    pp.  6.54,  6.5S. 
Ilaldeman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50  Pa.  St.  425. 

p.  1107. 
Hale  V.  Cove,  Strange,  642.    p.  1964. 
Hale  V.  Rich,  48  Vl.  217.    pp.  778,  1047. 
Hale  V.  Sittingbourne  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  HurL  & 

X.  488;  «.  c.  30  L.  J.  (Exch.;  81.  p.  1218. 
Hale  V.  Taylor,  45  X.  H.  40.5.  pp.  344,  346. 
Hale    Man.  Co.  v.  American    Saw  Co.,  43 

Mich.  2.50.    p.  105>!. 
Hales  V.  Owen,  2  Salk.  625.    p.  2080. 


Haley  v.  Case,  142  Mass.  316 ;  «.  c.l  X.    E. 

Rep.  877.    p.  1241. 
Haley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  69  Mo.  614.    p.  1311. 
Haley  r.  State.  63  Ala.  83.    pp.  421,  454,  470. 
Halfertv  r.  Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.,  82  Mo.  90. 

pp.  1307,  1494. 
Halifax's  Case,  Bull.  (N.  P.)  7th  ed.  298.    p. 

1331. 
Hall  V.  Biever,  I  la.  113.    p.  1060. 
Hall  V.  Burgess,  o  Barn.  &  Cres.  3S2.    p.  1003. 
Hall  r.  Cheney,  36  X.  H.  26.    pp.  1322,  1343. 
Hall  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  la.  2.58.    p.  2. 
Hall  V.  Coin.  (Pa.),  12  All.  Rep.  163;  s.  c.  11 

Cent.  Rep.  183.    pp.  63,  78. 
Hall  r.  Costello,  48  X.  H.  176.    p.  820. 
Hall  v.  Cunningham,  1  Munf.   (Va.)330.    p. 

918. 
Hall  V.  Dewev,  10  Vt.  .593.    p.  1044. 
Hall  r.  Durha'm,  10  X.  East.  Rop.  .581.   p.  1619. 
Hall  r.    Flockton,  16  Ad.    &  El.  (N.  8.)  1039. 

p.  955. 
Hall  V.  Fond  du  Lao,  42  Wis.  274.    p.  1249. 
Hal.  i\  Fuller,  5  Barn.   &  Cres.  750.    p.  1034. 
Hall  V.  Gale,  20  Wi.<.  292.    p.  1473. 
Hall  V.  Hawkins,  5  llumpb.  (Tenn.)  357.  pp. 

1195,  1 107. 
Hall  r.  Henline,  9  Ind.  256.    p.  1674. 
Hall  V.  Lowell,  10  Gush.  260.    p.  1247. 
Hall  r.  lAIcLeod,  2  Mete.  (Kv.)  98.    p.  1012. 
Hall  V.  Xees,  27  111.  411.     p.  2063. 
Hall  V.  Parsons,  17  Vt.  271.    p.  1446. 
Hall  V.  Patterson,  51  Pa.  St.  289.    p.  316. 
Hall  V.  Platimer,  49  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)   500; 

s.  c.  5  Daly  (X.  Y.),  534.    p.  145. 
Hall  r.  Rav,  18  X.  H.  126.    p.  364. 
Hall  V.  Rehfro,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  51.  pp.  806, 1343. 

1667,1771,1772. 
Hall  V.  Robinson,  25  la.  91.    pp.  1984, 1993. 
Hall   V.  Rupley,  10   Pa.    St.    231.    pp.  1947, 

1948. 
Hall  V.  Southmayd,  15  Barb.  32.    p.  891. 
Hall    V.  State,  40  Ala.  698.    pp.    22,  35,  302, 

1800. 
Hall  V.   State,  .51  Ala.  9.    pp.  17,  19,  69,  129. 
Hall  v.  State ,  8  Ind.  439.    pp.  1710,  1715 ,  1750, 

1896,  1897. 
Hall  V.  suvdam,  6  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  84.    pp.  1197, 

1198,  1199. 
Hall  V.  Tittabawassee  Boom  Co.,  51  Mich. 

377.     p.  1148. 
Hall  V.  Weare,  92  U.  S.  728.    p.  214. 
Hall  V.  Weir,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  261.    p.  1698. 
Hall  r.  Wheeler,  13  Ind.  371.    p.  1446. 
Hall  i:  Wolff,  61  Iowa,  559.    pp.  705,  708,  713, 

743,  761. 
Halleck  r.  Mixer,  16  Cal.  574.    p.  890. 
Hallettv.  Jenks,  I  Gaines'  Gas.  (X.  Y.)  43.  p. 

2007. 
Halliburton   v.   Johnson,  30  Ark.    723.    p. 

2093. 
Ilalliday  v.  Briggs  (Xeb.),  18  N.  W.  Rep.  55. 

p.  925. 
Hallidav  v.  Jones.  .59  Mo.  482.    p.  1598. 
Halliday  v.   Sterling,  62  Mo.  321.    pp.  1168, 

1171. 
Halligan  v.  Wade,  21  111.  470.    pp.  1003,  1005. 
Ilallock  i\  Franklin,   2  Mete.    (Mass.)    558. 

pii.  112,  1975,  1976. 
Halpin  r.  Third  Avenue  R.  Co.,  8  Jones  &  S. 

(X.  V.)  17.5.     p.  207. 
Halsey  v.  Sinsebaugh,  15  X.  Y.  485.    pp.  355, 

361,  365. 
Ham  V.  Goodrich,  37  X.  II.  185.    p.  1496. 
Ham    V.  Losher,  24    Up.    Can.  Q.  B.  r)33n. 

]..  114. 
Ham  r.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  645.    pp.  253,  1817. 
Hamaker  v.  Eberly,  2  Binn.  (Pa.)  506.    p. 

1139. 
Ilainbleton  v.  Dempsey,  20  Oh.  231.    p.  2009. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxvii 


Hamblett  v.  Hamblett,  6  N.  H.  333.    p.  5S5. 
Hambley  v.  Trott,  Cowp.  373.    p.  890. 
Hanier  v.  Hathawaj-,  33  Cal.  117.    p.  1494. 
Hamilton  v.  Bishop,  2-2  Iowa,  211.    ]).  1425. 
Haniiltou  v.  Boston,  14  Allen  (Mass.),  475. 

p.  1210. 
Hamilton   v.  Burch,  28  Ind.    233.    pp.  2141, 

2146. 
Hamilton   v.  Conyers,  25  Ga.  158.    pp.  2067, 

2U99. 
Hamilton  v.  Cutts,  4  Mass.  348.    p.  1003. 
Hamilton  v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  Co. ,  36  la. 

31.     pp.  1964,  1965. 
Hamilton  r.  Eno,  81  N.  Y.  116.   p.  1460. 
Hamilton   v.  Glenn,  1  Pa.   St.  340.    pp.  1938, 

1962. 
Hamilton  v.  Marks,  63  Mo.  178.    p.  9.i0. 
Hamilton  v.  Pease,  38  Coun.  115.    pp.    1913, 

1921,  1922,  1923. 
Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173.    pp.  283, 
371,   402,  409,  412,  452,  456,  457,  458,  575,  732, 
1505,  1506,  1508,  1511,  1517.  1691,  1770,  1816. 
Hamilton  v.  Rice,  15  Tex.  382.    p.  3b3. 
Hamilton  v.  Russell,  1  Cranch  (U.  S.),  309. 

pp.  !440,  1669. 
Hamilton  r.  Shoaff,  90  Ind.  63.    p.  2038. 
Hamilton  v.  State,  11  Oh.  436.    p.  1566. 
Hamilton  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  194.    pp.  1560. 
Hamilton  v.  Taylor,  Littell's  Sel.  Cas.  (Ky.) 

444.     p.  294. 
Hamlyn  v.  Nesbit,  37  Ind.  284.    p.  219. 
Hamm  v.  Romine,  98  Ind.  77.    pp.  21,37,  2138. 
Hammon  v.  Sexton,  69  Ind.  37.    pp.  2110,  2112. 
Hammat  i-.  Russ,  16  Me.  171.     p.  1670. 
Hammersley  i-.  Brown,  2  Johns.  Oh.  (N.  Y.) 

423.     p.  649. 
Hammett  v.  Yea,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  144.    p.  886. 
Hammon  v.  Hopping,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  503. 

p.  608. 
Hammond  v.  Mukwa,  40  Wis.  35.    p.  1247. 
Hammond  v.  Stewart,  1  Strange,  510.    p.  179. 
Hampton  r.  Dean,  4  Tex.  455.     p.  1672. 
Hampton  i'.  Speckenagle,  9  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

212.     p.  1941. 
Hampton  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  652.    p.  1835. 
Hampton  v.  State,  45  Tex.  1,54.    p.  4.37. 
Hamrich  v.  Combs,  14  Neb.  381.    p.  191. 
Hamrick  v.    Danville  &c.  Co.,  32  Ind.  347. 

p.  561. 
Hancock  v.  Bliss,  7  AVend.  (N.  Y.),  267.    p.  965. 
Hancock  v.  Horau,  15  Tex.  507.    p.  1672. 
Hancock  v.  Whybark,  66  Mo.  672.    p.  871. 
Hancock  Mut.   Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Moore,   34 

Mich.  41.     pp.  325,  326. 
Hanford  v.  Artcher,  4  Hill  (N.  Y.),  272.    pp. 

1440,  1441. 
Handler  r.  Leigh,  8  Tex.  129.    pp.  1964.1966. 
Haudliiief.  State, 6Tex.  App. 347.    pp. 22,125. 
Handly  v.  Call,  30  Me.  9.    pp.  69, 1934. 
Hanegar  i\  Spangler,  29  Ga.  217.    p.  188. 
Hanev  V  Caldwell,  35  Ark.  156.    p.  860. 
Haney  v.  Caldwell,  43  Ark.  184.    p.  1690. 
Handy  v.  Sta^.e,  7  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  42.    p.  879. 
Hanger  v.  Evins,  38  Ark.  334.    p.  1690. 
Hanger  r.  Imboden,  12  Mo.  83.    ii.  1937. 
Hanks  v.  Neal,  44  Miss.  213.    p.  1747. 
Hanks  v.  State,  21  Tex.  526.    pp.  103, 120. 
Hanlon  v.  Ingram,  3  la.  81.    p.  1210. 
Hanlyn  v.  Nesbit,  37  Ind.  284.    )).  239. 
Hanna  v.  People,  86  111.  243.    p.  23. 
Hanna  r.  Phillips,  1  Grant  Uas.   (Pa.)   253. 

pp.  849, 1412. 
Hann;i  v.  Renfro,  33  Miss.  126.    p.  1747. 
Hannah   v.  McKellop,  49  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  342. 

p.  474. 
Hannah  v.  State,  75  Tenn.  (II  Lea)  201.    pp. 

722, 1.520. 
Hannah  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  579.    p.  1896. 
Hannahau  v.  People,  91  111.  142.    p.  1647. 


Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox  (Kan.),  3  Pac. 

Rep.  330.     p.  1239. 
Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  31  Kan.  590.    pp. 

1261,  1483. 
Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mahoney,  42  Mo.  467. 

p.  20.55. 
Hannibal  &c  R.  Co.  v.  Martin,  111  111.  225. 

pp.  J -288,  1483. 
Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  37  Mo.  338. 

pu.  560,  572. 
Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  12  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

262.    ]!.  1152. 
Hannum  v.  Belchertowu,  19  Pick.   (Mass.) 

311.     pp.  1753,  1794,  19S3. 
Hauoff  V.  State,  37  Oh.  St.  178;  s.  c.  41  Am. 

Rep.  496.     pp.  282,  527,  530,  S'.O. 
Hansen  v.  Erickson,  28  111.  257.    p.  1774. 
Hanson  v.  Meyer,  6  East,  614.    \>.  909. 
Hanson  v.  Presbyterian  Church,  11  N.  J. 

Eq.  441.     p.  424.  " 
Happel  V.  Brethauer,  70  111.  166.    p.  819. 
Harbor  v.  Morgan,  4  Ind.  158.    p.  1674. 
Harbour  v.  Scott,  12  La.  Ann.  152.     p.  1903. 
Hardenburgh  v.  Crarv,  15  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 

307.     pp.  107,  111,  119,"  123,  127. 
Hardin    v.    Branner,    25    la.    364.    pp.  2033, 

2036. 
Hardin  v.  Helton,  50  Ind.  319.    p.  1726. 
Hardin  t>.  Kritsinger,  17  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  293. 

p.  609. 
Hardin  v.   State,  4    Tex.  App.  355.    pp.  93, 

565,  1811. 
Harding  v.  Colburn,  12 Mete.  (Mass.)  333.    p. 

1072. 
Harding  v.   Whitney,  40  Ind.  379.    pp.  124, 

1990. 
Haidly  v.  State,  7  Mo.  607.    p.  1951. 
Hardihan  v.  Bellhouse,  9  Mees.  &  W.  596.    p. 

955. 
Hardy  v.  Merrill,  56  N.  H.  227.    p.  342. 
Hardy  v.  Norton,  66  Barb.    (N.  Y.)  527.    p. 

1940. 
Hardy  v.  Simpson,  13  Ired.  L.   (N.  C.)  132. 

pp.  1407,  1408,  1409,  1410. 
Hardy  v.  Skinner,  9  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  191.    p. 

1410. 
Hardy  r.  Sprowle,  32  Me.  310.    pp.  53, 117. 
Hardy  v.  State,  7  Mo.  607.    ]>.  150(5. 
Hardy,  Ex  parte  (Ala.),  3  Cent.  L.  J.  50.    pp. 

132.  153. 
Hardy's  Case,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  414.    pp.  363, 

1905,  1909. 
Hare  v.  Henty,  30  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  302;  s.  c.  10 

Com.  Bench  (N.  s.),65.    p.  944. 
Hare  r.  Sproul,  2  How.  (Miss.)  722.    p.  2097. 
Hare  v.  Siate,  4  How.  (Miss.)  187.    pp.  387, 

1904,  1921,1981. 
Harebottle  r.  Placock,  Cro.  Jac.  21.    p.  1926. 
Harford  v.  Gardner,  2  Leon.  30.    p.  889. 
Haring  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  13  Barb.  (N, 

Y. )  9.     p.  1230. 
Harker  v.  Anderson,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  372. 

p.  937. 
Harkins  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  452.    p.  81. 
Harlan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65  Mo.  26.    p.  1305. 
Harlan  r.  St.   Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  480; 

s.  c.  2  Thomp.  Neg.  439.    p.  1235. 
Harmon  v.  Shotwell,  49  Mo.  423.    p.  1707. 
Harmon  v.  Thornton,  3  111.  351.    p.  .560. 
Harner'8  Ai)peal,  5  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  473.    p. 

2057. 
Harness  v.  State,  57  Ind.  1.    pp.  372,  552. 
Harnett  r.  Harnett,  59  la.  401.    jip.  2068,  2093. 
Harnev  f.  Owen,  4  Blackf.    (Ind.)  337.    pp. 

S8S,  895. 
Harper  v.  Burrow,  6  Ired.  L.   (N.  C.)  30.    p. 

265. 
Harper  V.  Calhoun,  7  How.   (Miss.)  203.    p. 

1023. 


Ixxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Harper  t'.  Farmers'  &c.  Bank,  7  Watts  &  S. 

(Pa.)  204.    p.  1941. 
Harper  v.  Harper,  57  Ind.  .547.    p.  37'2. 
Harper  v.  Keen,  11  Serg.  &  K.  (Pa.)  '280.    pp. 

69,  71,  838. 
Harper  v.  Lamping,  3.3  Cal.  (Ul.    p.  392. 
Harperi'. Lexington &c.  R.Co.,  2Daua(Kv.), 

227.    p.  697. 
Harper  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  365.    p.  1248. 
Harper  v.  Minor,  27  Cal.  108.    p.  2094. 
Harper  v.  State,  101  lud.  109.    pp.  1776,  2092. 
Harper  r.  Smith,  1  Cranch  0.  0.  (U.  S.)  495. 

p.  1669. 
Harriman  v.  Boston,  114  Mass.  241.    p.  1249. 
Harrimau  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.,  49  Wis.  71.    pp. 

•2030,  '2042. 
Harrimau  v.  Wilkins,  '20  Me.  93.    p.  1939. 
Harring  r.  Allen,  '25  Mich.  505.    pp.  1009. 
Harrington  v.  Latta,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  364.    p. 

2050. 
Harrington  v.  Lincoln,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  133. 

p.  449. 
Harringtons.  Lincoln,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  563. 

p.  472. 
Harrington  v.  Snyder,  3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  380. 

p.  1328. 
Harrington  v.  State,  76  Ind.  112.    p.  1977. 
Harris  v.  Bishop  of  Lincoln,  2  P.  Wms.  137. 

p.  841. 
Harris  v.  Butterly,  Cowp.  483.    1584. 
Harris  v.  Central  R.  Co.  (Ga.),3N.  East.  Rep. 

355.    p.  378. 
Harris  v.  Davis,  1  Chit.  6-25n.    p.  2003. 
Harris  v.  Doe,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  369.    pp.  825, 

827,  1750. 
Harris  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  37  Mo.  308. 

p.  1607. 
Harris  v.  Lee,  80  Mo.  420.    p.  1708. 
Harris  v.  Miner,  '28  111.  135.    p.  1669. 
Harris  v.  North  Ind.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  232.    p. 

1343. 
Harris  v.  Packwood,  3  Taunt.  264.    pp.  1319, 

1337, 1361. 
Harris  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  5  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  312. 

p.  566. 
Harris  v.  Ray,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  628.    p.  2071. 
Harris  v.  Robinson,  4  How.  (U.  S.)  336.    p. 

942. 
Harris  v.  Rosenberg,  43  Conn.  227.    p.  336. 
Harris  v.  Shaffer,  92  N.  C.  30.    p.  2. 
Harris  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  Mo.  App. 

328.    p.  2087. 
Harris  v.  State,  30  Ind.  131.    p.  471. 
Harris  v.   State,  6  Tex.  App.  97.    pp.  17,  30. 
Harris  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  .309.    p.  1855. 
Harris  v.  State,  44  Tex.  146.    p.  313. 
Harris  r.  Tippett,  2  Camp.  637.    pp.  396,416. 
Harris  v.  Wall,  7  How.  (U.  S.)  693.    p.  572. 
Harris  v.  Wilson,  7  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  57.    pp. 

414,  547,  804. 
Harris  v.  Woody,' 9  Mo.  11.3.    pp.  1507,1597, 

16'20,  1621,  16'24. 
Harrisburg  Bank  v.  Foster,  8  Watts  (Pa.), 

304.    p.  59. 
Harrison  v.  Brooks,  20  Ga.  537.    p.  1394. 
Harrison  v.  Cachelin,  27  Mo.  26.      pp.  1668, 

1669,  167'2. 
Harrison  v.  Davies,  23  La.  Ann.  216.    p.  968. 
Harrison   v.  Hance,  37   Mo.    185.    pp.    1506, 

1951. 
Harrison  v.  Harrison,  4  Moore  P.  C.  96.    pp. 

646, 649,  650. 
Harrison  v.  Lockwood ,  14  Nev.  263.    p.  2099. 
Harrison  v.  Middleton,  11  Gratt.  (Va.)  527. 

pp.  353,  361. 
Harrison  v.  Park,  1  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  170, 

pp.  703,  725. 
Harrison    v.   Price,   22   Ind.  165.    pp.    1920. 

1974,  2141. 


Harrison    v.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

580.     p.  392. 
Harrison  r.  Rowan,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  32. 

pp.  19-26,  1972. 
Harrison  v.  Sparrow,  3  Curt.  Ecc.  1 ;  s.  c  7 

Eng.  Ecc.  3.57.     pp.  646.  650. 
Harrison  v.  Spring  Valley  Ilvdraulic  Gold 

Co.,  65  Cal.  376.     pp.  1683,  1751. 
Harrison    v.    St.    Mark's    Church,  12  Phila, 

(Pa.)  259.    p.  1383. 
Harrison  v.  State,  35  Ark.  458.    pp.  146,   151. 
Harrison  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.    558.    pp.  16, 

20. 
Harrison  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  42.    p.  1855. 
Harrison  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  183.    pp.  1873, 

1874. 
Harrison  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  407.    p.  1873. 
Harrison  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  325.    p.  389. 
Harrison  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  442.     p.  1779. 
Harrison  v.  Young,  9  Ga.  3.59.    pp.  1711,  1762. 
Harrison's  Appeal,  48  Conn.  202.    ]).  422. 
Harrison's  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  861.    pp. 

472,  484. 
Harriss  v.  Guin,  10  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  563. 

p.  1060. 
Hart  V.  Boiler,  15  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)  162.    pp. 

955   958. 
Hart'i'.  Bray,  50  Ala.  446.    p.  1689. 
Hart  V.  Brooklyn,  36  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  226.    p. 

r249. 
Hart  V.  Girard,  56  Pa.  St.  23.    pp.  1019, 1746. 
Hart  V.  Heilner,  3    Rawle  (Pa.),  407.    pp. 

293,  805. 
Hart  V.  Hud.son,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.),  294.    p.  952. 
Hart  V.  Kimball,  72  Cal.  283  ;s.  c.  13  Pac.  Rep. 

852.    p.  2085. 
Hart  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  112  U.  S.  331. 

p.  1360. 
Hart  V.  Rector,  7  Mo.  531.    p.  1592. 
Hart  V.  Red  Cedar,  63  Wis.  634.    p.  2043. 
Hart  V.  State,  57  Ind.  102.    pp.  74,  1566, 1697. 
Hart  V.  State,  14  Xeb.  572.    p.  707. 
Hart  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  16.3.    p.  1756. 
Hart  V.  Tallmadge,  3  Day  (S.  C),  381.     p.  35. 
Hart  V.  Wall,  2  C.  P.  Div.  146.    p.  1453. 
Hart  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Mann's  Boudoir  Car  Co. 

(Mich.),  32  N.  W.  Rep.  820.     p.  2030. 
Ilarter  r.  Seaman,  3  Blackf.    (Ind.)  27.    pp. 

1910,  1911. 
Hartfield  v.  Roper,  21  Wend.  (N.Y.)  615 ;  s.  c. 

2  Thomp.  Neg.  221.     pp.  1'231,  1232,  1605. 
Hartford  v.  State,  96  Ind.  461.    p.  1803. 
Hartford  Bank  v.  Barry,  17  JNIass.  93.  p.  1022. 
Hartford  Bank  v.  Hart.  3  Day  (Conn.),  491. 

pp.  53,  82. 
Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  36  Mich. 

502.    p.  805. 
Hartley  v.  Chidester,  36  Kan.  363;  s.  c.  13  Pac. 

Rep. "578.     p.  2046. 
Hartley  v.  Cummins,  5  C.  B.  248.     p.  891. 
Hartshorn  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  Iowa, 

613.     p.  1500. 
Hartshorn  v.  Gelston,  3  Caines  (N.  Y.),84. 

p.  7. 
Hartnett  v.  Garvev,  66  N.  Y.  641.    p.  507. 
Hartz  v.  Com.,  1  Grant  Cas.    (Pa.)   359.    p. 

1060. 
Hartzell  v.  Com.,  40  Pa.  St.  462.    pp.  42,  92. 
Harvey  v.  Childs,  28  Ohio  St.  319.    p.  878. 
Harvey  v.  Ellithorpe,  '26  111,    418.   pp.    221, 

222. 
Harvey  v.  Hewitt,  8  Dowl.  P.  C.  598.  pp.  1966, 

1067. 
Harvey  v.  Huston,  94  Ind.  527.    pp.  .563,  2090. 
Harvey  v.  Jones,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  157.    pp. 

1964,  1992. 
Harvey  v.  Mitchell,  2    Mood.  &  R.  366.    p. 

615. 
Harvey  v.  Osborne,  55  Ind.  .535.    pp.  322,  577. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxix 


Harvev  v.  Rickctt,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  87.    p. 

]9(i4." 
Haivey  v.  Rose,  26  Ark.  3.    p.  1369. 
Harvey  v.  bkipwith,  16  Gratt.  (Va.)  405.    p. 

]'i70. 
Harvev  v.  Smith,  55  111.  2-25.    p.  1036. 
H;.rveV  v.   State,  40  Ind.  516.    pp.  357,  568, 

T2',  732,  786.  1520,  1694. 
Harvev  v.  Sullens,  46  Mo.  147.    p.  1410. 
Harvey  v.  Terre  Haute  &c.  R.   Co.,  74  Mo. 

538.    p.  1361. 
Harvey  v.   Tvler,   2  Wall.  (U.   S.)  328.    pp. 

1708,  1740,  1956. 
Haselmton  v.  Gill,  3  T.  R.  620.     p.  1440. 
Haseltine  v.    Ausherman,    87   Mo.    410.    p. 

1412. 
Haseltine  v.  Simpson,  61  Wis.  427.    p.  2101. 
Haskell  v.  Beckec,  3  Me.  92.    p.  1990. 
Haskell  V.  Champion,  30  Mo.  136.    pp.  1031, 

1032. 
Haskett  v.  State,  51  Ind.  176.    p.  14.5. 
Haskiiigs  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  302. 

pp.  1669,  1671. 
Haslack  v.  Mavers,  26  X.  J.  L.  284.    p.  893. 
Hassa  r.  Junger,  15  Wis.  598.    \>.  1229. 
Hasselback  v.  Sinton,  11  Ind.  545.    pp.  2108, 

2111. 
Hasselmeyer  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  690.    p. 

no. 

Hassfeldt  v.  Dill,  28  Minn.  469.    p.  1413. 
Hassler  v.  Schumacher,  10  Wis.  419.    p.  777. 
Hastiuffs  V.  Bangor  House  Proprietors,    IS 

Me.  437.    p.  1754. 
Hastings  v.  Lovering,   2  Pick.   (Mass.)  214. 

p.  925. 
Hastings  r.  Lusk,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  410.    p. 

795. 
Hastings  v.  Palmer,  20  Wend.    (N.  Y.)  225. 

p.  307. 
Hastings  r.  Pepper,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  41.    pp. 

1322,  1343,  1365,  1366,  1367. 
Hastings  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingalls,  15  Neb.  123. 

p.  2091. 
Hatch  V.  Bayley,  12  Cush.   (Mass.)  27.    pp. 

90S,  920. 
Hatch  V.  Fowler,  28  Mich.  205.    p.  912. 
Hatch  V.  Mann,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  262.    pp. 

1902,   1904. 
Hatch  V.  Oil  Co.,  100  U.  S.  124.    p.  910. 
Hatch  r.  Potter,  2  Gilm.  (111.)  725.    p.  372. 
Hatch  V.  Spearin,  11  Me.  354.    p.  1698. 
Hatch  V.  State,  S  Tex.  App.  416.    pp.  747,  750, 

752,  758,  760. 
Hatch  ell   v.  Odom,  2  Dev.  &  Batt.  (X.  C.) 

302.     p.  1585. 
Hatcher  v.  Fowler,  1  Bibb  (Ky.),  337.    p.  108. 
Hatcher  v.  Moore,  51  Mo.  115.    p.  2052. 
Hatcher  v.  State,  18  Ga.  460.    p.  748. 
Hatlield  v.  Cheanev,  76  111.  488.    p.  1947. 
Hatfield  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  61  la.  440. 

pp.  1261,  1802. 
Hatfield  v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.  (Minn.),  22  X. 

W.  Hep.  176;  s.  c.  ,32  Minn.  130.     j).  6.56. 
Hatrtel,.;  v.   St.  Paul  &c.   R.   Co.,  IS  Am.   & 

Eng.  R.  R.  Cas.  292.    p.  654. 
Hathaway  v.  Brown,  18  Minn.  414.     p.  344. 
Hathaway  u.  Crocker,  7  Mete.   262,     p.  375. 
Hathaway  v.  Crosby,  17  Me.  448.    pp.  1748, 

1749. 
Hathaway  v.  Helmer,  25  Barb.  (X".  Y.)  29. 

pp.  59,112. 
Hathaway    a.    Hemingway,    20  Conn.    195. 

p.  307. 
Hathaway  v.  Xational  Life  Insurance  Co., 

48Vt.  336.     pp.  505,  515. 
Hathaway  v.  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.,  46  Ind.  25. 

p.  1224. 
Hathorn  v.  King.  8  Mass.  371.    p.  497. 
Hathorn  v.  Stinson,  10  Me.  224.    p.  1670. 


Hatton  V.  Robinson,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  416.    p. 

272. 
Hauii  V.  Wilson.  28  Ind.  296.    pp.  1983,  1984, 

1990. 
Haupt  V.  Pohlman,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  s.)  301.   p. 

1693. 
Hauser  v.  Com.,  5  Am.  L.  Reg.  (n.  s.)  668. 

p.  68. 
Haussknecht  v.  Clayi^ool,  1  Black  (U.  S.), 

431.     p.  554. 
Havemeyer  i'.  Ingersoll,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  s.) 

301.    p.  580. 
Haven  r.  Foster,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  130.    p.  820. 
Havis  V.  Tavlor,  13  Ala.  324.     p.  566. 
Hawes  r.  Gu8tin,2  Allen  (Mass.),  402.  pp.55,' 

316,  385. 
Hawkes  v.  Kennebeck,  7  Mass.  461.    p.  55. 
Hawkes  v.  Salter,  4Bing.  715;  s.  c.  1  Moore  & 

P.  750.    p.  944. 
Hawkes  v.  Saunders,  Cowp.  290.    p.  889. 
Hawkes  v.  Smith,  i  Car.  &  M.  72.    pp.  1321, 

1345. 
Hawkins  v.  Andrews,  39  Ga.  118.    p.  119. 
Hawkins  v.  Carbines,  3  Hurl.  &  N.  914.    p. 

11.58. 
Hawkins  v.  Hoffman,  6  Hill  (X.  Y.),586.    pp. 

1157,  1330. 
Hawkins  v.  New  Orleans  PrintingCo.,  29 La. 

Ann.  134.     pp.  1922,  1923,  1924. 
Hawkins  v.  Xye,  59  Tex.  98.    p.  1080. 
Hawkins  v.  Pleasants,  71  N.  C.  325.    p.  416. 
Hawkins  i\  State,  9  Ala.  137.    p.  40. 
Hawkins  r.  State,  13  Ga.  322.    p.  41. 
Hawks  V.  Baker,  6  Me.  72.    p.  329. 
Hawks  V.  Crofton,  2  Burr.  700.    p.  2011. 
Hawley  i\  Chicago &c.  R.  Co.,  71  la.  717:  s.  c. 

29  N.  W.  Rep.  787.     p.  1632. 
Hawthorn  v.  State,  58  Miss.  778.    p.  1791. 
Hav  V.  Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  159.    p.  1316. 
Hay  V.  Ousterout,  3  Oh.  384.    p.  2003. 
Havcroft  V.  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun  (N. 

Y".),489.    p.  1209. 
Haycroft  v.  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  N.  Y. 

636.     pp.  1209,  1218. 
Hayden  v.  Johnson,  59  Ga.  105.    p.  2062. 
Hayden  r.  Long,  S  Ore.  244.    p.  127. 
Havden  v.  Madison,  7  Me.  78.    p.  892. 
Hayden  v.  Suiithville  Man.  Co.,  29  Conn.  548. 

p.  1210. 
Hayden  v.  Souger,  56  Ind.  42 ;  s.  c.  26  Am.  Rep. 

1.    p.  1750. 
Havden  r.  Woods,  16  Neb.  306.    p.  2058. 
Haves  v.  Acre,  Com.  &  M.  19.    p.  891. 
Hayes  v.  Caldwell,  10  111.  333.    p.  261. 
Haves  v.  Cheatham,  6  Lea  (Tenn.),  2.    pp. 

485,  489. 
Hayes  v.  Fischer,  102  U.  S.  121.    p.  150, 
Haves  v.  Reg.,  10  Irish  L.  53.    p.  35. 
Haves  v.  State,  68  Ga.  35.    pp.  205, 1650, 1653, 

1658. 
Hayes  r.  Thompson,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (ST. 

S.)220.    pp.  118,  123. 
Hayes  v.  Warren,  2  Strange,  933.    p.  889. 
Haymondu.  Saucer,84  Ind.  3.    pp.  1492,  1776. 
Haynes  v.  Birks,  3  Bos.  &  P.  599.    p.  944. 
Haynes  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  23  Fed.  Rep. 

18.    p.  2092. 
Haynes  v.  Crutchfield,  7  Ala.  189.    p.  85. 
Haynes  v.  Hunsicker,  26  Pa.  St.  58.    p.  80.5. 
Haynes  v.  Ledyard,  33  Mich.  319.    pp.  376, 

385,  388. 
Haynes  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  84.    p.  1744. 
Havnes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38.    p.  1911. 
HaVnie  r.  Baylor,  18  Tex.  498.     p.  1109. 
Hays  r.  Bell,  16  :Mo.  496.    pp.  1598, 1600. 
Hays  r.  Ford,  55  Ind.  52.    p.  136. 
Hays  V.  Gallagher,  72  Pa.  St.   136.    pp.  1222, 

1225. 
Hays  I'.  Hayman,  20  La.  Ann.  336.    p.  1195. 


Ixxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Havs  V.  Havs,  10  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  419.    pp. 

n22,  1124. 
Havs  r.    Keuuedv,  41   Pa.  St.  378.    pp.  1318, 

13'22,  134f;,  1347,  ii^r,,  1S58. 
Havs  V.  McKoe,2  Hlackf.  (Ind.)  11.    p.  2107. 
Havsr.  Richardson,  1  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  366.   p. 

205. 
Ha.\  ward  v.  Bath,  38  X.  H.  1S2.    p.  344. 
Havward    v.    Kuapp,    22    Minn.    5.    pp.  695, 

ifXi'.l. 

Ilayward  r.  LeBaron,  4  Fla.  404.    p.  886. 
Havward  r.  I^eoiiard,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  181;  s. 

c.  19  Am.  Dec.  2(;8.     p.  892. 
Havward  r.  Peoi.le,  90  111.  492.    p.  532. 
Hayward  i-.  Callioun,  2  Oh.  St.  164.     p.  05. 
Havwood  r.  Harman,  17  111.  477.    \<.  1141. 
Hazard  i-.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  Biss.  (U.  S.) 

503.    p.  1284. 
Hazard  Powder  Co.  r.  Viergutz,  6  Kan.  471. 

pp.  2034,  2036,  2041,  2124. 
Hazi'ltine  r.   Stinipson,  Wis.  61  427.    p.  2097. 
Hazeltou  v.  Case,  46  AVis.  392.     p.  1380. 
Hazzard  v.  Citizens'  Bank,  72  Ind.  130.    p. 

1647. 
Heacock  v.  Hosmer,  109  111.  245.    p.  2. 
Heacock  v.  Lubukee,  108  III.  641.    i)p.  2,  3. 
Heacock  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  97.    p.  59. 
Head  r.   Langworthy,  15  la.  235.    pp.  1727, 

1728, 1948. 
Head  v.  Sleeper,  20  Me.  314.    p.  1604. 
Head  v.  State,  44  Mis.s.  731.    pp.  81,  1747. 
Headen  v.  Womack,  88  N.  C.  468.    p.  1061. 
Headrick  v.  AVisehart,  57  Ind.  129.    p.  2066. 
Heady  v.  Fishburn,  3  Neb.  263.    p.  2097. 
IleadV  r.  Vevay  Turnp.  Co.,  52  Ind.  117.    pp. 

679,"681. 
Ileaffer  r.  Xew  Era  Life  Ins.  Co.,  101  Pa.  St. 

178.    p.  624. 
Heagv  r.  State,  85  Ind.  260.    pp.  721, 1520. 
Ileald    V.  Thing,  45    Me.   392.    pp.  495,  497, 

498. 
Heard  v.  Pierce,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)   338.    pp. 

i;57,  142, 171,  187. 
Heard  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  1.    p.  1962. 
TIr;irn  v.  Greenslnirgh,  51  Ind.  119.    p.  55. 
lii'arn  v.  Kiehl,  3S  Pa.  St.  147.    p.  955. 
Ilearn  v.  Tenuant,  14  Ves.  136.    p.  167. 
Hearue  v.  Southern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal. 

482.    p.  1223. 
Hcarsav  v.  Pruyn,  7  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  179.    p. 

1625. 
Ilcarsomr.  Grandine,87  111.  115.    p.  2069. 
Heartt  v.  Rhodes,  66  111.  351.     p.  1647. 
Ueaston  v.  Cincinnati  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  Ind. 

275.    p.  128. 
Heath  v.  Biddle,  9  Pa.  St.  273.    pp.  1065, 1066. 
Heath  v.  Com.,  1  Rob.  (Va.)  735.     p.  123. 
Heath  v.  Conwav,  1   Bibb   (Ky.),  398.    pp. 

1965,  1966,  1983, 1984,  2096. 
Heath  V.  Cook,  7  Allen  (Mass.), 59.    p.  886. 
Heath  v.  Randall,  4   Cush.  (Ma.ss.),  195.    p. 

916. 
Heath  v.  Waters,  40  Mich.  4.57.    p.  ,368. 
Heberd  v.  Wines,  105  Ind.  237.    p.  2102. 
Heckelman  r.  Rup)),  Sa  Ind.  286.     p.  2014. 
Uecker  v.  noi)kius,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  301, 

n.     pp.  218,  220. 
Hecker  v.  Sterling,  36  Pa.  St.  423.    p.  1089. 
Hector  r.  Knox,  63  Tex.  61i5.    ])p.  1015,  1016. 
Hedges  i\  Hudson  River  &c.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 

223.    p.  1143. 
Hedges  V.  Williams,  33  Hun  (X.  Y.),  546.    p. 

.'570. 
Ilecrdt  V.  Wetmore,  2  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  697.    p. 

181. 
Ileirncr  v.  ^fov.st,  40'Oh.  St.  112.    p.  20.'j8. 
lletfner  v.  Wenrich,  .32  I'a.  St.  423.    p.  1031. 
Helfron   r.   (iallnpe,   r,n    Mc.   563.     pp.    1921, 
1923, 1939,  1943,  1954,  1969. 


Heffron  v.  State,  8  Fla.  73.    pp.  215,  234. 
Hefner  v.  Palmer,  67  111.  161.    pp.  1099,  1100. 
Hege  V.  Xewson,  96  Ind.  426.     p.  1715. 
Hegeman   r.  We.-^lern   R.   Corp.,  13  N.  Y.  9; 

s.  c.  Tliomi).  Carr.  Pass.  16().    p.  1238. 
Ileil  r.  (ilandinir,  42  Pa.  St.  493.     p.  1223. 
Ileilner  r.  liattin.  27  Pa.  St.  517.    p.  324. 
Heihnan  r.  Shanklin,  6l)  Ind.  424.     p.  218. 
Heimann  r.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  57  Wis. 

.'■)62.     p.  11.50. 
Heine  v.  Morrison,  13  Mo.  App.  577.    p.  2089. 
Heinicke  r.  (;rillith,29  Kan.  516.     j).  14.57. 
Ileinleu  ?•.  Heilhron,  71  Cal.  557.     \<.  2(IS5. 
Ileirn  v.  IsrcCaughan,  .32  Miss.  17.    p.  1647. 
Heise's  Case,  44  -Md.  456.    p.  313. 
Hei.ser  i'.   Van   Dyke,  27  la.  359.    pp.   1906, 

1910. 
Heland  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen  (Mass.).  407.    p. 

1209. 
Ilelbrion  v.  State,  2  Tex.. App.  637.    p.  1744. 
Ileldt  r.   State,  30  X.   W.   Rep.   626;  s.  c.  20 

Xeb.  492.    pp.  775,  1S4.'5. 
Heller  v.  English,  4  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)  486. 

p.  1997. 
Hellmau  r.  Holladav,  Woolw.  .365.    p.  1151. 
Helm  V.  Cantrell,  59'lll.  525.    p.  348. 
Helm  V.  Coffey,  80  Ky.  176.    p.  2053. 
Uelmholz  v.   Everiugham,  24  Wis.  266.    p. 

090 

Helnis  r.  Chadbourne,  48  Wis.  690.    p.  2098. 
Helms  r.  Howard,  2  llarr.  &  McH.  (Md.)  76. 

p.  1046. 
Ilelser  v.  McGrath,  52  Pa.  St.  531.    p.  387. 
Hemiug  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  35  Mo.  408. 

p.  4. 
Hemingway  r.  Garth,  51  Ala.  530.    p.  444. 
Hem  me  v.    School    Dist.,  30  Kan.    377.    p. 

2075. 
Ilemmer  v.  Wolfcr,  11  N.  East.  Rep.  88.5.    p. 

1741. 
Hempstead  v.  Stone,  2  Mo.  65.    p.  2055. 
Henck  v.  Todhunter,  7  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  275. 

p.  796. 
Hendel  r.  Berks  &c.  Tp.  Road,  16  Serg.  &R. 

(Pa.)  92.     pp.  1938,  1942. 
Henderson  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  48  Iowa, 

220.     p.  1309. 
Henderson  v.  Aliens,  1  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  235. 

p.  2009. 
Henderson  f.  Dickey, 76  Ind.  264.    pp.2008, 

2014. 
Henderson  v.  Fox,  5  Ind.  489.    p.  1157. 
Henderson  v.  Henderson,  55    Mo.  534.    p. 

2055. 
Henderson    v.  Hydraulic  Works,  9   Phlla. 

(Pa.)  100.     pp.  386,  387. 
Henderson  v.  Jones,  10  Serg.  &  R.  322.    pp. 

482,  485,  487. 
Henderson  v.  Mabey,  13  Ala.  715.    p.  1408. 
Henderson    v.  Mears,  1    Fost.  &  Fin.  636. 

•p.  1(104. 
Henderson  v.  Mcrritt,  38  Ga.  232.    p.  324. 
llender.sou  v.  Slate,  70  Ala.  29.     )>.  434. 
Henderson  r.   Slate,  1  Tex.   Apj).   432.    pp. 

414,437,  1777. 
Henderson  v.  Stevenson,  L.  R.  2  H.  L.  (Sc. ) 

470.     j>.  13(;5. 
llendrick  v.  Com.,  5  Leigh  (Va.),  707.    pp. 

89,  100. 
Ilendriekson  v.  Kingsbury,  21  Iowa,  379.  pp. 

1479,  1964,  1968,  1993. 
Ilendriekson  v.  Walker,  32  Mich.  68.    p.  2052. 
liendrix  v.  Heinian,  90  hid.  il9.     p.  2110. 
Henley  v.  .\rbuckle,  13  Mo.  209.     p.  2003. 
JlenleV  v.  Mavor,  6  Ping.  100.    p.  201)3. 
Henlow  v.  Leonard,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  200.    p. 

1917. 
llennan  r.  Lester,  12  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  776;  s   c 
9  Jur.  (X.  8.)  601.    p.  1749. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Ixxxi 


Hennies  v.  Vogel,  87  111.  242.    pp.  248,    728, 

747,  753. 
Henric  v.  State,  41  Tex.  573.    p.  124. 
Henrv  v.  Hassett,  'h  Mo.  90.    p.  1061. 
Henrv  v.  Cuvillier,  3  3Iart.  (La.)  (N.  S.)  524. 

p.  120 
Henrv  v.  Davis,  7  W.  Val  715.    pp.  1664, 1682. 
Henrv  v.  Jones,  1  Idaho  T.  38.    p.  1670. 
HenrV  v.  Lee,  18  Eng.  C.  L.  273  (2  Chit.  Rep. 

124)'.    p  353. 
Henry  v.  Ricketts,  1  Crunch  0.  C.  (U.  S.)  545. 

p.  1973. 
Henry  v.  Sioux  Citv  &c.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  30 

N.  VV^  Rep.  630.    p^  747. 
Henrv  v.  Southern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  183. 

p.  1221. 
Henry  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  288.    p. 

1222. 
Henry  v.  State,  33  Ala.  389.     p.  22. 
Henrv  v.  State,  77  Ala.  75.    p.  114. 
Henrv  v.  State,  33  (ia.  441.    p.  103. 
Henry  v.  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.)    270.    p, 

129. 
Henry  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  359.    p.  1746. 
Henrv  County  Turnpiice  Co.  t'.  .Jaclvson,  86 

Ind".  Ill ;  s.  c.  44  Am.  Kep.  274.    p.  1278. 
Henschen    v.    <>'Bannon,  56  Mo.    289.    pp 

16!52,  1686,  1756. 
Hensgen  v.  Donnelly,  24  Mo.  App.  398.    p 

1673. 
Henshaw  v.  Robins.  9  Mete.  (Mass.)  83.    p 

925. 
Hensley  v.  Peck,  13  Mo.  587.    p.  1588. 
Henson  r.  King,3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  419.    p 

927. 
Henson  v.  Veach,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)   370.    p 

1467. 
Heuwood  V.  Cheeseman,  3  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

500.    p.  891. 
Herbert  v.  Butler,  97  U.  S.  319.    pp.  1605, 1625. 
Herbert  v.  Ford,  33  Me.  90.    p.  855. 
Herl)ert  v.  Ilenrick,  16  Ala.  581.    p.  1044. 
Herbert  v.  Huie,  1  Ala.  IS.    p.  1698. 
Herbert  v.  Shaw,  11  Mod.  118.     p.  1976. 
Herdic  v.  Bigler,  47  Pa.  St.  60.    p.  1668. 
Herman  t>.  Dickinson,  5  Bing.  182.    p.  1031. 
He^ndon  v.  Bradshaw,  4  Bibb  (Ky.),  45.    p. 

Herndon  r.  Bryant,  39  Miss.  336.    p.  1668. 
Herndon  i'.  Given.s,  16  Ala.  26L     p.  329. 
Herndon  r.  Givens,  19  Ala.  313.    p.  966. 
Hernsheim  v.  Babcock  (Tex.),  2  S.  W.  Rep. 

880.    p.  343. 
Herpel  v.  Malone,  56  iNIich.  199.    p.  1077. 
Herrick  v.  Smitli,  13  Hun  (N.  Y.),  446.   p. 486. 
Herrick  v.  Swomlcy,  66  Md.  439.    pp.  385,  388. 
Herriman  r.  Shoman,  24  Kan.  387;    s.  c.  36 

Am.  Rep    261.     p.  191. 
Herring  v.  Wilmington  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  Ired. 

(N.  C.)  402.     p.  1235. 
Herrington  v.    Bradford,  Walker    (Miss.), 

520.    p.  829. 
Herrman  v.  Ins.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  162.    p.  S81. 
Hesketh  v.  Braddock,  3  Burr.  1847.    pp.  55, 

125. 
Heskew  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  161.    p.  37. 
He.9lop  V.  Chapman,  23  L.  J.   (Q.  B.)  49.    p. 

1165. 
Hess  V.  Frankenfleld,  106  Pa.  St.  440.    p.  956. 
Hess  V.  AVileox,  58  Iowa,  380.    p.  311. 
Hess  V.  Young,  59  Ind.  379.    p.  1431. 
Hesse  v.  Missouri  Ac  Ins.  Co.,  21  Mo.  93. 

pp.  1.589, 1,590. 
Hessing  v.  McCloskey,  37  111.  341.    p.  1669. 
Hessong  v.  Presslev,'86  Ind.  555.    p.  2010. 
Hester  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  St.  139.    pp.  414,  487. 
Hester  v.  State,  17  (ia.  146.    pp.  1983, 1986. 
Hewettr.  Buck,  17  Me.  147.    p.  559. 
Hewett  V.  Cobb,  40  Miss.  61.    p.  128. 


Hewitt  V.  Flint  &c.  R.  Co.  (Mich.),  11 W.  Rep. 

148.    p.  1724. 
Hewitt  V.  Jones,  72  HI.  218.    p.  1750. 
Hewitt  V.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  23  Minn.   178. 

p.  1979. 
Hewitt  V.  ^Veek,  51  Wis.  .368.    p.  201. 
Hewlett  V.  Brown,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  655.    p. 

185. 
Hewson   v.   Tootle,    72  Mo.    632.    pp.  .1410, 

1437. 
Hey  V.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  (Va.)   946.    pp.  253, 

257. 
Heyl  V.  State  (Ind.),  10  N^orth  East.  Rep.  916; 

s.  c.  109  Ind.  589.     pp.  81,  765,  772. 
Hevwood  r.  Pickering,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  428;  s.  c. 

43  L.  J.  (Q.  B.)  145.    p.  945. 
Hevwood  V.  Reed,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  574.    pp. 

471.473. 
Hiljbard  v.  Haughian,  70  N.  Y.  54.    p.  570. 
Hibbard  v.  Russell,  16  N.  H.  410.    p.  346. 
Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine,5  Mees.  &  W.  462. 

p.  882. 
Hibler  v.  McCartney,  31  Ala.  501.    pp.  1669, 

lii81. 
Hiljler  v.  Servoss,  6  Mo.  24.    p.  1617. 
Hickevv.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen  (Mass.), 

429.  pp.  1224,  1235. 

Hickey  v.  Ryan,  15  Mo.  63.    pp.  801, 1506. 
Hickey,  Ex  parte,  4Sm.  &  M.  (Mis^.)  751.    p. 

biO. 
Hickok  V.  Farmers'  &c.  Bank,  35  Vt.  476.    p. 

1022. 
Hickox  V.  Xaugatuck  R.  Co.,  31  Conn.  281.  p. 

1151. 
Hicks  V.  Bailey.  16  Tex.  229.    p.  1670. 
Hicks  V.   Buriiaus,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  243.    p. 

900. 
Hicks  r.  Chaffee,  13  Hun  (X.  Y.),  293.  p.  1246. 
Hicks  r.  Davis,  4  Oal.  67.     p.  1040. 
Hicks  v.  Klli.s.  (iS  Mo.  176.    j).  1980. 
Hicks   V.   Faulkner,  51  L.  J.  (Q.  B.)  268.    pp. 

1167,  1168,  1169. 
Hicks  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  Mo.  330.    p. 

1290. 
Hicks  V.  Pacific  R.  R.,  65  Mo.  34 ;  s.  c.  64  Mo. 

430.  pp.  1225,  1257. 

Hicks  V.  State,  5  Tex  App.  488.    p.  24. 
Hicks  V.  Stone,  13  Minn.  434.    p.  431. 
Jligliee  V.  Moore,  66  Ind.  263.    p.  2110. 
Higdon  V.   Higdon,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  48. 

pp.  215.  228,  230. 
Higgiusr.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  482 

p.  1285 
Higgins  r.  Lee,  16  111.  495.     pp.  2048,2051. 
Iliggins  V.  McCrea,116  U.  S.  671.     pp.  823, 

825 
Iligginson  v.  Fabre,  3  Desau.  88.    p.  899. 
Higg.^^   !•  Mavnard,   12  Jur.  (N.    S.)705;s    c. 

1  flarr.  &  Ruth.  581.    p.  1222. 
High  V.  Johnson,  28  Wis.  72.    pp.   1910, 1912. 
Higliam^r.  Gault,  15  Hun    (X.   Y.),  383.    p. 

399.  ^ 

Hight  r.  Langdon,  53  Ind.  81.    p.  21. 
High  tower  v.  Hawthorn,  1  Hempst.  (V.  S.) 

42.     p.  796. 
Higley  r.  Lannt,  3  Mich.  612.    p.  1060. 
IlillH.^^h  V.  Hilbish,  71  Ind.  30.    p.  904. 
Ilildeburu  v.  Curreu,  65  Pa.  St.  59.     p.  414. 
Hildreth  v.  Trov,  101  X.  Y.  234;  s.  c.  54  Am. 

Rep.  6S6.     J).  128. 
Ilill  r.  Alexander,  77  Mo.  296.    p.  2052. 
Hill  r.  Cantield,  56  Pa.  St.  458.    p.  1670. 
Hill  r.  Covell,  1    X.  Y.  522.    pp.   2007,  2008, 

2009. 
Hill  r.  Crandall,  52  111.  70.    p.  141. 
Hill  r.  Doaver,  7  Mo.  57.     p.  2065.' 
Hill  i:  Gittings,  2  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)    112.    p. 

.561.  ^ 

Hill  V.  Grange,  Plowd.  173.    p.  1128. 


6a 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Hill  V.  Gnst,  45  Ind.  45.    p.  437. 

Hill  r.  Hobart,  16  Me.  164.    pp.  Ill",  1122. 

Hill  V.  Hollo«-ay,  r)2  la.  676.    p.  2119. 

Hill   V.  Mason,  7   Joues   L.    (N.   C.)  551.    p. 

10S4. 
Hill  V.  New  Haven,  :17  Vt.  501.    p.  1225. 
Hill  V.  Nichols.  .50  .Ma.  3:56.     p.  1761. 
Hill  V.  Palm,  38  Mo.  22.    pp.  1180, 1194,  1195, 

1198. 
Hill  V.  People,  16  Mich.  351.    pp.  5,  6,  121. 
Hill  i:  Perrv,  82  Ind.  28.    pp.  214,  215,  238. 
Hill  V.  Portland  &c.  R.  Cfo.,  55  Me.  439.    pp. 

505,  514. 
Hill  V.  Kucker,  14  Ark.  706.    p.  1585. 
Hill  V.  State,  64  Ga.  454.    pp.  1509, 1913, 1984, 

1998. 
Hill  V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  579.    p.  1746. 
Hill  r.  .^tate,  17  Wis.  67.5.    p.  353. 
Hill  V.  .state,  2  Yery.  (Tenn.)  246.    p.  40. 
Hill  I'.  Sturgeon,  28  Mo.  329.    pp.  571, 1321, 

1.345. 
Hill  r.  Sutton,  8  Mo.  App.  353.    p.  811. 
Hill  V.  Tissier,  15  Mo.  App.  299.    p.  1092. 
Hill  V.  Ward,  7  111.  2S5.     )).  1G69. 
Hill  V.  Weisler,49  Cal.  146.    p.  2087. 
Hill  V.  Wilkins,  4  Mo.  App.  86.    p.  2065. 
Hill  r.  Yates,  8  Taunt.  182.    pp.  1172,  1173. 
Hill  V.  Yates,  2  J.  P..  Moore,  80.    p.  1181. 
Hill,  Ex  parte,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  355.    p.  1906. 
Hill's  Case,  2    Gratt.   (Va.)    595.    pp.   1579, 

1891. 
Hiller  v.  Sharon  Springs,  28  Han  (N.  Y.}, 

344.    p.  653. 
Hilllard  v.  Beattie,  59  N.  H.  462.    p.  317. 
Hllliard  v.  Wilmington  &c.  R.  Co.,6  Jones 

L.  (N.  C.)  343.     p.  1374. 
Hilton  V.  Fairclough,  2  Camp.  633.    p.  943. 
Hilton  V.  Southwick,  17  Me.  303.    pp.  1923, 

1929. 
Hinchcliff's  Case,  1  Lewin  C.  C.  161.    p.  1627. 
Hincklev  v.  Penobscot,  42  Me.  89.    p.  1210. 
Hinde  v".  Longworth,  11  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  99. 

pp.  560,  1445,  1446. 
Hindle  v.  Birch,  8  Taunt.  26.    p.  1989. 
Hinds  V.  Gage,  56  Cal.  487.    p.  2084. 
Hiner  v.  Peoyile,  34  111.  297.    pp.  1090,  1091. 
Hines  V.  Driver,  100  Ind.  315.    p.  2064. 
Hines  v.  State,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  597.    pp. 

85,  1903,  1907,  2094,  2101. 
Hines  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  483.    pp.  727.  785. 
Hinkle  v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa,  3.55.     p.  1470. 
Hinkle  v.  Margerum,  50  Ind.  240.    pp.  2071, 

2076,  2110. 
Hinkson  v.  Morrison,  47  la.  167.    p.  576. 
Hinson  c.  Slate,  7  Mo.  244.    p.  1562. 
Hint  on  V.  Heather,  14  Mees.  &  W.  131.    pp. 

1166.  1172,  1180. 
Hintoii  V.  Cream  City  R.  Co.,  65  Wis.  335. 

pp.  1761,  1802. 
Hinton  v.  Nelms,  13  Ala.  222.    p.  1733. 
Hintrager  r.  Suml)argo,  ,54  la.  604.    p.  2100. 
Hirshiiorg  v.  Strauss,  64  Cal.  272.    p.  1676. 
Hirslilield  v.  Smith,  Harr.  &  Ruth.  284.    p. 

941. 
Hirshman  v.  People,  101  111.  568.    p.  1801. 
Hirsch  v.  State,  8  Baxt.  fTenn.)  89.     )>.  268. 
Hirst,  In  re, 9  Phila.  (Pa.)  216.    p.  148. 
Hise  V.  Fincher,  10  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  139.    p. 

loos. 
Hitchcock  V.  Burgett,  38  Mich.  .501.    p.  498. 
Hitchins   v.  Eardlev,  L.   R.  2  Prob.  &  Div. 

248:  s.  c.  40  I  J.  .1.  (i'rol).  &  Mat.)  70.    j).  290. 
Hitchlftr  V.  Voelker,  8  Mo.  Apj).  492.    p.  811. 
Hite  r.  Blandford,  45  111.  9.    p.  1670. 
Hite  V.  Hunton,  20  Mo.  286.     p.  1618. 
Hitson  V.  Forrest.  12  Tex.  320.    p.  1198. 
Hitt  r.  Allen,  13  111  .592.     p.  1125. 
Hix  ?•.  Dnirv.  5  Pick.  fMa-^s.)  297.    pp.  1921, 

1945,  1946,  i955,  1991,  2021. 


Hoag  V.  Lake  Shore  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Pa.  St.  293; 

s.  c.  4  W.  N.  Cas.  552;  6  Cent.  L.  J.  95.    p. 

1221. 
Hoasrland  v.  Moore,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  167.     p. 

1477. 
Hoaijland  v.  State,  17  Ind.  488.    p.  523. 
Hoar  r.  Wood,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  193.    p.  795. 
Hoard  v.  Peck,  56  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  208.    pp. 

512,  516. 
Iloare  v.  Broom, Cro.  Eliz.  369.    p.  31. 
Hoare  v.  Silverlock,  12  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  624. 

p.  1507. 
Holjl)s  V.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  66  Me.  572.    p.  1687. 
IIol)l)s  V.  Outlaw,  6  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  174.    p. 

1750. 
llobbs  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  117.    pp.  1732, 

1744, 1745. 
Hoberg  v.  State,  3  Minn.  272.    pp.  1914, 1915, 

1922. 
Hobson  V.  Emanuel,  8  Porter  (Ala.),  442.    p. 

1060. 
Hocum  V.  Weithcrick,  22    Minn.    152.    pp. 

1225,  1254,  1705. 
Hodge  V.  State,  85  Ind.  561.     pp.  1694,  1698. 
Hod.gon  V.  Latham,  33  111.  .346.     p.  963. 
lloilgen  V.  Commissioners,  10   Kan.  638.    p. 

2130. 
Tlodges  V.  Cooper,  43  N.  Y'.  216.    p.  1705. 
Hodges  V.  Strong,  10  Vt.  247.    p.  827 . 
Hodgkins  v.  Hook,  23  Cal.  584.     p.  1446. 
Hodg.son  r.  Scarlett,  1  Barn.  &  Aid.  232;  s.  c. 

1  Holt  N.  I'.  621.     ]).  795. 
Hoe  r.  .Sanburn,  21  N.  Y.  5,52.    p.  1419. 
Hoeflinger  v.  Stafiord,  38  Wis.  391.    pp.  1586, 

1608. 
Iloffljauer  r.  Railway  Co.,  52  Iowa,  342.    p. 

1290. 
Hoffman  v.  Danner,  14  Pa.  St.  25.    p.  1085. 
Hoffman  v.  State,  65  Wis.  46;  s.  c.  26  N.  W. 

Rep.  110.    p.  774. 
Hogan  V.  Crearan,  6  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  138.    p.  418. 
Ilogan  V.   llendrv,  IS  Md.  128.     p.  725. 
Hogan  V.  State,  36  \Vis.  226.    p.  119. 
Ilogell  V.  Lindell,  10  Mo.  483.    p.  1729. 
Hogg  v.  People,  15  Bradw.  (HI.)  288;  s.   c.  19 

Cent.  L.  J.  476.     p.  I.i36. 
IIoLTcr  ('.  State,  7  Ind.  551.    p.  1720.  * 

Hogg  c.  Wilkins,  1  Grant  (Pa.V  67.    p.  1417. 
Hoggctt  V.  Oxley,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  251.  p. 

217. 
Hogsett  V.  State,  40  Miss.  522.    pp.  1647, 1784. 
Hogshead  v.  State,  6  Hamph.    (Tenn.)    59. 

pp.  113,  1932. 
Iloitt  V.  Ilolcomb,  32  N.  H.  186.    p.  1746. 
Hoke  V.  Fleming,  10  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  263.    pp. 

489,  490. 
Holbeit  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  219.    p.  462. 
Holbrook  v.  Baker,  6  Me.  309.    p.  1443. 
Holbrook  v.  Coolev,  25  Minn.  275.     p.  169. 
Holbrook  V.  Holbrook,  30  Vt.  433.    p.  441. 
Holbrook  V.  McBride,   4  Gray   (Mass.),   215. 

1).  308. 
Holbrook  t'.  Utica  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  236; 

s.  <•.  16  Barb.   (N.   Y.)  113.     pp.   1225,   1235, 

1236,  1237. 
Holbrook  v.  Wight,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  169. 

p.  11.56. 
Ilolcomb  V.  Cornish,  8  Conn.  375.    pp.  141, 

148. 
Ilolcomb  V.  Ilolcomb,  28  Conn.  177.    p.  804. 
Holcroft  r.  Barber,  1  Car.  &  K.  4.    p.  1137. 
Ilohlane  v.  Biilterworth,  5  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  1. 

1)1).  1105,  1747,  1751. 
Holder  r.   SouIbv.SC.  B.  (N.  .S.)  2.54.    p.  1340. 
Holder  r.  State,  5  (ia.  441.    pp.  1509,  16.58. 
Ifoldridge  r.  Cubbeire,  71  (ia.  2.54.     i).  1708. 
Ilolcsapiilc  r.  Kawbush,  51  Ind.  494.    ]>.  2051. 
llolker  r.  I'arker,  7  Cranch  (U.  S.),436.    pp. 

191,  192, 193. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxxiii 


Holland  v.  Barnes,  53  Ala.  83;  s.  c.  25  Am. 

Rep.  595.    p.  4S0. 
Holland  v.  Fisher,  O.  Bridg.  181.    p.  2008. 
Holland  v.  Fox,  3  El.  &  Bl.  ;t77.    p.  H57. 
Holland  v.  Palmer,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  95.    p.  1068. 
Hollenbeck  v.  Marshalltown,  62  la.  21.    pp. 

50,  2043. 
Hollenbeck  v.  Ptowley,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  473. 

p.  601. 
Holley  V.  Winooski  Turnpike  Co.,  1    Aik. 

(Vt.)  74.    p.  1247. 
Holley  V.  Young,  68  Me.  215.    614. 
Hollingshead  v.  Sturgis,  21  La.  Ann.  450.    p. 

1008. 
Hollingsworth  v.  Duane,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.)  353. 

pp.  49,  117. 
Hollingsworth  v.  Duane,  Wall.  La.  (U.  8.) 

77.    p.  132. 
Hollis  1-.  .State,  8  Tex.  App.  620.    p.  116. 
HoUis  V.  Swift,  74  Ga.  595.    p.  885. 
Hollister  v.  Loud,  2  Mich.  312.    ]).  1446. 
Hollistert).  Nowlen,  19  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  234.  p. 

1305. 
Ilollowayr.  Griffith,  32  Iowa,  409.    p.  1491. 
llulloway  V.  State,  53  Ind.  544.    p.  124. 
llollv  1-.  Brown,  14  Conn.  256.    p.  1750. 
Hohnan  v.  Chicago  &c.  K.   Co.,  62  Mo.  562. 

pp.1222,  1223. 
Hohnan  v.  Crane,  17  Ala.  570.    pp.  825,  827, 

8'' 8 
Hohnan  v.  King,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  384.    p.  820. 
Hoi  man  v.  Mayer,  34  Tex.  668.    p.  152. 
lldhnan  v.  State,  13  Ark.  105.    p.  645. 
lluhuead  v.  Corcoran,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

119.    p.  1982. 
Holmes  v.  Baddeley,  1  Phil.  Ch.   476.    p.  276. 
Holmes  v.  Blogg,  S  Taunt.  508;  s.  c.  2  J.  B. 

Moore,  552.    p.  895. 
Holmes  v.  Clark,  10  la.  423.    p.  1429. 
Holmes  v.  Doane,  9  Cush.   (Mass.)  135.    p. 

1755. 
Holmes  v.  Gayle,  1  Ala.  517.    p.  361. 
Holmes  v.  Hamburg,  47  Iowa,  348.    p.  1247. 
Holmes  v.  McKiuney,  4  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  5. 

pp.  2095,  2096. 
Holmes  v.  Kogers,  13  Cal.  191.    p.  192. 
Ilohnes  v.  State,  23  Ala.  17.    p.  1849. 
Ihihiies  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  314.    p.  18.37. 
lldhnesT.  state,  20  Tex.  App.  509.    p.  1763. 
Holmes  ».  Stateler,  17  111.  453.    p.  450. 
Holmes,  Ex  parte,  21  Neb.  324 ;s.  c.  32  N.  W. 

Ilep.  71.     pp.  2075,  2078. 
Holt  V.  Bacon,  25  Miss.  567.    p.  1023. 
Holt  V.  Meirs,  9  Car.  &  P.  191.    p.  613. 
Holt  V.  Penobscot,  56  :\Ie.  15.    p.  1249. 
Holt   V.   People,   13  Mich.    224.    pp.    73,   98, 

126. 
Holt  V.  Simmons,  14  Mo.  App.  450.    p.  2108. 
Holt  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  571.    pp.  116,  130. 
Holton  V.  Greenwell,4  Dana  (Ky.),  633.    p. 

2060. 
Holton  V,  Kemp,  81  Mo.  661.    p.  1030. 
Holyoke  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  48  N.  H. 

541.     pp  1481,  1483. 
Homans  v    Corning,  60  N.  H.  418.    pp.  344, 

345,  421. 
Homans  v.  Lambard,  21  Me.  308.     p.  860. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  r.  Favorite,  46  111.  263.    p.  986. 
Homer  v.  Engelhardt,  i  17  Mass.  539.    p.  1459. 
Homer  V.  Taunton,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  661.    ]>.  1507. 
Homes  v.   Crane,  2  Pick.    (Mass.)  607,  n.  1. 

p.  1442. 
Honegsberger  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  1  Keyes 
(N.  Y.),570;  s.  c.  U  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  195; 
2    Abb.  App.   Dec.   (N.    Y'.)    378;    1   Daly 
(N.  Y.),89.     pp.  1232,  1233. 
Honev  v.  Honev,  18  Mo.  466.    p.  2072. 
Honstine  v.  O'Donnell, 5  Hun  (N.  Y  ),472. 
p.  436. 


Hood  t\  Fahnestock,  I  Pa.  St.  470.    p.  1052. 
Hook  V.  Craghead,  35  Mo    380.    p.  1750. 
Hook  V.  Page,  1  Overton  (Tcnn.),  250.    p.  69. 
Hooker  i\  Eagle  Bank,  30  N.  Y.  83.    p.  609. 
Hooker  V.  State,  4  Ohio,  *t8.    pp.  88,  89. 
Hooksett  r.  Amoskeag  Man.  Co.,  44  X.  H. 

105.    p.  1758. 
Hooper  v.  Edwards,  IS  Ala.  280.    p.  849. 
Hooper  V.  Moore,  3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  428.    p. 

432. 
Hooper  v.  Moore,  5  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  130.    pp. 

SI 9,  820. 
Hoojier  r.  Rathbone,  Taney  (U.  S.),  519.    pp. 

1,322,  1345. 
Hoot  V.  Spade,  20  Ind.  326.     p.  106. 
Hoover  «.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79.    p.  1020. 
Hopkins  v.  Coburn,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  292.    p. 

188. 
Hopkins  v.  Preston,  2  A.  K.   Marsh.  (Ky.) 

64.    p.  106. 
Hopkins  v.  Robinson,  3  Watts  (Pa.),  205.    p. 

1044. 
Hopkins  V.  St.  Lawrence  R.  Co.,  36  X.  H.  9. 

p.  1486. 
Hopkins  r.  Stanley,  43  Ind.  553.    pp.  2029, 

2041. 
Hopkins  v.  Ware,  L.  R.  4  Exch.  268.  p.  944. 
Hopkins  v.  Westcott,  6  Blatchf.  64.  p.  1360. 
Ilopkinson  v.  Leeds,  78  Pa.  St.  396.  p.  1623. 
Hopkuison  V.  People,  18  111.264;  s.  c.  Horr. 
&  Thomp.  Cas.  Self-Def.  SO.  pp.  1542, 1646, 
1681. 
Hopkinson  v.  Steel,  12  Vt.  .582.    pp.  308,  321, 

323,  1943,  1958. 
Hoppe  V.    Chicago   &c.  R.  Co.,  01  Wis.  357. 

p.  2037. 
Hopper  V.  Mooie,  42  la.  563.    p.  2028. 
Hopps  V.  People,  31  111.  385.    p.  1883. 
Hopson  V.  Brunwankel,24  Tex.  607.    p.  862. 
Hopt  r.  People,  104  U.  S.  631.    pp.  1726, 1733. 
Hopt  V.  People,  7  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  614;  s.  c.  21 

Am.  L.  Rev.  459.     pp.  316,  614,  747,  786. 
Hopt  v.  Utah,  120  U.  S.  430;  s.  c.  7  U.  S  Sup. 

Ct.  Rep.  614.    pp.  758,  1762. 
Horacek  r.  Keebler,  5  Xeb.  356.    p.  2051. 
Horback  r.  Miller,  4  Xeb.  43.    p.  2051. 
Horback  v.  State,  43  Tex.  242.    pp.  89,  93. 
Hord  V.  Taubman,  79  JIo.  101.    ji.  1032. 
Horlor  v.  Carpenter,  27    L.  J.  (C.  P.)  1.    n. 
1698.  '^ 

Horn  V.  Amicable  &c.  Co.,  64  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  81 ; 

s.  c.  3  Big.  Ins.  Cas.  712.     p.  1408. 
Horn  V.  Baker.  9  East,  21.5.     p.  1443. 
Horn  V.  Eberhart,  1 .'  Ind.  118.    p.  2043. 
Home  V.  Puckett,  12  Tex.  201.    p.  869. 
Home  V.  State,  37  Ga.  80.    p.  41. 
Home  V.  Williams,  12  Ind.  325.    p.  511. 
Hbrne  v.  Williams,  23  Ind.  37.    p.  2091. 
Home  Tooke's  Case  (Anno,  1798),  25  How. 

St.  Tr.  1.     p)).  45,  68. 
Horner  v.  Hower,  49  Pa.  St.  475.    p.  956. 
Horner  v.  Xicholson,  56  Mo.  222.    nu.   1316 
1483.  ' 

Hornsberger  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  335.    p. 
1778.  ^ 

Horner  v.  Wood,  16  Barb.  386.    pp.  1671,  1746. 
1750.  ' 

Horr  V.  People,  95  111.  169.     p.  145. 
Hortou  V.  Horton.  2  Cow.   (X.  Y'.)  589.    p. 
191(1.  ^ 

Horton  v.  Moot,  60  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  27.    p.  886. 
Hortou    V.   Parsons,  (X.    Y'.    Sup.    Ct.),  24 

Week.  Dig.  •.'34.     p.  7S8. 
Hortou  V.  '1  owns.  6  Leigh  (Va.),  47.    p.  1025. 
Horton  V.  \\  illuims,21  Minu.  187.    pii.  1706. 

17(17,  1714,  1726. 
Horton  v.  Wil.son,  25  Ind.  316.    pp.  2091,  2107. 
Ho.sford  V.  Stone.  6  .\eb.  381.     p.  2051. 
Hoskius  V.  Hatterback,  14  la.  314.    p.  2075. 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Hospes  r.  Alder,  6  East,  16,  n.    p.  948. 
Hotchkiss  V.  Gennania  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  5  Hun 

(N.  Y.),  90      pp.  437,  48.5,  4".)U. 
Hotteudtein  v.  Lerch,  104  Pa.  .'^t.  454.    p.  1052. 
Hotz  c.  Hotz,  2  .Vsh.  (Penu.)  245.    p.  92. 
Houdlette  r.  Tallniau,  14  Ale.  403.    pp.  907, 

908. 
Hough  r.  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  29  Conn.  10.    pp. 

972,  982. 
Hough  r.  Railway  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213.     p.  1254. 
Hoiiichtaling  v.  IJall,  19  >lo.  84.    p.  1600. 
Houghlalingr.Osborn,  15  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  119. 

p.  1997. 
Houghton   r.  First  Nat.  Bank,  26  Wis.  663. 

pp.  1022, 1023. 
Houghton  V.  Houghton,  37  Me.  72.    p.  854. 
Houghton  V.  Jonefi,  1  AVall.  (U.  S.)  702.    pp. 

3.S4,  392. 
Houghton  i:  Manufacturers  &C.  Ins.  Co.,  8 

Meto.  (Mass.)  114.    p.  976. 
House  r.  Fulton,  29  AYis.  296.    p.  1219. 
House  c.  Metcalf.  27  Conn.  631.    ii.  1383. 
House  V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  31.    p.  1763. 
House   r.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  227.    pp.  755, 

1697,  17^9. 
House  V.  Wright,  22  Ind.  383.    p.  2101. 
Houser  v.  State,  93  Ind.  228.    pp  631,  633. 
Houser  v.  Tulley,  62  Pa.  St.  96;  s.  c.  1  Am. 

Rep.  ,390.    p.  1339. 
Houstine  v.  O'Donnell,  5  Hun,  472.    p.  357. 
Houston  V.  Bruner,  39  Ind.  376.    p.  2082. 
Houston  V.  Clark,  50  N.  H.  479.    p.  1007. 
Houston  V.  Potts,  65  X.  C.  41.    p.  1923. 
Houston  V.  Sneed,  15  Texas,  307.    p.  1080. 
Houston  V.  Terrell  (Tex.),  7  S.  W.  Rep.  670. 

p.  102. 
Houston  V.  Woodward,  17  N.  J.  L.  344.    p. 

697. 
Houston  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilmore,  62  Tex.  391. 

p.  1672. 
Houston  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Gorbett,  49  Tex.  576, 

pp.  1285,  1297. 
Houston  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Randall,  50  Tex.  255. 

pp.  1253,  12,54,  1261. 
Housworth   v.  Bloomhuff,  54  Ind.    487.    p. 

2124. 
Hovey  v.  Grant,  52  X.  H.  569.    p,  303. 
THoyey  i:  Lane,  52  Ind.  49.     p.  584. 
Hovey  v.  Thompson,  37  111.  538.    p.  1937. 
How  J-.  Hall,  14  East.  274.    p.  608. 
How  V.  Taylor,  .52  Mo.  592.    p.  923. 
Howard  v.  Brown,  21  Me.  385.    p.  1749. 
Howard  v.  Carpenter,  22  Md.  10.    pp.  803, 

807,811. 
Howard  v.  Chamberlin,  68  Ga.  684.    p.  421. 
How.ard  /•.  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  4  Denio  (N.  Y'.), 

502.    p.  .3!)6. 
Howard  v.   Cobb,  3  Day  (Conn.),  310.    p. 

I9a5. 

Howard  v.  Kislinc,  15  Ind.  83.    p.  215. 
Howard  v.  Marshall,  48  Tex.  471.    p.  817. 
Howard  v.  McCall,  21  Gratt.   (Va.)  212.    p. 

i9a5. 

Howard  r.  Miner,  20  Me.  325.    p.  1745. 
Howard  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  318.    p.  1560. 
Howard  v.  M'inters,  3  Xey.  .5.39.     p.  2099. 
Howard  r.  Wissman,  18  How.  (U.  S.)  231.  pp. 

1342,  1367. 
Howard  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cormick,  24  111.455.    p. 

1815. 
Howcott  r.  Kill)Ourn,  44  Ark.  213.    p.  2088. 
Howe  V.  (-'lanccv,  53  Me.  130.    p.  890. 
Howe  V.  llunliugton,  15  Me.  350.    p.  1122. 
Howe  V.  Keeler,  27  Conn.  538.    p.  1446. 
Howe  v.  Lowell,  101  Mass.  99.    p.  1219. 
Howe  V.  Plainfield,  41  X.  II.  135.     p.  1249. 
Howe  V.  Russell,  41  Me.  446.     p.  891. 
Howe  Machine  Co.  r.  Clarke,  15  Kan.  492.    p. 

433. 


Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Rosine,  87  111.  105.    p. 

315. 
Howell  r.  Commonwealth,  5  Gratt.  (Va.)  664. 

p.  703. 
Howell  V.  Edmond,  47  111.  79.    p.  560. 
Howell  1'.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.,  6  Biss.  (U.  S.) 

1()3.     p.  1940. 
Howell  r.  Howell,  59  Ga.  145.    pp.  95,  99. 
Howell  I'.  Huvck,  2  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (X.  Y.) 

423.     p.  (!U9. 
Howell  V.  Leayitt,  90  X.  Y.  238.    p.  20.59. 
Howell  V.  Rol)ertS()n,  6  N.  .J.  L.  142.    p.  20. 
Howell  V.  State,  5  (Ja.  48.     p.  1542. 
Howell  V.  State,  16  Tex.  Api).  93.    p.  1777 
Howenstein   v.   Missouri   Pacific  R.  Co.,  55 

Mo.  33.     pp.  1.S07,  1308. 
Ilowerlon    v.   Holt,    23  Tex,  52.     pp.  1444, 

1448. 
Howerton     v.    State,   Meigs    (Tenn.),   262. 

p.  121. 
Howie  V.  Lea,  75  X.  C.  326.    p.  .363. 
Howland  v.    (iifford,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  43,  n. 

p.  27,  111,  119,1976. 
Howland  c.  Jenks,  7  Wis.  57.    p.  420. 
Howland  r.  Marine  Co.,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 
■  S.)  474.     p.  1211. 
Howland   v.  Reeycs,  25  Mo.   A.pp.  458.      pp. 

2092,  2093,  2094. 
Howland  v.  Sheriff,  5  Sandf.  (X.  Y'.)  219.    p. 

353. 
Rowland  v.  Willetts,  9  X.  Y'.  170.    pp.  1942, 

1958,  196-.>. 
Howie  V.  Dunn,l  Leigh  (Va.),  455.    p.  1906. 
Howley  v.   Whipple,  48  X.  H.  487.    pp.  641, 

642. 
Howth  V.  Franklin,  21  Tex.  798.    p.  1340. 
Hoxle  V.  Green,  37  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  97.    pp. 

219,  221,222. 
Hoxie  V.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  33  Conn.  471.    pp. 

728,  739,  740,  747,  753,  7.55. 
Hoy  V.  Morris,  13  Gray  (Mass.), 519.    pp.  272, 

273. 
Iloye  V.  State,  39  Ga.  718.    p.  1984. 
lloVt   V.    American    Exch.    Bank,   1    Duer 

(X.  Y.),652.     pp.  596,60.5. 
Ilovt  V.  City  of  Hudson,  27  Wis.  656.    p.  1266. 
llovl  V.  Hudson,  41  Wis.  105.    pp.  1225,  1227. 
Hoyt  V.  .Jackson,   3  Dem.  (N.   Y'.)  390.    pp. 

590,  625,  626,  634. 
Ilovt  V.  .letfers,  30  Mich.  194.    p.  1316. 
Hubbard  v.  I!elden,27  Vt.  645.     p.  892. 
Hubbard  r.  Briggs,  31  X.  Y.  518.    p.  428.' 
Hubbard  v.  Concord,  35  X.  H.  52.    pp.  1249. 

1377. 
IIul)bard  v.  Gale,  105  Mass.  511.    p.  82. 
Hubbard  v.  Hubbard,  7  Ore.  42.    p.  2,57. 
Hubbard  v.  Rutledge,  57  Miss.  7.    pp.  59,  116. 
Hul)bell  V.   Bowe,  17  Jones  &  Sp.  (40  N.  Y. 

Siip.'r.)  131.     p.  322. 
Iluhbsv.  Bancroft,  4  Ind.  388.    p.  1438. 
Ilubhv  c.  Slate,  8  Tex.  Ai)p.  597.    p.  3.56. 
Ilubb'v  V.  Stokes.  22  Tex.  217.    p.  17.54. 
Ilublcy  V.    White,  2  Yeatos  (I'a.),  133.    p.  25. 
1  lubner  v.  Feige,  90  111.  208.     p.  1213,  1750. 
llubotter  v.  State,  32  Tex.  479.    pp.  81.  89,  91. 
Huckabee  v.  May,  14  Ala.  263.    p.  966. 
Huckins  v.  People's  &c.,  Ins.  (Jo.,  31  X.  II. 

238.     1).  361. 
Iluckraan  v.  Fernle,  3  Mees.  &  W.  505.    pp. 

214,217,  218,  1417. 
ThirkshDld  r.  St.  [>ouls,  &c.  R.  Co.  (Mo.),2S. 

W    i;.|).  794.     I).  747. 
IhKlilerson   v.  Prizer,  9  Phila.  (Pa.)  65.    p. 

1&8. 
HudoLson  v.    State,  94    Ind.  426.     pp.    1515, 

1.525. 
Hudgcns  r.    State,  2  Ga.  173.     pp.  42,  67,  63, 

74.  124. 
Huduutt  I'.   Comstock,  .50  Mich.  596.    p.  359. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Ixxxv 


Hudson  V.  Allison.  54  Ind.  215.    p.  193. 
Hudson  V.  liaxendale,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  575.    p. 

1342. 
Hudson  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co. ,  53  Mo.  525. 

p.  U'.tS. 
Hudson  V.  State,  1  Blackf.    (Ind.)  317.    p. 

101. 
Hudson  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  525. 

pp.  802,  1308,  1498. 
Hudson  V.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  408.    pp. 

1914,  1992. 
Huds-on  V.  Wier,  29  Ala.  294.    p.    810. 
Hudson    r.    Wetherington,   75  N.  C.  3.    pp. 

215,  221,  222. 
Hudspeth   v.   Herston,  64  Ind.  133.    pp.  53, 

121. 
Huebner   v.  RooseTelt,  7  Daly  (N.  Y.),  111. 

p.  437. 
Huelsenkamp  v.  Citizen's  R.  Co.,  37  Mo.  537. 

pp.  1255,  1282,  1296. 
Hueske  v.  Broussard,  55  Tex.  201.    p.  867. 
Huey  V.  Huey,  65  Mo.  689.    p.  873. 
Huff  V.  Bennett,  6  X.  Y.  337.    p.  353. 
Huff  V.  Cole,  45  Ind.  300.    p.  1620. 
Huff  V.  Cox,  2  Ala.  310.    p.  1638. 
Huff  V.  Gilbert,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  19.    p.  2117. 
Huff  V.  Nims,  11  Xeb.  364.    p.  879. 
Huff  V.  State,  29  Ga.  424.    p.  324. 
Huff  r.  Walkins,  15  S.  C.  82.    p.  37. 
Huffell  I'  Armitstead,  7Car.  &P.  56.    p.  1135. 
Huffman  v.  Acklev,  34  Mo.  277.  p.  1668. 
Huffman  v.  Cauble,  66  Ind.  591.    p.  319. 
Huffman  v.  Hulbert,  13  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  375. 

p.  952. 
Hughes  V.  Biddulph,  4  Russ.  190.    p.  276. 
Hughes  V.  Ellison,  5  Mo.  110.    p.  1600. 
Hughes  V.  Listner,  23  Ind.  396.    p.  1983. 
Hughes  V.  M'Gee,  1  A.  Iv.  Marsh.  (Ky.)29. 

p.  2064. 
Hughes  V.  Monty,  24  la.  499.    p.  1647. 
Hughes  V.  People,  116  111.  330;  s.  c.  6  X.  East. 

Rep.  55.     pp.  124,  2096. 
Hughes  V.  Pipkin,  4  Phill.  L.   (X.  C.)  4.    p. 

1137. 
Hughes  V.  State,  75  Ala.  31.    pp.   1638,  1653, 

1798. 
Hughes  V.  Westmoreland  Coal  Co.,  104  Pa. 

St.  207.     pp.  385,  388,  1623. 
Hughes  V-  Winona  &c.   R.  Co.,  27  Minn.  139. 

p.  1261. 
Hughey   v.  State,  47  Ala.  97;  s.  c.  Horr.  & 

Thomp.   Cas.  Self-Def.  589,  note.    p.  1542. 
Huguenin  r.  Raylev,  6 Taunt.  186;  2  Big.  Ins. 

Cas.  208.    pp.  975,  1417. 
Hulett  V.  Hulett,  37  Vt.  581.    p.  344. 
Hull  V.  Albro,  2  Disney  (Ohio),  147.    pp.  117, 

118, 123. 
Hull  V.  Alexander,  26  la.  569.    pp.  356,  718. 
Hull  t'.  City  of    Kan.sas,  54  Mo.  600.    p.  1280. 
Hull  V.  Cooper,  14  East,  479.    pp.  974,  1143. 
Hull  V.  Louth,  109  Ind.  315.    pp.  2110,  2143. 
Hull  r.  Lyon,  27  >Io.  570.     p.  295. 
Hull  r.  Richmond,  2  Woodb.  &  M.  (U.  S.)  337. 

p.  1247. 
Hull  r.  State,  93  Ind.  128.    p.  390. 
Humbert  v.  Eckerr,  7  Mo.  259.    p.  2064. 
Hume   V.   Xe\v  York,  47  X.  Y.  639.    pp.  1246, 

1247,  1249. 
Hummel's  Case,  9  Watts  (Pa.),416.    p.  151. 
Humphrey  v.    State,    21  Tex.  App.  666.    p. 

760. 
flunii)hrey.  Ex  parte,  2  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  283. 

p.  166. 
Humphreys  v.  Collier,  2  111.  48.    p.  1669. 
Humphreys  r.  Reed,  6  Whart.  (Pa.)  435.    Y>p. 

1322, 1346,  1347. 1358. 
Humphreys  v.  Spear,  15  111.  275.    p.  642. 
Humuhrevs  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  302.    pp. 

1790,  1791. 


Humphreys  v.  Walton,  2  Bush  (Ky.).  580. 

pp.  2053,  2071. 
Humphries  c.  Dawson,  38  Ala.  199.    p.  631. 
Humphries  v.  .Johnson,  20  Ind.  190.    p.  1780. 
Humpliries  v.  McCravy,  5  Ark.  61.    p.  1937. 
Humphries  t\   Parker,  52  Me.  502.    pp.1161, 

1168,  1171,  1181,1189,  1193, 1702,  1704. 
Hundhausen  v    Ins.  Co.,  5  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 

702.    p.  151. 
Huugate  V.  Hamond,  Cro.  Eliz.  188.    p.  113. 
Hungerford  v.  Burr,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

527.    p.  233. 
Huuuicut  r.   State,  18   Tex.   App.  500.    pp. 

1777,  1796,  1797. 
Hunt  V.  Adams,  6  Mass.  519.    p.  1032. 
Hunt  r.  Bate,  Dyer,  272.    p.  889. 
Hunt  V.  Elliott,  80  Ind.  245;  s.  c.  41  Am.  Rep. 

794.    p.  2110. 
Hunt  V.  Fish,  4  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  324.    p.  640. 
Hunt  V.  Goodlake,  43  L.  J.  C.  P.  54.    p.  1453. 
Hunt  V.  Lo\yell  Gaslight  Co.,  8  Allen!(Mass.), 

169.     pp.  502,  503,  504,  509. 
Hunt  V.  Maybee,  7  X.  Y.  266.    pp.  942,  1740, 

1956. 
Hunt  ('.  Mayo,  27  La.  Ann.  197.    p.  33. 
Hunt  r.  McFarland,  38  Pa.  St.  69.    p.  1088. 
Hunt  V.   Owings,  4  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  20.    p. 

2096. 
Hunt  V.  Pownall,  9  Vt.  411.    p.  1280. 
Hunt  r.  Salem,  121  Mass;.  294.    p.  1210. 
Hunt  V.  Scobie,  6  I'..  Monr.  (Ky.)  469.    p.  26. 
Hunt  V.  State,  49  Ga.  255.    pp.  705,  708. 
Hunt  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  156.    pp.  255, 1855, 

1859. 
Hunt  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  212.  pp.  18.55,  1859. 
Hunt  V.  Stewart,  7  Ala.  525.    p.  158. 
Hunt  V.  Swain,  1  Lev.  165;  s.  c.  Sir  T.  Raym. 

227  ;  1  Sid.  248.    p.  889. 
Hunt  V.  The  Cleyeland,  6  McLean  (U.  S.),  76. 

pp.  1322,  1345,  1346,  I35H. 
Hunter  v.  Allen,  35  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  42.    p.  657. 
Hunter  v.  Caldwell,  10  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  s.)  69. 

p.  1243. 
Hunter  v.  Chrismann,  70  Ind.  439.    p.  2059. 
Hunter  i>.  Cleyeland,  1  Brey.  1(57.    p.  188. 
Hunter  v.  Com.,  79  Pa.  St.  503.    p.  523. 
Hunter  v.  Corbett,  7   Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  75.    p. 

1443. 
Hunter  v.  Hatfleld,  68  Ind.  416.    p.  1492. 
Hunter  v.  Parsons,  22  Mich.  96.     p.  89. 
Hunter  v.  State,  43  Ga.  484.    pp.  1784,  1924, 

1977. 
Hunter  r.  State,  101  Ind.  406.    p.  2142. 
Hunter  v.  State,  102  Ind.  428.    p.  2142. 
Hunter  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  76.    pp.    1964. 

1965,  1967,  1995. 
Hunter  v.  AVatson,  12  Cal.  363.    p.  273. 
Huntington  v.  Blaisdell,  2  X.  H.  318.   p.  1016. 
Huntington  v.  Breen,  77  Ind.  29.    p.  1278. 
Huntington  r.  Conkey,  33  Barb.  (X.   Y.)  218. 

pp.  214,  217,  218,  22i;  222,  225. 
Huntington  v.  Drake,  24  Ind.  347.    p.  2101. 
Huntington  v.  Shultz,  Harp.  (S.  C.)  453.    p. 

1016. 
Huntress  v.  Epsom,  15  Fed.  Rep.  732.  p.  697. 
Hunisman  v.  X^^ichols,    116   Mass.  521.    pp. 

309,  718. 
Huntzinger  v.  Roberts,  44    Pa.    St.  204.    p. 

1438. 
Hnppert  v.  Weisgerber,  25  Mo.  App.  95.    p. 

2087. 
Hurley  v.  State,  29  Ark.  17.    pp.  1942,  1948. 
Hurlev  r.  Tavlor.  7s  Mo.  238.     p.  1445. 
Hurd  r.  Marple,  10  ISradw.  (III.)  418.    p.  201. 
'Hurd  V.  :\riller,  2  Hilt.  (X.  Y.)  540.    p.  891. 
Hurd  i\  Shaw.  20  111.  356.    i)p.  1172,  1197. 
Hurd  V.   Swan.  4   Denio  (X.   Y.),  7.5.    p.  184. 
Hurley  i'.  .Alorgan,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  425.    p.  837. 
Hurley  v.  State,  29  Ark.  17.    pp.  81, 129. 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Hurst  r.  'Rnrnside,  12  Ore.  520.    p.  713. 
Hnrst  V.  Kailroad  Co.,  49  la.  76.    \u  505. 
llussoy  V.  Alli'ii,  .5'.t  Mf.  2(!9.     pp.  113,  1976. 
Hufisev  V.  Saragosssa,  3  Woods  (U,  S.),380. 

pp.  1322,  1341.  1342,  1345. 
Hussou  V.  Fox,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  464.    p. 

603. 
Husiton  V.  Mitchell,  14  Serg.  &.  R.  (Pa.)  307. 

p.  191. 
Hutchings   v.   "Western  R.    Co.,  25  Ga.    61. 

pp.  1151,  1154,  1155. 
llutcliins  V.  Hudson,  S  Humph.  (Tenn.)426. 

p.  1101. 
HutcliiiLson  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  41  Wis. 

541.     p.  1270. 
Huuhiuson  v.  Consumers'    Coal  Co.,  36  N. 

J.  L.  24.     pp.  1924.  1985.  1990. 
Hutchinson  v.  Decatur,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

8.)  291.     p.  1944. 
Hutchinson   v.  Lord.  1  Wis.  287.    pp.   1437, 

1444. 
Hutchinson  i\   National  Assurance  Soc,  3 

Big.  Ins.  Cas.  444.    p.  1417. 
Hutchins   v.    Maslerson,    46   Tex.    551.    p. 

1672. 
Hutchinson  v.  Patricli,  3  Mo.  65.    p.  1618. 
Hutchinson  v.   Saudt,   4   Kawle    (Pa.),  234. 

p.  1983. 
Hutcliinson  v.  State,  19  Neb.  262.    p.  64. 
Hutchin^^on   v.   Bowker,  5  Mees.  &  W.  535. 

pp.  834,  837. 
Huth  V.  Carondelet  &c.  Co..  56  Mo.  202.    p. 

868. 
Hutton  V.  Hun.  Cro.  Eliz.  849.    p.  125. 
Huttou  V.  .Schumaker,  21   Cal.  453.    p.  1141. 
Hutton  V.  "VVetherald,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  38.    p. 

890. 
Hutts    V.    Hutts,   62  Ind.  215.    pp.   455,  480, 

552. 
Hutts  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  44.    p.  1815. 
Hvatt  V.  Clements,  65  Ind.  12.    pp.  215,  2034. 
Hvde  V.  .Scyssor,  Cro.  Jac.  538.    p.  1235. 
Hvde  V.  Jamaica,  27  Vt.  443.    p.  1225. 
Hvde  V.  (State,  16  Tex.  445.    p.  65. 
Hyde  r.  Stone,  20  How.  (T.  S.)  170.    p.  947. 
Hyde  Park   v.    Cornell,  4  Bradw.  (111.)  602. 

p.  2053. 
Hydraulic  Works  Co.  v.  Orr,  83  Pa.  St.  332. 

p.  1141.- 
Hyland  v.  Milner,  99  Ind.  308.    pp.  369,  382, 

430. 
Hvman   v.   Wheeler,    29  Fed.  Rep.  347.    p. 

1775. 
Hynds  r.  Hayes,  25  Ind.  31.    p.  1647. 
HyiJfner  v.  Walsh.    3   G.  Greene  (la.),  509. 

p.  1670. 

I. 

laslgi  V.  Brown,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  401.    pp. 

593,  .i94,  595. 
Ihl   c.  Foriv-second  Street  R.  Co.,  47  N.  Y. 

317.     pp.  1231,  14,s8. 
Ikerd    r.   Beavers,  106   Ind.  483.     pp.  202G, 

2070. 
Illinois  &c.  U.  Co.  r.  Able,  59  111.  131.    i)p. 

VMH,  1967. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Baches,  55  111.  388.    pp. 

I:i00,  1304,  1488. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Cassell,  17  111.  389.    pp. 

825,861. 
lUinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Chambers,  71    HI.  520. 

p.  1295. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cobb,  72  111.  148.    p. 

1  i6'.i. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Coiielaud,  24  111.  332.    p. 

1151. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Frankcnl)urg,  .54  111.  88. 

l>p   1362,  1364,  1365. 


Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Goddard,  72  111.  .'i69.    p. 

1299. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Godfrey,  71  111.  500.    p. 

1.'99. 

Illinois  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  72  111.  222.    p.  1235. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammer,  85  111.  526.    p. 

1726. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hetherington,  83  III. 

510.    p.  1235. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Maffit,  67  111.  431.    p. 

1683. 
Illinois  &C.R.  Co.r.  Middlesworth,46  111.  494. 

p.  1309. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson,  93  111.  290.  p. 

2066. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Slatton,  54  111.  139.    pp. 

1236. 1295. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  42  111.  438.    p. 

497. 
Illinois   &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  53  111.  397.    p. 

1284. 
Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitmore,  43  111.  420. 

p.  1146. 
Imlur  r.  Springfield,  55  Mo.  119.    p.  1266. 
Improvement  Co.  r.  Munson,  14  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

442.     pp.  1605,  1625. 
Inchbald  r.   Robinson,  L.  R.  4  Ch.  App.  388. 
"  pp.  1383, 1388. 
Incledon  v.   Berry,    1  Camp.  203.    pj).  1167, 

1172. 
Independence  v.  Jeckel,  38  Iowa,  427.    p. 

1247. 
Indiana  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Foster,  107  Ind.  432;  «. 

c.  8  X.  East.  Rep.  264.     p.  1311. 
Indiana  A:c.  R.  Co.  r.  McBroom,  103  Ind.  310. 

pp.  2059,  2079. 
Indiana  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Quick,  109  Ind.  295.    p. 

2112. 
Indiana  Car  Co.  r.   Parker,  100  Ind.  181.    pp. 

1477,  1482. 
Indiana  Manf.  Co.  v.  Millican,  87  Ind.87.    p. 

1709. 
Indianapolis  v.  Gaston,  58  Ind.  224.    p.  1482. 
Indianapolis   r.    La\yyer,  38   Ind.    348.    pp. 

2030,  2031. 
Indianapolis  v.  Scott,  72  Ind.  196.    pp.  1268, 

1272,  1482,  1483,  1675,  1973. 
Indianapolis  Ac.  K.  Co.  v.  Beaver,  41  Ind. 

49.3.     p)).  1284,  129M. 
Iiidianai)olis  &c.    R.  Co.».  Bonnell,  42  Ind. 

539.     p.  1308, 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bush,  101  Ind.  582. 

pp.  1703,  1711,2009,2010,  2014,  20.52. 
Indianaiiolis  iVc.  R.  Co.  v.  Christian,  93  Ind. 

360.     pp.  2108,  2109. 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cobb,  68  111.  64.    p. 

149.->. 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  f.Horst,  93  U.  S.  291. 

PI).  592,  1298,  1705,  1708. 
In<lianai)olis  &c.   R.  li.  Co.  v.  Irish,  26  Ind. 

26S.     p.  1308. 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Kecly's  Admr.,  23 

Ind.  133.     p.  1224. 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Klbby,  28  Ind.  479. 

p    1308. 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McCaffrey,  62  Ind. 

552.     J. p.  2034,  2036,  2039,  20(«. 
Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  «.  Miller,  71  111.464. 

p.  779. 
In(liaiiai>olis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Morganstern,  106 

111.216.     ],.  1240. 
Indianaiiolis  &c.  R.    Co.  v.  Rutherford,  29 

Ind.  8J.     p.  1235. 
Iiidianiiulis  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Stout,  53  Ind.  150. 

Pli.  KiiMi,  2036,  204.3. 
Indianapolis  Ac.   R.  Co.  v.  Wjatt,  16  Ind. 

2(14.     p.  21  OS. 
Ingalls  r.  lUlls,  9  Mote.   (:\ra88.)  1.     p.  1285. 
Iiigalls  V.  Stale,  48  Wis.  647.    p.  282. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxxvii 


Ingersoll  v.  Truebodv,  40  Cal.  603.    p.  1920. 
Ingersoll,  In  re,  9  Phila.  (Pa.)  216.    pp.  1-15, 

146. 
Ingle  V.  Mndd,  86  Mo.  216.    pp.  916,  1496. 
Ingle  V.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  574.    pp.  147, 

150. 
Ingram  v.  South  Carolina  Ins.  Co.,  3  Brev. 

(S.  C.)522.     p.  1748. 
Ingram  v.  State,  62  Miss.  142.    pp.  1691,  1791. 
Ingram  v.  State,  67  Ala.  67.    pp.  375,  480. 
Inman  r.  State,  72  Ga.  269.    pp.  776,  777. 
lumau  V.  AVestern  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  12  Wend. 

(N.  Y.)  452.     p.  982. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Cheever,  36  Ohio  St.  201;  s. 

c.  38  Am.  Rep.  573.     p.  781. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Foley,  105  U.  S.  350.    p.  992. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Lyons,  38  Texas,  258.    pp. 

973,  1027. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Palmer,  SI  111.  88.    p.  2080. 
Insurance  Co.  i-.  Rubin,  79  111.  402.    p.  315. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Weide,  9  Wall.  (U.  S.)  677. 

pp.  3.54,  362. 
Insurance  Cor.  Weides,  14  Wall.  (U.  S.)  375. 

pp.  ,354.  362. 
International  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Blanton,  63  Tex. 

109.     p.  .359. 
International  &c.  R.  Co.  f.  Ormond,  64  Tex. 

487.    p.  1284. 
International  &c  R.  Co.  v.  Ragsdale,  67  Tex. 

24;  s.  c.   2  S.  W.  Rep.  515.     p.  Ii512. 
International  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Underwood,  64 

Tex.  464.    p.  653. 
International  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davenport,  57  Mo. 

289.     p.  1613. 
Invincible,  The,  1  Lowell  (U.  S.),  225.    p. 

1367. 
Inwood  V.  Steamboat  Fleetwood,  19  Mo.  529. 

p.  1683. 
Inyo  Mining  Co.  v.  Pheby,  49  N.  Y.  Super. 

392.    p.  600. 
Ipswich  V.  Essex, 9  Pick.  (Mass.)  519.   p.  113. 
Ireland  r.  Emmerson,  93  Ind.  1.    p.  1698. 
Ireland  v.  Stiff,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  340.    p.  636. 
Ireland,  Ex  parte,  34  Tex.  344.    p.  137. 
Irish  r.  AVright,  8  Rob.  (La.)  428.    p.  1990. 
Iron  Mountain  Bank  v.  Murdock,  62  Mo.  70. 

pp.  1025,  1034,  1661,  1662. 
Irvine  v.   Cook,  15  Johns.   (N.    Y.)  239.    p. 

1944. 
Irvine  v.  Kean,  14  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  292.    pp. 

70,  76. 
Irvine  v.  Lumbermen's  Bank,  2  Watts  &  S. 

(l'a.)190.    p.  74. 
Irvine  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  12.    p.  1689. 
Irving  V.  Taggart,  1  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  360.    p. 

158H. 
Irvinson  v.  Van  Riper,  34  Ind.  148.    p.  561. 
Irwin  V.  Bell,  1  Tenn.  485.    p.  893. 
Irwin  V.  Dixon,  9  How.  (U.  S.)  10.    p.  1012. 
Irwin  t>.  Jones,  1  How.  (Miss.)  497.    p.  128. 
Irwin  I'.  Smith,  72  Ind.  482.    p.  2098. 
Irwin  V.  Sprigg,  6  Gill  (Md.),  200.    p.  1225. 
Irwin  V.  M'ickersham,  25  Pa.  St.  316.    p.  803. 
Isaac  V.  Clarke, 2 Gill  (Md.),  1.    p.  58. 
Isaac  v.  State,  2  Head  (Tenn.),  458.    p.  85. 
Isaacs  V.  Brand,  2  Stark.  167.    p.  1181. 
Isaacs  V.  Wilkey,  12  Vt.  677.    p.  1072. 
Isal)el  V.  Railroad  Co.,  60  Mo.  475.    p.  1305. 
Isbell  V.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Conn.  393. 

p.  12.55. 
Isbell  V.  New  Y'ork  &c.  K.  Co.,  25  Conn.  556. 

p.  336. 
Iseloy  V.  Lovejoy,  8  Blackf.   (Ind.)  462.    pp. 

1617,  1618. 
Ishiim  V.  State,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.),  111.    p.  125. 
Islay  V.  Stewart,  4Dev.  &  Bat.  (N.  C.)  160.   p. 

Isler  *'.  Dewey,  71  X.  C.   14.    pp.  469,  470,  489. 
Isler  V.  Dewey,  75  X.  C.  466.     p.  460. 


I  Isley's  Case,  1  Leon.  ISO.    p.  797. 
Israel  v.   Brooks,  23  lU.  575.    pp.  1161, 1167, 

1170,  1172,  1186,  1197. 
Iselt  r.  Hoge,  2  Watts  (Pa.) ,  128.    p.  1251. 
Ivei  son  V.  State,  52  Ala.  170.    p.  115. 
Ives  v.  Leonard,  50  Mich.  183.    p.  294. 
Ivev  V.  Owens,  28  Ala.  642.    p.  1.702. 
Ivey  r.  State,  12  Ala.  276.    p.  1535. 
Ivevr.  Phifer.  11  Ala  535.    p.  1733. 
Ivey  V.  State,  23  Ga.  576.    p.  1771. 
Ivey  r.  State,  43  Tex.  425.    p.  1763. 
Ivory  V.  Delore,  26  Mo.  505.    p.  1591. 


Jack  V.  Naber,  15  la.  450.    p.  1994. 
Jack  V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  656.    p.  1697. 
Jack  V.  State,  26  Tex.  1.    pp.  1906, 1974, 1975, 

1995. 
Jackman  v.  Bowker,  4   Mete.   (Mass.)  235. 

pp.  1747, 1756. 
Jackman  r.  State,  71  Ind.  149.    p.  1784. 
Jacks  V.  Adair,  33  Ark.  161 .    p.  2080. 
Jacks  V.  Stimpsou,  13  111.  701.     pp.  1172, 1186, 

1197. 
Jackson  r.  Benson,  o4  la.  654.    p.  340. 
Jackson  v.  Burchin,  14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  124. 

p.  1130. 
Jackson  v.  Burke,  1  Dill.  C.C.  (U.  S.)  311.    p. 

968. 
Jackson  v.  Cadwell,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y'.)  622.    pp. 

559,  560. 
Jackson  v.  Carpenter,  11  Johns.  (N.  Y"".)  539. 

p.  1130. 
Jackson,  V.  Catlin,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  248.    p. 

876. 
Jackson  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  la.  451.    p. 

1300. 
Jackson  V.  Cole,  16  Johns.  (N.Y'.)257.  p.  1090. 
Jackson  r.  Com.,  23  Gratt.  (Va.)  919.    pp.  69, 

70,  71,  74,  75. 
Jackson  v.  Dean,  1  Dongl.  (Mich.)  519.    pp. 

1438,  1441. 
Jackson  v.  Dickenson,  15  Johns.  (X.  Y'.)  309. 

p.  1986. 
Jackson  v.  Eddy,  12  Mo.  209.    p.  1003. 
Jackson  v.  Ellis,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y.)118.    p. 

1044. 
Jackson  v.  Etz,  5  Cow.  (X.  Y'.)  214.    p.  468. 
Jackson  v.  Evans,  73  N.  C.  128.    p.  424. 
Jackson  r.  Feather  R.  W.  Co.,  14  Cal.  19.    p. 

392. 
Jackson  v.  French,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  337.    p. 

272. 
Jackson  v.  Frier,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  192.    pp. 

620,  621. 
Jackson  v.  Gridley,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y'.)  99.    p. 

294. 
Jackson  v.  Hardin,  83  Mo.  175.    pp.  551, 1605, 

1607. 
Jackson  v.  Hawks,  2  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  619.    p. 

1997. 
Jackson  v.  Heskete,  2  Stark.  N.  P.  618.    pp. 

216,  217,  219. 
Jackson  r.  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.,  47  Ind. 

4.54.     p.  1224. 
Jackson  v.  Jackson,  32  Ga.  325.    pp.  1914, 

1975. 
Jackson  v.  Jackson,  40   Ga.  150.    pp.   1931, 

1932. 
Jackson  v.  Jackson,  5  Cow.  (X.  Y'.)  173.    p. 

1977. 
Jackson  v.  Jones,  3  Cow.  (X.  Y'.)  17.    p.  589. 
Jackson  v.  Joy,  9  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  102.    p.  1044. 
Jackson  v.  Lewis,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y'.)  505.    p. 

449. 
Jackson  v.  Litch,  62  Pa.  St.  451.    pp.  385, 1623, 
Jackson  v.  Mann,  2  Caines  (X.  Y'.),  Rep.  92. 

p.  170. 


Ixxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Jackson  v.  McVey,  IS  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  C30.    p. 

27J. 
Jackson  v.  Newton,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  355.    p. 

1(144. 
Jackson  v.  Ogden,  7  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  23S.    p. 

1(180. 
Jackson   i'.*  Osborne,  "2  Wond.   (X.  Y.)  555. 

pi).  413,  4.^9. 
Jacksou  r.  Parkhurst,  4  'SVend.  (X.  Y.)  369. 

!>.  .-SSI. 
Jackson  r.  People,  18  111.  S70.    pp.  1567,1571, 

157-2,  17SC,  ISi^S. 
Jackson    i:   Pbipps,  12   Johns.  (X.  Y.)  418. 

pp.  872,  873. 
Jackson  v.  PIttsford,  8  Blackl.  (Ind.)  194. 

pp.  89.  219. 
Jacl<son  V.  Post,  15  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  588.    p. 

144,i. 
Jackson  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  47  X.  Y.  274. 

p.  1238. 
Jacksou  V.  Sharp,  9  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  1(;3.    p. 

1044. 
Jacksou  V.  Sharpe,  29  Ind.  167.    p.  448. 
Jacksou  r.  Smith,  21  Wis.  26.    p.  1920. 
Jacksou  V.  Sou,2Caines(X.  Y.),178.    pp.392, 

393. 
Jackson  w.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  87  Mo.  422. 

p.  12.54. 
Jackson  r.  State,  33  Ark.  180.    p.  2098. 
Jackson  v.  State,  74  Ala.  2(!.    p.  (15. 
Jackson  v.  State,  77  Ala.  18.    p.  CO. 
Jackson  v.  State,  78  Ala.  471.     p.  371. 
Jackson  v.  State,  51  Ga.  402.    p.  85. 
Jackson  v.  State,  Ilorr.  &  Thoinp.  Cas.  Sclf- 

Dcf.  476.     pp.  1539,  1542,  1648. 
Jackson  V.  State,6  Klackf.  (Ind.)  461.    p.  5. 
Jacksou  r.  State,  14  Ind.  327.    p.  2,57. 
Jackson  V.  State,  4  Te.K.  App.  292.    pp.  17,  22. 
Jack~on  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  84.     p.  169.5. 
Jacksou  r.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  586.    pp.  737, 

745,  1679,  1680. 
Jacksou  V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  190.    p.  1575. 
Jackson  v.  State,   25  Tex.  (Supp.)  229.    p. 

1744. 
Ja(!kson  v.  Stephens,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  495. 

11.  1044. 
Jacksou  V.  Stetson,  15  Mass.  48.    pp.  1463, 

147(1. 
Jackson  V.  Thomas,  16  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  293. 

11.  1044. 
Jackson  v.  Town,  4  Cow.   (X.   Y.)  599.      p. 

1445. 
Jackson  V.  Varrick,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  238.    p. 

391. 
Jackson  V.  Waters,  12  Johns.  (X.  Y"".)  365.  p. 

1(141. 
Jackson  V.  AA'heat,  18  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  40.    p. 

1044. 
Jackson  v.  Williams,  2  T.  R.  281.    pp.  1584, 

1983,  19S5. 
Jackson's  Case,  25  Flow.  St.  Tr.  804.    p.  88. 
Jacob  r.  Ursullne  Xuus,  2  Mart.  (La.)  269; 

8.  f.  5  Am.  Dec.  7:!0.     p.  899. 
Jacol.sf.  Doolv,  1  Idaho,  36.    p.  1984. 
Jacobs  V.  KiKard,  25  Pa.  Si.  45.    p.  1065. 
Jacobs  V.  PhlUips,  8  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  158.    p. 

Jjicolis  V.  State,  9  Tex.  Anp.  278.    pp.  60,70. 
Jacobson  V.  LeGrauge,  3  .Johns.  (N.  Y.)  199. 

Ti.  895». 
Jacobson  v.  Metzger,  35  Mich.   103.    pp.  376, 

389. 
Jacobus  r.  St.  Panl  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  Minn.  125; 

8.  r.  1  Cent.  L.  .J.  37.5.     p.  1298. 
Jac.pics  V.  Collins,  2  Ulatchf.  (U.  S.)  23.    pp. 

.592,  .593. 
Ja<(,iics  ,:  Weeks,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  261.    pp. 

87(1,  1052. 
Jalle  V.  Cardinal,  35  Wis.  118.    p.  1226. 


James  v.  Commonwealth,  12  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

221.     p.  1,578. 
.lauies  r.  Cowing,  82  X.  Y.  449.    p.  2016. 
James  v.  Langdon,  7  B.  Mon.  193.    pp.  1764, 

1755. 
James  J'.  Mickcv,  26  S.  C.  270;  s.  c.  2  S.  E. 

Rep.  130.    p.  1770. 
James  v.  0'Dri.>coll,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  101;  s.  c.  1 

Am.  Dec.  632.     p.  899. 
James  v.  Phel|>s,  11  Ad.  &  El.  483.    p.  118L 
James  v.  Smith,  2  So.  Car.  183.    p.  152. 
James  v.  State,  .53  Ala.  :)S0.    pp.  81,  111. 
James  c.  Slate,  45  Miss.  572.    pp.  1821,  1860, 

1861,  1864,  1997. 
James  v.  State,  .55  Miss.  ,57.    pp.  1910,  1997. 
Jameson  r.  Androscoggin  R.  Co.,  .52  Me'.  412. 

pp.  110,113. 
Jameson  v.  Drinkald,    12  Moore,    148.    pp. 

499,  512. 
Jameson  r.  Swinton,  2  Taunt.  224.    p.  939. 
.lane  r.  Com.,  2  Melc  (Ky.)  90.     p.  1824. 
Janrin  r.  Scammon,  29  N.  II.  280.    p.  261. 
Janseu  r.  AU^hison,  16  Kan.  358.    p.  1249. 
Jausen  v.  Acker,  23  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  480.    p. 

1585. 
Jarnagln  v.  State,  10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  529.    pp. 

234,  1904. 
•Taniagin  >:  State,  6  Tex.  App.  465.    p.  1564. 
.Jacques  r.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va  )  88.    p.  53. 
.J.acqucsr.  Com.,  10  (;raU.    (Va.)  090.    p.  54. 
Jaccjues  V.  Hortou,  76  Ala.  239.    pp.  353,  356, 

365. 
Jaciuithr.  nndson,5  Mich.  123.    p.  876. 
Jarrell  v.  State,  58  Ind.  293.    pp.  1828,    1863, 

1911. 
.Tarrelt  v.  Arnold,  30  Ga.  323.    p.  16;?3. 
.Jarrettv.  Jarrett.  11  W.  Va.  584.    p.  1780. 
Jaspers  v.  Lane,  17 -Minn.  296.    p.  2027. 
Jarvist'.  Strong,  8  Ind.  284.    pp.  2112,  2113. 
Jaynes,  Ex  parte,  70  Cal.  638.    p.  590. 
.Jeitersou  v.  State,  52  Miss.  767.    pp.  22,  85. 
Jefferson  City  v.  Opel,  67  Mo.  394.    pp.  1980, 

2121,  2128. 
Jefferson  County  v.  Lewis,  20  Fla.  980.    p.  56. 
Jefferson  Couuiv  r.    Savory,   2   G.  Greene 

(la.),  238.     p.  84.5. 
Jefferson  I{.  Co.  i'.  Cleveland,  2  Bush  (Ky.), 

468.     p.  1374. 
Jeffersonville  &c,.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen,  40  Ind. 

545.     pp.  679,  691,  1233. 
Jetrersonville  «&c.   R.  Co.  r.  Cox,  37  Ind.  352. 

p.  1742. 
Jeffersonville  R.  Co.  v.  Hendricks,  26  Ind. 

228.     pp.  1224,  12;6. 
Jeffersonville  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  39  Ind. 

5(i8.     p.  1485. 
Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  28  Ind.  3. 

pji.  1292,  1293. 
Jeffersonville   &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  26  Ind. 

4.59.     p.  1668. 
Jefford  r.  Ringgold,  6  Ala.  544.     p.  614. 
.IclTorils  r.  Crmnp,  cited,     p.  1340. 
.JclFrics  r.  Ranilall,  14  Mass.  20,5.     pp.  120, 121, 
.Icniison  v.  Dcaring,  41  Ala.  2815.    p.  1670. 
Jencks  v.  Coleman,  2  Sumu.  (U.  S.)  221.    p. 

12S3. 
Jencks  r.  Smith,  1  N.  Y.  90.    pp.  1737, 1740. 
Jeudwine  r.  Sljide,  1  Ksp.  ,572.     p.  927. 
.Jenkins  r.  Corwin,  .55  Ind.  21.     p.  2102. 
Jenkins  v.  Davies,  10  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  s.)  314.  p. 

291. 
Jenkins  v.   Little   IMlaml    R.  Co.,  2  Disney 

(Oh.),  49.     Tip.  1208.  1212. 
.Jenkins  r.    Xorlli   Carolina   Ore    Dressing 

Co.,  65  N.  C.  .5(;;5.     pp.  728,  740. 
Jenkins  r.   State,   82  y\la.  86;  a.  c.  2  South. 

I!<M>-  !•''"•    J'l'-  bi'i2,  1731,  1890. 
Jenkln-i  v.  Slate,  1  Tex.  App.  346.    pp.1664, 

1695,  1763. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Ixxxix 


Jenkins  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  346.    p.  1564. 
Jenkins   v.    State,   41    Tex.    VIS.    pp.   1903, 

197.i. 
Jenkins   v.    Tobin,  31  Ark.   307.    pp.    1637, 

1638. 
Jenks  V.  Knott's  Co.,  58  la.  549.    p.  551. 
Jenks  V.  State,  39  Ind.  1.    p.  2142. 
Jenness  v.  Berry,  17  N.  H.  549.    p.  865. 
Jennie  f.  Delesdcrnier,  20  Me.  183.    p.  192. 
Jennings  v.  Durliam,  101  Ind.  391.    p.  2026. 
Jennings  v.  Prentice,  39  Micti.  421.    pp.  263, 

559. 
Jennings  v.  Paine,  4  Wis.  358.    p.  795. 
Jennings  r.   Slierwood,   8  Conn.  122.     p.  839. 
Jesse  i\  State,  20  Ga.  156.    pj).  43,  82,  312. 
Jessup  V.  Eldridge,  1  N.  J.  L.  401.    pp.  1940, 

1954. 
Jessup  V.  Gragg,  12  Ga.  261.    p.  1632. 
Jeter   v.   Heard,  12  La.  Ann.    3.    pp.  1983, 

1984. 
Jewell  V.  Blanford,  7   Dana  (Ky.),  473.    p. 

2063. 
Jewell  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  54  AVis.  610. 

p.  2030. 
JeweU   V.    Com.,   22  Pa.  St.  94.    pp.    30,  45, 

82. 
Jewell  V.  Parr,  13  C.  B.  909.    pp.  1601,  1602, 

1605. 
Jewell    V.   Schroeppel,   4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  564. 

p.  892. 
Jewsbury  v.  Sperry,  85  III.  .56.    p.  1920. 
Jezeph  V.  Ingram,  8  Taunt.  S38.    p.  1443. 
Jilz,   Ex  parte,    64    Mo.    205.    pp.    154,   253, 

2.54. 
Jim  V.    State,  4   Humpli.    (Tenn.)    289.    p. 

19(;8. 

Jocli  c.  Dankivardt,  85  111.  381.    p.  1211. 
John  V.  State,  16  Fla.  554.    pp.  81,  129. 
John  V.  State,  16  Ga.  200.    pp.  72,  463. 
Johns  V.  Com.  (Ky.),  3  S.  AV.  Rep.  369.    p.  23. 
John   e.  Hodges,  60   Md.  215;   s.  c.    45  Am. 

Rep.  722.    p.  118. 
Johns  V.  Davidson,    16  Pa.  St.  512.    p.  1089. 
Johns  V.  People,  25  Mich.  500.    p.  89. 
Johns  V.  State,  104  Ind.  .i,i7.    p.  2110. 
Johnson  v.  Addleman,  35  111.  268.    p.  560. 
Johnson  r.  Americas,  46  Ga.  80.    p.  55. 
Johnson  v.  Beasley,  65  Mo.  25.    p.  137. 
Johnson   v.    Blackman,    11   Conn.     342.    p. 

17.50, 
Johnson   v.    Blenkensopp,    5   Jur.    870.    p. 

1136. 
Johnson  V.  Boston  Tow-boat  Co.,  135  Mass. 

209.    ]).  1240. 
Johnson  v.  Brailsford,  2  Nott  &  McC.   (S. 

C.)  282.     p.  1008. 
Johnson  r.  Brown,  13  W.  Va.  71.    p.  1470. 
Johnson  v.  Canal  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  La.  Ann.  53. 

p.  1223. 
Johnson   v.  Central  &c.  R.  Co.,  56   Vt.  707. 

p.  516. 
Johnson   v.    Chambers,   10  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 

287.    p.  1195. 
Johnson  v.  ("lark,  6  Ark.  321.    p.  869. 
Johnson  r.  Cole,  2  X.  J.  L.  266.    p.  20. 
Johnson  v.  Coles,  21  Minn.  108.  p.  364. 
Johnson    r.   Commonwealth,  1  Bibb    (Ky.), 

598.    p.  132. 
Johnson    v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.,  39  Mich. 

33.    p.  2033. 
Johnson  v.  Davenport,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 

393.     pp.  1982,  n)S6. 
Johnson    v.  Donaldson,    8  Blatchf.    (U.  S.) 

287.     !>.  265. 
Johnson  r.  Grcini,  17  Nev.  417.    pp.  697,  1928. 
Johnson  v.  Glover.  10  North  E.   Rep.   (111.) 

214;  s.  c.  121  111.  283.    p.  3.39. 
Johnson  r.   Haverhill,  35  K.  H.  52.     pp.1246, 

1247,  1377,2021,2027. 


Johnson  v.  Hodges,  65  Mo.  589.    p.  2144. 
Johnson  v.  Howe,  7  111.  342.    p.  1997. 
Johnson  v.  Hubbard,  22  Kan.  277.    p.  1966. 
Johnson  r.  Hudson  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  65; 

s.  c.  6  Duer  (X.  Y.),  633;  5  Duer  (X.  Y.),  21. 

pp.  1209,  1211,  1223,  1225,  1255. 
Johnson  v.  Husband,  22  Kan.  277.    pp.  1966, 

1984,  1995,  2027. 
Johnson  v.  Irasburgh,  47  Vt.  28.    p.  1210. 
Johnson  v.  Josephs,  75  Me.  544.    pp.  214,  215, 

218,  221. 
Johnson  v.  Kinsey.  7  Ga.  428.    pp.  1658, 1701. 
Johnson  v.  Lyon,  14  la.  434.    p.  2075. 
Johnson  v.  Martin,  25  Ga.  269.    p.  237. 
Johnson  v.  Mason,  27  Mo.  511.    p.  310. 
Johnson  v.  Maxwell,  87  N.  C.  18.    pp.  214, 

219. 
Johnson  v.  McAllister,  30  Mo.  327.    p.  1440, 

1437. 
Johnson  v.  McCulloch,  89  Ind.  270.    pp  .  2082, 

2130. 
Johnson  v.  Milwaukee,  46  Wis.  568.    pp.  1271, 

1274. 
Jolinson  V.  Moss,  45  Cal.  515.    p.  1607. 
Johnson  v.  Moulton,  2  111.  532.    p.  1214. 
Johnson  v.   Myers,  9  X.  East.  Rep.  55.    p. 

1627. 
Johnson  v.  Patterson,  2  Hawks  (X.  C),  183. 

p.  489. 
Johnson  v.  Paul,  23  Minn.  46.    p.  2075. 
Johnson  v.  Perry,  2  Humph.  (Tenn.)  569.    p. 

1964. 
Johnson  v.  Preston,  9  Neb.  474.    p.  1090. 
Johnson  v.  Railway  Co.,  25  W.  Va.  570.    p. 

12,54. 
Johnson  v.  Revnolds,  3  Kan.  257.    p.  1341. 
Johnson  r.  Richardson,  17  111.  .302.    p.  1340. 
Johnson  v.  Richardson,  52  Tex.  481.    p.  54. 
Johnson  v.  Root,  2  Cliff.  C.  C.   (U.  S.)  108. 

pp.  1974,  1980,  1981. 
Jolinson  V.    San  Francisco  Superior  Court, 

63  Cal.  578.     p.  167. 
Johnson  v.  Sims,  50  Ga.  119.    p.  1634. 
Johnson,;-.  State,  17  Ala.  618.    p.  302. 
Johnson  r.  State,  47  Ala.  9.    p.  129. 
Johnson  r.  State,  73  Ala.  523.    p.  1535. 
Johnson  v.  State,  43  Ark.  391.    pp.  2068,  2128. 
Johnson  v.  State,  14  Ga.  55.    p.  254. 
Johnson  v.  state,  26  Ga.  611.    p.  1670. 
Johnson  r.  State,  3i)  (ia.  426.    p.  1634. 
Johnson  v.  State.  48  Ga.  116.    p.  459. 
Johnson  r.  State,  5S  Ga.  491.    p.  81. 
Johnson  r.  State,  59  Ga.  142.     pp.  727,  730. 
Johnson  r.  State, 2  Ind.  652.     p.  253. 
Johnson  V.  State,  21  Ind.  329.    p.  467. 
Johnson  v.  State,  4  G.  Greene  (la.),  65.    p. 

464. 
Johnson  v.  State,  63  Miss.  313.    p.  791. 
Johnson  v.  State,  7  Mo.  183.    p.  1550. 
Johnson  v.  State,  11  Lea  (Tenn.),  47.    p.  72. 
Johnson  t'.  State,  64  Tenn.  450.    p.  1904. 
Johnson  v.  State,  10    Tex.    App.    571.    nn. 

1878,1880. 
Johnson  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  38.5.    p.  1896. 
Johnson  ;•.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  3S5.   iip.  1679. 

1696,  1868. 
Johnson  r.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  368.    p.  1790. 
Johnson  v.  State,  27  Tex.  758.     pp.  116,  1674, 

1753,  1974,  1975,  1985,  1995. 

Johnson  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  268.    pp.  17. 
24.  1 «-  i^t-       , 

Johnson  V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  571.    pp.  253, 

2.55. 
Johnson  t'.  Stone,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  419, 

pp.  1151,  11.52. 
Johnson  v.  Terrv,  35  Ark.  220.    p.  2145. 
Jahnson  v.  Totten,  3  Cal.  343.    p.  1101. 
Johnson  V.  Weed,  5  Johns.  (X.   Y.)   310.    v. 

959. 


xc 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Johnson  r.  AVhltman  Agr.  Co.,  20  Mo.  App. 

100.    p.  1129. 
Johnson  V.  AVideman,  Dudley  (S.  C),  70.  p. 

214. 
Jolmson  V.  AViley,  74  lud.  233.    pp.  574,  2112, 

21i:{. 
Johnson  t'.  Wilson,  1  Plnney  ("Wis.),  66.    p. 

2065. 
Johnson  r.  AVrlght,  19  Ga.  509.    p.  324. 
Johnson  v.  AVright,  48  iiii.  648.    n.  1633. 
Johnston  v.  Cirarleston,  3  So.  Car.  232.    p. 

1246. 
Johnston  v.  Crawlev,  22  Ga.  348.    p.  1600. 
Johnston  r.  Jones,  1  Black  (U.  S.),209.  pp. 

37."),  408,  1740,  lH.ie. 
Johnston  v.  Mason,  27  Mo.  511.    p.  312. 
Johnston  v.  Sutton,  1  T.  R.  544.    pp.   1161, 

1162,  1163,  1167,  1170,  1181,  1191. 
Johr  V.  People,  26  Mich.  427.    p.  122. 
Joice  V.  Alexander,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

528.     pp.46.  93,97.100. 
Joiner  v.    Tan  Alstyue,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  944; 

«.  c.  20  Neb.  578.     p-  2051. 
Jolland  V.  Stainbridire,  3  Ve8.  478.    p.   1093. 
Jolleyr.  Tavlor,  1  (ami).  143.    pp.  608,  609. 
Joliffe  V.  Hile,  1  Call  (Va.),  301.    p.  918. 
Jones  r.  Adams.  17  Kev.  84.    p.  2087. 
Jones  V.  Andover,  10  Allen  (Mass.),  18.    p. 

1210. 
Jones  V.  Angell,  95  lud.  376.    pp.  563,  1750. 
Jones  V.  Baird,  76  Ind.  164.    p.  2(i08. 
Jones    i:  Brownlicld,  2  Pa.  St.    55.    p.  1007. 
Jones  V.  Buffum,  50  111.  277.    p.  1741. 
Jones   V.    Butterworth,   3   N.  J.  L.  345.    p. 

96. 
Jones  V.  Cox,  7  INfo.  173.    p.  1618. 
Jones  V.  Evans,  28  AVis.  168.    p.  2100. 
Jones  V.  Foster,  67  AVis.  296;  s.  c.  30  N.  AV. 

Rep.  697.    p.  2033. 
Jones  V.  Gaither,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  106. 

p.  2095. 
Jones  V.  GwTun.  10  Mod.  214.    p.  1161. 
Jones   V.    Hathaway,  77  Ind.  14.    pp.    1426, 

1694,  1698. 
Jones  V.  Hook,  47  Mo.  329.    pp.  912,914. 
Jones  V.  Holland,  8  Mete.    (Mass.)  377.    p 

344. 
Jones  r.  Inness.  32  Kan.  177.    p.  191. 
Jones  V.  Johns,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  426 

p.    3.')8. 
Jones   V.  Johnson,  3  A\"atts  &  S.    (Pa.)  276 

pp.  9.')5,  9.')8. 
Jones  V.  Jones,  71  111.  562.    p.  1708. 
Jones  1'.  Jones,  91  Ind.  72.    pp.  2071,  2076. 
Jones  V.    Jones,  57  .AIo.  138.    pp.  1642,  1688, 
Jones  V.  Jones,  1  Jones  L.  (N.    C.)  491,    p 

1016. 
Jones  V.  Jones,  13  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  448.    p 

1016. 
Jones  V.  Kea,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.)  .301.    p.  829. 
Jones  V.  Kimbro,6  Humph.  (Tenn.)  319.    pp 

195,  200. 
Jones  V.  Londemian,  39  Mo.  288.    p.  1607. 
Jones  V.  M'Williams,  6  Munf.  (Va.)  501.    p 

2017. 
Jones  r.  Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Mich.  437 

s.  e.  26  N.  ^V.  Rep.  662.    p.  1312. 
Jones  r.  Mills,  10  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.)  788;  s, 

r.  al  I..  J.  V.  P.  66.    )).  ii;». 
Jones  r.  Parker.  20  N.  H.,  31.    p.  612. 
Jones  V.  J'ashbv,29  N.  AV.  Rep.  374.    p.  1622 
Jones  r.  Peoi>le,  6  Colo.  4.52.     ]).  78. 
Jones  r.  I'eople,  2  Colo.  351.    pp.  78, 117,  125 

443,  445,  1772. 
Jones  v.  Porter,  3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.)  i:!2.    p 

1044. 
Jones  r.  Pullen,  66  Ala.  306.    ]).  802. 
Jones  V.  Railro.-id  Co.,  79  .Mo.  '.)•.'.     p.  925. 
Jones  V.  Smitli,64  N.  Y.  180.    p.  312. 


Jones  f.  State,  1  Ga.  610.    p.  42. 

Jones  r.  Sprague,  3  111.  55.    p.  2130. 

Jones  r.  State,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  475.    pp.  65, 

91,  103,  1902,  1904. 
Jones  v.  State,  65  Ga.  506.    pp.  727,  732, 1637, 

1640,  1668,  1728,  17.")6. 
Jones  V.  State,  3  Blackf.  (lud.)  37.    pp.  15, 

32,  33, 104. 
Jones  r.  State,  59  Ind.  229.    p.  1.566. 
Jones  r.  State,  57  Miss.  684.    ji.  66. 
Jones  v.  State,  20  Ohio,  34.    i).  1698. 
.Jones  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  150.    p.  2.53. 
Jones  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  228.    p.  1537. 
Jones  r.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  575.    p.  20. 
Jones  V.  State,  7  Tex.  Ap]).838.    p.  1560. 
Jones  V.  State.  8  Tex.  App.  648.    p.  103. 
Jones  V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  532.    j).  1564. 
Jones  V.  State,  13  Tex.  168.    pp.  1635,  1670, 

1903,  1929,  1931. 
Jones  V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  11.    pp.  1878, 

1880,1889. 
Jones  V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  85.    p.  1763. 
Jones  r.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  485.    p.  1538. 
Jones  r.  State  (Sup.  Ct.  Ohio  1851),  8  West. 

L.  J.  508.    p.  .32. 
Jones  r.  Talbot,  4  IMo.  279.    pp.  1682, 1710. 
Jones  V.  Trustees,  1  Ind.  109.    p.  572. 
Jones  V.  Tucker,  41  X.  H.  .546.    p.  294. 
Jones  r.  A'ail,  30  X.  J   L.  135.    p.  1914. 
Jones  V.  A'an  Patten,  3  Ind.  107.    p.  1710. 
Jones  V.  Vanzandt,  2  McLean  (U.  S.),  611 

p.  89. 
Jones  V.  AVilliamson,  5  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  371 

|).  192. 
Jones  V.  AVilson,  3  Johns.  (N.  T.)  434.    p.  898 
Jones  r.  AVood,  16  Pa.  St.  25.    p.  1668. 
Jordaine  r.  Lashbrooke,  7  T.  R.  601.    p.  464, 
Jordan  r.  Bowden,  46  N.  Y.  Super.  355.    p 

653. 
Jordan  r.  Fall  River  R.  Co.,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 

69.     pp.  1151,  11.52. 
Jordan  v.  Meredith.  1  Binu.  (Pa.)  27.    p.  113. 
Jordan  r.  Osgood,  109  Mass.  457.    p.  299. 
Jordan  v.  State,  22  Ga.  54.").    j).  126. 
.Jordan  v.  State,  14  Tex.  436.    p.  152. 
.Jordan  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  422.    p.  1744. 
Joseph  V.  Com.  (Ky.),  1  S.  A\'.  Rep.  4.     p. 

430. 
Joseph  7-.  Mather,  110  Ind.  114.    p.  2138. 
Josephine  v.  State.  39  Miss.  613.    p.  in4. 
Josev  ?•.  \\  ilmington  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Rich.  L. 

134"     p.  118. 
Joslin   c.  Grand  Rapids  Ice  &  Coal  Co.,  55 

Mich.  323.     p.  316. 
Jov  V.  Adams,  26  .Ale.  .330.    p.  961. 
•lov  r.  Slate,  14  Ind.  139.    p.  27. 
Juvee  r.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  273.    pp.  1964, 

i',«;,"),  I'.Kw;,  1092. 
Judah  c.  Trustees,  23  Ind.  272.    pp.  215,  221, 

2 '^2. 
Ju(lJ!re  r.  Leclalre,  31  Mo.  127.    p.  852. 
Judge  of  Probate  v.  Green,  1  How.  (Miss.) 

14().     11.265. 
Judge  of  Probate  v.  Stone,  44  N.  H.  593.    pp. 

21'.t,  243,  .581. 
.Judge  r.  Moore,  9  Fla.  269.    p.  1669. 
.Judson  t\  Kslava,  Minor  (Ala.),  3.    p.  9. 
.ludson  r.  Reardon.  16  AHnn.  431.    j).  1741. 
Judson,  Ex  parte,  3  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  89.    p. 

]t;6. 
Judson,  In  re,  3  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  148.    p.  186. 
Judv  V.  Gerard,  4  McLean  (U.  S.),  360.    p. 

886 
Jumpertz  v.  People,   21  111.    411.    pp.   1903, 

19()C,,  J008. 
Juneau  Bank  r.  McSpcdou,  5  Blss.    64     p. 

188. 
Justice  r.  Kirlin,  17  Ind.  .o88.    p.  833 
Justices  V.  GrilHn  &c.  Co.,  15  Ga.  39,    p.  1750. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCl 


K. 

Kabe  v.  Eagle,  2f>  "SVis.  108.    p.  2064. 

£ahii  V.  Central  Smelting  Co.,  2  Utah,  370.  p. 

877. 
Kahn's  Case,  11  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  147;  a.  c.  19 

How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  475.    p.  153 
Kaime  v.  Omro,4!t  "Wis.  371.    pp.  713,  714. 
Kaim  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  282.    p.  268. 
Kalamazoo  Noveltv  Mfg.  Co.t;.  McAllister,  36 

Mich.  327.     pp.  W38,  1944. 
Kalckhoff  v.  Zoehrlant,  43  Wis.  373.    p.  2028. 
Kaler  v.  Builders'  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  120 

Mass.  33.5.    pp.  416,  417. 
Kalk  t:  Fielding,  50  Wis.  339.    pp.  376,  377. 
Kalle  I',  People,  4  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.)  591.   p. 

311. 
Kallman  v.  United  States  Express  Co.,  3  Kan. 

205.    p.  1364. 
Kane  v.  Com.,  89  Pa.  St.  522;  s.  c.  33  Am.  Rep. 

787.     pp.  1512,  1521,  1530. 
Kanna  v.  Koster,  15  Week.  Dig.  (N.  Y.)  119. 

p.  1559. 
Kanouse  v.  Kanouse,  36  111.  4.39.    p.  331. 
Kansas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  28  Kan.  285.    p. 

673. 
Kansas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brady,  17  Kan.  380.    p. 

1226. 
Kansas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cutter,  19  Kan.  83.    p. 

1488. 
Kansas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lane,  33  Kan.  704.    p. 

1300. 
Kansas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pointer,  14  Kan.  37;  s.  c. 

9  Kan.  620     pp.  560,  503,    1225,  2034,   2035, 

2041. 
Kansas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Reynolds,  8  Kfin.  623. 

p.  2038. 
Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  30  Kan. 

645.     pp.  1344,  1360.  1373,  1497. 
Karle   r.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  55  Mo.  476. 

pp.  1218,  13U7,  1756. 
Karr  r.  Parks,  40  Cal.  188.    pp.  1233,  1234. 
Karriger  v.  Greb,  42  Mo.  44.    p.  1670. 
Kassebaum  v.  State,  45  Ind.  277.    p.  .50. 
Kauffman  r.  Babcock,  2  S.  W.  Rep.  (Tex.) 

878  ;  s.  c.  66  Tex.  241.    p.  343. 
Kauflfman  v.  Griesemer,  20  Pa.  St.  467.    p. 

1698. 
Kauffman  v.  Harrington,  23  Mo.  App.  573. 

p.  2051. 
Kaufman  r.  State,  49  Ind.  248.    pp.  1790, 1847. 
Kavauaugh    v.  Janesville,  24  Wis.  618.    p. 

1235. 
Kay  r.  XoU,  20  Xeb.  380 ;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  Rep. 

269.     pp.  1771,2041. 
Kay  r.  Pennsylvania   R.  Co.,  65  Pa.  St.  269. 

p.  1234. 
Kealing  v.  Van  Sickle,  74  Ind.  529.    p.  2010. 
Kearnev  v.  Gough,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  457.    pp. 

227,  233. 
kearney  v.  Holmes,  6  La.  Ann.  373.    p.  1197. 
Kearnev  v.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  5  Q.  B. 

411  ;  s.  c.  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  759;  2  Thomp.  Neg. 

1220.     p.  1222. 
Kearney  v.  New  York,  92  X.  Y.  617.    pp.  620, 

621,622. 
Kearney,  Ex  parte.  7  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  38.    pp. 

150,  152,  154. 
Kearney's  Case,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  459.    p. 

138. 
Ke.-irns  v.  Snowden,  104  Mass.  63,  n.     p.  1210. 
Keating  v  Irish,  Lutw.  227.     p.  1128. 
Keating  r.  State,  44  Ind.  449.    p.  2110. 
Keator  r.  Peojjle,  32  Mich.  484.    pp.  452,  456. 
Kee  i:  State,  28  Ark.  155.    ji.  19.50. 
Kcech  V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  Md.  32.    p. 

1670. 
Keeler  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  16  Wis.  523. 

p.  974. 


Keely  v.  State,  14  Ind.  36.    p.  1566. 
Keen  v.  Preston,  24  Ind.  395.    p.  916. 
Keeuan  v.  Com.,  44  Pa.  St.  55.    p.  1571. 
Keenan  v.  State,  8  Wis.  132.    pp.   125,  1903, 

1907,1908. 
Keener  v.  Kauffman,  16  Md.  296.    p.  1046. 
Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194.    pp.  119, 120, 1509. 
Keerl  v.  Bridgers,  10  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  612. 

p.  958. 
Keiser  r.  Lines,  57  Ind.  431.    p.  63. 
Keiser  v.  State,  83  Ind.  234.    pp.  1520,  1525, 

1526. 
Keith  V.  Herschberg  Optical  Co.,  48  Ark.  138. 

p.  2122. 
Keith  V.  Lathrop,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  454.    p. 

515. 
Keith  i\  New  Haven  &c.  R.  Co.,  140  Mass.  175. 

p.  814. 
Keith  V.  Wilson,  6  Mo.  435.    p.  257. 
Keith  r.  WombeU,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  217.    p.  265. 
Keithley  v.  Keithley,  85  Mo.  217.    p.  1712. 
Kelbourni'.  Bradley,  3  Day  (Conn.), 356;  s.  c, 

3  Am.  Dec.  237.    p.  889. 
Kelham  r.  The  Kensington,  24  La.  Ann.  100. 

pp.  1346,  1356,  1359. 
Kell  V.  Brillinger,  84  Pa.  St.  276.    p.  35. 
Kellar  v.  Roberts,  Bright  (Pa.),  109.    p.  264. 
Keller  r.   Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  How.  Pr. 

(X.  Y.)172.     p.  1212. 
Keller  v.  Strasburger,  90  X*.  Y.  379.    p.  1559. 
Kelley  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  138. 

pp.  1305, 1307. 
Kelley  v.  People,  .55  N.  Y.  565;  s.  c.  14  Am. 

Rep.  342.     pp.  47,  48,  1811. 
Kelley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  75  Mo.  140.    pp.  1305. 

1307. 
Kelley  v.  Riley,  106  Mass.  339.    p.  796. 
Kelley  v.  Schupp,  60  Wis.  76.    p.  1764. 
Kelley  v.  State,  53  Ind.  312.     p.  1574. 
Kelley  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  262.    p.  1762. 
Kelley  v.  United  States  Express  Co.,  45  Mo. 

428.    p.  1770. 
Kelley  v.  Weber,  9  Abb.  N.  C.  (X*.  Y.)  62.    p. 

630. 
Kellogg  V.  Adams,  51  Wis.  141.    p.  1003. 
Kellogg  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  26  Wis.  223: 

s.  c.  7  Am.  Rep.  69.    p.  1485. 
Kellogg  V.  French,  15  Gray  (Mass.),  354.    p. 

Kellogg  r.  Nelson,  5  Wis.  125.    p.  375. 
Kellogg  r.  Steiner,  29  Wis.  626.    p.  1662. 
Kellogg  V.   Wilder,  15  Johns.   (N.   Y.)  455. 

p.  1931. 
Kelly   V.  Beauchamp,  59  Mo.  178.    pp.  1493. 

1494. 
Kelly  V.  Brooks,  25  Ala.  523.    p.  383. 
Kelly  r.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  70  Mo.  604.    p. 

1599. 
Kelly  V.  Jackson,  6  Pet.  (U.  S.)  622.  pp.  1708, 

1709,  iS92. 
Kelly  f.Mack,  49  Cal.  523.  p.  2089. 
Kelly  V.  Sheehy,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.),29.  p.  1983. 
Kelly  V   State,  3  Smed.    &   M.    (Miss.)    518. 

p.  23. 
Kelly  V.  Troy  Ins.  Co.,  3  Wis,  254.    p.  250. 
Kelly  r.  Wright,  65  Wis.  236.    p.  191. 
Kelsear.  Haines,  41  X'.  H.  246.    pp.  346,912. 
Kelsey  v.  Glover,  15  Vt.  708.    p.  1247. 
KelsoV.  Townsend,  13  Tex.  140.    p.  1668. 
Kelton   r.   Bevius,  Cooke    (Tenn.),  90.    pp. 

1161,1176,1181,1197. 
Kemmerer  v.  Edelmau,  23  Pa.    St.  143.     p. 

1380. 
Kemp  r.  Dcrrett,  3  Camp.  510.    p.  1135. 
Kemp  1-.  Kennedy,  5  Crauch  (U.  S.),  185.    p. 

136. 
Kemp  r.  Phillips,  55  Vt.  69.    p.  1245. 
Kemp  V.  State.  13  Tox.   App.  561.    pp.  1545, 

1546,  1557,  1571,  1573,1891. 


XCll 


TAHLE    OF    CASES. 


Kemp  V.  State,  38  Tex.  111.    p.  312. 
Kemper  v.  Louisville,  14  Hush  (Ky.),  87.    p. 

55. 
Kempinger  v.  St.  Louis  &c.   R.  Co.,  3  Mo. 

App.  5S1.    i>.  l'2;?-2. 
Kenan  r.  ilollowav,  16  Ala.  53.    p.  1702. 
Kendall  r.  Albla  (Iowa),  34  N.  W.  Kep.  833. 

pp.  5.'>,  5(5. 
Kendall  v.  IJrownson.  47  X.  H.  ISfi.    p.  322. 
Kendall  r.  May,  10  Allen  (Mass.l,  M.    p.  293. 
Kendel  v.  Judah,  63  Ind.  291.    p.  2140. 
Kendrick  V.  Cisco,  "7  Teun.  (3  Lea)  248.    p. 

1703. 
Kendrick  V.  Com.,7S  Va.  490.    pp.  264  26S. 
Keudrick  v.  State,  55  Miss. 436.    p.  1">42. 
Kennard  v.  Hurtou.  25  Me.  39.    p.  1224. 
Kenneda  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  2.5S.   pp.  1695, 

1A">5. 
Kennedy  v.  Bohannon,  11  B.  Mon.  (Kj-.)  IIS. 

Pl>.  1096,  ia)7,  109S. 
ICennedy  v.  Com.,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  340.   pp.  19, 

110,117,119. 
Kennedy  v.  Dale,  4  "SVatts  &  S.  (Pa.)  176.    p. 

92. 
Kennedy  v.  Gibbs,  15  111.  406.    p.  1125. 
Kennedy  V.  Holladay,  25  Mo.  App.  503.    p. 

343. 
Kennedy  v.  Kennedy,  2  Ala.  571.    p.  S69. 
Kennedy  v.  Kennedy,  18  N.  J.   L.  450.    pp. 

1964,  1967. 
Kennedy  v.  Moore.  17  S.  C.  464.    p.  218. 
Kennedy  v.  North  Mo.  11.  Co.,  36  Mo.  351.    j). 

1677. 
Kennedy  v.  People,  40  111.  488.   pp.  1815, 1833, 

1834, 1843. 
Kennedy  v.  Prueltt,  24  Mo.  App.  414.  p.  1059. 
Kennedy  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  620.    pp.  65, 

321. 
Kennev  v  Altvater,  77  Pa.  St.  34.    p.  1101. 
Kenney  v.  Kailroad  Co.,  70  Mo.  244.    p.  1311. 
Kennon  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  326.    p.  127. 
Kenrick  v.  Heppard,  23  Ohio  St.  333.    pp.  118, 

120. 
Kent  V.  Charlesto\yn,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  281.  p. 

113. 
Kent  V.  Elstob,  3  East,  18.    p.  1223. 
Kent  r.  IIarcourt,33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  491.  p.  1625. 
Kent  V.  Lincoln,  32  Vt.  591.    pp.  310,  .516. 
Kent  r.  Masson,  1  Bradw.  (III.)  466.    p.  365. 
Kent  r.  Miltenberger,  13  Mo.  App.  503.    pp. 

882, 883. 
Kent  V.  Tyson,  20  N.  H.  121.    pp.  1698,  1913, 

1956. 
Kenworthy  ?;.  Ironton,  41  Wis.  655.    p.  1270 
Kenworthy  r.  Williams,  5  Ind.  375.    i)p.  1726, 

1727. 
Kenyon  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  5  llun  (X. 

Y.),479.     p.  1235. 
Kenyon  v.  Sutherland,  8  111.  99.    p.  746. 
Keokl'  V.  Main,  .52  X.  Y.  Sui)er.  160.    p.  105. 
Keokuk  &c.  Packet  Co.  v.  True,  83  111.  609.  p. 

1286. 
Keongh  v.  McXitt,  6  Minn.  513.    p.    098. 
Kepperly  r.  Kanisden,  S3  111.  3M.    p.  1224. 
Kerby  t'.  Com.,  7  Leigh  (Va.).  747.    !>.  4S. 
Keruf.  Soiiih  St.  Louis  ."Slut.  In.^.  Co..  40  Mo. 

19.    p.  979. 
Kernodle  v.  Cason,  25  Ind.  :'62.  p.  I'O. 
Kerner  r.  Peligo.  25  Kan.  C25.    jip.  2U00,  2073. 
Kerr  c.  Day.  14  Pa.  St.  112.    p.  lo.-i2. 
Kerr  r.  Korgiic,  54  111.  .182.     i-.  1232. 
Kerr  I',  (iilniore.  6  Watts  (Pa.).  4"l.    p.  870. 
Kerr  r.  Mc(;uire.  28  N.  Y.  416.    p.  Oil. 
Kerr  v.  Wlllan,  2  Stark.  53.     j).  1364. 
Kerr  r.  Workman,  Add.  (I'a.)  270.    p.  1167. 
Kerr.ilns  v.  I'cople,  60  X.  Y.  221.    ]>]).  345,  ,52>'. 
Kerrigan,  Matter  of,  33  N.  J.  L.  314.    pp.  137, 

13S,  l:!9,  140. 
Kcrschbaugher  v.  Slusser,  12  Iud.4,53.  j).  106. 


Kerwin.Ex  parte.  S  Cow.  (X.  T.)  118.    p.  1033. 
lve>lcr   r.  MyiTs,  41   Ind.  543.     pp.  2107.  2111, 

2117,2121,212.;. 
Ketchani  c.  Clark,  6  Johns.  (N.  T.)  144.    pp. 

llol,  1103,1104. 
Kctchum  V.  K\i)ress  Co.,  52  Mo.  390.    p.  1318. 
Kettle  V.  Ilaryev,  21  Vt.  301.    p.  892. 
Key  V.  lIolenian,2  Bay  (S.  C.),315.    p.  1980. 
Key  V.  Lynn,  4  Litt.  (Ky.)  338.    p.  361. 
Keys  i:  (;rant,  118  I'.  .^."25.    p.  1075. 
KeVser  v.  Kvans,  30  Pa.  St.  507.    p.  1046. 
Kibler  v.  Mcllwain,  16   S.  C.  551.    pp.  383, 

384. 
Kidd  V.  Com.,  16  Pa.  St.  426.    p.  961. 
Kidd  r.  Cromwell,  17  Ala.  648.     pp.  825,  827. 
Kidd    r.   Kawliiison,    2  Bos.  &.   P.  59.    pp. 

1440,  1441,  1442,  1443. 
Kiddell    v.  Buruard,  9  Mees.  &  W.  668.    p. 

929. 
Kidder  v.  Parkhurst,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  393.    p. 

IISI. 
Kidwelly  r.  Brand,  Plowd.  71.    p.  1126. 
Kiernan  r.  Abbott,  1   llun  (X.  Y.).  109:  s.  c. 

3  Thomi).  &  ('.  (X.  Y.)  755.     pp.  266,  267. 
Kiernau  v.  Kocheleau,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  148. 

p.  1671. 
Kiler  r.  Kimball,  10  Cal.  267.    p.  560. 
Kilcfore  r.  Jordan,  17  Tex.  341.    p.  1995. 
Kilgore  V.  State,  74  Ala.  1.    p.  1797. 
Killen  v.  Sistrunk,  7  Ga.  283.    pp.  1945, 1954, 

19,55. 
Killian  v.  Eigenman,  57  Ind.  480.    pp.  1646, 

2027,  2029. 
Killij)  V.   Empire  Mill  Co.,  2  Nev.  34.    pp. 

20S4,  2085. 
Killman  i\  State,  2  Te.x.  App.  222.    p.  1744. 
Kilnioie   v.    Abdoolah,  27  L.  J.  (E.xch.)  307. 

pp.  1473,  15,59. 
Kilpatrick  v.  People,  5  Denio  (X.  Y.),277. 
'  p.  1537. 

Kilpatrick  v.  State.  13  Pa.  .St.  198.    p.  1890. 
Kinihall  r.  Bates,  .50  Me.  308.     p.  1169. 
Kiuiliall  V.  Bath,  38  Me:  219.    p.  1473. 
Kinil)all  v.  Cleveland,  4  Mich.  606.    pp.  1022, 

1023. 
Kiml)all  v.  Davis,  19  AVend.  (X.  Y.)  437;  a.  c. 

25  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  259.    p.  .569. 
Kimball  v.  Estate  of  Baxter,  27  Vt.  623.    p. 

966. 
Kimball  r.  Tenner,  12  N.  H.  248.    p.  1447. 
Kimball  v.  Loomis,  62    Ind.  201.    pp.  2112, 

2123. 
Kimball  V.  Morris,  2  Mete.  (Mass.)  573.    p. 

159. 
Kimball  i'.    Parmerlee,   29  Minn.    302.    pp. 

2072,  2073. 
Kimball    v.    Rutland  &c.   R.  Co.,  26  Vt.  247. 

p.  1343. 
Kiinliall  V.   Thompson,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  441. 

]>.  204. 
Kimball  Ac.  Man.  Co.  v.  Vronlan,35  Mich. 

310.    p.  325. 
Kimble  r.  Adair,  2  Blatchf.  (Ind.)  320.   p.  221. 
Kimliru  r.  Hamilton,  28  Tex.  .500.     p.  1637. 
Kimbniugh  r.  Stale,  62  Al;i.  248.    p.  84. 
Klncaid  r.  Xicely,  90  Ind.  403.    p.  1621. 
Kincaid  v.   Rogers,  3  Suced  (Tenu.),  1.    ji. 

184. 
Kinc.'innon  i\  Carroll,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  II 

p.  847. 
Klne  r.  Beaumont,  7  .1.  B.  Moore,  112.    p.  611. 
King  V.  Atkins,  33  La.  Ann.  1057.     p.  383. 
King  V.  Bailey,  8  Mo.  332.     pp.  1440,  1441. 
King  V.  Bunlett.  12  West  Va.  088.     j)p.  2,  3. 
Kingr.    Butler,  15  .Johns.  (X.  Y.)  281.     ii.  899. 
King  V.  Chicago  &c.  li.  Co.,  98  HI.  376.    i). 

201. 
King'v.  Ilckla  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  58  Wis.  514.    p. 

986. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XClll 


King  V.  Iowa  Midland  R.  Co.,  34  la.  458.    p. 

673. 
King  V.  Kearsev,  2  Ind.  402.    p.  4.51. 
King  r.  King,  3"?  Ga.  205.    pp.  1633, 1681. 
King  V.  King,  4!t  Ga.  622.    p.  1984. 
King  v.  Little  Rock.  26  Ark.  479.    p.  2053. 
King  V.  Ohio  &c.  11.  Co.,  7  Biss.  (U.  S.)  529. 

p.  145. 
King  V.  Phillips,  8  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  603.    p.  1416. 
King  r.   Shepherd,  3  Story  (U.  S.),349.    pp. 

1321, 1345. 
King  V.  State,  21  Ga.  220.    p.  103. 
King  V.  State,  5  How.  (Miss.)   730.    pp.  33,  73, 

99,  100. 
King   V.  State,   9    Tex.    App.  515.    pp.  1S78, 

1880. 
King  V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.    277.    pp.  1695, 

lti96. 
King  V.  Williams,  21  N.  W.  Rep.  (la.)  502.  p. 

10U6. 
King  V.  Woodbridge,  34  Vt.  565.    p.  343. 
King's  Proctor  i\  Daims,  3  Hagg.  218.    p.  829. 
Kingen  v.   State,  46  Ind.   132.    pp.  118,  120, 

122. 
Kingsbury  v.  Buchanan,  11  la.  388.    p.  854. 
Kingeley  v.  Wallis,  14  Mc.  57.    ]i.  1122. 
Kinloch's  Case,  Foster,  16.    p.  1905. 
Kinnaiuan  v.  Kiunamau,  71    Ind.  417.    pp. 

740,  744. 
Kinney  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  L.  513.    p. 

1298. 
Kinney  v.  "Williams,  1  Col.  191.    p.  1646. 
Kinuicutt  v.  Stockwell,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  73. 

p.  119. 
Kinsell  v.  Daggett,  11  Me.  309.    p.  1044. 
Kinsman  v.  Dullman,  5  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  382. 

p.  1074. 
Xinzey  v.  King,  6  Ired.  (N.  C.)  76.    p.  184. 
Kip,  Matter  of,  1  I'aige  (N.  Y.),  601.    p.  265. 
Kipp  V.  Wiles,  3  Sandf.  (S.  C.)  (N.  Y.)  585. 

p.  1122. 
Kirby  v.  Bruns,  45  Mo.  234.    p.  1.591. 
Kirk  V.  Bhirton,  9  Mees.  &  W.  284.    p.  1074. 
Kirk  V.  Folsom,  23  La.  Ann.  584.    pp.  1322, 

1346,  1357. 
Kirk  V.  State,  14  Oh.  511.    p.  1723. 
Kirk  V.  Wolff  Man.  Co..  US  111.  567;  s.  c.  6 

West.  Rep.  500.     pp.  1653,  1686. 
Kirkman  v.  Handy,  II  Humph.  (Tenn.)  406. 

p.  1394. 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co., 86  Mo. 

341.     pi).  923,  1369,  1495. 
Kirksey  v.  Cole,  47  Ark.  504.    p.  2111. 
Kirkwood's  Case.l  Lewin  C.  C.  103.    p.  299. 
Kirland  v.  State,  43  Ind.  146;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep. 

386.     p.  1756. 
Kirschbon  v.  Bousel  (Wis),  29  N.  W.  Rep. 

S07;s.  c.  67  Wis.  178.    p.  311. 
Kirschner  v.  State,  9  Wis.  140.    p.  285. 
Kirwin  v.  People,  96  111.  206.    p.  8. 
Kistler  v.  State,  54  Ind.  400.    p.  1800. 
Kitchen  v.  Cape  Girardeau  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Mo. 

514.     p.  1708. 
Kitchens  v.  State,  41  Ga.  217.    p.  1635. 
Kittt'ri'.  People,  25  111.  42.    p.  127. 
Kiltredge  v.  Elliott,  16  N.  H.  77.    i>.  1944. 
Kittredge  v.  Proprietors,  17  Pick.   (Mass.) 

246.     p.  1051. 
Kittredge  v.  Russell,  114  Mass.  67.    p.  348. 
Kitzinger  v.  Sanborn,  70  111.  146.    p.  1498. 
Kizer  v.  State,  12  Lea  (Teuu.),564.    pp.  707, 

708. 
Klein  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  13  Pa.  St.  247.    p. 

983. 
Klein  v.  Russell,  19  Wall.  (U.  S.)  433.    pp. 

409,  618,  619. 
Kleinback  r.   State,  2  Spccrs  L.  (S.  C.)  418. 

pp.  43,  84,  89,  92. 
Kleinmau  v.  Boernstein,  32  Mo.  314.    p.  946. 


Kleinschmidt  v.  McAndrews,  117  L'.  S.  282 

pp.  2104.  2127. 
Kline  r.  Baker,  99  Mass.  253.    pp.  819,  1507. 
Kline  v.  Cent.  Pac.    H.  Co.,  37  Cal.  400.    p. 

1290. 
Klingensmith  v.  Klingensmith's  Ex.,  31  Pa. 

St.  460.    p.  1020. 
Klinger  r.  State,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.)  2,57.    p.  83. 
Klipuer  v.  Coffev,  44  Md.  117.    p.  1210. 
Klock  V.  State,  60  Wis.  574.    pp.  321,  322,  323, 

334. 
Klosterman  v.  Germanla  Life  Ins.  Co.,  6  jNIo. 

App.  582.    p.  740. 
Klutts  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  642. 

p.  1256. 
Knapp  V.  Schneider,  24  Wis.  70.    pp.  383,  420. 
Kneeland  v.  State,  62  Ga.  395.    p.  268. 
Knickerbocker  v.  People,  43  X.  Y.  177.    pp. 

1892, 1896. 
Knight  f.  Campbell,  62  Barb.  (N".  Y.)  16.    p.  4. 
Knight  r.  Clements,  45  Ala.  89.    pp.  1669, 1733. 
Knight  V.  Clements,  8  Ad.  &  El.  215.    p.  1031. 
Knight  V.   Cunnington,  6  Hun  (X.  Y.),  100. 

jip.  375,  385. 
Knight  V.   Egerton,  7  Exch.  407.    pp.  1472, 

1473,  1559. 
Knigbt  V.  Forward,  63  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  311.    p. 

397. 
Knight  V.  Freeport,  13  Mass.  213.    pp.  1921, 

1923,  1927. 
Knight  c.  Goodyear  &c.  Co.,  38  Conn.  438. 

pp.  1400,  1401. 
Knight  r.  House,  29  Md.  194.    p.  456. 
Knight  V.  Hunt,  5  Bing.  432.     p.  1068. 
Knight  ?i.  Killebrew,  86  X.  C^  400.    p.  2129. 
Knight  V.  Low,  15  Ind.  374.     p.  797. 
Knight;-.  Xew  England  ^VorstedCo.,  2  Cush. 

(Mass.)  272.     p.  1007. 
Knight  V.  Pontchartrain  R.  Co.,  23  La.  Ann. 

462.    p.  1223. 
Knight  V.  State,  70  Ind.  375.    pp.  525,  787. 
Knight  V.  A'ardemaim,  25  .\la.  262.    p.  1642. 
Knode  v.  Williamson,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  586.  p. 

454. 
Knoll  ».  Mayer,  13  Bradw.  (111.)  203  p.  1381. 
Kuoop  t'.  Nelson  Distilling  Co.,  26  Mo.  App. 

303.     pp.  1440,  1446. 
Knott  V.  People,  83  111.  583.    p.  145. 
Knowles  V.  People,  15  Mich.  409.    pp.  761,  775, 

1772. 
Knowles  V.  Rexroth,  67  Ind.  59.    p.  107. 
Knowlton  v.  Milwaukee  City  R.  Co.,  59  Wis. 

278.    p.  2042. 
Knox  V.  Easton,  38  Ala.  345.    p.  1669. 
Knox  V.  Rives,  14  Ala.  249.    p.  1156. 
Knox  V.  Summers,  3  Cranch  (U.  S.),  496.    p. 

1059. 
Knox  V.  Trofalet,  94  Ind.  346.    p.  2014. 
Knoxville      Iron    Co.     v.    Dobson,    15   Lea 

(Tenn.),  410.    p.  20(!6. 
Knyaston  v.  Shrewsbury,  Andrews,  85.    pp. 

112,  125. 
Koch  c.  State,  32  Ohio  St.  3.52.    p.  92. 
Koecker  r.  Koecker,  7  Phila.  364.    p.  179. 
Koehler  r.  Wilson,  40  la.  183.    p.  1698. 
Koelges  v.   Guardian  Life  Ins.  Co.,  57  X.  Y. 

638.     pp.  745,   747.  755,  756. 
Koenig  v.  Bauer,  1  Brewst.  (Pa.)  304.    pp.  113, 

120. 
Koenig  v.  Globe  Mutual  Life  Ins  Co.,  10  Hun 

(N.  v.),  558.     p.  509. 
Koerner,  v.  State,  98  Ind.  8.    pp.  1569, 1632, 

1616, 1647, 168S,  1709,  1785.  1868,  1877. 
Koester  v.  Ottumwa,  34  la.  41.    p.  1929. 
Koger  V.  Havs,  57  Mo.  329.    p.  1,594. 
Kohler  V.  Wells,  60  Cal.  606.    p.  309. 
Kohn  V.  Lucas,  17  -Mo.  Ai)p.29.    p.  2108. 
Koon  ('.  Ins.  Co.,  104  U.  S.  106.     p.  201. 
Kouutz  V.  Kennedy,  63  Pa.  St.  187.    p.  1031. 


XCIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES, 


Krack  r.  Wolf.  39  Ind.  88.    pp.  1738, 1743. 
Krninph  v.  Hatz,  52  Pa.  St.  525.    pp.   1131, 

1251. 
Kraiis  f.  Burlington  Ac.  R.  Co.,  55  Iowa,  33S. 

p.  1309. 
liranz  r.  Thiohen,  15  Bradw.  (111.)  482.    pp. 

1675,  1681,  l(i!H1. 
Krebs  v.  O'Gradv,  23  Ala.  732.    p.  1019. 
Krelis  V.  State,  S'Tox.  A])!).  1.    j).  115. 
Krech  v.  Pacific    liailroad,  64  Mo.  172.    p. 

1668. 
Kreitline  v.  Franz,  lOR  Ind.  359.    p.  2102. 
Kicniling  v.  Lallman,  K;  Xeb.  280.    p.  43. 
Krider  v.  Laffcrty,  1  AVliart.   (Pa.)   303.    p. 

1052. 
Krieg  v.  "Well.s.  1  E.  D.  Smith,  76.    p.  1232. 
Krov  V.  Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.,32  la.  3.57.    p. 

12(53. 
Krug  r.  Davis,  101  Ind.  75.    p.  2008. 
Kruidcuicr  v.  Shields,  70  la.  428;  s.  c.  30  N. 

W.  Hup.  681.     p.  1945. 
Krutz  V.  Craig,  .53  Ind.  .561.    p.  2076. 
Kuhlman   r.  Medliuka,  29  Tex.  385.    pp.331, 

2007. 
Kuhn.-i  V.  Gates,  92  Ind.  C6.    p.  2012. 
Kuhtraan  v.  Browu,  4  Kich.  L.  (S.  C.)  479.    p. 

821. 
Kun's  Executor  v.  Young,  34  Pa..  St.  60.    p. 

857. 
Kuvkendall  v.  McDonald,  15  Mo.  41(!.    pp. 

1440,  1449. 
Kyle  V.  Hostick,  10  Ala.  .591.    p.  5r.;t. 
Kyle  V.  Miller,  lOS  Ind.  90.    p.  1108. 


L.  V.  n.,4  Sw.ah.  &  Tr.  1I.'>.    pp.  646,  619,  651. 
Labar  v.  Koplin,  4  X.  Y.  546.    p.  16ft5. 
Laberr.  Cooper,  7  Wall.  (U.    S.)  565.    pp. 

1670, 1708. 
Labron  v.  Woran.  1  Hill  (X.  Y'.),91.    p.  582. 
Lacey   v.   Mitchell,   23   Ind.    67.     pp.    1164, 

1172. 
Lacey  v.  State,  58  Ala.  385.    p.  127. 
Lack  V.  Seward,  4  ( 'ar.  &  P.  106.    p.  1223. 
Lackawanna  &c.  11.  Co.  v.  Doak,  52  Pa.  St. 

379.    p.  1210. 
Lacker  v.  United  States,  7  Cranch  (U.  S.) 

339.     p.  2003. 
Laconv.  Iliggins,  3  Stark.  178;  s.  c.  D.  &  11. 

178.    p.  246. 
Ladd  V.  Hildcbrant,  27  Wis.  135.    p.  2061. 
Ladd  r.  Moore,  3  Sandf.  (S.  C.)  (N.  Y.)  589. 

p.  1132. 
Ladd  V.  WUson,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  5.    p, 

1982. 
Lady  Herbert  r.  Shaw,  11  Mod.  118.    p.  112. 
Lady  Joy's  Case,  cited  1  Ld.  Raym.  148.    p. 

1936. 
LaFarge  v.  LaFarge  Ins.  Co.,  14  How.  Pr. 

(X.  Y.)  26.    p.  182. 
Lafayette  r.  Larson,  73  Ind.  .367.    p.  1272. 
Lafavette  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Huffman,  28 Ind.  289. 

p.  1233. 
Lafayette  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Xew  Albany  &c.  R. 

Co.,  13  Ind.  90.    p.  120. 
Lafayette  Bank  v.    State  Bank,  4  McLean 

(U.S.)  208.     pp.  1022,  1023. 
Lafavette  I'lank  lioinl  Co.  t\  Xew  Albany  &c. 

R.  "Co.,  13  Ind.  90.     p.  1992. 
Lafever  v.  Stone,  55  la.  49.    pp.  2088,  2101. 
Lafolletc  r.  Thompson,  83  .Mo.  199.    ]).  211.3. 
La  Fontaine  r.  Underwriters,  83  N.   C.  132. 

pp.  132,  139,  171.  266,  268,  285,  286. 
La  Force  r.  Park,  1  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

223.     J).  891. 
La  Fronibois  v.  Jackson,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  589. 

pp.  2008,  2009. 
Laggins  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  65.    p.  130. 


Laicher  v.  New  Orleans  &c.  II.  Co.,  28  La» 

Ann.  320.     pp.  1223,  1235. 
Laidlow  r.  Organ,  2  Wheat.   (U.  S.)  178.    p. 

1U4. 
Laing  r.  Colder,  8  Pa.  St.  234.     p.  1236. 
Laird  v.  Iven^i,  45  Tex.  622.    p.  1102. 
Lake  v.  Bender,  18  Xev.  361.    ]>.  2082. 
I.ako  c.  Johnnveako.9  Kan.  511.    p.  1751. 
Lake  c.  Milliken.  02  Me.  240.     p.  1221. 
Lake  v.   People,  1  I'ark.  Cr.   (X.  Y.)495.    p. 

17S0. 
Lake  Erie  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Acres,  108  Ind.  .548; 

s.  e.  9  X.  E.  Roil.  4.53.    p.  2089. 
Lake  Erie  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Fix.  88  Ind.  381 :  s.  c. 

45  Am.  Ken.  461.     i)p.  1295,  1312,  1477.  1479. 
Lake   Erie  kc.  \l.  Co.  v.  Parker,  '.)4  lud.  91. 

pp.  563,  .577, 17(i5. 
Lake  shore  &e.  U.  Co.  r.  Fltzpatrick,  31  Oh. 

St.  479.    1).  1210. 
Lake  Shore  &c.  IJ.  Co.  i-.  Hart,  87  111.  529.    p. 

1235. 
Lake  Shore  &c.  R.   Co.  i-.    Miller,  25  Mich. 

274.     ]).   12  ill. 
Lake  Shore  Ac.  R.  Co.  r.  O'Conner,  115  111. 

2.-).5.    p.   I J 13. 
Lake   *liore    &c.  R.    Co.    v,     Sunderland,  2 

r.radw.  (111.)  31)7.    p.  1230. 
Lakey  r.  llurnhy,  9  Ind.  .536.     p.  .561. 
Lainance  r.  Bvhies,  17  Xev.  197.    pp.  2087, 

2'r.i9. 
Lamb  r.  Brolaski,  38  AIo.  .53.    p.  892. 
Lamb  r.  Camden  &c.  R.  Co.,  46  X.  Y.  271.   pp. 

1318,  1:522,  1:541.  1346,  1:547,  134S. 
Lamb  r.  First  Presb.  Soc.  20  la.  127.    p.  2036. 
Lamb  r.  Lmuc,  4  Oh.  St.  167.    p.  4. 
Lamb  v.  Old  Colony  B.  Co.,  140  Mass.  79.    p. 

210'.*. 
Lamb  V.  State,  :^6  Wis.  424.    pp.  94,  105. 
Lamb  v.  Western   U.  Corp.,  7  Allen  (Mass.), 

98.    pp.  1:533,  1336. 
Lambert  r.  Ghiselin,  9  How.  (U.  S.)  552.    p. 

942. 
Lambert  v.  McFarland,  7  Xev.  159.    p.  2028. 
Lambert  r.Saulord,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  137.    p. 

194. 
Lambertson  v.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.) 

200.     p.  25. 
Lam  me  v.  Gregg,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  444.    pp.  926, 

927. 
Lammers  r.  White  Sewing  Machine  Co.,  23 

.Mo.  App.  471.     p.  1033. 
LWmoureaux  v.  Crosby,  2  Paige  (X.  Y.),  422. 

p.  147. 
Lampe  v.  Kennedv,  60  Wis.  110.    p.  1766. 
Lamphier  v.  State",  70  Ind.  317.    p.  121. 
Lamprey  v.  Munch,  21  Minn.  379.    p.  389. 
Lanagin  f  Xo\vland,44  Ark.  84.    j).  2010. 
Lancaster  t'.  Collins,  115  U.  S.  222.    p.  214. 
Lance  v.  Bonnell,  105  I'a.  St.  46.    p.  2076. 
Lando  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  33  Wis.  640.    p. 

1308. 
Lander   r.  State,   12  Tex.  462;  s.  c.   Horr.  & 

Thoinp.  ('as.  Self-Def.  366.     p.  1542. 
Laudis  r.  Ilamillon,  77  Mo.  5.54.    p.  1605. 
Landis  v.  Laudis,  1  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  249.    p. 

1009. 
Landsbergcr  v.  Gorham,  5  Cal.  450.    i)p.  272, 

392. 
Lane  v.   Atlantic  Works,  107  Mass.  104.    p. 

1224. 
Lane  v.  Ballcv,  47  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  395.    p.  1773. 
Lane  v.  Com.,  .59  Pa.  St.  371.    pp.  1.5.57,  1861. 
leaner.  Crockett,  7  Price,  .566.     p.  2063. 
Lane  v.  Croinbie,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  177.    pp. 

1224, 1754. 
Lane  v.  Goodwin,  47  Me.  .59.3.    p.  117. 
Lane  v.  Scovllle,  16  Kan.  402.    pp.  113,  121. 
Lane  I'.  Salter,  4  Rob.  (N.  V.)  239.    p.  1222. 
Lane  v.  Slate,  16  Tex.  App.  l73.    p.  1.538. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xcr 


Lane  V.  Stebbins,  9  Paige  (X.  Y.),  622.    p. 

58;t. 
Laufear  r.  Sumner,  17  Mass.  109.    p.  1131. 
Lang  r.  State,  1  S.  W.  Rep.  319.    p.  1694. 
Langdale  v.  ■I'rimmer,  15  East,  291.    p.  944. 
Langdon  v.  Goole  3  Lev.  21.    p.  847. 
Langford  r.  Green,  52  Ala.  lO.S.    p.  S91. 
Langley  v.  Borrv,  14  X.  H.  82.    p.  1447. 
Langley  v.  Warner,  3  N.  Y.  327.    pp.   2007, 

2008,  2000. 
Langwonby  v.   Myers,   4   la.  18.    pp.    1948, 

19.3(). 

Lanier  r.  Driver,  24  Ala.  149.    p.  649. 
Lanigan  v.  Xcw  York  &c.  Co.,  71  X.  Y.  30.    p. 

1642. 
Launen  v.  Albany  Gasligbt  Co.,  44  X.  Y.  4.i9. 

p.  1300. 
Lanning  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  Iowa,  502; 

S.  c.  27  X.  W.  Rep.  478.     p.  1312. 
Lansdale  r.   Brown,  4  Wash.   C.   C.    (U.  S.) 

148.     pp.  1945,  1954. 
Lansing  v.  Johnson,  18  X'eb.  175.    p.  1496. 
Lansing  v.  Russell,  13  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  510.    p. 

1645. 
Lapeer  Ins.  Co.  r.  Dovle,  30  Mich.  159.    pp. 

825,  845. 
Lapevre  v.  Paul,  47  Mo.  .586.    p.  1051. 
Large  v.  Orvis,  20  Wis.  696.    pp.  816,  817. 
Larilliau  r.  Lane,  8  Ark.  372.    p.  6. 
Larimer  r.  Kollv,  13  Kan.  78.    p.  1930. 
Larkin  i-.  l?uck,"n  Oh.  St.56S.    p.  893.     ' 
Larkiii  v.  Taylor,  5  Kan.  433.    p.  1224. 
Larkins  r.  Tartar,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.),  681.    pp. 

l-.t8S,1992. 
Larmun  v.  lluey,  13  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)  436.    p. 

310. 
Larned  v.  Buffington,  3  Mass.  546.    pp.  1466, 

1467. 
Larned  v.  Griffin,  12  Fed.  Rep.  590.    p.  188. 
La  Rose  r.  Logansport  Xat.  Bank,  102  Ind. 

322.     p.  2138. 
Larrabee  v.  Selbv,  52  Cal.  506.    p.  1.50. 
Larrabee  v.  Sewall,  66  Me.  376.    p.  1209. 
Lary  r.  Cleveland  &c.   R.  Co.,  78  Ind.  323; 

s.  c.  41  Am.  Rep.  572.    p.  1312. 
Lassell,  Ex  parte,  8  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  119.    p.  199. 
Laselle  v.  Wells,  17  Ind.  33.    pp.   1627, 1726. 
Lassiter  v.  Jackmon,  88  Ind.  118.    p.  2036. 
Lassiter  v.  State,  67  Ga.  739.    p.  257. 
Lathrop  V.  Sharon,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  172.    p 

17.52. 
Latham  v.  Selkirk,  11  Tex.  314.    pp.  215,  217 

239. 
Latimer  1'.  Batson,  4  Barn.  &  Cres.  652.    pp 

1441,  1443. 
Latshaw  v.  Territory  of  Oregon,  1  Ore.  140, 

p.  1669. 
Laughlin  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  28  Wis.  204, 

p.  1363. 
Laughlin  v.  Clawson,  27  Pa.  St.  328.'  p.  1176 
Laughlin  v.  Eaton,  54  Me.  156.    p.  1235. 
Laughlin  ?•.  State,  19  Oh.  St.  99.    p.  258. 
Laurel  v.  Bank,  25  Minn.  48.    p.  2092. 
Lawrcns,  The  Bark,  1  Abb.  Adm.   508.    pp. 

132,  136. 
Lavin  v.  People,  69  111.  303.    p,  58. 
Law  V.  Cross,  1  Black  (U.  S.),  533.    pp.  835, 

1709. 
La^v  V.  Fairfield,  46  Vt.  425.    p.  431. 
Law  V.  Jackson,  8  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  746.    pp.  2130, 

2131. 
Law  V.  Long,  41  Ind.  586.    p.  1130. 
Lawler  v.  Earle,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  22.    p.  2021. 
Lawler  I'.  Linden,  1-.  R.  10  ('.  L.  188.    p.  1136. 
Lawler  v.  Mcl'heeters,  73  Ind.  577.    p.  1730. 
Lawler  v.  Northampton  Gas.  Co.,  2  Allen 

(Mass.),  307.    p.  1232. 
Lawless  r.  Connecticut  &c.  R.  Co.,  136  Mass. 

1.    p.  1241. 


Lawless  v.  Reese,  3  Bibb  (Ky.),  486.    p.  1943. 
Lawrence  i\   Barker,  5  Wend.   (X.   Y.)  305. 

pp.  361, 1663. 
Lawrence  v.  Beaabien,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  623. 

pp.  2007,  2015. 
Lawrence  v.  Boswell,  Saver,  100.    p.  1984. 
Lawrence  v.  Clark,  14  Mees.  &  W.  249.    p.  613. 
Lawrence  v.  Collier,  1  Cal.  37.    p.  123. 
Lawrence    v.  French,  25  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  443. 

I).  1003. 
Lawrence  v.  Fulton,  19  Cal.  690.    p.  1141. 
Lawrence  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  29 Conn.  390. 

p.  1256. 
Lawrence  v.  Lanning,  4  Ind.  191.    p.  414. 
Lawrence  v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.,  11  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 

245,  note  a.    pp.  344,  589. 
Lawrence  v.  Shreve,  26  Mo.  492.    p.  1583. 
Lawrence  v.    State,  20   Tex.  App.  536.    pp. 

1506,  1705. 
Lawrence  w.  Stiles,  16  Bradw.  (111.)  489.    pp. 

35,-<,  642. 
Lawrence  v.  Van  Home,  1  Caines  (X.  Y.), 

27(>.    p.  634. 
Laws  V.  Rand,  27  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  76 ;  s.  c.  3  Com. 

Bench  (N.  s.),  442.    p.  944. 
Lawson  v.  Bachmau,  81  X.  Y.  616.    p.  609. 
Lawson  v.  Glass,  6  Colo.  134.    pp.  321,  355. 
Lawson  v.  State,  32  Ark.  220.    pp.  351,4.52. 
Lawton  v.  Sager,  11  Barb.   (X.  Y.)    349.    p. 

876. 
Lawyer  v.  Loomis,  1  Thomp.  &  C.  (X.  Y.) 

3!>3.     p.  344. 
Lawyer  v.  Smith,  8  Mich.  411.    p.  1009. 
Lave'r's  Case,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  135.    pp.  45, 

68,  88,  93,  105. 
Layton  v.  Riney,  33  Mo.  87.    p.  1593. 
Lea  V.  Henderson,  1  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  146.    pp, 

265,  287. 
Lea  V.  Henry,  56  la.  662.    p.  831. 
Leach  v.  People,  53  111.  311.    pp.  69,  72. 
Leach  V.   Wilbur,  9  Allen  (Mass.),  212.    p. 

1917. 
Leach 6  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  279;  s.  c.  3  S. 

W.  Rep.  539.     pp.  1708, 1884. 
Leadbeter  v.  Roth,  25  111.  587.    p.  1003. 
Leaf  r.  Butt,  1  Car  &  M.  451.    p.  613. 
Leahy  v.  Dun  lap,  6  Colo.  552.    pp.  2,  3. 
Leaptrot  v.  Robertson,  44  Ga.  46.    p.  1713. 
Learned  r.  Hall,  133  Mass.  417.    pp.  737,  775. 
Learyr.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  580;  s. 

c.  2  N.  E.  Rep.  115.     p.  1241. 
Leary  v.  IMever,  78  Ind.  393.    p.  629. 
Leas  V.  Cool,  68  Ind.  166.    p.  1911. 
Leas  V.  W^alls,  101  Pa.  St.  57;  s.  c.  47  Am. 

Rep.  699.     p.  1250. 
Leavenworth  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs,  17  Pac. 

Kep.  391.    p.  2040. 
Leavenworth  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  10  Kan.  426. 

1).  2033. 
Leavitt  v.  Stansell,  44  Mich.  424.    pp.  389,  416. 
Le  Barrou  v.  Le  Barron,  35  Vt.  365.    pp.  646, 

65 1 . 
Le  r.eau  v.  People,  34  X.  Y.  223.    pp.  403,  409, 

53 1 . 
Lecraw  v.  Boston,  17  How.  (U.  S.)  426.    p. 

812. 
Ledbetter  v.  State,  21  Tex.  Anp.  344.    p.  1637. 
Ledford  v.  Ledford,  95  Ind.  283.    p.  375. 
Ledley  j.  State,  4  Ind.  .580.    p.  1742. 
Leduke  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  4  Mo.  App. 

485.    p.  1230. 
Lee  V.  Angas,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  59.    p.  180. 
Lee  V.   Ashbrook,  14   Mo.  378;  s.   c.  55  Am. 

Deo.  110.     p.  892. 
Lee    r.  Campbell,  4   Port.    (Ala.)   198.    pp. 

2008,  2009,  2013. 
Lee  V.  Chadsev,  2  Keves,  546.    pp.  414,  432. 
Lee  i\  Clute,  19  Xev.  151.    p.  1964. 
Lee  V.  David,  11  Mo.  114.    pp.  1598, 1621. 


XCVl 


TABLE    OF   CASES- 


Lee  V.  Pnnlap,  55  >ro.  454.    p.  S02. 

Lee  c.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  36  Upper  Can. 

(Q.  It.)  350.     p.  1155. 
Lee  r.  Hamilton,  12  Tex.  413.    p.  1672. 
Leer.  Ins.  Co.,3Grav  (Mass.),6S3.    p.  977. 
Lee  V.  Lee,  71  X.  C.  139.    ]>.  27. 
Leer.  Leo,  6  Gill  &  .1.  (Mil.)  316.    p.  899. 
Lee  r.  JMcLeod,  15  Nev.  15S.    pp.  1920,  1976, 

2062. 
Leer.  Mound  Station,  118111.306.    p.  1749. 
Leer.  jMusriceridu-ejS  Taunt.  ?,{>.    p.  SS9. 
Leer.  reUr,(U;ill&.I.  (.M(l.)447.    p.  90. 
Lee  V.  Slalo,  45  Miss.  Ii4.     p.  74. 
L,ee  r.  State,  21  Oli.  t^t.  151.    p.  630. 
Lee  V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  2(>6.    p.  1S5.5. 
Lee  r.  State,  21  Tex.  Ai.p.  244.    p.  1.548. 
Lee  V.  Stowe,  57  Tex.  444.    pp.  .5(i9,  570. 
Lee  r.  Tebo  Ac  K.  Co..  53  Mo.  178.    p.  1499. 
Lee  r.  Troy  &c.  Gaslight  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  115. 

pp.  1640, 1642. 
Leegee  r.  Thomas,  1   Blatchf.    (U.  S.)   11. 

p.  1059. 
Leese  v.  Clark,  20  Cal.  387.    p.  2n.'?6. 
Leet  V.  "Wilson,  24  Cal.  398.    j).  50,5. 
Leetchr.  Atlantic  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  4  Daly  (N. 

Y.)518.     ]).  331. 
Leete  r.  Pilgrim  Cong.  Church,  St.  Louis  Ct. 

of  Apjieals  (unreported),     p.  1388. 
Lefever  r.  Johnson,  79  Ind.  554.    p.  319. 
Leffel  v.-  Letfel,  :)r,  Ind.  76.    )).  20;{3. 
Leftwich    r.    Day,    32   Minn.    512.    pp.  2000, 

2011. 
Leftwich  r.  Lecann,  4  Wall.  (U.  S.)  187.    p. 

211!l. 

Legg  V.  Drate,   1  Oh.  St.    286.    pp.  383,  783, 

Leggett  V.  Blount,  Taylor  (X.  C.)  123.    p. 

1181. 
Leggett  r.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  382.    p.  1079. 
Lehigh  CoaKtc.  Co.  v.  Nortliampton  County, 

S  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  334.    p.  1087. 
Lehman  r.  P.rooklyn,  29  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  234.  pp. 

1233,  1602. 
Lehman  v.   State,  18  Tex.  App.  174.    pp.  1865, 

1892,  1894,  1895, 
Lehman  v.  Strassbnrgcr,  2  Woods  (U.  S.),554. 

p.  882. 
Leiber  v.  Weidcn,  17  Neb.  584.    p.  1006. 
Leicester  v.  Pittsford,  6  Vt.  245.    p.  1247. 
Leigh  V.   People,  113  lU.  372.     pp.  1846,  1849, 

1870. 
Leigiiton  v.  Sargent,  31  X.  H.  120.    pp.  1929, 

1982, 1985. 
Leimerv.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  26  Mo.  26.    p.  1593. 
Leister  v.  Smith,  2  Root  (Conn.),  24.    p.  1466. 
Leith  v.  Poi.e,  2  W.  BI.  1327.     p.  1477. 
Leland  i:  K;mtli,  47  Mich.  .508.    p.  410. 
Lemarr.  AVilliams,  32  JSliss.  341.    p.  1647. 
Lc.Merchand's  Case,  Leaclie's  Cr.  Cas.  336,  n. 

p.  609. 
Le  Mere  r.  McTTale.  30  Minn.  410.    p.  176. 
Lenike  r.  Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.,  39  Wis.  449.  pp. 

2036.  2030. 
Lemmonr.  Moore,  97  Ind.  1.5.    p.  2041. 
Lemon  r.  Chanslor,  68  Mo.  342.   pp.  1285, 1286, 

1299, 1483. 
Lemon  r.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  38  Conn.  294.    p. 

991. 
Lemon  r.  State,  4  W.  Va.  755.    p.  476. 
Lemprevr.  Munch,  21  Minn.  379.    i).  370. 
Lenox  v.  Knox  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Me.  322.    p. 

2092. 
Lenox  v.  Pike,  2  Ark.  14.    pp.  210(5, 2122. 
Leonard  v.  Allen,  11  Cush.    (Mass.)  241.    p. 

449. 
Leonard  v.  Baker,  1  Maule  &  .S.  251.    p.  1443. 
Leonard  v.  Leonard, 2  Allen  (Mass.),  543.    p. 

11.58. 
Leonard  r.  Scbuler,  .34  Mo.  475.    p.  2092. 


Leonard  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  417.  p.  1566. 
Leonard  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  442.  p.  77*. 
Leonard  r.  Territory,  7  I'ac.   Ro)).  872;  s.  c. 

2  Wash.  Tcr.  381.  "pp.  1825,  1870,  1871. 
Leonard  c.  Warrine,  20  Wis.  41.  {t.  2130. 
Leonard  v.  \\liile,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  177.    p. 

324. 
Leonori  v.  Bishop,  4  Duer  (X.  Y.),  420.    pp. 

470,  488. 
Le  Uov  r.  Beard,  8  How.  (U.  S.)  451.    p.  1444. 
Lc  Roy  V.  Market  F.  Ins.  Co.,  39  X.  Y.  90.    p. 

975. 
Le  Rov  r.  Park  F.  Ins.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  56.    pi). 

976,  9"78. 
Le  Roy  r.  Rassette,  32  Cal.  171.    p.  2086. 
I>e  Sage  r.  Coussniaker,  1   Esp.  187.    ji.  899. 
Lesem  v.  Harriford,  44  .Mo.  323.     p.  1440. 
Leslie  r.  Merrick,  9'.)  Ind.  180.    p.  20:i'.(. 
Lessee  of  Pennr.  Messenger,  1  Veates  (Pa.), 

2.    p.  1.52. 
Lesser  v.  Banks,  46  Ark.  482.    pp.   2104,  2120, 

2)45. 
Lester  v.  Goode,  2  Murph.  (X.   C.)  37.    p. 

1983. 
Lester  r.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo.  265. 

1).  1669. 
Lester  v.  Pittsford,  7  Vt.  1.58.    p.  1225. 
Lester   v.  Stanley,  3   Day    (Conn.),  287.    p. 

1910. 
Lester  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  433.    pp.  9,  51, 

103,  105, 116. 
Lctcliford  r.  Golden  Eagle,  17   La.   Ann.  9. 

pp.  1322,  1346,  1358. 
Lctton  V.  Graves,  26  Mo.  251.    p.  .5.59. 
Letton  r.  Young,  2  Mete.  (Ky.).5.59.    p.  1772. 
Leveu  v.  Smith,  1  Denio  (X.  Y.),571.    p.  1671. 
Leverett  r.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  213.    pp.  1964, 

1965, 1967. 
Levers  r.  Buskirk,  4  Pa.  St.  309.    p.  1699. 
Leverich  v.  Frank,  6  Ore.  212.     pp.  449,  450. 
Levering  r.  Union  &c.  Co.,  42  Mo.  88.    pp. 

1318,  1322,1347,  1348,  1349,  1350. 
Levi  V.  Milne,  4  Bing.  195.    p.  1517. 
Levin  r.  Russell,  42  N.  Y.  251.    p.  583. 
Leviston  r.  Junction  R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  597.    pp. 

825,  827. 
Levitzkv  v.  Canning,  33  Cal.  299.    p.  1003. 
Levy  r."P>rannan,  3vt  Cal.  485.    ]).  19(>3. 
Levv  V.  Brown,  .56  Miss.  83.     pp.  191.  192. 
Levy  V.  Milne.  12  Moore,  418;  s.  c.  i  Bing.  195. 

pp.  1473,  1,5.59. 
Levv  r.  Gadsbv,  3  Cranch  (U.S.),  180.    pp. 

82.5,  886. 
Levy  r.  Peters,  9  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  125.    p.  948. 
Lewis  V.  Armstrong,  64  Ga.  645.    p.  807. 
Lewis  V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  Md.  588.    p. 

1235. 
Lewis  V.  Chapman,  16  X.  Y.  369.    pp.  1456, 

14.57. 
Lewis  r.  Christie,  99  Ind.  377.    p.  1783. 
Lewis  r.  Denton,  13  la.  441.    p.  1.588. 
Lewis  r.  Ilartlev,  7  Car.  A:  P.  405.     p.  658. 
Lewis  r.  Klotz  (La.),  1  South.  Rep.  .539.    p.  3. 
Lewis  r.  Lewis,  8  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)  530.    p. 

898 
Lewi's  V.  Marshall,  7  Jfan.  &~G.  729.    p.  304. 
Lewis  V.  McDaniel,  82   Mo.  577.     pp.   1468, 

1469. 
Lewis  r.  McJIullln,  5  W.  Va.  .582.    p.  1983. 
Lewis  V.  Moses,  6  Coldw.  (Tcnn.)   193.    pp. 

1983,  VMK. 
Lewis  r.  .Moxcv,  9  :Nro.  App.  .597.    p.  20.55. 
Lewis  r.  Xiles",  1  Root  (Conn.),  346     p.  1466. 
Lewis  r.  Xuckolls,  2(;  :\I().  -MS.     p.  1060. 
Lewis  r.  Parker,  4  Ad.  .t  Li.  838.    p.  217. 
Lewis  r.  People,  44  III.  542.     )..  1904. 
Lewis  r.  Pnill,  48  Vt.  3.58.     p.  1000. 
Lewis  r.  Sai)lo.  1  Mood.  &  Malk.  39.     p.  878. 
Lewis  r.  Schweuu,  15  Mo.  App.  342.    p.  2080. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCVll 


Lewis  V.  State,  35  Ala.  380.    p.  421. 

Lewis  V.  State,  51  Ala.  1.    18. 

Lewis  V.  State,  33  Ga.  132.    p.  1750. 

Lewis  V.  State,  9  Smed.   &  31.    (Miss.)   115. 

pp.  65,  82,  85. 
Lewis  V.  State,  3  Head  (Tenn.),  127.    p.  85. 
Lewis  V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  116.    pp.   1695, 

1713, 1746,  1756. 
Lewis  r.  Wake  County,  74  N.  C.  194.    p.  171. 
Lexington  &c.  Ins.  Co,  v.  Paver,  16  Oh.  324. 

p.  214. 
Leyner  v.  State,  8  Ind.  491.    p.  2107. 
Licett  V.  Stale,  23  Ga.  57.    p.  125. 
Lichteiiheiu  v.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  11  Cnsh. 

(Mass.)  70.    pp.  1321.  1366. 
Liddy  v.   St.   Louis  &c.  K.   Co.,  40  Mo.  511. 

pp.  1.S06.  1773. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  8  Pet.   (U.  S.)  291. 

j).  2061. 
Light  r.  Kennard,  11  Neb.  130.    pp.  2051,  2052. 
Lightfoot  V.  People,  16  Mich.  507.    pp.  436, 

440. 
Lightlv  V.  Clauston,  1  Taunt.  112.    p.  892. 
Lilleyv.  Elwin,  11  Ad.   &  El.  (N.  S.)  742.    p. 

1136. 
Lillev  V.  Havs,  5  Ad.  &  El.  548.    p.  1018. 
Liliis"  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.   464.    p. 

1668. 
Lilly  V.  Griffin,  71  Ga.  535.    p.  1951. 
Lilly  V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  11.    p.  1544. 
Lin  V.  Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.,   10  Mo.  App. 

125.     pp.  1363,  1364. 
Lincoln  v.  Gillilan,  19   Neb.   119.    pp.    1269, 

1280. 
Lincoln  r.  Iron  Co.,  103  U.  S.  412.    p.  2005. 
Lincoln  r.  Stowell,  73  111.  246.     p.  21. 
Lincoln  r.  Walker,  IS  Neb.  244.    pp.    1271, 

1274,  1278,  1280,  1483. 
Lindauer  v.  Teeter,  41  N.  J.  L.  256.    pp.  19S3, 

1985. 
Lindenan  r.  Desborough,  8  Barn.    &  Cres. 

586.  p.  975. 
Lindholm  r.  St.  Paul,  19  Minn.  245.  p.  1249. 
Lindley  r.  Kindall,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  189.  p.  32. 
Lindo,  Ex  parte,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  445.  p.  261. 
Lindsay  v.  Dayis,  30  Mo.  406.  pp.  926,  929. 
Lindsay  v.  Janson,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  699.  p.  995. 
Lindsay  v.  Larned,   17  Mass.  190.     p.  1161, 

1704. 
Lindsay  V.  Lindsay,  11  Tt.  621.    p.  1597. 
Liudsey  v.  Union  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  3  R.  1. 157. 

pp.  974,  976. 
Lindsley  v.  European  Petroleum  Co.,  3  Lans. 

(N.  Yi)  176.     p.  214. 
Lindsley  v.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.)  233. 

p.  90. 
Lime  v.  Taylor,  3  Post.  &  Fin.  731.    p.  6.58. 
Lingham  r.  Eggleston,  27  Mich.  324.    p.  912. 
Lining  v.  Bentham,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  1.    pp.  132, 

141. 
Links  V.  State,  13  Lea  (Tenn.),  701.    p.  1711. 
Linn  v.  Le  Compte.  47  Tex.  440.    p.  2076. 
Linn  v.   Wright,  18  Tex.  317.    pp.  U36,  1439, 

1698. 
Liuscv  V.  Ramsey,  22  Ga.  627.    p.  717. 
Linsley  v.  Loyely,26  Vt.  123.    pp.  383,  387. 
Liuvilfe  r.  Early  wine,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  469.  p. 

1670.  ' 

Linyille  v.  Welch,  29  Mo.  203.    p.  1681. 
Lionberger  v.  Pohlmau,  16  Mo.  App.  392.    p. 

1627. 
Lipe  V.  Eisenlerd,  32  N.  Y.  228.    pp.  413,  459. 
Lisle  V.  state,  6  Mo.  426     p.  112. 
Listv.  Koriepeter,  26  Ind.  27.    pp.  221,  222. 
Listen-.  Boker,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  439.    ji.  261. 
Lister  i\  Perryman,  L.  R.  4  H.  L.  521 ;  s.  c.  39 

L.  J.  Exch.'l77.     pp.  1172,  1176,  1177. 
Listen  V.  Central  &c.  R.  Co.,  70  la.  714;  s.  c. 

29  N.  W.  Rep.  445.    pp.  575,  2043. 


Litchfield  v.  Hutchinson,  117  Mass.  195.    p. 

1415. 
Llthgow  V.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297.    pp.  64,  69, 

73,  115. 
Lltlethale  v.  Dix,  11  Cush.   (Mass.)  364.    p. 

1484. 
Little  V.  Blrdwell,  21  Tex.  597.    p.  1995. 
Little  V.   Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  66  Me.  239.    pp. 

1321, 1345. 
Little  V.  Clarke,  36  Pa.  St.  114.    p.  1101. 
Little  r.  Com.,  25  Gratt.  (Va.)  921.    p.  74. 
Little  v.  Dawson,  4   Dall.  (U.  S.)  111.    p.  899. 
Little  V.  Jacks,  67  Cal.  165.    pp.  2085,  2086. 
Little  V.  McGuire,  43  la.  450.    p.  1765. 
Little  r.  Vance,  14  Ind.  22.    p.  1060. 
Little  r.  Woodworth,  8  Neb.  283.    p.  928. 
Littlefleld   r.  Beamis,  5   Rob.   (La.)   145.    p. 

19.56. 
Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  20  Ohio,  415. 

p.  1225. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Atkins,  46  Ark.  430. 

p.  1297. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Cavenesse  (Ark.), 

2  S.  W.  Rep.  505.    p.  747. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Corcoran,  40  Ark. 

375.     pp.  1347,  1356. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlev,  37  Ark.  562. 

p.  1309. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Harper,  44  Ark.  208. 

lip.  1347,  ia56. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Payne,  33  Ark.  816. 

p.  1309. 
Little  Rock  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Talbot,  39  Ark.  523. 

pp.  1322,  1345,  1347,  1355,  1356. 
Little  Schuylkill  Nay.  Co.   v.  Richard,  57  Pa. 

St.  142.     pp.  1938,  19.56,  1962. 
Littlejohn  v.  Greeley,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y'.)  4L 

p.  218. 
Littleton  v.  Clayton,  77  Ala.  571.    p.  612. 
Littleton  v.  Richardson,  32  N.  H.  59.    p.  1221. 
Litton  V.  Graves,  26  Mo.  250.    p.  .560. 
Livermore  r.  Campbell,  52  Cal.  75.    p.  2057. 
Liverraore    r.  St.   John,  4  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  12. 

pp.  600,  638. 
Liversidge  v.  Broadbeut,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  602. 

p.  1018. 
Livineood  v.  Livingood,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  268. 

p.  2117. 
Livingston  v.  Ackeston,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y'.)  531. 

pp.  888.  895. 
Livingston  v.  Heerman,  9  Mart.   (La.)  656. 

p.  114. 
Livingston  r.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cranch 

(U.  S.),  280.     pp.  819,  1507. 
Livinsston  v.  Mavor  of  New  York,  8  Wend. 

(N."Y.)  85.     p.  lo~S. 
Livingston's  Lessee  v.  Moore,  7  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

469.    ]).  1578. 
Livingston  v.  Rogers,  1  Caines  (N.  Y'),  583. 

]i.  900. 
Livingston  v.   Smith,  1  Johns.  (N.  Y".)  141. 

p.  7. 
Livingstone  v.  Com.,  14  Gratt.  (Va.)592.    pp. 

498,  505. 
Lloyd  r.  Brmck,  35  Tex.  1.    p.  2049. 
Llovd  V.  Hough,  1  How.  (U.  S.)  160.    p.  891. 
Lloyd  V.  Jones,  7  Best  &  S.  475.     p.  1644. 
LloVd  V.  McClure,2  G.  Greene  (la.),  139.    pp. 

1983,  1994. 
Llovd  V.  Nourse,  2  Rawle  (Pa.),  49.    p.  70. 
Llovd  r.  Scott,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  205.    p.  886. 
Llovd  r.  Thompson,  5  Bradw.  (111.)  90.   p.  385. 
Lobdell  v.  New  Bedford,  1  Mass.  1,53.  p.  1249. 
Locke  V.  First  Division  &c.  R.  Co.,  15  Minn. 

350.    p.  1305. 
Locke  v.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank.  66  Ind.  353. 

p.  2010. 
Locke  r.  Palmer,  26  Ala.  312.    p.  869. 
Locke  r.  Railway  Co.,  46  la.  109.    p.  661. 


XCVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Locke  V.  Rowcll,  47  N.  H.  46.    p.  1015. 
Locke  V.  Sioux  &c.  R.  Co.,  46  la.  109.    p.  1211. 
Lockctt  v.  State,  63  Ala.  5.    p.  283. 
Lockluirt  V.  State,  92  Ind.  452.    p.  .319. 
Lock  wood  i'.  Bull,  1  Cow.    (N.  Y.)  322.    pp. 

1;!21,  1329. 
Lockwood  V.  Crawford,  18  Conn.  361.    pp. 

819,  938. 
Lockwood  V.  Ins.  Co.,  47  Conn.  553.  .  p.  983. 
Lockwood  V.  State,  1  Ind.  161.    pp.  150,  171, 

173. 
Lockwood  V.  Thome.  11  N.  T.  170.    p.  11,33. 
Loetlier  r.  Keokuk  Packet  Co.,  7  Mo.  App. 

185.    p.  101. 
LoeflFener  v.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  598.    p.  74. 
Loenier  v.  Haug,  20  Mo.  App.  163.    p.  968. 
Loew  V.  State.  60  "Wis.  559.    pp.  1748,  1999. 
Loewe  v.  Keismau,  8  Bradw.   (111.)  525.    p. 

p.  294. 
Loewer  v.  Sedalia,  77   Mo.    431.    pp.    1269, 

1276,  1278,  1281 ,  1483. 
Loaran  v.  Mesurier,  6  Moore  P.  C.  116.    p.  910. 
Logan  V.  Mathews,  6  Pa.. St.  417.    pp.  1322, 

1325. 
Logan  V.  Monroe,  20  Me.  259.    p.  775. 
Logan  V.  Quigley  (Penn.),  11  Atl.  Rep.  92. 

p.  1052. 
Logaii  r.  State,  50  Miss.  269.    pp.  18, 69,  70,  76. 
Logan  V.  State,  53  Miss.  431.    p.  22. 
Logan  V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  50.    p.  1756. 
Logansport  r.  McMillen,  49  Ind.  493.    p.  1501. 
Loggins  V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  65.    p.  116. 
Lohmau  v.  People,  1  Comst.  (N.  Y.)  379.    p. 

262. 
Lombard  v.  Chicago,  4  Biss.  (U.  S.)  460.    p. 

1246. 
London  v.  Coleman.  59  Ga.  653.    p.  20,58. 
London  Savings'  Fund  Soc.  v.  Ilagerstown 

Savings'  Bank,  36  Pa.  St.  498.    p.  1019. 
Long  V.  Duncan,  10  Kan.  294.    p.  2034. 
Long  Z-.  Higginbolham,  5ii  Mo.  245.    p.  1050. 
Longr.  Hughes,  1  Duv.  (Ky.)  387.    pp.  2071, 

2080. 
Long  V.  Lewis,  16  Ga.  154.    pp.  1586, 1605. 
Long  v.  Morrison, -14  Ind.  595.    pp.  411, 1235. 
Long  V.  Rodgers,  19  Ala.  321.    pp.  827, 1733. 
Long  V.   State,  12  Ga.  294.    pp.  203,  209,  703, 

736,  737,  1669,  1713. 
Longr.  State, .56  Ind.  133.    p.  2141. 
Long  V.  State,  .56  Ind.  182.     p.  787. 
Long  r.  State,  95  Ind.  481.    pp.  338, 1711,  1950, 

1974,  1985. 
Long  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  381.    pp.  1763, 

1796,  1797. 
Longcojie  v.  Brace,  44  Tex.  434.    p.  2001. 
Lonsdale  v.  Brown,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  151. 

p.  1139. 
Loomis  V.  Eagle  &c.  Ins.  Co., 6  Gray  (Mass.), 

396.    p.  991. 
Loomis  V.  Jewett,  35  Hun  (N.  Y'.),313.    p. 

1111. 
Loonev  v.  Bush,  Minor   (Ala.),  413.    p.  2119. 
Loop  V.  Gould,  17  Hun  (N.  Y.),  535.    p.  167. 
Looper  V.  I'.ell,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  373.    p.  108. 
Lopez  V.  State,  34  Tex.  133.     p.  465. 
Lorainer.  Cartwright,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

151.     p.  1131. 
Lord  V.  Brown,  5  Den.  (N.  Y.)  345,    pp.  57, 

99.  100. 
Lord  V.  French,  61  Me.  420.    p.  890. 
Lord  Behuore  v.  Anderson,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  90. 

p.  646. 
Lord  (irey's  Case,  9  How.  St.  Tr.  128,  S.  C, 

Skin.  82.    p.  4,5. 
Lord  Fitzwater,  Case  of,  805.    p.  1964. 
Lord    Peter  v.    Heneage,    12   Mod.   520.    p. 

1936. 
Lord   Stafford's    Case,   7  How.  St.  Tr.  1294. 

p.  399. 


Lord  Walsingham  v.  Goodricke,  3  Hare,  122, 

p.  276. 
Lore  V.  State,  4  Ala.  173.    p.  82. 
Loring  v.  Bacon,  4  >Iass.  575.    pp.  889,  899. 
Lorrimer  v.  Bank  of  Illinois,  1  la.  223.    p. 

1060. 
Lott  V.  Macon,  2  Strobh.  L.  (N.  C.)  178.    p. 

1945. 
Lott  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  206.    p.  1537. 
Lott  i:  State,  18  Tex.  App.  627.    p.  727. 
Lottman  r.  Barnott,  62  :Mo.  J65.    p.  1316. 
Lotz  V.  P.riggs,    50  Ind.  346.    pp.  1937,   1939, 

1946,  1950. 
London  Savinsrs  Fund    Soc.  v.  Ilagerstown 

Savings  Bk.,  36  Pa.  St.  498.    p.  1024. 
Louisiana    Plank    Road    Co.  v.  Mitchell,  20 

Mo.  432     1).  1593. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Boland,  70  Ind.  595. 

p.  199. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v,  Brownlee,  14  Bush 

(Ky.),  590.     p.  13(!4. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  409. 

pp.  496,  497,  498.  506,  508,  509.  516,   519,  520, 

563,  582,  584,  655,  1256,  1477,  1482,  1484,  lii75. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  11  Bush  (Ky.), 

506.     p.  1287. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrigan,  94  Ind.  245. 

]).  1756. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  92  Ind.  372. 

pp.,  1293,  1295,  1757. 
Louisville  &c.  R.    Co.    v.   Mahony,  7  Bush 

(Kv.\235.     p.  2088. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McCoy,  81  Ky.  403. 

p.  2088. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.   v.  McKenna,  13   Lea 

(Tenn.) ,  280.    pp.  825,  838. 
Louisville  &c.  R.    Co.    v.  Murphy,  9  Bush 

(Kv.),522.     pp.  1207,  1225. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  97  Ind.  267. 

1).  2110. 
Loui-sville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shanklin,  98  Ind.  573. 

p.  1756. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.    v.  Sickings,    5    Bush 

(Kv.),l.    p.  1235. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  107  Ind. 

442.     pp.  2042,  2084. 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  554; 

s.  c.  115  Ind.  570.     pp.  2038,  2043. 
Louisville  .Vc.  R.  Co.  v.  Worley,  107  Ind.  320. 

J])).  2027,  2(129. 
Louisville  iVc.  Works   v.  Commonwealth,  8 

Bush  (Ky.).  ISl.     p.  2068. 
Louisville  Rock  Line  Co.  v.  Kerr,  78  Ky.  12. 

p.  21169. 
Louthain  v.  ^filler,  85  Ind.  161.    p.  2039. 
Louw  V.  Davis,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y'.)  227.    p.  19. 
Love  V.  Carpenter,  30  Ind.  284.    p.  2052. 
Love  V.  DicUcrson,  85  X.  C.  5.     p.  218. 
Love  V.  Hall,  76  ln<l.  326.    p.  3. 
Love  V.  :Moo<ly,  68  \.  C.  200.    pp.  1978, 1979. 
Love   V.   State,  62  Tenn.   (6  Baxt.)  154.    p. 

1907. 
Lovejoy  v.  Spafford,  93  U.  S.  430.    pp.  1099, 

1103,  1104. 
Lovelady  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  .545.    p.  507. 
Lovell  V.  Briggs,  2  X.  H.  218.    p.  351. 
Lovell  V.  Davis,  101  IT.  S.  541.    p.  576. 
Lovett  V.  Salem  &c.  R.  Co.,  9  Allen  (Mass.), 

557.     p.  1233. 
Lovett  r.  State,  60  Ga.  257.    pp.  72, 123. 
Low  V.  (ietiv,  18  111.  493.    p.  1664. 
Low  r.  Mitciiell,  18  Me.  372.    p.  527. 
Lowber  v.  Le  Roy,  2  Saudf.  (S.  C.)  202.    p. 

838. 
Lowe  V.  Foulke,  103  111.  58.    pp.  2060,  2066. 
Lowe  V.  McCorkle,  8  West.   L.  J.  64.    p.  113. 
Lowe  V.  Sinklear,  27  Mo.  310.    )).  892. 
Lowell  V.  Ins.  Co.,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  127.    p. 

977. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XCIX 


Lowenburg  v.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  414. 

pp.  65,  73. 
Lowney  v.  New  Brunswick  R.  Co.,  78  Me.  479 ; 

s.  c.  7  Atl.  Hep.  381.    p.  1311. 
Lowney  v.  Perham,  20  Me.  235.    p.  265. 
Lowery  v.  Carver,  104  Ind.  447.    p.  2112. 
Lowrie  v.  France,  7  Xeb.  192.    p.  2088. 
Lowery  v.  State,  72  Ga.  649.    p.  1777. 
Lowry  v.  Orr,  6  111.  70.    p.  1214. 
Lovd  V.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  509.    pp. 

6o3,  728,  747,-749,  1229,  1477. 
Loyd  V.  Lee,  1  Strange,  94.    p.  889. 
Lovd  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  32.    p.  1744. 
Loza  V.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  488.    p.  1696. 
Lubbering   v.  Kehlbrecher,  22  Mo.   586.    p. 

1030. 
Lubbock  V.  Inglis,  1  Stark.  104.    p.  1330. 
Lucas  i\  Brooks,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.)  436.    j).  1705. 
Lucas  V.  Cannon,  13  Bush  (ivy.),  '350.    p.  1984. 
Lucas  V.  Cole,  57  31o.  145.    p.  877. 
Lucas  V.  Daniels,  34  Ala.  188.    p.  1051. 
Lucas  V.  Flinn,  35  Iowa,  9.    p.  434. 
Lucas  I'.  Growning,  7  Taunt.  164.    p.  835. 
Lucas  V.  Johnson,  8  Barb.  (N.   Y.)  244.    p. 

1047. 
Lucas  V.  Mariene,  40  Ind.  289.    p.  1910. 
Lucas  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.  33  Wis.  50. 

p.  1283. 
Lucas  V.  New  Bedford  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Gray 

(Mass.),  64.     pp.  1224.  1236. 
Lucas  v.  Nichols,  7  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)32.  p.  1456. 
Lucas  V.  San  Francisco,  28  Cal.  596.    p.  2015. 
Lucas  V.  Snyder,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  499. 

p.  825. 
Luck  V.  State,  96  Ind.  16.     p.  1981. 
Luckett  V.  Townsend,  3  Tex.  119.    p.  869. 
Luckhart  v.  Ogdeu,  30  Cal.  547.    p.  825,  828, 

831,  1119,1122. 
Ludden  v.  demons,  16  Neb.  506.    p.  1650. 
Ludlow  V.  Knox,  7  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  (N.  S.) 

411  (X.  Y.  Court  of  Appeals,  1869.).    p.  151. 
Ludwig  V.  Sager,  84  III.  90.    p.  1653. 
Lnera  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  2.57.    p.  1889. 
Lufkins  v.  Collins   (Idaho),  10  Pac.  Rep.  300. 

p.  2027. 
Lumbert  v.  Palmer,  29  Iowa,  104.    p.  1662. 
Lumbkin  v.  Slate,  12  Tex.  App.  341.     p.  1889. 
Luiiik-y  ('.  Caswell,  47  la.  159.     p.  1263. 
Lumpkin  r.  State,  68  Ala.  56.    p.  464. 
Lund  V.  Tyngsboro,  11  Gush.  (Mass.)  563.    p. 

1721. 
Lundie  v.  Roberts,  7  East,  231.    p.  948. 
Lung  V.  Deal,  16  Ind.  349.    p.  1726. 
Luningi'.  State,  1  Cliand.  (Wis.)  178.    p.  783. 
Lunt  V.  Whitaker,  10  Me.  310.    p.  1442. 
Lunt  V.  Wormell,  19  Me.  100.    pp.  218,  221. 
Lush  V.  Druse,  4  Wend.  (X.  Y.j  313.    p.  1476. 
Luster  v.  State,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  169.    p. 

1913. 
Luther  v.  Skeen.  8  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  356.    p. 

450. 
Latterell  v.  Reynell,  1  Mod.  282.    pp.  483,  484. 
Luttrell  V.  JMaysville  &c.  R.  Co.,  18  B.  Mon. 

(Ky.)  291.    pp.  1014,  1974. 
Luxford  V.  Large,  5  Car.  &  P.  421.    p.  1223. 
Lycoming  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ward,  90  111.  545. 

pp.  6y,  71. 
Lyles  V.  Lyles,  1  Hill  Ch.  (S.  C.)  76.    p.  489. 
Lyles  V.  Lyles,  2  Xott  &  McC.    (N.  C.)  531. 

p.  829. 
Lyles  V.  State,  41  Tex.  172.    pp.  49,  51. 
Lyman  v.  Bauk  of  U.  S.,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  225. 

p.  958. 
Lyman  v.  Philadelphia,  56  Pa.  St.  488.    pp. 

456, 476. 
Lyman  v.  Redman,  23  Me.  286.    p.  1758. 
Lyman  v.  State,  45  Ala.  72.    p.  51. 
Lyman  v.  State,  69  Ga.  405.    pp.  258,  259, 1976. 
Lynch  y.  Com.,  77  Pa.  St.  205.    p.  1878. 


Lynch  t\  Metropolitan  Ac.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y. 

77 ;  s.  c.  43  Am.  Hep.  141.    p.  1293. 
Lynch  v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B.  29;  s.  c.  4  Per.  & 

Dav.  672.    p.  1231. 
Lynch  v.  Peabody,  137  Mass.  92.    p.  779. 
Lynch  v.  Smith,  104  Mass.  53.     pp.  1232, 1233, 

1234. 
Lynch  v.  State,  9  Ind.  541.    pp.  317,  705,  722, 

726,  727,  732,  1520. 
Lynn  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  167.    p. 

1307. 
Lyon  V.  Barrows,  13  Iowa,  428.    p.  630. 
Lyon  V.  Commercial  Ins.  Co.,  2  Rob.  (La.) 

267.    p.  20. 
Lyon  V.  Daniels,  14  Pa.  St.  197.    p.  1586. 
Lyon   v.  Fox,  2  Browne  (Pa.),  67.    pp.1161, 

1198. 
Lvon  V.  Johnson,  28  Conn.  1.    p.  1101. 
Lyon  V.  Lyon,  21  Conn.  18, 185,  196.    p.  132. 
Lyon  I'.  Siblev,  32  Me.  577.    p.  1586. 
Lyons  V.  Desotelle,  124  Mass.  387.     p.  1210. 
Lvons  V.  Lawrence,  12  Bradw.  (111.)  531.    pp. 

618,  1927,  liimi. 
Lyons   y.  Rosenthal,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.),46.    p. 

1222. 
Lytton  V.  Baird,  95  Ind.  349.    p.  1756. 

M. 

M.  V.  B.,  3  Swab.  &   Tr.  550.    pp.  646,  649,  651. 
M.  V.  H.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  517.    pp.  649,  651. 
M'Aleece,In  re,  7  Ir.  C.  L.  146.    p.  136. 
M'Clintock  v.  Emick  (Ky.),  7  S.   W.  Rep. 

906.    p.  925. 
M'Xaughton's  Case,  10  CI.  &  Fin.  200.    pp. 

49i»,  502. 
M'Causlandt'.  Causlaud,  1  Y''eates  (Pa.),  372. 

p.  1980. 
Mass  V.  White,  37  Mich.  126.    p.  854. 
Mabbett  r.  White,  12  X.  Y.  442.    p.  560. 
Macclestield  v.  Pedley,  4  IJarn.  &  Ad.  403.  pp. 

1505,  1507,  1515. 
MacFarland  v.    Bellows,    49    Mo.    311.    p. 

1508. 
MacKinley  v.  McGregor,  3  Whart.  (Pa.)  370. 

)).  386. 
Macbeath  v.  Haldiman,  1  T.  R.  172.    pp.  831, 

832,  835. 
Macdonald  v.  Evans.  IC.  B.  930;  s.  c.  21  L.  J. 

C.  P.  141 ;  16  Jur.  103.    p.  635. 
Mace  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  110.    p.  1746. 
Mack  v.  Rochester  German  Ins.  Co.,  35  Hun 

(X.  Y.),75.     p.  980. 
Mack  V.  Salem,  6  Ore.  275.    p.  1248. 
Mackay  v.  Commercial  Bauk,  L.  R.  5  P.  C. 

394;  s.  c.  43  L.  J.  (P.  C.)  31.     p.  1022. 
Mackay  i:  Hhinelauder,  1  Johns.  Cas.  (X.  Y.) 

408.    p.  074. 
Mackey  v.  Adair.  99  Pa.  St.  143.    p.  191. 
Mackey  i-.  Ford,  5  Hurl.  &  X.  792.    p.  795. 
Mackev    v.  Xuw  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  27  Barb. 

(X.  Y.)  528.     p.  1226. 
Mackey  v.  People,  2  Colo.  13.    pp.  20, 1682. 
Mackinson  v.  Glegg,  95  Ind.  373.    p.  2051. 
Maclin  v.  Bloom,  54  Miss.  365.    p.  1912. 
Macklin  v.  Waterhouse,  5  Bing.  212.    p.  1364. 
Macklot  V.  Dubreuil,  9  Mo.  477.    p.  1042. 
Maclean  v.  Scripps,  52  Mich.  215.    p.  745. 
Maclin    v.   Insurance   Co.,  33  La.  Ann.  801. 

p.  640. 
Maclin  v.  Wilson,  21  Ala.  670.    p.  184. 
Macomber  i'.  Parker,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  183.  p. 

910. 
Macomber  v.    Taunton,   100   Mass.  255.    p. 

1379. 
Macro w   v.  Great  Western  B.    Co.,  L.  B.  6 

Q.  15.  612.     pp.   11.52,  1154. 
Macullar   v.  Wall,  6  Gray   (Mass.),  507.    p. 

307. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Madan  v.   Covert    13  Joue8  &  Sp.  (X.  Y.) 
M^c^^::.^^K-52la.692.    pp.  30.,  441. 

Mnddc  1  V.  Tucker,  4tt  Me.  367.    p.  10. .. 

Madsdeu  V.    Phoenix   Fire  ins.  Co.,  1  b.   C. 

M^iu^ka^fT.>omas.6Kan.l^.PP.5^^g. 
Maffelt  I'.  Toukius,  b  N.  J.  1-  -£-»•  PI"-  "^  ' 
MSef  t'.  Carmack,  13  111.  289.  pp.  1131, 1132, 
Magee  v.  Harrington,  13  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.) 
MSee^-.H'oliand.  27  N.  J.  L.  86.  pp.  891, 
Ts/^-ee  V   Magee,  37  ^liss.  138.    p.  1043. 

mScs^s  J:'liate,2  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  309.    p. 

mShcss  v.  Stewart.  2  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  309 

Maguiac  V.  Thompson,  7  Pet.  (U.  S.)  348.    p. 

Mig'niu  t'.  Dinsmore,  56  N.  Y.  168.    PP- 1321. 

Mlgomn  V.  Muldrow,  12  Mo.  512     p.  890. 
Matuinr.State,10Oh.  232      P- "ll:     „„,     .,„ 
Maher  v.  Allanlic  &c.  11.  Co.,  bi  Mo.  267.    PP 
mSI- "central  Park  R.  Co.,  67  X.Y.  52. 

MaiiS:  People  10  Mich    212     V-  1554. 
Maher  v.  Slate,  1  Port.  2fao.    P-  2( . 

Major  r.  Pulliam,  3  Daua  (Ivy.), 583.    pp.  H ' . 

Mlior  ..  spies.  6^ar^(XY.^577.p^340. 

Maior  v.  State,  4  bneeu  ^ivj-;,  "  •      f 
Saiorsr.  State  29  Ark.    12     p  448.       ^^^^ 

£a"rMc\^S.^3^^nd.  273.  Iv  ni5. 
MS-ok..TowerGrovell.  C0..57M0.17. 
Mlmi't'r.  Mallet,  1  Root  (Conn.).  501      p.328. 


Mi^ii^iioufh^t^^^I-;/t.t6     P.380. 

^aione  v.  Murphy  2  Kan.  2  0.    P-  1197. 
Malone  v.  State,  6  ca.  408.    p.  u*- 


Malone  r.  State,. 49  Ga.  210     P;  30- 

Maloy  f.  New  York  &C.  U.  Oo.,56iJaru.  i,i.^. 

Mai;^y'- -SUUe'^ex.  599   ^PP;  ^.2076 

Mals6n  V.  Fry,  1  \\  "i^^  /  l-^lit-^-^^jj^-y  j  473. 
Maltbv  V.  Harwood,  12  Barb.  (N.    i-)  *'^- 

mJuIu? ':  ilUelds,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  653     p.  816. 
Manchester   v.    Dodbridge,  3  Ind.    300.      p. 

Manchester  r.  Hartford,  30  Conn.  118.     p. 

Mandeville  r.  Heynolds.CS  N  Y   528^^   P-  191. 
IMandigo  r.  Mandigo.  2b  Micl    34J.    P-  l.*i- 
Mauer  estate.  8  Tex.  App..ibl.    p.^l• 
Manga.n  r.  Urook lyn  &c  K.  Co.,  38  X.  1.  400. 

M!;i:h:;imeiTil'^^ii.^^iMo.App.297.    p. 

K&vr^Si!!;^^r8rp|il|io94. 

Manke  v.  People,  17  Han  V  \.).  410.  p.  78- 
Manly  r.  Hubbard.  9  Ind.  230.  •'';'•,„  j^^g^ 
Maun  i:  Uirchard,  40  \  t.  .526.  'l  ■  1*^—  ''**"• 
Mann  r.  Clifton,  3  IJlackf.  Und.)  304.  p.  2097. 
Mann  v.  Faiilee,  44  Vt  6i3.  p.  1". 
Mann  i-.  Glover,  14  ^.  J.  L-  -«0J-    PP-  '*•  °^' 

Malint-'Scke,12N   H.246.    p.890 
Mauning  j;.  Bresnahan  (Jlich.),  30   is.    \m. 

Kep.  189.    p.  747.  o.„    t?   pr.    on  N   W. 

Manning  r.  Burlington  &c.  1^-  Co--  -»  ^.  >V. 

Kep.  163;  S.  <••  64  Iowa,  240      p.  .6. 
Manning  r.   Cuumugham,    21    Neb.  288.    p. 

Manning  v.  Gasharie,  27  Ind.  399.    pp.563. 

Manning  v.  Wells.  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  746. 

M!^i^Ieid^cti\;li.4C^sii^(Ma;B;)213.    p. 

Manslield  v.  Wheeler,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  79. 

Mansiiii^d  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  23  Mich.  519. 

Mlnu'/hicturers  Bank  v.  Scofleld.  39  Vt.  590. 

Manulacturing  Co.  v.  Thomas  (Iowa),  5  N. 

M:^\,'[^f;>'Hrig^s?l|vtV7^^,^p.l66. 
Manwell  r.  Turner  2.5  Kan.  42       p.  -101. 

K^^:^^i^c?VG^"y(^la^.).395.  p. 

Ml^blehead  M.  F.  Ins.  Co,  v.  Underwood.  2 
MSiS^'s?n^Sll'K^^.-5M.    p.2087. 
M  rch"  .^llabough,  103  Pa-  ^  33,->     p^  871. 
March  v.  Uarrell.  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  iiJ.    P- 

Mlrch  V.  Ludlum.  2  Sandi.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  35.  p. 
Man-h  v.  Portsmouth  &c.  U.  Co.,  19  N.  H. 
M^h':-.^ate.44Tex.C4.  pp.  1912,  1918, 
Miay'"'shultB.29  N.Y.346.    pp.  355.  365, 

Manulstv  State, 26  ind  101     p.  561. 
Marcy  v.  Barnes,  10  Gray   (.Mass.;.  loi-    i 
661. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CI 


Marcy  v.  Sun  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  11  La.  Xm\.  749. 

p.'.ti»3. 
Mart'tzek  v.  Cauldwell,2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  s.)  407; 

s.  c.  5  Kobt.  6ij0.    p.  63. 
Margrave  v.  Ausmuss,  51  Mo.  561.    p.  5fi0. 
Mariam  v.  Dougherty,  46  (Jal.  26.    p.  2057. . 
Manner  v.  Dver.  2  Me.  165.    p.  132. 
Mariner  v.  Pettibone,  14  Wis.  Hi.a.    p.  1637. 
Mariner  v.  Saunders,  5  Gilm.  (111.)  113.  p.  611. 
Marion  v.    State,   20  N.     \V.    Rep.  290.    pp. 

ISTD,  1871. 
Marion  v.    State  (Neb.),  29  X.  ^Y.  Eep.  911. 

PI).  370,  450. 
Markel  v.  Moudy,  13  Neb.  323.    pp.  373,  430. 
Mark  v.  State,  lo  Tex.  App.  3:U.    p.  1744. 
Markes   v.  Hilsendegeu,   46   Mich.    336.    p. 

407. 
Markham  v.  Lee,  cited  1  Leon.  8S.    p.  29. 
Markle  v.    Haltield,   2  Jolins.    (N.    V-)  458. 

pp.  1132,  1133. 
Marks  v.  King,  64  N.  Y.  628.    p.  5S3. 
Marler  v.  State,  67  Ala.  55.    p.  464. 
Marmaduke,  Ex  parte,  91  Mo.  228.    pp.  164, 

177,  178,  179. 
Marnoch  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  269.    p.  1903. 
Marr  f.  Marr,2  Head  (Tenn.),  303.    p.   1008. 
Marscimetz  v.  Wright,  50  Wis.  175.    p.  1664. 
Marsh  v.  Elsworth,  36  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  532; 

s.  c.  1  Sweeny  (NT.  Y.),  152.    p.  795. 
Marsh  v.   Horne,  5  Barn.  &  Cress.  322.    pp. 

1319,  1337. 
Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  25  Wis.  706.    p.  1090. 
Marsh  i>.  Richards,  29 Mo.  105.    p.  892. 
Marsh  r.  State,  30  Miss.  627.    pp.  81,  82. 
Marshall  r.  American  Express  Co.,  7  Wis.  1. 

pp.  214,  215,  713. 
Marshall  r.  Russard,  Gilm.  (Va.)  9.     p.  1161. 
Marshall  v.    Davies,    78  N.    Y.  414;  s.  c-.    58 

How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  231;  16  Hua(N.Y.),  606. 

pp.  307,  300. 
Marshall  v.  Fisher,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  111.   p. 

1749. 
Marsliall  v.  Gougler,  10  Scrg.  &R.  (Pa.)  1G4. 

p.  1031. 
Marsliall  v.  Krugg,  2  A.  &  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  36. 

p.  106. 
Marshall  v.  Haney,  4  Md.  498.    p.  1670. 
Marshall  v.  Jones,  U  Me.  54.    p.  893. 
Marshall   v.  Maddock,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  (Ky.) 

1(16.    p.  1198. 
Marshall  v.  Morris,  16  Ga.  368.    p.  1634. 
Marshall  v.  Nagel,  1  Rail.  (S.  C.)  308.    p.  194. 
Marsliall  V.  bchricker,  63  Mo.  308.    pp.  808, 

1239. 
Mar.shall  v.  Shatter,  32  Cal.  176.    p.  389. 
Marshall?;.  State,  107  Ind.  173.    p.  2112. 
Marshall  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  273.    pp.  316, 

458. 
Marshall  v.  Wolfe,  11  Mo.  608.    pp.  1584,  1585. 
Marshall  &c.  Co.  v.  Kirtley,  8  Colo.  108.    p. 

2130. 
Marston  v.  Roe,  8  Ad.  &  El.  14.    p.  647. 
Martin  v.  Anderson,  21  Ga.  301.    p.  272. 
Martin  v.  Cauble,  72  Ind.  67.    p.  2052. 
Martin  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  59  la.  411.    p. 

2040. 
Martin  v.  Com.,  2  Leigh  (Va.),  745.    p.  1909. 
Martini).    Cope,  28  N.  Y.  181.     pp.  1684,1685. 
Martin  r.  Elden,  ;52   Oh.    St.  282.     i)p.36S,  382. 
Martin  v.  Khrenfels,  24  111.  187.    p.  1984. 
Martin  v.  Faruham,  25  N.  H.  195.    p.  397. 
Martin  v.  Good,  14  Md.  398.    p.  3.53. 
Martin  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  16  C.  B.  179. 

p.  1698. 
Martin  v.  Henley,  13  Mo.  312.    p.  1584. 
Martin  v.  Matlield,  49  Cal.  42.    p.  2081. 
Martin  v.  Miller,  3  Md.  135.    p.  1616. 
Martin  r.  Morelock,  32  111.  487.    pp.  1912, 1921, 

1923, 1996. 


Martin  v.  Nutkin,  2  P.  Wms.  266.    p.  1399. 
JIarliu  V.  Orndorff,  22  lovva,  504.    p.  758. 
Martin  v.  People,  54  111.  225.    pp.  1912,  1913. 
Martin  v.  Ramsey,   7  Humph.   (Tenn.)  260. 

p.  188. 
:Martin  v.  Reg.,  12  Irish  L.  399.    p.  55. 
Martin  v.  Rushton,  42  Ala.  289.    p.  2019. 
Martin  v.  Smvlee,  55  Mo.  577.    p.  1708. 
Martin  v.  State,  25  Ga.  494.    pp.  63, 1919. 
Martini'.  State,  16  Oh.  364.    p.  65. 
Martin  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App .  293.    p.  1918. 
Martin  v.  Tapley,  119  Mass.  116.    p.  796. 
Martin  i\  Tidwell,  36  Ga.  332.    pp.  1020,  1976, 

1977,  2062. 
IMartiu  v.   Travers,  12  Cal.  243.    pp.  559,  560. 
Martini'.  Weblj,  5  Ark.  72.     p.  1585. 
Maniu  V.  Wiiglit,  13  Wend.  (N.  V.)  460;  s.  c. 

28  Am.  Dec.  4t)S.    p.  9t)0. 
Martin,  Ex  parte,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)    456.    p. 

150. 

Martineau  v.  Steele,  14  Wis.   273.    pp.   828. 

852. 
Martinez  r.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  122.    p.  1707. 
Martyn  v.  Gray,  14  C.  B.  (N.  s.)  824.    p.  1100. 
Martz  t7.  Martz,  25Gratt.  (Va.)  361.    pp.  551, 

552. 
Marvin  v.  Raygan,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  132.    p. 

631. 
Marvine  v.  Hvmers,  12  N.  Y.  223.    p.  888. 
Marx  V.  fechvvartz  (Ore.),  12  Pac.  Rep.  253. 

p.  1661. 
Marye  v.  Strouse,  5  Fed.  Rep.  494.    p.  2098. 
Mascheck  v.   St.  Louis  R.  Co.,   3  Mo.   App. 

600     p.  1232. 
Maslin  v.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  W.  Va. 

180.    p.  1372. 
Mason  v.  Bank  of  Commerce,  16  Mo.  App. 

275.    p.  950. 
Mason  v.  Bair,  33  111.  194.    pp.  2105,  2106. 
Mason  V.  Croom,  24  Ga.  211.    pp.  215,  224. 
Mason  v.  Ditchbourne,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  462,  n. 

p.  380. 
Mason  v.  Lewis,  1   G.  Greene  (Iowa),  494. 

p.  1603. 
Mason  v.  Poulson,  43  Md.  162.    p.  1708. 
Mason  v.  Russell,  1  Tex.  721.    pp.  1972,  1983, 

1985,  1995. 
Mason  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  534.    p.  64. 
Mason  v.  Slate,  42  Ala.  532.    pi).  299,  3U4. 
Mason  c.  Thompson,  9  Pick.  2o0;  s.  c.  20  Am. 

Dec.  471.     p.  1340. 
Mason  v.  Wlutbeck  Co.,  35  Wis.  134.    p.  1734. 
Mason,  In  re,  8  Mich.  70.    p.  177. 
Massengale  i<.   Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  17 

Mo.  App.  257.     p.  1150. 
Massey  v.  Hackett,  12  La.  Ann.  54.    p.  358. 
Massony.  Bovet,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  69.   p.  1132. 
Mastea  v.  Devo,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  424.    pp. 

1172,1181,  1182,1187. 
Master  r.  Miller,  4  T.  R.  320.    p.  1031. 
Masters   r.   .Madison  Co.  Alut.  Ins.  Co.,  II 

Burb.  (N.  Y.)625.     pp.  974,  977. 
Masters  v.  Warren,  27  Conn.  293.    pp.  1481, 

1672. 
Masterson  v.  Cheek,  23  111.  73.    p.  87:!. 
Masterson  v.  LeClaire,  4  Minn.  163.    p.  193. 
Masterson  v.  West  End  Narrow  Gauge  R. 

Co.,  5  Mo.  App.  64.    p.  1092. 
Mastin  i\  Bran  ham,  86  Mo.  643.    p.  966. 
Mastin  v.  Paciiic  R.  Co.,  83  Mo.  634.     p.  863. 
Mateer  v.  Brown,  1  Cal.  221.     pp.  1586,  1605. 
Mather  v.  Parsons,  32  Hun(N.  Y.),339.    p. 

640. 
Matheson  v.  Stewart,  2  How.  (U.  S.)  263.    p. 

2003. 
Mathews  v.  Mass.  Nat.  Bank,  1  Holmes  (U. 

!S.),396.     p.  1023. 
Mathis  V.  Buford,  17  Tex.  152.    p.  321. 
Mathis  V.  State,  18  Ga.  343.    p.  1980. 


cu 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Matilda  v.  Mason,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  343. 

p.  99. 
Matuey  v.  Gragg  Bros.   Grain   Co.,  19  Mo. 

App.  107.    p.  1473. 
Matron  V.  BucIj,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  499.    p.  1466. 
Maton  V.  People,  15  111.  536.    pp.  37, 40. 
Matteson  v.  Noyes,  25  111.  591.    p.  641. 
Matthews  v.  Coulter,  9  Mo.  705.    p.  1030. 
Matthews  v.  Hamilton,  2i  111.  470.    p.  1675. 
Matthews  v.   St.  Louis  Grain  Elevator  Co., 

50  Mo.  149.     p.  1600. 
Matthews  r.  Story,  54  Ind.  417.    p.  1646. 
Matthews  i\  Itice,  31  N.  Y.  457.    pp.  1414, 1438. 
Matthews  v.  State,  6  Tex.  Ap\^.  23.    p.  24. 
Matthews  v.  Tufts,  87  N.  Y.  568.    p.  188. 
Matthews   v.  ^Yard,    10  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  443. 

p.  1046. 
Matthewson  v.  Burr,  6  Neb.  312.    p.  452. 
Mattocks  V.  Lyman,  16  Vt.  113.    pp.  361,  362. 
Mattocks  V.  Wheaton,  10  Vt.  498.    p.  184. 
Mauerman  v.  Siemens,  71  Mo.  101.    p.  1212. 
Maugham  v.  Hubbard,  8  Barn.  &  Cres.   14. 

p.  362. 
Maulsby,  Ex  parte,  13  Md.  625.    pp.  171. 173. 

174, 187. 
Mauran  v.  Lamb,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  174.    p.  274. 
Maurer  v.  People,  43  N.  Y.  1.    p.  1916. 
Maurice  v.  Worden,  54  Md.  233.    pp.  581,  585. 
Mauro  v.  Piatt,  62  111.  450.    p.  1784. 
Maverick  v.  Salinas,  15  Tex.  57.    p.  1412. 
Mawson  v.  Hartsink,  4  Esp.  102.    p.  456. 
Maxwell  v.  Boyne,  36  Ind.  120.    pp.  2032, 2040. 
Maxwell  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  95. 

pp.  567,  1261,  14S3,  1646, 1686. 
Maxwell  v.  Kennedy,  10  La.  Ann.  798.    p.  629. 
Maxwell   v.    Planter's    Bank,    10    Humph. 

(Tenn.)  507.     p.  1023. 
Maxwell  i-.  Kives,  11  Nev.  213.    p.  151,  281. 
Maxwell  v.  Wilkinson,  113  U.  S.  656.    p.  355. 
May  V.  Burk,  80  Mo.  67.i.    p.  861. 
May  V.  Elam,  27  Iowa,  365.    p.  126. 
May  V.  Gwynne,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  301.     p.  589. 
May  V.  Hoover  (Ind.),  14  North  East.  Rep. 

472.    p.  95. 
May  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  AVis.  219. 

p.  4. 
May  V.  Pavey,  63  Ind.  4.    p.  2112. 
May  V.  People,  8  Colo.   224.     iip.  1548,  1555, 

1557,   1562,   1568,  1569,   1571,  1573,  1574,  1576, 

1808. 
May  V.  People,  60  111.  120.    pp.  1828, 1832. 
May  V.  Shumway,  16 Gray  (Mass.),  86.    p.  188. 
May  V.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  595.    p.  1679. 
May,  In  re,  1  Fed.  Rep.  737.    p.  1923. 
May  bee  v.  Fisk,  42  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  327.   p.  1645. 
Maybee  v.  Sniffen,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  1. 

p.  641. 
Mayer  v.  People,  80  X.  Y.  364.    p.  385: 
Mayeys  v.  Parish,  11  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  38.    p. 

1669. 
Mayfleld  v.  Cotton,  37  Tex.  229.    pp.  727,  733. 
Mayhew  v.  Burns,  103  Ind.  328.    p.  1316. 
Mavnard  V  Fellows,  43  N.  H.  255.    p.  1957. 
Mayuard  v.  Head,  1  S.  E.  Rep.  273.    p.  2099. 
Mavnard  v.  Johnson,  4  Ala.  116.    j).  1733. 
Maynard  v.  Shorb,  85  Ind.  501.    p.  312. 
Mayo  r.  Archer,  1  Strange,  531.    p.  2012. 
Mayo  I'.  Preston,  131  Mass.  304.    p.  1336. 
Mayor  v.  Humphries,  1  Carr.  &  P.  251.    p. 

1610. 
Mayor  v.  Pentz,  24  AVend.   (X.  Y.)  668.    p. 

612. 
Mayor  &c.  of  York  v.  Pilkington,  2  Atk.  302. 

p.  158. 
Mavor  of  Devises  v.  Clark,  3  Ad.  &  El.  506. 

p.  2021. 
Mavijr  of  Dartmouth  v.  Iloldsworth,  10  Sim. 

476.    p.  276. 
Mays  V.  Foster,  26  Kan.  518.    p.  2038. 


Maze  V.  Miller,  1  Wash.  (U.  S.)  328.    p.  955. 
McAdory  v.  State.  62  Ala.  154.    pp.  747,  755. 
^McAfee  v.  Ryan,  11  Mo.  364.    p.  1626. 
McAfee  V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  131.    pp.  1796, 

1797. 
INIcAffee  V.  State,  31  Ga.  411.    p.  422. 
McAllilley  t'.  Horton,  75  Ala.  491.    p.  2019. 
JIcAllister  r.   Conn.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  78 

Ky.  531.     pp.  2048,  2050,  2086. 
McAllister  r.  Engle,  52  Mich.  56.    p.  1741. 
McAllister  v.  Sibley,   25  Me.  474.    pp.  1465, 

1780,  1920,  1977. 
.AIc.Mlister  v.  State,  17  Ala.  434.    pp.  81, 1780. 
McAllister  v.  Williams,  1  Tenn.  (Overt.)  107. 

p.  328. 
McAlpine  v.  Reichneker,  27  Kan.  257.     p. 

1090. 
SIcAlpine  v.  State,  47  Ala.  78.    p.  1849. 
lAIcArthur  v.  Henry,  35  Tex.  804.    p.  1080. 
McArthurr.  Soule,  5Hun  (N.  Y.),63.  p.  572. 
.AIcAvoy  V.  Long,  13  111.  147.     p.  837. 
McBain  r.  Smith,  13  Ga.  315.    p.  1669. 
McBeatht).  Wabash  &c.  R.   Co.,  20  Mo.  App. 

445.     pp.  1343,  1368. 
McBrayer  v.  Hill,  4  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  136.    p. 

1456. 
McBride  v.  Thompson,  8  Ala.  650.    p.  1758. 
McBride  v.  Wallace  (Mich.),  29  N.  W.Rep. 

75.    p.  323, 
McCabe  v.  Brayton,  38  N.  Y.  196.    pp.  397, 

583. 
jNIcCabe  v.  Hammond,  34  Wis.  590.    p.  1249. 
McCabe  v.  Lewis,  76  Mo.  301.    p.  2049. 
McCall  V.  Butterworth,  8  la.  329.    p.  184. 
McCall  V.  Davis,  56  Pa.  St.  431.    p.  1413. 
McCall  V.  Seevers,  5  Ind.  187.    pp.  1747,  1750. 
McCall  V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  363.    pp.  1745, 

1788. 
McCallister  v.  Mount,  73  Ind.  669.    p.  1730. 
McCamant  v.  Busch,  33  Mo.  544.    p.  1670. 
McCampl)elU\  State,  9  Tex.  App.  124.    p.  49. 
McCaudless  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  411.    p. 

1889. 
McCann  r.  Beere,  1  Hogan,  129.    p.  279. 
McCann  v.  People,  88  111.  103.    p.  1904. 
McCann  v.  State,  9  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  465. 

pp.  190t,  1907,1921,  1981. 
McCarragher  v.  Gaskell,  42  Hun  (N.  Y.),  451. 

p.  1211. 
McCarrow  v.  Cassiday,  18  Ark.  34.    p.  869. 
McCarthy  v.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  15  Mo.  App. 

3S5.    p."  3. 
McCarthy  v.  Railway  Co.  (Mo.),  4  S.  W.  Rep. 

516.    pi>.  62,  126. 
McCarthy  v.  State,  56  Ind.  203.    p.  1515. 
McCartny  v.  Territory,  1  Neb.  121.    pp.  566, 

567. 
McCarty  v.  Kitchen,  59  Ind.  505.    pp.  1196, 

1920. 
McCarty  v.  McCarty,  4  Rich.  L.  (N.  C.)  594. 

l)p.  1930,  1975. 
McCarlv  v.  State, 26  Miss.  299.    pp.  17,81,  111. 
McOarty  v.  Waterman,  96  Ind.  694.    pp.  684, 

1756. 
Mc(  !arver  v.  Pipen,  12  Ileisk.  (Tenn.)  057.    p. 

1922. 
McCaslandv.  Kimberlin,100Ind.  121.    p.  1775. 
McCaulay  v.  Palmer,  40  Hun  (N.  Y.),38.    p. 

167. 
McCauley  v.  Murdock,  97  Ind.  229.    p.  2101. 
Mc(Jausland  v.  McCauslaud,  1  Yeates  (Pa.), 

372.     i)p.  62,  72,  120. 
McCausland  v.  Ralston,  12  Nev.  195.    p.  364. 
McClain  v.  Esham.  17  B.  Mon.  (Kv.)  156.    p. 

1669. 
McClane  v.  Riddle,  19  Ala.  180.    p.  649. 
M<',('laren  v.  Indianapolis  &c.  11.  Co..  34  Ind. 

319.    p.  2035. 
McClarv  r.  State,  75  Ind.  260.    pp.  1918, 1983, 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cm 


pp. 


McClay  v.  Hedge,  18  Iowa,  66.    pp.  340,  893. 
McClay  v.  State,  1  Ind.  385.    p.  17J6. 
McClean  r.  Hertzog,  6  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  154. 

p.  609. 
McClellau  v.  Bond,  92  Ind.  424.    pp.  563,  574, 

2115. 
McClenaghau  v.  Brock,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  17. 

p.  1621. 
McClelland  v.  Lindsay,  1  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.) 

360.    p.  552. 
McClerkin  v.  State,  20  Fla.  879.    p.  2048. 
McClintock  iJ.  Curd,  32  Mo.  41L    pp.  214,  227, 

1670. 
McCloskev  v.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  R.  (N.  Y.) 

308.    p.  32. 
McClung  V.  Kelly,  21  la.  508.    pp.  910,  912. 
McUlung  V.  Ross,  5  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  124.    p. 

1044. 
McClung's  Executors  v.  Spottswood,  19  Ala. 

165.    p.  1019. 
McCluuy  V.  Lockhart,  1  Bailev  (S.  C),  117. 

p.  1980. 
McClure  v.  McClure,  74  Ind.  108.    p.  2039. 
McClure  v.  Red  Wing,  28Miuu.  186.    p.  1241. 
McClure   v.  State,  1  Yerg.   (Tenn.)  206.    pp. 

122,  125. 
McCIurkin  v.  Ewing,  42   111.  283.    pp.    2050, 

2051. 
McCollough,  Ex  parte,  35  Cal.  97.    p.  152. 
McCollum  V.  Seward,  62  N'.  Y.  317.    p.  503. 
McCoraas  v.  Haas,  93  Iiid.  276.    p.  2042. 
McComas  V.  Haas,  107  Ind.  512.    p.  2038. 
McComas  r.  State,  11  Mo.  116.    p.  2064. 
McCombs  V.  Chandler,  5  Harr.   (Del.)  423. 

p.  2096. 
McConnell  v.  Kibbe,  33  111.  175.    p.  1750 
McConnell  v.  Kitchens,  20   S.    C.  430, 

218,  223. 
McConnell  v.  Linton,  4   Watts    (Pa.),   357. 

p.  1999. 
McConnell  v.  State  (Tex.),  3  8.  W.  Rep.  699. 

pp.  768,  772. 
McCorkle  v.  Binns,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  340.   p.  113. 
McCorkle  v.  State,  14  Ind.  40.    pp.  1905, 1911, 

1997. 
McCormick  v.  Brookfleld,  4  X.  J.  L.  69.    pp. 

5,46,  97. 
McCormick  v.  Dunville,  36  Iowa,  645.    p.  931. 
McCormick  v.  Elston,  16  111.  205.    p.  1125. 
McCormick  v.  Irwin,  35  Pa.  St.  111.    p.  1941. 
McCormick  v.  Joseph,  77  Ala.  236.    p.  345. 
McCormick  v.  l^ougliran,  16  Neb.  87.    p.  568. 
McCormick  r.  Mliler,  12  Minn.  443.    p.  2050. 
McCormick  v.  Mulvihill,  1  Hilt.  (X.  Y.)  131. 

p.  353. 
McCormick  i\  Pennsylvania  &c.  R.  Co.,  49  X. 

Y.  3U3.     p.  1494. 
McCormick  v.  Sisson,  7  Cow.   (X.  Y.)  715. 

pp.  1181,1198. 
McCormick  v.  Sullivant,  10  Wheat.   (U.  S.) 

192.    p.  136. 
McCourt  V.  People,  64  X.  Y.  583.    p.  1535. 
McCoy  V.  Huffman,  8  Cow.  (X'^.  Y.)  84.    p. 

895. 
McCoy  V.  Lassiter,  95  X.  C.  88.    p.  869. 
McCov  V.  Phillips,  4  Rich.  (S.  C.)  463.    p.  309. 
McCoy  V.  Rives,  1  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  592. 

p.  2001. 
McCoy  V.  State,  22  Ark.  308.    p.  109. 
McCov  r.  State,  15  Ga.  205.    p.  1670. 
McCoy  V.  State,  44  Tex.  616.    p.  1896. 
McCrarv  r.  Crandall,  1  la.  117.    p.  1773. 
McCray"«-.  Stewart,  16  Ind.  377.    p.  1982. 
McCreciie  v.  Senior,  4  Paige  (X.  Y.),  378.    p. 

151. 
McCullev  r.  State,  62  Ind.  463.    pp.  1562, 1756. 
McCullough  V.  Rice,  59  Ind.  580.    p.  1196. 
McCullough  V.  State,  5  b.  W.  Rep.  175;  s.  c. 

23  Tex.  App.  620.    u.  1846. 


McCnlly  v.  Barr,  17  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  445.    p. 

1938. 
McCullv  V.  Clarke.  40  Pa.  St.  399.    pp.  1210, 

1-'18,  1223. 
McCuue  V.  Com.,  2  Rob.  (Ta.)  777.    pp.  71,  74. 
McCurrv  v.  Hooper,  12  Ala.  823.    p.  551. 
McCutchen  r.  McCutchen,  9  Port.  (Ala.)  650. 

pp.  456,  476,  827. 
McDaniel  r.  Crosbv,  19  Ark  533.    p.  227. 
McDaniel  v.  State, "53  Ga.  253.    p.  444 
McDaniel  v.  Stale,  S  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  401. 

p.  1671. 
McDaniels  v.  McDailieIs,40  Tt.  363.    pp.  1921, 

1923,  1976. 
McDaniel:^  v.  Robinson,  26  Vt.  317.    pp.  1321, 

1338, 1340. 
McDermott  v.  Highbv.  23  Cal.  489.    p.  2044. 
McDermott  v.  Hoffman,  70  Pa.  St.  31.    pp.  20, 

38,  95. 
McDermott  v.  State,  89  Ind.  187.    p.  1709. 
McDonald  v.  Beall,  55  Ga.  288.    pp.  119,  120, 

1646. 
McDonald  v.  Bellamy,  18  Ga.  411.    p.  1670. 
McDonald  v.  Carson,'  95  X.  C.  378.    p.  612. 
McDonald  v.  Cooper  &c.  Co.,  32  Kan.  61.    pp. 

2056,  2073. 
McDonald  v.  Elfes,  61  Ind.  279.    p.  2112. 
McDonald  v.  Hodge,  5  Havw.  (Tenn.)  85.    p. 

1956. 
McDonald  v.  Matney,  82  Mo.  .358.    p.  876. 
McDonald  v.  McDonald, 55  Mich.  155.    p.  421. 
McDonald  v.  Mulhollan,  5  Watts  (Pa.),  173. 

p.  1065. 
McDonald  v.  Xorth,  47  Barb.  (X.  Y'.)  530.    p. 

561. 
McDonald  v.  Rooke,  2  Bing.  (X^  C.)  219.    p. 

1169'. 
JIcDonald  v.  Shaw,  1  X'.  J.  L.  6.    p.  30. 
McDonald  r.  State,  63  Ind.  544.    p.  1526. 
Mcliouel  V.  State,  90  Ind.  320.    pp.  480,  647, 

1482,  1709. 
McDonough  v.  Virginia  City,  6  Xev.  93.    p. 

1246. 
McDowell  V.  Crawford,  11  Gratt.  (Va.)  377. 

p.  310. 
McDuflie  V.  Clark,  39  Hun  (X.  Y'.),166.    p. 

1073. 
Mclilfatrick,  v.  Cofforth,  29  Ind.  37.    i>.  2141. 
McElfresh  v.  Guard,  32  Ind.  4U8.    p.  2iiH. 
McElhinuey  v.  Kraus,  10  Mo.  App.  218.    p. 

1050. 
McElven  v.  State,  30  Ga.  869.    pp.  1845, 1984. 
McEutee  v.  Xew  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  45 

X.  Y.  34.     pp.  11.56,  1157". 
McEwen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Hill  (X.  Y".),  101.    p. 

977. 
McFadden  v.  Com.,  23  Pa.  St.  12.    pp.  51,  86, 

91. 

McFadden  v.  Mitchell,  61  Cal.  148.    pp.  385, 

389. 
McFadden  r.  Wallace,  38  Cal.  51.    p.  64. 
McFarland  v.  Bellows,  49  Mo.  311.    pp.  584, 

1598. 
McFarland  v.  Carver,  34  Mo.  195.    pp.  1423, 

1424. 
McFarlin  v.  State,  41  Tex.  23.    pp.  398,  430. 
McGar  r.  Drake  (Tenn.), 5  Reptr.  347.    p.  878. 
McGarry  v.  Loomis,  63  X.  Y.  Iu4.    p.  1233. 
McGarry  v.  People,  2  Lans.  (X'.  Y.)  227.    p, 

524. 
McGavock  v.  Brown,  4  Humpli.  (Tenn.)  251. 

p.  2094. 
McGee  v.  Robbins,  58  Ind.  463.    pp.  577,  2051, 

2090. 
McGehee  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  94.    p.  183. 
McGinitv  v.  Xew  Y'ork,  5  Duer  (X.  Y'.),674. 

p.  124S: 
McGinnis  r.  State.  24  Ind.  500.    pp.  609.  660. 
McGinty  i'.  Keokuk,  66  la.  727.    p.  1277. 


CIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


McGovern  v.  New  York   &c.    K.  Co.,  67  X. 

Y.  417.     pp.  1232,  1303. 
McGowau  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  61  Mo.  528. 

p.  1239. 
McGowan  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  184.    pp. 

47,67,69,  70,  115. 
McGowen  v.  Campbell,  28  Kan.  25.    p.  203. 
McGrath  v.   Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  32  Barb. 

(N.  y.)  144;  s.  c.  19  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  2n. 

pp.  1208,  1212. 
McGrath  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,1  Thomp. 

&  C.  243.     p.  1251. 
McGregg  V.  State,  4  Blackf.  (lud.)  101.    pp. 

73,  74, 
McGregor  v.  Armill,  2  Iowa,  30.    p.  1671. 
McGregor  r.  Gardner,  16  la.  53t?.    p.  2075. 
McGrew  v.  Foster,  66  Mo.  30    p.  2144. 
McGrew  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  539.    pp.  1796, 

1797. 
McGrew  v.  Stone,  53  Pa.  St.  436.    p.  1221. 
McGuffle  V.  State,  17  Ga.  497.    pp.  26,  27,  46, 

70,  97, 121. 
McGulre  v.  People,  44  Mich.  280;  s.  c.  6  N.  W. 

Rep.  669.    p.  1834. 
McGuire  v.  People,  2  Park.  Cr.  R.  (N.  Y.)  148. 

p.  20. 
McGuire  v.  State,  37  Miss.  369.    pp.  57,  85. 
McGuire  v.  State,  37  Miss.  703.    p.  1815. 
McGuire  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  125.    p.  1917. 
McHenry  v.  Marr,  39  Md.  522.    p.  725. 
McHeury  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  448. 

p.  1108. 
McHugh  V.  State.  38  Oh.  St.  153.    p.  73. 
Mcllvaine  v.  State,  80  Ind.  69.    p.  2029. 
Mcllvaine  v.  Wilkins,  12  N.  H.  374.    pp.  1914, 

1921,  1923. 
Mclutire  v.  Hussey,  57   Me.   493.    pp.  1921, 

1923. 
Mclutyre  v.  Kline,  30  Miss.  361.    p.  1669. 
Mclutire  v.  Mclntire,  80  Mo.  470.    p.  2055, 
Mclutyre  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  37  N.  Y. 

287.    p.  1488. 
Mclutyre  v.  People,  38  111.  514.    p.  1904. 
Mclntyre  v.  Thompson,  14  Bradvy.  (111.)  554. 

p.  372. 
Mcintosh  V.  Smith,  2  La.  Ann.  757.    pp.  1671, 

1905. 
Mclver  v.  Humble,  16  East,  169.    p.  1097. 
McKain  v.  Love,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  506.    p.  1919. 
McKay  V.  Evans,  48  Mich.  597.    p.  1741. 
McKay  V.  Leonard,  17  la.  569.    p.  1750. 
McKean  v.  Wagenblast,  2  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.) 

462.     pp.  839,  850. 
McKee  V.  Bidwell,  74  Pa.  St.  218.    p.  1210. 
McKee  V.  Calvert,  SO  3Io.  348.    pp.  2002,  2128. 
McKee  v.  McDonald,  17  Ind.  518.    p.  2101. 
McKee  V.  People,  36  N.  Y.  113.    p.  1645. 
McKeen  v.  Gammon,  33  Me.  187.    p.  200. 
McKellip  v.  Mcllhenuy,  4  Watts  (Pa.),  317. 

p.  608. 

McKenua  v.  People,  81  N,  Y.  360.    p.  1639. 
McKenua  r.  State,  61  Miss.  589.    p.  1848. 
M'Kenzie   v.  Milligau,  1   Bay    (S.  C),  248. 

p.  221. 
McKenzie  v.  State,  26  Ark.  334.    pp.  1571, 1913, 

1913,  1982. 
McKenzie   v.  Sykes,  47  Mich.  294.    pp.  827, 

855. 
McKeon   v.  Citizen's  R.  Co.,  43  Mo.  79.    p. 

1291. 
McKeon  v.  Lane,  1  Hall  (N.  Y.),  319.    p.  184. 
McKeon  v.  See.  4  Rob.  (N.  Y.)  449.    p.  1390. 
McKeown  v.  Harvey,  40  Mich.  226.    p.  323. 
McKinley  v.  O'Ke.son.  5  Pa.  St.  3()9.    p.  900. 
McKinley  v.  Smith,  Hard.  (Ky.)  167.    jv  117. 
McKinley  V.  Wilmington  Star  Mining  Co.,  7 

Bradw.  (111.)  386.     \>.  196. 
McKinney  v.  Hartman,  4  Iowa,  154.    p.  806. 
McKinney  v.  Jones,  55  Wis.  39.    p.  310. 


McKinney  v.  Neil.  1  McLean   (U.   S.),  540.- 

pp.  1236, 1237,  1285. 
McKinney  v.   People,    7  111.  540.      pp.  329, 

1902,  1,903,  1907. 
McKinney  v.  Shaw  &c.  Co.,  51  Ind.  219.    pp. 

577,  2051. 
McKinney  v.  Simpson,  51  Iowa,  662.    pp.  119, 

120. 
McKinney  v.  Snyder,    78   Pa.  St.  497.    pp. 

1681,  1705. 
McKinney   v.  State,  8    Tex.    App.  626.    p. 

115. 
McKinney  v.  Western  Stage  Co.,  4  Iowa,  420. 

p.  1235. 
McKiusey  v.  Bowman,  58  Ind.  88.    p.  2112. 
McKleroy  v  State,  77  Ala.  95.    p.  1815,  1820, 

1863. 
McKnabb  v.  Thomas,  18  Ga.  495.    p.  74S. 
McKuight  f.  Kutclitf,  44  Pa.  St.  156.    p.  1671. 
McKown  V.  Craig,  39  Mo.  1,56.    p.  1600. 
McKown  V.  Furgason,  47  Iowa,  636.    p.  1429. 
McKown  V.  Hunter,  30  N.  Y.  625.    pp.  344, 

345. 
McLain  v.  Dibble,  13  Bush  (Ky.),  297.    p.  2088. 
McLain  v.  State,  18  Nob.  159.    p.  1796. 
McLain  v.  State,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  720.    pp.  710, 

745,  776. 
McLain  v.  State,  10  Yerg.   (Tenn.)  241.    p. 

1907. 
McLain  v.  Van  Zandt,  7  Jones  &  Sp.  (N.  Y.) 

347.     p.  1208,  1233. 
McLanahan  v.  Universal  Ins.  Co.,  1  Pet.  (U. 

S.)  170.    p.  1644. 
McLane  v.  Lafayette,  Bank,  3  McLean  (U. 

S.),589.     p.  952. 
McLaren  v.  Birdsong,  24  Ga.  265.    p.  64. 
McLaren  v.  Hall,  26  la.  303.    p.  1670. 
McLaughlin  v.  Corrv,  77  Pa.  St.  109.    p.  1249. 
McLaughlin  v.  Upton,  2  N.  Y.  27.    p.  2076. 
McLean  v.  Burbank,  11  Minn.  277.    p.  1237. 
McLean  v.  Burbank   12  Minn.  530.    p.  2027. 
McLean  v.  Clark,  47  Ga.  25.    pp.  1669, 1771. 
McLean  i:  Clark,  48  Ga.  66.    p.  1761. 
McLean  v.  State,  16  Ala.  672.    p.  253. 
McLean  v.  State,  18  Ga.  508.    p.  1899. 
McLean  v.  State,  8  Mo.  153.     p.  1907. 
McLees  i:  Felt,  11  Ind.  218.    pp.  215,  230. 
McLeland  v.  State,  25  Ga.  477.    p.  1633. 
McLellan  v.  Crolton,  6  Me.  307.    pp.  118, 123, 
McLellau  V.  Cumberland  Bank,  24  Me.  566. 

p.  1197. 
McLendon  v.  Frost,  57  Ga.  449.    p.  740. 
McLeod  r.  Humeston  &c.  R.  Co.,  71  la.  138; 

s.  c.  32  N.  W.  Rep.  246.    p.  1945. 
McLeran  v.  McNamara,  55  Cal.  508,    pp.  193, 

196. 
INIcLimans  v.  Lancaster,  63  Wis.  596.    p.  2041. 
McLure  v.  Colclough,  17  Ala.  96.    p.  874. 
MCxMahon  v.  New  York,  33  N.  Y.  642.    p.  1233, 
McMahon  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co.,  39  Md 

438.     pp.  1231,  1235. 
McMahon  v.  O'Connor,  137  Mass.  216.    pp 

1714,  1741. 
McManuis  i'.  Lee,  43  Mo.  208.    p.  1480. 
McMasters  v.  West  Chester  &c.  Co.,  25  Wend 

(N.  Y.)  379.    p.  2021. 
McMath  V.  State,  55  Ga.  304.    p.  727. 
JNIcMaugli  V.  Milwaukee,  32  Wis.  200.    p.  1247, 
McMe(;tien  v.  iMcMechen,  17  W.  Va.  684.    j)p 

499,  .506. 
Mc.Meen  v.  State,  9  Atl.  Rep.  878;  s.  c.  114  Pa, 

St.  300.     p.  1S39. 
Mc^Iichen  v.  Amos,  4  Rand.  (Va.)   134.    p 

2018. 
McMicken  v.  Brown,  6  Mart.  (n.  s.)  (La.)  86, 

p.  1663. 
McMicken  v.  Perin,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  1.33.    p 

1.50. 
McMillan  v.  Birch,  1  Binn.  (Pa.)  178.    p.  796, 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cv 


McMillan  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  46  la.  231. 

p.  1232. 
McMillan  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  142.    pp.89, 

1885. 
McMinn  v.  Whelan,  27  Cal.  306.   pp.  210, 1636, 

imo,  1768. 
McMorris  v.  Herndon,  2  Bail.  (S.  C.)  Law, 

56 ;  s.  c.  21  Am.  Dec.  515.    p.  889. 
McMullan  v.  MacKenzie.  2  G.  Greene  (la.), 

368.    p.  876. 
McMulleu  r.  State,  53  Ala.  531.    p.  1535. 
McXair  v.  Hunt,  5  Mo.  300.    p.  10i4. 
McNair  v.  Piatt,  46  III.  211.    p.  1678. 
McXair  v.  Schwartz,  16  111.  24.    p.  891. 
McXair  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  83.    p.  1895. 
McX'^amara  v.  Clintonville,  62  Wis.  207;  s.  c. 

61  Am.  Rep.  722.     p.  1485. 
McXamara  r.  Dratt,  40  la.  413.    p.  1979. 
McNamarar.  Minnesota  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Minn. 

388.     p.  2047. 
McXamara  v.  Northern    Pacific  R.   Co.,  50 

Cal.  581.    p.  1210. 
McXeese  v.  Herring,  8  Tex.  151.    p.  1198. 
McNeil  V.  Farneman,  37  Ind.  2(i3.    p.  2076. 
McNeil  V.   Holbrook,  12  Pet.  (U.  S.)  84.    p. 

1669. 
McNeil's  Case,  6  Mass.  245.    p.  188. 
McNeill  t'.  Arnold.  22  Ark.  477.    p.  1679. 
McNeill  r.  Massey,  3  Hawks  (N.  C.),91.    pp. 

1698, 1701. 
McXichol  r.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  12  Mo.  App. 

401.     pp.  834,  835,  850,  1368. 
McPheeters  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  45  Mo. 

22.     p.  1299. 
McPherson  v.  Featherstone,  37  Wis.  632.    p. 

1010. 
McPherson  v.    State,  23   Ga.  478.    pp.    1509, 

1.539. 
McQueen  r.  State,  82  Ind.  74.    p.  1800. 
McQuesney  v.  Heister,  33  Pa.  St.  435.    p.  961. 
McQuilken  r.  Central  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal. 

7.    V'l>-  l'^25, 1226. 
McQnillen  v.  State,  8  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  587. 

p.  1909. 
McKae  r.  Lawrence,  75  N.  C.  289.    p.  236. 
McRaer.  Lillv,l  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  118.    p.  1641. 
McRevnold.s  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  106 

III.  152.    p.  238. 
Mci^hane  v.  Braender,  66  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

294.     pp.  221,  222. 
McVickar  v.  Greenleaf,  4  Rob.  CN.  Y.)  657. 

p.  580. 
McWilliams  v.  Bannister,  42  Wis.   301.    p. 

2083. 
Meacham  v.  Moore,  59  Miss.  561.    p.  312. 
Meacham  r.  Pell,  51  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  65.     p.  36.5. 
Mead  v.  Boxborough,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  362. 

pp.  1747,  1756. 
Mead    v.    McGraw,    19    Oh.  St.  55.    pp.  353, 

1772. 
Mead  i\  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  7  N.  Y'.  530. 

p.  980. 
Meade  v.  Smith,  16  Conn.  346.    p.  1985. 
Meade's  Case,  Lewin  C.  C.  184.    p.  1.539. 
Meadow  Val.  &c.  Co.  v.  Dodds,  6  Nev.  261. 

p.  2099. 
Meagoe  v.  Simmons,  3  Car.  &  P.  75.    p.  246. 
Means    r.  Means,  7  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  533.    p. 

1940. 
Means  v.  Moore,  3  McCord  (S.  C),  282.    p. 

1008. 
Mears  v.  Griffin,  2  Scott  (N.  R.),  15;  s.  c.  1 

Man.  &  G.  796.    pp.  1473,  1559. 
Meaux  i:  Meaux,  81  Ky.  475.     p.  2088. 
Meaux  v.  Whitehall,  8  Bradw.  (111.)  173.    pp. 

63,  64,  116. 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Rawls,  7  Ga.  191.    p.  446. 
Mechanics'    &c.   Bank    v.  Smith,   19  Johns. 

(N.  Y.)  115.     pp.  96,  125. 


Mechanics'  Savings  Institution  v.  Potthoff, 

9  Mo.  App.  574.    p.  811. 
Mechelke  v.  Bremar,  59  Wis.  57;   s.  c.  17  N. 

W.  Rep.  682.    p.  316. 
Medbury  v.  Watrous,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  110.    p. 

895. 
Medcalf   v.  Hall,    Triu.    Term,   22   Geo.    3, 

B.  R.  3;  Doug.  113.     p.  941. 
Medler  v.  State,  26  Ind.  171.    pp.  1973, 1974. 
Medlin  v.  Platte  County,  8  Mo.  235.    p.  1031. 
Meek  v.  Keen,  47  Ind.  77.    p.  577. 
Meeker  v.  Fountain  Co.,  53  Ind.  31.    p.  2108. 
Meeker  v.  Potter,  5  X.  J.  L.  586.    p.  58. 
Meekinsr.  Smith,  1  H.  Bl,    636.    p.  188. 
Meeks  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  52  Cal.  602. 

p.  1233. 
Meeks  v.  State,  57  Ga.  329.    p.  119. 
Mehan  v.  Syracuse  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  585. 

p.  1211. 
Mehesv  v.  Kahu,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  209.    p.  598. 
Mchncrt  v.  Thieme,  15  Kan.  369.     p.  2101. 
Meier  r.  Pennsvlvania  R.  Co.,  64  Pa.  St.  225. 

pp.  1236,  1237,  "1285,  1287. 
Melhuish  v.  Collier,   19  L.  J.  Q.  B.  493.   p. 

444. 
Melledge  t\  Boston  Iron  Co.,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 

158.    p.  1672. 
Mellish  V.  Arnold,  Bunbury,  51.    pp.  1964, 

1967. 
Mellish  V.  Rawdon,  9  Bing.  416.    pp.  934,  935, 

936,  1144. 
Melody  v.  Chandler,  12  Me.  282.    p.  1443. 
Melsou  V.  Dickson,  63  Ga.  682;  s.  c.  36  Am. 

Rep.  128.     pp.  54,  95. 
Melvin  v.  Easley,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  386.    pp. 

741,  782. 
Melvin  i\  Proprietors  &c.,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 
-161.    p.  10.53. 
Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Chastine,54  Miss.  503. 

p.  1607. 
Memphis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitfield,  44  Miss.  467. 

pp.  1207,  1481. 
Meach  v.  Bolbach,  4  Phila.   (Pa.)  68.    pp. 

1914,  1922.  1923. 
Mendiola  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  462.    pp.  1743, 

1746,  1878. 
Meuk  V.  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  14  Pac.  Rep. 

837.     p.  2099. 
Meranda  r.  Spurlin,  100  Ind.  380.    p.  2051. 
Mercer  v.  State,  17  Ga,  146.    p.  123. 
Mercer  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  452.    pp.  465, 

791,  1779. 
Mercer  v.  Whall,  5  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  447.    pp. 

214,  218,  220,  223,  225,  243. 
Mercer   Academy    v.   Rusk,  8    W.  Va.    373. 

pp.  1747,  1748. 
Mercersmith  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.   211.    p. 

1575. 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  Bliss,  35  N.  Y.  412.    p.  265. 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  Rudolf,  5  X"eb.  527.    p. 

1022. 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  State  Bank,  10  Wall.  (U. 

S.)  604.     pp.  1022,  1023,  1605. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Coruforth,  3  Col. 

280.    p.  1364. 
Merchants'  Dispatch  Co.  v.  Theilbar,  86  111. 

71.    p.  1364 
Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chauviu,  8  Rob.  (La.) 

49.    p.  1023. 
Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hauck,  83   Mo.  20. 

pp.  1689,  1708. 
Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  State  Nat.  Bank,  3 

Cliff.  (U.S.)  201.    p.  591. 
Mercier  v.  Mercier,  43  Ga.  323.    p.  1600. 
Meredith  v.  Com.,  18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  49.    p. 

1539. 
Meredith  v.  Crawford,  34  Ind.  399.    pp.  1726, 

1727. 
Meredith  v.  State,  40  Tex.  483.    p.  313. 


CVl 


TABLK    OF    CASES. 


Mersrcnthelm  r.  State  (Ind.),  8  N.  East.  Kcp. 

5t>S;  s.  0.  107  Ind.  507.    1>1).  317,  551. 
Moikle  r.  State,  37  Ala.  13;).    p.  784. 
Moik'  r.  Hascall,  l(i  Mo.  40t;.    jip.  l(;07, 1C08. 
MorUizzi  r.  Gleeson,  .V."  Md.  '214.     p.  2(14. 
Meiriiiold  v.  AVestou,  i!8  lud.  71.    p.  2113. 
ilerriain  r.  Cunulugham,  11  Cush.  (Mass.) 

40.    p.  214. 
Merriam  r.  Hartford  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  Conn.  354. 

p.  475. 
Mornam  r   MitchcU,  13  Me.  43*1.     p.  1195. 
Merrick  v.  Slate,  6^^  Ind.  327.    p.  21. 
Alerrill  v.  ISerksliire,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  269. 

pp.  113,  2.-'.i,;583,  l'.t7ti. 
Merrill  i:  George,  23  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  331. 

p.  188. 
Merrill  v.  Grinuell,  30  N.  Y.  594.    pp.  1151, 

1152. 
Merrill  v.  Hampden,  26  Me.  234.    pp.  1224, 

124(1,  1247. 
Merrill  i:  Hilliard,  .TO  X.  H.  481.    p.  1049. 
Merrill   i\  Ithaca  &c.  li.  Co.,  16  Wend.  587. 

PI).  (542,  892. 
Merrill  v.  Narv,  10  AUen  (Mass.),  416.    pp. 

150(i,  1733, 1951. 
Merrill  v.  Perkins,  59  X.  H.  343.    p.  403. 
Merrill  v.  Hailway  Co.,  16  Wend.  586.    p.  363. 
Merrill  v.  St.  Louis,  83  Mo.  244;  s.  c.  affirmed, 

12  Mo.  App.  466.     p.  2. 
Merrinian  v.  Brii;  Mav  Queen,  1  Newb.   (U. 

S.)  4(>4.     pp.  1322,  1343,  1347. 
Merriman  v.  Cuuuingliam,  11  Cush.  (Mass.) 

40.     p.  241. 
Merritt  v.  Given,  34  Mo.  98.    p.  1646. 
Merril  t  v.  Merritt,  20  111.  65.    pp.  1653, 1690. 
Merritt  v.  AVilcox,  52  Cal.  238.    p.  199. 
Mersev  Docks'  Trustees  v.  Gibbs.  L.  R.  1  H. 

L.  93".    p.  1248. 
Mershon  v.  State,  51  Ind.  14.    pp.  524,  526. 
Mertens  v.  Kiclmann,  79  Mo.  412.    pp.  1055, 

1056. 
Merz  V.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  Mo.  App.  4,59. 

p.  821. 
Meshke  v.  Van  Doren,  16  Wis.  319.    p.   1734. 
Metcalf  V.  Fouts,  27  111.  110.    pp.  1741,  20.53. 
Metcalfe  v.  Deaue,  Cro.  Eliz.  189.    pp.  1914, 

1986. 
Metropolitan  Bank  v.  Hale,  28  Hun  (X.  Y.), 

341.    p.  324. 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  L.  R.  3  App. 
Cas.  193 ;  s.  c.  47  L.  J.  C.  P.  306 ;  37  L.  T.  679. 
pp.  1215,  1216,  1602. 
Metz  V.  Eddy,  21  Mo.  13.    p.  1618. 
Metzgcr  v.  S"tate,  18  Fla.  481.    p.  95. 
Metzer  v.  State,  39  Ind.  .596.    p.  372. 
Meyer  v.  Cullen,  54  N.'"Y.  392.    p.  312. 
Meyer  v.  Foster.  16  Wis.  294.    pp.    1902, 1904. 
Mever  v.  Paciflc  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  15.5.    pp.  1279, 

1296,  1598,  1600. 
INIever  v.  Peck,  28  X.  Y.  590.    p.  1367. 
Mever  v.  State,  19  Ark.  156.    pp.  69,  75,  119, 

122,  123. 
Meyers  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Mo.  223.    p. 

1708. 
Meyers  v.  State,  20  Ind.  511.    p.  129. 
MeVers  v.   State,  33  Tex.  535;  s.  c.   Horr.  & 

I'homp.  Cas.  Self-Def.  432.    p.  1542. 
Movers  v.  Union  Trust  Co.,  82  Mo.  237.    p. 

8il. 
Mev.senburg   v.  Engclke,  18  Mo.  App.  346. 

pp.  1180,  1182. 
Miami  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Bailev,  37  Oh.  St.  104.    p. 

654. 
Miami  Vallcv  Furniture  Co    v.  Wesler,  47 

Ind.  6.5.     J>."124. 
Michael  r.  St.  Louis  :\Iutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  17 

Mo.  App.  23.     J..  825. 
Michaels  v.  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co..  30  X.  Y. 
564.     pp.  1318,  1347. 


Michan  v.  "Wvatt,  21  Ala.  813.    p.  649. 
Michel  V.  Wa're,  3  Xeh.  229.     p.  ,560. 
Michell  r.  Williams,  11  Mees.  &  W.  205.    p, 

1181. 
INIicliigan  Air  Line  Rv.  i:  Barnes,  44  Mich. 

223.     ]).  699. 
Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Barnes,  40  Mich.  383. 

!>.  56. 
Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Campaw,  34  Mich.  468. 

p.  12,{5. 
Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Carrow,  73  111.  348.    p. 

1155. 
Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Lantz,  29  Ind.  528.    p. 

1224. 
IMiehigan  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Oehm,  56  HI.  293.    p. 

1155. 
Micliigan  Bank  v.  Eldred,  9  Wall.  (U,  S.)  544. 

pp.  1669,  1672. 
Michigan    Paneling   &c.  Co.  v.    Parsell,  38 

Mich.  475.    pp.  2031,  2038. 
Mickle  r.  State,  27  Ala.  20.    p.  1859. 
Middlebrooks  v.  Middlebrooks,  57  Ga.  193. 

I).  2099. 
Middlel)rook  v.  State,  43  Conn.  257.    pp.  132, 

133,  136,  148. 
Middletonr.  Ivansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Mo. 

579.     pp.  1017,  1024. 
Middleton  v.  Quigley,  12  X.  J.  L.  352.  p.  200L 
Middletown  v.  Amos,  7  Vt.  166.    p.  55. 
Midland  li.  Co.  v.  Bromley,  17  C.  B.  372;  s.  c. 

33  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  235.     pp.  1332,  1333,  1334. 
Milllin  V.  Bingham,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  294.  p.  328. 
Mikell  V.  State,  62  Ga.  368.    p.  110. 
Milburn  v.  Kansas  City  &C.  R.  Co.,  86  Mo.  104. 

p.  1226. 
Milburn  v.  Waugli,  11  IMo.  369.    p.  1441. 
Mildrone's  Case\  1  Leach  C.  C.  459.    p.  330. 
Miles  r.  Buchanan,  36  Ind.  491.  pi).  2108,  2112. 
Miles  V.  Douglas,  34  Conn.  393.     )).  1670. 
Miles  V.  Goodwin,  35  111.  53.    p.  1060. 
Miles  V.  Lingerman,  24  Ind.  385.    \).  1130. 
Miles  V.  Pulver,  3  Demo  (N.  Y.-),  84.    p.  34. 
UUes  V.  Roberts,  34  X,  H.  245.    ji.  348. 
Miles  V.  Rose,  Hemp.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  37.  p.  106. 
Miles  V.  Sackett,  30 Hun  (X.  Y.),  68.    pp.  396, 

400. 
Miles  V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  156.    p.  1680. 
Miles  V.  Stevens,  3  Pa.  St.  21.    p.  570. 
Miles  V.  United  States,  102  U.  S.  304,    p.  1815. 
Miles  V.  Williams,  8  Q.  B,  147.    p.  796. 
Millar  v.  Cuddv,  43  Mich.  273.     p.  1947. 
Millard  v.  Lvons,  25  Wis.  516.     p.  17,30. 
Millard  i\  Porter,  18  Ind,  .502.     p.  1647. 
.Miller  v.  Alliaugh,  24  la.  128.     pp.  2075,2093. 
Miller  r.  Ballhassar,  78111.  302.  pp.1664,  167,5. 
Jliller  I'.  Barber  (N.  Y.  Cl.  of  App.),  4  Cent. 

I^aw  Journ.  177.     j).  315. 
Miles  I'.  Buchanan,  36  Ind.  490.    p.  2107. 
Miller  v.  Burkey,3  Casev  (Pa.),  317.    p.  I25I. 
Miller  V.  Brvan,  3  la.  .58."   p.  1698. 
Miller  v.  Diivton,  57  la.  424.     p.  1808. 
Miller  V.  Drake,  62  Mo.  544.    p.  1708. 
Miller  V.  Dunlap,22  Mo.  App.  97.     p.  828. 
Miller  y.  Garrett,  3.5  Ala.  96.    p.  1733. 
Miller  V.  Gilleland,  19  Pa,  St,  119.    pp.  1031, 

1032. 
Miller  v.  Goodwin,  70  111.  659.    p.  819. 
Miller  v.  Gorman,  6  Blackf.   (Ind.)  112.    p. 

1670. 
Miller  V.  Green,  110  Tnd.  .569,    p,  2112. 
Miller  v.  Ilacklev,  5  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  375.    p. 

948 
Miller   v.  Hampton,   37   Ala.  342.    pp.  1726, 

1949. 
Miller  V.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  (Iowa),  29  X.  W. 

Rep.  411  :  s.  r.  70  la.  704.    p.  313. 
IMillerr.  Ileinrick,  4  Camp.  155.    p.  820. 
Miller  v.  Hower,  2  Havvle,  .53.    p.  2014. 
M  lller  V.  Jauuett,  63  Tex.  82.    p.  368. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


evil 


Miller  v.  Kirby,  74  Ind.  242.    p.  Ifi47. 
Miller  V.  Lancaster,  4  Me.  159.    p.  965. 
Miller  v.  Lebanon  Lodge,  88   Ind.    286.    p. 

3090. 
Miller  r.  Lullinau,  SI  Mo.  311.    pp.  873,  874. 
Miller  v.  Marks,  20  Mo.  App.  369.    p.  1071. 
Miller  v.  Mavbon,  6  la.  456.    pp.  1906,  1911. 
Miller  v.   McCullough,  104  Pa.   St.    624.    p. 

1086. 
Miller  v.  Morgan,  143  Mass.  25;  s.  c.  3  N.  Eng. 

Rep.  119.    p.  2004. 
Miller  v.  Mutual  Ben.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  31  Iowa, 

216.    p.  977. 
Miller  v.  Pancoast,  29  N.  J.  L.  250.    p.  1442. 
Miller  v.  People,  39  111.  464.    pp.  1564,  1776, 

1828,  1832. 
Miller  v.  Read,  27  Pa.  St.  244.    p.  1031. 
Miller  v.  Russell,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  309.    p.  994. 
Miller  v.  Sliackleford,  4  Dana,  264.    pp.  827, 

2010,  2011. 
Miller  v.  Smith,  112  Mass.  470.    pp.  373,  375. 
Miller  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  5  Mo.  App.  473. 

pp.  1964,  1985. 
MiUer  v.  State,  15  Fla.  577.    pp.  540,  541, 1805, 

1S06. 
Miller  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  251.    p.  465. 
Miller  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  34.    p.  1896. 
Miller  v.  Stewart,  24  Cal.  502.    p.  1438. 
Miller  v.  Talcolt,  46  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  168.    p.  967. 
Miller  r.  Tillman,  61  Mo.  316.    p.  1708. 
Miller  r.  Voss,  49  Ind.  307.    p.  2028. 
Miller  v.  White  River  School  Tp.,  101  Ind. 

303.    p.  2030. 
Miller  v.  Wild  Cat  Gravel  Rd.  Co.,  52  Ind. 

51.     p.  56. 
Miller  V.  Wilson,  24  Pa.  St.  114.    p.  111. 
Millerd   i:  Thorn,   15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  376; 

s.  c.  56  N.  Y'.  402.     pp.  214,  216. 
Milliken  v.  Barr,  7  I'a.  St.  23.    pp.  608,  610. 
Milliken  v.  Ross,  9  Fed.  Hep.  855;  s.  c.  4  Wood 

C.  0.  (U.  S.)  69.     p.  2065. 
Milliken  v.  Tufts,  31  Me.  497.    p.  1749. 
Millington,  In  re,  24  Kan.  214.    pp.  132, 134. 
Mills  1-.  Barber,  1  Mees.  &  W.  425;  s.  c.  Tyr. 

&  G.  835.    p.  217. 
Mills  V.  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y".  489.    p.  1266. 
Mills  V.  Siramouds,  10  Ind.  464.    p.  2117. 
Mills  V.  State,  52  Ind.  187.    p.  2082. 
Mills  r.  Thompson,  72  Mo.  367.    p   1440. 
Mills  V.  Wvnuui,  3  Pick.  (Mass.)  207.    p.  897. 
Milne  r.  Ilenrv,  40  Pa.  St.  352.    i>.  1406. 
Milluer  v.  Eglin,  64  Ind.  197 ;  s.  c.  31  Am.  Rep. 

121.     pp.  1642,  1784,  1803. 
Milner  r.  Wilson,  45  Ala.  478.    p.  1734. 
Milo  c.  Gardner,  41  Me.  549.    pp.  145, 1906. 
Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  11  Wis.  160. 

p.  1225. 
Mima  Queen  v.  Hepburn,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  3;  s.  c.  7  Cranch  (U.  S.),  290.    pp.  46,  49, 

64,  97. 
Mimms  v.  State,  16  Oh.  St.  221.    pp.  115, 116, 

Minis  V.  Lockett,  23  Ga.  237.    p.  1067. 

Minis  r.  Mitchell,  1  Tex.  443.    pp.  1356,  1359. 

Minchin  v.  Clement,  6  Barn  &  Aid.  252.    p. 

15S4. 
Miner  r.  Brown,  20  Conn.  519.    p.  43. 
Miner  v.  Pliillips,  42  111.  123.    p.  344. 
Miner  v.  Vedder  (Mich.),  33  N.  W.  Rep.  47. 

p.  2030. 
Minich  v.  People,  8  Colo.  452.    pp.  112, 1770, 
.1773,  1821,1828,1833. 
Minklaer  v.  Rockfeller,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y'.)  276. 

p.  899. 
Minnesota  Linseed  Oil  Co.  v.  Montague,  59 

Iowa,  448.    p.  1131. 
Minnitt  v.  Whitney,  16  Vin.  Abr.  244,  pi.  12. 

p.  HOI. 
Miuns  V.  Smith,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  318.    p.  636. 


Minor  r.  Mechanics'  Bank,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  46. 

p.  1130. 
Mirick  r.   Hemphill,    Hempst.   (U.  S.)  179. 

pp.  1750,  1753,  1983. 
Mississippi  &c.  Boom  Co.  v.  Prince,  34  Minn, 

71.    p.  1497. 
Mississippi  &c.  R.  Co.  ■;;.  Kennedy,  41  Miss. 

671.    pp.  1154, 1155. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Goodrich,  38  Ivan.  224 ; 

s.  c.  16  Pac.  Rep.  439.     p.  2061. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Haines,  10  Kan.  439. 

p.  373. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Holley,  30  Kan.  465. 

p.  2031. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Manson,  31  Kan.  339. 

p.  1308. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Munkers.  11  Kan.  223. 

pp.  58,  121. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  35  Kan.  625. 

p.  1307. 
Missouri  Coal  &  OH  Co.  i\  Hannibal  «&c.  R. 

Co.,  35  Mo.  84.     pp.  806,  1.506. 
Missouri  Furnace  Co.  v.  Abend,  107  111.  44. 

pp.  1673,  1674. 
Mitchell  V.  Allison,  29  Ind.  43.    p.  1756. 
Mitchell  V.  Carter,  14  Hun  (N.  Y'.),448.    pp. 

1944,  1949. 
Mitchell  V.  Coglazier,  106  Ind.  464.    p.  2008. 
Mitchell  V.  Com.,  75  Va.  856.    p.  412. 
Mitchell  V.  Denbo,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  259.    pp. 

31,  33. 
Mitchell  V.  Ehle,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  59.5.    p. 

1963. 
Mitchell  V.  Harcourt,  62  la.  349.    p.  551. 
Mitchell  V.  Harmony,  13  How.  (U.  S.)  115. 

p.  1644. 
Mitchell  V.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  32  la.  422.    p.  971. 
Mitchell  V    Huron  Circuit  Judge,  53  Mich. 

541 ;  s.  c.  sub  nam.  Mitchell  v.  Wixon,  19  N. 

W.  Rep.  176.     p.  188. 
Mitchell   V.  Insurance  Co.,  51  Pa.  St.  403. 

p.  977. 
Mitchell  V.  Jenkins,  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  588.    pp. 

1168,  1171,  1195. 
RlitcheU  v.  Likens,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  258.    pp. 

31,  33. 
Mitchell  V.  Mayor  of   Rome,  49  Ga.  19.    p. 

1633. 
Mitchell  V.  Milhoan,  11  Kan.  617.    p.  2073. 
Mitchell  V.  Mitchell,  11  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  388. 

p.  1670. 
Mitchell  V.  Napier,  22  Tex.  120.    p.  886. 
Mitchell  17.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Hun  (N. 

Y.),  535;  s.  c.  5  N.  Y'.  S.  C.  (T.  &  C.)  L    p. 

1230. 
Mitchell  V.  Hvan,  3  Oh.  St.  377.    p.  873. 
Mitchell  V.  Sellman,  5  Md.  377.    p.  566. 
Mitchell  V.  State,  58  Ala.  417.    p.  18. 
Mitchell  V.  State,  22  Ga.  211.    pp.  103, 123. 
Jlitchell  V.  State,  43  Tex.  512.    pp.  35,  85,  89. 

93. 
Mitchell  V.  United  States  Express  Co.,  46  la. 

214.     pp.  1322,  1346,  1347. 
Mitchell  V.  Western  &c.  R.  Co.,  30  Ga.  22.    p. 

1669. 
Mitcliell  V.  Williams,  11  Mees.    &   W.  205. 

p.  1173. 
Mitchell  V  Zimmerman,  4  Tex.  75.    p.  1758. 
Mitchell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  249.    pp. 

273,  274,  275,  277,  279,  280,  286,  328,  590. 
Mitchum  V.  State,  11  Ga.   615.    pp.  123,  438, 

728,  729,  739,  747,  757,  773. 
Mix  v.  Madison  Ins.  Co.,  11  Ind.  117.    p.  884. 
Mixer  v.  Cook,  31  Me.  340.    p.  910. 
Mize  V.  State,  30  Ark.  661.    p.  1549. 
Moberly  r.  Leophart,51  Ala.  587;  s.  c.  47  Ala. 

257.    ]).  6,3]. 
Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcraft,  48  Ala.  15. 

p.  1473. 


CVlll 


TAIil.K    OF    CASKS. 


Mobile  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  41  Ala.  4S6. 

p.  1345. 
Mobile  &c.  K.  Co.  i:  Jarboe,  41  Ala.  G44.    p. 

1345. 
Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McArthur,  43  Miss.  ISO. 

p.  1W2. 
Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  42  Ala.  672.    p. 

lois. 
Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Yeatcs,  67  Ala.  164.    p. 

Mobl'cv  V.  Ilamit,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  590. 

p.  4.i6. 
Mockabec  r.  Com.,  78  Kv.  380.    p.  l.i.W. 
Moffat  V.  Conkliu,  35  Mo.  453.    pp.  1646, 1647, 

Uiiil,  1662. 
Mollil  v.  Rosters,  15  la  433.    p.  1994. 
Motlitt  V,  Cressler,  8  la.  122.    pp.  1669, 1671. 
Moliawk  Rank  v.  Atwater,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

60.     p.  5S3. 
Mohawk   Hank  v.  Rroderick,  13  Wend.   (X. 

Y.)  137.    p.  936. 
3Iohlcr.  The,  21  Wall.  (U.  S.)  230.    pp.  1322. 

134.^),  1356. 
Mohuev  r.  Evans,  51  Pa.  St.  84.    p.  1646. 
Moll  ('."Bewckler,  28  Wis.  611.    p.  2064. 
Moloney  r.  Dows,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  247.    p.  26S. 
Molton  V.  Mason,  21  Mich.  364.     pp.  616,  617. 
Moncricf  v.  State,  .59  Ga.  570.    i)p.  117,  124. 
Monday  v.  State,  32  Ga.  672.    jip.  65,  103. 
Monies  V.  Lvnn,  119  Mass.  273.    p.  1247. 
Jlonke  r.  Butler,  1  Rolle,  83.    p.  1331. 
Mononsrahela  Water  Co.  v.   Stewartson,  96 

I'a.  St.  436.     pp.  385,  433. 
Monroe   r.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  65  lud.  60.    p. 

2039 
Monroe  v.  Brigham,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  368.    p. 

118. 
Monroe    v.   State,  5  Ga.  86;  s.  c.    Horr.   & 

Tliomp.  Cas.  SelC-Def.  442.    pp.  16.58,  1982. 
Monroe  r.  State,  23  Tex.  10.    pp.  63,  71,  117. 
Montag  r.  Linn,  23  111.  5.51.    p.  827. 
Montague  v.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  767.    pp. 

45,  49,64,65,81,126. 
3Iontaguc  v.  Perkins,  22  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  1S7. 

p.  1144. 
Montague  v.  State,  17  Fla.  662.    p.  73. 
Montee  v.  Commonwealth,  3   J.  J,  Marsh. 

(Kv.)  132.     PI).  1214,  1.505,  1510. 
Montfort  v.  Rowland,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  181.    pp. 

581,583. 
Montgomery  v.  Blair,  2  :Nfo.  190.    p.  20.50. 
Montgomery  v.  Des  Moines,  55  Iowa,  103. 

pp.  1271,1280. 
Montgomery  v.  Ellis,  6  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  326. 

p.  109. 
Montgomery  v.  Evans,  8  Ga.  178.    p.  1669. 
Montgomery  f.  Hamilton,  43Ind.  451.    p.  2112. 
Montgomerv  v.  Railroad  Co.,  (Mo.),  2  S.  W. 

Rep.  409.  "p.  126. 
Montgomerv  v.  Scott,  34  Wis.  338.    p.  516. 
Mont-tomerv  v.  State,  3  Kan.  263.    p.  125. 
MonlKoinerv  v.  State,  11  Oh.  St.  424.    pp.  1505, 

1.508,  1517, "1520. 
Montgomery  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  669.    p. 

1S.55. 
Montgomery  r.  Swindler,  32  Ohio  St.  224. 

pp.  214,216,219. 
Montgomery  v.  Townsend  (Ala.),  2  South. 

Rep.  155.     p.  820. 
Montgomery  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  51  Ala.  396. 

p.  1322. 
Montmorency  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Rock,  41  Ind.  263. 

p.  1501. 
Montmorency  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stockton,  43  Ind. 

328.     p.  1.501. 
Moody   V.   Dcutsch,  85  Mo.  237.    pp.    1171, 

1182,  1598. 
Moody  t'.  Keener,  7  Port.  (Ala.)  218.    p.  333. 
Moody  V.  Payne,  3  .Johns.  Ch.  2'J4.    p.  649. 


Moodv  v.   i*omeroy,  4  Dcnlo    (X.  Y.),  115. 

pp.  1915,  1723. 
Moody  V.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  490 ;  s.  c.  28 

Am.  Dec.  317.    pp.  324,  ;W3,  387,  301,393,  498. 
Moon  r.  Heller,  25  Kan.  140.    p.  1451. 
Moonev  r.  Olseu,  22  Kan.  69.     p.  2037. 
Moore  r.  Bank,  13  Pet.  (V.  S.)  302.    i>.  560. 
Moore  r.  Barnell,  17  Ind.  349.    p.  2016. 
Moore  V.  Biekhain,  4  llinn.  (I'a  )  1.     p.  1032. 
Moore  v.  Camplieli,  10  Kxch.  323.    p.  918. 
Moore  V.  Cass,  10  Kan.  288.    pp.  11,  121. 
Moore  V.  Central  R.  Co.,  24  N.  J.  L.  268.    p. 

1225. 
Moore  V.  Clerk,  6  Lift.  (Kv.)  104.    p.  144. 
:\roore  r.  Collishaw,  10  Pa.  St.  225.    p.  1043. 
.Moore  v.  Ediiiislon,  70  X.  C.  471.    pp.  1978, 

1979. 
Moore  V.  Fitchburg  II.  Co.,  4  Gray  (Mass.), 

465.    p.  1200. 
Moore  v.  Gwvnn,  5  Ircd.  L.  (X.  C.)  187.    p. 

819. 
Moore  r.  Harvev,  50  Vt.  297.    p.  891. 
^loore  c.  Hutcliinson,  69  Mo.  429.    p.  1032. 
Moore  r.  Leseur,  18  Ala.  606.     p.  827. 
Moore    r,    McDonald,    r.i    Atl.    Rep.     117. 

p.  1409. 
Moore  r.  Miller,  4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  279.  p.  825. 
Moore  i:  Mobile,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  284.    p.  1246. 
Moore   v.   Moore,  67  Tex.  293;  s.  c.  3  S.  W. 

Rep.  284.     p.  2001. 
Moore  ^•.  Morgue,  Cowp.  479.    p.  1246. 
Moore  f.  Peiper,  51  Mo.  157.    pp.  810,  811. 
Moore  V.  Peojil"',  108  111.  484.     p.  40S. 
^looro  r.    Philadelphia  Bank,  5  Serg.  &  R. 

(I'a.)  41.    1)11.123,2093. 
Moore  v.  Phillips,  8  Porter  (Ala.),  467.    p. 

1060. 
Moore  r.  Ross,  11  X.  H.  .547.    p.  1698. 
Moore  v.  Sanborin,  42  .Mo.  490.    pp.  1197, 1756. 
Moore  V.  Seaton,  31  liul.  11.    p.  205i) 
.Moore  V.  Shreveport,  3  La.  Ann.  645.    p.  1225. 
Moore  V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  275.    pp.  1564^ 

1708. 
Moore  v.  State,  21  Te.v.  App.  666.    p.  758. 
Moore  V.  State,  (Tex.),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  887.    p. 

747. 
Moore  V.  Stone,  50  Ga.  157.    p.  1633. 
Moore  v.  Ulm,  34  Ga.  365.    p.  2067. 
Moore  V.  Watts  (Ala.), 2 South.  Uep.  278.    p. 

1647. 
:\Ioore  V.  Wingatc,  53 Mo.  398.    p.  1712. 
Moore's  Exr.  v.  Jlills,  69  Tex.  109 ;  s.  c.  58.  W. 

Rep.  675.    p.  2007. 
:Mooring  i:  State,  42  Tex.  83.    p.  1744. 
Morav.  McCredy,  2  Bosw.  (N.   Y.)  669.    p. 

590. 
Morals  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  494.    pp.  711,  716, 
Moran  r.  Com.,  0  Leigh  (Va.),  651.    pp.  71,  74. 
Moran  v.  .lanuarv,  52  .Mo.  .523.    p.  2072. 
.Moree,  .Mailer  of,  64  X.  ('.  308.    p.  14.5. 
Morehead  r.  Adams,  18  Neb.  569.    p.  2144. 
Morehead  v.  Jones,  2  B.  Mou.  (Ky.)  210.    pp. 

1465,  1467. 
Morehouse  r.  Heath,  99  Ind.  .509.    ]).  775. 
Morehouse  r.  Mathews,  2  X.  Y.  514.     p.  338. 
Morel  ('.  .Missl.ssippi  Ins.  Co.,  4  liush  (Ky-)> 

.535.     p.  1235. 
Morel  t:  Slate,  80  Ind.  278.    p.  1576. 
Moresl  r.  Swift,  15  Nev.  216.     p.  1771. 
.Morford  v.  reek.  46  Conn.  380.     p.  564. 
Morford  c.  Woodworth,  7  Ind.  83.    p.  1750. 
.Morgan  c.  Browne,  71  Pa.  ."^t.  130.     ]>.  .5.52. 
Morgan  r.  P.rvdges,  2  .'>tark.  314.    p.  383. 
.Morgan   c.  ('o"m.,  14  Busli(Ky.),  106.     p.   126. 
.Morgan  r.  Couclinian,  14  C.  ii.  100,  s.  c.  23  L. 

.J.  (('.  P.)  Mi.     p.   1608. 
Morgan  r.  D;ivl<lson,  1  Stark.  144.    p.  940. 
Morgan  v.  Durfee,  69  Mo.  469.    pp.  1494,  1603, 

1627, 16S4. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CIX 


ISIorgan  v.  Frees,  15  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  352.    p. 

39ii. 
IVIorgan  v.  Frees,  1  Am.  L.  Rej?.  92.    p.  396. 
Morgan  v.  Houston,  6  Yerg.  (Teun.)  3U.    p. 

1060. 
Morgan  v.  Jones,  24  Ga.  115.    p.  611 
Morgan  v.  Mori,'au,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  291. 

pp.  169, 183, 184. 
Morgan  v.  Nashville  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Tenn.  379. 

p.  1235. 
Morgan  v.  Ross,  74  Mo.  318.    p.  1491. 
3Iorgau  v.  Ryerson,  20  111.  343.    p.  1214. 
ISlorgan  v.  Shaw,  4  Madd.  57.    p.  277. 
Morgan  «J.  State,  31  lud.  193.    p.  73. 
Morgan  v.  Stevenson,  6  Ind.  169.    p.  73. 
Morgan  v.  Taylor,  32  Texas,  364.    p.  923. 
Morning  Star  r.  State,  59  Ala.  30.    p.  312. 
Morrell  v.  Frith,  3  Mees.  &  W.  402.    pp.  826, 

835,  964. 
Morrill  v.  Wallace,  9  X.  H.  111.    p.  926. 
Morris  v.  Barnes,  35  Mo.  412.    p.  b88. 
Morris  v.  Beach,  2  Jolins.  (X.  Y.)  294.    p.  188. 
Morris  v.  Bowman.  12  Gray  (Mass.),  467.    p. 

1709. 
Morris  v.  Brower,  1  Anth.  (X^  Y.)  368.    p.  1394. 
Morris  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  45  la.  29.    pp. 

1306, 1481. 
Morris  v.  Corson,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  281.    pp. 

1172,  1183,  1198. 
IMorris  v.  Creel,  1  Va.  Cas.  333.    p.  170. 
Morris  r.  Howe,  36  la.  49U.    pp.  1994,  1995. 
Morris  r.   Lachman,  68  Cal.  109.    pp.   1632, 

1637, 1653. 
Morris  v.  Phelps,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  38.    p.  1223. 
Morris  r.  Piatt,  32  Conn.  75.    pp.  1670, 1679. 
Morris  r.  state,  25  Ala.  57.    p.  1733. 
Morris  v.  State,  27  Ala.  57.    p.  1734. 
Morris  v.  State,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  37.    p.  2082 
Morris   i:  State,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  607.    p.  89. 
Morris  r.  State,  101  Ind.  561.     p.  1784. 
Morris  r.  Stern,  80  Ind.  227.    p.  2112. 
Morris  v.  Varner,  32  Ala.  499.    p.  874. 
Morris  r.  Vivian,  10  Mees.  &   W.  137.    pp. 

1926,  192S. 
Morris'  Case,  4  How.  St.  Tr.  12.55.    p.  87. 
Morris  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayres,  29  N.  J.  L.  393. 

pp.  1147,1374. 
Morrison  v.  Chapin,  97  Mass.  72.    p.  354. 
Morrison  v.  Clark,  7  Cush.   (Mass.)  213.    p. 

1S19. 
Morrison  v.  Cummings,  26  Vt.  3.54.    p.  892. 
Morrison  v.  Davis,  20  Pa.  St.  171.    p.  1221. 
Morrison  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.   302.    p. 

1236. 
Morrison  r.  Lehew,  17  Mo.  App.  633.    p.  2121. 
Morrison  v.  Lenuard,  3  Car.  &  P.  127.    p. 

332. 
Morrison  v.  Loveioy,  6  Minn.  319.    pp.  90, 

98,  101. 
Morrison  v.  McDonald,  21  Me.  550.    pp.  132, 

136.  160, 
Morrison  v.  McKinnou,  12  Fla.  ,552.    pp.  53, 

114, 123. 
Morrison  i'.  Moreland,  15  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 

61.    p.  1945. 
Morrison  v.  Myers,  II    Iowa,  538.    pp.  436, 

7.58. 
Morrison  v.  Phillips  &c.  Co.,  44  AVis.  405.    p. 

1364. 
Morrison  v.  State,  76  Ind.  335.    pp.  448,  524, 

525,  526.  769,  787,  1683. 
Morrison  r.  Sturges,  26  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  177. 

pp.  596,  603. 
Morrlssey  v.  Schindler,  IS  Neb.  673.    p.  2005. 
Morrow  r.  Com.  21  Kan.  484.    pp.  1906,  1910, 

2026,  2040. 
Morrow  v.  Com.,  48  Pa.  St.  305.    p.  610. 
Morrow  v.  Saunders,  1  Brod.  &  Bing.  318.    p. 

589 


Morrow  v.  State,  48  Ind.  432.    pp.  525,  2110, 

2lla. 
Morse  v.   Erie  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  Barb.    (X.  Y.) 

490.     p.  1230. 
Morse   r.  Goddard,  13  Mete.    (Mass.)   177. 

p.  1003. 
Morse  V.  Mason,  103  Mass.  560.    p.  1007. 
Morse  v.  Morse,  25  Ind.  156.    pp.  2024,  2038. 
Morse    V.  Pitman  (N.   H.),  4  Atl.  Rep.  880. 

p.  929. 
Morse  v.  Potter,  4  Grav  (Mass.),  292.     p.  309. 
Morse  v.  Shaw,  124  Mass.  59.    p.  1415. 
Morse  v.  AYevmouth,  28  Vt.  824.    p.  827. 
Morss  V.  Palmer,  15  Pa.  St.  51.    pp.  476,  477, 

479. 
Morton   v.  Frankfort,  55  Me.  46.    pp.  1603 

16U5. 
Morton  v.  Lawson,  1  B.  Mon.  (Kv.)  46.    pp. 

1747,  1760. 
Morton  r.  Smith,  48  Wis.  265.    p.  701. 
Morton  v.  State,  1  Kan.  468.    pp.  76, 115, 116. 
Morton  v.   State,  I  Lea  (65  Tenn.),  498.    p. 

1919. 
Mose  V.   State,  36  Ala.  211.    pp.  1020,    1860, 

1861,  1863,  1865. 
Mosely  r.  Caldwell,  59  Teun.  208.    p.  966. 
Moser  «.  Krelgh,  49  111.  84.    p.  560. 
Moses  V.  Arnold,  43  la.  187.    p.  890. 
Moses  V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  N.  H.  523.    p. 

1374. 
Moses  V.  Gatewood,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  234. 

p.  220 
Moses  V.  State,  10  Humph.  (Tenn.)  456;  s.  c. 

11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  232.    pp.  70,  74,  75. 
Moses  V.  Steven.s,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  332.    p.  895. 
Mosey  V.  Troy,  61  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  581.    p.  1249. 
Mosher  v.  Lawrence,  4  Denio  (N,  Y.),  421. 

p.  1663. 
Mosher  V.  Lawrence,  Thomp.  Carr.  Pass.  554, 

n.  7.     p.  1606. 
Mosier  r.  State,  14  Ind.  261.    p.  846. 
Mosley  V.  Vermont  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  55  Vt. 

142.     p.  468. 
Mosley  v.  Walker,  7  Barn.  &  Cres.  53.    pp. 

1505,"  1507,  1515. 
Mosoati    V.  Lawson,  1    Mood.  &   Rob.  454. 

p.  796. 
Moss  V.  Priest,  19  Abb.  Pr.  (X'.  Y.)  314.    pp. 

2026,  2028,  2035. 
Moss  V.  Witness  Printing  Co.,  64  Ind.  125. 

p.  1647. 
.Mostvn  V.  Fabrigas,  Cowp.  164.    p.  820. 
Motley  r.  Head,  43  Vt.  636.    p.  564. 
Mott  V.  Consumers'  Ice  Co.,  52  How.  Pr.  (N. 

Y.)  244.     p.  182. 
Mott  V.  Consumers    Ice  Co.,  2  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

(X.  Y.)  143.     pp.  596,  .597. 
Mottram  v.  Heyer,  1  Deuio  (X.  Y.),483.    p. 

1020. 
Moughon  V.  State,  59  Ga.  308.    pp.  72,  123, 

1984. 
Moule  V.  Brown,  4  Bing.  N.  C,  266.    p.  944. 
Moulton  V.  Bowker,  115  Mass.  36.    p.  192. 
Moultou  V.  McOweu,  103  Mass.  687.    p.  892. 
Moulton  V.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Minu.  85. 

PI).  1344,  1360. 
Mounseu  i\  AVest,  1  Leon.  88.    pp.  29,  53. 
Mount  I'.  Derick,  5  Hill  (X.  Y.),  455.    p.  1156. 
Mount   V.    Larkins,  8   Bing.  122.    pp.   1143, 

1144. 
Mount  Desert  v.  Cranberry  Isles,  46  Me.  411. 

pp.  117,118,  120. 
Mount  Vernon  v.  Dusouchett,  2  Ind.  586.    p. 

1224. 
Mountfort  r.  Hall,  1  Mass.  443.    p.  42. 
Mower  r.  Watson,  11  Vt.  636.    p.  795. 
Mowrev  c.  Central  Park  R.  Co.,  51  X.  Y.  667. 

p    1232. 
Mowiv  r.  Hill,  11  Wis.  146.    p.  2083. 


ex 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Mowrv  i\  ?lo{mcr,  3  S.  C.  iol.    p.  825. 
Mowrv  V.  Smith,  '.i  Alien  (.Mass.)  07.    p.  425. 
Mowrv  r.  Starbuck,  i  Ci\\.  271.    \i.  !'.>. 
Mown-  V.  Wood,  12  AVis.  4l;i.    pp.  8.V2,  105S. 
Miukl"r.  SiK'kennorc,  1  Nov.  &  P.  32;   s.  c. 

5  Ad.  \-  Kl.  730.     pp.  87S,  870. 
Mud. lie  c.  StruiU-,  ii  Car.  vt  I'.  380.    p.   13G6. 
Miiollor  r.  Kcbham,  1)4  111.  142.    p.  87. 
Miiiliiian  t'.  D'Kguiiio,  2  H.  lil.  565.    pp.035, 

1 1.'2. 
Miiiiliead  v.  Evans,  6  Exch.  447,  449.    pp.  5, 

0,  85. 
Mulcahv  V.  Keg.,  Irish  Rep.  1  C.  L.  12;  s.  c. 

atlinncd  in  L.  K.  3  Jl.  L.  306.    p.  11. 
Mulcairns    v.    Janesvillc   (Wis.),  29   N.  W. 

Keii.5(io.     pp.  710,  745. 
Muldowuev   r.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  Iowa, 

61.t;  s.  c-."36  Iowa,  462;  32  Iowa,  176.    pp. 

514,  1224,  1254,  1263. 
Muldowuey  v.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  la;.  178. 

p     1600. 
Muldrow  v.  Caldwell,  14  Mo.  523.    p.  1670. 
Muldiow  V.  Uobinsou,  58  Mo.  332.    p.    1092. 
Mulford  r.  Grittin,  1  Fost.  &  Fin,  145.    pp. 

1096,  1097. 
Mulhado  v.  Brooklyn  City  R.  Co.,  30  N.  Y. 

370.    p.  653. 
Mulliall  V.  Neville.  8  Exch.  390.    p.  1250. 
Mullee,  In  re,  7  JJIatchf.  (U.  S.)  24.    p.  116. 
Mullen  V.  Morris,  2  I'a.  St.  85.    p.  1937.      . 
Mullen  r.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  567.    p.  1222. 
Muller  v.  McKesson,  73  N.  Y.  198.    p.    1626. 
MuUer   v.  St.    Louis  Hospital  Assn.,  5  Mo. 

Ap|).  390;  s.  c.  73  Mo.  243.     p.  403. 
Muller  V.  State,  11  Lea  (Tcnn.),  IS.    p.  272. 
Mullick  V.  Radakissen,   9  Moore   1'.    C.    46. 

]'!'.  934,  1144. 
Mullitran  v.  Cole,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  ."549.    p.  1453. 
Muilii;au  v.  Curtis,  100  Mass.  512.    pp.  1232, 

1234'; 
Mulligan  v.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  181. 

!>.  1365. 
Mullin's  Appeal  (Pa.),  5  Atl.  Rep.  738.    pp. 

20,  24. 
Mullmix  r.  People,  76  111.  211.    pp.  1520,1524. 
Mullins  i:  Cattrell,  41  Miss.  291.    p.  1980. 
Miillins  V.  People,  110  111.  42.    pp.  1768, 1788, 

17'.*:.,  1S46,  1870. 
Mulli>ek    V.    Lawrence,   5   City   Hall   Rec. 

(N.  Y.)  84.     p)).  1964,  1966. 
Mulrooney  v.  State,  26  Ohio  St.  327.    p.  1.563. 
Muinford  v.  Brown,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  475.    pp. 

SSO,  898. 
Muinford  t'.  Oxford  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  HurL  &  N. 

34.     p.  1404. 
Mundc  1-.  Lambie,  125  Mass.  367.    p.  1943. 
Mnnden  v.  State,  37  Tex.  3.i3.    p.  1835. 
Mundy  v.  Mundy,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  290.    p.  1008. 
MundV   V.     Whittemore,   15    Neb.    647.    p. 

1006^ 
Hunger  v.  Tonawanda  &c.  R.  Co.,  4  N.  Y.  349. 

p.  1223. 
Munkers  r.  Watson,  9  Kan.  668.    p.  2000. 
Munlv  V.  State,  7  IMackf.  (Ind.)  .593.    p.  89. 
Munn  r.  Mavor  of  Pittsburgh,  40  Pa.  St.  364. 

p.  I.i86. 


Munns  r.  Bnpont,  2  Browne  (Pa.),  Apx.  42; 

s.  r.  3  Wa  ■  ~     ""  ■■    " 

11 KO,  1201. 


3.  r.  3  Wash.  C.  C.  31.    pp.  1161 


.),  Ap> 
,  1163, 


1181, 


Monroe  ^•.  Brighani,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  368.    p. 

111. 
Monroe  v.  Gates,  42  Me.  178.    p.  1112. 
Munshowcr  r.  Patton,10  Serg.  &ll.  (Pa.)  334. 

pp.  20,  1014. 
Munson  V.  Ma-itlngs,  12  Vt.  346.    p.  482. 
Murrh    V.   Coneord   H.  Co.,  29  N.   H.  9.    p. 

12H?,. 

Murchison  i;.  Marsh,  2  Kerr  (X.  B.),  608.    p. 
29. 


Mnrchlson    v.  IVIcLcod,  2   Jones    L.  (N.  C.) 

p.  607. 
MurdocK  v.  Sumner,  22  Pick.  (Mass.)  156.    p. 


230.     p.  607. 
1982.  ' 


I^Inre  r.  Kaye,  4  Taunt.  84.    p.  1183. 
Murphy  v.  Bedford,    18   Mo.  App.    279.    p. 

S.-)l. 
Muiphv  r.  Chieairo  Ac.  R.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  661; 

.S-.  <•.  ;ls  Iowa,  r.;o.    p.  1235. 
Murjihv  i:   Deane,  101  Mass.  456.    pp.    1223, 

1224.' 
Mnr))hyi».  Indianapolis,  83  Ind.  76.    p.  1278. 
Murjihy  v.  Kipp,  1  iJuer  (N.  Y.),  6.59.    )).  7. 
Murphy  v.  I'eople,  37  111.  447.    pp.  II,  1669, 

1890. 
Murphy  v.  Price,  48  Mo.  247.    p.  1613. 
Morphvr.  Redler,  16  La.  Ann.  1.    p.  1197. 
Murphy  v.  St.   Louis  Type  Foundry,  29  Mo. 

.\pp.541.     i>.  794. 
.Muri)hv  c.  State,  37  Ala    142.    pp.  84,  112. 
-Murphv  r.  Stale,  3S  Ark.  514.     p.  2097. 
Murphy  v.  Stale,  6  lud.  490.    pp.   727,    733, 

1520. 
Murphy  v.  State,  15  Neb.  383.    p.  78. 
Murphv  V.   State,  17  Tex.  App.  645.    p.  1855. 
Murphv   V.   Staton,3    Munf.   (Va.)  239.    pp. 

1322,  1344. 
Murphv  r.  Tillv,  11  Ind.  511.    pp.  20:W,  2107. 
Murrav  v.  Abbot.  61  Wis.  198.    p.  2030. 
MurraV  V.  Bethune,  1  AYend.    (N.    Y.)    191. 

I).  346. 
Murray  r.    Com  ,  79  Pa.  St.  311.    pp.  1682, 

1683. 
Murrav  v.  Cnnningliam,  10  Neb.  167.    p.  359. 
Murray  v.  Elston,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  212.    pi).  180, 

182. 
Murrav  v.  Harding, 2  Wm.  Bl.  859.    p.  886. 
Murrav  r.  Long,  1  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  140.     pp. 

11S2,"1187,  1105,  1198. 
^lurray  v.  Phillips.  59  Ind.  .56.    pp.  563,  2039, 

2042. 
Murray  v.  Riggs,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  571.    p. 

1436. 
Murray  v.  Spencer,  88  N.  C.  357.    p.  1083. 
Murrav  v.  State,  26  Ind.  141.     p.  1738. 
Murrav  v.  State,  1  Tex.  Anp.  415.    p.  1635. 
Murrav  v.  State  (Tex.),  3  S.  W.  Hep.  114;  s.  C. 

1  S.  \y.  Rei).  522.     pp.  16,  10,  20,  84. 
Murrell   v.    Whiting,  32   ^Vla.    55.    pp.    1122, 

1125. 
Muschamp  v.  Lancaster,  8  Mces.  &  W.  421. 

p.   1362. 
.Muser  v.  Holland,  17  Blatchf.  412.    p.  1361. 
.Musi(;  r.  Atlantic  A:c.  R.  Co.,  57  Mo.  134.    p. 

1668. 
Mu.sick  V.  Peoiile,  40  111.  268.    pp.  .58,  .59. 
Musselnian  r.  Pratt, 41  Ind.  126.    pp.  706,707, 

1671,  1750,  1076,  2000. 
Mu.^ser  r.  .Mavnard,  .59  la.  11.    p.  1748. 
Mutual  &c.  liis.  Co.  V.  Gannon,  48  Ind.  264. 

p.  2040. 
Mutual  Insurance  Co.  v.  Deale,  18  Md.  27. 

p.  074. 
Mvatls  i:  Bell,  41  Ala.  222.    p.  1731. 
.MVer  r.  Cluunbers,  6S  .Mo.  626.     p.  1609. 
Mvers  r.  Coin.,  70  Pa.  St.  308.        pp.  75,  77. 
.Mvers  V.  Dixon,  45  llow.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  48.    p. 

"1200. 

.Mvers  v.  Girard  Ins.  Co.,  26  Pa.  St.  192.    p. 

i.-)8<i. 

.Myers  V.  James.  3  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  301.    p. 

1.52. 
Mvers  V.  Malcolm, 20  111.  621.    p.  901. 
Mvers  r.  Stale,  7  Tex.  App.  640.     pp.  60,  116. 
Mvers  v.  Welles, 5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  463.     p.  9.52. 
.Mvlock  r.  Saladin,  1  W.  HI.  4S0.     pp.  59.  72. 
.Mvnalt  V.  Hubbs.  6  Ilelsk.  (Tcnn.)  320.    p. 

1027. 
Myrlck  r.  Hicks,  15  Ga.  1.55.    p.  1748. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXI 


N. 

Xadenbouch  v.  Sharer,  4  AV.  Va.  203.    p.  123. 
Kat'ee  V.  lugersoll,  7  Pa.  St.  185.    pp.  1076, 

1085. 
XajjTle  V.  Allegheny  &c.  R.  Co.,6W.  N.  C. 

olU;  s.  c    8  Cent.  L.  J.  307.     p.  1233. 
Xaglt^  V.  Homer.  8  Cal.  3o:i.    p.  S71. 
Naglee  v.  Ingersoll,  7  Pa.  St.  185.    pp.  1076, 

KIS5. 
Nailoi-  V.   Williams,  8  Wall.  (U.  S.)  107.    p. 

576. 
Xall  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Mo.  113.    p. 

1638. 
Xance  r.  Alexander,  48  Ind.  516.    p.  891. 
Xapper  r.  Young,  12  la,  450.    p.  1637. 
Xash  V.  Drisco,  ol  Me.  417     p.  825. 
Xash  V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  362.    p.  124. 
Xashville  v.  Shepherd,  3  Baxt.  (Tenu.)  373. 

p.  8. 
Nashville   &c.    R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  6  Heisk. 

(Tenn.)  367.    p  1229. 
Xashville    &c.    R.     Co.   v.   Foster,    10   Lea 

(Tenn.),  351.    p.  2. 
Xason  V.  United  States,  1  Gall.    (U.   S.)   53. 

p.  1649. 
Xational  Bank  v.  Ingalls,   126  Mass.   209.    p. 

912. 
Xational  Bank  r.  Isham,  48  Vt.  590.    pp.  338, 

340. 
Xational  Bank  v.  'Williams,  46  Mo.  17.    p. 

2080. 
Xational  Benefit  Assn   i\  Grauman,  107  Ind. 

288  -,8.0.1  X.  East.  Rep.  233.    p.  1709. 
Xauer  ».  Thomas,  13  Allen   (Mass.),  572.    p. 

797. 
Xaugatnck  R.  Co.  v.  "VVaterbury  Button  Co., 

24  Conn.  4GS.     p.  1586. 
Xaunian   i-.  Overle^  (Mo.),  3  S.  AV.  Rep.  380. 

p.  925. 
Xave  V.  Flack,    90  Ind.    205.     pp.  1278,  1295, 

1312,  1674,  1757. 
X'ave  V.  Tucker,  70  Ind.  15.    pp.  506,  508,  509. 
Xave's  Admr.  r.  Williams,   22  Ind.  368.    p. 

804. 
Xavlor  V.  Semmes,  4  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  273.    p. 

265. 
Xazro   V.  Fuller,  24   Wend.  (X.  Y.)  374.    p. 

1034. 
Xeal  V.  Delaware,  103  U.  S.  370.    p.  8. 
Xoal  V.  Jovner,  89  X.  C.  287.    p.  1549. 
•Xeal  V.  State,  64  Ga.  272.    p.  1908. 
Xeal  V.  Cunningham,  1  Cranch   C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

76.    p.  261. 
X'^eally  v.  Greenough,  25  X.  H.  325.    p.  608. 
Xoaly  V.  Brown,  6  111.  10.    p.  1669. 
Xeanow  v.  Uttech,  46  Wis.  5S1.    p.  1210. 
Xearlioff   v.    Addlemau,    31  -Pa.  St.  279.    p. 

1044. 
Xeave  v.  Amtz  (Wis.),  14  X.  W.  Rep,  41.    p. 

925. 
X'ed  V.  State,  7  Porter  (Ala.),  187.    p.  71. 
Ned  V.  State,   33  Miss.  365.    pp.   1913,  1921, 

1981. 
Xeece  r.  Halev,  23  111.    416.    p.  1442. 
Xeedham  r.  People,  98  111.  279.    p.  1564. 
Xeedham  i-.  San  Francisco  &c.  R.  Co.,  37  Cal. 

400.    p.  1223. 
Neel  V.  State,  9  Ark.  259.    pp.  144,  150. 
Xeely  v.  People,  13  111.  685.    pp.  70,  74. 
Xeclv's  Case,  13  111  68.5.    p.  69. 
Netf  V.  Cincinnati,  32  Oh.  St.  215.    p.  238. 
XetF  r.  Horner,  63  Pa.  St.  327.    p.  1U31. 
Xetf  ('.  Reed,  98  Ind.  341.    p.  2051. 
Xegley  v.  Farrow,  60  Md.  158;   s.  c.  45  Am. 

Hep.  715.     pp.  14.54,  1460,  1461. 
Negro  Jerrv  r.  Townshend,  9  Md.  145.    pp. 

503,  1780,  1938,  1942. 
NelUig  V.  Cole,  13  Neb.  39.    p.  703. 


Neier  r.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Mo.  App.  26. 

p.  821. 
Neil  V.  Abel,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  185»    pp.  1943, 

1949,  1962. 
Neil  i\  Tarin,  9  Tex.  256.    p.  324. 
Xeil  V.  Thorn,  88  X.  \.  270.    pp.  177,  385. 
Xeilou  r.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  599. 

pp.  1028,  125i,  1260,  1261,  1485. 
Xeilson  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Wis.  517. 

pp.  682,  688. 
Xeilson  v.  Harford,  8  Mees.  &  W.  823.    pp. 

826,  837,  844. 
Xelms  V.  State,  58  Miss.  362.    p.  1787 
Xelms  r.   State,  13    Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  590. 

pp.  71,  72.  1917,  P.)18,  1991. 
Xels  V.  State,  2  Tex.  2S0.    pp.  127,  1505. 
Nelson  v.  Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.,  68  3Io.  593.   pp. 

1229,  1297,  1305. 
Xelsou  v.  Cook,  19  111.  440.    p.  192. 
Xelson  V.  Dodge,  116  Mass.  3ti7.    p.  1721. 
Nelson   v.   Ewell,  2    Swan  (Tenn.),   271.    p. 

184. 
Nelson  v.  Matthews,  2  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  164. 

p.  918. 
Nelson  v.  State,  57  Miss.  286.    p.  48. 
Xelson  V.  State,  57  Mo.  286.    p.  48. 
Nelson  v.  State,  2  Swan  (Tenn.),  237.  pp.  253, 

254,  257. 
Nelson  v.  State,  32  Tex.  71.  /pp.  1903,  1906. 
Nelson  v.  Vorce,  55  Ind.  455.    pp.  1642,  1784, 

1803. 
Nelson  v.  Woodruif,  1  Black  (U.  S.),  156.    pp. 

1342,  1367. 
Neptune,  The,  6  Blatchf.  194.    pp.  1346, 1346, 

ia5fi,  1358. 
X'esbett  V.  Brown,  30  Ark.  585.    p.  212S. 
Nesbit  V.  Dallam,  7   Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  492.     p. 

329. 
Nesbit  V.  Hines,  17  Kan.  316.    pp.  2047,  2051, 

2073. 
Nesmith  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  8  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 

Y-.)423.    p.  7 
Nesmith  r.  Clinton  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  8  Abb.  Pr. 

(X.  Y.)  141.     pp.  1914,1922,  1923,  1981. 
Nettles  r.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  7  Rich.  L. 

(S.  C.)  190.    11.  1322. 
Neuman   v.  Third  Avenue  E.  Co.,  50  N.  Y. 

Super.  412.    pp.  6.53,  655. 
Nevins  v.  Bank  of  Lansiugburg,  10  Mich.  547. 

p.  942. 
Xevins  v.  De  Grand,  15  Mass.  436.    p.  1031. 
Xevins  v.  Peoria,  41  111.  .502.    p.  1267. 
Xevison  r.  Whitlev,  Cro.  Car.  501.    p.  885. 
Xew  V.  Fisher,  11  Dalv  (X.  Y.)  309.    p.  282. 
Xew  r.  Walker,  108  Ind.  365.    j).  2042. 
New  Albanv  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  12  Ind. 

55.    p.  1374. 
New  Albany  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pace,  13  Ind.  411. 

p.  1308. 
New  Albany  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,   16  Ind. 

402.    p.  21U. 
New  Brunswick  Co.  v.  Tiers,  24  N.  J.  L.  697. 

p.  1671. 
New  Eng.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wetmore,  32  111.  221. 

p.  978. 
New  England   Iron  Co.  v.  New  Y'ork  Loan 

Co.,  55  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  351.     pp.  600,  603. 
New  .Jersey  Express  Co.  v  Nichols,  32  X.  J. 

L.  166;  s.  c.  33  N.  J.  L.  434.     pp.  1225.  1226. 
New  Jersey  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baker,  94  U.  S. 

610     p.  ;646. 
New    Orleans  v.  Steamship  Co.,  20  Wall. 

(U.S.)  387.     p.  150. 
New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Albritton,38Miss. 

242.     15.  1237. 
New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  i-.  Bailev,  40  Miss. 

391.     p.  1486. 
New  Orle:ins  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hemphill,  35  Miss. 
'     17.     p.  48. 


0X11 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


New  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Mitchell,  52  Miss. 

SOS.    p.  1230. 
Xew  Orleans  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  40  Miss. 

39.    p.  1154. 
New  Orleans  INIntnal  Ins.  Co.  r.  Xew  Orleans 

itc.  K.  Co.,  20  La.  Ann.  :iO-'.     p.  1350. 
New  Yorii  r.  Mason,  4  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.), 

142.    p.  110. 
Sew  York  v.  Price,  5  Sandf.  (X.  Y.)  542.    p. 

ICTl. 
New  York  &c.  Co.  v.  Mever,  51  Ala.  325.    p. 

19.59. 
New  York  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stnrges,  2  Cow. 

(N.  Y.)  664.     p.  S86. 
New  York  Ac.  K.   Co.  v.  Doan,  105  lud.  92. 

pp.  204S,  2051,  2068. 
New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Fraloff,  100  U.  S.  24; 

s.   c.  9  Cent.  L.  J.  432.     pp.  11.52,  1154. 
New  York  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Sabine,  26  Pa.  St. 

242.    p.  1087. 
New  York  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Waldeu,  12  Johns. 

(N.  Y.)513.     p.  1658. 
New  York  Firemen's    Co.  i'  Lawrence,  14 

Jolins.  (N.  Y.)  46.    p.  344. 
New  York  Fireman's  lus.  Co.  v.  Ely,  2  Cow. 

(N.  Y.)  678.    p.  886. 
Newberry  r.  Furuival,  46  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

139.    p."   416. 
Newberry  v.  Lee,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  526.    pp. 

195,  1663. 
Newburger  r.  Campljell,  9Daly  (N.  Y.),  102; 

s.   c.  58  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  313.    p.  20S. 
Newburger  v.  Howard,  6  Phila.  174.    p.  1360. 
Newby  r.  Sharp,  8  Cli.  Div.  39.    p.  1003. 
Newby  v.  Yestal,  6  Ind.  412.    pp.  891, 1620. 
NewbV  r.  Warren,  24  lud.  161.    p.  1742. 
Newby  r.  Wiltshire,  2  Esp.  739.    pp.  889,  898. 
Newcomb    i:    Griswold,  24  N.  Y.  298.     pp. 

403,413.  436,459,526,619. 
Newcomb  v.  State,  37  Miss.  383.    p.  282. 
Newell  r.  Ayer,  32  Me.  334.  p.  1973. 
Newell  i-.  Downs,  8  Black.  (lud.)  523.    pp. 

1171,1195. 
Newell  r.  Homer.  120  Mass.  277.    p.  444. 
Newell  V.  Houlton,  20  Minn.  19.     p.  2044. 
Newell  V.  How,  31  Minn.  235.    pp.  1455,  1456. 
Newell  r.  Newell,  9  Paige  (N.Y.),25.    pp. 

646,  650. 
Newlicld  v.  Coppermau,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y'.) 

CN.  S.)  360.    p.  795. 
Newkirk  r.  State,  27  lud.  1.    pp.  1506,  1950. 

1951,1952. 
Newlove  v.  Woodward,  9  Neb.  502.    p.  2055. 
Newman  v.  Dodson,  61  Tex.  94.    p.  1480. 
Newman  v.  Hazelrigg,  96  Ind.  73.    pp.  1642, 

1783. 
Newman  v.  People,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  630.    p. 

524. 
Newman  v.  State,  26  Ga.  637.    p.  1639. 
Ncwmarch  v.  Clay,  14  East.  239.    p.  1584. 
Newmarket    Man.    Co.    r.    Pendergast,    24 

N.1I.54.    p.  1051. 
Newton  r.  Allis,  16  Wis.  197.    p.  807. 
Newton  v.  Askew,  6  Hare,  310.    p.  188. 
Newton  t'.   Harris,  2  Seld.  (X.   i.)  345.    pp. 

396,  397. 
Newton  v.  Jackson,  23  Ala.  335.    pp.  469.  483. 
Newton  r.  Locklin,  77  111.  103.    pp.  141,  160. 
Newton  v.  Pope,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  109.    p.  1328. 
Newton  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  245.    p.  1744. 
Ncy  V.  Rothe,  61  Tex.  374.    pp.  214,  241. 
Ncj'land  r.  State,  13  Tex.   App.  536.    j).  1680. 
Niagara  Fire  Ins.   Co.  v.   Scammon,  100  111. 

644;  s.  c.  11  Ins.  L.  J.  614.     }>.  982. 
Nias  i\  Northern  &  Eastern  R.  Co.,  2  Keen, 

76.    p.  276. 
Nichol  V.  Lytle,  4  Yerger   (Teun.),  456.    p. 

lO.-jO. 
Nicholas  v.  Stale,  6  Mo.  6.    p.  1670. 


Nicholls  V.  Foster,  89  111.  386.    p.  1984. 
Nichols  V.  Alsop,  10  Conn.  263.    p.  1977. 
Nichols  t".  Bronson,  2  Day  (Conn.),  211.    p. 

1920. 
Nichols  r.  Frothingham,  45  Me.  22(t    p.  847. 
Nichols  V.  Earkin,  79  Mo.  264.    p.  1607. 
Nichols  r.  Nichols,  136  Mass.  256.     p.  1934. 
Nichols  r.  Rubelman,  13  Mo.  App.  615.    p. 

1449. 
Nichols  V.    Shearon,  49  Ark.  75;  s.  c,    4  S. 

W.  Rep.  167.    p.  2071. 
Nichols  V.  Sixth  Avenue  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  131. 

p.  1212. 
Nichols  V.  State,  65  Ind.  512.    pp.  1937, 1950, 

2039. 
Nichols  V.  Stewart.  20  Ala.  358.    pp.  481,  484. 
Nichols  V.  Suucook  Man.  Co.,  24  N.  H.  437. 

p. 1985. 
N-ichols  V.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  326.    pp. 

354,  642. 
Nicholson  v.  Coghill,  4  Barn.  &  Cres.  21.    p. 

1197. 
Nicholson  r.  Com.,  96  Pa.  St.  503.    p.  1-528. 
Nicholson  r.  Desobry,  14  La.  Ann.  81.    p.  383. 
Xicoles  V.  Calyert,  96  Ind.  316.     j).  1756. 
Nicoll  r.  Greaves,  17  Com.  Bench  (N.  S.)  27; 

s.  c.  33  L.  J.  ((;.  P.)  255.    p.  1136. 
Nightingale  v.  Oregon  &c.  R.  Co.,  2   Sawy. 

(U.  S.)  338.    p.  192. 
Nimmo  v.  Kuvkcndall,  85  111.  576.    p.  2053. 
Niinsr.  Bigelow,  44  N.  H.  376.    pp.  1912, 1918. 
Nininger  r.  Knox,  8  Minn.  140.    p.  1911. 
Ninnon  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  650.     p.  1797. 
Nixon  V.  Brown,  4   Blackf.    (Ind.)   157.    p. 

1647. 
Nixon  r.  Downey.  49  la.  166.    p.  2063. 
Nixon  r.  Vanhis"e,  2  South.  (N.  J.)  491 ;  s.  C. 

8  Am.  Dec.  618.    p.  889. 
Noaker  r.  Morev,  30  Ind"  103.    p.  2034. 
Noble  V.  Epperlv,6  Ind.  468.    p.  1998. 
Noble  V.  McCliritock,  6  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  38. 

p.  729. 
Noble  r.  National  Discount  Co.,  5  Hurl.  & 

N.  22.5.     p.  1018. 
Noble  V.  People,  1  111.  29.    p.  67. 
Noble  r.  Richmond,  7  Reporter,  478.    p.  1249. 
Noble  V.  Smith,  5  .lohns.  357.     p.  178. 
Noble's  Case,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  731.    p.  41. 
Noblesville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ganse,  76  lud.  142; 

s.  c.  40  Am.  Rep.  224.     p.  1293. 
Noe  I'.  State,  92  Ind.  92.     p.  73. 
Noe  V.  State,  4  How.  (Miss.)  330.    p.  71. 
Nofsiuger  v.  Reynolds,  52  lud.  218.     p.  2090. 
Nofsinger  v.  Ring,  4  Mo  App.  570.    p.  1018. 
Nolan  V.  Shickle,  3  Mo.  App.  30o.    p.  1604. 
Nolan  V.  State,  19  Oh.  131.    p.  465. 
Nolan  v.  \08berg,   3  Bradw.    (III.)   596.    p. 

1944. 
Nolaud  V.  McCracken,  1  Dev.  &  Batt.  (X.  C, 

594.     p.  1636. 
Nolen  V.  State,  2  Head    (Tcnn.),  520.    pp. 

82,  85,  1919. 
Nolen  r.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  419.    pp.  10,  49. 
Noles  r.  State,  20  Ala.  31.    p.  1548. 
Nolton  r.  Moses,  3  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  31.    p.  1645. 
Nomacjue  v.  People,  1  111.  109.    p.  122. 
Xorberg's  Case,  4  Mass.  81.    p.  331. 
Norburv  i'.  Kennedy,  3  Crawf.  &  Dix  (Irish) 

Cir.  124.    p.  35. 
Norcross  i\  Norcross,  53  Me.  163.    p.  1340. 
Norcum  v.  Gatv,  19  Mo.  65.    p.  1130. 
Norden  r.  Jones,  33  Wis.  600.    p.  891. 
Nordham  v.  Btough,  .50  Ind.  280.    p.  2100. 
Nordinanser  r.  Hitchcock,  40  Mo.  178.    pp. 

15S6,  1588. 
Nordvke  &c.  Co.  v.  Van  Sant.  99  Ind.  188. 

I»p."l621,  16J2. 
Norlleet  r.  State,  4  Suced  (Tenn.),  340.    pp 

69,  71,  77,  114. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXlll 


Norfolk  V.  Gaylord,  28  Conn.  300.     pp.  283, 

524. 
Norman  v.  Beaumont,  'Willes,  4S4.    p.  32. 
Norman  v.  Wells,  17  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  136.    pp. 

512,  1703. 
Normaque  v.  People,  Breese  (111.),  145.    p. 

1996. 
Norris  i\  Cargill,  57  Wis.  251.    p.  420. 
Norris  v.  Casel,  90  lud.  143.    p.  1756. 
Norris  V.  Cook,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)464.    p. 

1720. 
Norris  v.  Ha8ler,23  Fed.  Rep.  581.    p.  168. 
Norris  v.  Morrill,  40  X.  H.  395.    p.  344. 
Norris  v.  School  District  Xo.  1,  12  Me.  293; 

s.  c.  28  Am.  Dec.  182.    p.  892. 
Norris  r.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  333.    pp. 

1983,  1984. 
North  V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  111.     p.  1695. 
North    British  &c.   Ins.   Co.  v.   Steiger,   13 

Bradw.  (111.)  482.    p.  978. 
North  Missouri  It.  Co.  v.  Stephens,  36  Mo. 

150.    p.  196. 
North  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  r.  Heilenian,  49 

Pa.  St.  60.    p.  1230. 
North  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Mahoney,  57 

Pa  St.  187.    p.  1233. 
North  Vernon  v.  Voegler,  103  Ind.  314.    p. 

516. 
Northcutt  r.  Buckles,  60  Ind.  .577.    p.  2077. 
Northern  Central  K.  Co.  r.  Gies,  31  Md.  357. 

pp.  1224,  1227. 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  29  Md.  420. 

pp.  1229,  1304. 
Northern  Line  Packet  Co.  v.  Biuuinger,  70 

111.  576.    p.  1298. 
Northern  Pacitic  R.  Co.  i\  Paine,  7  Sup.  Ct. 

Rep.  323.     pp.  197,  1671. 
Northington  v.  State,  78  Tenn.  (14  Lea)  424. 

pp.  728,  747,  771,  782. 
Northwestern  &c.    Co.   v.   Blankenship,  94 

Ind.  535.     p.  2039. 
Northwestern  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ilazelett,  105 

Ind.  212.     p.  2090. 
Northwestern  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Heimann,  93 

Ind.  24.     pp.  2038,  2110. 
Northwestern    &c.    Ins.    Co.   v.   Muskegon 

Bank,  122  U.  S.  501.    pp.  991,  992. 
Norton  v.  Hevward,  20  Me.  359.    p.  615. 
Norton  v.  Ittner,  56  Mo.  351.    pp.  1208, 1210, 

1212,  1218,  1226. 
Norton  v.  Kearney,  10  Wis.  443.    p.  1411. 
Norton  v.  Lexington  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  16  111.  236. 

p.  99G. 
Norton  v.  McLearv,  8  Oh.  St.  205.    p.  4. 
Norton  v.  Reeds,  6  Mo.  64.    p.  1600. 
Norton  v.  Seton,  3  PhiUimore,  147.    pp.  646, 

649. 
[Nourse  v.  Prime,  7  Johns.  Ch.   (X.  Y.)   77. 

p.  886. 
'  Nourse  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  588.    p.  465. 
'.Norval  v.  Rice,  2  Wis.  23.    p.  4. 
[Nowlan  f.  Ablett,  2  Cromp.   Mees.  &  R.   54; 
.     s.  c.  5  Tyrwh.  709.    p.  1136. 
iNovea  t\  Byxbce,  45  Conn.  382.    p.  137. 
Noyes  v.  Hemphill,  58  X.  H.  536.    p.  1007. 
Noyes  v.  Rock  wood,  56  Vt.  647.    p.  1597. 
Noyes   v.   Shepherd,    30   Me.   173.  pp.   1750, 

1755. 
Noyes  ».  Stillman,  24  Conn.  15.    p.  1110. 
Nugent  V.  Smith,  1  C.  P.  Div.  423.    p.  J344. 
Nugent  V.  Trepaguier,  2  Martin  (La.),  205. 

pj).  60,  87. 
Nugent,  Ex  parte,  4  Clark  (Pa.  L.  J.),  106. 

p.  152. 
Nute  r.  Nute,  41  N.  H.  60.    p.  441. 
Nuzum  V   State,  88  lud.  599.    p.  1.526. 
Nye  V.  Lewis,  65  Ind.  326.    p]).  2139,  2141. 
Nye  V.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  124  Mass.  241.    p. 

2137. 


Oakland  R.   Co.  v.  Fielding,  48  Pa.  St.  320. 

pp.  1209,  1232. 
Gates  r.  Brown,  59  Ga.  711.    p.  1984. 
Gates'  Case,  10  How.  St.  Tr.  1082.     pp.  52,  86. 
Gatfleld  v.  Waring,  14  Johns.  (N.  Y  )  188.    p. 

900. 
O'Barr  v.  Alexander,  37  Ga.  195.    pp.  1925, 

1926. 
Obear  v.   Railroad  Co.,  13  Mo.  App.  84.    p. 

2121. 
Ober  V.  Carson,  62  Mo.  209.    p.  912. 
Obcr  V.  Gray, 68  Ga.  182.     pp.  1907, 1917,  1963. 
Oberfelder  v.  Kavanaugh  (Neb.),  32  N.  AY. 

Rep.  296;  s.  c.  21  Xeb.  483.    pp.  313,  399. 
Oberman  v.  Coble,  13  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  I.    p. 

551. 
Obermier  v.  Core,  25  Ark.  562.    p.  20.53. 
O'Bliuskie  v.  Judge  &c.,  34  Mich.  62.    p.  2070. 
Obouchon  v.  Boon,  10  Mo.  442.    p.  1600. 
O'Brian  v.  Com.,  9  Bush  (Kv.),  333.    p.  114. 
O' Brian  v.  McGlyuchy,  68  Me.  5.52.   pp.  12,  35. 
O'Brien  v.  Merchants'  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  6  Jones 

&  Sp.  (X^  Y.)  482.     pp.  1943,  1945,  1955. 
O'Brien  r.  People,  36  X.  Y.  276;s.  c.  48  Barb. 

(X.  Y.)  274.     pp.  64,  65,  74,  98. 
O'Brien  r.  Phila.  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Phila.    (Pa.) 

76.    p.  1223. 
O'Brien  v.  Phcenix  Ins.  Co.,  76  N.  Y.  459.    p. 

1131. 
O'Brien  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  667.    p.  1576. 
O'Brien  f.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,  7  Mo.  App. 

257.    pp.  81,  129. 
O'Bvrne  v.  State,  29  Ga.  36.    p.  38. 
O'Callaghan  v.  Booth,  6  Cal.  63.    p.  1047. 
Ocean    Wave,  The,  3  Biss.    (U.  S.)  317.    pp. 

1322,  1345,  1359. 
Ocheltree  v.  Carl,  23  la.  394.    pp.  1671,  1672, 

1746. 
O'Coigly's  Case,  26  How.  St.   Tr.  1191,    1231. 

PI),  45,  68,  88. 
O'Connell  v.  Mansfield,  9   Irish  L.    179.    p. 

95. 
O'Connor  r.  Corbitt,  3  Cal.  370.    p.  891. 
O'Connor  v.  Gutlirie,  11  la.  80.    p.  1915. 
O'Connor   v.    Koch,   66  Mo.    253.    pp.   2055, 

2056. 
O'Connor  v.  State,  9  Fla.  215.    pp.  27,  53,  73, 

89,  106,  108. 
Odd  Fellows'  Hall  v.  Messer,  24  Pa.  St.  507. 

p.  1947. 
O'Dea  V.  State,  16  X^^eb.  242.    p.  1576. 
O'Dell  V.  Coppie,  5  Hei.sk.  (Tenn.)    88.-   p. 

264. 
Odell  r.  Reynolds,  40  Mich.  21.    p.  2. 
Odell  V.  Sargent,    3  Kan.  80.     pp.  2073,  2083. 
Odiorne  v.  Bacon,  6  Cush.   (Mass.)  185.    p. 

J739. 
Odle  V.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  159.    p.  1927. 
Odom  V.  Gill,  59  Ga.  180.    p.  20. 
O' Donald  v.  Constant,  81  lud.  212.    p.  2110. 
O'Donnell  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  8  Cent.  L. 

J.  414.    p.  1235. 
O'Donnell  v.  Segar,  25  Mich.  367.    p.  553. 
O'Donnell's  Case,  referred  to  18  Am.  L.  Rev. 

97.    p.  539. 
O'Donohue   v.   Hendrix,    13    Neb.    255.    p. 

2055. 
O'Driscoll  V.  M'Burney,  2  Nott.  &M.  (S.  C.) 

54.    p.  1198. 
Oestrich  v.  Gilbert,  9  Hun  (X.  Y.),  242.    p. 

192. 
Offlt  V.  Vlck,  Walker  (Miss.),  99.    pp.  1906, 

1914. 
O'Flahertv  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  45  Mo.  70.    pp. 

1232,  12.^4. 
OIlov  c.  Hicks,  Cro.  Jac.  263.    p.  875. 
Ogden  V.  Parks,  16  Johns.  N.  Y.  180.    p.  100. 


8a 


CXIV 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Ogg  V.  Shehan,  17   Neb.  323;  s.  c.  22  X.  W. 

Kep.  55(5.    p.  2036. 
Ogle  V.  Dill,  til  Iiul.  43S.  p.  -2041. 
Ogle  V.  t?tate,  33  Miss.  383.    pp.  75,  116. 
Oglotreo    V.    State,   2S   Ala.   693.    pp.    1534, 

1687. 
O'Hagan   v.  Dillon,   76   N.  Y.  170.    pp.  336, 

337. 
O'Hara   r.  Richardson,  44    Pa.  St.  385.    pp. 

1049,  1938,  1947,  19H-.>. 
Oliio&c.  H.  Co.  r.  Collarn,  73  Ind.  261;  s.  c. 

38  Am.  Rep.  134.    p.  1477. 
Ohio  &c.    R.  Co.  V.  Dickerson,  59  Ind.    321. 

l>p.  1284,  1289. 
Ohio  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Dickerson,  59  Ind.  321.  p. 

12S9. 
Ohio  &c.    R.  Co.  V.  Dunbar,  20  111.  623.    p. 

1343. 
Ohio  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Hemberger,  43  Ind.  462. 

Ohio  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Kuhn,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  419.  p. 

2087. 
Ohio  &c.  R.  Co.    V.    Schicbe,  44  111.  460.    p. 

1236.    . 
Ohio  &c.    R.  Co.  V.  Selby,  47  Ind.  471.    pp. 

1298,  2043. 
Ohio  &c.    R.  Co.  V.  Stratton,   78  111.  88.    p. 

1295. 
Ohlsen  r.  Manderfeld,  28  Minn.  390.  p.  1052. 
Oil  Co.  V.  Van  Etton ,  107  U.  S.  325.    p.   1133. 
O'Kecfe  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  la.  467.  p. 

1305. 
Okeson  r.  Patterson,  29  Pa.  St.  22.    p.  1013. 
01dersha\T  r.  Knovvles,  101  111.  117.    p.  391. 
Oldfield  r.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  310;s.  c. 

3  E.  D.  Smith,  103.    pp.  1233, 1234. 
Oldham  r.  Hill,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  300.  p.  5. 
Olds  V.  Moderwell,  87  Ind.  582.    p.  2042. 
Olendorf  i\  Cook,  1  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  37.    p.  864. 
Oleson  17.  Meader,  40  la.  662.    pp.  1976,2062. 
Olive  V.  Guin,  2  Siderfln ,  145.    p.  1936. 
Olive  V.  State,  II  Neb.  1.    pp.  75,  76,  379,  580, 

1777. 
Olive  V.  City  of  Kansas,  69  Mo.  80.    pp.  1268, 

1280. 
Oliver  v.  Eaton,  7  Mich.  108.    pp.  1410, 1437, 

1438, 1443. 
Oliver  v.  Gray,  1  Harr.  &  G.  (Md.)  204.    p. 

965. 
Oliver  v.  La  Valle,  30  Wis.    592.    pp.   1221, 

1485. 
Oliver  v.  Pate,  43  Ind.  132.    pp.  375,  480. 
Oliver  v.  State,  17  Ala.  587;  s.   c.  Ilorr.  & 

Thomp.  Cas.  Self -Def.  725.    pp.  1533, 1534, 

1539, 1548. 
Oliver  v.  State,  39  Miss.  526.    p.  1668. 
Oliver  V.  Williams,  25  Ga.  217.    p.  1045. 
Ollam  V.  Shaw,  27  Ind.  388.    pp.  1715,  2028. 
Olnistead  r.  Gere,  100  Pa.  St.  127.    p.  522. 
Olmstead  v.  Kevs,  85  N.  Y.  593.    p.  991. 
Olmstead  v.  Miller,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  506.    p. 

1617. 
Olney  v.  Hatcliff,  37  Hun  (N.  Y.),  286.    p. 

604. 
Olney  r.  Mvers,  3111.  311.    pp.  888,  895. 
Olney  v.  VVickes,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  122.    p. 

899. 
Omaha  v.  Kane,  15  Neb.  657.     p.  56. 
Omaha  r.  Olmstead,  5  Neb.  446;  s.  c.  16  Am. 

L.  Rej).  3.56.    p.  55. 
Omaha  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker  (Neb.),  23  N.  W. 

Rep.  348;  s.  c.  17  Neb.  432.    p.  689. 
O'.Mara  v.  Com.,  75  Pa.   St.  424.    pp.  72,  75. 
O'Mara  v.  Hudson  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  445. 

p.  1-232. 
O'Mealyr.  State,  1  Tex.  App.   180.    pp.118. 

1'22. 
Onirod  v.  Hath,  14  Mees.  &-W.  664.    p.  927. 
O'Neal  V   State,  47  Ga.  229.    p.  54. 


O'Neal  r.  Walton,  1  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  234.  pp, 

354,  3.55,  361. 
O'Xeallt'.  Calhoun,  67  111.  219.    p.  1939. 
O'Neil  t'.  Capelle.  .ill  Mo.  296.    p.  16t-T). 
O'Neil  V.  Lake  Sujierior  Iron  Co.  (Mich.),  35 

N.  W.  Rep.  162.    p.  82, 
O'Neil  V.  State.  48  Ga.  66.    pp.  1761, 1849. 
O'Neill   V.    James,    43   N.    Y    84.    pp.  1626, 

1739. 
Onev  i\  Clendonnin,  28  W.  Va.  34.    p.  2055. 
Opdvke  V.    Marl)le,44  Barb.  (N.  Y\)  64,    pp. 

182,  183,  596,  ■i97,  .599,  604. 
Opdvke  V.  Stephens,  28  N.  J.  L.  83.    pp.  1077, 

1078. 
Op<ivkc  V.  Weed,  18  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  223  n. 

pp".  218,220. 
Opotlile-Yoholo  r.  Mitchell,  2  Stew.  &  Port. 

(Ala.)  125.    p.  38. 
Oppenheimer     v.  United   States     Express 

Co.,  69  111.  62.     pp.  1360,1364. 
Oram  v.  Bishop,  7  ilalst.  (N.  J.)  L.  153.    pp. 

145,  1906. 
Orange  Co.  Bank  r.  Brown,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

85.     p.  1151. 
Orcutt  V.  Carpenter,  1  Tyler  (Vt.),  250.    pp. 

47,  lis,  1920. 
Orear  v.  McDonald,  9  Gill  (Md.),  350.    p.  947. 
Oregon  &.c.   I{.   Co.   r.   Oregon  Steam  Nav. 

Co.,  3  Ore.  178.    p.  1983. 
O'RelUv  r.  Hendricks,  2  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.) 

208.     p.  1671. 
Organ  v.  State,  26  Miss.  83.    pp.  1921,  1981. 
Orme  v.  Pratt,  4  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.   S.)  124. 

pp.  118,  123. 
Ormes  v.  Dauchy,  82  N.  Y.  443.    p.  1626. 
Ormod  v.  Huth,  14  Mees.  &  W.  651.    p.  1419. 
Ormychund  c.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21;  s.c.  Willes,, 

543.     p.  330. 
O'liourk  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  530. 
.  p.  1369. 

Orr  V.  State,  15  Ark.  540.    p.  339. 
Orr  V.  Worden,  10  Ind.  553     p.  2108. 
Orrok  r.  Com.  Ins.  Co.,  21  Pick.  (Mass.)  457. 

pp.  113, 1976. 
Ortman  v.  Dixon,  9  Cal.  33.    p.  159. 
Ortman  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  32  Kan.  419.   p. 

1969. 
Orton  V.  Tilden,  110  Ind.  131.    p.  2138. 
Ortweia  v.  Com.,  76  Pa.  St.  414.    pp.  75, 77. 
Ortwein  v.  State,  76  Pa.  St.  414.    p.  1878. 
Osl)orne  I'.  Governors  of  Guy's  Hospital,  2 

Stra.  728.     p.  899. 
Osborne  v.  Hamilton,  29  Kan.  1.    p.  2073. 
Osborne     v.    London    Dock    Co.,    10  E.xch. 

(H.  &G.)701.    ]).  2S6. 
Osl)orne  v.  O'Reilly,  34  N.  J,  Eq.  60.    pp.  424, 

425. 
Osl)orne  v.  Peoi)lc,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  583. 

p.  304. 
Osceola  Tribe  i:  Rost,  15  Md.  295.    p.  822. 
Osgood  V.  Devrey,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  240.    p. 

891. 
Osgood  V.  Lewis,  2  Harr.  &  G.   (Md.)  495. 

pp.  925,  926,  927. 
Osgood  i:  Manhattan  Co.,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  612. 

p.  557. 
Osgood  1-.  McConnell,  32  111.  74.    p.  1998. 
Osgood  r.  State,  63  (ia.  791.    p.  118. 
O'Shields  r.  State,  55  Ga.  696.    pp.  123,1720, 

1748. 
Osiander  v.  Com.,  3  Leigh    (Va.),  780,     pp. 

67,  69,  74. 
Ossipe   Man.  Co.  v.  Canney,  54  N.  H.  295. 

p.  91. 
Ostcrtag  r.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  64  Mo.  421.    pp. 

1229,  12a5,  12.57,  12.59. 
O'Sullivan  r    Roberts,  39  N.  Y.  360.    p.  .586. 
Oswald  I'.  Minneapolis  &c.  R.  Co.,  20  Minn.  6k 

p.  1922. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXV 


Oswego  V.  Oswego  Canal  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  257. 

p.  101-2. 
Otis  V.  Raymond,  3  Conn.  413.    p.  1419. 
O'Toole's  Estate,  1  Tuck.  (N.  Y.)  (S-irr.)  39. 

p.  182. 
Ott  i:  Oyer,  106  Pa.  St.  6.    pp.  1698,  1767, 1769, 

1958,  1962. 
Ott  r.  Soulard,  9  Mo.  681.    p.  1082. 
Ottawa  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McMath,  91  111.  104.    p. 

2087. 
Otter   Creek  Coal  Co.  v.  Rainy  34  lud.  329, 

p.  2035. 
Otterbackr.  Brown,  2  MacArth.  (D.  C.)  541. 

p.  1637. 
OUinger  v.  Ottinger,  17  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  142. 

p.  1942. 
Otto  V.  Dnrege,  14  Wis.  574.    p.  886.    p. 
Ougier  v.  Jenninsrs,  1  Camp.  505.     p.  1143. 
Oulton  V.  IMorse,  2  Kerr  (N.  B.),  77.    p.  29. 
Ousley  V.  Hardin,  23  111.  404.    p.  1495. 
Outlaw  (-.  Hurdle,  IJones   (N.   C.),450.    pp. 

463,  1937,  1939. 
Outwater  v.  Dodge,  7  Cow.    (N.   Y.)  87.    p. 

909. 
Over  V.  Scliiffling,  102  Ind.  191.    p.  563. 
Overall  v.  Overall,  Lit.  Sel.  Cas.  513.    p.  1008. 
Overbee  v.  Com.,  1  Va.  7-56.    p.  1907. 
Overcash  v.  Kitchie,  89  N.  C,  384.    p.  766. 
Overfleld  v.  Christie,  7  S.  &  E.  (Pa.)  173.    p. 

1044. 
Overton  v.  Tracy,  14  Serg.  &  R.  324.    pp.  569, 

839. 
Overton  v.  Matthews,  35  Ark.  147.    p.  1031. 
Overton  v.  Overton,  18  B.  Mou.  61.    p.  1114. 
Owen  V.  Hudson  River  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  516.    p. 

1226. 
Owen  V.  Jordan,  27  xila.  608.    p.  2019. 
Owen  V.  O'Reillv,  20  Mo.  603.    p.  312. 
Owen  V.  Owen,  4  Hagg.  Ecc.  261.    p.  646. 
Owen  V.  Phillips,  73  lud.  287. 
Owen  V.    Warburton,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  (N.  R.) 

326.     pp.  1966,  1984. 
Owens  r.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  58Mo.  386.  pp. 

1207,  1223,  1307,  1670,  1708. 
Owens  V.  Rector,  44  Mo.  389.    p.  1414. 
Owens  w.  State,  19Tex.App.  242.    p.  1538. 
Owens  V.  White,  28  Ala.  413.    p.  493. 
Owens   Co.   v.  Pierce,    5   Mo.    App.  576.    p. 

793. 
Owings  V.  Hull,-  9  Pet.  (U.  S.)  608.    p.  1131. 
Owings   V.  Low,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)   134.    p. 

274. 
Owings   r.  Shannon,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.   (Ky.) 

188.    p.  361. 
Oxford  Iron  Co.  v.  Spradley,  51  Ala.  172.    p. 

346. 
Oxley  V.  Storer,  54  111.  159.    p.  1667. 
Ozier  v.  Hinsburgh,  44  Vt.  220.    p.  1249. 


Pacific,  The,  1  Xewb.  (IT.  S . )  9.    p.  488. 
Pacific  R.  Co.  V.  Chrvstal,  25  Mo.  544.   p.  1499. 
Packard  v.  Smith,  9  Wis.  184.    p.  2057. 
Packard  r.  United  States,  1  G.  Greene  (la.), 

225.    p.  1994. 
Packer  v.  Cockayne,  3  G,  Greene  (la.).  111. 

p.  1670. 
Packer  v.  Gonsalus,  1  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)  526. 

p.  485. 
Packet  Co.  v.  Clough,  20  Wall.  (U.  S)  528. 

pp.  574,  1298. 
Packet  Co.  v.  Sickles,  5  Wall.  (U.  S.)  590. 

p.  1074. 
Paddock    v.   Franklin  Ins.     Co.,   11   Pick. 

(Mass.)  227      p.  993. 
Paddock  V.  Wells.  2  Barb.  Ch.   (N.  Y.)  331. 

p.  53. 


Padgett  V.  Lawrence,  10  Paige  (N.  Y.),170. 

p.  1073. 
Padmore  v.  Lawrence,  11  Ad.  &  E.  380.    p. 

795. 
Paducah  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoehl,  12  Bush  (Kv.), 

41.    pp.  1225,  r2:>2. 
Page  V.  Carter,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  192.    pp.  215, 

223. 
Page  V.  Com.,  27  Gratt.  (Va.)  954.    p.  70. 
Page  V.  Contoocook  &c.  K.  Co.,  21  X.  11.438. 

pp.  56,  117. 
Page  V.  Gushing,  38  Me.  523.    pp.  1162.  1171, 

1173. 
Page  V.  Danvers,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  326.    p.  110. 
Page  V.  Kankey,  6  Mo.  433.    p.  383. 
Page  V.  Marsh,  36  N.  H.  305.    p.  888. 
Page  V.  Osgood,  2   Gray    (Mass.),  260.    pp. 

218,  241. 
Page  r.  Parker,  40  X.  H.  47.    pp.  315,  351, 
Paget  V.  I'erchard,  1  Esp.  205.    p.  1440. 
I'aige  V.  O'Neal,  12  Cal.  483.    p.  95. 
Page  V.  Wheeler,  5  N.  H.  91.    pp.  1945, 1954, 

1955. 
Pahlman  v.  King,  49  111.  266.    p.  1750. 
Pain  V.  Rochester,  Cro.  Eliz.  871.    p.  1191 
Paine  v.  Edscll,  19  Pa.  St.  178.    p.  1031. 
Paine  v.  Hutchins,  49  Vt.  314.    p.  1045. 
Paine  v.  Lake  Erie  &c.  R.  Co.,  31  Ind.  283. 

p.  2029. 
Paine  V.  Riugold,  43  Mich.  341.    p.  845. 
Paine  v.  Tilden,  20  Vt.  .5.54.    pp.  469,  471,  476. 
Palatka  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  State  (Fla.),  3  S.  Rep. 

158.    p.  2071. 
Fallen  r.  Glidden,  68  Me.  559.    p.  1704. 
Palmer?;.  Kennedy,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  498. 

p.  2057. 
Palmer  v.  Marshall,  8  Bing.  161.    pp.   953, 

1143. 
Palmer  v.  People,  4  Xeb.  68.    pp.  71,  78, 115. 
I'almer  v.  Pinkham,  33  Me.  35.    p.  344 
Palmer  v.  Portsmouth,  43  X.  H.    265.    pp. 

r.'OO,  1246. 
Palmer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  76  Mo.  217.    pp.  1311, 

1708. 
Palmer  v.  Rowan  (Neb.),  32  N.  W.  Rep.  210. 

p.  188. 
Palmer  v.  State,  42  Oh.  St.  596.    p,  76. 
Palmer  v.  Utah  &c.  R.  Co.  (Idaho),  13  Pac. 

Rep.  425.     p.  747. 
Palmer  v.  Vandenburg,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  281. 

p.  899. 
Palmore  v.  State,  29  Ark.  248.    pp.  1924, 1930, 

1933,  1945. 
Pangborn  v.  Continental  Ins.   Co.    (Michi- 
gan), 29  N.  W.  Rep.  475.    p.  608. 
Pangburn  v.  Bull,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  345.    pp. 

1168,  1170,  1172,  1173,  1181,  1184,  1193,  1198. 
Pannel  v.  Com.,  86  Pa.  St.  260.    p.  1780. 
I'annel  c.  state,  29  Ga.  681.    pp.  85, 129. 
Panton  v.  Williams,  2  Ad.  &  FA.  (n.  s.)  169; 

s.  c.  1  Gale  &  Dav.  504.    pp.  1172, 1173, 1176, 

1181,  1189,1192. 
Pa,i)ineau   r.  Belgurde,  81  111.  61.    pp.  1964, 

1967. 
Para  more  v.   Lindsey,  63  Mo.  63.    pp.  1029. 

103' I,  j920. 
Parch  man  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  228.    p.  70. 
Pardee  v.  Drew,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  459.    pp. 

1154,  1155. 
Parham  v.  Harney,  6  Smed.  &  M.  (Pa.)  55. 

pp.  1964,  1965,  1967,  1968. 
Paris  v.  .State,  36  Ala.  232.    p.  18. 
Parish  i\  Gates,  29  Ala.  254.    p.  869. 
Park  V.  O'Brien,  23  Conn.  347.    pp.  1209, 1224, 

1226. 
Park  r.  Piedmont  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  51  Ga.  510. 

p.  1454 
Park  r.  Wooten,  35  Ala.  242.    p.  1098. 
Parker  j;.  Adams,  12 Mete.  (Mass.)  415.    p.  1224. 


CXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Parker  v.  Barker,  2  Mete.  (Mass.)  423.    pp. 

144-2, 1447. 
Parker  c.  Browning,  S  Paige  fX.  Y.),  388.    p. 

ur>. 
Parker  v.  Crane,  6  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  647.     p. 

900. 
Parker  r.  Donaldson,  6   AVatts  &  S.  (Pa.) 

13'2.    pp.  HiSS,  1701. 
Parker  v.  Dubuque  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  Iowa,  400. 

p.  1309. 
Parker  r.  Dudlev,  US  Mass.  602.    p.  425. 
Parker  v.  Easlow,  102  111.  272.    p.  653. 
Parker  v.  Fe^gu^^,  52  111.  419.    p.  1679. 
Parker  t'.  Gordon,  7  East,  385.    p.  939. 
Parker  v.  Hardy,  24  Pick.  (Mass.)    246.    p. 

20St4. 
Parker  v.  Ilawlev,  4  Colo.  336.    p.  969. 
Parker  v.  Ilotchkiss,  1  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)200. 

p.  18S. 
Parker  r.  Ibbetsou,4  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  345.    pp. 

821,825,828,  1137. 
Parker  v.  Jenkins,  3   Busti  (Ky.),  587.    p. 

1472. 
Parker  v.  Marquis,  64  Mo,  38.    p.  1661. 
Parker  v.  Palmer,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  387.    p. 

1144. 
Parker  v.  Potts,  3  Dow.  (Pari.  Rep.)  23.     p. 

994. 
Parker  r.  Proprietors  &c.,  3  Mete.  (Mass.) 

91.  p.  1051. 
Parker  v.  Smith,  4  Cal.  105.    p.  581. 
Parker  r.  8mitii,  17  Mass.  413.     p.  10S6. 
Parker  v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  2  C.  P.  Div. 

416.    p.  13(55. 
Parker  v.  State,  34  Ga.  262.    pp.  58,  62, 1633. 
Parker  V.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  292.     p.  576. 
Parker  v.  State,  55  Miss.  444.    pp.  113,  121, 

2062. 
Parker  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  88.    p.  1903. 
Parker  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  72.    pp.  1549, 

1709. 
Parker  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  15  La.  Ann.  688. 

p.  993. 
Parker  v.  Union  Woolen  AVorks,  42  Conn. 

399.    pp.  1400,  1401. 
Parker  v.  Waugh,  34  Mo.  340.    p.  2056. 
Parkhill  v.  Brighton,  61  la.  103.    p.  1277. 
Parkhill  v.  Imlay,  15  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  431.    pp. 

1131,1134. 
Parkhurst  v.  Lawtou,  3  Madd.  121.    p.  277. 
Parkin  v.  Caruthers,  3  Esp.  248.    p.  1101. 
Parkin  v.  Moon,  7  Carr.  &  P.  408.    p.  369. 
Parkins  v.  Cobbet,  1  Car.  &  P.  282.    p.  622. 
Parkins  v.  Dunham,  3  Strobh.  Law  (S.  0.) 

224.    p.  1062. 
Parkinson  v.  Parker,  48  Iowa,  667.    p.  123. 
Parks  V.   Boston,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)  198.    pp. 

682,  684. 
Parks  V.  Hill,  45  Ind.  172.    p.  2090. 
Parks  V.  State,  4  Oli.  St..  234.     pp.  113,  2062. 
Parks  V.  Turner,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  39.    p.  2005. 
Parkyn's  Case,  13  ilow.  St  Tr.  7.5.    p.  88. 
Parley  v.  State,  57  Ind.  331.    p.  533. 
Parmalee  v.  Kisher,  22  111.  212.    p.  1154. 
Parmele  v.  Guthery,  2  Root  (Conn.),  185.    p. 

113. 
Parmlee  v.  Sloan,  37  Ind.  469.    pp.  1910,  1911. 
Parmiter  v.  Coupland,  6  Mees.  &  W.  105.    p. 

14.53. 
Parr  v.  Seams,  Barnes'  Notes,  438.    pp.  1964, 

1966. 
Parr  v.  Van  Ilorne,  40  111.  122.    p.  2069. 
Parris  v.  State,  2  G.    Greene  (la.),  449.    p. 

1727. 
Parrott  v.  Anderson,  14  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  371. 

p.  960. 
Parrott  v.  Thatcher, 9  Pick.  (Mass.)  426.    pp. 

1989,2021. 
Parry  v.  May,  1  Mood.  &  R.  279.    jip.  65,  616. 


Parsons  z!.  Brown,  15  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  590.    p. 

1698. 
Parsons  v.  Harijer,  16  Gratt.  (Va.)  64.    p.  111. 
Parsons  v.  Hulf,  38  Me.  137.    pp.  321, 1908. 
Parsons  v.  State,  22  Ala.  .50.    pp.  81,  82. 
I'artridge  v.  Forsythe,  29  Ala.  200.     p.   1733. 
Partridge  v.  Gilbert.  3  Duer  (N.  Y.),  184.  p. 

2026. 
Partridge  v.  Patterson,  6  la.  514.  p.  845. 
I'asauka  v.  Daus,  31  Tex.  72.    p.  15. 
I'asclial  V.  Ciishmau,  26  Tex.  74.    p.  2007. 
I'asolial  V.  Davis,  3  Ga.  2.)6.    pp.  1669,  1677. 
Paslevi-   English,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  236.    p.  1597. 
Pasoilr  V.  Lineborger,  90  X.  C,  159.    p.  2. 
Passmore  \Villiamson's  Case,  26  Pa.   St.  9, 

18.     pp.  132, 136. 
Patapsco  Ins.  Co.  v.  Southgate,5  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

617.    p.  572. 
Patchin  v.  Sands,  10  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  570.    p.  7. 
Patchin  v.    Trustees,  2   Wend.  (X.   Y.)  377. 

p.  6i)8. 
Pate    V.  People,  8   111.  661.    pp.    1815,  1903, 

1905. 
Patent  Type  Foundry  Company  v.  Lloyd,  29 

L.  J.  (Exch.)  207.'    p.  657. 
Pater,  In  re,  5  Best  &  S.  299;  s.  c.  10  Jur. 

(N.  S.)  972.     p.  136. 
Patman  v.  State.  61  Ga.  379.    p.  398. 
Patrick  v.  Hallett,  3  Johns.  Cas.  (X.  Y.)  76. 

pp.  993,  994. 
Patrick  V.  Leach  (Xeb.),  I  X.  W.  Rep.  853. 

p.  925. 
Patrick  v.  Pote,  117  INIass.  297.    p.  1210. 
Patricks.  Roach,  27  Tex.  579.    p.  1047. 
Patten  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  32  Wis.  524.    p. 

1221. 
Patten  v.  Goldsborough,  9  Serg.  &   R.  (Pa.) 

47.     p.  1086. 
Patten  r.  Gurnev,  17  Mass.  182.    p.  351. 
Patterson  v.  Ball,  19  Wis.  243.    p.  1734. 
Patterson  v.  Beecher  6  J.  B.  Moore,   319. 

p.  947. 
Patterson  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  38  Iowa, 

279.     p.  1224. 
Patterson  v.  Clyde,  67  Pa.  St.  500.    pp.  1322, 

1345,  1347, 1355,  13.56,  1359. 
Patterson  v.  Colebrook,  29  X.  H.  94.    p.  1645. 
Patterson  v.  Edwards,  7  111.  720.     p.  1469. 
Patterson  v.  Ely,  19  Cal.  35.     p.  199. 
Patterson  w.  Mickey,  32  (ia.  156.    p.  1009.    , 
Patterson  v.  Jack,  .59  111.  633.    pp.  2073,2091. 
Patterson   v.  McClanahan,  13  Mo.  507.    p . 

1751. 
Patterson  v.  Patterson,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 

379.     p.  899. 
Patterson  v.  People,  46  Barb.  (X.   Y.)   625. 

().  ,524. 
Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  Pa. 

St.  389.    p.  1211. 
Patterson  v.  State,  7  Ark.  59.    p.  108. 
Patterson  v.  State,  70  Ind.  341.    pp.  118,  120. 
Patterson  ?'.  "Wallace,  1  Macq.  H.  L.  Cas.  748. 

pp.  1209,  1212. 
Patterson's  Case,  6  Mass.  486.    p.  19. 
Pattison  v.  AVilson,  22  Ind.  358.    p.  2101. 
Patton  V.  Ash,  7  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  116.    p.  92. 
Patton  V.  Gregory,  21  Tex.  513.    p.  1671. 
Patton  V.  Hamilton,  12  lud.  256     pp.  215,  235, 

385. 
Patton  V.  Ilughesdale  Man.  Co.,  11  R.  1. 188. 

pp.  696,  1976. 
Patton  V.  Philadelphia,  1  La.  Ann.  98.    p. 

5C>6. 
Paty  V.  The  Queen,  2  Ld.  Raym.  1105.    p.  1.52. 
Paul  V.  Joel,  3  Hurl.  &  X.  455.    j).  945. 
Paulette  v.  Brown,  40  Mo.  .52.    ]).  1770. 
Paulitsch  r.  Railroad  Co.,  60  (X.  Y.)  Super. 

(J.  *S.)  2H.    p.  119. 
Pauska  r.  Duus,  31  Tex.  72.    p.  125, 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXVll 


Pavey  v.  American  Ins.  Co.,  56  Wis.  221.    p. 

■202S. 
Pavey  v.  Burch,  3  Mo.  447.    p.  585. 
Pavey  v.  Wintrode,  87  Ind.  379.    p.  574. 
Pawling?;.  United  States,  4  Cranch  (U.  S.), 

219.    p.  1603. 
Paxson  V.  BaileT,17  Ga.  640.    p.  1046. 
Pavne  v.  Hodge,  7  Hun  (N.  Y.),  612.    p.  350. 
Payne  v.  Com.,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  370.    pp.  1850, 

1854. 
Payne  v.  Com.  Bank,  6  Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.)  24. 

p.  1023. 
Payne  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  29  Conn.  415.     p. 

1060. 
Payne  v.  Ibbotson,  27  L.  J.  Exch.  341.    p. 

636. 
Pavne  v.  McLean,  1  Up.  Can.  K.  B.  (O.  S.) 

444.    p.  35. 
Pavne  V.  State,  60  Ala.  SO.    pp.  433,  440,  441, 

l"542. 
Payne  v.  Stanton, 59  Mo.  159.    p.  1445. 
Payne  v.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  375.    pp. 

69,  70,  71   74. 
Payne  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  184.    pp.  1637, 

1898. 
Pea  V.  Pea,  35  Ind.  3S7.    p.  2029. 
Peacham  r.  Carter,  21  Vt.  515.    pp.  1921,  1945. 
Pearce  v.  Brower,  72  Ga.  243.    pp.  1461, 1462. 
Pearce  v.  Hooper,  3  Taunt.  60.    p.  628. 
Pearce  v.  Young,  ^Valk.  (Miss.)  259.    p.  1060. 
Pearse  r.  Rogers,  2  Fos.  &  F.  137.    pp.  51,  95. 
PearsoU  v.  Cliapin,  44  Pa.  St.  9.    p.  890. 
Pearson  v.  Coles,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  206.    p. 

217. 
Pearson  v.  Duane,  4  "Wall.  (U.  S.)  605;  s.c. 

Thomp.  Carr.  Pass.  17.    p.  1294. 
Pearson  v.  South,  61  Iowa,  232.    p.  315. 
Pearson  v.  Wightman,  1  Mills  Const.  Rep. 

336.    p.  118. 
Pease  v.  State,  63  Ga.  631.    p.  .540. 
Peck  V.  Bacon,  18  Conn.  377.    p.  1416. 
Peck  V.  Boyes,  7  Scott  X.  R.  441.    p.  1181. 
Peck  V.  Brewer,  48  111.  54.    pp.  1984,  1990. 
Peck  V.  Chouteau,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  577;  s.  c.  91 

Mo.  138.     pp.  560,  563. 
Peck  V.  Crouse,   46   Barb.   (N.  Y.)  15L     p. 

1441. 
Peck   V.    Hiler,   24  ■  Barb.   (X.  Y.)    178.     p. 

1003. 
Peck  V.  N.  Y".  &c.  Steamship    Co.,  5  Bosw. 

(X.  Y.)226.     pp.  967,  968. 
Peck  V.  Peck,  21  Law  Times  (N.  S.)  670;  s.  c. 

18  Week.  Rep.  295.    p.  632. 
Peck  V.  Ritchie,  66  IMo.  114.    p.  1646. 
Peck  V.  Yorks,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  131.    p.  413. 
Pederson  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  485.    p.  1680. 
Peebles  ('.  Horton,54X.  C.  374.    p.  775. 
Peed  i\  Brenneman,  89  Ind.  2.52.    p.  237. 
Pegram  v.  Isabell,  1  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  387.    p. 

2013. 
Peiffer  v.  Com.,  15  Pa.  St.  468.    p.  1905. 
Pekin  v.  Winkel,  77  111.  56.    pp.  1965,  1967, 

1968. 
Pelamourges  v.  Clark,  9  Iowa,  1.    p.  496. 
Pelham   r.  Page    6  Ark.  535.    pp.  1927,  1930, 

1931,  1932,  1933.  1980,  l'.iS8. 
Pellersells  v.  Allen,  56  la.  717;  s.  c.  10  X.  W. 

Rep.  261.     p.  385. 
Peltz  V.  Eichele,  62  Mo.  171.    p.  2055. 
Pemberton  v.  Johnson,  113  Ind.  538;  s.  c.  15 

X.  E.  Rep.  SOi.     p.  2095. 
Pembroke    Iron    Co.    v.    Parsons,   5   Gray 

(Mass.),  589.    p.  917. 
Pence    v.  Garrison,  93  Ind.  345.    pp.  2026, 

2070. 
Pence  v.  State,  110  Ind.  95.    p.  2142. 
Pender  r.  People,  18  Hun  (X^.  Y.),  560.    p.  78. 
Pendergrass  v.  Cross,  15   Pac.  Rep.  63.    p. 

2099. 


Pendergrastr.  Gullatt,  lOGa.  218.    p.  1669. 
Pendleton   i\   Bank    of    Kentuckv,  1   T.   B. 

Monr.  (Ky.)  171.    pp.  1022,  1023. 
Pendleton  V.  Dvett,  4  Cow.  (X.  Y'.)581;s.  c. 

8  Cow.  (N.  Y'.")  727.    p.  1003. 
Pendleton  Street  R.  Co.  v.  Stallman,  22  Oh. 

St.  1.     p.  1705. 
Pendrill  v.  Second  "Ave.  R.  Co.,  2  Jones  & 

Sp.  (X.  Y.)481.    p.  1232. 
Penfleld  v.  Carpender,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  350. 

p.  1944. 
Penhyrn  Slate  Co.  v.  Meyer,  8  Daly  (X.  Y.), 

61.     p]).  214,  222,  223,  242. 
Peninsula  Bank  v.  Hanmer,  14  Mich.  208.    p. 

1022. 
Peninsular  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  20  Mich.  18.  p. 

56. 
Penn.  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crane,  134  Mass.  56. 

p.  974. 
Penn.  Hall,  In  re,  5  Pa.  St.  204.    p.  43. 
Penn.   Mutual  Aid    Society  v.  Corley  (Pa.), 

11  Ins.  Law  Journal,  493.    p.  565. 
Pennell  v.  Percival,  13  Pa.  St.  197.    p.  129. 
Peunewill  v.  CuUen,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  238.    p. 

1108. 
Pennimau  v.  Jones,  59  X.  H.  119.    p.  281. 
Peunock  v.  Dialogue,  2  Pet.  (U.  S.)  1.    pp. 

1698,  1703,1739. 
Pendril  v.  Second  Avenue  R.  Co.,  43  How. 

Pr.  (X.  Y.)  399.     p.  1209. 
Penns'    Lessee  v.  Ingraham,  2  "Wash.  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  487.    p.  572. 
Pennsylvania  r.    Bell,  Add.    (Pa.)  156.    pp. 

732,  1505,  1508,  1511. 
Pennsylvania  v.  McFall,  Add.  (Pa.)  255.    p. 

1890. 
Pennsvlvania  v.  Ravenel,  21   How.  (U.  S.) 

103.  "p.  1014. 
Pennsvlvania  Canal  Co.  r.  Pentley,  66  Pa. 

St.  30.     pp.  1208,  1212,  1225. 
Pennsylvania  Co.   v.  Dandridge,  8  Gill  &  J. 

(Md.)  249.    p.  1025. 
Pennsvlvania  Co.  v.  Hoagland,  78  Ind.  203, 

p.  1295. 
Pennsylvania   Co.  v.   Smith,  98  Ind.  42.    p, 

2039. 
Pennsvlvania  Co.  v.  Stoelke,  104  111.  201.    p, 

1213." 
Pennsvlvania  Co.  v.  Weddle,  100  Ind.  189. 

|).  ll"'79. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Billings,  94  Pa.  St. 

40.    pp.  1107,  1108. 
Pennsvlvania  R.  Co.  v.  Conlan,  101  111.93. 

pp.  1207,  1208. 
Pennsvlvania  R.  Co.  v.  Frana,  112  111.  405. 

pp.  820,  1230. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  51  Pa.  St. 

315.  p.  1298. 

Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  31  Pa.  St.  372. 

p.  1232. 
Pennsvlvania  R.  Co.  v.  McCloskey,  23  Pa.  St. 

526.  "p.  1295. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  McTighe,  46  Pa.  St. 

316.  p.  1225. 

Pennsvlvania  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  87  Pa.  St.  395. 

p.  1321. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Ogier,  35  Pa.  St.  60. 

pp.  1304,  1472. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Vandiver,  42  Pa.  St. 

365      p.  12!tO. 
Pennsvlvania  R.  Co.  v.  Weber,  76  Pa.  St.  157; 

s.  c.  72  Pa.  St.  27.    p.  1225. 
Penny  r.  Brink,  75  X.  C.  68.    p.  168. 
Penry  v.  Richards,  52  Cal.  496.    p.  1090. 
Pensenneau  r.  Pensenneau,  22  Mo.  27.    p. 

1607. 
People    V.    Ah    Chung,    54    Cal.    398.      pp. 

32.  66. 
People  V.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  61.    p.  469. 


CXVlll 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


People  V.  Ah  Fong,  12  Cal.  345.    p.  1726. 
People  V.  Ah  Sam,  41  Cal.  645.    p.  208/. 
PeoTJle  V.  Ah  You,  47  Cal.  121.    p.  89. 
Peopler.  Albany,  6  Wend.  (N. J .)-548.    p.  107. 
People  V.  Albright,  23  How.  Pr.  (N.  1.)  300. 

People  'v.  Allen,  43  N.  Y.  28.    pp.  63,  66,  67. 
People  V.  Aniauacus,  50  Cal.  233.    p.  472. 
People  r.  Ames,  39  Cal.  403.    p.  464. 
People  V.  Anderson,  44  Cal.  65.    pp.  727,  732. 
People  V.  Anderson,  14  Johns.  (N.  i.)  294. 

pJople  V.  Anthony,  m  Cal.  400.    pp.  1864, 1868. 

People  V.  Apple,  7  Cal.  289.    p.  560. 

People  V.  Arceo,  32  Cal.  40.    pp.  49,  82,  89, 

People  V.  Arnold,  40  INlich.  710.    pp.  283,  403, 

410,  540,  545,  18o5,  ISOB,  1808. 
People  r.  Ashe,  44  Cal.  288.    pp.  1821,  lb22. 
People  r.  Atchinson,  7  How.  Pr.  (N.  1.)  241. 

p   45 
People  V.  Atherton,  51  Cal.  495.    p.  126. 
People  V.  Augsbiiry  97  N.  Y.  501.    p.  506 
People  r.  Backus, 5  Cal.  275.    pp.  99, 1907. 
People  V.  Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340.    p.  34o. 
People  V.  Barker,  60  Mich.  277;  s.  c.  27  N.  W. 

Rep.  539.     p.  272.  ^      n    /xr  v  n 

People   V.  Barker,  2  Wheeler  Cr.  C.  (N.  Y.) 

19.     pp.  1965, 1966.  „^„  _„. 

People  V.  Barnhart,  59  Cal.  402.    pp.  748,  766. 
People  V.  Beck,  58  Cal.  212.    p.  526. 
People  V.  Bcckwith(X.  Y.),  15  ^orthEa8t. 

Rep.  53.    p.  79. 
People  V.  Beelcr,  6  Cal.  246.    p.  1'26. 
People  V.  Bell,  53  Cal.  119.    pp.  416,  419. 
People  V.  Benson,  52  Cal.  380.    p.  39/. 
People  V.  Blakeley,  4  Park.  Cr.  R.  (N.  1.) 

People  r.  Bodine,  1  Denio  (X.  Y'.),306.    pp. 

59.  69,  96,  97,  98,  103, 115,  125,  127. 
People  V.  Boggs,  20  Cal.  432.    p.  1912. 
People  V  Bollinger  (Cal.),  11  Pac.  Rep.  799. 

P- 465.  „,„ 

People  V.  Bonds,  1  Nev.  33.    p.  210. 
People  V.  Bonnev,  19.  Cal.  42b.    pp.  6/3,  676, 

677,  1906,1907,1969. 
People  V.  Boscovitch,  20  Cal.  436.    p.  257. 
People  V.  Bourke,   66   Cal.    455.    pp.    1731, 

2109 
People  V.  Bradner,  107  N.  Y.  1;  s.  c.  13  N.  E. 

Rep.  87.    p.  2077.  „        ,^^  _^ . 

People  V.  Bragle,  10  Abb.  New  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

300 ;  s.  c.  26  Hun  (N.  Y.),  378.    p.  315. 
People  V.  Brannigau,  21  Cal.  340.    p.  1982. 
People  v.  Brannon,47  Cal.  96.    p.  182o. 
People  V.  Brennan,  44  Barb.  (N.  \.)  344.    p. 

137 
People  V.  Brotherton,  43  Cal.  530.     pp.  70, 

126. 
People  V.  Brown,  48  Cal.  253.    p.  75. 

People  V.  Brown,  53  Mich.  531.    pp.  510,  511. 
People  V.  Brown,  72   (N.  \.)  o71.    pp.  282, 
409,  527,  533,  534,  535.  nn     ..  qq 

People  r.  Brown  (Cal.),  14 Pac. Rep.  90.  p.99. 
People  V.  Buckley,  49  Cal.  241.  p.  95.  _,_, 
People  r.  Buddenseck  (N.  Y.),  9  North  East. 

People**:  Bus^CCal.),  10  Pac.  Rep.  169;  s.  c. 

71  Cal.  602.     pp.  676, 677.  _       „ 

People  i:  Bush.  68  Cal.  623;  s.  c.  10  Pac.  Rep. 

People^r.  Bush,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  553.    p. 

People  V.  Cadd.U  Reporter,  200;  s.  c.  60  Cal. 

People^;,  cltvin.  60  Mich.  113;  s.  c.  26  N.  W. 

People^t'.  Campbell,  8  111.  466.    p.  819. 
People  V.  Carey,  17  Abb.  L.  J.  432.    p.  524. 


People  V.  Carnal,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  256. 

People  V.' Carpenter,  102  N.  Y.  238;  s.  c.  86 

North  East.  Rep.  584.    pp.  63,  78^ 
People  V.  Carr  (Mich.),  31  N.  W.  Rep.  591. 

People 'v.  Carrillo,  70  Cal.  643;  s.  c.  11  Pac. 

Rep.  840.    pp.  1819, 185S. 
People  V.  Carroll,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  1.)  -3.    p. 

People  V.  Casey,  65  Cal.  260.    pp.  1632, 1767. 
People  V.  Casey,  72  X.  Y.  393.    p.  396. 
People  V.  Casey,  96  N.  Y.  115.    P  ■  '8. 
People  V.  Cassel,  5  Hill  (N.  1.),  164.    pp.  152, 

155 
People  V.  Cassiano,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.),3S8.    p. 

PeoiJle  V.  Choong   Foon   Ark,  61  Cal.  528. 

PtfoiK.  Christie,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  256;  s. 

c.  2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  579.    PP- 63,  6/,  104. 
People  V.  Church, 2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  262.    p.  145. 
People  V.  Clark,  8  N.  East.  Rep.  38.    pp.  5^0, 

People  V.  Clark,  10  Mich.  317.    p.  1565. 
I'eople  r.  Clark,  23  Hun  (NY.),  374.    p.  5 
People  r.  Cloonau,  50  Cal.  449.    pp.  464,  465. 
I'eople  V.  Clough,  .59  Cal.  428.    p.  39.  ^ 
People  V.  Cochran,  61  Cal.  548     p    /o. 
People  V.  Cogdell,  1  Hill  (X .  "i  •),  94.    p.  1566. 
People  r.  Cole,  43  N.  Y.  508.    p.  o69 
People  V.  Colson,  49  Cal.  679.    p.  126. 
People  V.  Colt.  3  HiU  (N.  Y.),  432.    pp.  21, 25, 

People  V.  Comstock,  55  Mich.  405.    p.  43 
People    V.   Connors,    50  N.   \.   240.    pp.531, 

Peop'le  V.  Conrov,  33  Hun  (N.  Y.),119;  s.  C. 

20  Week.  Dig.  242,    p.  1639. 
People  r.  Cornetti, 92  K.  1.85.    V-'\ 
People  V.  Cotta,  49  Cal.  166.    pp.  o2,  99,  353. 
Peoples.  Cottle,  6  Cal.  227.    pp.  /O    '5. 
People  V.  Court,  83  N.  1 .  436     p.  4a| 
Peo  ilev.  Courtney.  28  Hun  (N.  Y.),  589.  p.  465. 
People  V.  Coyodo,40  Cal  586.    pp.  1'-  ^d. 
People   I'.   Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  288.    pp.  530,  534, 

People  V.  Crawford,  48 -Mich.  500.    P-  fee. 
People  V.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  191.    pp.  1801,  1819, 
1857,  1858,  1860.  ^  ,         ^        /xr    v  ^ 

People   V.  crosswell,  3  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

pSle?^cae?:\b^^-Y.  234;  s.  c.  6  North 

East.  Rep.  384.    p.  78.  . 

People  V.  Cunningham,  1  Demo  (N.  \.),  524. 

Peopled.  Cummings,  3  Park.  Cr.  R.  (N.  T.) 

343      pp.  20,  25,  27,  110.  ^,  . 

People  i  Cox,  21  Huu  (N.  Y.),47.    pp.  414, 

People  V.  Damon ,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  351.    pp. 

People  v.  Dane,  59  Mich.  550.    p.  754. 

?3e:::SSfS:Vs^:«.o.64caL 

peopled  mvai^Wend.-(N.Y.)  309.    pp. 
People '/•'  Devine,  44  Cal.  452.    pp.  414,  433, 

Peo'p'le  ^'.'Devine ,  46  Cal.  46.    p.  21. 

People  V.  Dcwick,  2  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.)  230. 

IC     Q7     QS 

Peoi'.le  V.  Do'  Witt,  68  Cal.  584.    p.  1548. 
People  V.   Dewey  (Idaho),  6  Pac.  Rep.  loa 

pi'tf'r.'  Dick,  32   Cal.   213.    pp.  I860.  1861, 

1864.  1865. 
People  V.  Dick,  37  Cal.  2,7.    p.  95. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXIX 


People  i\  Doe,  1  Mich.  451.    pp.  95,  114. 
People  r.  Doesburg,  17  Mich.  135.    p.  2001. 
People  V.  DolMii ,  61  X.  Y.  485.    p.  32. 
People  V.  Douohue,59  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  417. 

p.  151. 
People  V.   Douglass,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y'.)  26.    pp. 

1903.  1906,  1931. 
People  r  Dowling,  84  X.  Y'.  479.    p.  i566. 
People  V.  Dovell,iS  Cal.  So.    pp.  484,  1647. 
People  r.  Durfee  (3iich.),29  N.  W.  Rep.  109. 

pp.  560,  2109. 
People  r.  Dwindle  29  Cal.  632.    p.  151. 
People  V.  Dvle,  21  X.  Y.  478.    p.  180S. 
People  V.  Eastwood,  14  X.  Y.  562.    p.  341. 
People  V.  Euoch,  13  Wend.    (N.  Y.)  163.    p. 

1572. 
People  V.  Edwards,  41  Cal.  640.    p.  70. 
People  V.  Elliott  (N.  Y.),  12  X.  E.  Hep.  602. 

p.  813. 
People  V.  Elster  (Cal.),  3  West  Coast  Rep. 

33.     p.  532. 
People  V.  Fancher,  2  Hun  (X.  Y'.l,  226.    p. 

152. 
People  V.  Fancher,  4  Thomp.   &  C.   (X.  Y.) 

467.     pp.  K2,  136,  171,  187. 
People  V.  Farrell,  31  Cal.  577.    pp.  .528.  787. 
People  V.  Felliuger,  24  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y'.)  341. 

p.  1563. 
People  V.  Ferguson,  34  Cal.  309.    pp.  2130, 
-    2131. 

People  V.  Fernandez.  .35  X.  Y.  49.    p.  663. 
People  i:  Ferris,  56  Cal.  442.    p.  1731. 
People  V.  Finley,  38  Mich.  482.    pp.  1838,1848. 
People  V.  Finnegan,  1  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  147. 

pp.  481,  485. 
People  V.  Fisher,  51  Cal.  319.    p.  2087. 
People  V.  Forsvthe,  65  Cal.  102.    p.  1899. 
People  V.  Freeman,  4  Den.  (N.  Y'.)  9.    pp.  88, 

96. 
People  V.  Freshauer,  55  Cal.  575.    p.  283. 
People  V.  Frisbie,  26  Cal.  135.    p.  2060. 
People  r.  Frost,  5  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y'.)  53.    pp. 

1919, 1990. 
People  V.  Fuller,  2  Park.  Cr.  R.  (X.  Y'.)  16. 

pp.  33.  74,  100. 
People  V.  Furtado,  57  Cal.  346.    pp.  396,  400, 

414. 
People  V.  Gaffney,  14  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  s.)  (X. 

Y^)  36.     pp.  1506,'  1924,  1952,  1973. 
People  V.  Gar  Sov,  57  Cal.  102 ;  s.  c.  23  ^Ub.  L. 

J.  418.    pp.  63,  105. 
People  V.  Gardner,  2  Johns.  (X.  Y'.)  477.    p. 

1566. 
People  V.  Garv,  105  111.  264.    p.  2069. 
People  V.  Gatewood,  20  Cal.  146.    p.  116. 
People  V.  Gaunt,  23  Cal.  1.56.    p.  116. 
People  r.  Gay,  7  X.  Y.  378.    pp.  413,  459,  467, 

471,  473,  488,  535. 
People  V.  Gehr,  8  Cal.  3.59.    pp.  70,  75,  76. 
People  V.  Genet,  19  Hun  (X.  Y'.),  92;  s.  c.  83 

X.  Y'.  438.     pp.  393,  409. 
People  V.  Genung,  11  AYend.  19.    p.  400. 
People  V.  Getty,  49  Cal.  584.    p.  2099. 
People  V.  Gibbons, 43  Cal.  557.    )).  528. 
People  V.  Glenn,  10  Cal.  32.    p.  559. 
People  V.  Gonzales,  35  X.  Y.  49.    p.  647. 
People  V.  Graham,  21  Cal.  261.    pp.  59,  334. 
People  V.  Gray,  66  Cal.  271.    pp.  1708, 1763. 
People  r.   Gray,  5  Wend.   (X.  Y'.)  289.    pp. 

1693, 1703. 
People  V.  Green,  53  Cal.  60.    p.  678. 
People  V.   Guidice,  73  Cal.  226:  s.  c.  15  Pac. 

Rep.  44.     pp.  1543,  1546,  1547,  1549.  1830. 
People  V.  Hainblin,  68  Cal.  101.    p.  532. 
People  V.  Hamilton,  62  Cal.  377.     p.  99. 
People  V.  Hardin,  37  Cal.  2.58.    p.  95. 
People  V.  Harris,  61  Cal.  136.    p.  39. 
People  V.  Hartung,  4  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y')  256. 

pp.  786,  1506,  1917,' 1952,  1985,  1989. 


People  V.  Hatch,  36  111.  14.    p.  2080. 

People  V.  Hayes,  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  (X.  Y'.)  582. 

p.  70. 
People  V.  Healey,  48  Barb.   (X.  Y'.)  564.    p. 

151. 


People  V.  Henderson,  28  Cal.  466.    p.  126. 
People  V.  Heneck,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y"".)  82. 


264. 


P- 


People  r.  Henries,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  T.)  579. 

p.  45. 
People  V.  Herbert,  61  Cal.  454.    p.  1671. 
People  V.  Herrick,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  82.    p. 

526 
People  V.  Hettick,  1  Wheeler  Cr.  C.  (N.  Y'.) 

399.    p.  67. 
People  r.  Holbrook,    13  Johns.  (X.  Y''.)   90. 

pp.  608,  609. 
People  r.  Honeyman,  3  Denlo  (X.  T.),121. 

pp.  67.  71,83,88,96,  93. 
People  V.  Hope,  62  Cal.  291.    p.  693. 
People  V.  Hosmer,  1  Wend.   (X.   Y'.)  297.    p. 

1983. 
People  r.  Hovev.  29  Hun  (X.  T.),  383.    p.  409. 
People  V.    Howard,    16    Pac,    Rep.    694.    p. 

2093. 
People  I'.  Howell,  4  Johns.  (X.  T.)  296.    p.  41. 
People  V.  Hovt,  3  Utah,  396.    p.  105. 
People  V.  Hughes,  29  Cal.  257.    p.  1995. 
People  t'.  Hulse,  3  HUl  (X.  Y.),300.    pp.477. 

481.  485,  488. 
People  ('.  Hunt,  59  Cal.  430.    p.  1990. 
People  i:  Hurley,  8  Cal    390.    p.  1714. 
People  r.  Hurlev,60  Cal.  74.    p.  1894. 
People  V.  Jacobs,  49  Cal.  384.    pp.  444. 
People  V.  Jenks,  24  Cal.  11.    p.  89. 
People  V.  Jewett,  3  Wend.  (X.  Y'.)  314.  p.  31. 
People  V.  Jewett,  6  Wend.  (N.   Y.)  386.    p. 

118. 
People  V.  Johnson,  2  Wheeler  Cr.  C.  (X.  Y'.) 

361.     pp.  67,  73,  74. 
People  r.  Johnston,  46  Cal.  78.    pp.  70,  74,  75. 
People  V.  Jones,  31  Cal.  573.    p.  787. 
People  V.  Jones,  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  112. 

p.  65. 
People  V.    Jones,  24   Mich.  215.    pp.  19,  21, 

545,  1671,  1806. 
People  V.  Jones,  11  Pac.  Rep, 501.    p.  1970. 
People  V.  Justices.  74  X.  Y.  406.    p.  5. 
People  1'.  Justices  of  Chenango,  2  Gaines' 

Cas.  rX.  Y'.)  319.    pp.  2060,  2061,  2073. 
People  V.  Keenan,  13  Cal.  581.    pp.  705,  706, 

708. 
People  V.  Keller,  28  Cal.  423.    p.  1896. 
People  r.  KelleV,  47  Cal.  125.    p.  528. 
People   V.  Kellev,  35  Hun  (N.  Y.),295.    pp. 

1639,  1758,  1787. 
People  V.  Kellv,  46  Cal.  357.    pp.  1905,  1911. 
People  V.  Kelly.  24  N.  Y.  74.    pp.  148,  149, 151, 

158,171,173,174,187,271. 
People    V.  Kelly,  94  N.  Y.  527.    pp.  705,  707, 

1916. 
People  v.  Kennedy,  2  Park.  Cr.  R.   (X.  Y.) 

312.    p.  4. 
People  V.  Kerrick,  52  Cal.  446.    p.  1858. 
People  V.  Kerrigan  (Cal.),  14  Pac.  Rep.  849. 

p.  208. 
People  V.  Keyser,  53  Cal.  183.    p.  2087. 
People  V.  King,  27  Cal.  507.    pp.  69,  73,  75. 
People  V.  Knapp,  71  Cal.  1;  s.  c.  8  Crim.  L. 

Mag.  640.    p.  1801. 
People    V.  Knapp,  42  Mich.  267.     pp.  1918, 

1934. 
People  V.  Knickerbocker,  1  Park.  Cr.  (X.  T). 

302.    pp.  6:5, 115 
People  V.  Kohle,  4  Cai.  199.    p.  89. 
People  17.  Kunz  (Cal.),  14  Pac.  Rep.  836.    p. 

813 
People  V.  Labadie  (Mich.),  33  X.  W.  Rep.  806. 

p.  15. 


cxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


People  V.  Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358;  s.  c.  1  Park.  Cr. 

(X.  Y.)  495.     ])p.  496,  504,  512,  513. 
People    V.  Lane,    6    Abb.   Pr.    (n.    S.)    105. 

p.  4. 
People  V.  Langton,   67  Cal.    427.    pp.    1S8G, 

lt<SS. 
People  V.  Lamed,  7  X.  Y.  445.    pp.  94,  129, 

662. 
People  V.  Lee,  5  Cnl.  353.    p.  59. 
People  V.  Leo,  49  Cal.  37.    p.  164. 
People  V.  Lee  Ah  Chuck,  66  Cal.  662.     p. 

368. 
People  V.  Lee  Ah  Yute,  60  Cal.  95,    p.  748. 
People  V.  Lohinan,  2  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  450.    p. 

63. 
People  V.  Lohman,  2T5arb.  (X.  Y.)  216;  s.  c. 

1  N.  Y.280.     pp.  96,  1751. 
People  r.Loucks,  28  Cal.  68.    p.  2069. 
People  r.  Loughliu,  3l'tah,  133.     p.  40. 
People  r.  Lowrcv,  70  Cal.  193;  s.  c.  11  Pac. 

Rep.  605.    p.  1970. 
People  V.  Mahoney.  IS  Cal.  180.    p.  63. 
People  V.  Majors,  65  Cal.  138.    p.  (iii. 
People  V.  Mallou,  S  Laus.  (X.   Y.)  224.    pp. 

69,  73,  75. 
People  V.  Manning,  48  Cal.  335.    pp.  409,  412, 

561,564. 
People  V.  Marble,  38  Mich.  309.    p.  2077. 
People  V.  Marion,  29  Mich.  32.    p.  2032. 
People  V.  Jlartin,  6  Cal.  477.    p.  2099. 
People  r.  Matlu-r,  4  AVeud.  (X.  Y.  ^  229.    pp. 
68,  69,  75,  88,  96,  98, 112,  261,  286,  313,  334,393, 
456. 
People  V.  Matteson,  2  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  433.    p. 

294. 
People  v.  McCalla,  8  Cal.  301.    p.  41. 
People  V.  McCalluni,  103  N.  Y.  587.    p.  1893. 
People  V.  McCann,  16  X.  Y.  58.    p.  1848. 
People  V.  McCann,  3  Parker  Cr.  K.  (X.  Y.) 

272.    p.  20. 
People  V.  McCarty,  48  Cal.  557.    p.  90. 
People  V.  McCaulev,  1  Cal.  379.    p.  74. 
People  V.  McCollister,  1   Wheeler  C.  C.  (X. 

Y.)391.    p.  58. 
People   V.  McCoy,  45  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  216. 

p.  658. 
People  V.  McDowell,  64  Cal.  467.    p.  1708. 
People  V    McFadden,  65  Cal.  445.    pp.  1552, 

1647. 
People  V.  McGarren,  17  TVend  (X.  Y.)  460. 

p.  409. 
People  V.   McGee,  1   Denio  (X.  Y.)  i9.    p 

832. 
People  r.  McGeery,  6  Park.  Cr.  R.    (X.  Y.) 

653.    p.  35. 
People  t'.  JIcGulre,  43  How.  Pr.   (X.  Y.)  67. 

p.  7. 
People  V.  McGungill,  41  Cal.  429.    pp.  95, 116, 

524,  527,531. 
People  V.  McKay,  18  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  212.    pp. 

18,  19,  87. 
Peni>lc  V.  McKellcr,  53  Cal.  65.    pp.  416,  419. 
People   V.   McLean,  2  Johns.  (N.    Y.)   381. 

People  r.  McLeod,  1  Hill  (X.  y.),377;  «.  c. 
•     Horr.  &  Thomp.  Case   Self-Def.    784.    p. 

1539. 
People  V.  McMahon,  2  Park.    Cr.   CN.   Y.) 

663.     pp.  67,  581. 
People  V.  Melvane,  39  Cal.  614.    pp.  464,  465. 
People  r.  Melvin,  2  Wheeler  Cr.  C.  (X.  Y.) 

26.0.     p.  67. 
People  V.  Milgate,  5  Cal.  127.    p.  1848. 
People  V.  Montgomery,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  6.) 

(X.  Y  )  207.     p|>.  175.  1903,  1969. 
People  V.  Moore,  52  Mich.  563.    p.  1626. 
People  V.  Moore,  15  AVend,  (X.  Y.)  419.    pp. 

:'.92.  ;!93,  4.><5. 
People  V.  Morrlgau,  29  Mich  5.    pp.  371,  642. 


People  V.  Morrisser,  1  Buff.  (X.  Y.)  Sup.  295.. 

p.  I'.i76. 
People  r.  Morrow,  60  Cal.  146.    p.  1801. 
Peoi>le  r.  Mnlkev,  65  Cal.  501.    p.  1666. 
I'eopio  V.  Muller,  32  Hun  (N.  Y.),  209.    p.  66 
People  i\  iSIuiin,  65  Cal.  211.    p.  1SS8. 
I'eoiilor.  jMuriiliY,  45Cal.  137.     pp.  74,  126. 
I'eople  V.   31urpiiy,  1   Daly   (X.V.),462.     p. 

161. 
People  V.  Murrav,  52  Mich.  288.    p.  2037. 
People  V.  Xaughton,7  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  (N.  S.) 

421.    p.  171. 
People  V.  Noill,  74111.  68.    p.  14.'). 
People  V.  Xevins.l  Hill  (X.  Y.),154.    p.   148. 
People  V.  O'Brien,  66  Cal.  602.    jip.  261,  531. 
I'eople  r.   O'Laughliu,  3  Utah,  133.    pp.   74, 

253    259 
People  r.'  O'Xeal,  67  Cal.  378.    pp.  1752,1801. 
People  V.  O'Xeil,  61  Cal.  4:^.5.    p.  39. 
People  V.  Otto,  101  X.  Y.  690;  s.  c.  5  Xorth 

East.  Uep.  788.    p.  78. 
People  V.  Oyer  and  Terminer,  83  X.  Y.  436. 

pp.  73,  392,  .393,  403. 
People  V.  Padillia,  42  Cal.  536.    pp.  1819, 1820, 

1857,  1858. 
People  V.  Page,  1  Idaho,  114.    p.  1948. 
People  V.  Parish,  4  Denio  (X.  Y.),  153.    p, 

351. 
People  V.  Parton,  49  Cal.  632.    pp.  313,  442. 
Peoi)le  V.  Perrv,  65  Cal.  568.    pp.  1631,  1632, 

1719. 
People  V.  Petmecky,  99  X.  Y.  415.    pp.  1801, 

1802. 
People  V.  Phipps,  39  Cal.  326.    pp.   1819, 1858, 

1867. 
People  V.  Plummer,  9  Cal  298.    p.  123. 
People  V.  Price,  67  Cal.  350.    p.  1714. 
I'eople  V.  Quick,  92  111.  .580.    p.  191. 
I'eople  r.  Ransom,  7  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  417.    pp. 

Ill,  19U3,  1934. 
People    V.  Rathbnn,  21  "Wend.   (N.  Y.)    509. 

pp.  98,  125,   1615. 
People  V.  Reagle,  60  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  257.    p. 

1905. 
People  V.  Real,  42  X.  Y.  270.    p.  534. 
People  V.  Rector,  19  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  569     pp. 

261,  310,  4.56,  467,  468,602,  603,  1572. 
People  t'.  Reinhart,  39  Cal.  449.    pp  526,  626,, 

529. 
People  V.  Renfrew,  41  Cal.  37.    p.  95. 
People  V.  Reyes,  5  Cal.  347.    pp.  62,  63,  104. 
l'eoi)le  r.  Reynolds,  16  Cal.  128.    pp.  66,   70, 

73,  89,  95,  96, 106. 
People  V.  Rlghetti,  66  Cal.  185.    p.  1771. 
People  V.  Rllev,  66  Cal.  107.    p.  1671. 
People  V.  Roberts.  6  Cal.  214.    pp.  87, 1669. 
People  V.  Robert.son,67  Cal.  646.    p.  1.545. 
People  V.  Robinson,  2  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.;  235. 

p.  20. 
People  V.  Robinson,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  649. 

p.  1780. 
People  V.  Robinson,  66  Cal.  136.    p.  1.560. 
People  V.   Rodngo,  69  Cal.  601 ;  s.  c.  &  Grim. 

Law  Mag.  503.     pp.  412,  454,  1848. 
People  r.  Rodrigues,  10  Cal.  50.    pp.  35,  87. 
People  v.  Rogers.  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  B.)  {S.  Y.) 

370.    pp.32,  94. 
Peoiilev.  Ro9evear,.56Mich.  168.    p.  48. 
People  V.   Russell,  46  Cal.   121.    pp.  90,  370, 

,531. 
People  V.  Ryan,  2  Wheel.  Cr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.) 

47      p.  65. 
People  V.  Ryland,  28  Hun  ^N,  Y.),  668,    p. 

465. 
People  V.  SaflFord,  5  Denio  (X  Y".;,  112.    p. 

443. 
Peoples.  Sam  Lung  (Cal.),  11  Pac.  Rep  673. 

p.  2.53. 
People  V.  Sameels,  66  Cal.  99.    pp   1732, 1799.. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXl 


47, 


People  r.  Sanchez,  24  Cal.  17.    p.  65. 
People  V.  Sandford,  -13  Cal.  29.    pp.  113, 118. 
People  V.  Saxton,  22  N.  Y.  309.    p.  344. 
People  V.  Scales,  4  111.  351.    p.  122. 
People  V.  Scoggins,  3"  Cal.  676.    p.  90. 
People  V.  Scolt.  M  JMicli.  154.    pp.  48, 113. 
People  V.  Shafer,  1  Utah  Ter.  260.    pp. 

1905,  1907. 

People  i:  Sheldon,  68  Cal.  434.    p.  1675. 
People  V.  Schuler,  28  Cal.  490.    p.  1860. 
People  V.  Sing  Lum,  61  Cal  538.    p.  2077. 
People  V.  Smallmau,  55  Cal.  185.    p.  433. 
People  V.  Sprague,  53  Cal.  491.    pp.  1770, 1771, 

1985,  2099. 
People  V.  St.  Clair  Cir.  Judge,  37  Mich.  131. 

p.  2065. 
Peoples.  Steubenvoll,  8  Crim.  L.  JJag.  265; 

s.  c.  28  N.  W.  Uep    883.     pp.  1816,  1830, 1997. 
People  V.   Stewart,  7   Cal.  140.    pp.  65,  115, 

126. 
People  V.  Strong,  30  Cal.  151.    pp.  1709, 1860, 

1861,1862,1864,  1865. 
People  V.  Swift,  66  Cal.  348.    p.  1680. 
People  V.  Stoncifer,  6  Cal.  405.    pp.  47,  113, 

115. 
People  V.   Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.  R.   (N.  Y.)  71. 

pp.  46,  69,  71,  73,  87,  96,  126,  302. 
People  V.  Stuari,  4  Cal.  225.    p.  21. 
People   V.  Sturtevant,  9  N.  Y.  263.    pp.   132, 

151,153. 
People  V.  Symonds,  22  Cal.  348.    p.  71. 
People  I'.  Tanner,  2  Cal.  257.     pp.  65,  66. 
People  V.  Tavl<ir,  59  Cal.  640.    p.  1694. 
People  V.  Taing,  53  Cal.  602;  s.  c.  8  Kep.  618. 

p.  1542. 
People  i>.  Thompson,  34  Cal.  671. 
People  r.  Thompson,  41  N.  Y.  1. 
People  V.  Thurston,  2  Park.   Cr. 

p.  508,  1780. 
People  V.  Tomlinson,  63  Cal.  344. 
People  r.  Trim,  37  Cal.  276.    p]).  1722,  1723. 
People    V.    Turcott,    65    Cal.  126.    pp.   1671, 

1756. 
People  V.  Turner,  1  Cal.  152.    pp.  151, 159. 
People  V.  Turner,  39  Cal.  370.    p.  1982. 
People  V.  Turner,  65  Cal.  540.    p.  1708. 
People  V.  Tweed,  50  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  286. 

pp.  25,  29,  30,  31,  34,  99. 
People  V.  Tyler,  85  Cal.  553.    p.  456. 
People  V.  Tvler,  36  Cal.  522.    pp.  198,  627 
People  V.  Vail,  2  Cow.  N.  Y.)  623.    p.  589. 
People  V.  Van  Alstyue,  MS.,  cited  in  6  Cow. 

(N.  Y.)  565.     p.  68. 
People  V.  Vance,  21  Cal.  400.    p.  21. 
People  V.  Vane,  12  AVend.   (N.  Y.)  78.    pp. 

466.  468,  485. 
People  V.  Vasquez,  49 Cal.  560.    pp.  1631, 1632, 

1641. 
People  V.  Verniilyea,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  108.    pp. 

66,  68,  70,  94, 102,  125,  129. 
People  V.  Voll,  43  Cal.  166.    p.  113. 
People  V.  Thompson,  28  Cal.  214.    p.  2105. 
People  V.  Thomas,  9  Mich.  314.    pp.  532,  540, 

545. 
People  V.  Walsh,  44  Cal.  440;  s.  c.  1  Green 

Cr.  L.  487.    p.  95. 
People  v.  Wassow,  65  Cal.  538.    p.  402. 
People  V.  Webb  (Cal.),  11  Pac.  Kep.  609;  s.  c. 

70  Cal.  120.     p.  416. 
People  r.  Webster,  14  How.  Pr.  (N".  Y.)  242; 

s.  c.  3  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  503.    p.  141. 
People  V.  Weil,  40  Cal.  268.    pp.  76,  116. 
People  1-.  Welch,  49  Cal.  174.    pp.  24,  35,52, 

75,  1630,  1647,  1648. 
People  V.  West,  73  Cal.  345.    p.  1921. 
Peojjle  V.  Wheeler,  65  Cal.  77.    pp.  1671, 1694, 

1801. 
Peojile  V.  Wheeler,  60  Cal.  680;  s.  c.  44  Am. 

Rep.  70.    pp.  783,  784,  786. 


p.  48. 
p.  715. 
(X.  Y.)  49. 

p.  1690. 


People  V.  White,  53   Vllch.  537.    pp.  320,  410, 

771. 
People  V.  Wiley,  3  Fill  (X.  Y".),  194.    p.  1751. 
People  V.  AVillett, 36 Hun  (X.  Y.),500.    pp.78, 

1543,  1887. 
People  V.  Williams,  6  Cal.  206.    p.  61. 
People  V.  Williams,  17  Cal.  142.    )).  73. 
People  V.  Wliliams,  18  Cal.  187.    p.  580. 
People  V.  Williams,  24.Cal.  31.    pp.  1924, 1953, 

1980. 
People  V.  Williams,  43  Cal.  344.    p.  21. 
People  r.  Williams,  24  Mich.  156.    p   19. 
People  V.  Wilson,  64  111.  195.    pp.  132, 133. 
People  V.  Wilson,  5  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  368.    p. 

146. 
People  V.  Wilson,  55  Mich.  506.    pp.  715,  776. 
People  V.  Wilson,  3  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  199.  pp. 

65,  85,  812. 
People  V.  Wilson,  8  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y'.)  137;  *.  c. 

4  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  619.    pp.  1945,  1976, 1988, 

1989. 
People  V.  Winters,  49  Cal.  383.    p.  333. 
People   V.  Wong  Ah    Bang  (Cal.),  3   West 

Coast  Rep.  58.    p.  831. 
People  V.  Wood,  3  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  681.    p. 

299. 
People  V.  Woods,  29  Cal.  135.    p.  76. 
People  V.  Young,  65  Cal.  225.    p.  1762. 
People  ex  rel.  v.  County  Judge,  27  Cal.  151. 

p.  152. 
People  ex  rel.  v.   Jacobs,  66  N.  Y'.    8.    p. 

152. 
People  ex  rel.  v.  Sheriff,  7  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 

96.    p.  152. 
Peoria  v.  Calhoun,  29  111.  317.    pp,  816, 1507. 
Peoria  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Mclntire,  39  111.  299.    p. 

1308. 
Peppers  v.  Railroad  Co.,  67  Mo.  716.    p.  1311. 
PercifuU  v.  Piatt,  36  Ark.  461.    p.  2055. 
Percy,  Matter  ot,  2  Daly   (X.  Y.),530.    pp. 

148,  152. 
Perdue  v.  Burnett,  Minor  (Ala.),  138.    p.  128. 
Peri  V.  People,  65  111.  17.    p.  19. 
Perigo  V.   Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  Iowa,  277. 

pp.  1254,  1263. 
Ferine  v.  Van  Xote,  4  X.  J.  L.  146.    p.  1969. 
Perkins  v.  Bradley,  24  Vt.  66.     p.  1024. 
Perkins  i».  Dacon^i  12  Mich.  81.    p.  909. 
Perkins  v.  Eastern  &c.  R.  Co.,  29  Me.  307.   p. 

1224. 
Perkins  v.  Ermel,  2  Kan.  325.    pp.  145,  «*, 

218,  219,  764,  1906. 
Perkins  v.  Fayette,  68  Me.  152.    p.  1247. 
Perkins  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  34  Wis.  435.    p.  120l»- 
Perkins  v.  Guy,  55  Miss.  153.     |>.  273. 
Perkins  v.  Hart,  11  Wheat.  (U.   S.)  237.    r 

1133. 
Perkins  v.  Knight,  2  N.  H.  474..   p.  1921. 
Perkins  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  55  Mo.  201 

pp.  1290,1291,1486. 
Perkins  v.  Perkins,  39  X.  H.  163.    p.  228. 
Perkins  v.  State,  4  Ind.  221.    p.  489. 
PerkiQS  v.  Towle,  59  X.  H.  583.    p.  403.  . 
Perkins,  Ex  parte,  18  Cal.  60.    p.  152. 
Perley  v.  Littie,  3  Me.  97.    p.  1586. 
Perrins  v.  Marine  &c.  Soc,  2  El.  &  El.  317; 

s.  c.  2  Big.  Ips.  Cas.  561.     p.  1417. 
.  Perry  v.  Bailey,  12  Kan.  539.    pp.  1930,  1984, 

1994. 
Perry  v.  Banks,  14  Ga.  699.    p.  1634. 
Perry  t'.  City  of  Worcester  6  Gray  (Mass.), 

544.    p.  1273. 
Perry  r.  Cottingham,  63  la.  41.    p.  1945. 
Perry  v.  John,  79  Pa.  St  412.    p.  1247. 
Perry  v.  Mitchell,  5  Benio  (X.  Y.),  337.    p.  163. 
Perry  v.  Xewton,  5  Ad.  &  El.  514     p.  1940. 
Perry  v.  State,  41  Tex.  483.    p.  1896. 
Perry  v.  State,  9  Wis.  19.    p.  30. 
Perry,  In  re,  30  AVis.  268.    p.  152. 


CXXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


rersall  v.  McCartney,  28  Ala.  110.    p.  239. 
Persse  v.  Persse,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  671.    p.  188. 
Perth  Anibov  Man.  Co.  v.  Condit,  21  N.  J.  L. 

659.    p.  8-25. 
Peru  V.  French,  55  111.  -517.    p.  1249. 
Potor  V.  Steel,  3  Yeates  (Pa.),  250.    p.  895, 
Peter  r.  Thickstuu,51  Mich.  590.    p.  1133. 
Petcrkin  v.  Inloes,  4  Md.  175.    p.  1078. 
Peterson;-.  Gresham,25  Ark.  380.    |i.  2093. 
Peterson  r.  Ilaugen,  34  la.  395.    p.  1960. 
Peterson  r    Laik,24  Mo.  641.    p.  1130. 
Peters  v.  Lane,  55  Ind.  391.    p.  2041. 
Peters  v.  New    Orleans  &c.  E.  Co.,  50  Ala. 

528.     p.  l:,82. 
Peterson  v.  Roach,  32  Ohio  St.  374.    p.  878. 
Peterson  r.  State,  45  Wis.  5.35.    p.  16. 
Peterson  v.  United  States,  2  \Yash.  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  36.     pp.  2010,  2013. 
Petries'  Case,  cited,  4  T.  R.  756.    p.  280. 
Petrikin  v.  Collier,  7  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.)  392. 

p    630. 
Petteer.  Tenn.  Manufacturing  Co.,  1  Sneed 

(Tenu.),  386.    p.  893. 
Pettesv.  Biilgham,  10  N.  H.  514.    p.  2011. 
Pettibonev.  Deriuger,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

215.    pp.  307,572. 
Pettiljone  v.  Maclem,  45  Mich.  381.    p.  2038. 
Pettiljone  v.  Phelps,  13  Conn.  445.    pp.  1913, 

197.M977. 
Pettiugillr.  Porter,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  1.    pp. 

1158,  1159. 
Pettis  v.  Warren,  Kirbv  (Conn.),  426.    p.  68. 
Peyton  V.  Rose,  41  Mo.  257.     pp.  5.59,5(50. 
Pfeffele  v.  Second   avenue  K.  Co.,  34    Hun 

(N.  Y.),497.    pp.1717.  1718. 
Pfomer  v.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N.    Y.)  558. 

p.  1539. 
Pfund  V.  Herlinger,  10  Phila.  13.    p.  1003. 
Phares  v.  Barber,  61  111.  272.   pp.  321,  341,  372 

439. 
Pharr  V.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  485.    p.  18.55. 
Phelau  V.  Moss,  67  Pa.  St.  59;  s.  c.  5  Am.  Rep. 

402.    p.  1250. 
Phelps  V.  Hall,  2  Tyler    (Vt.),  401.    pp.  58, 

129. 
Phelps  V.  Hartwell,  1  Mass.  71.    p.  228. 
Plielps  V.  Hunt,  43  Conn.  194.    p.  ,381. 
Ptielpsr.   Maver.  15  How.    (U.  S.)   160.    pp. 

2126,2127,2134. 
Phelpsv.  Loudon  &c.  R.  Co.,  19  C.  P..  (N.  s.) 

321 ;  s.  c.  11  Jur.  (N.  S.)  652.    p.  1151. 
Phelps  V.  People,  6  Hun  (N.  Y.)  401;  s.  c.  72 

N.  Y.  334.    p.  78. 
Phelps  V.  People,  55  111.  334.    p.  1697. 
Phelps  V.  Piatt,    54   Barb.    (N.  Y.)    557.    p. 

602. 
Phelps  V.  Sheldon,  13  Pick.   (Mass.)  50;  s.  c. 

23  Am.  Dec.  659.    p.  892. 
Phenix  v.  Baldwin,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y'.)  62..   p. 

569. 
Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  91  Pa. 

St.  351 ;  s.  c.  39  Am.  Rep.  787.    p.  1286. 
Philadelphia  &c.   R.  Co.  r.  Derby,  14   How. 

(U.S.)  468.     PI).  1290,  1298. 
Philadelphia    &c.  R.   Co.  v.  Harper,  29  Md. 

3.30.    p.  1670. 
Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.r.  Larkln,47  Md.  1,50. 

p.  1747. 
Ptiiladeliihla  &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Long,  75  Pa.  St. 

257.     p.  1234. 
Philadelplila  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Philadelphia  &c. 

Tow   Boat  Co.,   23  How.  (U.   S.)  209.    p. 

1210 
Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Quiglcv,21  How. 

(U.S.) -202.     p.  1486. 
Philadelphia&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Spearen,  47  Pa.  St. 

300.     pp.  1-209,  1211,  1232,  1-235. 
Philadeli)hia&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stimpson,  14  Pet. 

(U.  S.^448.     pp.  384,392. 


Philibert  v.  Burch,  4  Mo.  App.  47C.    pp.  839, 

867. 
Phillips  V.  Beene,  16  Ala.  720.    p.  1733. 
Phillips  r.  Blstoh,  2  Barn.  &  Cres.  511.    pp. 

912,  914. 
Phillii)8    V.  Brigham,  26    Ga.    617.    pp.    1599, 

1600. 

Phillips    V.    Cassady,  36   La.    Ann.    2,S8.    p. 

1587. 
Phillips  V.  Com.,  19  Gratt.  485.    pp.  1904, 1907, 

1981. 
Phillips  r.  Dickerson,  85  111.  11.    p.  1221. 
Phillips     V.   Fowler,    Comvns,    .525;     s.     c. 

Barnes  Notes.  441.    pp.  1964,  1966. 
Phillip  V.  Gallant,  62  N.  Y.  256.    p.  893. 
Phillips  V.  Hill,  3  Tex.  397.    p.  2001. 
Phillips  r.  Hovle,  4    Gray  (Mass.),  468.    pp. 

425,  1491. 
Phillips  V.  Irving,  7  Man.  &   G.  325.    p.  1144. 
Phillipps  i\  Kinglield,  19  Me.  375.    p.  457. 
Phillips  V.  INlahan,  52  Mo.  197.    p.  968. 
Phillips  V.  McGuire,  73  Ga.  517.    p.  9,56. 
Philips  V.  Middlesex,  1  Esp.  355.    p.  384. 
Phillips  V.  Ocmulgee  Mills,  55  Ga.  633.    pp. 

1748, 1756. 
Phillips  V.  People,  57  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  356.    p. 

304. 
Phillips  V.  Protection  Ins.  Co.,  14  Mo.  220. 

p.  982. 
Phillips  V.  Rensselaer  &c.  R.   Co.,49N.  Y^ 

177.    p.  1295. 
Philips  V.  Sackford  Cro.   Eliz.  455.    p.  1138. 
Phillips    v.  Smith,    110   Mass.    61.    pp.  793, 

794. 
Phillips  V.  Smoot,  15  Mo.  598.    p.  1708. 
Phillips  V.  Soule,  6  Allen  (Mass.),  150.    pp. 

2105,2136. 
Phillips  V.  Star,  26  Iowa,  349.    pp.    500,  501. 
Phillips  V.  State,  29  Ga.  105.    pp.  23,  5.5. 
Phillips  r.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  44.    p.  88. 
Phillips  V.  State,  17  Tex.  App,  169.    p.  1779. 
Phillips  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  1,58.    p,  1745. 
Phillips.  V.  Welch,  11  Nev.  187.    p.  1.50. 
Phillips  f.  Welch,  12  Nev.  171.    p.  152. 
Phillips  V.  Wisconsin  State  Ag.  Soc,  60  Wis. 

401.    p.  1751. 
Phillips,  Kx  parte,  10  Exch.  731;  s.  c.  1  Jur. 

(N.  S.)  143:  24  L.  .1,  Exch.  79.     pp.  118,  122. 
Phillipsburgh   Bank  v.  Fulmer,  31  N.  J.   L. 

53.    p.  1929. 
Philpot  V.  Tavlor,  75  111.  309.    p.  721. 
Phillpottr.  Kellev,  3  Ad.  &  El.  106.    p  1329. 
Phipps  V.  Mansfield,  62  Ga.  209.    p.  55. 
Phcenix  Ins.  Co.  v.   Allen,  11  Mich,  501,    pp. 

729,  936. 
Phosnix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Frissell,  142  Mass.  513.  p. 

1-246. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v  La  Poiute,  118  111.  384.  pp. 

1750,  1768. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mundav,  5  Coldw.(Tenn.) 

547.     p.  983. 
Phronix  Ins.    Co,  v.  Sholes,  20  Wis.  35.    p. 

397. 
Pha'nix  Ins.  Co,  v.  Tucker,  92  HI.  64.    p.  981. 
Phcenix  Ins.   Co.  r.  Underwood,  12  Heisk. 

(Tenn.)424.    p.  1938. 
Phienix  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Raddln,  120 

U.  S.  1S3.    pp.  21C9,  2110,2114. 
Phoenix  AVater  Co.  v.  Fletcher,  23  Cal.  48L 

p.  -2044. 
Phvsico- Medical  College   v.  Wilkinson,   89 

liul.  23.     p.  2102. 
Piatt  r.  Head,  35  Ivan.  282.    p.  705. 
Piatt  (-.  People,  29  111.  .54.     p.  1670. 
Pick  V.  Rubi(;ou    &t:  Co.,  27  A\is.  433.    p.  673. 
Pickens  r.  Hobbs,  42  Ind.  270.     i>.  118. 
Pickorell  r.  Carson,  8  Iowa,  544.     )).  827. 
Picket  V.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  22  Ark.  346. 

p.  I9i. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxxm 


Picket  V.  Rlchet,  2   Bibb    (Ky.).    1"9-    PP- 

2011,2095. 
Pickett  V.  AVallace,  54  Cal.  148.    p.  2085. 
Pico  V.  Steveus,  18  Cal.  376.    p.  143S. 
Piercer.  Busti,3]?ibb  (Kv.),317.    p.  117. 
Pierce  v.  Delameter,  1  X.  Y.  17.    p.  208. 
Pierce  v.  Lyman,  28  Ark.  550.    p.  218. 
Pierce  v.  Negro  John,  6  Md.  28.    p.  1670. 
Pierce  v.  Pierce,  25  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  243.   p.  891. 
Pierce  v.  Randolph,  i2  Tex.  290.    p.  849. 
Pierce  r.  Rehfuss,  35  Mich.  53.    p.  1653. 
Pierce  v.  State,  67  Ind.  354.    p.  21. 
Pierce  v.  State,  13  N.  H.  536.    pp.  65,  81,  82, 

103, 1508, 1517. 
Pierce  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  232.    pp.  }550, 

1575. 
Pierce  r.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  540.    p.  1680. 
Pierce  v.  State,  53  Ga.  365.    pp.  1771, 1773. 
Pierce  v.  Stevens,  30  Me.  184.    p.  1443. 
Pierce  v.  Tate,  27  Miss.  283.    p.  128. 
Pierce  v.  Thompson,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  193.    p. 

1171. 
Pierce  v.  Wood,  23  N.  H.  519.    p.  307. 
Pierce  v.  AVoodward,  6  Pick.  206.    pp.  1989, 

2021. 
Pierce,  In  re,  44  Wis.  411.    pp.  151, 172. 
Piersol  v.  Neill,  63  Pa.  St.  420.    p.  1620. 
Plerson  v.  People,  18  Hun  (X.  Y.),239.    p.  32. 
Plerson  r.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424.    p.  90. 
Plerson  v.  State,  12  Ala.  149.    p.  1517. 
Piersoii  v.  State,  11  Ind.  341.    p.  59. 
Plerson  r.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  524.    pp.  11, 

755,  757,  767,768,774. 
Piere  v.  Martin,  14  La.  64.    p.  1975. 
Pike  V.  Bright,  21  Ala.  332.    p.  890. 
Pike  r.  Dvke,  2  Me.  213.    p.  1090. 
Pike  V.  Emerson,  5  N.  H.  393.    pp.  193, 196. 
Pike  County  v.  GriiBu  &c.  Plank  Road  Co., 

15  Ga.  39.     p.  64. 
Pilkington  v.  Scott,  15  Mees.  &  W.  657.    p.  891. 
Pines  V.  State,  21  Ga.  227.    p.  103. 
Pingrv  ('.  Washburn,  1  Aik.  (Vt.)  264;  s.  c.  15 

Am.  Dec.  676.    p.  308. 
Pinkerton  v.  Woodward,  33  Cal.  557.    p.  1340. 
Pinuell  V.  Stringer,  59  Ind.  555.    p.  1621. 
Plnuev  V.  First  Division  &c.  R.  Co.,  19  Minn. 

251.  ■  p.  1124. 
Pinschower  v.  Hanks,  18  X'ev.  29.    p.  2093. 
Piper  V.  Lodge,  16  Serg.  &  R.  214.    pp.  54,  59. 
Piper  V.  Manny,  21   Wend.  (N.  Y.)   282.    p. 

1340. 
Piper  V.  Pearson,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  120.     p. 

160. 
Piper  V.  White,  56  Pa.  St.  90.    p.  316. 
Pitchers  v.  Barrows,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  361.    p. 

1104. 
Pitt  V.  Davidson,  37  Barb.   (X.  Y.)   97.    pp. 

148,  152. 
Pitt  V.  Shen,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  206.    p.  1143. 
Pitt  V.  Yalden,  4  Burr.  2060.    p.  1244. 
Pitts'  Adm'r.  v.  Pitts,  21  Ind.  314.    p.  904. 
Pitts  V.  State,  43  Miss.  472.    p.  1780. 
Pitts  r.  Whitman,  2  Story  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  609. 

pp.  1707.  1739. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  105  Ind.  151. 

p.  2007. 
Pittsburgh  O.  &   St.  L.    Rv.  Co.  v.    Adams 

(Ind.),  5  X.  E.  Rep.  187.    p.  1239. 
Pittsburgh  &c.   R.    Co.  v.  Andrews,  39  Md. 

329.     pp.  440,  1211,1235. 
Pittsfleld  r.  Barnstead,  40  X.  H.  477.    p.  110. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Barrett,  36  Oh.  St. 

448.     p.  1374. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell,  74  Pa.  St. 

421.     pp.  12:!2,  12,33.  129S. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Evans,  53  Pa.  St.  250. 

p.  1207. 
Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Eby,  55  Ind.  567.    p. 

1308. 


Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ehrhart,  36  Ind.  118. 

p.  1308. 
Pittsburgh  r.  Greer,  22 Pa.  St.  54.    r    1229. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hixon,  110  Ind.  225. 

p.  2041. 
Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Krouse,  30   Oh.   St. 

222.    p.  1682. 
Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin,  82  Ind.  482. 

p.  1300. 
Pittsburg  &c.   R.  Co.,  v.  McClurg,  56  Pa.  St. 

294.    p.  1235. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  72  Pa.  St. 

169.    p.  1235. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Porter,  32  Oh.  St. 

328.     pp.  1927,  1930,  1932,  1974,  1978. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  98  Ind.  186. 

pp.  2007.  2010.2024. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.   Co.  r.  Thompson,   56  HI. 

138.     pp.  1236,  1237. 
Pittsburgh  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Vining's  Admr.  27 

Ind.  513.     pp.  1224.1233,  1234. 
Pittsburg  &c.    P.  Co.  v.  Williams,  74   Ind. 

462.     pi).  1286,  2040. 
Pitzer  V.  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.,  80  Ind.  569. 

p.  2008. 
Planch  V.  Colburn,  8  Bing.  14.    p.  901. 
Plant  I'.  Fleming,  20  Cal.  92.    p.  1588. 
Planters'  Bank  v.  Richardson,  15  Ga.  277.  p. 

1747. 
Planters'  Bank  v.  Walker,  7  Ala.  926.    p.  649. 
Plaster  v.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  35  Iowa,  449. 

p.  1224. 
Platner  v.  Platner,  78 X.  Y.  90.    pp.  336,  583. 
Piatt  V.  Hibbard,  7  Cow.   (X.  Y.)  501.    pp. 

1321.  1336,  1337. 
Piatt  V.  Piatt ,  58  X.  Y.  646.    p.  616. 
Platter  v.  Commissioners  &c. ,  103  Ind.  360. 

p.  2026. 
Pleak  V.  Chambers,  7  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  565.    p. 

1706. 
Pleasaut  v .  State,  13  Ark.  360.    pp.  1508,  2097. 
Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark.  624.    pp.  257,  450. 
Pleasants  v.  Fant,  22  Wall.  (U.  S.)  116.     p. 

1605. 
Pleasants  v.  Heard,  15  Ark.  403.    pp.   1966, 

1982,  1984,1989. 
Plimpton  V.  Winslow,  9  Fed.  Rep.  365.   p.  188. 
Plumb    V.    Cattaraugus    &c.    Co.,    18  N.   Y. 

392.    p  972. 
Plume  f  Plume,  7  Ves.  258.    p.  899. 
Plume  V  Seward,  4  Cal.  94.    p.  1141. 
Plummer  i\  Ossipee,  59  X.  H.  55.    p.  403. 
Plummer  i\  People,  74  111.  361.    pp.  50,  71. 
Plummer  r.  Webb,  4  Mason  (U.S.),  380.    p. 

891. 
Plunkettw.  Appleton,9  Jones  &  Sp.  (N.  Y.) 

1.59;  s.  c.  51  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  469.    pp.  1914. 

1915. 
Poage  V.  Bell,  3  Rand.  586.    p.  827. 
Pocket  ('.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  5.52.    p.  22. 
Poeppers  i\  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co..  67  Mo.  715; 

s.  c.  7  Cent.  L.  J.  252.     p.  1221. 
Poertner  v.  Poertner,  66  AYis.  644.    p.  1761. 
Pogue  i\  Jovner,  7  Ark.  462.    p.  214, 
Pogue  V.  State,  13  Mo.  414.    p.  2052. 
Pogue  V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  283.    p.  18.55. 
Poignard  v.  Smith,  6  Pick.   (Mass.)  172.    p. 

1044. 
Poindexter  v.  Davis,  6  Gratt.  (Va.)  481.    p. 

287. 
Pointer  v.  Thompson,  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  532. 

p.  108. 
Polack  V.  McGrath,  32  Cal.  15.    p.  1141. 
Polaski  V.  Ward,  2  Rich.  L,   (S.  C.)  119.    p. 

1906. 
Pole  V.  Rogers,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  287.    p.  217. 
Pohlemus  v.  Helmau,  50  Cal.  438.    p.  1995, 
Polhill    V.   Walter,  3    Barn.   &   Ad.  114.    p. 

1419. 


CXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Police  Jury  i-.  Manning,  1(5  La.  Ann.  182.    p. 

687. 
Poliu  v.  State,  16  X.  W.  Rep.  891 ;  s.  c.  14  Neb. 

540.     pp.  773,  777,  18-24. 
Polii  r.  State,  45  Aik.  165.    p.  75. 
Polk  r.  State,  19  lud.  170.    p.  1848. 
Pollardi;.  D\visht,4  Cranch  (U.  S.),421.    p. 

1051). 
Pollard  V.  Teel,  3  Ired.  L.   (X.  C.)  470.    p. 

11)70. 
Pollard  r.  AVvbourne,  1  Hagg.  Ecc.  725.    pp. 

640,  648,  65)". 
Pollen  V.  Le  Ror,  30  X.  Y.  550.    p.  1685. 
PoUv  V.  McCall",  37  Ala.  20.    p.  1733. 
Ponieroy  v.  Bailey,  43  X.  H.  118.    p.  1446. 
PomeroV  v-  Insurance  Co.,  2  Caines  (X.  Y.), 

260.    p.  2094. 
Pomerov  v.  Stephens,  11  Met.   (Mass.)  244. 

p.  1093. 
Poniroy  v.  Parmlee,  0  la.  140.    p.  1670. 
Pond  V.    Wyman,    15    Mo.     175.     pp.    1682, 

1708. 
Ponton  V.  Ballard,  24  Tex.  619.    p.  1094. 
Pontius  V.  People,  82  X.  Y  340.    p.  583. 
Pool  V.  Chicago  &c.  It.  Co.,  56  Wis.  227.    p. 

1295. 
Pool  V.  Dlcas,  1  Bing.  X.  C.  649.    p.  642. 
Pool  V.  Higginsou,  S  Daly  (X.  Y.),  113.    p. 

1387. 
Pool  v.  Pool,  35  Ala.  12.    p.  1670. 
Poolr.  Whitcombe,  3  Fost.  &  Fin.  70;  s.  c.  6 

L.  T.  (N.  S.)  783.     pp.  1473,  15.59. 
Poole  V.  Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.,  6  Fed.  Rep.  844; 
s.  c.  11  Reporter,  828;  12  Cent.  L.  J.  492.   p. 
1920. 
Poole  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  McCrary  (U. 

S.)251.     pp.  1913,  1920. 
Poole  V.  Fleeger,  11  Pet.  (U.  S.)  185.    p.  2133. 
Poole  V.  Huskinson,  11  Mees.  &  W.  827.    p. 

1012. 
Poole  V.  Xorth  Carolina  &c.  R.  Co.,  18  Jones 

L.  (X.  C.)  340.     p.  1235. 
Poole  V.  People,  80  X.  Y.  648.     p.  1862. 
Poole   V.  Perrett,  1  Speara   (S.  C),  128.    p. 

261. 
Pooler  V.  Curtlss,  3  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  228. 

pp.  408,  413. 
Pooley  V.  ■\Vhethan,  15  Ch.  Dlv.  435  ;s.  c.  50 

L.  J.  (Chan.)  236.    p.  136. 
Pope  V.  Latham,  1  Ark.  66.    p.  219. 
Popet'.  Kislev,  23  Jlo.  185.     p.  I(i96. 
Pope   t:  State,  36  Miss.  121.    pp.    1917,  1921, 

1930,  1933,  1981. 
Pope  r.  Thompson,  66  Mo.  661.    p.  2144. 
Poppell  V.  State,  71  Ga.  276.    p.  1805. 
Porter  v.  Greenough,  Smith  (X.  H.),  238  n. 

p.  119. 
Porter  v.  Havens,  37  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  343.    p. 

881. 
Porter  v.  Knight,  63  la.  365.    p.  1666. 
Porter  v.   Mount,  45  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  422.    pp. 

1937,  1962. 
Porter  v.  I'atterson,  15  Pa.  St.  229.    p.  1131. 
Porter  v.  I'latt,  57  Vt.  533.    p.  809. 
Porter  v.  Ravworth,  13  East,  417.    p.  948. 
Porter  r.  State,  65  Ala.  107.    p.  1797. 
Porter  r.  State,  2  Ind.  435.    )>i).  257,  448,  1906. 
Porter  r.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  474.    p.  1714. 
Porter  v.  Throop,  47  Midi.  313.    p.  71.5. 
Porter  v.  Waltz,  108  Ind.  40;  s.  c.  6  W.  Rep. 

329.     pp.  1751,  2038. 
Porter  v.  Woods,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  56;"s.  c. 

39  Am.    Dec.  I.i3.     p.  893. 
Portis  V.  State,  27  Ark.  360.    p   1974. 
Portland  &<;.  F  rrv  Co.  v.  Pratt,  2  Allen  ^X. 

B.),17.     p.  56. 
Post  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  14  Xcb.  112.    p 

1283. 
Post  V.  Garrow,  18  Xcb.  682.    p.  1498. 


T»ost  V.  Gazlay,  1  Cln.  Sup.  Ct.  (Oh.)  105.  pp. 

1938.1942. 
Post  V.  state.  10  Tex.  App.  579.    pp.  75.  1873. 
I'ost  V.  Supervisors,  105  U.  S.  667.    pp.  Sit, 

819 
I'otier  r.  Barclav.  15  Ala.  439.    p.  607. 
I'otsdainer  v.  Slate,  17  Fla.  895.    p.  124. 
I'ott  V.  Eyton,  3  C.  B .  32.    p.  1100. 
I'ottle  V.  McWhorter,  13111.   454.    pp.  2050, 

2051. 
Totter  V.  Chicago  R.  Co.,  46  la.  399.    p.  1239. 
I'olter  V.  Clueago  &c.  R.  Co.,  22  Wis.  615 ;  s.  c. 

21  Wis.  372.     ]).  1225. 
Potter  V.  Hopkins,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  417.    p. 

1748. 
Potter  V.  Mcl'herson,  61  Mo.  240.    p.  1708. 
I'otter  V.  Parsons,  14  Iowa,  286.    p.  192. 
Potter  V.  Potter,  41  111.  SO.    p.  1750. 
Potter  V.    Scale,  8  Cal.  217.    pp.  1116,  1163, 

1167,1170,  1171,1181. 
Potter  r.  Stiles,  32  Ind.  318.    p.  2107. 
Potter  V.   Wooster,  10    Iowa,  S34.    pp.    806, 

1620. 
Potts  V.  Davenport,  79  111.  455.    p.  101,5. 
Potts    V.   House,  6  Ga.   325.     pp.  1658,   1748, 

1754.  1755, 1780. 
Poucher  v.  Livingston,  2  AVend.  (X.  Y.)  296. 

p.  7. 
PouUain  v.  Poullaiu,   4   S.  E.  Rep.  81.    p. 

2097. 
Powell  V.  Bradlee,  9  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  220.   pp. 

821,  1G68. 
Powell  r.  Camp,  60  Mo.  669.    p.  1708. 
Powell  ('.  Ford,  2  Stark.  164.    p.  878. 
Powell  V.  llaU'v,  28  Tex.  52.     p.  113. 
Powell  r.  Howard,  109  Mass.  192.    p.  892. 
PowelU'.  Howell, -21  Ga.  214.    p.  20(i7. 
Powell  V.  Jones,  12  Ohio,  35.    p.  1586. 
Powell  r.  Messer,  IS  Tex.  401.    p.  1689. 
Powell  V.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  80.    p. 

1605. 
Powell   V.  Myers,  26  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  591.    p. 

1157. 
Powell  V.  People,  5  Hun  (X.  Y.),  69.    p.  34. 
Powell  V.  Railroad  Co.,   68  X.    C.   895.    p. 

763. 
Powell  V.  State,  13  Tex.  244.    pp.  2.53,  2.55. 
Powell  r'.  Stale,  15  Tex.  App.  441.    pp.  465, 

1777,  1779. 
Powell  r.  I'owell,  23  Mo.  App.  365.    p.  808, 
Power  v.  Barham,  4  Ad.  &  El.  573.    pp.926, 

927. 
Power  V.  Savannah  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Ga.  471.    p. 

2067. 
Powers  V.  Browder,  13  Mo.  155.    p.  1614. 
Powers  v.  Evans,  72  Ind   23.    p.  2113. 
Powers  V.  Mitchi'U,  77  Me.  361.    p,  737. 
Powers  V,  Presgroves, 38  Miss.  227.    pp.81, 

95, 99. 
Powers  V.  Russell,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  69.    p 

1319. 
Powers  V.  State,  87  Ind.  145.    pp.  1524. 1572 

1694,  1697,  169,S,  2108,  2110,  2143. 
Poyer  t-.  Xew  York  Central  A:e.  R.  Co., 7  Abb, 

Xew  Cas.  (N.  Y.).  371,     p.  3. 
Piairie  State  &c.   Co.  v.  Dolg,  7  111.  52.    p 

1642. 
Prall  v.  IIinchman,6  Ducr  (X.  Y.),35I.    p 

547, 
Prall  V.  Peet,  3  La.  274.    p.  20. 
Pralus  V.  Pacillc  &c.  Co.,  85  Cal.  3.5.    p.  2015 
Prather  v.  Rambo,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)   189.    p 

.561. 
Prallier  v.  Ross,  17  Ind.  495.      pp.  834,  836 

838,  843. 
Pratt  V.  Chase,  40  Me.  269.    np.  912,  915. 
Pratt  r.  (iardiier,  2   Tush.  (Mass.)  68.  p.  160. 
Pratt  r  (irappe,  12  La.  451.    i>p.  15,  32. 
Pratt  V.  Hackell,  6  Johns   (N.  Y.)  13.    p,  831 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXV 


Pratt  V.  Hull,  13  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  334.    p.  15S5. 
Pratt  V.  Kellev,  24  Kau.  111.    p.  20.5], 
Pratt  V.  Page,  32  Vt.  13.    pp.  1009,  1101. 
Pratt  t;.  Pioneer  Press  Co.,  30  Miuu.  41.    p. 

1456. 
Pratt  V.  Rogers,  5  Mo.  53.    p.  2055. 
Pratt  V.   State,  56  Ind.  179.    pp.   1642,  1784, 

1803,  1906,  1930. 
Pratt's  Case,  21  Jac.  1.    p.  1954. 
Pratte  r.  Coffman,  33  Mo.  71.    p.  1982. 
Pratte  v.  Judge,  12  Mo.  194.    p.  2065. 
Pratte,  Matter  of,  12  Mo.  194.    p.  1749. 
Pray  v.  Garcelon,  17  Me.  145.    p.  1604. 
Pray  r.  Pierce,  7  Mass.  3S3.    p.  1044. 
Prentiss  v.  Blake,  34  Vt.  460.    p.  1072. 
Prentiss  v.  Danaher,  20  Mis.  311.    p.  2072. 
Prentiss  v.  Roberts,  49  Me   127.    p.  468. 
Prentiss  v.  Sinclair,  5  Vt.  149.    p.  1101. 
Presbury  v.  Com.,   9  Dana  (Ky.),  203.    pp. 

117,  123.  ^ 

Prescott  V.  Johnson,  8  Fla.  391.  p.  17.50. 
Prescott  r.  Trustees,  19  111.  324.  p.  819. 
Prescott  V.  Ward,  10  Allen  (Mass.),  203.    p. 

403. 
Prescott  V.  Wright,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  461.    p. 

1414. 
Prescott  Bank  v.    Caverly,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 

217.    p.  936. 
Presnall  v.  Herbert,  34  la.  539.    p.  2054. 
Presser  v.  State,  77  Ind.  274.    p.  467. 
Pressley  v.  State,  19  Ga.  192.    p.  16, 
Preston  v.  Culbertson,  58    Cal.   198.    pp  690, 

692. 
Preston  v.  Hill,  50  Cal.  43.    pp.  191, 192. 
Preston  y.  Simons,  1  Rich.  L.   (S.  C.)  262.    p. 

1060. 
Preston  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  30.    p.  108. 
Preston  v.  Walker,  26  Iowa,  205.    p.  214. 
Prestwitch  v.  Poley,  18  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  806.    p. 

192. 
Preswood  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  468.    p. 

115. 
Price  V.  Com.,  77  Va.  .393.    pp.  567,  787. 
Price  V.  Earl  of  Torrington  1  Sm.  L.  Cas. 

390.    p.  642. 
Price  V.  Evans,  4  B.  Mon.  (Kv.)  388.    p.  1750. 
Price  V.  Johnson  Co.,  15  Mo.  433.    p.  17.i8. 
Price  r.  Lambert,  3  N.  J.  L.  401.    p.  1917. 
Price  V.  Mazange,  31  Ala.  701.    p.  827. 
Price  V.  Mcllvain,  2  Tredw.   Const.  (S.  C.) 

503.    p.  1989. 
Price  1!.   Railroad  Co.,  34  111.  17.    pp.  1004, 

1005, 1298. 
Price  V.   Ship  Uriel,  10  La.  Ann.  413.    pp. 

1322,  1346,  1357. 
Price  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo.  414.    p. 

1229. 
Price  V.  St.  Louis  Life  Insurance  Co.,  3  Mo. 

App.  262.    p.  889. 
Price  V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  474.    p.  1704. 
Price  V.  Warren,  1  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  385.    pp. 

1982,  1984,  1985. 
Price,  Matter  of,  4  East,  587.    p.  178. 
Prichard  v.  Hopkins,  52  Iowa,  120.    p.  1425. 
Prickett  v.  Badger,  37  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  428.    p. 

901.  o  H  f 

Priddy  v.  Dodd,  4  Ind.  84.    pp.  317,  561. 
Prideaux  v.  Criddlc,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  455;  s.  c.  38 

L.J.  (Q.  B.)   232;  10  Best.  &  Sm.  515.    p. 

944. 
Prideaux  v.  Mineral  Point,  43  Wis.  513.    pp. 

1225.  1227,  1247,  1248. 
Pridgen  r.  State,  31  Tex.  420.    p.  1542. 
Priest  r.  (Jrotou,  103  Mass  540.    p.  326. 
Priest  V.  Way,  87  Mo.  16.    p.  794. 
Prim  V   State,  36  Ala.  244.    p.  1538. 
Primm  v.  Haren,  27  Mo.  205     p.  850. 
Primm  v.  Raboteau,  56  Mo.  407      p.  560. 
Prince  v.  Clarke,  S  Eug  C.  L.  54.    p.  1131. 


Prince  v.  Samo,  7  Ad.  &  El.  627.    p.  639. 
Prince  v.  State,  3  Stew.   &  Port.  (Ala.)  253. 

p.  29. 
Princeton  Turnp.  Co.  v.   Gulick,  16  X.  J.  L. 

161.    p   17.=>0. 
Prindeville  r.  People,  42  111.  221.    p.  1715. 
Pringle  v.  Huse,  1  Cow.   (X.  Y.)  432.    pp.  32, 

66,  102. 
Pringle  v.  Philips,  5  Sandf.  S.  C.  (X.  Y.)  157. 

p.  950. 
Printz  V.  Cheeney,  11  Iowa,  469.    p.  265. 
Prior   r.  Powers,  1  Keble,  811,  pi.    87.    pp. 

1963,  1966. 
Pritchard  v.  Comer,  71  Ga.  18.    jd.  9,56. 
Pritchard  v.  Heunessy,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  294. 

p.  1911. 
Probst  V.  Braeunlich,  24  W.  Va.  356.    p.  1985. 
Proctor  r.  I)e  Camp,  83  Ind.  559.    p.  770. 
Proctor  r.  Jennings,  6  Xev.  83.    p.  1221. 
Proctor  V.  Lewi.stown,  25  111.  1.53.    p.  1013. 
Proctor  V.  Wilcox,  4  S.  W.   Rep,  375;  s.  c.  68 

Tex.  219.    p.  2099. 
Propeller  XIagara  r.  Cordes,  21  How.  (U.  S.) 

726.     pp.  1322,  1345. 
Proprietors   v.   Wentworth,   36  Me.  339.    p. 

194. 
Prosser  r.  Henderson,  11  Ala.  484.    p.  704. 
Prov.  Inst.  V.  Burnham,  128    Mass.  458.    p. 

50. 
Providence  Life   lus.  Co.  v.  Baum,  29  Ind. 

236.    p.  991. 
Providence  &c.  Co.  v.  Martin,  32  Md.  310.    p. 

585. 
Provines  v.  Heaston,  67  Ind.  482.    pp.  1726, 

1728. 
Provis  r.  Reed,  3  Moore  A-  P.  4.    pp.  474,  475. 
Prowattain  r.  Tindall,  80  Pa.  St.  295.    p.  1802. 
Pruitt  i\  Brockman,  46  Ind.  56.    p.  430. 
Pruitc  V.  Cox,  21  Ind.  15.    pp.  467,  468. 
Pruitt  r.  Miller,  3  Ind.  16.    p.  469. 
Pruner  v.  Pendleton,  75  Va.  516.    p.  1394. 
Prussel  V.    Knowles,  4  How.  (Miss.)  90.    p. 

1986. 
Prvme  v.  Titmarsh,  10  Mee.  &   W.    605.    p. 

113. 
Pryor,  Matter  of,  18  Kan.  72.    pp.  146,  150. 
Pugh  V.  Reat,  107  III.  440.     pp.  2080,  2083. 
Pulaski  V.  Ward,  2  Rich.  L.  (X.  C.)  119.    pp. 

1974,  1980. 
PuUen  r.  Glidden,  68  Me.  559.    p.  2129. 
Pullen  V.  Hutchinson,  25  Me.  249.    p.  1029. 
Pulling  r.  Supervisors,  3  Wis.  337.    p.  1060. 
Pullman  &c.  R.  Co.  i\  Barker,  4  Colo.  344 ;  «. 

c.  34  Am.  Rep.  89.     p.  1485. 
Pulsford  r.  Richards,  22  L.  J.  (Ch.)  559;  s.  e. 

19  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  387.     p.  1068. 
Purcell  r.  MacXamara,  9  East,  361.    pp.  1167, 

1172,1616. 
Purdy  r.  People,  4  Hill  (X.  Y.),  384.    p.  819. 
Puriiiton  r.  Humjihreys,  6  Me.  379.    pp.  1925, 

1926,  1930,  1973. 
Purnell  v.  Gabdv,  46  Tex.  198.    p.  57a 
Purnell  v.  Purnell,  89  X.  C.  42.     p.  257. 
Purple  V.  Horton,  13  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  11.   p.  57. 
Purvear  v.   Com.    (Va.),  1  South  East.  Rep. 

513.    p.  22. 
Putnam  v.  Bowker,  11  Cnsh.  (Mass.)  542.    p. 

1043. 
Putnam  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  22  Mo.  App. 

589.     p.  2087. 
Pylus  V.  Mitford,  2  Leon.  77.    p.  1120. 
Pynohonr.  Day,  118  111.  9.    pp.  634,  635. 


Quackenbush  v.  Ehle,  5  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  472. 

p.  899. 
Quaifc    V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  48  Wis,  531; 

s.  c.  33  Am.  Rep.  821.    pp.  497,  1289. 


CXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Queen  r.  Hepburn,  7  Cranch  (U.  S.),  290.    p. 

87. 
Queen  v.  Mutters,  3-1  L.  J.  (Mag.  Cases)  22. 

p.  1316. 
Queen's  Case,  The,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  2S4.    pp. 

■264,  319,  330,  399,  432,  436,  637,  639. 
Queener  v.  Morrow,   1  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  124. 

p.  489. 
Quesenberry  v.  State,  3  Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.) 

3i»-i.    pp.  51,  71. 
Quesnel  v.  Woodlief,  2  Hen.  &  M.  (Va.)  17S. 

p.  918. 
Quick  V.  Brenner,  101  Ind.  230.    p.  2052. 
Quick  V.  Turner,  26  Mo.  App.  29.    p.  869. 
Quill  V.  Gullivan,  108  Ind.  235.    p.  2052. 
Quimby  v.  Vermont  Central R.  Co.,  23  Vt.  387. 

pp.  S21, 1147. 
Quincy   &c.  B.  Co.  v.  Ridge,  57  Mo.  601.    pp. 

1499,  1501. 
Quill ebaugli  Bank  v.  Leavens,  20  Conn.  87. 

pp.54,  118,120. 
Qulnebaug  Bank  v.  Tarbox,  20  Conn.  510. 

pp.  30,  48. 
Quinu  V.  Biggins,  63  Wis.  664.    p.  509. 
Quinu  V.  Halljurt,  52  Vt.  353.    p.  117. 
Qulim  V.   Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  51  111.   495,    p. 

1235. 
Qulnn  V.  State,  14  Ind.  589.    p.  1905. 
Quirk  V.  Holt,  99  Mass.  164.    p.  1209. 

R. 

Racer  v.  Baker,  113  Ind.  177;  s.  c.  11  W.  Rep. 

816.    p.  2050. 
Baco  V.  Green,  50  Tex.  483.    p.  817. 
Rader  v.  Barr,  7  Ind.  194.    pp.  2112,  2113. 
Radley  v.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Exch. 

71;  s.  c.  1  Anp.  Cas.  754;  L.  R.  10  Exch.  100; 

43  L.   J.  (Exch.)  73;  33  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  209;  2 

Thomp.  Neg.  1108.    pp.  1221,  1229. 
Rafe  V.  State,  20  Ga.  64.    pp.  15,  30,  32,  43,  69. 
Rafferty  v.  Williams,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  66.    p. 

598. 
Ragan  v.  Galther,  11  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)  472. 

pp.  801, 1647. 
Baglaud  v.  \VllIs,  6  Leigh  (Va.),  1.    pp.  1906, 

1910. 

Railroad  v.  Berks  County,  6  Pa.  St.  70.    p. 

1087. 
Railroad  v.  Konk,  11  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  575.    p. 

1665. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Adler,  56  111.  344.    p.  360. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Akers,  4  Kan.  457,    p.  1372. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Aspell,  23  Pa.   St.  147.    pp. 

1229, 1236,  1287. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Black,  58  111.  34.    p.  1501. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burns,  60  111.  284.    p.  1123. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Burrows, 55  Mich.  6.    p.  1123. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Campbell,  36  Oh.  St.  647.    pp. 

1371,1374. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Carpenter,  14  111.  190.    p. 

1501. . 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Curran,  19  Oh.  St.  1.    pp. 
-       1344, 1374. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Foreman,  24  West  Va.  662. 

p.  2. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Gladmon,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

401.    p.  1231. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Houston,  95  U.  S.  697;  s.  c. 

1  Thoni]).  Neg.  444;  6  Cent.  L.  J.  132.    pp. 

1230,  1604. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Linn,  15  Xeb.  234.    p.  1.503. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Lockwood,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

3.57.     pp.  1298, 1345,  1348,  1349,  1352. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Martin  (Tenn.),  2  S.  W.  Rep. 

381.    i).4. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  McDonald.  18  111.  172.    p.  1369. 
Railroad  Co.  i?.  Morris  (Tex.),  3  S.  W,  Rep. 

457.    p.  3. 


Railroad  Co.  i\  Norton,  24  Pa.  St.  465.    pp. 

1223,  1224. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Patnam,  118  U.  S.  545;  s.  c.  7 

Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  1.    p.  1645. 
Railroad  Co.  r.  Pollard,  22  Wall.  (U.  S.)  341. 

pp.  1236,  1238. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Reeves,  10  Wall.  (U.  S.)  176. 

pp.  1349,  1356,  1359. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith,  21  WaU.  (U.  S.)  256. 

p.  574. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Stanley,  7  Oh.  St.  155.    p.  95. 
Railway  Co.  i-.  Stevens,  95  V.  S.  655.    p.  1298. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  657. 

pp.  1208,  1212,  1219,  1231. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Taylor,  35  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  210. 

p.  1123. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Troesch,  68  111.  545.    p.  1607. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  AVinslow,  66  111.  219.    p.  315. 
Railsback  v.  Greve,  58  Ind.  72.    pp.  2112,2113. 
Railton  v.  Matthews,  10  CI.  &  Fin.  934.    p.  1419. 
Railway  Co.  v.  Warner,  mem.  in  62  N.  Y.  651. 

p.  486. 
Railway  Co.  v.  M'hilton,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.)  270. 

p.  1708. 
Rainforth  v.  State,  61  111.  365.    p.  1939. 
Rains  v.  Hood,  23  Tex.. 556.    p.  2065. 
Rainwater  v.  Elmore,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  363. 

p.  254. 
Raleigh  v.  Kane,  2  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  288.    p. 

159. 
Ralston  V.  Groff,  55  Pa.  St.  276.    p.  1646. 
Raniage  v.  Peterman.  25  Pa.  St.  349.    p.  1083. 
Ramadge  v.  Ryan,  9  Bing.  333.    p.  123. 
Ramirez  v.  Murrev,  5  Cal.  222.    p.  891. 
Ramos  V.  Bringidr,  2  Mart.  (N.  S.)  (La.)  192. 

p.  20. 
Ramsay  v.  Warner,  97  Mass.  8.    p.  968. 
Rand  v.  Nesmith,  61  Me.  111.    p.  890. 
Randall  V.Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S. 

478.     pp.  1075.  1605,  1625. 
Randall  v.  Barker,  3  Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  69.    p. 

1441. 
Randall  v.  Bayon,  4  Mart.  (N.  s.)  (La.)  132. 

p.  197.5. 
Randall  v.  Collins,  58  Tex.  231.    p.  2065. 
Randall  v.  Cook,  17  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  56.    p. 

1441. 
Randall  v.  Grover,  1  N.  J.  L.  151.    p.  1982. 
Randebaugh    v.  Shelley,  6  Oh.   St.  307.    p. 

230. 
Raudidge  v.  Lyman,  124  Mass.  361.    p.  966. 
Randolph  v.  Keiler,  21  Mo.  557.     p.  1614. 
Randolph  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  11  Iowa,  515. 

pp.  215,  233. 
Randolph  Iron  Co.  v.  Elliott,  37  N.  J.  L.  184. 

p.  890. 
Rangel  r.  State  (Tex.),  3  S.  W.  Rep.  788;  s.  c. 

22  Tex.  App.  642.     pp.  321,  322. 
Rank  c.  Shewey,  4  Watts  s.Va.),  218.    p.  54. 
Rankin  v.  Crow,  19  111.  626.    p.  628. 
Rankin  v.  Goddard,  4  Allen  (N.  B.),  155.    p. 

25. 
Rankin  v.  Lawton,  17  Mo.  App.  574.    p.  2055. 
Rankin  v.  Mortimere,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  372.    p. 

870. 
Rankin  v.  Patton,  65  Mo.  378.    p.  1410. 
Rankin  v.  Tavlor,  49  111.  451.    p.  1750. 
Rann  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  387.    p.  98C. 
Ranney  v.  Bader,  48  Mo.  .539.    p.  2003. 
Ranney  v.  Barlow,  112  U.  S.  207.    p.  1638. 
Ranney  v.  Higby,  5  Wis.  62.    pp.  831,  852. 
Ransom  v.  City  of  New  York,  20  How.  (U.  S.) 

581.     p.  1060. 
Ransom  v.  New  York  Ac.  R.  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  415. 

p.  1481. 
Ransom  v.   Railroad  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  415     p. 

1483. 
Ransone  v.  Christian,  56  Ga.  351.    pp.  215, 
220,  721,  727. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXVll 


Rapho  V.  Moore,  68  Pa.  St.  404.    p.  1246. 
Hasich  V.  Bissell,  5-2  Mich.  45.5.    pp.  ]638, 1671. 
Kasli  V.  State.  61  Al.t.  89.    pp.  18,  87,  126. 
Kathbun  v.  Ross,  46  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  127.    p. 

450. 
Ratlitf  r.  Hnntlv,  5  Ired.  L.  (?f.  C.)  545.    pp. 

2!«,204,  049.  lo()6. 
Ratteree  v.  Nelson,  10  Ga.  439.    p.  1632. 
Kauch    V.   Lord,  31  Pa.   St.  352.     pp.    1232, 

1377. 
Raulston  v.  Jackson,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.),  129. 

)).  1199. 
Ravenga  v.  Mackintosh,  2  Barn.  &  Ores.  693. 

p.  1197. 
RawHugs  V.  Chandler,  9  Exch.  687.    p.  636. 
Rawlins  v.  Desbrough,  2  Mood.  &R.  328.    pp. 

1410,1417. 
Rawson  V.  Curtiss,  19  III.  456.    pp.  1939,  1942, 

1943. 
Rawson  r.  Knight,  73  Me.  .343.    p.  614. 
Rawson  V.  Penns3lvania  R.  Co.,  48  X.  Y.  212. 

p.  1365. 
Rav  V.  Bell,  24  111.  444.    p.  4il. 
Ray  r.  McCary,  26  Miss.  404.    p.  2066. 
Ray  V.  State,  50  Ala.  104.    pp.  1775,  1825,  1839. 
Ray  V.  State,  15  Ga.  223.    pp.  67, 117, 123, 124. 
Rav  c.  State,  2  Kan.  40.i.    \^.  71. 
Rav  r.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  450.    pp.  81,  82,  91, 

93,  110,  111. 
Rav  V-  State,  13  Tex.  App.  .51.    p.  1855. 
Rav  r.  Thompson,  26  Mo.  App.  451.    p.  20S8. 
Ray  r.  Wooters,  19  111.  82.    p.  1726. 
Ravburn  v.  Mason  Lumber  Co.,  57  Mich.  273. 

p.  629. 
Ravmond  v.  Lowell,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  524.    p. 

1-246. 
Raviuond  v.  Nye,  5  Mete.   (Mass.)  151.    p. 

1753. 
Ravmond  r.  Thexton,   17  Pac.  Rep.  258.    p. 

2099. 
Rnynor  v.  Norton,  31  Mich.  210.    p.  .366. 
Raysdou  r.  Trumljo  52  Mo.  35.    p.  1685. 
Rea    V.   Missouri,  17  Wall.   (U.  S.)  532.    p. 

394. 
Read  V.  Cambridge,  124  Mass.  567.    p.  1914. 
Read  f.  Com.,  22  Gratt.   (Va.)  924.    pp.567, 

1985. 
Read  v.  French,  28  N.  Y.  293.    p.  192. 
Read  r.  Goodyear,  17  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)   350. 

p.  1044. 
Read  v.  Moore,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  337.    p.  614. 
Read  r.  Morse,  34  Wis.  315.    pp.  1210,  1668. 
Read  r.  Railway  Co.,  60  Mo.  199.    p.  1318. 
Read  v.  Si^aulding,   30  N.  Y.  630.    pp.  1318, 

1344,  1347. 
Read  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo.  199.    pp. 

1123,  1347,  1349. 
Read  v.  State,  2  Ind.  438.    p.  739. 
Reader  v.  Livingston,  3  Johns.  Ch.  (X.  Y.) 

500.    p.  1445. 
Reading's  Case,  7  How.  St.  Tr.  264.    p.  36, 
Reagan  v.  Grim,  13  5Pu.  St.  508.    p.  340. 
Real  ('.People,  42  N.  Y.  270.    pp.  338,  402,  404. 
Ream  v.  Hamilton,  15  Mo.  App.  577.    p.  883. 
Reamer  v.  Downer,  23  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  626.    p. 

943. 
Reason  v.  Bridges,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

478.     pp.  .16,  97,  104. 
Rebecca  Lea  v.  State  (Miss.),  1  So.  Rep.  244; 

s.  c.  64  Mis.  294.     p.  460. 
Records  v.  Melson,  1  Houst.   (Del.)   139.    p. 

239. 
Rector  v.  Hudson,  20  Tex.  234.    pp.  29,  110. 
Rector  v.  Pierce,  3  Thomp.  &  Cook  (N.  Y.), 

416.    p.  1209. 
Redden  v.  Barker,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  179.    p.  891. 
Redden  v.  Spruance,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  217.    pp. 

361,  642. 
Rftddiu  V.  Gates.    Cited,    p.  661. 


Reddington  v.  Gilman,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  235. 

p.  582. 
Reddle  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  401.    p.  124. 
Redelsheimer  v.  Miller,  107  Ind.  485;  s.  C.  5 

West.  Rep.  619.    pp.  2007,  2038,  2039. 
Redman  v.  Gulnac,  5  Cal.  148.    pp.  1722, 1723. 
Redmond  v.  Railroad  Co. ,76  Mo.  550.    p.  1311. 
Redmond  i\  Royal  Ins.  Co.,  7  Phila.  (Pa.) 

167.    p.  1930. 
Redus  V.  Wofford,  4  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  579, 

592.    p.  4. 
Reed  v,  Deerfleld,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  522.    pp. 

1209,  1603. 
Reed  v.  Greathouse,  7  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  558. 

p.  1669. 
Reed  v.  Inhabitants,  8  Allen  (Mass.),  534.    p. 

1625. 
Reed  r.  Jones,  15  Wis.  40.    p.  358. 
Reed  v.  Miller,  1  Bibb  (Ky.),  142.    pp.  2086, 

2096. 
Reed  v.  Northfleld,  13  Pick.  (Mass.)  94.    p. 

1249. 
Reed  v.  Proprietors  &c.,  8  How.  (U.  S.)  274. 

pp.  10.52,  1053,  1076,  1079. 
Reed  v.  Reed,  46  Pa.  St.  239.    p.  962. 
lieed  V.  ispaulding,  42  N.  H.  114.    pp.  484,  486, 

487. 
Reed  v.  State,  15  Oh.  217.    p.  21. 
Reed  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  1.    p.  110. 
Reed  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  317.    p.  1680, 
Reed  v.  Taylor,  4  Taunt.  616.    p.  1181, 
Reed  v.  Thayer,  9  Ind.  157.    p.  1998. 
Reed  v.  Upton,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  522.    p.  916. 
Reed  v.  Vaughn,  10  Mo.  447.    p.  l.!6. 
Rees  i:  Warwick,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  113.    p.  835. 
Reed  v.  ^\'ilkinson,    MS.,  cited  Whart.  Dig. 

87.     p.  948. 
Reese  v.  Beck,  24  Ala.  651.    pp.  163S,  1685, 

1686. 
Reese  v.  Mahouy,  21  Cal.  305.    p.  199. 
Reese  v.  Rigbv,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  202.    p.  1243 
Reese  i\  Walters,  3  Mees.  &  W.  527.    p.  294, 
Reeve  r.  Dennett,  141  Mass.  207.    p.  368. 
Reeve  v.  Underbill,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  440.    p. 

217. 
Reeves  v.  Larkin,  19  jMo.  192.    p.  1618. 
Reeves  v.  Moody,  15  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  312.    p. 

1986. 
Reeves  v.  Plough,  41  Ind.  204.    pp.  1912,  2089, 

2090. 
Reeves  v.  Reeves,  54  111.  332.    p.  2130. 
Reeves  v.  state,  23  Ind.  441.     p.  1477. 
Reford  v.  Cramer,  30  X.  J.  L.  250.    p.  1438. 
Reg.  V.  Aylmer.  1  Crawf.  &  D.  116.    p.  464. 
Reg.  V.  Bailev,  2  Cox  C.  C.  311.    p.  302. 
Reg.  V.  Ballivos,  1  P.  AVill.  212.    p.  1911. 
Reg.  V.  Bavnton,  17  How.  St.  Tr.  .589.    p.  645. 
Reg.  V.  Beard,  8  Carr.  &  P.  142.    p.  539. 
Reg.  V.  Benjamin,  4  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  179.    p. 

45. 
Reg.  V.  Bleasdale.  2  Carr.  &  K.  765.    p.  304. 
Reg.  V.  Boucher,  8  Carr.  &  P.  141.    p.  539. 
Reg.  V.  Brown,  L.  R.  1  Cr.  Cas.  Res.  70.    p. 

456 
Reg.  V.  Brownlow,  11  Ad.  &  El.  119.    p.  1121 
Reg.  V.  Conrahy,  1  Craw.  &  Dix  (Irish)  Cir. 

56.    p.  31. 
Reg.  V.  Colton,  12  Cox  C.  C.  400.    p.  301. 
Reg.  V.  Coulter,  13  Up.  Can.   (C.  P.)  299.    p. 

114. 
Reg.  V.  Courvoisier,  9  Carr.  &  P.  362.    p.  785. 
Reg.  V.  Crouch,  1  Cox  C.  C.  94.    p.  783. 
Reg.  ('.  Ciowhurst.  1  Carr.  &  K.  370.    p.  1896. 
Reg.  V.  Davis,   4  Xew   Sess.   Cas.  611 ;  s.  c.  5 

CoxC.  C.  237.     p.  1115. 
Reg.  V.  Delme,  10  Mod.  198.    p.  23. 
Reg.  V.  Doran,  Lewin  C.  C.  27.    p.  330. 
Reg.  V.  Dossett,  2  Carr.  &  K.  306.    p.  302. 
I  Reg.  V.  Dougall,  18  Low.  Can.  Jur.  85.    p.  45, 


CXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Reg.  r.  Dowlih,,  h  (.ox  C.  C.  509.    pp,  16,  99. 
Reg.  V.  Duncoiiibe,  b  Car.  &  P.  369.    p.  632. 
Reg.  v.  Exall,  4  Fost.  &  F.  92-2.    p.  1S96. 
Reg.  r.  Fellows,  19  Up.  Cau.  Q.  B.  48.    p.   45. 
Reg.  V.  Fitzpatrick,  Crawf.  &  D.  (Irish)  513. 

pp.  31, 101. 
Reg.  V.  Foster,  Dearsley  C.  C.  456.    p.  299. 
Reg.  V.  Frances,  4  Cox  "Cr.  Cas.  57.    pp.  499, 

.500,50  ,  1780. 
Reg.  V.  Frost,  9  Car.  &  P.  129.    pp.  44.  45,  87. 
Keg.  V.  Garbett,  2  Car.  &  Ker.  474.    ]).  287. 
Reg.  V.  Garner,  2  Car.  &  K.  920.    p.  289. 
Keg.  V.  Garner,  3  F.  &  F.  681.    p.  301. 
Keg.  ;'.  Geach,  9  Car.  &P.  499.    p.  45. 
Reg.  V.  Gray,  4  Fost.  &  F.  1102.    p.  302. 
Reg.  V.  Gray,  6  Irish  C.  L.  259.    pp.  37, 125. 
Reg.  r.  Gray,  11  CI.  &  Fin.  427.    p.  36. 
Reg.  r.  Guttridge,  9  Car.  &  P.  471.    p.  332. 
Reg.  V.  Hlcklin,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  360.    p.  661. 
Reg.  r.  Hill,  5  Cox  C.  C.  259.    p.  293. 
Reg.  V.  Hill,  2  Den.  C.  C.  259;  s.  c.  5  Cox  C.  C. 

470.    p.  804. 
Reg.  V.  Hughes,  1  C.  &  K.  235.    p.  95. 
Reg.  r.  Hughes,  2  Craw.  &  Dix  Cir.  396.    pp. 

87,  88, 102. 
Reg.  V.  Hunt,  2  Cox  C.  C.  261.    pp.  645,  648. 
Reg.  V.  Key,  3  Car.  &  K.  371 ;  s.  c.  15  Jur.  1065. 

p.  86. 
Reg.  V.  Key,  Temple  &  Mew  623.    p.  3S. 
Reg.  V.  Lacev,  3  Cox  C.  C.  517.    pp.  101, 102. 
Reg.  V.  Lang'ton,  2  Q.  B.  Div.  296.     p.  359. 
Reg.  V.  Lef roy,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  134 ;  s.  c.  4  Moak. 

250.    pp.  137, 140. 
Reg.  V.  Magill,  Ir.  Clrc.  Cas.  418.    pp.  464, 466. 
Ri'g.  V.  Malings,  8  Car.  &  P.  242.  pp.  538,  541. 
Reg.  V.  Martin,  L.  R.  1  Cr.  Cas.  Res.  378.    p. 

677. 
Reg.  V.  McCartie,  11  Ir.  C.  L.  (N.  S.).  188.    p. 

45. 
Reg.  V.  Mead,  2  Ld.  Raym.  927.    p.  658. 
Reg.  V.  Mears,  1  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  581.    pp.  351, 

1811. 
Reg.  V.  Megson,  9  Car.  &  P.  420.    p.  332. 
Reg.  V.  Mellor,  Dears.  &  Bell  C.  C.  468;  s.  c. 

4  Jur.  (N.  s.)  214;  7  Cox  C.  C.  454 ;  27  L.  J. 

(M.  C.)121.    pp.  121,122. 
Reg.  V.  Mitchell,  3  Cox  C.  C.  1.    p.  31. 
Reg.  V.  Murphy,  8  Car.  &  P.  297.    p.  394. 
Reg.  V.  Neale,  9  Car.  &  P.  431.    p.  1536. 
Reg.  V.  Newton,  3  Car.  &  K.  85;  s.  c.  13  Q.  B. 

716;  3  Cox  C.  C.  489;  13  Jur.  606;  18  L.  J. 

(M.  C.)200,    p.  1925. 
Reg.  V.  Nicholson,  8  Dowl.  P.  C.  422;  s.  c.  4 

Jur.  558.    p.  58. 
Reg.  V.  Nisbett,  6  Cox  C.  C.  320.    p.  299. 
Reg.  r.  O'Connell,  11   CI.  &  Fin.  155;  s.  c.  1 

Cox  C.  C.  384.    p.  31. 
Reg.  ('.  Patteson,  36  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  129.  p.  45. 
Reg.  V.  Pilkington,  5  Ad.  &  El.   (N.   S.)   662. 

p.  1137. 
Reg.  V.  Proud,  Leigh  &  Cave  C.  C.  97.    p.  302. 
Reg.  V.  Richardson,  2  Fost.  &  F.  343.    p.  30.5. 
Reg.  V.  Robinson,  12  Ad.  &  Kl.  672.    p.  1121. 
Reg.  V.  Roder,  12  Cox  C.  C.  630.    p.  302. 
Reg.  V.  Roebuck,  Dearsley  &  B.  C.  C.  24.    p. 

303. 
Reg.  V.  Rowton,  2  Benn.  &  H.  Cr.  Cas.  333. 

p.  476. 
Reg.  V.  Salt,  3  Fost.  &  F.  834.    p.  299. 
Reg.  V.  Slowrnan,  1  Dowl.  618.    p.  169. 
Keg.  V.  Smith,  8  Carr.  &  P.  160.    p.  1543. 
Keg.  V.  Southey,  1  Fost.  &  F.  864.    p.  1780. 
Reg.  I'.  Sterne,  citetl,  p.  1819. 
Reg.  V.  Stewart,  1  (Jox  C.  C.  174.    pp.  58,  99. 
Reg.  V.  Sullivan,  1  Per.  &  Dav.  96;  s.  c.  8  Ad. 

&K1.  831.     pp.  86, 1976. 
Reg.  V.  Taylor,  13  Cox  C.  C.  77.    pp.  783.  784. 
Reg.  V,  Vincent,  9  Carr.   &  P.  91  and  275.    p. 

1-536. 


Reg.  V.  "Walkin,  8  Carr.  &  P.  243.    p.  538. 

Reg.  V.  Wardle,  Car.  &  M.  647.    p.  86. 

Reg.  V.  Weeks,  Leigh  &  Cave  C.  C.  18.  p.  299. 

Reg.  V.  White,  4  Fost.  &  F.  383,  n.    p.  1816. 

Keg.  t\  Worseham,  1  Ld.  Raym.  705.    p.  658. 

Keg.  V.  Wrightson,  2  Salk.  698.    p.  134. 

Reg.  V.  Wycherley,  8  Carr.  &  P.  262.    pp.  646, 

647,  648. 
Regicide's  Case,  5  How.  St.  Tr.  978;    s.  c.  Sir 

J.  Kelyng,  9.    p.  60. 
Reich  t).  Rebellion  &c.  Co.,  3   Utah,  245.    p. 

2015. 
Reich  V.  State,  63  Ga.  616.    p.  540. 
Reichard  v.  Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co.,  31  Mo. 

518.    pp.  214,  215. 
Reichwald  v.  Gaylord,  75  111.  503.    pp.  2050, 

2051,  20.)3. 
Reid  V.  Colcork,  1  Nott  &  McC.   (S.  C.)  604. 

p.  618. 
Reid  V.  Griffith,  63  Mo.  545.    p.  2055. 
Reid  ('.  Pcidmont  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  58  Mo.  421. 

pp.  990,  16.38,  1671. 
Reiger  v.  Davis,  67  N.  C.  185.    p.  1652. 
Relnhard  ».  New  York,  2  Daly   (N.  Y.),243. 

p.  1249. 
Reinhart  v.  Miller,  22  Ga.  403.    p.  1634. 
Reinhold  v.  Alberti,  1  Binn.  (Pa.)  469.    p.  193. 
Reins  v.  People,  30  ill.  256.    pp.   1548,   1903, 

1906, 1918, 1991. 
Relssner  v.  Oxley,  80  Ind.  580.    p.  838. 
Reiterbaugh  v.  Ludwick,  31  Pa.   St.  131.    p. 

870. 
Reith  r.  Lullman,  11  Mo.  App.  254.    p.  966. 
Rembert  v.  Brown,  14  Ala.  36.     p.  343. 
Remington  v.  Cougdon,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  210. 

p.  795. 
Remy  v.  Municipality  No.  2,  12  La.  Ann.  500. 

pp.  682,  687. 
Renner?-.  Bank  of  Columbia, 9  Wheat.  (U.  S.) 

581.     pp.  620,  621,622. 
Reunick  v.  Walthall,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  23. 

p.  118. 
Reno  f.  Robertson,  48  Ind.  106.    p.  2093. 
Rensselaer  Glass  Factory  v.  Reed.  5  Cow. 

(N.  Y.)  587.     pp.  889,  898. 
Renwick  v.  La  Grange  Bank,  29  Ga.  200.    p. 

1605. 
Reops  V.  Barker,  4  Pick.    (Mass.)    238.    p. 

1998. 
Requa  V.  Rochester,  45  X.  Y.  129.    p.  1249. 
Respass  r.  Young,  11  Ga.  114.     p.  1002. 
Kespublica  v.  Duaue,  4  Yeates  (Pa.),  347. 

p.  189. 
Kespublica  v.  Me.sca,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  73.    p.  7. 
Respublica  r.  Richards,  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  480. 

p.  56. 
Rewey  v.  Riley,  17  Week.  Dig.  573.    p.  1559. 
Rex  V.  Adams,  Jebb  C.  C.  135.    p.  37. 
Rex  V.  Almon,  Wilmot,  243.    pp.  139,  171. 
Rex  v.  Atkinson,  5  T.  R.  437,  n.     pp.  2049,  2079. 
Rex  V.  Atwood,  2  Leach   C.  C.  521.    pp.  464, 

1506. 
Rex  V.  Balls,  1  Moody  C.  C.  470;  s.  c.  7  Carr.  & 

P.  429.    p.  300. 
Rex  V.  Barrett,  Jebb  C.  C.  103.    p.  86. 
Rex  V.  Birt,  5  Carr.  &  1'.  1.54.    p.  1.537. 
Rex  r.  Brooke,  2  Stark.  472.    p.  383. 
Rex  V.  Burl)age,  3  Burr.  1440.    pp.  177,  178. 
Rex  I'.  Burdetl,  12  Mod.  Ill  ;s.  c.l  Ld.  Raym. 

148.     pp.  1808.  1926,1936. 
Rex  V.  Burridge,  1  Str.  693;  s.  c.  2  Ld.  Raym. 

125.    V.  34. 
Rex  V.  Clarke,  2  Starkie,  241.    pp.  471, 472. 
Rex  V.  Clewes,  4  Carr.  &  P.  221.    p.  302. 
Rex  V.  Colley,  1  Mood.  &  M.  329.    p.  2.57. 
Rex  V.  Coombs,  Comb.  .57.    p.  1331. 
Rex  V.  Crump,  1  Carr.  &  P.  6.58.    p.  1697. 
Rex  V.  Davison,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  329.    pp.  136, 
143. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXIX 


Rex  r.  Dean  and  Chapter,  1  Stra.  536 ;  s.  c.  8 

Mod.  27.    p.  150. 
Rex  v.  Delany,  Jebb  C.  C.  106.    p.  86. 
Rex  V.  Delaval,  cited  p.  1966. 
Hex  V.  Derby,  3  Mod.  139.    p.  135. 
Rex  r.  Despard,  2  Man.  &  Ryl.  406.    pp.  34, 

86,  95. 
Rex  V.  Dixon,  3  Burr.  1687.    p.  1S3. 
Rex  V.  Dolby,  1  Dow.  &  Ry.  145;  s.  c.  2  Barn. 

&  Cres.  104.    pp.  23,  27. 
Rex  V.  Dunconibe,  12  Mod.  224.    p.  38. 
Rex  V.  Dunston,  Rv.  &  M.  109.    p    1558. 
Rex  V.  Kdamnds,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  471.    pp.  24, 

34,  35,  67,  68,  95,  96,  102,  125. 
Rex  r.    Edwards,   Russ.  &  Ry.  223;  s.  c.  4 

Taunt.  309 ;  3  Camp.  207.    p.  86. 
Rex  V.  Elkins,  4  Burr.  2130.    p.  2080. 
Rex  V.  Francis,  Cases  Temp.  Hardw.   (Lee) 

114.    p.  1120. 
Rex  r.  Geering,  18  L.  J.  (Mag.  Cas.)  215.    p. 

301. 
Rex  V.  Giles,  8  Price,  383.    p.  2009. 
Rex  V.  Gilham,  1  Esp.  285;  s.  c.  6  T.  R.  265. 

p.  330. 
Rex  V.  Greenacre,  8  Carr.  &  P.  a5.    p.  1848. 
Rex  v.  Hall,  3  Starkie,  67.    p.  1566. 
Rex  V.  Hanly,  1  Craw.  &  Dix  (Irish)  Cir.  188, 

71.     p.  60. 
Rex  V.  Haworth,  4  Car.  &  P.  254.    p.  609. 
Rex  V.  Haves,  2  Ed.  Raym.  1518.    p.  2013. 
Rex  V.  Hemp,  5  Carr.  &  P.  468.    p.  449. 
Rex  V.  Hill,  1  Car.  &  P.  667.    p.  25. 
Rex  V.  Holt,  5  T.  11.  438.    pp.  2049,  2079. 
Rex  V.  Hucks,  1  Stark.  N.  P.  523.    pp.  296, 

845. 
Rex  r.  Huggins,  2  Ld.  Rarm.  1574.    pp.  2008, 

2009,  2013. 
Rex  V.  Hunt,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  430.    pp.  25,  35, 

122. 
Rex  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  East,  77.    p.  526. 
Rex  V.  Johnson,  2  Stra.  1000.     pii.  29,  34. 
Rex  V.  Jones,  2  Camp.  131      p.  464. 
Rex  r.  Kenihvorth,  7  Ad.  &  El.  (X.  S.)  642. 

p.  294. 
Rex  V.  Kinloch,  1  Wils.  157;  s.  c.  Fost.  Cr.  L. 

16.    p.  86. 
Rex  r.  Kinnear,  2  Barn.  &   Aid.  462.     pp. 

1902,  1906. 
Rex  V.  Klrwan,  cited  Finlav's  Irish  Dig.  p. 

347.     pp.  46,  ■97,  102. 
Rex  V.  Langley,  2  Salk,697 ;  s.  c.  2  Ld.  Raym. 

1029.    p.  140. 
Rex  V.  Layer,  Fort.  396.    p.  177. 
Rex  V.  Lord  Fitzwater,  2  Lev.  140.    p.  1964. 
Rex  V.  Lord  Ossulston,  2  Strange,  1107  (s.  c. 

sub   nom.  King  t?.  Pierson,  Andrews,  310). 

p.  134. 
Rex  V.  Lord  Preston,  1  Salk.  278.    p.  17J. 
Rex  V.  Martin,  6  C.  &  P.  562.     p.  449. 
Rex  r.  Mayor  of  .Oxford,  3  Nev.   &   M.  877. 

p.  2061. 
Rex.  V.  McGowan,  ciferZ,  11  Ir.  C.  L.   (n.  s.) 

188.    p.  45. 
Rex  V.  Messenger,  Kelvng,  78.    p.  2008. 
Rex  V.  Mogg,  4  Carr.  &"  P.  364.    p.  302. 
Rex  r.  Morris,  2  Burr.  1189,    p.  2049. 
Rex  r.  Noakes,  5  Carr.  &  P.  326.    pp.  464,  466, 

1553. 
Rex  V.  Offord,  5  Carr.  &  P.  163.    p.  1780. 
Rex  V.  Okey,  1  Levinz,  61 ;  s.  c.  Sid.  72;  Sir  J. 

Kelvng,  13;  1  Keble,  244.    p.  38. 
Rex  V.  Oldroyd,  1  Russ.  &  Ry.  C.  C.  88.    p. 

439. 
Rex  V.  Owens,  10  How.  St.  Tr.  App.  194.    p. 

1521. 
Rex  V.  Owens,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  1203.    p.  1505. 
Rex  r.  Parker,  3  Dougl.  242.    p.  486. 
Rex  r.  Parrv,  7  Car.  &  P.  838.    p.  90. 
Rex  V.  Parry,  8  Car.  &  P.  836.    p.  44. 


Rex  r.  Percival,l  Sid.  243.    p.  52. 
Rex  I'.  Perkins,  Holt,  403.    p.  68. 
Rex  V.  Perry,  5  Term  Rep.  453.    p.  25. 
Rex  V.  Phelau,  1  Craw.  &  Dix,  189.    p.  37. 
l{e.x  V.  Phillips,  3  Camp.  73.    p.  646. 
Rex  V.  Pierce,  2  Shower,  327.    p.  1396. 
Rex  V.  Pitcher,  1  Carr.  &  P.  85.    p.  262. 
Rex  V.  Ramsden,  2  Carr.  &  P.  603.    pp.  362, 

363. 
Rex  V.  Ratcllffe,  1  "W.  Bl.  3;  s.  c.  18  How.  St. 

Tr.  429.    p.  38. 
Rex  V.  Redman,  1  Keny,  384.    p.  667. 
Rex  V.  Roddam,  Cowp.  672.    p.  178. 
Rex  r.  Hudge,  2  Peake  N.  P.  Cas.  232.    p.  449. 
Rex  c.  Russell,  1  Mood.  C.  C.  3.56.    p.  646. 
Rex  r.  Scalbert,  2  Leach  C.  C.  7uO.    p.  86. 
Rex  V.  Searle,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  75.    p.  503. 
Hex  r.  Sheehan,  Jebb  Cr.  Cas.  54.    p.  464. 
Rex  V.  Shelley,  3  T.  R.  142.    p.  658. 
Rex  r.  Shepherd,  1  Leach  C.  C.  119.    p.  29. 
Rex  v.  Shipley,  3  T.  R.  428,  n.    p.  1513. 
Rex  r.  Smith,  2  Shower,  288.    p.  23. 
Rex  V.  St.  Andrew,  8  Barn.  &  Cres.  679.    p. 

1137. 
Rex  V.  Stone,  6  Term   Rep.  527.    pp.  88, 1904. 
Rex  1-.  Sutton,  8   Barn.   &  Cres.  417 ;   s.  c.  15 

Eng.  C.  L.  252.  pp.  48,  117, 122,  1976. 
Rex  V.  Tipping,  1  Car.  &  P.  668.  p.  25. 
Rex  V.  Tremaine,  7  Dowl.  &  Ry.  684 ;  s.  c.  16 

Eng.  C.  L.  318;   s.  c.  sub  nom.  Rex   r.  Tre- 

mearne,5  Barn.  &  Cress.  254;  11  Eng.  C.  L. 

218.    p.  32. 
Rex  V.  Undertakers  &c.,2  T.  R.  662.    p.  1584. 
Rex  r.  Voke,  Russ.  &  Ry.  53).    p.  301. 
Rex  v.  Warrington,  1  Salk.  152.    p.  23. 
Rex  V.  ^Vatson,  2  Stark.  149.    pp.  407,  416, 430. 
Rex  V.  AVhelan,  1  Craw.  &  Dix,  189.    p.  37. 
Rex  V.  White,  1  Burr.  338.    p.  1.584. 
Rex  r.  Wliittaker,  Cowp.  752.     p.  12. 
Rex  V.  Wiukworlb,  4  Carr.  &  P.  444.    p.  303. 
Rex  r.  Wilke.s,  4  Burr.  2527.    pp.  1.505, 1.521. 
Rex  V.  Withers,  3  T.  R.  428.     pp.  1505, 1522. 
Rex  V.  Wood,  5  Jur.  225.    p.  480. 
Rex  V.  Woodcock,  2  Leach  Cr.  C.  563.    p.  296. 
Rex  V.  Woodfall,  5  Burr.  2661.    pp.  1505, 1512, 

1513,1.521,2013. 
Rex  r.  Woolf .  1  Chit.  R.  401.    pp.  1902.  1906. 
Rex  V.  Worcester,  Skin.  101.    p.  96. 
Rex  V.  Worfleld,  5  T.  R.  508.    p.  1137. 
Rex  V.  Wright,   1   Russ.  &  R.  456.    pp.  512, 

1780. 
Reynolds  v.  Champlain  Trans.  Co.,  9  How. 

Pr.  (X.  Y.)  7.     pp.  1991,  1992. 
Reynolds  v.  Copeland,  71  Ind.  422.    p.  1006. 
Reynolds  v.  Cox,  11  Ind.  262.    p.  1646. 
Reynolds  v.  Dechaums,24  Tex.  174.    pp.  849, 

1418. 
Reynolds  v.  Hindman,  32  Iowa,  146.    p.  1224. 
Reynolds  v.  Kennedy,  1  Wils.  232.    pp.  1181, 

1184. 
Reynolds  t'.  Loundsburv,  6  Hill  (X.  Y.),534. 

pp.  328,  804. 
Reynolds  v.  Magness,  2  Ired.  L.  (N".  C.)  26. 

p.  1747. 
Reynolds  r.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y. 

248;  s.  c.  2  N.  Y.  S.  0.   (T.  &  C.)  644.    pp. 

1230, 1232. 
Reynolds  v.  Richards,  14  Pa.  St.  205.    p.  850. 
Reynolds  r.  Robinson,  64  X.  Y.  589.    p.  503. 
Reynolds  v.  State,  1  Ga.  222.    pp.  46,  67,  69. 
Reynolds   v.    State,   8    Tex.  412.    pp.    1680, 

1695. 
Reynolds  v.  Tompkins,  23  W.  Va.  229.    pp- 

1983,  1985. 
Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  145.    pp. 

14,  72,  75,  77,  98,  99,  126. 
Reynolds  v.  West,  1  Cal.  323.    p.  1084. 
Rhea  r.  Riner.  21  111.  526.    pp.  854,  912. 
Rheiuhart  v.  State,  14  Kan.  322.    pp.  307,  718. 


9a 


cxxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Rhctt  r.  Poe,  2  How.   (U.  S.)   457.    pp.  942, 

Rhines  r.  Baird,  41  Pa.  St.  256.    p.  1094. 
Rhoades  !•.  Selin,  4  Wash.  C.  C.   (U.  S.)  715. 

p.  275. 
Rhoads  v.  Jones,  02  Ind.  328.    p.  576. 
Rhodes  v.  Chessou,  Busbee  (N.  C),  336.    p. 

852. 
Rhodes  V.  Com.,  48  Pa.   St.  396.    pp.   1557, 

1851. 
Rhodes  v.  Dunbar,  57  Pa.  St.  274.    p.  1384. 
Rhodes  r.  Otis.  3:5  Ala.  578.    p.  1382. 
I  Rhodes  r.  Slate,  17  Tex.  App.  579.     p.  1679. 
I  Rice  V.  Bancroft,  11  Pick.    (Mass.)  469.    p. 

1977. 
Ricer.  Codman,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 377.    p.  925. 
Ricer.  DesMoines,  40  Iowa,  641.    pp.   1249, 

1268, 1269,  1270,  1483. 
Rice  V.  Kvausville,  108  Ind.  7.    pp.  2007,  2038. 
Rice  V.  Montpelier,  19  Vt.  470.    ]).  1247. 
Rice  V.  Olin,  79  Pa.  St.  391.    pp.  1682,  1683. 
Rice  V.  Rico,  6  Ind.  100.    pp.  1670,  2030. 
Rice  V.  State,  7  Ind.  332.    p.  73. 
Rice  V.  State,  3  Kan.  157.    ]>.  1576. 
Rice  V.  State,  1  Yerg.  (Tenu.)  432.    pp.  67,  69, 

76, 121. 
Rice  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  451.    pp.  1635, 1636, 

1768. 
Rice  V.  ^A^esson,  11  Mete.  (Mass.)  400.    p.  939. 
Richr.  Campbell,  1  W.oods  (U.  S.),509.    p.  14. 
Rich  V.  Jackwav,  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  357.    p.  346. 
Rich  V.  Lambert,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  347.    pp. 

1322, 134.5. 
Rich  V.  Plaver,  3  Show.  261.    pp.  23,  96. 
Rich  V.  Slate,  1  Tex.  App.  206.    ii.  128. 
Richard  v.  Van  Meter,  3  Cranch  C.  0.  (U.  S.) 

214.    p.  144. 
Richards  v.  Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  690.    p.  7. 
Richards  v.  El  well,  48  Pa.  St.  361.    p.  1041. 
Richards  v.  Goddard,  L.  R.  17  Eq.  238.    p.  168. 
Richards  v.  Nixon,  20  Pa.  St.  19.     pp.  217, 

221,222. 
Richards  V.  Richards,  37  Pa.  St.  228.    p.  607. 
Richards  v.  Kuckolls,  19  la.  555.     p.  2092. 
Richards  t;.  M'estcott,  2  Bosw.   (N.  Y.)  589. 

pp.  1155,  1612. 
Richardson  v.  Backus,  1  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  59. 

p.  2(196. 
Richardson  v.  Brown,  8  Moore,  338;  s.  c.  1 

Bing.  344.    p.  927. 
Richardson  v.  City  of  Boston,  24 How.  (U.  S.) 

188.    p.  1644. 
Richardson  v.  Golden,  3  Wash.  (U.  S.)  109. 

p.  347. 
Richardson  v.  Jones,  1  Nev.  405.    p.  1930. 
Richardson  v.  Lessee  &c.,  4  Binn.  (Pa.)  198. 

pp.  309,  718. 
Richardson «;.  Mellish,  3  Bing.  334;  s.  c.  7 

Barn.  &C.  819.    p.  2003. 
Richardson  r.  Bobbins,  124  Mass.  105.    p.  628. 
Richardson  v.  Snider,  72  Ind.  425;  s.  c.  37  Am. 

Rep.  168.    p.  1097. 
Richardson  r.  St.  Joseph's  IronCo.,5Blackf. 

(Ind.)  146.    p.  2111. 
Richey  v.  Burnes,  83  Mo.  362.    pp.  916, 1599. 
Richey  v.  Hinde,  6  Ohio,  371.    p.  891. 
Richey  v.  McBean,  17  111.  63.    pp.  1163,  1172. 
Richey  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Mo.  App.  150. 

p.  64. 
Richman  v.  State,  2  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  532. 

p.  284. 
Richmond  v.  Atkinson,  58  Mich. 413.    v.. 667, 

675. 
Richmond  17.  Bronson,  5  Denio  .'i>     V.),  55. 

p.  1476. 
Richmond  v.  Dayton,  10  Johnv.  (N.  Y.)  393. 

pp.  135,  140,  141. 
Richmond  v.  Richmond,  10  Yerg.    (Tenn.) 

343.    i>.  469. 


Richmond  v.  Roberts,  98  111.  472.    pp.  64,  102. 
Richmond  t).  Sacramento  Valley  R.   Co.,  18 

Vti\.  351.    p.  1255. 
Richmond  v.  Wardlaw,  36  Mo.  313.    p.  2049. 
Richmond    &c.    Co.    v.    Farquar,  8   Blackf. 

(Ind.)  89.     p.  827. 
Richmond  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Starks.  4  Mason  (U. 

S.),296.    p.  1130. 
Richter  v.  Koster,  45  Ind.  440.    p.  2082. 
Rickabus  v.  Golt,  51  Mich.  227.    p.  739. 
Rickard  v.  State,  74  Ind.  275.    p.  1918. 
Ricketts  i;.  Harvey,  106  Ind.  564.    pp.   1705, 

1750. 
Ricketts  V.  Pendleton,  14  Md.  321.    pp.  876, 

942. 
Ricketts  v.  Richardson,  85  Ind.  ,508.    p.  2110. 
Rickov  r.  Zeppenfeldt,  64  Mo.  277.    p.  1708. 
Rickford  r.  Uidge,  2  Camp.  537.    p.  944. 
Ricks  r.  State,  19  Tex.  Ap"p.  308.     p.  764. 
Kiddle  v.  Core,  21  W.  Va.  530.    p.  2051. 
Riddle  i\  Varnum,  20  Pick.  (Mass.)  283.    pp. 

908,  909. 
Riddlesburg&c.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  65  Pa.  St.  416. 

pp.  1938,  195.S. 
Ridenhauer  r.  State,  75  Ga.  382.    p.  1509. 
Rider  r.  People,  110  111.  13.    pp.  ISOI,  1802. 
Kidgew.-^V  i'.  Hollidav,  59  Mo.  144.    p.  1055. 
Kidgwayr.  Dey,  13  Pa.  St.  208.    p.  948 
Ridgway  v.  Ewbank,  2  Mood.  &  R.  217.    pp. 

218,219. 
Ridgway  r.  Morris  -n,  28  Ind.  201.    p.  199. 
llidlev  y.  Buchanan,  2  Swan   (Tenn.),   555. 

p.  807. 
Ridley  r.  Gvdc,  1   Mood.  &  Rob.  197.    p.  635. 
Riest  v.  Goshen,  42  Ind.  339.    p.  1224. 
Rigby  V.  Hewitt,  5  Exch.  240.    pp.  1209,  1210, 

1221. 
Rigg  V.  Cook,  9  111.  336.    p.  1996. 
Riffgins  V.  Brown,  12  Ga.  272.    pp.  1714,  1905, 

1957,  2067. 
Riggs  r.  S.avage,  9  111.  129.    p. 
Riggs  V.  Tavloe,  9  AVheat.  (tJ.  S.    tai.     p.  620. 
Riggs  V.  State,  26  Miss.  51.    p.  19b4. 
Right  v.  Darbv,  1  T.  R.  159.    p.  113r. 
Riley  V.  Bussell,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  29*     ».  50. 
Riley  V.  Carter,  3  Humph.    (Tenn.)     i'X    p. 

1588. 
Riley  v.  Dickens,  19  111.  29.    p.  845. 
Riley  v.  Home,  5  Bing.  217.    pp.  1321    ^323, 

1345. 
Riley  v.  Riley,  36  Ala.  496.    p.  827. 
Riley  v.  State,  9  Humph.   (Ten-.       46.     p. 

1981. 
Riley  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  100.    ?.    1855. 
Riley  v.  Watson,  18  Ind.  291.    jip . .  26,  1727. 
Riley  v.  West  Virginia  &c.  R.  Co,    27  W.  Va. 

150.     pp.1254,  1261,1262,1487. 
Rindskoff  v.  Curran,  34  la.  326.    p.  1669. 
Kinehart  v.  Bowen,  44  Ind.  ^53.    p.  2139. 
Riney  v.  Vanlandingham,  9  Mo.  816.    pp.  481, 

1197. 
Ring  V.  Cohoes,  7  Reporter,  725 ;  s.  c.  19  ^ilb. 

L.  J.  472.     p.  1247. 
Ring  v.  State,  42  Tex.  282.    p.  1575. 
Ring  r.  Wheeler,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  725.    p.  795.. 
Ringgold  V.  Haven,  1  Cal.  108.    pp.  1590,  1605. 
Ringle  v.  First  Mat.  Bank,  107  Ind.  426.    p. 

2051. 
RIngo  V.  Field,  6  Ark.  43.    p.  1.5S5. 
Ripley  I'.  uEtna  Ins.  Co.,  30  X.  Y.  136.     p.  982. 
Ilv'cy  V.  Coolidgc,   Minor  (Ala.),  11.    pp. 

117, 125, 126. 
Ripon  r.  Bittel,  30  Wis.  619.    p.  783. 
Ripon  r.  Davies,  2  Nev.  &  I\r.  310.    p.  273. 
Ripp,  In  re,  29  N.  W.  Hep.  517.    i>p.  1622,1638. 
Rippey  v.  Friede,  26  Mo.  523.    p.  IGOO. 
Rippy  V.  State,  2  Head  (Tenn.),  217.    p.  1548. 
Rising  Sun  &c.  Co.  v.  Conway,  7  Ind.  187.. 

pp.  1726,  1727. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXl 


Ritchey  v.  Davis,  11  la.  124.    pp.  1170.  1171, 

1197. 
Ritchie  r.  Holbroolje,  7  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  458. 

pp.  1921,  1923,  1924,  1991. 
Rives  r.  McLosky,  5  Stew.  &  P.   (Ala.)  330. 

p.  1733. 
Rives  V.  Parmlev,  IS  Ala.  261.    p.  949. 
Roach  V.  Huliiitjs,  Ki  Pet.  (V.  S.)  319.    p.  1669. 
Roach  V.  (State,  41  Tex.  262.     p.  312. 
Roach  V.  Slate,  4  Tex.  App.  46.    pp.  465, 1779. 
Roan  V.  Rohrer,  72  111.  582.     p.  2080. 
Robb  r.  Hackley,  23  Wend.  (M.  Y.)  50.    pp. 

484,  486,  487,  490. 
Robb  V.  McDonald,  22  Iowa,  330.    p.  152. 
Robb  V.  Ross  Co.  Bank,  41  Darb.  (X.  Y.)  586. 

p.  1023. 
Robb  V.  Starkey,  2  Car.  &  K.  143.    p.  615. 
Robbius  1-.  Alton  Marine  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Mo. 

380.    p.  1600. 
Robbinsu.  Dillaye,33Barb.  (N.  Y.)  77.    pp. 

885,  886. 
Robbins  v.  Fowler,  2  Ark.  133.    p.  1669. 
Robbins  v.  Gortiam,  25  N.  V.  588.    p.  184. 
Robbins  V.  Parker,  8  Mete.    (Mass.)  117.    p. 

1443. 
Robbins  v.  State,  S  Oh.  St.  131.    pp.  1508, 1520, 

155K,  1851. 
Robbins  v.  State,  49  Ala.  394.    p.  111. 
Robbins  t'.  "Windover,  2  Tyler  (Vt.),  11.    p. 

1983. 
Roberts  v.  Rradshaw,  1  Stark.  28.    p.  611. 
Roberts  v.  Corbin,  28  la.  355.     p.  2042. 
Roberts  v.  Fallis,  1  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  238.    p.  1964. 
Roberts  r.  Graham,  6  Wall.  (U.  S.)  578.    pp. 

161.16,  1663. 
Roberts  v.  Jenkins,  21  N.  H.  116.    p.  929. 
Roberts  v.  Johnson,  37  X^.  Y.  Super.  157.    p. 

582. 
Roberts  r.  Johnson,  58  N.  Y.  613 ;  s.  c.  5  Jones 

&  Sp.  157.    p.  1237. 
Roberts  v.  Manslield,  32  Ga.  228.    p.  1632. 
Roberts  v.  Mason,  10  Oh.   St.  277.    pp.  1479, 

1486. 
Roberts  v.  Mazeppa  MiU  Co.,  30  Minn.  413. 

)).  1124. 
Roberts  v.  McGrath,  38  Wis.  52.    p.  1663. 
Roberts  v.  Nelson,  22  Mo.  App.  28.    p.  191. 
Roberts  z'.  Ogdensburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,29  Hun 

(N.  Y.),  1.54.     pp.  653,  655. 
Roberts  v.  Riley,  15  La.  Ann.  103.    pp.   1322, 

1345. 
Roberts  v.  Roberts,  85  X.  C.  9.    pp.  372,  423, 

551. 
Robertson  v.  Spring,  16  La.  Ann.  252.    p.  1197. 
Roberts  r  Swift,  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  209.    p.  899. 
Roberts  v.  Swearengen,  Hard.  (Ky.)  121.    p. 

i09. 
Roberts  v.  Thompson,  28  111.  79.    p.  1060. 
Roberts  v.  Trauwick,  13  Ala.  68.    p.  1589. 
Roberts  v.  Trenayue,  C  ro.  Jac.  507.    p.  886. 
Roberts  v.  Wood,  38  Wis.  60.    p.  1663. 
Robertson  v.  Caw,  3  IJarb.  410.    p.  482. 
Robertson  v.  Garshwiler,  81  Ind.    463.     p. 

2058. 
Roberts  v,  Hughes,  7  Mees.  &  W.  399.    pp. 

1986,  19.-'8. 
Robertson  v.  State,  43  Ala.  325.    p.  18. 
Robertson  v.  state,  9  Tex.  App.  20.i.    p.  1835. 
Robeson  r.  Whitesides,  16  Serg.   &  R.  (Pa.) 

320.    p.  870. 
Robidoux  V.  Cassilegi,  10  Mo.  App.  516.    p. 

1051. 
Robinson  v.  Adkins,  19  Ga.398.    pp.  721,  722. 
Robinson  v.  Anderson,  106  Ind.  1.52.    p.  2138. 
Robinson  v.  Bealle,  20  Ga.  275.    p.  341. 
Robinson  v.  Benson,  19  Xev.  331 ;  s.  c.  lOPac. 

Rep.  441.     pp.  2084,  20a5,  2099. 
Robinson  r.  Brock,  1  Hen.  &M.  (Va.)  213.  p. 

2013. 


Robinson  v.  Campbell,  8  Mo.  365.    p.  1056. 
Robinson  v.  Cone,  22  Vt.  213.    p.  1231. 
Robinson  v.  Corn  Exchange  Ins.  Co.,1  Rob. 

(X.  Y.)  14.    1).  1476. 
Robinson  v.  Cushman,  2  Denio  (X.  Y.),  149. 

Ijp.  888,  S94. 
Robinson  r.  Ferry,  11   Conn.    460.    pp.   289, 

293,  547,564,  ].")06,  1507. 
Robinson  r.  Fitchburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Gray 

(Mass.),  92.    p.  1224. 
Robinson  r.  Gould,  26  la.  89.    p.  873. 
Robinson  r,  lladlev,  14  Ind.  417.    p.  2091. 
Robinson  v.  Hawkesford,  9  Ad.  &  El.  i  .n.  s.) 

52.    p.  944. 
Robinson  v.  Hitchcock,  S  Met.  (Mass.)  64. 

pp.  214,  218,  219,  221,  223,  24.3. 
Robinson  v.  Hood,  67  Mo.  660.    p.  2128. 
Robinson  i\  Johnson,  61  Ind.  535.    p.  2141. 
Robinson  v.  I\[urphv,  69  Ala.  543.    p.  191. 
Robinson  v.  Xeal,  2"T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  212.    p. 

261.  ' 

Robinson  v.  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  Barb. 

(X.  Y.)146.     p.  1225. 
Robinson  v.  Randall,  82  111.  515.    i)p.  63,  115, 

116. 
Robinson  v.  Raynor,  36  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  131 :  s.  c. 

28  X.  Y.  497.     p.  899. 
Robinson  v.  Rice,  20  Mo.  230.    p.  1607. 
Robinson  v.  Robards,  15  Mo.  459.    pp.  1436, 

1440,  1447. 
Robinson  v.  State,  33  Ark.  180.    pp.  85,  2098. 
Robinson  v.  State,  16  Fla.  835.    pp.  453,  455. 
Robinson  v.  State,  84  Ind.  452.    p.  15J5. 
Robinson  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  390.    p.  1560. 
Robinson  r.  State,  1   Lea  (i'enn.),  673.     p. 

555. 
Robinson  v.  State,  34  Tex.  1.52.    p.  1744. 
Robinson  v.  Stewart,  10  X.  Y.  190.    p.  1446. 
Robinson  v.  Suter,  15  Mo.  App.  599.    p.  2103. 
Robinson  v.  Uhl,  6  Xeb.  328.    p.  920. 
Robinson  v.  Walton,  58  Mo.  38.    p.  1017. 
Robinson  v.  West  Pa.  R.  Co.,  72  Pa.  St.  316. 

p.  1107. 
Robinson  v.  AVestern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  48  CaL 

409.     pp.  1223,  1225. 
Robinson  v.  White,  42  Me.  209.    p.  1081. 
Robinson,  Ex  parte,  19  Wall.   (U'.  S.)  505. 

pp.  133,146,148,150. 
Ro  lies  V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  346.    pp.  48, 82. 
Robson  0.  Calze,Dougl.  216.    p.  1068. 
Robson  V.  Xortheastern  R.  Co.,  40  L.  J.  Q.  B. 

50 ;  s.  c.  2  Q.  B.  Div.  85.    p.  1216. 
Rocheblare  v.  Potter,  1  Mo.  .561.    p.  1440. 
Rochereau  i\  Bark  Hausa,  14   La.  Ann.  431. 

pp.  1322,  1343. 
Rochester  City  Bank  v.  Suydam,  5  How.  Pr. 

254.    p.  272. 
Rochester  White  Lead  Co.  v.  City  of  Roches- 
ter, 3  X.  Y.  463.     pi>.  1268,  1273. 
Rockford  v.  Hildebrand,  61  111.  155.    p.  1249. 
RoCKford  t'.  Russell,  9  Bradw.  (111.)  229.    p. 

661. 
Rockford  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Byam,  80  111.  528.    p. 

1230.  '■ 

Rockford  Ins.  Co.  r.  Xelson,  75  111.  548.    p.  21. 
Roddy  r.  Finnegan,  43  Md.  490.    p.  527. 
Rodgers  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.  (Cal.),  8  Pac. 

Rep.  377.    p.  1239. 
Roe  r.  Taylor,  45  111.  4S5.    pp.  827,  829,  1690 
Roeder  r.  Studt,  12  Mo.   App.  566.    pp.  709, 

737,744,1971.  ff  > 

Roolker,  In  re,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.),  276.    pp. 

166,169,176.  ^     o        ^  11 

Roemmich  v.  Wamsganz,  8  Mo.  App.  576. 

pp.  2093,  2094. 
Rogers  17.  Ackerman,  22  Barb.    (X.   Y.)   134. 

p.  927. 
Rogers  ?'.  Carcv,  47  Mo.  232.    p.  872. 
Rogers  v.  Colt,"21  X.  J.  L.  704.    p.  825. 


CXXXll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Kogers  v.  Diamoud,  13  Ark.  474.     pp.  219, 

Rogers  v.  Hocnig.  4G  Wis.  361.  pp.  2056, 2064. 
Kogers  r.  Lamh,  3  IJlackf.  (Ind.)  155.  p.  52. 
Rogers  r.  Maddeu,  2  Bailev  (S.  C),  321.    pp. 

1044,  1586. 
Rogers  r.  3[cCune,  19  Mo.  557.    pp.  1669, 1708. 
Kogers  v.  Moons  10  Conn.  13.    pp.  471,  475. 
Kogers  v.Moulthrop,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  274. 

p.  1720. 
Rogers  v.  Ostroni,  35  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  523.    p. 

1003. 
Rogers  v.  Rogers  (Ga.),  3  S.  East.vRep.  451. 

pp.  204S,  2055. 
Rogers  v.  Rogers,  46  Iiul.  1.    p.  2089. 
Kogers  V.  Rogers,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  131.    pp. 

71,96. 
Rogers  v.  Smith,  17  Ind.  333.    p.  1235. 
Rogers  v.  Smith,  1  Ad.  &  El.  772.    p.  18. 
Rogers  v.  State,  33  Ind.  543.    p.  26. 
Rogers  r.  State,  99  Ind.  218.    \).  2044. 
Rogers  v.  Stephens,  2  T.  R.  713.    pp.  947,  948. 
Rosrers  r.  The  Marshal,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.)  645. 

pp.  1740, 1956. 
Rogers  r.  Weir,  34  N.  Y.  463.    p.  1156. 
Rogers  v.  West,  9  Ind.  400.    p.  1476. 
Roggencamp  r.  Dobbs,  15  Neb.  620.    p.  207B. 
Rolirer  v.  Brockhage,  15  Mo.  App.   16.    jjp. 

204S,  2080,  2081,  2088. 
Rohrer  v.  Morningstar,  18  Oh.  St.  579.    p.  328. 
Rolf  V.  Polland,  16  Keb.  21;  s.  c.  19  N.   W. 

Rep.  615.    p.  218. 
Rolfe  V.  Rumford,  66  ]Me.  564.    pp.  728,  747. 
Roll  V.  Indianapolis,  52  Ind.  547.    p.  1264. 
Roiland  v.  Com.,  82  Pa.  St.  306.    pp.  19,  20,  30, 

.32. 
Roller  V.  Bachman,  5  Lea  (Tenn.),  154.    p. 

1983. 
Roller  V.  Wooldridge,  46  Tex.  485.    p .  1^2. 
Rollings  V.  Gate,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  97.    p.  1681. 
Rollins  V.  Ames,  2  N.  H.  349.    pp.  47, 1976. 
Rollins  V.  Chalmers,  51  Vt.  592.    p.  1491. 
Rollins  V.  State,  62  Ind.  40.    pp.  1694, 1800. 
Roloson  V.  Herr,  14  Ind.  5.39.    p.  2141. 
Romaiuey  v.  State,  7  Ind.  63.    pp.  67, 119, 123, 

124. 
Roman  r.  State,  41  Wis.  312.    p.  1930. 
Komeyn  v.  Caplis,  17  Mich.  449.    p.  151. 
Kondcau  v.  New  Orleans  ImiJ.  Co.,  15  La. 

Ann.  160.     p)).  26,  68,  69. 
Rood  V.  Priestlv,  58  Wis.  255.    p.  914. 
Kooh  V.  Brewster,  36  N.  \V.  Rep.  649.    p.  2075. 
Rooks  V.  State,  65  Ga  330.    p.  257. 
Rooney  r.  Grant.  40  Ga.  191.    pi).  2087,  2088. 
Roop  v.  Brubacker,  1  Rawle  (Pa.),  304.    p. 

1988. 
Root  V.  Brewster,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  649.    p.  2097. 
Root  V.  Curtis,  38  111.  192.    p.  1750. 
Root  V.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  29  la.  102.    p.  2054. 
Root  V.  King,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  613.    p.  1466. 
Root  v.  Sherwood,  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  68.    pp. 

1997, 1990. 
Roquest  v.  Boutin,  14  La.  Ann.  44.    p.  582. 
Rose  V.  Blakemore,  Ry.  &  M.  383.    p.  287. 
Rose  V.  Davis,  4  Cow.  "(N.  Y.)  17.    p.  1931. 
Rose  V.  Des  xMoines  Aalley  R.  Co.,  39  la.  246. 

p.  1298. 
Rose  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  91  Mo.  399.    pp.  879, 

880. 
Rose  V.  Lewis,  10  Mich.  483.    p.  609. 
Koser.  Northeastern  K.  Co.,  2  Exch.   Div. 

248;  s.  c.  46  L.  J.  (Exch.)  374.     p.  1216. 
Rose  V.  Spies,  44  Mo.  20.    pp.  1642,  l(i88. 
Rose  v.M-  Charles,  49  Mo.  .509.    p.  55. 
Rose  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  470.    p.  1537. 
Roseboro  v.  Thompson,  1   App.   C.  Ci\\,  § 

19.    p.  2071. 
Roseborough  r.  State,  43  Tex.  570.    pp.  113, 

118,  120. 


Rosecrans  v.  Wabash  &c.  R.  Co.,  83  Mo.  678. 

pp.  811,  1626,  1627. 
Rosenberg  v.  DesMoines,  41  Iowa  417.    pp. 

1268,  1270. 
Rosenblatt  v.  Haberman,  8  Mo.  App.  486.    p. 

937. 
Rosenheim  v.  American  Ins.  Co.,  33  Mo.  230. 

p.  560. 
Rosenthal  v.  Middlebrook,  63  Tex.  334.    pp. 

339   349. 
Ross'i'.  Ackcrman,  46  N.  Y.  210.    p.  413. 
Ross  V.  Butler,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  294.    p.  1384. 
Ross  V.  Bruce,  1  Day  (Conn.),  100.    p.  609. 
Ross  V.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.,  7  Mo.  App.  575.    p. 

811. 
Ross  V.  Crutsinger,  7  Mo.  245.    pp.  1441, 1447. 
Ross  V.  Gill,  1  Wash.  (Va.)  87.    j).  1.584. 
Ross  V.  Gould,  5  Me.  210.    pp.  216,  219. 
Ross  V.  Head,  51  Ga.  605.    p.  209. 
Ross  V.  Johnson,  5  Burr.  2825.    p.  13.30. 
Ross  V.  Misner,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  3(i2.    p.  2111. 
Ross  V.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  4  Mo.  App.  583. 

p.  1155. 
Ross  r.  Neal,  7  B.  Monr.  (Ky.)  408.    p.  6. 
Koss  V.  Ross,  21  Ala.  322.    p.  1698. 
Ross  V.  State,  59  Ga.  248    pp.  540,  .541,  1805. 
Ross  V.  Slate,  9  Tex.  App.  275.    p.  1S55. 
Ross  V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  554.    i).  1896. 
Ross  V.  State,  29  Tex.  499.     p.  1635. 
Ross  f.  Turner,  5  Yerger  (Tenn.),  338.    p. 

1080. 
Ross  r.  United  States,  12  Ct.  of  CI.  565.    p. 

2024. 
Rosser  v.  Barnes,  16  Ind.  502.    pp.  2030,  2031, 

2033. 
Rosser  v.  McColley,  9  Ind.  587.    pp.  317,  705, 

707,  1997. 
Roth  V.  Buffalo  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  548.    p. 

1143. 
Rotli  V.  Colvin,  32  Vt.  125.     pp.  950, 951. 
Koth  V.  Miller,  15  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)   100.    p. 

825. 
Rothe  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  21  Wis.  256. 

p.  1235. 
Rothrock  r.  Gallagher,  91  Pa.  St.  108.    p.  357. 
Rothschild  r.  Slate,  7  Tex.  App.  519.    pp.  66, 

74,75,77,116. 
Roulo  r.  Valcour,  58  N.  H.  347.    p.  820. 
Round  V.  State,  14  Ind.  493.    pp.  2107,  2108. 
Rounds  V.  McCorraick,  11  Bradw.  (lU.)  220. 

11.  338. 
Rourke  v.  Bulleus,  8  Gray  (Mass.),  349.    p. 

1604. 
Rouse  V.  Lewis,  4  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.) 

121.     p.  1669. 
Rouse  V.  Whited,  25  N.  Y.  170.    p.  639. 
Roush  V.  Layton,  51  Ind.  106.     pp.  2074,  2101. 
Rousseau   v.   Corey,  62  Ind.  250.    pp.  2050, 

2052. 
Roussln    V.  St.  Louis  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Mo. 

244.     p.  560. 
Routsong  V.  Pacific  R.   Co.,  45  Mo.  236.    p. 

1698. 
Rowan  v.  State,  30  Wis.  129.     pp.  1903,  1907. 
Rowbotham  v.  Pearce,  5  Iloust.   (Del.)  135. 

p.  1003. 
Rowe  r.  Brenlon,  3  Man.  &  Ry.  133.    p.  309. 
Rowe  V.  Canney,  1.39  Mass.  41.    pp.  1976, 1985. 
Rowe  V.  Haines,  15  Ind.  445.    p.  561. 
Rowe  V.  Portsmouth,  56  N.  H.  291.    pp.  1247, 

1249. 
Rowe  V.  State,  11  Humph.   (Tenn.)  491.    p. 

1930. 
Rowe  V.  Tipper,  13  Com.  Bench,  249.    i)|). 

943,  944. 
Rowe,  Ex  parte,  7  Cal,  181;  s.  c.  T  C'al.  177. 

1>1..  1.52,  17.5. 
Rowell  r.  Fuller's  Estate,  5  X.  Eng.  Rep.  217. 

p.  1645. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXlll 


Rowell  i:  Williams,  29  Iowa,  210.    p.  1249. 
Rowland  v.  Berries,  1  Carr.  &  Kir.  46.    p.  217. 
Rowland  V.  Rowland.  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  61. 

p.  1670. 
Rowland  v.  State.  14  Ind.  575.    p.  1990. 
Rowlands  v.  !?aniuels,  11  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)40, 

note.    p.  1167. 
Rowley  V.  Empire  Ins.  Co.,  36  N.  T.  550.    p. 

972. 
Rowley  v.  Insurance  Co.,  36  N.  T.  550.    p.  977. 
Rowley  «.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Keys  (N.  Y.),557.    p. 

977. 
Rowlev  V.  Rav,  139  Mass.  241.    p.  2002. 
Rov  r.  Targee,  7  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  359.    p.  552. 
Royal  r.  Smitli,  40  Iowa,  615.    p.  1491. 
Rovce  V.  Guggenlieim,  106  Mass.  201.    p.  1003. 
Rover  V.  Fleming,  58  Mo.  338.    p.  1668. 
Rover  t\  Schultz  Belting  Co.,  29  Fed.  Rep. 

281.     p.  1605. 
Rozar  v.  Burns.  13  Ga.  34.    p.  1698. 
Rozell  V.  Anderson,  91  Ind.  591.    p.  1264. 
Ruble  V.  McDonald,  7  la.  90.    pp.  1964, 1966, 

v:m,  1994. 
Ruclier  r.  Beatv,  3  Ind.  70.    p.  451 . 
Ruclier  v.   Edding,  7  Mo.   115.    pp.  309, 312, 

718, 1624. 
Rackersville  Bank  v.  Hemphill,  7  Ga.  396. 

pp.  1943,  1945. 
Ruckman  v.  Cowvell,  1  X.  Y.  505.    p.  136. 
Rudd  V.  Davis,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  287.    p.  1585. 
Rudd  i:  Davis,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  529.    p.  1605. 
Ruddell  V.  Tyner,  87  Ind.  529.    p.  2061. 
Rudolph  V.  Ilandwerlen,  92  Ind.  34.    pp.  710, 

737,  744,  745,  759. 
Rudolphy  v.  Fuchs,  44  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  155. 

p.  1219. 
Rudsill  r.  Slingerland,  ISMinn.  380.    p.  449. 
Ruff  V.  Rader.  2  Mont.  211.    pp.  70,  75. 
Ruff  r.  Ruff,  85  Ind.  431.     p.  1621. 
Rugg  V.  Minett,  11  East,  209.    p.  910. 
Rugg  r.  Spencer,  59  Barb.  383.    p.  137. 
Ruggles  V.  Coffin,  70  Me.  468.    p.  311. 
Ruloff  V.  People,  45  X.  Y.  213 ;  s.  c.  11  Abb 

Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  245.     p.  661. 
RundeU  v.  Butler,  10  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  119.    p 

560. 
Runnells  v.  State,  28  Ark.  121.    p.  2098. 
Runey  v.  Shoenberger,  2  Watts  (Pa.),  23.    p 

1014. 
Ruuvan  v.  Caldwell,  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  134 

P."l3-n. 
Ranyan  r.  Price,  15  Oh.  St.  1.    p.  428. 
Runvon  ?\  Clark,  4  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  52.    !> 

959. 
Runyon  r.  Groshon,  12  X.  J.  Eq.  86.    p.  1442 
Runyon  v.  State,  57  Ind.  84.    p.  1545. 
Rusch  V.  Davenport,  6  Iowa,  443.    p.  1224. 
Rush  r.  French,  1  Ariz.  99.    pp.  385,  386,  389, 

559,  561,  562.  .56.i,  573,  574. 
Rush  V.  Peddigo,  63  Ind.  479.    pp.  1911,  1912, 

2034. 
Rushin  v.  Shields.  11  Ga.  636.    p.  1632. 
Rushmore  v.  Hall,  12  Abb.  Pr.   (X.   Y.)   420. 

p.  1671. 
Rushton  V.  Martin,  43  Ala.  555.    p.  2019. 
Russel  V.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)440.    p.  1977. 
Russell  V.  Ashlev,  Hemp.  (U.  S.)  549.     p.  .572. 
Russell  V.  Artiiur.  17  S.  C.  477.    pp.  825,  831. 
Russell  V.  Barcroft,  1  Mo.  662.    p.  159S. 
Russell  V.  Branliam,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.j  277.    p. 

21 1.^. 
Russell  V.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  143.  pp.  471, 

472. 
Russell  V.  Columbia,  74  Mo.  487.    p.  1280. 
Hu.ssell  r.  Crutienden,  53  Conn.  564.    p.  407. 
Russell  r.  Dver,  40  X.  H   173.    )).  1108. 
Russell  ?•.  Gibbs,  5  Cow.  39.    p.  1139. 
Russell  V.  Hamilton,  3  111.  56.    p.  55. 


Russell  V.  Hudson  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  X.  Y.  134. 

pp.  361,  365. 
Russell  r.  Peo]ile,  44  111.  508.    pp.  1903, 1907. 
Russell  V.  Place,  94  U.  S.  606.    p.  1074. 
Russell  V.  Quinn,  114  Mass.  103.     pp.  113, 

2062. 
Russell  V.  Rider,  6  Car.  &  P.  416.    p.  632. 
Russell  V.  St.  Nicholas  &c.  Co.,  51  X.  Y.  643. 

p.  403. 
Russell  V.  State,  53  Miss.  365.    pp.  21,  65,  83, 

1930,  19S2. 
Russell  V.  State,  13  Xeb.  68.    p.  2051. 
Russell  V.  State  Ins.  Co.,  55  Mo.  585.    p.  1150. 
Russell  r.  Tilotson,  140  Mass.   201;  s.  c.  4  X. 

E.  Rep.  231.    p.  1241. 
Rust  r.  Eckler,  41  X.  Y.  488.    p.  569. 
Rust  I'.  Shacklef  ord,  47  Ga.  538.    p.  53. 
Ruston's  Case.  Leach  C.  C.  458.    p.  332. 
Rutherford  t\  Com.,  13  Bush  (Ky.),608.  pp. 

126,  287. 
Rutherford  v.  Geddes,  4  WaU.   (U.  S.)  224. 

p.  572. 
Rutherford  v.  Holmes,  66  N.  Y.  368;  s.  c.  5 

Hun  (X.  Y.).31.     ]».  141. 
Rvall  V.  Rowles,  1   Atk.  165;  s.  c.  1  Ves.  359. 

p.  1440. 
Rvan  V.  Conch,  66  Ala.  244.    pp.  253,  256. 
Rvan  r.  Dunlap,  17  111.  40.    p.  1023. 
Rvan  V.  Gross  (Md.),  12  Atl.  Rep.  115.    p. 

1415. 
Rv:m  V.  Harrow,  27  la.  494.    p.  1929. 
Rvan  V.  Hudson  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  Jones  &  Sp. 

"(X.  Y.)  137.    p.  1225. 
Rvan  V.  Kelly,  9  Mo.  App.  591.    p.  1985. 
Rvan  t:  Lvnch,  68  111.  160.    p.  819. 
Rvan  V.  Marsh,  2  Xott  &  M.  (S.  C.)   156.     p. 

891. 
Rvan  V.  People,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  188.    pp. 

"402,  409,  583. 
Ryder  v.  People,  38  Mich.  269.    p.  95. 
Rvder  V.  Womb  well,  L.  R.  4    E.xch.  32;  s.  c. 

38  L.  J.  Exch.  8.     pp.  1599,  1602, 1605. 
Ryerson  v.  Abiugton,  102  Mass.  526.    p.  1210. 


S.  1'.  E..  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  240.     pp.  646,  649.  651. 
Sacia  r.  O'Connor,  58  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  430. 

p.  2059. 
Sackett  v.  Loomis,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  148.    p. 

939. 
Sackett  r.  Spencer,  29  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  180.    p. 

358. 
Sacramento  &c.  Mining  Co.  v.  Showers,  6 

Nev.  291.     pp.  1927,  1932. 
Saddler  v.  Heulock.  4  El.  &  Bl.  570.    p.  1218. 
Saddler  v.  Rav,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  523.    p.  188. 
Saddler  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  194.    p.  1564. 
Saddler  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  195.    p.  1707. 
Sadler  v.  Sadler,  16  Ark.  628.    p.  1690. 
Safe  Deposit  Co.  v.  Pollock,  85  Pa.   St.  391. 

pp.  1321,  1338. 
Safford  v.  Grout,  120  Mass.  20.    p.  1415. 
Safret  I'.  Hartman,  5  Jones  L.   (X.   C.)  185. 

pp.  1081, 1082. 
Sage  V.  Brown,  34  Ind.  464.    pp.  1911,  2035, 

2040. 
Sage  V.  Valentine,  23  Minn.  102.    p.  1068. 
Sager  v.  Portsmouth  &c.  R.  Co..  31  Me.  228. 

p.  1348. 
Sager  r.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  110.    pp.  372, 

400  435. 
Sailer  v.  Barnousky,  60  AVis.  169.    p.  1703. 
Sailor  v.  Hertzog,  4  Whart.   (Pa.)  259.    p. 

10.r2. 
Sainthill  v.  Bound,  4  Esp.  74.    p.  635. 
Salander  v.  Lockwood,  66  Ind.  285.    pp.  2035, 

20.36. 
Salisbury  v.  Peniofe,  44  Mo.  554.    p.  936. 


CXXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Salmon  v.  Bennett,  1  Conn.  525.  p.  1445. 
Salmon  v.  AVard,  2  Carr.  &  P.  211.  p.  927. 
Salmon  Falls  Man.  Co.  v.  Goddard,  14  How. 

(U.S.)  446.    p.  8-i;5. 
Salmons  v.  Uouudtree,  24  Ala.  45S.    pp.  1750, 

1758. 
Saltmarsh  r.  Bower,  22  Ala.  221.    p.  1093. 
Salter  v.  Utica  &c.  li.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  42.    p. 

1304. 
Saltonstall  v.  Stockton,  1  Taney's  Dec.  11. 

p.  1211. 
Sam  r.  State,  13  Sni.  &  M.  (Miss.)  189.    pp. 

64,09,70,71,74,75,76,  121. 
Sam  r.  State,  1  Swan  (Tenn.),  61.    pp.  1907, 

1919. 
Sam,  Ex  parte,  51  Ala.  34.    pp.  132,  153. 
Samis  v.  Clark,  13  HI.  454.    p.  1125. 
Sample  v.  Kobb,  16  Pa.  St.  305.    p.  1066. 
Sampson   v.    SchafCer,  3   Cal.  107.    pp.  115, 

891. 
Samschen  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  45.    p.  24. 
Samuel,  The,  1  AVheat.  (U.  ti.)  15.    p.  671. 
Samuels  v.  Griffith,  13  la.  103.    pp.  312,  436, 

758. 
Samuels  v.  State,  3  Mo.  68.    p.  20. 
San  Antonio  v.  Lewis,  9  Tex.  69.    p.  825. 
San  Francisco  v.  Clark,  1  Cal.  386.    p.  1376. 
Sanchez  v.  McJIahon,  35  Cal.  218.    p.  2099. 
Sanchez  v.  People,  22  X.  Y.  147.    pp.  98,  125. 
Sanchez  f.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  635. 

p.  74. 
Sanderlin  v.  Sanderlin,  24  Ga.  583.    p.  334. 
Sanders  v.  Lov,  45  lud.  229.    p.  2101. 
Sanders  v.  Metcalf,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  419.    pp.  132, 

158. 
Sanders  v.  State,  2  la.  230.    pp.  1910, 1911. 
Sanders  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  222.    pp.  1735, 

1744. 
Sanders  v.  State,  41  Tex.  307.     p.  1695. 
Sanders  r.  AVeelburg,  107  liid.  266.    p.  2038. 
Sanderson  v.  Bowen,  4  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y.) 

675.     pp.  1937,  1947,  1962. 
Sanderson  r.  Nashua,  44  N.  H.  492.    p.  1969. 
Sanderson  v.  Ileinstadler,31  Mo.  483.    p.  942. 
Sanderson's  Case,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  638.  p.  261. 
Saudford  v.  State,  11  Ark.  238.    p.  108. 
Sands  v.  Com.,  21  Gratt.  ( Va.)  871.    p.  20. 
Sandusky  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sloan,  27  Oh.  St.  342. 

p.  1308. 
Sandwell  r.  Sandwell,  Comb.  445 ;  s.  c.  Holt, 

295.    p.  354. 
Sanford  v.   Chase,    3  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  381.    p. 

188 
Sanford  v.  Gaddis,  15  411.  228.    p.  1469. 
Sanford  v.  Sandford,  40  Hun  (X.    Y.),  540. 

p.  167. 
Sanger  v.  Seymour,  42  Hun  (X.  Y'.),  641.    pp. 

596,  598. 
Santissima  Trinidad,  The,  7  Wheat.  (U.  S.) 

383.    p.  177L 
Santry  v.  State,  67  Wis.  67  ;s.  c.30  X.  W.  Rep. 

226.    pp.  90.  74^1. 
Sarah  r.  State.  28  Ga.  576.    pp.  6,  2096. 
SargeanttJ.  Clark,  108  Pa.  St.  558.    p.  192. 
Sargeant  v.  Kellogg,  10  111.  273.    p.  560. 
Sargeant  v.  Solberg,  22  Wis.  132.    p.  1072. 
Sargent  v.  Koberls,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)   337.  pp. 

1914,1915. 
Sargent  t'.  State,  11  Oh.  472.    pp.  1903,  1911, 

19'.I6. 
Sartor  v.  McJunkin,  8  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  451.    p. 

1910. 
Sartor  v.  Sartor,  30  :Miss.  760.    p.  827. 
Sartonous  v.   State,  24  Miss.  602.    pp.  258, 

1896. 
Sartwell  v.  Wilcox,  20  Pa.  St.  117.    p.  1668. 
Sassecn  v.  Clark,  31  Ga.  242.    p.  1156. 
Saunders  v.  Baxter,  6  Heisk.   (Tenn.)  369. 

p.  728. 


Saunders  r.  Fuller,  4  Humph.    (Tenn.)  518. 

pp.  1983, 1984. 
Saunders'  Appeal,  .54  Conn.  108.    p.  1762. 
Sauudersou  v.  Lace,  1  Chand.  (Wis.)  231.    p. 

1637. 
Saunderson's  Case,  3  Crancli  C.  C.   (U.  S.) 

638.    p.  284. 
Savage  v.  State,  18  Fla.  90S.    p.  41. 
Savage  v.  Tuller,  Brayt.  (Vt.)  223.    p.  1537. 
Savannah  v.  Haucock,  91  Mo.  54.    )>.  1107. 
Savery  v.  Busick,  11  la.  487.    p.  1748. 
bavil  V.  Roberts,  1  Salk.  14 ;  s.  c.  I  Ld.  Raym. 

374.    p.  1167. 
Saville  r.  Robertson,  4  T.  R.  720.    p.  878. 
Savings  Bank  v.  Getchell,  55  X.  H.  281.    p. 

902. 
Savings  Bank  v.  Shakman,  30  Wis.  333.    p. 

713. 
Sawdon's  Case,  2  Lewin  C.  C.  117.    pp.  44,  51. 
Sawyer  V.  Fitts,  4  Stew.  &  P.  (Ala.)  365.    p. 

2001. 
Sawyer  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  37  Mo.  240. 

pp.  1237,  1688,  1964,  1966,  1984. 
Sawver  v.  Hopkins,  22  Me.  276.    p.  218. 
Sawyer  v.  Joslin,  20  Vt.  172.    p.  1020. 
Sawyer  v.  Merrill,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  478.    p. 

1711. 
Sawyer  v.  Ore,  140  Mass.  234.    p.  336. 
Sawver  r.  Sargent,  65  Cal.  259.    p.  2081. 
Sawyer  v.  Sauer,  10  Kan.  470.    pp.  1255, 1489, 

1690. 
Sawyer  V.  Spofford,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  598.    p. 

916. 
Sawver  v.  Taggart,  14  Bush  (Kv.),  729.    p, 

882. 
Sawver,  In  re,  14  Xat.  Bank.  Reg.  241.    p. 

10(58. 
Saxon  V.  Boyce,  1  Bailev  (S.  C),  66.    p.  56L 
Saxton  V.  Bacon,  31  \t.  540.    p.  1221. 
Sayer  v.  Kitchen,  1  Esp.  210.    p.  625. 
Sayres  v.  Scudder,  2  X.  J.  L.  53.    p.  19. 
Scaggs  V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  Md.  268. 

p.  325. 
Scales  V.  Anderson.  26  Miss.  94.    p.  891. 
Scales  r..Shacklefor(l,  64  (ia.  170.    p.  566. 
Scanlan  v.  Ayres,  73  Ind.  211.    p.  2137. 
Scarborough  v.  Stale,  46  Ga.  26.    p.  1647. 
Scarman  v.  Castell,  1  Esp.  270.    pp.  897,  899. 
Scattergood  v.  Wood,  79  X.  Y.  263.    p.  566. 
Schafer  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  239.    p.  66. 
Schanler  v.  Porter,  7  la.  482.    pp.  1964,  1968, 

1994. 
Schappner  r.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  55  Barb. 

497.     pp.  1937,  1944,  1946,  1962. 
Scharff  v.  Klein,  29  iMo.  App.  549.    p.  1673. 
Schaser  v.  State,  36  Wis.  429.    pp.  426,  427. 
Schalz  V.  Pfeil,  .56  Wis.  429.    p.  2027. 
Scheibel  v.  Fairbain,  1  Bos.  &  Pul.  388.    p, 

1141. 
Scheible  r.  Law,  65  Ind.  332.    p.  20.36. 
Schell  r.  Xat.  Hank,  14  Minn.  47.    p.  560. 
Schellito  r.  Sampson,  61  la.  40.    p.  551. 
Schmidt  v.  Chicago  Ac.  R.  Co.,  83  111.  405. 

pp.  1247,  1249.  ' 

Schenck  r.  Butsh,  32  Ind.  338.    p.  1187. 
Scheuckv.  Grillin,  38  X.  J.  L.  463.     pp.  408, 

460. 
Schenck  v.  Mercer  County  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  24 

X.  J.  L.  447.     p.  974. 
Schenck  v.  Steven.^^on,  2X.  J.  L.  387.    p.  1982. 
Schenectady  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thatcher,  11  X.  Y, 

102.     p.  1625. 
Schettler  r.  .Jones,  20  Wis.  412.    p.  3.58. 
Schilling  r.  Aberuathy,  112  Pa.  St.  437.    p. 

l-Ml. 
Schilling  V.  Durst,  42  Pa.  St.  126.    p.  957. 
Schindler  v.  Houston,  1  Deuio  (N.  Y.),  51.    p. 

910. 

Schiudlbr  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  394.    !>.  1895. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXV 


Schindler  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  408.    p.  1S55. 
Schlesinger  r.  Texas  &c.  R.  Co.,  13  Mo.  App. 

471 ;  s.  c.  87  Mo.  146.    pp.  1017,  10-27. 
Schmidt  V.  Blood,  9  Wend.   (N.  Y.)  2(58.    p. 

1335. 
Schmidt  V.  Chicago  &c.  E.  Co.,  83  111.  405.    p. 

42. 
Schmidt  v.  Ins.  Co.,  41  111.  295.    p.  978. 
Schmidt  v.  New  Yor.k  &c.  R.  Co.,  1  Gray 

(Mass.),  529.    p.  1781. 
Schmidt  v.  Smitli,  57  Mo.  135.    p.  889. 
Schmidt  «•.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  1  Johns.   (X.  Y.) 

63.     p.  716. 
Schmitt  V.  Schmitt,  32  Minn.  130.    p.  2082. 
Schmitz  V.  Lauferty,  29  Ind.  400.    p.  2001. 
Schmitz  r.  Rose,  6  Mo.  App.  587.   p)).  121, 123. 
Schneck  v.  Mercer  County  M.  F.  lus.  Co.,  24 

N.J.  Law,  447.    p.  978. 
Schneer*;.  Lemp,17  Mo.  142.    pp.  1637,  1642, 

1683. 
Schneider  v.  Hosier,  21  Oh.  St.  98.    p.  1489. 
Schnier  v.  People,  23  111.   17;    s.  c.  Ilorr.  & 

Thomp.   Cas.  Self-Def.  285.    pp.  331,  332, 

1520. 
Schoeder  v.  Railway  Co.,  47  la.  375.    p.  654. 
Schoelller  v.  State,  3  Wis.  823.    pp.  67,  69,  73, 

98,  115. 
Schffilkopf  V.  Leonard,  8  Colo.  159.    p.  1017. 
Schoflelder  v.  Ferrers,  47  Pa.  St.  194.    pp. 

1171,1195. 
School  Dist.  No.  1  V.  Bragdon,  23  N.  H.  507. 

p.  1915. 
School  District  v.  Lynch,  33  Conn.  330.    p. 

838. 
School  Trustees  v.  Bennett,  27  N.  J.  L.  513. 

p.  893. 
School-town   of    Rochester    v.    Shaw,   100 

Ind.  268.    p.  759. 
Schooling  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  518. 

p.  1626. 
Schools  r.  Woodburn-Sarven  Wheel  Co.,  56 

Mo.  174.    p.  1315. 
Schooner  Emma  Johnson,  1  Sprague  (U.  S.) 

527.-     pp.  1322,  1346,  1356. 
Schoonover  r.  Reed,  65  Ind.  313.    p.  2141. 
Schoregge  v.  Gordon,  29  Minn.  367.    p.  192. 
Schraeder  v.  Ehiers,  31  N.  J.  L.  146.    p.  140. 
Schreiberr.  Butler.  84  Ind.  576.    p.  2110. 
Schrubbe  v.  Council,  69  Miss.  476;   s.  c.  34  N. 

W.  Rep.  503.     p.  2031. 
Schuchardt  v.  Aliens,  1  AVall.  (U.  S.)  359.  pp. 

347,1605. 
Schuerman  v.  Missouri  R.   Co.,  3  Mo.  App. 

565.     p.  1225. 
SchutBin  v  State,  20  Ohio  St.  233.    pp.  91,  94. 
Schulter   v.  Bockwinkle,  19  Mo.    648.      pp. 

1593, 1594. 
Schulter  r.  Merchants'  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  62  Mo. 

237.    p.  983. 
Schultzi\  Astley,  2  Bing.  New  Cas.  544.    p. 

1033. 
Sch  ultz  V.  Cremer,  59  la.  182.    p.  2029. 
Schultz  V.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  316.    pp.  1817, 

1896. 
Schumackerz?.  State,  5W^is.  324.    pp.  49,  90, 

92,  122. 
Schuster  v.  W"ina:ert,  .30  Kan.  529.    p.  377. 
Schute  r.  Robins,  Mood.  &  Malk.  133.    p.  936. 
Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.  v.  Farr,  4  Watts &S.  (Pa.) 

362.    p.  38. 
Schuylkill  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McCreary,  58  Pa.  St. 

304.    p.  1941. 
Schwab  V.  Union  Line,  13  Mo.  App.  159.    p. 

1123. 
Schwartz   v.   Germania    Life   Ins.    Co.,   21 

Miun.  215.     p.  1646. 
Schwartz  v.  Kuhn,  10  Me.  274.    p.  1044. 
Schwartz  r.  Herrenkind,  26  111.  208.    pp.848, 

849,  1038. 


Schwarzbach     v.     Ohio   Valley  Protective 

Union,  25  W.  Va.  622.     p.  992. 
Schweickhardt  v.  St.  Louis,  2  Mo.  App.  571. 

p.  1248. 
.•Schweitzer  v.  Connor,  57  Wis.  177.    p.  1648. 
•Schwcnk  r.  Umsted,  6  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  351. 

pp.  38,  95. 
Schwingcr  !•.  Raymond  (N.  Y.),  11  N.  East. 

Rep.  952;  s.  e.  35  Hun  (N.  Y.),  666.    p.  1708. 
Schwinger  r.  State,  105  N.  Y.  648;  s.  c.  11  N. 

East.  Hep.  952.    p.  1738. 
Scofleld  r.  Walrath,  35  Minn.  356.    p.  554. 
Scotland  County  r.  Hill,  112  U.  S.  183.    p.  556. 
Scott  t'.  Buchanan,  11  Humph.   (Tenn.)  468. 

p.  1130. 
Scott  V.  Coxe,  20  Ala.  294.    pp.  289,  292, 1.506. 
Scott  r.  Dublin  &c.  R.  Co.,  11  Ir.  Rep.  C.  L. 

(N.  S.)  377.     p.  1229. 
Scott  r.  Elmendorf,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y'.)  315.    p. 

193. 
Scott  V.  Firth,  4  Fo.st.  &  Fin.  349.    p.  1404. 
Scott  r.  Henry,  13  Ark.  119.    p.  869. 
Scott  V.  Hull,  8  Conn.  296.    pp.  214,  221. 
Scott  V.  Hunter,  46  Pa.  St.  192.    p.  1221. 
Scott  V.  Jones,  4  Taunt.  865.    p.  608. 
Scott  f.  King,  7  Minn.  494.    p.  197. 
Scott  V.  Lillord,  9  East,  347;  s.  c.  1  Camp.  246. 

p.  944. 
Scott  r.  Lloyd,  9  Pet.  (U.  S.)  418.    p.  1708. 
Scott  i\  London  &c.  Docks  Co.,  3  Hurl.  & 

Colt.  596.     p.  1326. 
Scott  V.  London  &c.  Dock  Co.,  10  Jur.  (N.  s.-) 

1108.    p.  1222. 
Scott  r.  Moore,  41  Vt.  205.    pp.  113,  127. 
Scott  V.  Nelson,  1  Esp.  N.  P.  95.     p.  889. 
Scott  V.  Peutz,  5  Sandf.  S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  572.    p. 

875. 
Scott  V.  Scott,  82  Kv.  328.    pp.  2075,  2100. 
Scott  V.  Sheakly,  3  Walts  (Pa.),  50.    pp.  1073, 

1672. 
Scott  V.  Simons,  54  N.  H.  428.    p.  1003. 
Scott  V.   Simpson,  1  Sandl.  (N.  Y.)  601.    p. 

1605. 
Scott  V.  Smith,  70  Ind.  299.    p.  1979. 
Scott  V.  Stark,  4  Taunt.  865.    p.  609. 
Scott  V.  State,  37  Ala.  117.    p.  1734. 
Scott  r.  State,  64  Ind.  400.    pp.  435, 1646. 
Scott  I'.  State,  7  Lea  (Tenn.),  232.    pp.  1985, 

1986,  1992. 
Scott  V.  State,  71  Tenn.  (7  Lea)  232.    p.  766. 
Scott  V.   State,  19  Tex.  App.  325.    pp.  1865, 

1867. 
Scott  V.  Winship,  20  Ga.  429.    pp.  1633, 1634. 
Scott f.  Woodward,  2  McCord  (S.  C.).,  161.    p. 

310. 
Scotten  r.  Divilbiss,  60  Ind.  37.    p.  2108. 
Scotten  V.  Longfellow,  40  Ind.  23.    p.  1196. 
Scotten  V.  Sutter,  37  Mich.  526.    p.  912. 
Scovell  r.  Kingsley,  7  Conn .  284.    pp.  293, 555. 
Scranton  v.  Stewart,  52  Ind.  68.    pp.  73, 1130. 
Scripp.s  r.  Reilly,  35  Mich.  371.    pp.  91,  247, 

248,  249,  2.50,  556,  557. 
Scruggs  V.  Brackiu,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  528.    p. 

1585. 
Sea  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stebbius,  8  Paige  (N.  Y'.),  565. 

p.  145. 
Seabrook  v.  Hecker,2  Robt.  (N.  Y'.)  29L    pp. 

1209, 1211. 
Seabury  r.  Field,  1  McAll.  (U.  S.)  60.    p.  1698. 
Seacord  v.  Burling,  1  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y'.)  175. 

p.  US. 
Seal  V.  State,  13  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  286.    p. 

113. 
Seal  r.  State,  28  Tex.  491.    pp.  811, 1671. 
Sealy  r.  State,  1  Ga.  213.    pp.  45,  46. 
Seaman  v.  Duryea,  11  N.  Y.  324;  s.  c.  10  Barb. 

(N.  Y.)523.     pp.  137, 138. 
Seaman  r.  New  York,  3  Dalj-  (N.  Y.),  147.    p. 

1249. 


CXXXVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Searcv  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  440.    pp.  1560, 

163.x 
Seare  r.  Prentice,  8  East,  348.    p.  1750. 
Searl  r.  People,  13  III.  597.    p.  1562. 
Scaver  r.  Kobiiison.S  Duer  (N.  Y.),  622.    p. 

18S. 
Seavy  r.  Dearborn,  19  X.  II.  351.    pp.  55,  219. 
Seaward  r.  Malotte,  15  Cal.  304.    p.  827. 
SeawcU  v.  Colm,  2  Nev.  308.    p.  324. 
Second  Ward  Uank  r.  Upman,  14  AVis.  596. 

p.  2064. 
Second  Ward  Savings  Bank  v.  Shakman,  30 

Wis.  333.     p.  224. 
Secor  V.  Pestana,  37  111.  525.    p,  1669. 
Secor  V.  Toledo  &c  R.  Co.,  7  Biss.  (U.  S.)  513. 

p.  145. 
Seeley  v.  Ensrel,  17  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  530.    p.  328. 
Seeley  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  719; 

s.  c.  7  N.  East.  Rep.  734.    p.  1311. 
Sehorn  t'.  AVilliams,  6  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  575. 

pp.  58,  99. 
Seibel  v.  Sienion,  72  Ato.  526.    p.  1494. 
Seibel  v.  Vaughan,  69  111.  257.    p.  205.3. 
Seibert  r.  Price,  5  Watts  &  S.   (Pa.)   438.    p. 

1937. 
Seifrath  v.  State,  35  Ark.  412.    p.  2048. 
Seigel  V.  Eison,  41  Cal.  109.    p.  1226. 
Seigerson  r.  Pomeroy,  13  Mo.  620.    p.  1020. 
Seigel  V.  Louderbaugh,  5  Pa.  St.  490.    p.  1698. 
Seixas  V.  Woods,  2  Caines  (N.  Y.),  48.  p.  926. 
Selby  V.  Hutchinson,  9  111  319.    p.  1060. 
Selinr.  Snyder,  11  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)  319.    p. 

1682. 
'  Selkirk  &  Cobb,  13  Gray,  313.    p.  581. 
Sellar  v.  Clelland,  2  Colo.  532.    pp.  1431, 1432, 

1433,  1434,  1435. 
Sellars  r.  Johnson,  65  X.  C.  104.    p.  825. 
Selleck  v.  Sugar  Hollow  Tp.  Co.,  13  Conn. 

453.     pp.  113,  1976. 
Seller  v.  Jenkins,  97   Ind.    430.    pp.  348.  415, 

431,432,433. 
Sellers  v.  Jones,  22  Pa.  St.  423.    p.  957. 
Sellers  v.  People,  4  111.  412.    p.  121. 
Sellers  v.  Sellers  (N.  C),  3  South  East.  Rep. 

917.     p.  49. 
Sellers  v.  State,  52  Ala.  368.    p.  94. 
Sells  V.  Hoare,  7  J.  B.  Moore,  36;  s.  c.  Bred. 

&  Bing.  2o2.     pp.  329,  330. 
Senecal  V.  Richelieu  Co.,  15  Lower  Canada 

Jur.  1.    p.  1151. 
Senter  v.  Carr,  15  N.  H.  351.    p.  1772. 
Serio  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  633;  s.  c.  3  S.  W. 

Rep.  784.     p.  1668. 
Scrle  vi  Norton,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  401.    p.  944. 
Sertel  v.  Graeter,  112  Ind.  117;  s.  c.  11  West. 

Rep.  234.     p.  20S9. 
Sessengut  r.  Posey,  47  Ind.  408.    p.  2113. 
Sessions  r.  Newjiort,  23  Vt.  9.    pp.  982,  1247. 
Seven  Bishops,  Trial  of,  12  How.  St.  Tr.  429. 

)).  1931. 
Severance  v.  Carr,  43  N.  H.  65.    p.  322. 
Seward  i\  Jackson,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  406.    pp. 

1439,  1445,  2007,  2009,  2013. 
Scwell  V.  Com.,  3  Kv.  Law  Rep.  86.    p.  708. 
Sewell  r.  Eaton,  6  Wis.  490.    p.  910. 
Sewall  r.  Gliddon,  1  Ala.  52.    pp.  2008,  2014. 
Sewall  r.  Henry,  9  Ala.  24.    p.  839. 
Sexton  V.  Brock,  15  Ark.  34,5.    p.  2122. 
Sexton  r.  Ins.  Co.,9Barb.  (N.  Y.)  191.    p.  977. 
Sexton  V.  Lelievrre,  4  Cold.  (Tenn.)  II.    pp. 

1921,  1929.  1930,  1974. 
Sexton  V.  Montgomery  County  M.  Ins.  Co.,  9 

Barb.  (N.  V.)  191.     jJp.  974,975. 
Sexton  V.  Wheaton,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  242.    p. 

1445. 
Seymour  v.  Cowing,  1  Keyes  (N.  Y.),  532.    p. 

1740. 
Seymour  v.  Deyo,  5  Cow.   (N.  Y.)  289.    pp. 

119,  123. 


178.    p.  504. 
(N.  Y.)  SO.    p. 


Seymour  v.  Fellows,  77  N.  Y.  178. 
Seymour  v.  Marvin,  11  Barb.  (N. 

8S6. 
Seymour  V.  Parnell  (Fla.),  2  South  Rep.  312. 

p.  108. 
Seymour  v.  Wilson,  14  N.  Y,  567.    pp.  344,  345. 
Shackieford  v.  Bailey,  36  111.  387.    pp.  1049, 

2066. 
Shackieford  v.    State,  2  Tex.  App.  385.  p. 

31. 
Shadwell  v.  Hutchinson,  M.  &  M.  350.    p. 

1404. 
Shafer  v.  Ferguson,  103  Ind.  90.    p.  .563. 
Shafer  v.  Smith,  63  Ind.  226.    p.  2044. 
Shafor  v.  Stinson,  76  Ind.  374.    p.  1726. 
Shaffer  v.  Ryan,  84  Ind.  140.    p.    2039. 
Shaffer  v.  Weech,  34  Kan.  598.    p.  1090. 
Shaffner  v.  Com.,  72  Pa.  St.  60.    pp.  1557, 1851. 
Shafto  V.   Shafto,  28  N.  J.   Eq.  34.    pp.  646, 

6-18. 
Shain  v.  Markham,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  580. 

p.  106. 
Shakleton  v.  Sun  Fire  Office,  55  Mich.  290. 

p.  981. 
Shakspearer.  Markham,  10  Hun  (N.  Y.),322; 

s.  c.  72  N.  Y.  400.     p.  899. 
Shamburg  r.  Ruggles,  83  Pa.  St.  148.    p.  1098. 
Sharaokin  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Livermore,  47  Pa.  St. 

475.    p.  1087. 
Shane  v.  Clarke,  3  Har.  &  McH.   (Md.)  101. 

p.  117. 
Shank  v.  Case,  1  Ind.  170.    pp.  14&3, 1464. 
Shank  v.  Fleming,  9  Ind.   189.    pp.  215,  221, 

222. 
Sh'jink's  Case,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.  Y.)  38. 

p.  177. 
Shanley  v.  Wells,  71  111.  80.    p.  1577. 
Shannon  v.  Austin,  67  Mo.  485.    p.  967. 
Shannon  v.  State,  18  Wis.  604.    p.  1.51. 
Shai)ley  v.  White,  6  N.  H.  172.    p.  1915. 
Sharon  r.  Davidson,  4  Nev.  416.    p.  1046. 
Sharp  V.  Burns,  35  Ala.  653.    p.  1702. 
Sharp  V.  Flinn,  27  Ind.  98.    p.  561. 
Sharp  i\  Hendrickson,  2  N.  J.  L.  686.    p.  19. 
Sharp  V.  Ponce,  74  Me.  470.    p.  975. 
Sharp  r.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  650.    pp.  17.  115. 
Sharp  V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  171.    ]).  1564. 
Sharpe  v.  Brice,  2  W.  Bl.  942.    p.  1477. 
Sharpe    r.   Johnston,  59  Mo.  557.    pp.  1168,. 

1170, 1180,  1182. 
Sharpe  v.  State,  48  Ga.  16.    p.  1672. 
Shartle  v.  Minneapolis,  17  Minn.  315.     pp. 

1268,  1269,  1274. 
Shattuck  V.  Allen,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  540.    p. 

1459. 
Shattuck  V.  Myers,  13  Ind.  146.    p.  411. 
Shattuck  V.  State,  11  Ind.  473.    p.  438. 
Shattuck  V.  State,  51  Miss.  50.    pp.   132,  150, 

1.52. 
Shaughnessy  v.  Railway  Co.,  7  Mo.  App.  591. 

p.  2108. 
Shaul  V.   Brown,  28  la.  38.    pp.   1199,  1200, 

1201. 
Shaw  V.  Berry,  31  ]SIe.  478.    p.  1340. 
Shawr.  Barnhart,  17  Ind.  183.    p.  219. 
Shaw  V.  Brown,  13  la.  508.    p.  1670. 
Shaw  V.  Burney,  86  N.  ('.  331.    p.  2010. 
Shaw  V.  Collin,  58  Me.  254.    pp.  890,  895. 
Shaw  v.  risk,  21  Wis.  368.    p.  1992. 
Shaw  r.  Gardner,  12  Gray  (Mass.),  488.  pp. 

1321,  1345,  1357. 
Shaw  V.  McCombs,  2  Bay  (8.  C),  232.  p.  1997. 
Shaw  r.  Saum,  9  Ind.  517.    p.  17.56. 
Shaw  V.  State,  27  Tex.  750.    p.  121. 
Sl)aw«'.  Stone,  1  Cash.  (Mass.)  228.    p.  638. 
Shaw  V.  Van  Rensselaer,  60  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 

143.    p.  6.55. 
Shaw  V.  AVallace,  2  Stew.  &  P.  (^Vla.)  193.    p. 

1749. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXYll 


Shaw  r.  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  6  Rail.  Cas.  87 ;  s.  c. 

lo  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  347.  p.  1095. 
Shaw,  Ex  parte,  61  Cal.  58.  p.  165. 
Shea  r.  Lawreuce,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  167.    pp. 

119,  1923. 
ShcalT  r.  Grav,  -2  Teates  (Pa.),  273.    pp.  1921, 

1023,  1943,  1947,  r.i54. 
Shealv  r.  Edwards,  75  Ala.  412.    p.  1651. 
Shear  v.  Vau  Dyke,  10  Hun  (N.  Y.),  528.    p. 

350. 
Shearer  v.  Bovd,  10  A'a.  279.    p.  239. 
Sheehy  v.  Burger,  62  N.  Y.  558.    p.  1209. 
Sheel  V.  Appleton,  49   Wis.   128.     pp.  1280, 

1483. 
Shelf  V.  Hunting-ton.  16  VT.  Ya.  307.    p.  1254. 
Sheffield  r.  3Iullin,  28  Minn  251.    p.  2075. 
Sheffield  v.  t^vracuse  &c.  K.  Co.,  21  Barb.  (X. 

Y.)  339.     p. "1223. 
Shehan  v.  Barry,  27  Mich.  217.    p.  2038. 
Sheldon  v.  Connecticut  M.   F.  Ins.   Co.,    25 

Conn.  207.    p.  972. 
Sheldon  v.  Hudson  River  R.   Co.,  29  Barb. 

(X.  Y.)  22C..    p.  1605. 
Sheldon  v.  Perkins,  37  Yt.  550.    pp.  1983,1985. 
Sheldon  r.  South  School  District,  24  Conn. 

88.    p.  1750. 
Sheldon  V.  Wood,  2  Bosw.   (N.  Y.)  267.     p. 

51)9 
Sheiton  v.  Braithwaite,  7  Mees.  &  "SY.  436 

p.  943 
Sheiton  v.   Durham,  6  Mo.    434.      pp.   560, 

2096. 
Sheiton  r.  Franklin,  6S  111.  333.    n.  912. 
Shepard  r.  (iiddinss,  22  Conn.  282.    p.  616. 
Shepard  v.  Merrill,  13  Johns.  (^.  Y.)  475.    p. 

1467. 
Shepard  v.  Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  629;  «. 

c.  55  Am.  Rep.  390.     pp.  653,  654. 
Shepard  v.  Pratt,  16  Kan.  209.    p.  1494. 
Shepherd  v.  I'.avior,  5  X.  .J.  L.  827.    p.  1907. 
Shepherd  v.  Cassidav,  20  Tex.  24.    p.  1015. 
Shepherd  v.  Dean,  13  How.   Pr.  (N.  Y.)  174. 

p. 171. 
Sheplierd    v.   Hamilton   County,   8   Heisk. 

(Tenn.)  380.    p.  33'.t. 
Shepherd  v.  Kaiu,  5  Barn.  &  Aid.  240.    p.  925. 
Shepherd  r.  Parker,  36  X.  Y.  517.    p.  264. 
Shepherd  r.  Thompson,  4  X.  H.  213.     p.  1943. 
Shepherd  r.  Trigg,  7  Mo.  151.    p.  1441. 
Shepherd  v.  Union  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  38  X.  H. 

232.    p.  978. 
Shepherd  v.  AYhite,  11  Tex.  346.    p.  825. 
Shepherd  r.  AYillis,  19  Oh.  142.    p.  343. 
Shepherd,  In  re,  7  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  225.     p. 

181. 
Sheple  V.  Page,  12  Yt.  519.    p.  351. 
Sheplev  r.  Cowan,  52  Mo.  .559.    p.  1055. 
Sheppard  v.  Cook,  2  Hayw.  (X.  C.)  238.    p. 
Sheppard  v.  Lark,  2  Bailev  (S.  C),  .576.      p 

1966. 
Sheppard  v.  Sheppard,  10  X.  J.  L.  250.    p 

2097. 
Sheppard  v.  Wilson,  6  How.  (U.  S.)  260.    pp 

2133,  2134. 
Shorer  r.  Easton  Bank,  33  Pa.   St.  134.    mi 

942,  948. 
Sheridan  v.  Brooklyn  &c.  R.  Co.,  36  X.  Y.  39 

p.  1232. 
Sherlock  v.  Ailing,  44  Ind.  184.    pp.  577, 1293 
Sherman  r.  Champlain   Transp.   Co.,  31  Vt, 

162.    p.  1753. 
Sherman  v.  Dutch,  16  111.  283.    p.  1646. 
Sherman  r.  Shaw,  9  Xev.  148.    p.  20;'9. 
Sherwood  v.  Collier,  3  Dev.  L.   (X.  C.)  380. 

p.  959. 
Sherwood  v.  Railroad  Co.,  21  Minn.  127.    p. 

342. 
Sherwood  r.  Ruggles,  2  Sandf.  S.  C.  (X.  Y.) 

55.    p.  994. 


Sherwood  r.  State,  42  Tex.  498.    p.  312. 
Sherwood  r.  Titman,  55  Pa.  St.  77.     p.  566. 
Shields  v.  Cunningham,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  86. 

p.  2107. 
Shields  r.  Guffev,  9  la.  322.     pp.  324,  1942, 

1943,  1948,  1956. 
Shields  v.  Xiagara  Sav.  Bank,  3  Hun  (X.  Y.), 

477  ;  s.   c.  5  Th.  &  C.  (X.  Y.)  585.    p.  27. 
Shields  v.  State,  45  Conii.  266.    p.  20.)7. 
Shields  v.  St;ite,  95  Ind.  2'M).      pp.  63,  70,  1981. 
Shields  v.  Thomas,  18  How.  (U.  S.)  253.    p. 

1059. 
Shiells  V.  Blackburne,  1  H.  Bl.  158.    p.  1246. 
Shiels  r.  Stark,  14  Ga.  429.    pp.  1634, 1701. 
Shilcock  V.   Passman,    7  Car.   &  P.  289.    p. 

1243. 
Shillito  V.  Reineking,  30  Hun  (X.  Y.),  345.  p. 

884. 
Shimer  v.  Butler   UniversitT,    87  Ind.    21S. 

pp.  574,  2113. 
Shipman  r.  State.  38  Ind.  549.    p.  2094. 
Shippen's  Lessee  v.  ^Yells,  2  Yeatesi   (Pa.), 

260.    p.  181. 
Shipton  V.  Cassou,  5  Bam.  &  Cres.  378.    p. 

892. 
Shipton  V.  Thornton,  9  Ad.  &  El.  314.    p.  805. 
Shirley  I'.  Yail,  38  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.j  406.    pp. 

1603, 1605. 
Shirts  V.  Irons,  47  Ind.  445.    p.  2066. 
Shisler  v.  Keavv,  75  Pa.  St.  79.    p.  193. 
Shobe  V.  Bell,  1  Rand.  (Ya.)  39.    pp.  119,1965, 

1985. 
Shock  V.  McChesney,  4  Yeates  (Pa.),  507.    p. 

1172. 
Shockey  v.  Mills,  71  Ind.  2S8.    pp.  344,  966, 

969. 
Shoemaker  v.  Benedict,  11  X.  Y.  176.    p.  967. 
Shoemaker  r.  Railroad  Co.,  30  Kan.  359;  s.  c. 

2  Pac.  Rep.  517.     p.  2037. 
Shoemaker  r.  State,  12  Ohio,  43.    p.  125. 
Shoflfner  r.  State.  93  Ind.  .")l'.i.    pp.  2U51,  20S8. 
Sholly  r.  Diller,  2  Rawle  (Pii.),  177.     pp.  1937, 

1938,  1942. 
Shomo  V.  Zeigler,  10  Phila.   (Pa.)  611.    pp. 

1937,  1941,  19.5(3. 
Shook  V.  Blount,  67  Ala.  301.    p.  831. 
Shook  r.  Pate,  50  Ala.  91.    p.  662. 
Shorl5  v.  Kinzie,  100  Ind.  429.    pp.  779,  1783. 
Shore  v.  Bedford,  5  Man.  &  G.  271.    p.  273. 
Shores  r.  Casswell,  13  Mete.  (Mass.)  413.    p. 

194. 
Short  r.  State,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  .568.    p.  261. 
Short  r.  West,  30  Ind.  367.    pp.  1907,  1946. 
Short  r.  Woodward,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  86.    pp. 

8.52,  974. 
Shorter  v.  People,  2  X.  Y.  197.    pp.  1539, 1752. 
Shctwell  V.  Maurice,  1  N.  J.  L.   (Coxe)  224. 

p.  274.  , 

Shoulty  V.  Miller,  1  Ind.  544.    p.  1465. 
Shover  r.  Jones,  32  Ind.  141.    p.  2086. 
Showalter  v.  State,  84  Ind.  563.    ]).  787. 
Shreve  v.  Brereton,  51  Pa.  St.  175.    p.  870. 
Shreve  v.  Dulaney,  1  Cranch  C.   C.  (U.  S.) 

499.    p.  613. 
Shrewsbury  v.  Keeling,  11  Ad.  &  EI.  (N,  S.) 

834.    p.  294. 
Shrewsbury  v.  Kynaston,  7  Brown  Pari.  Cas. 

396.    ]).  2014. 
Shrewsbury  v.    Miller,  10  W.  Ya.  115.      p. 

2051. 
Shriver  r.  Sioux  City  &c.   R.  Co.,  24  Minn. 

506.     pp.  1322,  1343,  1363. 
Shubert  r.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  645.    p.  15.38. 
Shucraft  v.  Dayid.sou,  19  Ind.  98.    p.  2059. 
Shultz  V  State,  5  Tex.  App   390.     pp.  323,  333. 
Shuman  i'.  Gavin,  15  Ind.  93.    p.  2059. 
Shupe  V.  Galbraith,  32  Pa.  St.  10.    p.  880. 
Shurtleff  v.  AYillard,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  202.    p. 

915.      . 


CXXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Shustcr  r.  Com..  38  Pa.  St.  206.  p.  37. 
Bliusier  V.  Stout,  30  Kan.  529.  p.  37o. 
Sbutte  V.  Thompson,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)  151.    [i. 

5GS. 
Sibley  v.  Aldrich,  33  X.  H.  .'>53.    p.  1340. 
Sibley  v.  Smith,  4(5  Ark.  275;  s,  c.  55  Am.  Rep. 

5S4.    p.  054. 
Sibly  r.  Hood,  3  Mo.  290.    p.  1441. 
Sickles  r.  Tattison,  14  Weud.  (X.  Y.)  257;  s. 

c.  25  Am  .  Dee.  527.    p.  S'Jo. 
Sidener  v.  I.s.sox,  22  lud.  201.    p.  324. 
Sideways  r.  D\»vu,  2  Stark.  40.    j).  (>35. 
Sidgreavesr.  :ftlvalt,  22  Ala.  t)17.    p.  'J^iS. 
Sie'iert  v.  Leoiiard,21  Miuu.  442.    pp.  1G40, 

1CS2. 
Sill  r.  Keese,  47  Cal.  294.    pp.  200,  583. 
Sillivautr.  Keardoii.S  Ark.  141.    pp.  219,223. 
Sills  V.  r.rowu,  9  Car.  &  1\  (iOl.    pp.  501,  502. 
Silsbv  r.  Foote,  14  How.  (X.  Y.)  218;  s.  c.  1 

Hhrtch.  444.    p.  SI',. 
Silshe  V.  Lucas,  53  111.  479.    p.  2066. 
Siltz  V.  Hawkeve  lus.  Co.,  71  Iowa,  710;  s.  c. 

29  X.  ^V.  Kep!  605      p.  1668. 
Silverthorn  v.  Fowle,  4  Joues  L.  (X.  C.)  362. 

p.  1241. 
Silvis  V.  Ely,  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  42L    pp.  56, 

129. 
Simmons  v.  Chicago  &c.  K.  Co.,  110  111.  340. 

pp.  1213,  1605. 
Simmons  v.  Com.,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  617.    p.  1566. 
Simmons  v.  Haas,  56  Md.  153.    p.  640. 
Simmons  v.  Mitchell,  6  App.   Cas.  156.    p. 

1456. 
Simmons  v.  Morse,  6  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  6.    pp. 

1456, 1457. 
Simmons  v.  XewBedford  &c.  Steamboat  Co., 

97  Mass.  361.     p.  1207. 
Simmons  v.  State,  73  Ga.  609.    p.  114. 
Simmons  v.  Slate,  61  Miss.  243.    p.  1787. 
Simmons  V.  Swift,  5  Barn.  &  Ores.  857.    pp. 

910, 915. 
Simmons  v.  Wilmot,  3  Esp.  91.    pp.  897,  899. 
Simms  V.  fe'larke,  11  HI.  137.    pp.  1132,  1133. 
Simms  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  230.    pp.  72,  123. 
Simon  f.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  58  Mich.  278.    p.  378. 
Simpkins  v.  Smith,  94  Ind.  470.    p.  1750. 
Simpson  v.  Alexander,  35  Kan.  227.    p.  1494. 
Simijson  v.  Blunt,  42  Mo.  544.    p.  2049. 
Simpson  v.  City  of  Keokuk,  34  Iowa,  568.    p. 

1268. 
Simpson  v.  Dall,  3  Wall.  (U.  S.)  460.    p.  620. 
Simpson  v.  Gregg,  5  Xeb.  237.    p.  20.52. 
Simpsou  V.  Hargitson,  35  Leg.  Obs.  172.    p. 

834. 
Simpson  v.  Kent,  9  Phila.  (Pa.)  30.    pp.  1919, 

1922, 1923. 
Simpson  v.  McKay,  12  Ired  L.  (X.  C.)  144.    p. 

869. 
Simp^nt'.  Pittman,13  0hio,.365.    pp.  119. 120. 
Simpson  v.  Stackhouse,  9  Pa.  St.  186.    p.  1031. 
Sims  v.  Bovnton,  32  Ala.  3.52.    \).  8:'>0. 
Sims  V.  Mead,  29  Kan.  124.    p.  2036. 
Sinisv.  Templeman,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

1(;3.    p.  1945. 
Simson  v.  London  &c.  Omnibus  Co.,  L.  R.  8 

C.  P.  390;  s.  c.  42  L.  J.  (C.  P.;  112;  21  Week. 

Rep.  595.    p.  1237. 
Sinard  v.  Patterson,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  353.  pp. 

1750.1751. 
Sinclair  v.  Bowles,  9  Barn.  &  Cres.  92.    p. 

8;-.2. 

Sinclair  i'.  Rou'»h,  14  Ind.  450.     p.  19*3. 
Sinclair  r.  Talmadge,  35  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  602. 

]>.  893. 
Sindram  v.  People,  88  X.  Y.  196.    p.  1758. 
Sines  v.  Sui)erinlendeuts  of  Poor,  55  Mich. 

383.     l>.  854. 
Singer  Mfg.  Co.  r.   Sammons,  49  AVis.  ;516. 

pp.  2030,  2038. 


Singleton  v.  Bovle,  4  Xeb.  414.     p.  2051. 
Singleton  v.  Hil'liard,  1  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)203. 

pp.  1322,  1345,  1347. 
Singleton  r.  Millett,  1   Xott  &  McC.  (S.  C.) 

355.     i))).  214,  2.'1. 
Singleton  v.  I'acilic  Railroad,  41  Mo.  465.    p. 

Iii07. 
Singleton  v.  AVhiteside,5  Yerger  (Tenn.),  18. 

p.  1080. 
Sioux  City  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Brown,  13  Xeb.  317. 

1).  1698. 
Sioux  Citv  .<tc.  R.  Co.  r.   Finlayson,  16  Neb. 

578.     i)|).  ,5t;9,  653,  1667,  1698. 
Sisk  r.  Slate,  9  Tex.  Anp.  246.    pp.  1837,  1848. 
Sissou  V.  Barrett,  2  X."  Y.  406.     pp.  2008,  2009, 

2015. 
Sisson  V.  Conger,  1  Thomp.  &  C.  (X.  Y.)  564. 

pp.  338,  443,  446. 
Sitterlee  r.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  587.    p.  1896. 
Sittig  i\  Burkestack,  28  Md.  1.58.    ]).  1710. 
Six  Hundred  and  Thirty  Quarter  Casks,  14 

Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  517.    p.  1344. 
Skagg  V.  Slate  (Ind.). 6  West.  Rep.  261;  s.  c. 

108  Ind.  53.     pp.  321,  332,  2101. 
Skally  V.  Shute,  132  Mass.  367.    p.  1003. 
Skelleru  v.  May,  6  Cranch  (U.  S.),  267.    p.  136. 
Skeen  r.  Johnson,  55  Mo.  24.    p.  900. 
Skidmorc  ■/■.  Bricker,  77  Ind.  165.    \).  1196. 
Skillen  r.  Jones,  44  Ind.  136.     p.  2044. 
Skinner  r.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  5  Exch.  786; 

s.  c.  2  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  360 ;  15  Jur.  299.     p. 

1237. 
Skinner  r.  Skinner,  77  Mo.  148.    p.  64.3. 
Skinner  v.  State,  53  Miss.  399.    pp.  74,  84. 
Skipper  V.   State,  59  Ga.   65.    pp.   446,  1771, 

1773, 1774. 
Sladden  v.  Sergeant,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  322.    p. 

636. 
Slagel  V.  Murdock,  65  Mo.  522.    p.  2055. 
Slater  r.  Manes,  .54  Ga.  671.    p.  2067. 
Slater  v.  Rawson,  1  Met.  (Mass.)  450.    p.  1086. 
Slater  v.  Sherman,  5  Bush  (Ky.),  206.    p.  2088. 
Stater  i\   Wood,  9  Bosw.   (X.  Y.)  15.     pp. 

1536,  1537. 
Slaughter  r.  Ilailcv,  21  Tex.  .537.    p.  15SS. 
Slaughter  r.  state,  24  Tex.  410.    pp.  1904, 1918. 
Slauson  v.  Euglehart,  34  Barb.   (X.  Y.)  198. 

p.  219. 
Slauter  v.  Whitelock,  12  Ind.  338.    p.  329. 
Sledge  V.  Clo|)ton,  6  Ala.  589.     p.  869. 
Sledge  V.  Scott,  56  Ala.  202.    p.  346. 
Sleeper  v.  Van  Middlesworth,  4  Denio   (X. 

Y.),431.    1).  450. 
Slevin  r.  Reppv,  46  Mo.  606.    p.  1613. 
Slipher  v.  Fisher,  11  Ohio,  299.    p.  1586. 
Sloan  V.  Edwards,  61  Md.  90.    pp.  419,  431. 
Sloan  V.  Harrison,  1  X.  J.  L.  123.    p.  1921. 
Sloan  V.  Xew  York  C.  R.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  125.    p. 

437. 
Sloan  V.  Petric,  15  111.  425.    pp.  1461,  1463, 

1465. 
Sloan  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  220.    p. 

889. 
Sloane  v.  Sloane,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  341.     p.  2091. 
Smallcy  v.  Ilendricksou,  29  X.  J.  L.  371.    p. 

852. 
Smart  v.  Raynor,  6  Carr.  &  P.  721.    p.  224. 
Sinathers  v.  State,  46  Ind.  447.      p.  1646. 
Smclliurst,  Matter  of,  2  Sandf.  (X.  Y.)  724. 

PI)    148,  1.52. 
Smiley  f.  Burpee,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  568.    p. 

776. 
Smith  r.  Acker,  23  Wend.   (X.  Y.)  653.    pp. 

1438,1441. 
Smith  V.  .Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  211 ;  «. 

c.  3  Big.  Ins.  Cas.  708.    p.  1417. 
Smith  V.  Allen,  16  Ind.  316.     j..  ,561. 
Smith  r.  Arsenal    I'.auk,  104  Pa.  St.  518.     j)p. 

551,1647,2130. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXIX 


Smith  V.   Atlantic  &c.  R.   Co.,  25  Oh.  St.  91, 

102.    p.  4. 
Smith  V.   Battens,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  341.    p. 

875. 
Smith  V.  Beck,  25  Pa.  St.  106.    p.  10(55. 
Smith  v.  Bossard,  2  McCord  Ch.  (S.  C.)  409. 

p.  192. 
Smith  V.  Boston  &c.  R.R.,  120  Mass.  490.    p. 

1210. 
Smith  V.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  44  N.  H.  325.      p. 

11.55. 
Smitii  V.  Bouvier,  70  Pa.  St.  325.    p.  882. 
Smith  V.  Bradv,  17  X.  Y.  173.    p.  893. 
Smith  v.  Brown,  8  Kan.  608.    pp.  89,  94. 
Smith  V.  Brown,  3  Tex.  360.    p.  147. 
Smith  V.  Burtis,9  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  174.    p.  1044. 
Smitli  V.  Carr,  16  Conn.  450.    pp.  1671,  1746, 

1747, 1756,  1758. 
Smith  V.   Carrin^ton,  4  Cranch   (U.S.),  62. 

pp.  1044,  1703,  1739. 
Smith  V.   Cheetham,  3  Caines    (X.  Y.),    57. 

pp.  1964,  19G6. 
Smith  V.  City  of  Stockton,  73  Cal.  204;  s.  c.  14 

Pac.  Rep.  675.    p.  2099. 
Smith  r.  Clark,  31  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  140.    p.  1008. 
Smith  V.  Clark,  58  Mo.  145.    p.  1245. 
Smith  V.  Clark,  3T>ans.  (X.  Y.)  208.    p.  1209, 
Smith  V.  Clarke,  12  Yes.  477.     i>.  1418. 
Smith  V.  Clayton,  29  M.  J.  L.  357.    pp.  83,  129, 

827. 
Smith  V.  Com.,  6  Gratt.  (Va.)  698.    pp.  74,  77. 
Smith  v.  Com.,  7  Gratt.  (Ya.)  593.    pp.  74,  77. 
Smith  i\  Com.,  100  Pa.  St.  324.    p.  46. 
Smith  V.  Coopers,  9  Iowa,  379.    p.  214. 
Smith  V.  Crichtou,  33  Md.  103.    p.  1725. 
Smith  t'.  Crocker,  5  Mass.  538.    p.  1033. 
Smith  r.  Culbertson,  9  Rich.  L.    (X.  C.)   106. 

p. 1983. 
Smith  V.  Cushing,  18  AYis.  295.    pp.  2097, 2098. 
Smith  V.  Davidson,  45  lud.  .396.    p.  2130. 
Smith  i\  Denman,  48  Ind.  65.    p.  904. 
Smith  V.  Deuuie,6  Pick.  (Mass.)  266.    pp.  908, 

910. 
Smith  V.  Dolbv,  4  Harr.  (Del.)  350.    p.  1008. 
Smith  r.  Dukes,  5  Minn.  373.    pi).  1646,  1755. 
Smith  V.  Eames,  4  111.  76.    ])p.  69,  72,  1990. 
Smith  v:  Earle,  118  Mass.  n-6i.    p.  118. 
Smith  r.  Eastman,  3  Cush.   (Mass.)   355.    p. 

966. 
Smith  V.  Easton,  54  Md.  138.    p.  641. 
Smith  r.  Evans,  6  Biun.  (Pa.)  109.    p.  918. 
Smith  V.  Faulkuer,  12  Gray,  251.    pp.  825, 

860. 
Smith    i\    First    Congregational    Meeting 

House,  8  Pick.  (:Ma.ss.)  178.    p.  892. 
Smith  V.  Floyd,  8  Bajrb.  (X.  Y.)  5.    pp.  67,  98, 

103. 
Smiley  v.  Gamblll,  2  Head  (Tenn.),  164.    p. 

1008. 
Smith  V.  Graves,  1  Brev.  (S.  C.)  16.    p.  1914. 
Smith  r.  Griffith,  3  Hill  (X.  Y.),  333.     p.  569. 
Smith  r.  Grimes,  43  la.  356.    p.  1775. 
Smith  r.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  83  Mo.  683.    p. 

1621. 
Smith  V.  Harrow.  3  Bibb  (Ky.),446.    p.  1910. 
Smith  V.  Hickenbottom,  57  Iowa,  733.     pp. 

501,  502. 
Smith  V.  Holcombe,  99  Mass.  553.    p.  1948. 
Smith  V.  HoUis,  46  Ark.  16.    pp.  2053,  2(j55. 
Smith  V.  Hutchinson,  83  Mo.  683.    pp.  1598, 

1621. 
Smith  V.  Ins.  Co.,  24  Pa.  St.  320.    p.  977. 
Smith  V.  Janes,  20  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  192;  s.  c. 

32  Am.  Dec.  527.    p.  937. 
Smith  V.  Kyler,  75  Ind.  575.    p.  2110. 
Smith  V.  Lane,  12  Serg.  &  R.  84.    p.  642. 
Smith  V.  Lisher,  23  Ind.  .500.    p.  2123. 
Smith  V.  Little,  67  Ind.  549.    p.  2071. 
.Smith  V  Lovejoy,  62  Ga.  372.    p.  1924. 


Smith  r.  Lynes,  4  X.  Y.  44.    p.  910. 
Smith  r.  Marvin,  27  X*.  Y.  137.    p.  886. 
Smith  r.  Mayer,  3  Colo.  209.    p.  1496. 
Smith  V.  McDonald,  50  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  519. 

p.  182. 
Smith  V.  McMillen,  19  Ind.  391.    p.  1949. 
Smith  V.  Mechanic's  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  32  N.  Y. 

399.    p.  978. 
Smith  V.  Meldren,  107  Pa.  St.  348.    p.  2004. 
Smith  V.  Miller,  2  Bibb  (Ky.),  617.     p.  926. 
Smith  V.  Morgan,  38  Me.  468.    p.  481. 
Smith  V.  Morrison,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  81. 

pp.  725,  2096. 
Smith  V.  Morrison, 22  Pick.  (Mass.)  430.  p.  141. 
Smith  V.  Mullett,  2  Camp.  208.     p.  943. 
Smith  V.  New  Haven  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Allen 

(Mass.).  531.     p.  1343. 
Smith  V.  Newland, 40  111.  100.    pp.  2105,  2106. 
Smith  r.  Xew  YorJi  &c.  R.  Co.,  4  Abb.  App. 

Dec.  (N.  Y.)  202.    p.  628. 
Smith  r.  New  York  &c.R.  Co.,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.), 

25.    p.  1207. 
Smith  V.  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  X.  Y.  222; 

s.  c.  29  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  132.    p.  1298. 
Smith  V.  Xew  York  &c.  R.  Co. ,  43  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

225 ;  s.  c.  41  X.  Y.  620.     p.  1363. 
Smith  i\  O'Connor,  48  Pa.  St.  218.    p.  1232. 
Smith  r.  fJverbv,  50  Ga.  241.    p.  1681. 
Smith  V.  Parker.  41  Me.  452.    p.  1446. 
Smith  I'.  Peninsular  Car-works   (Mich.),  27 

N.  W.  Rep.  662.     p.  1239. 
Smith  r.  People,  25  111.  21.    pp.  1.565, 1577. 
Smith  V.  People,  103  111.  82.    p.  1892. 
Smith  V.  I'owers,  15  N^.  H.  456.    p.  1990. 
Smith  V.  Putney,  18  Me.  87.    p.  2021. 
Smith  V.  Railroad  Co.,  37  Mo.  287.    p.  1311. 
Smith  r.  Raymond,  1  Day  (Conn.),  189.    p. 

2001. 
Smith  z).  RockwcU,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  482.     p. 

1(139. 
Smith  V.  Euss,  17  "VYis.  227.    p.  1381. 
Smith  V.   Sasser,  5  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  388.    p. 

1(568. 
Smith  V.  School  District,  40  Mich.  143.    p.  122. 
Smith  r.  Shakleford,  1   Xott  &  McC.  (S.  C.) 

36.  p.  119S. 
Smith  V.  Sliattuck,  12  Ore.  362.    p.  626. 
Smith  r.  Shepard,!  Dev.  L.  (X.  C.)  46L    p. 

1749. 
Smith  V.  Shepherd,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)  147.    p. 

1003. 
Smith  V.  St.  Joseph,  54  Mo.  456.    p.  1235. 
Smith  V.  Smith,  15  Ind.  315.    p.  2110. 
Smith  V.  Smith,  8  Ired.  (X'.  C.)  29.    p.  1585. 
Smith  r.  Smith,  43  X.  H.  536.     p.  890. 
Smith  r.  Smith,  61  Wis.  665.    pp.  2075,  2100. 
Smith  V.  Smith,  .50  N.  H.  212.     pp.  1983,  1990. 
Smith  r.  St.  Paul  City  R.   Co.,  32  Minn.   1. 

pp.  673,  694. 
Smith  r.  State,  55  Ala.  1.    pp.  25,  51,66,81,85, 

91. 
Smith  V.  State,  79  Ala.  21.    p.  532. 
Smith  r.  State,  63  Ga.  1(>9.    j).  1904. 
Smith  V.  State,  64  Ga.  439.    pp.  2077,  207S. 
Smith  V.  State,  4  G.  Greene  (Iowa),  189.  p.  92. 
Smith  r.  State,  64  Md.  25;  s.  c.  54  Am.  Rep. 

752,    p.  264. 
Smith  r.  State,  55  Miss.  513.    pp.  65,  85, 129. 
Smith  r.  State,  57  Miss.  882.    p.  40. 
Smith  i\  State,  58  Miss.  867.    p.  1791 
Smith  V.  State,  75  X.  C.  306.    p.  7.53. 
Smith  r.  State,  4  Xeb.  277.    p.  35, 
Smith  V.  State,  5  Xeb.  ISl.    pp.  77,  78,  414. 
Smith  r.  State,  4  Lea  (Tenn.),  428,    pp,   254, 

257,  258, 
Smith  r.  State,  8  Lea  (Tenn.),  386.    p.  44, 
Smith  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  141.    p.  1679, 
Smith  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  l.iO.    p.  1S3.5. 
Smith  r.  Slate,  13  Tex.  App.  507,    p.  1779. 


cxl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Smith  V.  State,  15  Tex.   App.  139.    pp.  1679, 

Suiilh  V.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  33S.    p.  1549. 
Smith  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  96.    pp.   1639, 

1«!I6, 1878,  ISSO. 
Smith  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  278.    p.  727. 
Smith  r.  State,  42  Tex.  444.     pp.  GG8,  676. 
Smith  V.  State,  43  Tex.  103.    p.  1642. 
Smitli  V.  State  (Tex.;,  5  S.  AV.  Kep.  219.    p. 

813. 
Smith  V.  State  Ins.  Co.,  58  la.  478.    p.  312. 
Smith  V.  Stewart,  6  Jolins.  (N.  Y.)  46;   s.  c.  5 

Am.  Dec.  186.    p.  891. 
Smith  r.  Stickncy,  17  JJarb.  4S9.    p.  484. 
Smith  V.  Surridjfe,  4  Esp.  25.    p.  1143. 
Smitli  V.  Thompson,  1  Cow.  (K.  Y.)  221.    p. 

1906. 
Smith  V.  Thompson,  8  C.  B.  44.    p.  986. 
Smith  V.  Vniou  K.  Co.,  61  Mo.  591.    p.  1227. 
Smith  V.  "Wagaman,  58  la.  11.    \>.  2097. 
Smith  V.  AVageuseller,  21  Pa.  St.  491.    p.  60. 
Smith  V.  AVard,  2  Koot  (Conn.),  302.    p.  121. 
Smith  V.  AVarden,  8(3  Mo.  382.    pp.  1315,  1483. 
Smith  V.  AVare,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  257.    p.  8S9. 
Smith  r.  AVarren,  60  Tex.  462.    ]>.  2124. 
Smith  V.  AVhite,  5  Dana  (Ky.),  376.    p.  561. 
Smith  V.  AVhitnian,G  Allen  (Mass.),  562.    pp. 

316,585. 
Smith  V.  AVilliams,  11  Kan.  104.    p.  2097. 
Smith  V.  AVilliamson,  1 1  N.  J.  L.  313.    p.  1903. 
Smith  V.  AVilliugham,  44  Ga.  200.    pp.  1978, 

1979. 
Smith  V.  AVilson,  3  Barn.  &  Ad.  728.    p.  842. 
Smith  V.  AVise,  58  111.  143.    p.  1005. 
Smith  V.  Young,  26  Mo.  App.  575.    p.  343. 
Smith  t'.  A'arvaii,  69  Ind.  445;   s.  c.  35  Am. 

Rep.  232.    pp.  409,  411. 
Smith  V.  Zent,  59  Ind.  362.    p.  1196. 
Smith  V.  Zent,  77  Ind.  474.    p.  2044. 
Smith,  Ex  parte,  53  Cal.  204.    p.  152. 
Smith,  Ex  parte,  28  Ind.  47.    pp.  132,  135, 147. 
Smith,  Ex  parte,  94  U.  S.  485.    pp.  136,  147. 
Smith's  Appeal,  52  Mich.  415.     p.  1671. 
Smoot  V.  AVetumpka,  24  Ala.  112.    p.  1225. 
SmuU  V.  Jones,  6  AVatts  &  S.  (I'a.)  122.    p.  57. 
Smurr  v.  State,  88  Ind.  404.    pp.  1726,  1728. 
SmyrI  V.  Kiolon,  2  Bailey  (S.   C),  421.    pp. 

1322, 1346. 
Smyth  V.  Craig,  3  AVatts  &  Serg.  (Pa.)  18.    ]>. 

8.54. 
Snedeker  v.  AVarring,  12  N.  T.  170.    p.  344. 
Sneed  v.  OsboTu,  25  Cal.  627.    p.  563. 
Snell  V.  Ilarri-son,  S3  Mo.  651.    p.  1712. 
Snell  V.  Trustees  &c.,  58  111.  290.    p.  2053. 
Snellingr.  Darrell,  17  Ga.  141.    p.  2067. 
Snider  r.  Adams  Kxp.  Co.,  63  Mo.  376.    p. 

Snider  v.  Myers,  3  AV.  Va.  195.    p.  2097. 
Snodgras.s  v.  Hunt,  15  lud.  274.    pp.  42,  2091. 
Snook  V.  Southwood,  Kyan  &  Moo.  429.    p. 

25. 
Snow  V.  Allen,    Stark.  502.    p.  1197. 
Snow  V.  Crowe,  2  Utah,  172.    p.  2099. 
Snow  V.  Batchelder,  8  Cush.  (Maes.)  51.3.    p. 

237. 
Snow  V.  Grace,  29  Ark.  131.    p.  452. 
Snow  V.  Paine,  111  Mass.  520.     ii.  528. 
Snowr.  Penobscot  Iliver  Ice  Co.,  77  Me.  .55. 

p.  1704. 
Snowdeu  v.  State,  7  Baxter  (Tenn.),  482.    p. 

86. 
Snowdcn  r.  Craig,  20  la.  477.    p.  2068. 
Snyder  w.  Hanni)jal&c.  K.  Co.,  60  Mo.  413. 

p.  808. 
Snvder  v.  Iowa  Citv,  40  la.  646.    p.  176. 
Snyder  ».  Kurtz,  61  Iowa,  593.     p.  849. 
Snyder  v.  Leibengood,  4  Pa.  St.  30,5.    p.  880. 
Snvder  v.  Nations,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  295.    p. 

332. 


Snyder  v.  Raah,  40  Mo.  166.    p.  185. 
Snyder  v.  Railway  Co.,  11  W.  A'a.  14.    p.  1254. 
Snyder  v.  Snyder,  50  Ind.  492.    p.  324. 
Snyder  r.  United  Slates,  112  U.  S.  216.    pp. 

2003,  2005. 
Suyder  v.  A'an  Natha,  7  N.  J.  L.  25.    p.  700. 
Snyder  v.  AVitt,  15  Pa.  St.  59.    n.  1669. 
Sodusky  r.  Me(;ee,  5  .1.  J.  Afarsli.  (Ky.)  621. 

pp.  42,  214,  219,  240,  264,  282,  703,  710. 
Sohn  V.  Canibern,  106  Ind.  302.    p.  2042. 
Solin  r.  Marion  &c.  B.   Co.,  73  Ind.  77.    pp. 

2139,  2140. 
Solander  v.  People,  2  Colo.  48.    pp.  68.  97, 

110,125,1574,  1765,1801. 
Solarte  4'.  Melville,  7  Barn.  &  Cres.  431.    pp. 

886,  1643,  16.58. 
Solarte  v.  Palmer,  5  Moore  &  P.  475.    p.  945. 
Solinger  v.  Earle,  82  N.  Y.  393.    p.  1068. 
Solomon  U.  Co.  v.  Jones,  34  Kan.  443;  s.  c.  8 

Pac.  Rep.  731.     p.  2038. 
Soltan  r.  De  Held,  2  Sim.   (N.   S.)   133.    pp. 

1383,  1398. 
Somer.s  v.  Balabrega,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  164.    p. 

192. 
Somerville  v.  Donaldson,  26   Minn.  75.    p. 

2102. 
Sommer  V.  AA'ilt,  4  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)   19.    p. 

1197. 
Soper  V.  Medberry,  24  Kan.  128.    p.  2073. 
Sopris  V.  Truax.  1  Col.  91.    p.  1637. 
Soria  r.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  297.    ]>.  1903. 
Sorrelle  v.  Craig,  'J  Ala.  534.    pp.  449,454,  455, 

456. 
Souder  v.  Lippincott,  48  :N.  J.  L.  437.    p.  610. 
Soulden  v.  A'an  liensselaer,  9  AVend.  (N.  Y.) 

297.    p.  966. 
Soule  V.  Barlow,  49  A"t.  329.    p.  1045. 
South  V.  Thomas,  7  T.  B.  Mon.   (Kv.)   60.    p. 

2095. 
South  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Henlein,  52  Ala.  606.    pp. 

1:521,  1345,  1347,  1361. 
South  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  AYood,  71  Ala.  215 ;  s.  c.  46 

Am.  Rep.  309;  66  Ala.  l67;  41  Am.  Rep.  749. 

l)p.  1331,  1332,  1334,  1335. 
South  Ottawa  v.  Perkins,  94  U.  S.  260.     p. 

818. 
South  Park  Commissioners  v.  Trustees,  107 

111.  489.    p.  238. 
South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  Ind.  577.    pp.  261, 

264,  282,  409,  420,  1278. 
Southard  v.  Rexford,  6  Cow.   (N.  Y.)    254. 

pp.  261,  282. 
Souther  r.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  352.    p.  1703. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Hess,  53  Ala.  19. 

pp.  1321,  1363. 
Southern  Express  Co.  v.  Moon,  39  Miss.  822. 

pp.  l:!44,  13o0. 
Southern  Ins.  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Lewis,  42  Ga. 

588.     pp.  1633,  1681. 
Southern  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  AA'ilkinson,  53  Ga. 

5.35.     p.  1633. 
Southey  v.  Nash,  7  Carr.  &  P.  632.    p.  254. 
Southwark  Ins.  Co.  v.  Knight,  6  Whart.  (Pa.) 

327.    p.  570. 
Southwestern    Freight  Co.    v.  Stanard,   44 

yio.  71.    p.  912. 
St  uthwick  V.  McGovern,  28  Iowa,  533.    p. 

1103. 
Souverwelnv.  Jones,  7  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  335. 

1).  725. 
Spain  V.  State,  59  Miss.  19.    p.  66. 
Spain  r.  State,  64  Tenn.  514.    )).  1904. 
Sjialding  v.  Taylor,  1  Mo.  App.  34.    pp.  825, 

828. 
Spanaglo  v.  Bellinger.  38  Oal.  278.    p.  2075. 
Spangler  r.  Brown,  26  Oh.  St.  389.    p.  2053. 
Spangler  v.  Jacob,  14  111.  297.     J).  819. 
Spann  v.  Baltzell.  1  Kla,  302.    p.  642. 
Si)auu  V.  Clark,  47  Ga.  369.    p.  2076. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxli 


Sparbawk  v.  Union  Passenger  R.  Co.,  54  Pa. 

St.  401.    p.  1399. 
Sparks  r.  Com.,  3  Bush  (Ky.),  113.    p.  1573. 
Sparks  r.  Heritage,  45  lud.  66.    p.  2089. 
Sparks  f.  Slate,  59  Ala.  82.    pp.  89,91,  2J1,  319. 
Sparrow  r.  Turner,  2  Wils.  3ii6.    p.  25. 
Sparrowhawkr.  Sparrowliawk,  6  X.  Y.'Week. 

Dig.  281 ;  s.  c.  11  Hun  (N.  Y.),  528.    p.  561. 
Spauldiug  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  33  "Wis.  589. 

pp.  1210, 1668. 
Spauldiug  V.  Hollenbeck,  39  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  80. 

p.  883. 
Sp'aulding  r.  Hollenbeck,  35  N.  Y*.  204.    p.  583.' 
Spauldiug  V.  Hood   8  Cush.  (Mass.)  602.    pp. 

218,  2J1. 
Spauldiug  r.  People,  10  Paige  (>r.  Y'.),284;  s. 

c.  7  Hill  (X.  Y"  ),  301 ;  4  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y'.)  21. 

pp.  132,  134, 151. 
Spear  r.  Richardson,  37  X.  H.  24.    p.  498. 
Spear  I'.  Spencer,  1  G.  Greene   (Iowa),  534. 

pp.  60, 102. 
Spears  v.  Clark,  6  Blackf.  and.")  167.    p.  2117. 
Spears  v.  Forrests,  15  Vt.  435.    p.  450. 
Spears  '.'.  Ledergerber,  56  Mo.  465.    p.  191. 
Spears  v.  Mt.  Ayr,  66  la.  721.    p.  2068. 
Specht  V.  Howard,  16  Wall.  564.    p.  316. 
Speck  V.  Kiggin,  40  Mo.  405.    p.  1093. 
Speed  V.  Herrin,  4  Mo.  356.    p.  1600. 
Speerr.  Plank  Road  Co.,  22  Pa.  St.  376.    p. 

819. 
Speiden  v.  State.  3  Tex.  App.  156.    p.  94. 
Spence  v.  Hoinian,  30  Ga.  646.    p.  2ii83. 
Speuce  V.  Oustott,  3  Tex.  147.    p.  1747. 
Spence  r.  Spence,  4  "Watts  (Pa.),  165.     pp. 

1938,  1942,  1962. 
Spence  v.  State,  15  Lea  (Tenn.),  539.    p.  73. 
Spence  r.  Stuart,  3  East,  89.    p.  188. 
Spenceley  v.  De  AVillott,  3  Smith  (K.  B.;,322. 

p.  1923. 
Spenceley  v.  De  "Willott,  2  Lewin  C.  R.  155  u. ; 

s.  c.  7  East,  110.    pp.  407,  414,  416,  430. 
Spencer  v.  De  France,  3  G.  Greene  (la.),  216. 

pp.  89,111. 
Spencer  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.,  29  Iowa, 

55.     pp.  1254,  1303. 
Spencer  r.  Long,  39  Cal.  700.    p.  2099. 
Spencer  v.  McMa.-^ters,  16  HI.  405.    p.  1470. 
Spencer  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  It.  Co.,  17  Wis.  487. 

p.  1235. 
Spencer  r.  St.  Paul  &C.-R.  Co.,  22  Minn.  30. 

p.  559. 
Spencer  v.  Thistle.  11  Xeb.  228.    p.  2087. 
Spencer  v.  Trafford,  42  Md.  1.    pp.  S05, 1914. 
Spencer  1-.  Utica  &c.  R.  Co.,  5  Barb.  (X.  Y'.) 

337.    p.  1225. 
Spencer,  In  re,  4  McArthur  (D.   C.),433.    p. 

163. 
Speugler  v.  Davy,  15   Gratt.    ("\'a.)   381.    p. 

1199. 
Speusley  v.  Lancashire  Ins.  Co.,  62  "Wis.  443. 

p.  1781. 
Sperry  v.  Dickinson,  82  Ind.  132.    p.  2058. 
Sperry  v.  Miller,  16  X.  Y.  407.    p.  961. 
Sperry  v.  Moore,  42  Mich.  353.    p.  368. 
Sperry  v.  Wilcox,  1  Mete.    (Mass.)  279.    p. 

1319. 
Spies  V.  People,  122  III.  1 ;  s.  c.  12 -X.  East. 

Rep.  865.    pp.  63, 124, 130. 
SpinuertJ.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  67  X.  Y.  153. 

p.  1309. 
Spittorf  r.  State  (Ind.),  8  North  East.  Rep. 

911.    p.  52. 
Spivey  v.  State,  26  Ala.  90.    p.  1535. 
Spofford  r.  Harlow,  3  Allen  (Mass.),    176. 

pp.  1209,  1210. 
Spoflford  V.  AVeston,  29  Me.  140.    p.  1093. 
Spoford's  Case,  Clayton,  78.    p.  85. 
Spong  r.  Lesher,  1  Yeates  (Pa. ) ,  326.    p.  85. 
Spooiiemore  v.  Cables,  66  Mo.  579.    p.  1008. 


Spooner,  Ex  parte,  3  X.  Y.   Citv  Hall  Rec. 

109.    p.  172. 
Spoor  V.  Spooner,  12  Mete.  (Mass.)  281.    p. 

1989. 
Spottiswood  r.  "Weir,  66  Cal.  529;  s.  c.  6  Pac 

Hep.  381.    p.  2084. 
Spradliiig  v.  Conway,  51  Mo.  51.    p.  1074. 
Sprague  v.  Cadwell,  12  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  518.    p. 

433. 
Sprague  v.  Craig,  51  111.  289.    p.  721. 
Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  v.  Evans,  15  Md.  54. 

pp.  354,  984,  1058. 
Springdale  Cemetery  Assn.  v.  Smith,  24  111. 

480.     p.  1757,  1815. 
Springer  r.  Bowdoiuham,  7  Me.  442.    pp.1249, 

1748,  1749. 
Springer  r.  State,  34  Ga  379.    p.  1927. 
Siiringlield  v.  Dovle,  76  111.  202.     p.  1249. 
Springfleld  v.  LeClaire,  49  111.  476.    p.  1247. 
Springfield  v.  Sleeper,  115  Mass.  587.    p.  204. 
Siiringtieldi7.  "Worcester,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  52. 

p.  796. 
Springiield  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Rhea,  44  Ark.  258. 

p.  238. 
Sprouce  v.  Com.,  2  Ya..  Cas.  375.    pp.  69, 101, 

115. 
Spyer  v.  The  Mary  Belle  Roberts,  2  Sawy. 

(U.  S.)  1.     pp.     1322,1345,1346,1356. 
Si>urck  r.  Crook,  19  111.  415.    p.  1988. 
Spurr  r.  ghelburne,  131  Mass.  429.    p.  2021. 
Scpiire  r.  Central  Park  &c.  R.  Co.,  4  Jones  & 

Sp.  (X.  Y.)  436.     p)).  1225,  1232. 
Squire  V  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  98  Mass.  239. 

p.  I.i60. 
Squires  v.  Anderson.  54  Mo.  J93.    p.  831. 
St.  Anthony  Falls  W.  P.  Co.  v.  Eastman,20 

.Minn.  277.     p.  91. 
Slaak  r.  Sigelkow,  12  "Wis.  234.    p.  1072. 
Staat  r.  l':vans,  3J  111.  455.    p.  890. 
Staats  V.  Burke,  16  Ind.  44§.    p.  1646. 
Slaats,  Ex  parte,  4  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  76.    p.  146. 
Stack  r.  Portsmouth,  52  >.  H.  224.    p.  1247. 
Stackhouse  r.  O'Hara,  14  Pa.  St.  88.    p.  191. 
Stackus  r.  Xew  York  Central  i&c.  R.  Co.,  79 

N.  Y.  464.     p.  1211. 
Stacy  r.  Cobbs,  36  111.  349.    p.  1637. 
Staff,  In  re,  63  Wis.  285;  s.  c.  53  Am.  Rep.  285. 

p.  2. 
Stafford  v.  Bacon,  1  Hill  (X.  Y'.),  532.  p.  1703. 
Stafford  v.  Fargo,  35  111.  481.    \).  385. 
Stafford  v.  State,  55  Ga.  591.    p.  1983. 
Stagner  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  440.   pp.  82, 101, 

103.  ■  ff       ,        , 

Stahl  r.  Berger,  10  Serg.  &  R.   (Pa.)   170.    p. 
1033.  '•       '  f 

Staiuinger  v.  Andrews,  4  Xev.  59.     p.  1141. 
Staley  r.  Barhite,  2  Caines   (X.  Y'.i,  221.    p. 

1904.  ^ 

Stall  r.  Catskill  Bank.  18  "Wend.    (X.  Y'.)  466. 

p.  328. 
Stalls  V.  State,  28  Ala.  25.    p.  91. 
Stamper  v.  Griffin,  12  Ga.  450.    p.  471. 
Stamper  v.  Hayes,  25  Ga.  546.    p.  1600. 
Stamper  v.  Johnson,  3  Tex.  1.    p.  869. 
Stampofski  iJ.  Steffens,  79  111.  303.    pp.  1969. 

1976.  ^  '■ 

Staubro  v.  Hopkins,  28  Barb.  (X.  Y'.)  270.    d 

409.  ' ■ 

Stancell  v.  Kenan,  33  Ga.  56.    p.  1902. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Van  Etten,  107  U.  S.  325 

p.  437. 
Stanford  v.  Davis,  54  Ind.  45.    p.  1622. 
Standcu  r.  Standen,  2  Ves.  Jun.  589.    p.  841 
Stanley  r.  Bank  of  Mobile,  23  Ala.  652.    pn. 

942,943,949,1060.  ^^ 

Stanley  v.  Bunce,  27  Mo.  269.    p.  1436. 
Stanley  r.  Sutherland,  54  Ind.  339.     pp.  563. 

17.30.  '  ' 

Stanley  r.  Sutherland,  55  Ind.  339.     p.  1984. 


cxlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Stansbnry  v.  Marks,  2  Hall.    (Pa.)  313.    pp. 

143,  liK). 
Stanton  I'.  Bannister,  2  Vt.  464.    p.  1715. 
Stantou  County  v.  Caulield,  10  Neb.  390.    p. 

2051. 
Stanton  v.  Delaware  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  2  Sandf. 

(N.Y.)6H2.     i).5sn). 
Stanton  v.  State,  13  Ark.  317.    pp.  19S2,  19S4. 
Stape  r.  People,  Si  N.  Y.  390.    p.  4S1. 
Staples  r.  Parker,  41  P.arb.  (X.Y.)648.   p.  194. 
Slaplctou's  Case,  8  IIow.  St.  Tr.  .503.    p.  45. 
Starin  r.  Kcllv,  S8  N.  Y.  318.    ]i.  345. 
Stark  r.  P.arrett,  15  Cal.  361.     p.  827. 
Stark  r.  Lancaster, .^17  X.  H.  88.    pp.  1221,1247. 
Stark  r.  State,  6;5  Ind.  285.     p.  1.566. 
Starks  ?-.  People,  5  Denio   (N.  Y.),  106.    pp. 

396,  397,471,479,  488. 
Staruer  r.  State,  61  Ind.  360.    pp.  2050,  2052. 
Starrett  v.  Biirkhalter,  86  Ind.  439.    p.  1709. 
Startup  V.  McDonald,  6  Man.  &  G.  593.    pp. 

1126,  1127. 
State  V.  Abarr,  39  Iowa,  185.    pp.  1539,  1541. 
State  V.  Abrams,  11  Ore.  169.    pp.  .529,  710,  745. 
State  V.  Adair,  66  N.  C.  298.    pp.  85,  91. 
State  V.  Areola,  11  la.  246.     pii.  1945,  1994. 
State  V.  Achey,  64  Ind.  69.     pp.  1569,  1571, 

1888. 
State  V.  Adams,  20  Kas.  311.    p.  677. 
State  V.  Adams,  76  Mo.  605.    p.  2065. 
State  V.  Adaui>.  84  Mo.  310;  s.  c.  12  Mo.  App. 

436.      p)).  21149,  2iC)U. 
State  V.  All  Cliuev,  14  Ncv.  79.    pp.  267,  659. 
State  V.  Ah  Lee,  8  Ore .  214.    pp.  678, 1841. 
Stale  V.  Ah  Tong,  7  Nev.  148.    p.  210. 
State  V.  Alderson,10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  523.    p.  19. 
State  V.  Alfred,  31  Conn.  40.    p.  307. 
State  r.  Alexander,  66Me.  131.    pp.  1563,1569. 
State  r.  Alexander,  66  IMo.  148.    pp.  1886, 1984. 
State  V.  Allen,  1  Ala.  444.    p.  31. 
State  V.  Allen,  46  Conn.  531 ;  s.  c.  10  Reporter, 

107.    pp.  76, 114. 
State  V.  Allen,  47  Conn.  121.    p.  27. 
State?-.  Allen,  22  Mo.  318.     p.  1171. 
State  r.  Anderson,  8  Crim.  Law  Mag.  519;  s.  c. 

89  Mo.  312.     p.  527. 
State  V.  Anderson,  44  Cal.  65.    pp.  721,  727. 
Stater.  Anderson,  30  La.  Ann.,  Pt.   1,  557. 

p.  830. 
State  V.  Anderson,  1  Nev.  266.    p.  1924. 
State  V.  Anderson,  4  Nev.  265.    pp.  87,  89, 106, 

113. 
State  V.  Anderson,  10  Ore.  448.    pp.  505,  710, 

745. 
State  V.  Anderson,  86  Mo.  309.    p.  1851. 
State  v.  Anderson,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  565.    p. 

1903. 
State  V.  Andrew,  Phil.  L.  (N.  C.)  205.    p.  296. 
State  V.  Angel,  7  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  27.    p.  1630. 
States.  Ankrlm,  Tappan  (Ohio),  80.    p.  100. 
State  r.  AntboMv,  7  Ired.L.  (N.  C.)  234.  p.  54. 
State  V.  Antonio,  4  Hawks  (N.  C),  200.    p.  7. 
State  V.  Arata,  32  La.  Ann.  193.    p.  33. 
State  V.  Archer,  48  Iowa,  310.    pp.  167, 170. 
State  r.  Arden,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  487.    p.  648. 
State  V.  Arnold,  12  Iowa,  479.    pp.  33,  64,  102. 
State  V.  Arrington,  3  Murph.  (N.  C.)  571.    p. 

1911. 
State  v.  Arthur,  23  la.  430.    p.  1669. 
State  V.  Arthur,  39  la.  631.    p.  21. 
State  V.  Arthur,  2  Dev.  (X.  0.)  217.  pp.  37,  45, 

129. 
State  r.  Aver,  23  X.  II.  301.    pp.  71,  123,124, 

1914,  1980,  ]9a')   1990. 
State  V.  Askins,  33  La.  Ann.  1253.    p.  2. 
State  V.  P.abb,  76  Mo.  .504.    j).  1073. 
State  V.  Babcock,  1  Conn.  401.    pp.  117,  1903, 

1906. 
State  V.  Baber,  74  ^fo.  292.    p.  73. 
State  V.  Baber,  11  Mo.  App.  586.     pp.  744,  749. 


State  V.  Ballev,  54  la.  414.    p.  287. 
state  V.  BaileV,  2  X.  J.  L.  415.    p.  264. 
Stale  V.  Bailev,  4  La.  Ann.  376.    p.  1780. 
Slate  f.  Bailey,  57  Mo.   131.    pp.   1669,    1671, 

1677. 
State  r.  Baker,  63  N.  C.  276.    p.  1973. 
State  V.  Balch,  31  Kjui.,  465;  s.  c.  2  Pac.  Rep. 

609.     p.  789. 
Staler.  Baldwin,  1  Const.  Rep.  (S.  C.)   296. 

pp.  47, 102. 
State  r.  V.aldwin,  2  ITill  (S!  C),  379.     p.  30. 
J^tate  v.  Baldwin,  80  N.  C.  390.     p.  54. 
Slate  r.  lialdwin,  1  Dev.  &  Batt.  (N.  C.)  197. 

p.  1384. 
State  r.  I?aldev,  17  la.  39.    p.  1929. 
State  r.  Ballerie,  11  La.  Ann.  81.    p.  1524. 
State  V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  Md.  84.    p. 

1231. 
State  r.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  15  W.  Va.  367. 

p.  1577. 
State  r.  Bancroft,  22  Kan.  170.    p.  124. 
State  r.  Banks  (Me.),  3  New  Eng.  Rep.  240. 

pp.  787,788. 
State  V.  Banks,  73  Mo.  592;  s.  c.  10  Mo.  App. 

111.     pp.  528,  771,  1694. 
State  V.  Barham,  82  Mo.  67.    p.  763. 
State  r.  Barnes,  34  La.  Ann.  395.    p.  79. 
State  r.  Barrontine,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.) 

553.    p.  45. 
State  V.  Bartlctt,  55  Me.  200.    pp.  787,  788, 
State  V.  Bartlett,  43  N.  H.  224.    p.  1893. 
State  r.  Bartlctt,  47  Me.  3(^8.    p.  1781. 
Stale  V.  Barton,  19  IMo.  227.    p)).  1903,  1906. 
State  r.  Barton,   8  Mo.  App.   15;  s.  c.  71  Mo. 

288.    pp.  75,  78. 
State  V.  Bassernian,  54  Conn.  88.    p.  2002. 
Stale  V.  Baumbagcr,  28  Minn.  229.    p.  1566. 
State  r.  Beal,  67  Ind.  345.    p.  .526. 
State  V.  Beasley,  o2  La.  Ann.  1162.    p.  110. 
State  V.  Beatly,  4  La.  Ann.  1226.    p.  1990. 
State  V.  Beauchamp,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  299.    p. 

91. 
Stale  V.  Belcher,  13  So.  Car.  4.59.    pp.  Ill,  129. 
Slate  V.  Bell,  70  Mo.  633.    p.  1903. 
State  V.  Beneko,  9  Iowa,  203.    p.  4. 
State  V.  Benham,  23  Iowa,  154.    p.  1544. 
State  V.  Benjamin,  7  La.  Ann.  47.    p.  167. 
Stale  V.  Bennett,  14  La.  Ann.  651.    pp.  17,  64, 

102. 
Stale  r.  Benton,  2  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.)  196.    pp. 

25,  45,46,  73,  82,  84,  98,  113,  125,  127,  129. 
State  r.  Berlin,  24  La.  Ann.  46.    pp.  676, 1970. 
Stale  V.  Bilausky,  3  ^linn.  246.    pp.  282. 
State  r.  Bill,  15  La.  Ann.  114.     pp.  64, 102. 
State  V.  Bixley,  39  la.  465.     ]>.  2077. 
State  V.  Blackwell,  10  So.  Car.  35.    p.  134. 
State  V.  Blan,  69  Mo.  317.     p.  2048. 
State  r.  Bland,  97  N.  C.  438.    pp.  1.551, 1552. 
State  r.  Blocker,  14  Ala.  450.    p.  171. 
State  r.  Blue,  84  X.  C.  807.    p.  1.5.33. 
Staler.  Blunt  (Mo.),  4  S.   AV.  Rep.   394.     p. 

1836. 
State  r.  Boatwright,  10  Rich.  L.   (S.  C.)  407. 

]..  91. 
State  V.  Bohan,  19  Kan.  28.    pp.  33, 1539, 1541, 

1.548,  1765,  1769. 
State  i:  Bone,  7  Jones.  X,.   (N.   C.)   121.    pp. 

45,  74. 
State  V.  Boon,  80  N.  C.  461;  s.  c.  82  N.  C.  637. 

pp.  110,111.  119. 
State  c.  Borowskv,  11  Nev.  119.    p.  6. 
State  r.  Bowden,  71  Me.  89.    p.  113. 
State  r.  Bowers,  17  Iowa,  46.    p.  92. 
State  r.  Bowman,  78  N.  C.  .509,     pp.  601,  502. 
State  r.  Bradley,  6  La.  Ann.  560.    pp.   1943, 

1957,  1982. 
State  r.  Bradv,  S7  Mo.  142.    p.  394. 
State  r.  Braisford,  3  Dall.  (U.  S.)  1.    p.  732. 
State  V.  Branuon,  45  Mo.  329.    pp.  1903,  1906. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxliii 


State  V.  TJraustetter,  65  Mo.   149.     pp.   1964, 

1965,  19t>i. 
State  V.  Braswell,  S2  X.  C.  693.    p.  741. 
State  V.  Brazil,  2  Ga.  Dec.  107.    p.  1914. 
State  r.  Breaux.  32  La.  Ann.  222.    pp.  81,  129., 
State  V.  Breeden,  5S  Mo.  507.    pp.  448,  1642. 
State  r.  Brette,  6  La.  Auu.  652.    pp.  70,  1909, 

1978,  1984. 
State  r.  Bridges,  29  Kan.  138.    pp.  1822, 1828. 
State  t'.  Bridgmau,  49  Vt.  202.    p.  299. 
State  V.  Brooks,  9  Ala.  9.    p.  31 . 
State  V.  Brook.*,  92  Mo.  542.    pp.  1900,  2067. 
State  V.  Brooks  (Mo.),  5  S.  AV.  Rep.  258.    p. 

124. 
State  V.  Brooks,  30  X.  J.  L.  356.    pp.  17, 18. 
State  c.  Brookshire,  2  Ala.  203.    p.  258. 
State  V.  Brown,  12  Minn.  538.     p.  1890. 
State  V.  Brown,  15  Kan.  400.    ]).  116. 
State  V.  Brown,  22  Kan.  222.    p.  1917. 
State  r.  Brown,  4  La.  Ann.  505.    p.  ii9. 
State  V.  Brown,  12  Minn.  538.    pp.  20,  94,  111. 
State  r.  Brown,  61  .Alo.  367.     p.  1545. 
State  f.  Brown,  71  JIo.  454.     pp.  77,  78. 
State  V.  Brown,  67  N.  C".  435.    p.  1642. 
t*tate  r.  Brown,  3  Sirob.  L.  (S.  C.)  508.    p.  84. 
State  r.  Brownilold,  15  Mo.  App.  5H3.    p.  787. 
State  V.  Bruce,  48  la.  533.    p.  1878. 
State  V.  Bruin,  34  Mo.  537.    pp.  1892, 1895. 
State  V.  tiraintrton,  22  La.  Ann.  9.    p.  125. 
State  r.  Bucklev,  40  (  oun.  247.    p.  1527. 
State  r.  Buckner.  25  Mo.  167.    pp.  16, 17,  26. 
State  r.  Bulla  (Mo.).6  West.Eep.  440.   p.  526. 
State  r.  Ballard,  16  X.  H.  139.    p.  1929. 
State  r.  Bullock,  63  X.  C.  570.    pp.  21, 126. 
State  r.  Bulluck,  91  X.  C.  614.    p.  1542. 
State  r.  Buntrer,  14  La.  Ann.  461.    pp.  17,  66, 

74,75,  76,  116,  118. 
State  V.  Burgwvn,  87  X.  C.  572.    pp.  294,  296. 
State  r.  Burke,  30  Iowa,  332.    p.  1.544. 
State  i\  Burnett,  81  Mo.  119.    p.  2048. 
State  r.  liurns,  3.j  Kan.  .390.    ii.  1576. 
State  V.  Burns,  33  Mo.  48 !.    p.  1909. 
State  r;.  Burns,  85  Mo.  47:  s.  c.  16  Mo.   App. 

State  V.  Butler.  8  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  S3,    p.  184. 
State  r.  Butterfield,  75  Mo.  297.    pi>.  1563, 1575, 

1832,  1892,  1897. 
State  V.  Brvan,  40  la.  379.    p.  87. 
State  c.  Bryan,  34  Kan.  64.    p.  1576. 
State  r.  Brvant,  55  Mo.  75.    p.  1548. 
State  r.  Brvant  (Mo.), 6  S.  AV.  Bep.  102.    p.  78. 
State  r.  Ca'in,  2  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  20i.    p.  1670. 
State  V.  Cain,  20  AV.  Va.  710.    pp.   1548,  1570, 

1891,  1942. 
State  r.  Caldwell,  3  La.  Ann.  435.    p.  1983. 
State  r.  Calvert,  32  La.  Ann.  224.    p.  127. 
State  r.  Cameron,  2  Chand.  (Wis.)  172.    pp. 

29  89. 
Statle  v.  Cardoza,  11  So.  Car.  195.    pp.  37,  355, 

364. 
State  V.  Carland,  90  X'.  C.  668.    pp.  49, 1848. 
State  V.  Carlisle,  57  AIo.  102.    p.  17S6. 
State  V.  Carman,  63  la.  130;  s.  c.  50  Am.  Rep. 

741.     p.  2. 
State  r.  Carr,  43  Iowa,  420.    p.  1564. 
State  r.  Carrick,  6  Xev.  120.    ]>.  76. 
Slate  r.  Carrigues,  1  Hayw.  (X.   C.)  241.    p. 

1905. 
State  r.  Carson,  50  Ala.  134.    !>.  75. 
State  V.  Carstaphen,  2  Hayd.  (X.  C.)  238.    p. 

1990. 
State  V.  Cartright,  20  AV.  Va.  43.    p.  1985. 
State  V.  Catlin,  3  Vt.  530.    p.  1717. 
State  r.  Caullield,  23  La.  Ann.  148.    pp.  116, 

1918,  1927,  1930,  1978. 
Slate  V.  Cavanaugli,  76  Mo.  54.    p.  20. 
State  r  Caveness,  78  X.  C.  484.    pp.  710,  739, 

746,  763. 
State  V.  Cazeau,  8  La.  Ann.  109.    p.  37. 


735, 


pp. 


State  )•.   Certain  Intoxicating  Liquors    &c. 

(Me.),  12  Atl.  Rep.  794.    p.  2059. 
State  V.  Chadbourne,  74  Me.  506.    p.  44 
State  r.  Chamberlain,  89  Mo.  129;  s.  c.  1  S. 

AV.  Rep.  145.    ]).  531. 
State  r.  Chandler,  36  La.  Ann.  177.    p.  2049. 
state  V.  Chajnnan,  6  Xev.  320.    p.  95. 
State  V.  Chatham  X'at.  Bank,  80  Me.  626.    p. 

126. 
State  V.  Cheek,  13  Ired.  L.  (X".  C.)  114.    p. 

364. 
State  V.  Cherry.  63  X.  C.  493.    pp.  469,  479. 
State  V.  Chevallier,  36  La.  Ann.  81.    pp.  1763, 

1764. 
State  V.  Christian,  66  Mo.  143.    p.  1574. 
State  V.  Christian,  30  La.  Arm.  367.    pp.  84, 

128. 
State  V.  Clark,  16  Ind.  97.    p.  448. 
State  r.  Clark,  32  La.  Ann.  559.    p.  65. 
State  r.  Clark,  18  Mo.  App.  531.    p.  1536. 
State  V.  Clark,  42  At.  629.    pp.  67,  77. 
State  r.  Clark,  29  X.  J.  L.  96.     p.  1537. 
State  V.  Clarkson,  3  Ala.  378.    p.  31. 
State  1-.  Claudius,  1  Mo.  App.  551.    pp. 

763. 
State  V.  Cleaves,  59  Me.  298.    pp.  787.  788. 
State  V.  Clements,  32  3Ie.  279.    p.  1542. 
State  V.  demons,  51  la.  274;   s.  c.  1  X.  AV. 

Rep.  546.     p.  1800. 
State  V.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380  ;  s.  c.  29  Am.  Rep. 

506.     pi».  448,  .524.  526,  531. 
State  V.  Clvburn,  16  S.  C.  37.5.    p.  311. 
State  V.  Cbckman,2  AVinst.  (X.  C.)  95. 

74, 115. 
State  r.  Cohn,  9  X"ev.  179.    pp.  524,  525. 
State  V.  Cole,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  626. 
State  V.  Cole,  94  X.  C.  959.    p.  294. 
State  r.  Coleman,  27  La.  Ann.  691. 

310,312. 
State  r.  Coleman,  8  So.  Car.  237. 

101,111,  114. 
State  i:  Coleman,  20  S.  C.  441.      pp.  72,  73.  82. 
state  r.  Collins,  32  la.  36.     pp.  438,  1548. 
State  V.  Collins,  33  Kan.  77.      pp.  375,  398. 
State  v.  Collins,  70  X.  C.  241.     pp.  74,  705,  706, 

711,712. 
State  r.   Collins.  15  S.  C.  373;   s.   c.  40Am. 

Kep.  697.     pp.  3.54,  363. 
State  V.  Cohvell,  3  R.  I.  132.    p.  361. 
State  r.  Comstock,  20  Kan.  650.     pp.  70S,  744, 

749. 
State  V.  Conlev  39  Me.  78.    p.  40. 
State  r.  Conwav,  IS  Mo.  321.    p.  1566. 
State  f.  Cook,  20  La.  Ann.  145.    p.  16. 
State  V.  Cook,  84  Mo.  40.    p.  1801. 
State  V.  Cooper,  71  Mo.  436.    p.  471. 
State  v.  Cooper,  22  X.  J.  L.  52.    p.  646. 
State  i\  Cooper,  83  X.  C.  671.    p.  48. 
State  c.  Copp ,  1  5  X.  H.  212.    pj).  142,  148. 
State  r.  Core,  70  AIo.  491.    pp.  75,  78. 
State  r.  Coulter,  Wright  (Ohio),  421.    p.  143. 
State  (.'.  Coupenhaver,  30Mo.  430.    p.  1982. 
Stale  i:  Courtney,  28  La.  Ann.  794.    pp.  48, 

1 12. 
State  r.  Cox,  8  Ark.  436.    pp.  4,  6. 
State  V.  Cox,  67  AIo.  352.    p.  531. 
State  i:  Crank,  75  Mo.  406.    pp.  1892,  1895. 
State  V.  Crank,  2  BaUev  (S.  C.),  66.    p.  84. 
State  r.  Craton,  6  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  164.    pp. 

45,  602. 
State  r.  Crawford,    34    AIo.     200.     pp.     1S25, 

1846 
State  r.  Creasman,  10  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  395. 

pp.  91 ,  99. 
Stater.  Crosby,  Harper  Const.  Rep.  (S.  C.) 

90.    J).  20. 
State  V.  Crosby,  4  La.  Ann.  434.    p.  1909. 
State  i:  Croteau.  2:i  Vt.  15.    p.  1521. 
State  '•.  Crowner,  56  Alo.  149.     p.  1562. 


pp. 

p.  19. 
71,  73, 
pp.  21,  90, 


cxliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


State  V.  Cncucl,  31  X.  J.  L.  -240.  pp.  lOOS,  1912, 

iy-J:5,  1924,  1973,  1974,  1981,  19>l(). 
State  V.  Culler,  82310.  623.     p.  77. 
State  r.  Cummings,  72  N.  C.  409.    p.  85. 
State  V.  Cunimiugs,  o  La.  Auu.  330.  pp.  91,  93. 
Stater.  Curtis,  70  Mo.   594.    pp.  1569,  1786, 

1886. 
Stater.  Curtis,  5  Ilumph.  (Tenn.)  601.  p.  86. 
State  V.  Cushing,  29  jNlo.  215.     p.  1772. 
State  V.  Dale,  8  Ore.  229.    p.  27. 
State  v.  Dancy,  78  X.  C.  437.    p.  1642. 
State  V.  Danforth,  48  La.  43 ;  s.  c.  30  Am.  Hep. 

387.    p.  652. 
State  V.  Daniels,  44  X'^.  H.  383.    pp.  1976,  2062. 
State  V.  l)a  Hocha,  20  La.  Ann.  356.    pp.  30, 

31. 
Stale  i:  Daubert,  42  Mo.  242.    p.  315. 
Slate  r.  Davidson,  67  X.  C.  119.    p.  530. 
State  V.  Davis,  41  Iowa,  311.    pp.  87, 115. 
State  V.  Davis,  29  Mo.  391.    p.  75. 
State  V.  Davis,  14  Xev.  439.    pp.  63,  64,  69,  87, 

102. 
Stale  V.  Davis,  80  X'.  C.  412.  pp.  85,  87,  91, 119, 

125. 
State  r.  Dean,  49  la.  74.    p.  1566. 
State  V.  Dean,  40  Mo.  464.    pp.  1032, 1033. 
Slate  r.  Decklolts,  19  Ln.  447.    pp.  1544, 1890. 
Slate  r.  Deo,  14  Minn.  35.    p.  398. 
State  V.  Dcgonia,  69  Mo.  486.     pp.  35,  88,  737, 

740,  1913,  1926. 
State  V.  Delong,  12  Iowa,  453.    pp.  1!^07, 1948. 
State  V.  Deniouchet  (La.),  3  S.  AV.  Kep.   565. 

pp.  5,  39. 
Stater.  Dennin,  32  Tt.  158.    p.  490. 
Stale  r.  De  Kance,  34  La.  Ann.  186.    p.  73. 
State  r.  Desmond,  5  La.  Ann.  399.    pp.  1902, 

1909. 
State  r.  Dcsmouchet,  32  La.  Ann.  1241.    pp. 

26, 72. 
Stater.  De  Wolf,  8  Conn.  93.    pp.  332,  475,485. 
Slate  r.  Dibble,  6  Mo.  App.  584.    p.  731. 
State  r.  Diclj,  2  Winst.  (X.  C.)  45.    p.  763. 
State  r.  Dickson,  6  Xan.  211.     pp.  81,  1567, 

1568. 
State  V.   Dickson,  78  Mo.  438.    pp.  740,1569, 

1886. 
State  r.  Dictz,  67  la.  220.    p.  1777. 
State  r.  Dill,  2  Sneed  (Tenn.),  414.    p.  184. 
State  V.  Dineen,  10  Minn.  408.    pp.  1818, 1825. 
State  r.  Diskm,  35  La.  Ann.  46.     p.  72. 
State  r.  Dixon,  75  X.  C.  275.     p.  1630. 
State  r.  Doan,2  Root  (Conn.),  451.    p.  48. 
State  r.  Dodson,  16  S.  C.  453.    pp.  82,  126,  741. 
State  r.  D'Oencii,  31  Mo.  453.    p.  1436. 
State  r.  Dolling.  37  "Wis.  396.     pp.  1903, 1907, 

1908,1991. 
Stater.  Donnegan,  74  Mo.  67.    p.  1567. 
State  r.  Donnellv,  2  Dutch.  (X.  J.)  463.    p. 

705. 
State  V.  Donncly,  9  Mo.  App.  519.     pp.  825, 

1440. 
State  r.  Donovan,  10  Xev.  36.    p.  1747. 
State  r.  Doon,  K.  M.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  1.    pp. 

1982, 1984. 
State  V.  Doty,  32  N.  J.  L.  403.     pp.  132,  145, 

1923. 
State  V.  Doughcrtv,  70  la.  439;   s.  c.  30  N.  W. 

Kep.  685.    J).  2075. 
State  r.  Dougherty,  1  West.  L.  J.  271.    p. 

1903. 
Stat  e  r.  Douglass,  7  la.  413.    p.  1994. 
State  r.  Douglass,  28  I-a.  Ann.  425.      p.  127. 
State  r.  Douglass,  81  Mo.  231.     p.  531. 
State  r.  Douglass.  63  X.  C.  500.    p.  110. 
Stale  r.  Dove,  10  Ired.  L.  (X.  C)  469.    pp.  74, 

95,  98. 
Stale  r.  Downer,  21  Wis.  274.    p.  1758. 
State  r.  Downs,  3  S.  W.  Kep.  219;  s.  c.  91  Mo. 

19.     pp.  399,  4:iO. 


State  r.  Dozier,  2  Speers  L.  (S.  C.)  211.    pp, 

IS,  19. 
State  r.  Draper,  48  Mo.  56.    p.  234. 
State  r.  Drawdv,  14  Kich.  L.  (.S.  C.)  87.    pp. 

1508,  1519,  179.5. 
State  r.  Dubord,  2  La.  Ann.  732.    p.  17. 
State  r.  Duestoe,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  377.    pj).  1980, 

1981. 
State  r.  DutTv,  15  Iowa,  425.    pp.  284,  286. 
Male  V.  Dugav,  35  La.  Ann.  327.    p.  73. 
State  r.  Dunijihey,  4   Minn.  438.     pp.  91,123, 

124,  1980.  1990. 
State  r.   Dunn,  IS  Mo.  419.     pp.   1554,  1571, 

1846. 
Stale  r.  Durham,  72  X.  C.  447.    p.  1973. 
Stale  r.  Durien,  29  Kan.  688.    ]).  40. 
State  V.  Dwire,  25  Mo.  5.53.    p.  1770. 
Slate  r.  Earlc,  24  La.  Ann.  38.     )i.  41. 
State  V.  Eaton,  75  Mo.  586.    p.  1548. 
State  r.  Eller,  85  X.  C.  585.    pp.  61,  294,  296, 

.529. 
State  r.  Eldridge,  65  Mo.  .584.    p.  1980. 
State  V.  Ellick,  Winst.  L.  (N.  C.)  50.    p.  1848. 
State  r.  Ellington,  7  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  61.    pp. 

74,98,  127. 
State  V.  Elliott,  45  la.  486;  s.  c.  2  Am.  Crim. 

Kep.  322.     pp.  115.  -.91). 
State  r.  Elliott,  90  Mo.  350;  s.  c.  2  S.  W.  Rep. 

411.    p.  1801. 
Stale  r.  p:ilis,  3  Conn.  186.    p.  1566. 
Slate  r.  Ellis,  74  Mo.  207.    pp.  1554, 1555. 
Slate  r.  Elsham,  70  la.  531;  s.  c.  31  X.  W. 

Kep.  66.     pp.  1838, 1839, 1877. 
State  r.  Emerich,  13  Mo.  App.  492.    p.  646. 
Slate  V.  Emory,  12  Mo.  App.  593;  s.  c.  79  Mo. 

461.    p.  740. 
Slate  r.  Engles,  13  Oh.  490.    pp.  1903, 1911. 
Stale  V.  Enoch,  69  Ind.  314.    p.  266. 
State  V.  Estes,  70  Mo.  428.    p.  766. 
Slate  V.  Erb,  9  Mo.  Ajip.  588.    pp.  731,  732. 
Slate  V.  Evans,  21  La.  Ann.   321,    pp.   1902, 

1909. 
State  V.  Everage,  33  La.  Ann.  120.    pp.  5,  39. 
Slater.  Excelsior  Distilling  Co.,  20  Mo.  App. 

21.    p.  1449. 
Slate  V.  Ezell,  41  Tex.  35.    p.  425. 
Stale  •('.  Fagin,  28  La.  Ann.  887.    p.  152. 
Stale  r.  Farmers"  Branch,  36  Barb.  (X.  Y.) 

332.    p.  1023. 
Stale  r.  Farrow,  74  Mo.  531.    p.  74. 
State  r.  Fay,  43  Iowa,  651.    p.  627. 
State  r.  Feirrav,  22  La.  Ann.  423.    pp.  17,  31. 
State  r.  Feller,  25  Iowa,  67.    l)p.  .500,501, 1880. 
State  r.  Feller,  32  Ja.  53.    pp.  184(i,  1878, 1883. 
State  r.  Fenlason,  78  Me.  495.    )).  1738. 
State  r.  Ferguson,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  629.    p.  1545. 
State  r.  First  Xal.  Bank,  4  Xev.  3,58.    p.  2084. 
Stale  r.  Fisher,  2  Xott  &  McCord  (S.  C.),26i. 

pi).  16,  118. 
State  r.  Fitzsimmons,  30  Mo.  236.    p.  258. 
Stale  r.  Florez,  5  La.  Ann.  429.    pp.  91,  92. 
Slate  r.  Flower,  Walker  (Miss.),  318.    pp.  73, 

74,  99,  100. 
Stale  r.  Flovd,  15  IMo.  349.    pp.  1681,  1708. 
Stale  r.  Five,  26  Me.  312.    p.  1319. 
State  r.  Foley,  12  Mo.  Api).  431.    p.  761. 
Stale  r.  Folke,2  La.  Ann.  744.    p.  20. 
Slate  V.  Ford,  37  La.  Ann.  443.    pp.  40,  1520, 

1,522. 
Slate  r.  Forshner,  43  X.  H.  89.    p.  11. 
State  r.  Forsyth  (Mo.),  1  S.  W.  Rep.  834.    p. 

747. 
State  r.  Forsythe  (Mo.),  6  West.  Rep.  438. 

1).  737. 
State  r.  Foster,  61  Mo.  549.    p.  1891. 
State  r.  Foster,  23  X.  II.  348.    p.  283. 
Slate  r.  Fox,  Ga.  Dec.  pt.  1,  p.  36.    pp.  1906, 

1981. 
State  v.  Fox,  0  X.  J.  L.  244.    p.  128. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


State  V.  Fox,  25  N.  J.  L.  566.    pp.  102,  307. 
State  V,  Fox,  29  X.  J.  L.  566.    p.  68. 
State  V.  France,  76  Mo.  681.    pp.  48, 1573. 
State  V.  Frank,  23  La.  Ann.  213.     pp.   1902, 

1907, 1909. 
State  V.  Freeman,  5  Conn.  348.    p.  1984. 
State  V,  Fruze,  28  La.  Ann.  657.     pp.   1913, 

1920. 
State  V.  Fry,  07  la.  478.    pp.  1793,  1794. 
State  r.  Fuentes,  5  La.  Ann.  427.    p.  7 
State  V.  Fuller,  39  Vt.  74     p.  88. 
State  V.  Funck,  17  Iowa,  365.    pp.  119,  I'JO. 
State  V.  Gainer,  2  Ilavw.  (N.  C.)  140.    p.  38. 
State  V.  Gaitliur,  77  Mo.  304.    p.  2128. 
State  r.  Gallowaj-,  5  Coldw.  (Tenu. )  326.    pp. 

132,1.50,151. 
State  V.  Garrand,  5  Ore.  216.    p.  1915. 
State  I'.  Garrett,  Busbue  CX-  C.),357.    pp.  530, 

659. 
State  V.  Gartrell,  14  Ind.  280.    p.  1562. 
State  i\  Gates,  9  La.  Ann.  94.    p.  127. 
Slate  V.  Gay,  25  La.  Ann.  197.    p.  33. 
State  V.  Gav,  25  La.  Ann.  472.    pp.  41,  49. 
State  V.  Gedicke,  43  X.  J.  L.  86.    p.  497. 
State  V.  Gee,  85  Mo.  C47.    pp.  1543,  1548, 1567, 

1568,  1569, 1.571,  1.'574,  1770,  1773, 1832,  1990. 
State  V.  George,  8  Ired.  (X.  C.)  324;  s.  c.  49 

Am.  Dec.  392.     pp.  489,  2049. 
State  V.  George,  8  Itob.  (La.)  535.    pp.  69,  70, 

73. 
State  V.  Gibson,  21  Ark.  140.    p.  109. 
State  V.  Gi2;her,  23  la.  318.    p.  524. 
State  r.  Giles,  10  Wis.  101.    p.  150. 
State  V.  Gill,  14  So.  Car.  410.    p.  115. 
State  V.  Gillick,  7  la.  287.    p.  1890. 
State  r.  Gillick,  10  la.  98.    pp.  70, 1002, 1953. 
State  r.  Gilman,  70  Me.  329.    p.  2078. 
State  V.  Given,  32  La.  Ann.  782.    p.  111. 
State  V.  Glass,  5  Ore.  73.    pp.  1860, 1861, 1863, 

1864,  1865,  1869. 
State  V.  Glass,  60AVis.  218.    p.  528. 
State  V.  Goff,  Wright  (Ohio),  78.    p.  143. 
State  V.  Godfrey,   Brayt.   (Vt.)   170.    pp.  67, 

100. 
State  V.  Golden,  49  la.  49.    p.  1898. 
State  V.  Grace,  18  Minn.  398.    p.  164. 
State  V.  Graham,  74  X.  C.  616.    pp.  647,  660. 
State  V.  Graham,  17  X.  W.  Rep.  192.    p.  787. 
State  V.  Grant,  79  Mo.  113.    p.  526. 
State  V.  Graynor  (Mo.),  6  West.  Rep.  207.    p. 

527. 
State  V.  Grebe,  17  Kan.  459.    p.  1810. 
State  V.  Green,  20  Iowa,  424.    n.  94. 
State  r.  Green,  33  La.  Ann.  1408.    p.  41. 
State  r.  Green,  66  Mo.  640.    p.  1550. 
State  V.  Greenwade,  72  Mo.  298.    p.  75. 
State  V.  Gregory,  33  La.  Ann.  737.    pp.  259, 

Sta'te  V.  Griffin,  87  Mo.  608.    pp.  767,  769,  1548. 
State  V.  Groning,  33  Kan.  22.    \^:>.  1887, 1897. 
State  V.  Groome,  10  la.  308.    pp.  113,  117. 
State  r.  Guidry,  28  La.  Ann.  630.    pp.  15, 16, 

32,  70, 63. 
State  V.  Gunter,  30  La.  Ann.  539.    p.  17. 
State  V.  Gurnee,  14  Kan.  111.    p.  G09. 
State  V.  Gut,  13  Minn.  341.    ]>.  31. 
.  State  V.  Guttiores,  15  La.  Ann.  190.    p.  4. 
State  V.  Guy,  69  Mo.  430.    p.  769. 
State  V.  Hall,  20  Mo.  App.  397.    p.  283. 
State  V.  Hall,  39  Me.  107.    p.  1670. 
State  V.  Hall,  26  W.  Va.  236.    pp.  2056,  2061. 
State  r.  Hamilton,  57  la.  698;   s.  c.  11  X.  W. 

Rep.  5.    pp.  1793, 1847,  1853. 
State  V.  Hamilton,  27  La.  Ann.  400.    pp.  103, 

115. 
State  V.  Hamilton,  55  Mo.  520.    pp.  234,  448, 

767. 
State  V.  Hannibal,  37  La.  Ann.  619.    pp.  1520, 

1523. 


State  V.  Hardie.  47  la.  648.    p;  1574. 

State  V.  Hardin,  46  la.  623.      pp.  23,  24,  1793, 

1794, 1847. 
State  V.  Harding,  46  la.  623.    p.  1800. 
State  V.  Harding,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  267.     p.  1980. 
State  V.  Harkin,  7  Xev.  377.    pp.  210, 1649. 
State  V.  Harlow,  21  Mo.  446.    pp.  1903, 1906. 
State  r.  Harper's  Ferry  Bridge  Co.,  16  W. 

Va.  864.    p.  1.32. 
State  V.  Harrington,  12  Xev.  125.    pp.  527, 

528,  1647. 
State  V.  Harris,  30  La.  Ann.  90.     pp.  20,  111, 

119,120. 
State  V.  Harris,  11  la.  414.      p.  1891. 
State  V.  Harris,  59  Mo.  553.     pp.  1569, 1668, 

1708. 
State  V.  Harris,  12  Xev.  414.    p.  1906. 
State  V.  Harris,  7  X.  J.  L.  361.    p.  128. 
State  V.  Harris,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  190;   s.  c. 

Horr.  &  Thomp.  Cas.  Self-Def.  276.      pp. 

1,539,  1540. 
State  V.  Harrison,  5  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  1-15.    p. 

1668. 
State  V.  Hartmann,  46  Wis.  248.    p.  1953. 
State  r.  Hartneit,  75  Mo.  251.    p.    408. 
State  V.  Hascall,  6  X.  H.  352.     pp.  30,  34, 110, 

1921,1923,1954,  1976,1990. 
State  V.  Hatfleld,  72  Mo.  518.    p.  325. 
State  V.  Hawkins,  8  Porter  (Ala.),  461.    p. 

1697. 
State  V.  Havden,  51  Vt.  296.    p.  123. 
State  V.  Hayden,  45  la.  11.    pp.  4.38, 1822, 1846, 

1869,  1870. 
State  V.  Haves,  78  Mo.  309.    p.  1576. 
State  V.  Haves,  59  X.  H.  450.    p.    1007. 
State  V.  Hays,  23  Mo.  287.    pp.  88,  89,  1786, 

1891. 
State  V.  Heaton,  77  X.  C.  505.    p.  48. 
State  V.  Heaton,  23  W.  Va.  776.    p.  1567. 
Slate  1-.  Hecox,  83  Mo.  531.    p.  1.563. 
State  v.  Helvenstou,  R.  M.  Charlt.   (Ga.)  48. 

p.  145. 
State  V.  Hendricks,  32  Kan.   564.     pp.    487, 

1577. 
State  V.  Henrick,  62  la.  40.    p.  1793. 
State  V.  Henry.  24  Kan.  460.     p.  1898. 
State  V.  Henrv,  15  La.  Ann.  297.    p.  17. 
Slate  V.  llenson,  81  Mo.  384.    p.  325. 
State  V.  Hernandes,  4  La.  Ann.  379.    p.  16. 
State  V.  Herudou,  1  Murph.  (X.  C.)  269.    p. 

184. 
State  V.  Hessians,  50  la.  135.    p.  1898. 
State  V.  Hester,  2  Jones  L.    (X^.   C.)  83.    p. 

1978. 
State  V.  Hickman,  75  Mo.  416.    p.  763. 
State  V.  Hill,  65  Mo.  85.    pp.   1567,  1786,  1887, 

1897. 
State  V.  Ilinkle,  6Iowa,  380.    p.  74. 
State  V.  Hodge,  50  X.  H.  510.    p.  1893. 
State  V.  Holding,  1  xMcCord  (S.  C.),  379.    pp. 

145,  146. 
State  V.  Hollescheit,  ef  Mo.  302.     pp.  1786, 

1891. 
State  V.  Holme,  54  Mo.   153.    pp.   1554,  1573, 

1848,  1891. 
State  V.  Holt,  90  X.  C.  749  ;  s.  c.  47  Am.  Rep. 

544.    p.  2. 
State  V.  Honig.  78  Mo.  249.    p.  717. 
State  V.  Hopkins,  1  Bay  (S.  C.),  372.    pp.  117 

122. 
State  V.  Hopper,  71  Mo.  425.    pp.  769,  1506, 

1918,  1952. 
state  V.  Horn,  9  Kan.  119.    pp.  1548, 1984, 1994. 
State  V.  Horner,  86  Mo.  71.    p.  2005. 
State  V.  Horner,  16  Mo.  App.  191.    p.  159. 
Stale  V.  Hornsby,  8  Rob.  (La.)  554.    pp.  1902, 

1905,  1909,  1911. 
State  V.  Hosmer,  85  Mo.  553.    p.  1455. 
State  V.  Howard,  63  lud.  502.    p.  100. 


10a 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


State  V.  Howard,  14  Kan.  173.    p.  154S. 
State  r.  Howard,  17  N.  H.  171.    pp.  68,  69,  73, 

82, 119, 1-23. 
State  V.  Howard,  32  Tt.  380.    p.  465. 
State  r.  Howell,  3  La.  Ann.  50.    p.  16. 
State  V.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518.    pp.  42,  43,  71,  74, 

100, 116. 
State  V.  Hudson,  59  Mo.  135.    p.  1668. 
State  V.  Hulf,  11  Jsev.  17.    pp.  524,  527,  534, 

535. 
State  V.  Hugel,  27  La.  Ann.  375.    p.  71. 
State  V.  Hughes,  ?5  Kan.  632 ;  s.  c.  12  Pac. 

Kep.  28.    p.  2075. 
State  V.  Hughes,  72  N.  C.  25.    p.  1384,  1394, 

1397. 
State  V.  Hull,  26  la.  292.    p.  438. 
State  V.  Hunt,  4  La.  "Ann.  438.    pp.  1909,  1978. 
State  V.  Hunt,  4  Strobh.  (S.  C.)  L.  322.    p.  161. 
State  V.  Hutintj-,  21  Mo.  464.    p.  1879. 
State  r.  Huxford,  47  la.  18.    p.  1576. 
State  V.  Hvmer,  15  Nev.  49.    p.  584. 
State  V.  Igo,  21  Mo.  451).    pp.  1903, 1906. 
State  r.  Irwin,  SO  Mo.  249.    p.  1758. 
State  V.  Ivey,  41  Tex.  38.    pp.  91,  92,  94. 
State  r.  Jackson,  12  La.  Ann.  679.    p.  16. 
State  V.  Jackson,  37  La.  Ann.  768.    p.  76. 
State  V.  Jackson,  39  Mo.  420.    p.  1576. 
State  V.  Jacobs,  5  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  260.    pp. 

658,  6.59. 
State  V.  Jaynes,  78  X.  C.  504.    p.  1533. 
State  V.  Jeiikins,  32  Kan.  477.    p.  31. 
State  V.  Jennings,  18  Mo.  435.    pp.  1550,  1571. 
State  V.  Jennings,  81  Mo.  1S5.    pp.  325,  763. 
State  V.  Jennings.  15  Kich.  L.  (S.  C.)  176.    p. 

48. 
State  V.  Johnagen,  53  Iowa,  250.    p.  813. 
State  V.  Johnson,  lOi  Ind.  247.    p.  1574. 
State  r.  Johnson,  30    La.  Ann.,  Pt.  II.,  904. 

pp.  1520,  1523,  1908. 
State  r.  Jolmson,  33  La.  Ann.  889.    p.  73. 
State  V.  Jolinson,  Walker  (Miss.) ,  .392.    p.  74. 
State  V.  Johnson,  76  Mo.  121.    [jp.  7t4,  749. 
State  V.  Johnson,  33  X.  H.  441.    p.  303. 
State  V.  Johnson,  1  N.  J.  L.  219.    p.  30. 
State  V.  Johnson,  3  Jones  L.    (N.  C.)    266. 

pp.  1848, 1890. 
State  V.  Johnson,  75  N.  C.  174.    p.  1542. 
State  17.  Johnson,  1  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  354.    p. 

763. 
State  V.  Johnson,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  385.    pp.  132, 

141. 
State  V.Jones,  5  Ala.  666.    p.  108. 
State  V.  Jones,  64  la.  350.    pp.  1756, 1879. 
State  V.  Jones,  20  Mo.  58.    p.  1.554. 
State  V.  Jones,  53  Mo.  488.    j).  1553. 
State  V.  Jones,  61  Mo.  232.    pp.  20,  125,  1694, 

1726. 
State  V.  Jones,  64  Mo.  391.    pp.  54,  442. 
State  V.  Jones,  78  Mo.  283.    pp.  1548, 1549, 1567, 

1570,  1573, 1799,  1804,  1836, 1848,  1891. 
State  V.  Jones,  86  1Mb.  627.    p.  1836. 
State  t».  Jones,  7  Nev.  408.     pp.  1930,  1931, 

1978. 
State  V.  Jones  (Xev.),  11  Pac.  Rep.  317;  s.  c. 

19  Xev.  365.     pp.  1819,  1857,  1858,  1860. 
State  V.  Jones,  77  N.  C.  520.    pp.  775,  1542, 

1766,  1767. 
State  V.  Jones,  80  N.  C.  415.    p.  82. 
State  V.  Judge,  11  La.  Ann.  79.     pp.  29,  1903. 
State  V.  Judges,  32  La.  Ann.  1256.    p.  151. 
State  V.  Jurche,  17  La.  Ann.  71.    pp.   1520, 

1523. 

State  V.  K ,  4  X.  H.  .562.    p.  283. 

State  V  Kane,  32  La.  Ann.  999.    pp.  17,  27. 
State  V.  Kaufman,  51  Iowa,  578;  s.  c.  9  Cent. 

L.  J.  313.    p.  6. 
State  V.  Kearlcv,  26  Kan.  77.    pp.  1815, 1824. 
State  V.  Keatley,  21  Mo.  App.  484.     p.  2130. 
Stale  V.  Keene,  50  Mo.  307.    p.  1542. 


State  i:  KeUcrman,  14  Kan.  135.    pp.  466, 1777, 

1778,2097. 
State  V.  Kelley,  57  la.  646.    pp.  1895,  1898. 
State  V.  Kellv,  73  Mo.  608 ;  s.  c.  9  Mo.  App.  612. 

pp.  1892,  1893,  1897. 
State  V.  Kennedy,  20  Iowa,  571.    pp.  1543, 1544. 
State  V.  Kennedy,  8  Rob.   (La.)  590.    pp.  65, 

118,  120,  121. 
State  r.  Kennedy,  88  Mo.  341.    p.  1895. 
State  r.  KenncdV,  7  Nev.  374.    pp.  1646,  1647. 
State  V.  Ketclie)',  70  X.  C.  621.    p.  112. 
State  V.  Kilgore,  93  X^.  C.  533.    p.  78. 
State  r.  Kimball,  50  Me.  409.    pp.  1506, 1951. 
State  V.  King,  28  La.  Ann.  425.     p.  127. 
State  V.  King,  44  Mo.  238.    p.  1708. 
State  V.  King  (Xeb.),  37  X.  W.  Bep.  310.    p. 

2060. 
State  V.  Kingsbury,  58  Me.  238.    pp.  69, 124. 
State  V.  Kinlev,  43  la.  294.    p.  437. 
State  V.  Kinney,  81  Mo.  101.    pp.  810,  811. 
State  i\  Kirkuatrick,  63  la.  556.    p.  1577. 
State  V.  Kline,  54  la.  183;  s.  c.  6  N.  W.  Rep. 

184.  pp.  1793,  1794,  1847. 

State  i\  Klinger,  43  Mo.  127.    p.  1879. 
State  V.  Klinger,  46  Mo.  224.    pp.  16,  20. 
State  V.  Knapp,  45  X.  H.  148.    p.  300. 
State  V.  Knight,  43  Me.  11.     pp.  47,  95, 1890. 
State  V.  Knight,  46  Mo.  83.    pp.  2003,  2076. 
State  V.  Knight,  61  Mo.  373.    p.  34. 
State  r.  Koerner,  51  Mo.  174.    p.  2049. 
State  r.  Krlng,  64  Mo.  591.    p.  747. 
State  V.  Kring,  74  Mo.  612.    pp.  395,  728,  740, 

747. 
State  V.  Krum,  32  Kan.  372.    p.  396. 
State  V.  Lamltert.  93  X.  C.  618.     p.  119 
State  V.  Lamon,  3  Hawks  (X.  C.),  175.    pp. 

26,  27. 
State  V.  Lane,  64  Mo.  320.    p.  1891. 
State  V.  Lane,  1  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  113.    p.  1545. 
State  r.  Lang,  63  Me.  215.    p.  .530. 
State  V.  Lanier,  79  X.  C.  622.    p.  450. 
State  V.  Lantz,  23  Kan.  728.    pp.  1917,  1943, 

1944,  1946. 
State  V.  Larkin,  U  Xev.  314.    p.  126. 
State  V.  Lartigue,  29  La.  Ann.   642.    pp.  74, 

116. 
State  V.  Laurie,  1  Mo.  App.  371.    p.  1449. 
State  V.  Lautenschlager,  22  Minn.  514.    pp. 

100,  101. 
State  V.  Lawhorn.  88  X.  C.  634.    p.  530. 
State  V.  Lawlor,  28  Mian.  216.    pp.  662,  813, 

1777. 
State  V,  Lawrence,  38  Iowa,  51.    pp.  74,  75. 
State  V.  Lawrence,  57  Me.  574.    pii.  787,  788. 
State  ».  Laxton,  78  X.   C.  564.    pp.  203,  318, 

320,  488,  1642. 
State  V.  Lee,  22  IMinn.  407.    pp.  476,  477. 
State  V.  Lee,  66  Mo.  165.    pp.  728,  740,  747,  761. 
State  V.  Leeper,  78  Mo.  470.    p.  1576. 
State  V.  Lefaivre,  53  ]Mo.  470.    pp.  825.  828. 
State  V.  Leicham,  41  Wis.  581.    ]).  1.566. 
State  V.  Leiclit,  17  la.  28.    pp.  60,  64,  102. 
State  V.  Leonard,  6  La.  Ann.  420.    p.  1542. 
State  V.  Leiiage,  57  X.  H.  245.    pp.  297,  298, 

301. 
Rtate  V.  Levy,  5  La.  Ann.  64.    p.  1987. 
State  V.  Lewis,  48  la.  579.    p.  1576. 
State  V.  Lewis,  28  La.  Ann.  81.    pp.  82, 83, 129. 
State  V.  Lewis,  6  Mo.  App.  58t.    )).  747. 
State  V.  Linney,  52  ^lo.  40.     p.  1546. 
State  V.  Ligon,  7  J'ort.  (  Ala.)  167.    p.  47. 
State  V.  Lopez,  15  Xev.  407.    !>.  696. 
State  V.  Loi)her,  35  La.  Ann.  975.    p.  117. 
State  V.  Lonsdale,  48  Wis.  348.    pp.  172,  173, 

185,  186,  187,  285. 

State  V.  Lovenstein,  9  La.  Ann.  313.    pp.  20, 

129. 
State  V.  Ludwig,  70  Mo.  412.    p.  101. 
State  V.  Lull,  37  Mo.  246.    pp.  321,  353 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlvii 


state  r.  Lurch.  12  Ore.  99.    pp.  531,  532. 

State  V.  Lvnott,  5  R.  I.  295.     p.  1642. 

State  r.  Lvtle,  5  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  58.    pp.  25, 

1906. 
State  r.  Madoil,  12  Fla.  151.    pp.  67,  118,  119, 

123,  190(i,  190S. 
State  ('.  Maguire,  69  Mo.  197.    pp.  1545,1801. 
State  V.  Malm,  25  Kan.  186.    pp.  1879,  1881. 
State  r.  .Alahon,  3  Harr.  (Del.)  568.    p.  1016. 
State  r.  Maine,  27  Conn.  281.    p.  1530. 
State  r.  Maine  &c.  R.  Co.,  76  Mc.  357.    p.  1475. 
State  r.  Mallon,  75  Mo.  355.    pp.  765,  766, 1712. 
State  V.  Malov,  44  la.  113.    p.  157.5. 
Stater.  Manchester  &c.  R.  Co.,52N.  H.  529. 

pp.  1208,  1212,  1221. 
State  V.  Mann,  83  Mo.  590.    p.  101. 
State  r.  Mansfield,  41  Mo.  47o.    p.  6. 
State  V.  Marshall,  8  Ala.  302.    pp.  49, 51.  81,  82 

129. 
State  V.  Marshall,  36  Mo.  400.    pp.  20, 124,  261 

315,  2055,  2056. 
State  V.  Martin,  8  Mo.  102.    p.  1616. 
State  V.  Martin.  74  Mo.  547.    p.  787. 
State  r.    Martin,  2  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  101.    p 

1809. 
State  r.  Marvin,  12  Iowa.  499.    pp.  1562,  1577 
State  r.  Marvin,  35  K.  H.  22.    p.  300. 
State  r.  Massev,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  379.    p.  30. 
State  r.  Matthews,  20  Mo.  55.      pp.  1.505,  1694, 
State  r.  Matthews,  80  N.  C.  417.    p.  103. 
State  V.  Matthews,  37  N.  H.  450.    pp.  132,  148 

149. 
State  V.   Maxwell,  42  Iowa,  210.     pp.   1536 

1860. 
State  I'.  Mav,  4  Dev.  L.  (X.  C.)  330.    p.  316. 
State  V.  Mc.Vfee.  64  N.  C.  339.    p.  105. 
State  V.  McAllister,  24  Me.  139.    p.  761. 
State  V.  McCall,  4  Ala.  643.    pp.  537,  538. 
State  r.  INIcCartev,  17  Minn.  76.    pp.  21,  27. 
St  ite  V.  McClear"  11  Xov.  39.    pp.  4,  42,  51,  70. 
State  V.  McCool,  34  Kan.  613.    pp.  767,  778. 
State  V.  McCoy,  34  Mo.  431.    pp.  1879, 1884. 
State  V.  McCrea  (La.),  3  S.  Rep.  380.    p.  2050. 
State  V  McCurrv,  63  X.  C.  33.    pp.  35, 1670. 
State  r.  McDevitt,  69  la.  549;   s.  c.  29  X.  W. 

Rep.  4.59.     p.  1772. 
State  V.  McDonald,  65  Me.  466.    pp.  437,  439. 
State  V.  McDonald.  8  Ore.  113.    pp.  117,  119. 
State  V.    McDonald,  9  W.  Va.  456.    pp.   119, 

121,124. 
State  V.  McDonnell.  32  Vt.  491.    p.  1890. 
State  V.  McDuffle,  .52  Ala.  4.    ]>.  138. 
State  r.  .McElmurray,  3  Strobh.    (S.   C.)    33. 

pp.  25^1,  r.)0:!. 
State  r.  McGee,  36   La.  Ann.  206.     pp.  317, 

2049. 
State  V.  McGinnis,  76  Mo.  326.    p.  1801. 
State  V.  MeOraw,  74  Mo.  .573.    p.  531. 
State  V.  McGrew,  13  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  316.    p. 

40. 
State  V.  McJunkin,  7  S.  C.  21.    p.  31. 
State  V.  McKee,  If^g  Ind.  498.    p.  2108. 
State  V.  ATcLaughlin,  44  la.  82.    pp.  559, 1994. 
State  V.  McLaughlin,  27  INIo.  111.    p.  2097. 
State  r.  McLaughlin,  76  i\Io.  320.    p.  531. 
State  V.  JIcLeau,  11  La.  Ann.  546.    p.  40. 
Stater.  McLean,  21  La.  Ann.  546.    pp.  118, 

120. 
State  V.  McLendon,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  195.    p.  18. 
State  iJ.  McLeod,  1  Hawks  (X.   C),  344.     u. 

1985. 
State  V.  McXinch,  90  X.  C.  695.    p.  1549. 
State  V.  McXinch,  12  So.  Car.  89.    ]>.  46. 
State  V.  :McQuaige,  5  S.  C.  429.    jip.  34, 116. 
State  V.  Meaker,  54  Vt.  112.    p.  73. 
State  V.  Medlicott,  9  Kan.  257.    i)p  71,  75. 
State  V.  Meller,  75  X".  C.  74.    p.  1520. 
State  !'..Melwin,  U  La.  Ann.  535     p.  66. 
State  V.  Merrill,  2  Dev.  L.  (X.  C.)  269.    p.  1890. 


State  r.  Meshek,  61  la.  316.    p.  1569. 

State  V.  Mewherter,  46  la.  88.    pp.  1878, 1883. 

State  V.  Mever,  58  Vt.  457 ;  s.  c.  3  Atl.  Rep. 

195.     pp.  13,  1831,1850. 
State  V.  Meyers,  68  Mo.  266.    p.  5. 
State  V.  Middleton,  5  Port.   (Ala.)   484.    p. 

47. 
State  V.  Millain,  3  Nev.  409.    p.  125. 
State  V.  Miller,  53  la.  209.    pp.  356,  524, 1528, 

1776. 
State  V.  Miller,  29  Kan.  43.    p.  76. 
State  V.  Miller,  26  La.  Ann.  579.    pp.  15,  32. 
State  V.  Miller,  36  La.  Ann.  158.    p.  2049. 
State  V.  Miller,  67  Mo.  604.    pp.  325, 1708. 
State  v.  Miller,  75  X.  C.  73.    p.  712. 
State  V.  Miller,  1  Dev.  &  B.  (X.  C.)  500.    pp. 

1906,  1978. 
State  V.  Millican,  15  La.  Ann.  557.    pp.  234, 

1984. 
State  V.  Mills,  91  X.  C.  581.    p.  10. 
State  V.  Minis,  26  Minn.  183.    pp.  96, 1984. 
State  V.  Mix,  15  Mo.  153.    pp.  315,  1770,  1903, 

1905,  1906. 
State  r.  Modecai,  68  X.  C.  207.    p.  647. 
State  V.  Molisse,  36  La.  Ann.  920.    p.  296. 
State  V.  Monaquo,  T.  U.  P.  Charlt.  (Ga.)  22. 

p.  41. 
Slate  V.  Moncla  (La.),  2  South.  Rep.  814.  pp. 

24,  81. 
State  r.  Monk,  3  Ala.  415.    pp.  23, 124. 
State  r.  Montgomery,  56  la.  198.    p.  1576. 
State  V.  Morea,  2  Ala.  275.     pp.  74,  85,  87. 
Sttite  r.  Morgan,  20  La.  Ann.  442.     pp.  30,  31. 
State  i'.  Moore,  28  Oh.  St.  195.    p.  95. 
State  r.  Moore,  28  Oh.  St.  595.    p.  88. 
State  r.  Morphy,  33  la.  270;  s.  c.  Xi  Am.  Rep. 

125.     pp.  1484,  1548. 
State  V.  Morrill,  16  Ark,  384.    pp.  132,  133. 
State  t'.  Morris,  3  Hawks  (X.   C),  388.    pp. 

1698,  1701. 
State  r.  Moslev,  31  Kan.  355.    pp.  787,  788. 
State  V.  Mott,  4  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  419.    p.  150. 
State  V.  Mullen,  14  La.  Ann.  570.    p.  65. 
State  V.  Jlurphy,  6  Ala.  846.    p.  1833. 
State  V.  Myers,  44  Iowa.  580.    i>.  15L 
State  V.  Xadal  (Iowa),  29  X.  W.  Rep.-451,    p. 

1666. 
State  V.  Xadal,  8  Crim.  Law.  Mag.  730.    p. 

1694. 
State  u.  Xash,7Ia.  3.50.    p.  1824. 
State  V.  Xash,  10  la.  81.    p.  524. 
State  r.  Xash,  8  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  35.    p.  25. 
State  V.  ^auert,  6  Mo.  App.  596.    p.  314. 
State  V.  Xeagle,  65  Me.  468.    p.  30. 
state  V.  Xeeley,  20  la.  108.    pp.  1544, 1548. 
State  V.  Xegro  Peter,  Ga.  Dec.,pt.  1,  p.  46.    p. 

1981. 
State  t»;  Xelson,  58  la.  208.    pp.  62,  476. 
State  V.  Xelson,  11  Xev.  334.    pp.  1819,  1857, 

1858,  1860. 
State  V.  Xerbovig,  33  Minn.  480.    p.  35. 
state  V.  Xeuner,  49  Conn.  232.    p.  39. 
State  V.  Xewhouse,  29  La.  Ann.  821.    p.  31. 
State  V.  Xichols,  29  Minn.  357.    p.  284. 
State  I'.  Xixon,  32  Kan.  213.     p.  1882. 
State  V.  Xorris,  59  X.  H.  636.    p.  1553. 
State  V.  Xorthrup,  48  la.  583.    pp.  1793,  1800, 

1847. 
State  V.  Xorwood,  12  Md.  177.    p.  324. 
State  V.  Xowell,  58  X.  H.  314.    p.  268. 
State  V.  Xueslein,  25  Mo.  111.    p.  1555. 
State  V.  Ober,  52  X.  H.  459;  s.  c.  13  Am.  Rep. 

88.     pp.  524.  527,  529. 
State  r.  O'Brien,  7  R.  T.  331.    pp.  783,  1906. 
State  r.  O'Connor,  65  Mo.  374.    p.  578. 
State  V.  O'Gradv,  3  Woods  (U.  S.;,  496.    p.  39. 
State  i\  Oriniston,  66  la.  1.52.    ]>.  1776. 
State  r.  O'Xeal,  7  Ired.    (X.  C.)  L.  25L    pp. 

741,  1698. 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


State  r.  O'Xealc,  4  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  88.    p.  450. 
State  V.  Orr,  (14  Mo.  339.    ji.  lGr):i. 
State  V.  Oscar,  7  .loues  L.  (X.  C.)  303.    p.  18-25. 
State  V.  Ostrander,  18  la.  437.     pp.  74,  81,  S3, 

438,1831. 
State  r.  Ott,  49  Mo.  326.    p.  1707. 
State  V.  Overton,  24  X.  J.  L.  435.    p.  1147. 
State  i\  Owen,  Phlll.  L.  4-25.     p.  35. 
State  V.  Owens,  79  Mo.  (!I9.    p.  1836. 
State  V.  Vngv,  21  Mo.  257.    pp.  705,  706,  708. 
State  r.  I'agels,  92  Mo.  300;  s.  c.  10  West.  Rep. 

288.    p.  1886. 
State  V.  Pasols  (Mo.),  4  S.  W.  Rep.  931.    p.  49. 
State  V.  rainier,  S8  Mo.  568.    p.  16:i4. 
State  t'.  rainier  (Mo.),  5  West.  liep.  387.    p. 

526. 
State  V.  Parish,  79  N.  C.  610.    p.  484. 
State  V.  Parker,  77  Teuu.   (13  Lea)  221.    p. 

16()8. 
State  V.  Parks,  21  La.  Ann.  251.    pp.  118, 120. 
State  r.  Parks,  3  Ired.  L,  (X.  C.)  29G.    p.  450. 
State  V.  Parsons,  7  Xcv.  57.  pp.  1909, 1981, 1982. 
State  V.  Parllow,  90  Mo.  608.     pp.  1703,  1709. 
State  V.  Parraut,  16  Miuu.  178.    pp.  1903, 1905, 

1932. 
State  V.  Pate,  Bush.  (N.  C.)  244.    pp.  43, 107. 
State  V.  Patrick,  3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  443.     pp. 

87, 118,  120. 
State  r.  Patterson,  88  ISFo.  88.    p.  531. 
State  V.  Patterson,  74  N.  C.  157.    pp.  416,  417. 
State  V.  J'atterson,  2  Ired.  (X.  C.)  346.    pp. 

282,  416,  417,  530. 
State  r.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  308.      pp.  1914, 1915. 
State  V.  Pavton  (Mo.),  2  S.  AV.  Rep.  394;  s.  c. 

90  31o.  220.     p.  1836. 
State  V.  Peace,  1  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  251.    p. 

1670. 
State  V.  Peak,  85  Mo,  190.     pp.  568, 1545, 1574, 

1786, 2048. 
State  V.  Pender^ass,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.   L.  (N. 

C.)  365.    p.  1552. 
State  V.  Perkins,  66  N.  C.  126.    p.  91. 
State  V.  Perry,  Busbee  (X.  C),  330.      pp.  20, 

22,  53,  1902. 
State  r.  Pete,  39  La.  Ann.  1095.    p.  2049. 
State  V.  Peterson  (Kan.),  16  Pac.  Rep.  263. 

p.  124. 
State  V.  Petrie,  25  La.  Ann.  386.    p.  30. 
State  V.  Pettv,  21  Kan.  54.    pp.  485,  487,  489. 
State  V.  Pfeiferlc,  36  Kan.  90.    p.  630. 
State  V.  I'liair,  48  Vt.  366.    p.  67. 
State  V.  J'liares,  24  W.  Va.  657.    pp.  2051, 

20.55,  2128. 
State  V  Pliifer,  90  X.  O.  721.    p.  1.533. 
State  V.  Phillips,  2  Ala.  297.    p.  19. 
State  V.  Phillips,  28  La.  Ann.  387.    p.  127. 
State  V.  Phillips,  24  Mo.  475.    pp.  21,  760. 
State  V.  Phillips,  70  N.  C.  462.    p.  420. 
State  V.  Phinney,  42  Me.  384.    pp.  1698, 1702. 
State  V.  IMcrce,  7  Ala.  728.     p.  1537. 
State  V.  Pierce,  8  Iowa,  231.    i^p.  91,  92. 
State  V.  J'icrce,  65  la.  89.    pp.  1821,  1828;  1832. 
State  V.  IMerce,  8  Nev.  291.    i>.  717. 
State  V.  I'ike,  65  Me.  HI.    p.  J984. 
State  V.  Pike,  20  N.  H.  344.     pp.  119, 123,  126, 

1938. 
State  r.  Pike,  49  X.  IL  406.    pp.  42, 91. 
States.   I'ike  (Sup.  Ct.   N.  H.),  11  Am.   L. 

Reg.  233.    p.  72. 
State  V.  Pitts,  11  la.  .343.    p.  1720. 
State  V.  IMlts.  58  Wo.  .556.     pp.  34,  84. 
State  V.  I'lunkett,  64  Me.  534.     p.  304. 
State  V.  Pollard,  14  Mo.  App.  583.    pp.  737, 
739. 

State  V.  Poison,  29  la.  133.    p.  559. 

State  V.  Ponyicr,    6  Ciim.  L.  Map.  851.    p. 
1575. 

State  V.  Pcpulns,  12  La.  Ann.  710.    pp.  1905, 
1909. 


State  V.  Porter,  34  la.  131,    p.  1842. 

State  t'.  Porter,  26  Mo.  201.    i)p.  310,  312. 

State  V.  Porter,  75  M<i.  171.    p.  .531. 

State  V.  Potter,  18  Conn.  166.   pp.  46, 47, 73,89, 

105,  128. 
Stale  V.  Potter,  13  Kan.  414.    p.  1548. 
State  V.  Potter,  15  Kan.  302.    p.  1726. 
State  V.  Powers,  10  Ore.  145;  s.  c.  45  Am. 

Kop.  138.     p.  119. 
State  V.  Prater,  26  S.  C.  198;  s.  c.  2  8.  E.  Rep. 

108.     pp.  58,  82,  1717. 
State  V.  I'rescotl,  7  X.  H.  287.    pp.  1907,  1908, 

1931,1982. 
State  V.  I'rescott,  33  X.  IL  212.    p.  298. 
State  V.  Pre-ston,  77  Mo.  294.     p.  788. 
State  V.  I'restoii,  34  AX' is.  ()75.     p.  1537. 
State  V.  Price,  3  Mo.  App.  586.    ]).  17. 
State  V.  Price,  10  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  351.    p.  90. 
State  V.  Primrose,  3  Ala.  546.    p.  9. 
Stale  V.  Pritcliard,  15  Xev.  74;  s.  c,  10  Re- 
porter, 273.     pp.  66,  89,  92, 129. 
Stale  V.  Push,  23  La.  Ann.  14.    p.  49. 
State  r.  Putnam,  1  X.  J.  L.  260.    i».  128. 
State  V.  Quarrel,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  150.    pp.  117. 

120. 
State  V.  Ragland,  75  X.  C.  12.    p.  48. 
State  V.  Railroad,  .58  X.  H.  410.    p.  403. 
State  V.  Railroad  Co.,  24  AV.  Va.  785.    p.  1577. 
State  V.  Kash,  12  Ired.  L.  (X.  (J.)   382.    pp. 

1669,  1070. 
State  r.  Rawls,  2  Nott  &  McC.   (S.   C.)  33L 

pp.  355,361.362. 
Stale  v.  Uavinond,  11  Xev.  98.    pp.  .33,  73,  95, 

115,116,  129. 
State  V.  Red,  53  la.  67;  s.  c.  4  X.  AV.  Rep.  831. 

pp.  524,  1793,  1847. 
State  V.  Rcddick,  7  Kan.  152.     p.  1882. 
State  V.  Reed,  62  la.  40.;  s.  c.  17  X.  AV.  Rep. 

150.     pp.  1793,  1847. 
State  V.  Reed,  62  INIe.  129.    pp.  1709, 1830. 
State  V.  Reed,  71  Mo.  200.    pp.  730,  732. 
State  V.  Reed,  47  X.  H.  466.    jip.  40,  42. 
State  r.  Reeves,  11  La.  Ann.  685.    pp.  17,  26, 

65,  85. 
State  V.  Reid,  28  La.  Ann.  387.    p.  127. 
State  V.  Kenton,  15  X.  11.  174.    p.  297. 
State  r.  Rcvells,  35  La.  Ann.  342.    p.  72. 
State  V.  Revells,  31  La.  Ann.  387.    p.  15. 
State  f.  Ithodes,  1  llousi.  (Del.)  Crim.  Cas. 

476.    p.  3.53. 
State  V.  Rice,  56  la.  431.    pp.  1514, 1.538. 
State  r.  Richart,  57  la.  245.    p.  1898. 
State  r.  I.'icks,  32  La.  Ann.  1098.    pp.  74,  75. 
State  i-.  Rider  (Mo.),  6  AVest.   Rep.  458.    p. 

526. 
State  V.  Ridley,  48  la.  370.    p.  2032. 
State  V.  Rigg,  10  Xev.  284.    pp.  1 10, 127. 
Stale  r.  L'ing,  29  Minn.  78.    jip.  49,-65. 
State  r.  KMplev,  31  Me.  386.    pp.  351, 181L 
State  r.  Kivers,  68  la.  616.    p.  1898. 
State  r.  Roark,  23  Kan.  147.    p.  763. 
Stale  r.  Hobli,  90  ]Mo.  31.    ii.  797. 
Slate  r.  Robl)in8,  65  Mo.  443.    p.  1892. 
State  V.  Roberts,  81  X.  C.  (.06.    p.  416. 
State  r.  Roberts.  15  Ore.  187.    p.  1789. 
State?'.  Robertson  (S.  C),  1  S.  K.  Rep.  443. 

)..  747. 
Stale  r.  Robinson,  20  AV.  A'a.  713.    pp.   1879, 
]9a5,  2078. 
j   State  V.  Hobinson,  36  La.  Ann.  873.    p.  108. 
State  r.  Hobinson,  39  Me.  150.    p.  1670. 
State  V.  KoliiiKson,  49  ]Mc.  285.    ]).  2059. 
State  V.  Robourn,  14  Ind.  300.    p.  1742. 
Slate  V.  Hockatellow,  6  X.  J.  L.  332.    p.  128. 
Stale  V.  Roderigas,  7  Xev.  328.    pp.  89, 94, 125, 
State  V.  Roe,  12  Vt.  9.3.    pp.  469,  471,  492. 
Slate  V.  RoUlus,  77  Me.  380.      pp.  408, 1653, 

17.51. 
State  V.  Rollins,  22  X.  II.  528.    p.  107 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlix 


State  V.  Rombaner,  44  Mo.  490.    p.  2076. 
State  V.  Rorabaeher,  19  la.  154.     pp.  1853, 

1854. 
State  V.  Rose,  33  La.  Ann.  932.    pp.  310,  311. 
State  V.  Rose,  32  Mo.  ;346.    p.  1671. 
State  V.  Rosenfleld,  35  Mo.  472.    p.  1440. 
State  V.  Ross,  30  La.  Ann.  1154.    p.  129. 
State  V.  Ross,  29  Mo.  32.    p.  1670. 
State  V.  Rounds,  76  Me.  123.    pp.  1830,  1840. 
State  V.  Rousseau,  28  La.  Ann.  579.    pp.  49,82. 
State  V.  Rugan,  68  Mo.  214.    p.  531. 
State  V.  Ruhlniau,  111  Ind.  17;   «.  c.  11  N.  E. 

Rep.  793.     p.  174S. 
State  V.  Russell,  33  La.  Ann.  135.     p.  1777. 
State  r.  Rvan,  13  Minn.  370.    pp.  42,  43. 
State  V.  Sales,  2  Xev.  268.    p.  1922. 
State  V.  Salge,  1  Nev.  4.55.    p.  48. 
State  V.  Salge,  2  Nev.  321.    p.  257. 
State  V.  Saliba,  18  La.  Ann.  35.    p.  1520. 
State  V.  Sanders,  68  Mo.  202    p.  695. 
State  V.  Sanders.  84  N.  C.  728.    p.  294. 
State  V.  Sargent,  32  Me.  431.    p.  425. 
State  V.  Sarton,  2  Strobh.   L.    (.S.  0.)  60.    p. 

783. 
State  V.  Sater,  8  Iowa,  420.    p.  74. 
State  V.  Saunders  (Ore.),  12  Pac.  Rep.  441.  p. 

126, 
State  V.  Saunders,  14  Ore.  300.    pp.  531.  533. 
State  V.  Sauvinet,  24  La.  Ann.  llii.    p.  160. 
State  V.  Sayers,  53  Mo.  .585.    p.  383. 
State  V.  Schlagel,  19  Iowa,  169.    pp.  465,  1709. 
State  V.  Schnapijer,  22  La.  Ann.  43.    p.  63. 
State  V.  Schneider,  35  Mo.  533.    p.  315. 
State  V.  Schorn,  12  Mo.  App.  590.    p.  740. 
State  V.  Schwin,  65  AVis.  207.     p.  1013. 
State  V.  Scott,  11  La.  Ann.  421.    p.  1524. 
State  V.  Scjtt,  12    La.  Ann.  386.    pp.  1524, 

1698. 
State  V.  Scott,  45  Mo.  302.    pp.  879,  880,  1940. 
State  V.  Scott,  2  Uev.  &  Batt.  (N.  C.)  35.    p. 

169S. 
State  V.  Scott,  64  N.  C.  5S6.    p.  1697. 
State  V.  Scott,  80  N   C.  365.     p.  318. 
State  V.  Seaborn,  4  Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  305.   p.  32. 
State  V.  Seav,  64  Mo.  89.    p.  1067. 
State  V.  Sha'ffer,  59  la.  290.    p.  1898. 
State  V.  Sharp,  cited,  6  X.  J.  L.  332.    p.  128. 
State  V.  Shaw,  5  La.  Ann.  342.'  p.  125. 
State  V.  Sbaw,3  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  632.    pp.  45, 

53, 125. 
State  V.  Shay,  30  La.  Ann.  114.    pp.  16, 113, 

State  V.  Sheeley,  15  Iowa,  404.    p.  60. 

State  V.  Shehane,  25  Mo.  565.    p.  19S0. 

State  r.  ShPlledv,  8  la.   477.      pp.  60,  81,  91, 

119,  120,  129,  1545,  1549,  1555,  1565,  1567,  15^8, 

1570,  1571,  1572,  1574,  1766,  1774,  1782,  1811, 

1860,  1861,  1863,1887,1891. 
State  V.  Sherbourne,    Dudley  (Ga.),  28.    p. 

1907. 
State  V.  Shermer,  55  Mo.  83.    pp.  1535,  1566, 

1696. 
State  V.  Shields,  33  La.  Ann.  991.    p.  66. 
State  V.  Shields,  13  Mo.  236.    p.  448. 
State  V.  Shoultz,  2.")  Mo.  128.    p.  1541. 
State  V.  Shuftlin,  20  ( )hio  St.  233.    p.  89. 
State  V.  Sidney,  74  Mo.  390.    p]).  1895, 1897. 
State  V.  Simmons,  6  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  309.    p. 

19. 
State  v.  Simmons,  6  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  21.    p. 

1652. 
State  r.  Simons,  4  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)  266.    pp. 

351,1811. 
State  V.  Sims,  2  Bailev  (S.  C),  29.    pp.  84, 102. 
State  V  Sizemore,  7  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  206.    p. 

1555. 
State  V.  Skmner,  34  Kan.  256.    p.  44. 
State  V.  Slack,  1  Bailer  (S.  C),  330.    p.  111. 
State  V.  Sloan,  55  la.  217.    p.  1853. 


State  V.  Sloan,   47   Mo.   604 ;    »,  c.    Horr.    & 

Thomp.  Gas.  Self-Def.    516.    pp.  1542, 1548. 
State  r.  Smalls,  11  S.  C.  263.    p.  466. 
State  V.  Smallwood,  78  X.  C.  560.    p.  1985. 
State  r.  Smallwood,  75  N.   C.   104.    pp.   1636, 

1760,  1809. 
State  V.  Smith,  49  Conn.  376.    pp.  736,  1637, 

1656. 
State  V.  Smith,  20  Minn.  376.    p.  92. 
State  V.  Smith,  31  Mo.  556.    p.  1440. 
State  V.  Smith,  21  Mo.  App.  595.    p.  1836. 
State  V.  Smith ,  32  Me.  369.    p.  646. 
State  V.  Smith,  2  Ired.  L.  402.    pp.  37,  40. 
State  V.  Smith,  75  N.  C.  306.    pp.  728,  747. 
State  V.  Smith,  34  N.  W.  Rep.  597.    p.  1569. 
State  v.  Smith  (la.),  6  N.  W.  Rep.  153;  s.  c.  23 

Alb.  L.  J.  43;  s.  c.  54  la.  104.     p.  652. 
State  i;.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  33.    pp.  1506, 1916, 1951, 

1952. 
State  V.  Snow,  18  Me.  346.    pp.  732,  1506, 1520. 
State  i\  Snyder,  14  Ind.  429.    p.  1553. 
State  V.  Snyder,  20  Kan.  306.    p.  1918. 
State  V.  Soper,  16  Me.  293.    p.  40. 
State  V.  Sopher  (Iowa),  30  N.  W.  Rep.  917.  p. 

78. 
State  1'.  Sparrow,  3  Murph.   (N.  C.)  487.    pp. 

257,  1926,  1927,  1930. 
State  V.  Speight.  69  N.  C.  72.    p.  450. 
State  V.  Spencer,  21  N.  J.  L.  197.    pp.  68,  74, 

102. 
State  V.  Spaulding,  24  Kan.  I.    pp.  73,  78. 
State  V.  Squaires,  2  Nev.  226.    pp.  19,  32,  95. 
State  V.  St.  Louis,  1  Mo.  App.  501.    p.  2054. 
State  V.  St.  Loui3  Brokerage  Co.,  85  Mo.  411. 

pp.  1671,  1703. 
State  t'.  Stalcup,  2  Ired.  L.    (X.  C)  50.    p. 

1552. 
State  V.  Staley,  14  Minn.  105.    pp.  554,  1741. 
State  V.  Stalmaker,  2  Brev.  (S.  C.)  1.    p.  45. 
State  V.  Staples,  47  X.  II.  113.    p.  262. 
State  V.  Stark,  10  Mo.  App.  591.    p.  740. 
State  V.  Stark,  72  Mo.  37.    pp.  768,  797, 1917. 
State  I'.  Starr,  38  Mo.  270.    pp.  1545, 15i8, 1891. 
State  V.  Start,  7  Iowa,  499.    pp.  135, 147. 
State  V.  Stebbins,  29  Conn.  463.    p.  464. 
State  I'.  Stedman,  7  Port.  (Ala.)  495.    p.  19. 
State  V.  Steelev,  65  Mo.  218.     p.  88. 
State  V.  Stephens,  11  So.  Gar.  319.    pp.  85, 110. 
State  V.  Stephens,  13  S.  C.  285.    pp.  2(i,  46. 
State  V.  Steptoe,  1  Mo.  App.  19.    p.  2003. 
State  V.  Sterrett,  71  la.  386.    p.  1801. 
State  V.  Stephens,  103  Ind.  55.    p.  1479. 
State  V.  Stewart,  .52  la.  284;  s.  c.  3  N.  W.  Rep. 

99.     pp.  1846,  1853. 
State  V.  Stewart,  8'i  N.  C.  563.    p.  5. 
State  V.  Stewart,  11  Ore.  52.    pp.  421,  435. 
State  V.  Stickley,  41  la.  232.      pp.  496,  1880, 

1886. 
State  V.  Stokely,  16  Minn.  282.    pp.  19, 1984, 

1985. 
State  V.  Stone,  68  Mo.  101.    p.  1535. 
State  r.  Stonum,  62  Mo.  596.    pp.  1505, 1694. 
State  V.  Stouderman,  6  La.  Ann.  280.    p.  1669. 
State  ('.  Stoughton,  51  Vt.  362;   s.  c.  8  Re- 
porter, 762.     p.  40. 
State  V.  Stout,  31  Mo.  406.    p.  1772. 
State  V.  Strauder,  11  W.  Va.  745.    pp.  119, 123. 
State  V.  Straw,  33  Me.  554.    p.  1698. 
State  V.  Stubblefleld,  32  Mo.  564.    p.  1553. 
State  V.  Summers,  4  La.  Aon.  26.    pp.  1917. 

1918. 
State  V.  Sutfln,  22  W.  Va.  771.    p.  2056. 
State  V.  Sutton,  99  Ind.  300.    p.  1803. 
State  V.  Swain,  68  Mo.  605.    p.  1836. 
State  V.  Swartz,  9  Ind.  221.    p.  2113. 
State  V.  Swavze,  30  La.  Ann.  1323.    p.  395. 
State  V.  Sweeney,  68  Mo.  96.    p.  2108. 
State  v.  Sykes,  79  N.  C.  618.    p.  1643. 
State  V.  Talbott,  73  Mo.  S47.    pp.  1786, 189L 


cl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


State  V.  Tnllv,  23  La.  Ann.  677.    p.  1524. 
State  V.  Taster,  31  Mo.  445.    i>.  1436. 
State  V.  Talro,  50  Vt.  488.    i).  07. 
State  r.  Tavlor,  26  la.  273.    p.  1S98. 
Stale  V.  Tavlor,  20  Kan.  tU3.    p.  1944. 
State  V.  Ta'zwi'll,  3ii  l,a.  Aim.  8S4.    p.  49. 
State  V.  TestiTiuan,  OS  Mo.  4u6.    p.  531. 
State  r.  Thomas,  47  Couu.  456.    pp.  1521, 1527. 
State  V.  Thomas,  32  La.  Ann.  349.    pp.  Ill, 

39.5 
State  V.  Thomas,  35  La.  Ann.  24.    p.  119. 
State  V.  Thomas,  19  Jliim.  4S4.    p.  52. 
Mate  t>.  Thomas,  78  Mo.  336.    pp.  1557,  1567, 

l.i09,  1571,  1574,  1773,  1886. 
State  V.  Thomas,  3  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.)  269.    p. 

481. 
State  r.  Thomas,  11  Lea  (Tenn.),113.    p.  184. 
State  t'.  Thomas  (1ml.),  10  West.  Rep.  808. 

p.  448. 
State  V.  Thompson,  9  Iowa,  188.    pp.  1543, 

1548,  1S44. 
State  V.  Thompson,  21  "W.  Va.  746.    pp.  1770, 

1773. 
State  v.  Thome,  81  N.  C.  555.    p.  50. 
Stale  V.  Thurmond,  37  Tex.  340.    p.  150. 
State  V.   Tickel,  13  Nev.  502.    pp.  210,  436, 

440. 
State  V.  Tllghman,  11  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  513. 

pp.  1906,  lii78,  1979. 
Stater.  Tilton,  6:>  la.  118.    p.  1898. 
^tate  V.  Tindall,  10  Kich.  L.  (S.  C.)  212.    pp. 

1945,  195.=),  1983. 
State  V.  Tipton,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  166.    pp.  132, 

150. 
State  V.  Tobv,  31  La.  Ann.  736.    p.  17. 
folate  V.  Toui,  8  Oregon,  177.    pp.  126,  127. 
State  V.  Tompkins,  71  Mo.  613.     pp.   1937, 

1940, 1948. 
State  V.  Touchet,  33  La.  Ann.  1154.    p.  3. 
State  V.  Towle,  42  X.  H.  540.    pp.  141, 150, 152. 
State  V.  Towle,  13  U.  I.  6B1.    p.  ."iSB. 
State  t^.  Town,  Wright  (Oh.),  75.    p.  1925. 
State  V.  True,  20  Mo.  Api).  176.    p.  1448. 
Stale  V.  Trumball,  4  N.  J.  L.  139.    pp.  166, 167, 

168. 
State  V.  Tucker,  10  La.  Ann.  501.    pp.  1908, 

1909,  1978. 
State  V.  TuUer,  34  Conn.  280.    pp.  113,  114, 

2062. 
State  V.  Turner,  6  La.  Ann.  309.    pp.  119, 123. 
State  V.  Turner,  25  La.  Ann.  573.    pp.  17,  111, 

1906,  1975. 
State  V.  Turner,  76  Mo.  350.    p.  531. 
State  V.  Turner,  Wright  (Ohio),  29.    p.  18.50. 
State  V.  Turner,  6  Kaxt.  (Teun.)  201.     p.  I'.t72. 
State  V.  Turpiu,  77  N.  C.  473.    pp.  1539,  l.Ml. 
State  V.  Tint,  63  Mo.  598.     i).  Ibm. 
State  V.  T\\  iH\  ,2  Hawks  (N.  ('.),  449.    p.  466. 
State  V.  Underwood,  37  Mo.  226.     p.  157<;. 
State  V.  L'nderwood,  57  Mo.  40.    pp.  1818, 1891, 

1984,  1990. 
State  V.  Underwood,  75  jMo.  230.    pp.  325,  763. 
State  V.  Underwood,  2  Overtou  (Tenn.),  92. 

p.  69. 
State  V.  Underwood.  6  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  96.    p. 

110. 
State  V.  Upham,  38  Me.  261.    p.  761. 
State  V.  Upton,  20  Mo.  397.    p.  1930. 
State  V.  Vance,  31  La.  Ann.  398.    p.  31. 
State  V.  Van  Matre,  49  Mo.  268.    pp.  5,  6. 
State  V.  Vann,  82  X.  C.  631.    pp.  Sr,,  296. 
Statev.  Vaneant,  SO  Mo.  67.     i>p.   1545,  1.548, 

1549,  1.560,  1.568,  1571,  17(i5,   17f6,   1799,   1820, 

1S21,  1822,  1.832,  1860,  1861,  1803. 
Stater.  Van  Waggoner  (La.),  3  South.  Rep. 

119.     p.  82. 
Stale  V.  Vegas,  19  La.  Ann.  10.5.    p.  19. 
6tate  t'.  Verry  (Kan.),  13  Pac.  Rep.  838.    p. 

726. 


State  V.  Vestal,  82  X'.  C.  563.    p.  85. 

State  r.  Vincent,  24  Iowa,  570.    pp.  484, 1793, 

1794,  1817. 
State  V.  Vinson,  37  La.  Ann.  792.    pp.  1520, 

1523. 
State  v.  Vogcl,  22  Wis.  471.    pp.  49,  122. 
l^tate  V.  Volmor,  6  Kan.  371.    p.  1709. 
State  V.  Wall,  15  Mo.  208.     p.  J980. 
Stater.  Wall.li  Vcrg.  (Tenn.)  349.    p.  47. 
Stale  i\  Wallace,  3  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  195.    pp. 

2007,  2013. 
Stale  v.  \Vallac>\  9  X.  H.  515.    p.  300. 
Slate  ('.  W;illahan,Tai)pau(Oh.),52.    p.  1903. 
State  r.  Wallham,  48  Mo.  55.     pp.  214,  234. 
Stale  /•.  Walton,  74  Mo.  270.     pp.  .53,  73,  78. 
Slate  V.  Ward,  49  Conn.  429.     p.  467. 
State  V.  Ward,  14  La.  Ann.  673.    pp.  18,  64,  71, 

102. 
Stale  V.  Ward,  2  Hawks  (X.  C.) ,  443.    p.  lU. 
State  V.  Ward,  39  Vt.  2'25.    pp.  65,  81. 
State  V.  Ware,  62  Mo.  597.    p.  156(i. 
State  V.  W:u-ner.  13  Lea  (Tenn. ),  52.    p.  268. 
State  V.  WiiH,  51  la.  587.    pp.  1902,  1903,  1917. 
State  V.  Waters,  1  Mo.  App.  7 ;  s.  c.  62  Mo.  196. 

p.  16. 
State  V.  Waterman,  1  Xev.  552.    p.  1794. 
State  V.  Watkins,  9  Conn.  47.    p.  302.     . 
Stale  V.  Watkins,  3  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  441. 

p.  86. 
State  V.  Watson,  63  Me.  128.    p.  530. 
State  r.  Watts,  10  Ired.  L.   (X.   C.)  369.    p. 

2009. 
State  V.  Weber,  22  Mo.  321.    p.  331. 
State  V.  Webster,  13  X.  II.  491.    p.  70. 
State  V.  Wells,  46  la.  662.    p.  .^.i. 
State  V.  Wells,  28  Kan.  321.    p.  123. 
State  V.  Wcntworth,  65  Me.  234.    p.  524. 
St.ate  V.  Wentworth,  37  X.  H.  197.    p.  304. 
State  v.  West,  69  Mo.  401.    pp.  51,  61,  63,  65, 

66,  1786,  1930. 
State  r.  White,  11.  M.  Charlt.-  (Ga.)  136.    p. 

132. 
State  V.  Whiie,  19  Kan.  415;  *.  c.  27  Am.  Rep. 

140.    p.  5J4. 
State  V.  \Vhite,  7  La.  Ann.  531.    p.  17. 
Slate  V.  White,  33  La.  Ann.  1218.    j).  2. 
State  V.  While,  35  La.  Ann.  96.    p.  111. 
State  V.  W  Mite,  76  Mo.  98.    p.  1.576. 
State  V.  White,  68  X.  C.  158.    j).  118. 
Stale  V.  Whitman,  14 Rich.  L.  (S.  O.)  113.    p. 

81. 
Staler.  Wieners, 66 Mo.  14;  s.  c.  4  Mo.  App. 

492.     p.  662. 
State  r.  Wiley,  88  X.  C.  691.    p.  48. 
Stale  r.  Williams, 3  Stew.  (Ala.)  454.    pp.  15, 

2(1,:!.',  (iS,  74,  85. 
Stater.  Williams,  30  Me.  484.     pp.  .55,  82. 
Sl;ite  r.  \\illiains,  77  Mo.  310.     p.  2048. 
Stale  c.  Williams,  2  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  194.    p. 

1896. 
State.  V.  Williams,  1  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  188.    pp. 

18,  19. 
Stat e  V.  Williams,  65  X''.  C.  .53.    p.  728. 
Stater.  Williams,  3  Speers(S.  C),  26.    p.  134. 
State  r.  Williams,  2  Ulll  (S.  C),  38L    pp.  47, 

86,  110. 
State  V.  Williamson,  42  Conn.  261.    pp.  464, 

1777,  1778,  l'.iii2. 
Slate  r.  W  illiamson,  68  la.  .3.52.     p.  1891. 
Slate  I'.  \\'lllingliam,  33  La.  Ann.  537.    pp. 

397,402,  18611,  1863. 
Stale  r.  Willis,  03  X.  O.  26.    p.  ]8i8. 
State  r.  Wilson,  38  Conn.  126.    pp.  67,  71,  73. 
Stale  r.  Wilson,  4  la.  4U7.     pp.  .^is,  103. 
State  V.  Wilson,  30  I,a.  Ann.  804.    p.  108. 
Slater.  Wilson,  di  Mo.  134.     p.  7.3. 
State  r.  Wil.son,48  X.  II.  398.    pp.  8,  42,   29. 
State  r.  Wincroft,  70  N.  O.  38.    pp.  48,  98. 
State  r.  Wiugo,  89  lud.  206.    p.  1566 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


cli 


State  V.  TVingo,  66  Mo.  ISl.    pp.  1569, 1886. 
State  v.  Wisdom,  84  Mo.  177.    pP-  136U,  1575, 

1676,  1801,  18S6. 
Btate  V.  Wise,  7  Rich.  L.  412.    pp.  37,  40. 
State  r.  AVitham,  72  Me.  531.    pp.  300,  425,521, 

525,  527. 
State  V.  Witt,  8  Pac.  Rep.  769.    p.  1S52. 
State  V.  Wolcott,  21  Conn.  272.    p.  464 
State  V.  Wolff,  15  Mo.  168.    p.  315. 
State  V.  Wood,  46  la.  116.    p.  1566. 
State  V.  Wood,  53  X.  II.  484.    p.  580. 
State  V.  Woodliu,  5  Ired.  (X.  C.)  199.    p.  150. 
State  V.  Woodruff,  67  N.  C.  89.    p.  652. 
Stale  T.  Woodson,  41  la.  425.    p.  1919. 
State  r.  Woolery,  39  Mo.  525.    p.  1060. 
State  i\  Worthihgliam,  23  Minn.  .528.    p.  107. 
State  V.  Wright,  53  Me.  328.    p.  11. 
State  r.  AVright ,  75  N .  C.  439.    p.  432. 
State  V.  Yancey,  3  Brev.  (S.  C.)  3nfi.    p.  41. 
State  V.  Zeibert,  40  la.  173.    pp.  1890,  1891. 
State  r.  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  220.  pp.  99, 164,  254, 

15.04. 

State  r.  Zorn,  71  Mo.  415.    p.  1801. 

State  r.  Zumbun.son,  86  Mo.  Ill  ;s.c.  7  Mo. 

App.  526.     pii.  740,  742,  8ll9. 
State  Bank  v.  Fox,  3  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  431.  p. 

1023. 
State  Bank  v.  Haves,  3  Ind.  400.    p.  1647. 
State  Bank  v.  Hubbard,  8  Ark.  183.    p.  1669. 
State  Bank  v.  Littlejohn,  1  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.) 

563.    p.  se,.T. 
State  Bank  r.  Williams,  6  Ark.  156.    p.  1669. 
State  Bank  v.  AVilson,  1  Dev.  (N.  C.)  484.    p. 

1(122. 
Staudenmier  v.  Williamson,  29  Ala.  566.    p. 

784. 
Staunton  v.  Paton,  1  Carr.  &  Kir.  148.    p.  217. 
Staunton  v.  State,  13  Ark.  31;».    ji.  1990. 
Staup  V.  Com.,  74  Pa.  St.  458.    pp.  69,  76,  77. 
Bt.  Clair  r.  Piatt,  AVright  (Ohio),  532.    p.  144. 
Steagald  r.  Slate,  22  Tex.  App.  464;  s.  c.  3  S. 

AV.  Rep.  771.    p.  1757. 
Steagall  v.  McKellar,  20  Tex.  265.    pp.  1122, 

1123. 
Steamboat  Charles  Morgan,  115  U.  S.  69.    pp. 

432,  436. 
Steamboat  Emilv  v.  Carnev,  5  Kan.  645.    p. 

1359. 
Steamboat  v.  Hopkins,  30  Miss.  703.    p.  821. 
Steamboat  r.  Matthews,  28  Mo.  248.    p.  1626. 
Steamlioat  New  World  v.  King,  16  How.  (U. 

8.)  469.     pp.  129S,  1299. 
Steiniiboat  Sultana  v.  Chapman,  5  AA'is.  454. 

p.  821. 
Stearns  v.  Dillingham,  22  Yt.  624.    p.  890. 
Stebbius  v.  Eddv,  4  Masou   (U.  S.),  414.    p. 

918 
Steck  V.  Maher,  26  Ark.  536.    p.  2055. 
Steed  V.  Cruise,  70  Ga.  168.    p.  182. 
Steel  r.  Malonv,  1  Minn.  347.    pp.  110, 118, 120. 
Steel  r.  State  (Ala.),  3  South.  Rep.  547.    p.  82. 
Steel  r.  Thatcher,  1  Ware  (V.  S. ',  91.    p.  891. 
Steele  v.  Burkhardt,  104  3Iass.  59.    pp.  1210. 
Steele  v.  Logan,  3  A.  K.  Mar.sh.  (Ky.)  394.    p. 

1983. 
Steele  v.  Townsend,  .37  Ala.  247.    pp.  1322, 

1343,  1344,  1345,  1348,  1350,  13.i2. 
Steer  r.  Little,  44  N.  H.  613.     p.  322. 
Steer.s  r.  Liverpool  Steamship  Co.,  57N.  Y.  1. 

pp.  1321,1345,1365. 
Steffv  V.  Carpenter,  37  Pa.  St.  41.    pp.  1013, 

1048. 
Steinberg  r.  Meanv,  53  Cal.  425.    p.  370. 
Ste inert.  Matter  of,  24  Hun  (X.  Y.),246.    p. 

146. 
Steinkeller  «.  Newton,  9  Carr.  &  P.  313.    pp. 

3,54,  62:>. 
Steinwetz  v.  AVingate,  42  Ind.  574.    p.  1647. 
Stell  V.  Glass,  1  Ga.  475.    p.  1658. 


Stephens  v.  Brown,  12  Bradw.  (111.)  619.    p. 

575. 
Stephens?-.  Citv  of  Macon,  83  Mo.  345.    pp. 

1226,  1275,  1276.  1279,  1376. 
Stepliens  r.  Dewing,  2  Aik.  (Vt.)  112.     p.  1044. 
Stephens  v.  Hume,  25  Mo.  349.    p.  1591. 
Stei>hens  r.  People,  38  Mich.  739.    pp.  75,  76, 

78,  101,  126. 
Stephens  v.  People,  19  N.  Y.  549;  s.  c.  4  Park. 

Cr.  (N.    Y.)  396.    pp.  166,  177,  362,  434,  436, 

439,  1903,  1905,  1906. 
Stephens  r.  Sherrod,  6  Tex.  294.    p.  869. 
Stephens  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  255.    pp.  755, 

756. 
Stephens  r.  Thornton,  26  111.  323.    p.  960. 
Stephenson  v.  Clark,  20  A't.  624.    p.  1446. 
Stephenson  v.   Slate,  40  Ga.  291.    pp.  1633, 

1651. 
Stephenson  v.  State,  110  Ind.  3.58;  s.  c.  11  N. 

Last.  Rep.  361.    pp.  1709.  1726. 
Stephenson  r.  Stale   (Ind.),  4  North  East. 

Rep.  361).    p.  65. 
Stepheu.son  v.  Stiles,  3  N*.  J.  L.  43.    p.  96. 
Stephenson  v.  AValker,  4  Esp.  50.    pp.  474, 

475. 
Sleptoe  V.  Flood,  13  Gratt.  (Va.)  323.    pp. 

1984,  1985. 
Steptoe  V.  Harvev,  7  Leigh  (Va.),  501.  p.  220. 
Sterling  r.  State.'l5  Tex.  App.  249.    p.  1695. 
Sterling  Bridge  Co.  v.  Pearl,  80  111.  250.    p. 

94. 
Stern  v.  Henley,  63  Mo.  262.    p.  1440. 
Stern  Auction  Co.  v.  Mason,  16  Mo.  App.  473. 

p.  1447. 
Stetter  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  49  Wis.  613.    p. 

1664. 

Steudle  v.  Rentchler,  64  111.  161.    p.  1750. 
Stevens  f.  Boxlord,  10  Allen  (Mass.),  25.    p. 

1209. 
Stevens  V.Brown,  12  Bradw.   (111.)   619.    p. 

385. 
Stevens  v.  Fassett,  27  Me.  266.    p.  1197. 
Stevens  v.  Hill,  10  Mees.  &  W.  30.    p.   145. 
Stevens  r.  Hollister,  18  A't.  294.    p.  827. 
Stevens  v.  Irwin,  12  Cal.  306.    p.  456. 
Stevens  i\  Xevitt,  15  Ind.  224.    p.  2036. 
Stevens  r.  N.  AV.  Stage  Co.,  1  Idaho  (N.  S.l, 

604.     pp.  2072,  2085,  2099. 
Stevens  v.  People,  67  111.  588.    p.  1576. 
Stevens  v.  Stale,  19  Xeb.  6.50.    p.  1564. 
Stevens  v.  AA'arreu,  101  Mass.  5H4.    p.  991. 
Stevens  v.  AA'elib,  7  Carr.  &  P.  60.    p.  247. 
Stevenson  v.  Stale,  17  Tex.  App.  619.   j).  1575. 
Steves  V.  Oswego  &c.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  422.    p. 

1605. 
Stevick  V.  Com.,  78  Pa.  St.  460.    p.  523. 
Steward  r.  Lombe,  1  Brod.  &  B.  .506.    p.  1443. 
Steward  c.  Strippleman,  16  Tex.  17.3.    p.  1439. 
Steward  r.  Thomas,  35  Mo.  202.    p.  1441. 
Stewart  r.  Allen,  45  AVis.  15S.    p.  139. 
Stfewart  V.  Brooklyn  &c.  R.  Co.,  90  N.  Y.  588 ; 

s.  c.  43  Am.  Rep.  185.     p.  1293. 
Stewart  c.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co.,  11  la.  62. 

pp.  1943,  1945,  1984,  1994. 
Stewart  r.  Eden,2Caines  (N.Y'.),150.    p.  889. 
Stewart  v.  English,  6  Ind.  176.    pp.  1411, 1438. 
Stewart  r.  Ewbauk,  3  Iowa,  191.    pp.  113, 119, 

120,  121,  123. 
Stewart  v.  Fitch,  31  X'.  J.  L.  17.    p.  891. 
Stewart  i:  Kirk,  69  111.  509.     p.  551. 
Stewart  r.  Maddox,  63  Ind.  51.    p.  1479. 
Stewart  r.  Xelson,  76  AIo.  522.    p.  1440. 
Stewart  v.  Peoide,  23  Mich  63.    pp.  491,  492. 
Stewart  v.  Randolph,  2  Cin.   Supp.  132.     p. 

1906. 
Stewart  t'.  Rankin,  39  Ind.  161.    pp.  2107,2123, 

2124. 
Stewart  r.  Reckless,  24  X.  .1.  L.  427.    p.  966. 
Stewart  v.  Ripon,  38  AVis.  584.    p.  1485, 


clii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Stewart  v.  Shaw,  55  ISIich.  613.    p.  200. 
Stewart  r.  Small,  o  :Mo.  525.    p.  1975. 
Stewart  v.  SouneboiD,  98  U.  S.  187.    pp.  1167, 

1195. 
Stewart  v.  State,  63  Ala.  109.    p.  2129. 
Stewart  r.  State,  78  Ala.  43(5.    p.  345. 
Stewart  v.  State,  13  Ark.  720.    pp.  17,  22,  67, 

99,  115,129. 
Stewart  v.  State,  58  Ga.  577.    pp.  41, 123. 
Stewart  1^.  Stale,  1  Oh.  ftt.  66.    pp.  81,  1672, 

1746. 
Stewart  v.  State,  15  Oh.  St.  155.    p.  114. 
Stewart  v.  State,  19  Oh.  312.    p.  341. 
Stickney  v.  Stiekney,  21  N.  H.  61.    p.  1.588. 
Stieknev,  Ex  parte,  40  Ala.  167.    pp.  152, 159. 
Stier  V.  Oskaloosa,  41  la.  353.    p.  1209. 
Stiles  V.  Estate  of  Botkin,  30  la.  60.    p.  2071. 
Stiles  V.  Geesey,  71  Pa.  St.  439.    pp.  1223, 1224, 

1229. 
Stiles  V.  Lightfoot,  26  Ala.  443.    p.  1446. 
StilU'.  Huidekopers,  17  Wall.    (U.   S.)   3S5. 

p.  617. 
Stilling  V.  Thorp,  54  Wi^.  628.    p.  782. 
Stillson  V.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  67  Mo.  671. 

p.  1235. 
Stlmpsnn  r.  West  Chester  R.   Co.,  3   How. 

(U.  S.)  553.    p.  2114. 
Stineman  v.  Beath,  36  la.  73.    pp.  2075,  2093, 

2100. 
Stinhouse  v.  State,  47  Ind.  17.    pp.  385,  390. 
Stites  V.  McKibben,  2  Oh.  St.  588.    pp.   1938, 

1942. 
Stitz  V.  State,  4  N.  East.  Rep.  145 ;  s.  c.  104 

Ind.  359.    p.  ]a52. 
Stix  V.  Pump,  37  Ga.  332.    p.  1005. 
St.  John  V.  Bumpstead,  17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  100. 

p.  827. 
St.  John  V.  Homans,  8  Mo.  382.    p.  937. 
St.  John  t'.  New  York,  6  Duer  (N.   Y.),  315. 

p.  1378. 
St.  John's  Lodge  v,  Callender,  4  Ired.  L. 

(X.  C.)  342.     p.  1589. 
St.  Johnsbury  v.  Thompson,  9  Atl.  Rep.  571; 

S.  c.  59  Vt.  300.     p.  1.507. 
St.  Joseph  E.  Co.  v.  Wheeler,  35  Kan.  188.  p. 

1209. 
St.  Louis  V.  Mever,  13  Mo.  App.  367 ;  s.  c.  87 

Mo.  276.    p.  1U77. 
St.  Louis  &c.  Co.  V.  Vickers,  122  U.  S.  360.    p. 

16^5. 
St.  Louis  V.  State,  8  Neb.  405.    p .  65. 
St.  Louis  &c.  U.  Co.  V.  Cantrell,  37  Ark.  521. 

pp.  1297, 1483. 
St.  Louis  &c.  K.  Co.r.  Casner,  72111.  384.  p.  87. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Dalby,  19  111.  353.    p. 

1292. 
St.  Louis  &c.  E.  Co.  V.  Edwards,  26  Kan.  74. 

p.  1308. 
8t.  Louis  &c.  E.  Co;  v.  [Godby,  45  Ark.  485. 

p.  2121. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Holman,  45  Ark.  102. 

pp.  2134,2137. 
St.  Louis  &(■.  K.  Co.  V.  Lux,  63  111.  523.  p.  115. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Mauly,  58  III.  300.  pp. 

1299, 1300. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Myrtle,  51  Ind.  566.  pp. 

740, 1972. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Rapp,  39  Ark.  558.  pp. 

2135,  2]. ",7. 
St.  Lonis&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shoemaker,  38  Kan. 

723;  s.  c.  17  I'ac.  Rep.  384.    )).  2037. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Silver,  56  Mo.  265.    p. 

3S3. 
St.  Louis  &c.  E.  Co.  V.  Valirins,  56  Ind.  611. 

p.  1284. 
St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  AVeaver  (Kan.),  11 

Pac.  Hep.  408.    p.  1239. 
St.  I>oui8  Agricultui-al   &c.  Association    r. 

Eelnecke,  21  Mo.  App.  478.    p.  1050, 


St.  Louis  Brewery  Co.  v.  Bodeman,  12  Mo 

App.  573.     p.  1971. 
St.   Louis  Collin  Co.  v.  Rubelman,  15  Mo. 

App.  280.     p.  1449. 
St.  Louis  Floating  Dock  Ins  Co.  v.  Soulard, 

8  y\o.  665.     p.   1585. 
St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kyle,  11  Mo.  278.    p.  082. 
St.  Louis  National  Stock  Yards  r.  Wiggins 

Ferry  Co.,  1U2  111.  514.    pp.  808,  860. 
St.  Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen,  9  Mo. 

421.     p.  ]023. 
St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  Risley,  40  Mo.  357. 

p.  560. 
St.  Martin  v.  Desnoyer,  1    Minn.  156.    pp. 

1964,  1066,  1983,  1990. 
Stockbridge  Iron  Co.  v.  Cone  Iron  Works, 

102  Mass.  80.    p.  607. 
Stockdale  ?•.  Hansard,  9  Ad.  &E.1;«.  c.  4  Jar. 

70;subnom.   Reg.  v.   Gossett,  3  Per.  &  D. 

340;  sub  nom.  Reg.  v.  Evans,  8  Dowl.  P.  C. 

451 ;  sub  nom.  Sherltf  of  Middlesex,  H  Ad. 

&  K.  273.    p.  152. 
Stockdale's  Case,  cited,    p.  1.522. 
Stocken  v.  Collhi,  7  Mees.  &  W.  515.    p.  943. 
Stockett  r.  Ellicott,  3  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)   123. 

pp.  886,  887. 
Stockett  V.  Watklns,  2  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  326;  a. 

c.  20  Am.  Dec.  428.    p.  801. 
Stocking  V.  State,  7.  Ind.  326.    p.  732. 
Stocklev  V.  Hornidge,  8  Car.  &  P.  11.    pp. 

1168,  1170. 
Stockton  V.  Frey,  4  Gill  (Md.),  407.    p.  227, 

12.36,  1237. 
StockwcU  V.  Railroad  Co.,  43  la.  470.    pp. 

694,  1920. 
Stockwell  V.  State,  101  Ind.  1.    p.  2061. 
Stoddard  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  65  Mo.  514. 

pj).  1208,  1212. 
Stoddert  v.  Manning,  2  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  147. 

p.  561. 
Stokeley  v.  Com.  71  Va.  Cas.  330.  pp.  144, 150. 
Stokely  v.  Robinson,  34  Pa.  St.  315.    p.  191. 
Stoker  v.  Kendall,  Busb.  L.  (S.  C.)  242.    p. 

1137. 
Stokes  V.  Arey,  8  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  66.    p. 

1749. 
Stokes  V.  Burrell,  3  Grant  Cases  (Pa.),  241. 

pp.  861,  1608. 
Stokes  V.  Lewis,  1  T.  R.  20.    p.  898. 
Stokes  V.  People,  53  N.  Y.  164.    pp.  42,  43,  78, 

402,  1639. 
Stokes  r.  Saltonstall,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.)  181 ;  s.  c. 

Thomp.  Carr.  Pass.,  p.  183.    pp.  1236, 1237, 

1285. 
Stokes  V.  State,  18  Ga.  17.    p.  456. 
Stokes  V.  Staie,  5  l?axt.  (Tenn.)  619;  «.  c.  2 

Tex.  Law  Journ.  243.     pp.  660,  1060. 
Stokes  V.  Stickney,  Ob  N.  Y.  320.    p.  265. 
Stokes,  In  re,  5  So.  Car.  71.    p.  152. 
Stolp  V.  Blair,  68  111.  541.    pp.  481,  485,  487. 
Stone  V.  Bird,  16  Kan.  488.    p.  1907. 
Stone  I'.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 47  Iowa,  82.    pp. 

1200, 1621. 
Stone  r.  Clark,  1  Mete.  (Mass.)  378.    p.  1086. 
Stone  t".  Crocker,  24  Pick.    (Mass.)   81.    pp. 

1161,  1162, 1164, 1168, 1172, IISO,  1182, 1186, 1197. 
Stone  V.  Danbury,  46  N.  H.  139.    p.  1413. 
Stone  V.  Great  Western  Oil  Co.,  41  111.  85.    p. 

560. 
Stone  V.  Grubbam,  1  RoUe  Rep.  3,  pi.  5.    p. 

875. 
Stone  V.  Grnbham,  2  Bnlst.  225.    p.  1440. 
Stone  V.  Hawkeye  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  68  la.  737. 

p.  2063. 
Stone  r.  Miller,  16  Pa.  St.  450.    pp.  955,  958. 
Stone  V.  I'coplc,  3  Hi.  326.    pp.  85.  110. 
Stone  V.  Powell,  5  Mo.  435.    p.  1617. 
Sione   V.  Sanborn,  104  Mass.  319.    pp.  639, 
640. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cliii 


Stone  V.  Segur,  11  Allen  (Mass.\  56S.    p.  43. 
Stone  r.  State,  4   Humph.    (Tenn.)   58.      pp. 

1907,  1930,  19S2,  1990. 
Stone  V.  State  (Tex.),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  585.    p. 

747. 
Stone  V.  Stevens,  12  Conn.  219.    pp.  1195, 1198. 
Stone  V.  Swift,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  389.    p.  1197. 
Stone  r.  Taylor,  63  Ga.  309.    p.  2099. 
Stoueman  v.  Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  503. 

p.  1223. 
Stoueman  v.  Cora.,  25  Gratt.  (Va.)  887.    pp. 

567,  1548. 
Stones  r.  Menliem,  2  Exch.  383.     p.  667. 
Stoney  v.    Winterlialter  (Pa.),   11  Atl.  Rep. 

611.     pp.  2048,  2051. 
Stonewall  Man.  Co.  v.  Peek,  63  Miss.  342.     p. 

lo74. 
Storev  r.  P.reunan,  15  X.  Y.  524.    p.  1669. 
StoreV  r.  Peo|ile,  79  111.  45.    p.  172. 
Storni  r.  United  States,  9t  U.  S.  76.    pp.  369, 

403,  408. 
Story  V.  Stale,  99  Ind.  413.    p.  1756. 
Stoudenmeier  v.  Williamson,  29  Ala.  558.    p. 

375. 
Stoulf er  V.  Latshaw,  2  Watts  (Pa.),  165.    p. 

1598. 
Stout  V.  Duncan,  87  Ind.  Sf-S.    p.  2102. 
Stout  r.  Hyatt,  13  Kan.  232.    pp.  82, 116. 
Stout  V.  McAdams,  3  111.  67.    p.  1669. 
Stout  r.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  132.    pp. 

67,  73,  98. 
Stout  r.  State,  90  Ind.  1.    pp.  75,  78, 1812, 1828, 

1860,  1861,  1863. 
Stoui  r.  State,  93  Ind.  150.    p.  1037. 
Stout  V.  State,  96  Ind.  407.    pp.  727,  730,  1520, 

1756. 
Stovall  V.  Fowler,  72  Ala.  77.    p.  1740. 
Stover  V.  Bluehill,  51  Me.  439.    p.  1256. 
Stover  r.  People,  56  N.  Y.  315.    pp.  524,  787, 

1S08,  1887. 
Stowe  V.  Havwood,  7  Allen  (Mass.),  118.    pp. 

891,892. 
Stowe  V.  Querner,  L.  R.  5  Exch.  155;  s.  c.  39 

L.  J.  (Exch.)  60.     pp.  289,  292,  293. 
Stowe  V.  Sheldon,  13  Neb.  207.    p.  192. 
Stowell  V.  Goodenow,  31  Me.  538.    p.  1698. 
Stoyell  V.  Cole,  19  Cal.  602.    p.  2062. 
St.  Paul  V.  Kuby,  8  Minn.  1.54.    pp.  1233, 1485. 
St.  Paul  Ins.  Co.  r.  Allis,24  Minn.  75.    p.  2053. 
Strader  v.  Golf,  6  W.  Va.  257.    p.  2097. 
Strader  v.  Snyder,  67  111.  404.    p.  360. 
Straker  v.  Graliam,  4  Mees.  &  \V.  721;   s.  c.  7 

Dowl.  P.  C.  223.     pp.  1960.  1984. 
Strange  v.  Barrow,  65  Ga.  23.    p.  629. 
Stranger  r.  Searle,  1  Esp.  14.    p.  879. 
Stratford  r.  Hogau,  2  Ball  &  B.  164.    p.  279. 
Stratford  c.  Sandford,  9  Conn.  294.    p.  324. 
Straton  r.  Rantall,  2  T.  R.  366.    p.  842. 
Stratton  c.  Paul,  10  la.  139.    pp.  1727,  1730. 
Strattou  V.  Kennards,  74  Ind.  302.    p.  2110. 
Stratton  v.  People,  5  Colo.  276.    p.  65. 
Stratton  r.  state,  45  Ind.  468.   pp.  4,50,  4.51,471. 
Strauder  v.  State,  100  U.  S.  303;   s.  c.  10  Cent. 

L.  J.  255.     p.  8. 
Straus  V.  Beard.sley,  79  X.  C.  59.    p.  551. 
Straus  r.  Minzesheimer,  78  111.  492.    pp.  912, 

1646,1671. 
Straus  V.  Railroad  Co.,  75  Mo.  190.    p.  1297. 
Straus  V.  Kansas  City  &o.  R.  Co.,  86  Mo.  421. 

p.  809. 
Strauss  V.  Kranert,  56  111.  254.    pp.  1425, 1426 . 
Strecker  v.  Conn,  90  Ind.  469.    pp.  1099.  1103, 

1104,1105,2039. 
Streeper  v.  Williams,  48  Pa.  St.  450.    p.  870. 
Street  v.  Goss,  62  Mo.  226.     p.  1410. 
Street  r.  Lynch  ,  38  Ga.  631.    pp.  1698,  1702. 
Streeter  v.  Streeter,  43  111.  155.    p.  825. 
Streett  v.  Launier,  34  Mo.  469.    p.  1210. 
Strickland  v.  Strickland,  8  C.  B.  724.    p.  802. 


Stringer  v.  Young,  3  Pet.    (U.   S.)   320.    pp. 

566,  567. 
Stroh  r.  Hinchman,  37  Mich.  490.    p.  42. 
Strong  V.  Kean,  13  Irish  L.  93.    p.  124. 
Strong  V.  Saunders,  15  Mich.  339.    p.  854. 
Strong  V.  Strong,  1  Abb.   Pr.  (N.  S.)  (N.   Y.) 

233.     pp.  597,  603. 
Stropes  V.  Board  &c.,  72  Ind.  42.    pp.  2008, 

2052. 
Strout  r.  Gooch,  8  Me.  127.    p.  1016. 
Strudwick  v.  Brodnax,  83  X.  C.  401.     p.  591. 
Sitryker  w.  Turubull,  3  Caines  (N.  Y.),  103. 

p.  7. 
Stuart  V.  Allen,  45  Wis.  158.    pp.  138, 171,  186. 
Stuart  V.  Bigler,  98  Pa.  St.  80.    p.  1321. 
Stuart  V.  Fitch,  3  Vroom  (X.  J.),  17.    p.  891. 
Stuart  r.  Haven,  17  Xeb.  211.    p.  6,53. 
Stuart  r.  People,  Breeze  (111.),  395.    p.  150. 
Stuart  v.  Simpson,  1   Wend.  (X.  Y.)  376.    p. 

1605.  '■ 

Slubber  v.  Wall,  1  Craw.  &  Dix.  (Irish  Cir.) 

54.    p.  29. 
Stuckey  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  174.    p.  1874. 
Stuckslager  v.  McKee,  40  la.  212.    vv.  2075. 

2093. 
Studdard  r.  Linville,  3  Hawks  (N.  C),  474. 

p.  1457. 
Studley  v.  Hall,  22  Me.  198.    pp.  70, 1927, 1933. 
Stumm  r.  Hunimell,  39  la.  478.    ]).  59. 
Stump  V.  Estill,  Peck.  (Tenn.)  175.    p.  893. 
Siupetski  V.  Transatlantic  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  43 

Mich.  373.    p.  9S1. 
Sturdivant  v.  Davis,  9  Ircd.  L.  (X.  C.)  365. 

p.  1436. 
Sturdivant  r.  Watkins,  47  Mo.  177.    p.  1980. 
Sturgeon  r.  Gray.  96  Ind.  166.     p.  2142. 
Stingeon  River  Boom  Co.  v.  Xester,  55  Mich. 

113.    p.  1149. 
Sturges  V.  Bridgman,  11  Ch.  Div.  852;  s.  c.  28 

Week.  Rep.  2o0.    p.  1392. 
Sturges  V.  Bank  of  Circleville,  11  Oh.  St.  153. 

p.  J023. 
Sturgia  v.  Bobbins,  62  Me.  289.    p.  403. 
Sturm  V.  Atlantic  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  63  N.  Y. 

87.    p.  569. 
Sturtevant  v.  Ballard,  9  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  337. 

pp.  1407, 1440. 
Sturtevant  v.  Wallack,  141  Mass.  119.    p.  814. 
Stutsman  v.  Barringer,  16  Ind.  363.    p.  1906. 
St.  V'rain  r.  Columbia  Bottom  Levee  Co.,  56 

Mo.  590.    p.  1598. 
Style  V.  Smith,  cited  2  Leon.  111.    p.  889. 
Styles  V.  Alien,  5  Allen  (Mass.),  320.    p.  6.32. 
Suggs  r.  Anderson,  12  Ga.  461.    pp.  2097. 
Suit  c.  Bonnell,  33  Wis.  ISO.    p.  397. 
Sullivan  V.  Honacker,  6  Fla.  372.     p.  827. 
Sullivan  y.  Phila.  &c.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  234. 

pp.  1207,  1236,  1237,  1238. 
Sullivan  v.  State,  66  Ala.  48.    pp.  729.  747,  755. 

762. 
Sullivan  v.  State,  52  Ind.  309.    p.  1821 
Sullivan  v.  State,  46  X.  J.  L.  446     p.  705. 
Sullivan  v.  State,  47  X.  J.  L.  151.    p.  705, 
Sullivan  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  623.    p.  1896. 
Sullivan  v.  Wallace,  73  Cal.  307;  s.  c   14  Pac. 

Kep.  789.     pp.  2084,2099. 
Sultzner  v.  State,  43  Ala.  24.    p.  1014. 
Summers   v.   Greathouse,  87  Ind.  205.      pn. 

2032,  2033,  2035. 
Summers,  Ex  parte,  5  Ired.  (X.  C.)  149.  p.  150. 
SumuicrviUe  v.  Horton,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  ."41. 

p.  1443. 
Sumner  v.  Blair,  9  Kan.  521.    p.  375. 
Sumner  v.  Chandler,  92  X.  C.  634.    p.  2129. 
Sumner  r.  Crawford,  45  X.  II.  416.    p.  :;97. 
Sumner  r.  State, 5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  579.    p.  1866. 
Sumner  r.  Sumner,  7  Harr.   &  J.    (Md.)  388.- 

]).  1003. 
Sumrall  r.  State,  29  Miss.  202.    p.  30. 


oliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Supervisors  v  Ilceuan,  2  Minn.  330.    pp.  816, 

S19. 
Supervisors  of  \Vavne  Co.  v.  Kennicott,  103 

r.  S.  544.     p.  3. 
Supreme  Lodge  r.  Johnson,  78  lud.  110.    p. 

2139. 
Susquehanna  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Quick,  61  Pa.  St. 

328.     pp.  323,  630. 
Sutherland  v.  Ilarkins,  5G  Ind.  343.    p.  1742. 
Sutlierland  v.  Veuani.  32  Ind.  483.    p.  561. 
Sutlitt  V.  Gilbert,  8  Oh.  405.    pp.   1910,   1911, 

1912. 
Sutlle  V.  Batie,  1  la.  141.    pp.  26,  83. 
Sutton  V.  Ballon,  46  Iowa,  519.    p.  922. 
Sutton  V.  Floyd,  7  H.  Mon.  (Kj-.)  3.    p.  1670. 
Sutton  V.  Fox,  55  Wis.  531;  s.  c.  42  Am.  Hep. 

744.     p.  49. 
Sutton  r.  Johnstone,  1  T.  R.  493.    p.  1172. 
Sutton  V.  Madre,  2  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  320.    pp. 

1668,  1674. 
Sutton  V.  Mandeville,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  187.    pp. 

215,  223. 
Sutton  v.  McConnell,  46  Wis.  269.    p.  2. 
Sutton  V.  People,  119  111.  250.    p.  375. 
Sutton  V.  Slate,  41  Tex.  513.    p.  107. 
Sutton  V.  Wanwatosa,  29  Wis.  21.    p.  1210. 
Suttrell  V.  Dry,  1  Murph.  (N.  C.)  94.    p.  1982. 
Suvdam  v.  Grand  Street  &c.  R.  Co.,  41  Barb. 

(X.  Y.)  375.     p.  1225. 
Suydani  r.  Pitcher,  4  Cal.  280.    p.  1060. 
Swaggerty  iJ.  Caton,  1    Heisk.   (Tenn.)   199. 

p.  1721. 
Swails  r.  Butch  r,  2  Ind.  84.    pp.  1463, 1464. 
Swain  v.  Ettling,  32  Pa.  St.  486.    i).  880. 
Swallow  V.  State,  22  Ala.  20.    p.  1698. 
Swan  V.  Middlesex,  101  Mass.  173.    p.  375. 
Swan  r.  Tappan,  5  Cush.   (Mass.)  104.    pp. 

1459,  1460,  1462. 
Swan  and  Jeffrey's  Case,  Foster  Cr.  L.  104. 

p.  41. 
Swank  v.  Nichols,  24  Ind.  199.    p.  1668. 
Swank  v.  Swank,  85  Mo.  198.    p.  2136. 
Swann  v.  Rary,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  298.    p.  109. 
Swansen  v.  Swansen,  12  Neb.  210.    p.  2054. 
Swarnes  v.  Sittou,  5S  111.  155.    pp.  120,  121. 
Swartout  v.  Michigan  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  Mich. 

389.    p.  1726. 
Swarlz  )•.  Chickering,  58  Md.  291.    pp.  354, 

424,  425. 
Swayne  v.  Waldo,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  78.    p.  1627. 
Swearingen  v.  Leach,  7  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)  287. 

pp.  548,  549. 
Sweat  r.  Rogers,  6  Heisk.   (Tenn.)   117.    pp. 

315,  381. 
Sweazy  v.  Nettles,  2  Mo.  6.    p.  1611. 
Sweeney  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  10  Allen 

(Mass.),  368.    p.  1312. 
Sweeney  r.  State,  35  Ark.  586.    pp.  1508, 1517, 

1890. 
Sweet  V.  Gloversville,  12  Hun   (X.  Y.),  302. 

p.  1248. 
Sweet  V.  Sherman,  21  Vt.  24.    pp.   469,   471, 

476. 
Sweet  V.  Tuttle,  14  N.  Y.  465.    p.  344. 
Swete  V.  Fairlie,  6  Car.  &  P.  1.    p.  1417. 
Swett  v.  Colgate,  20  Johns.   (N.  Y.)   196.    p. 

926. 
Swett  V.  Shumway,  102  Mass.  365.    p.  443. 
Swisher  v.  Swisher,  Wright  (Oh.),  755.    p, 

630. 
Swift  V.  Fitzhugh,  0  Port.  (Ala.)  39.    p.  1408. 
Swift  V.  Ilarriinan,  30  Vt.  607.    p.  892. 
Swift  r.  Ji-wsburv,  L.  R.  9  (,».  B.  301.    p.  1022. 
Swift  r.  Mass.    Life   Ins.   Co.,  63  N.  Y.  186;  3 

Big.  Ins.  ('as.  392.     i)p.  1410,  1417. 
Switt  V.  Mnlkfv,  14  Ore.  59;  s.  c.  12  Pac.  Rep. 

76.     1).  2027. 
Swift  V.  Newburv,  36  Vt.  355.    p.  1209. 
Swift  r.  Plessuer,  3'J  Mich.  178.    p.  2038. 


Swift  V.  Tvson,  16  Pet.  (U.  S.)  1.    p.  950. 

Swift  r.  Whitncv,  20  111.  144.    p.  560. 

Swift  V.  Winterbotham,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  244.    p, 

1022. 
Swigar  v.  People,  109  111.  272.    p.  1686. 
Swigart  r.  Slate,  67  Ind.  287;  s.  c.  21  Alb.  L. 

J.  278    p.  63. 
Swindler  r.  IlilHard,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.   C.)  286. 

pp.    1319,  1321,   1.344,   1345,   1347,   1348,   1352. 
Swinfen  v.  Chelmsford,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  890.    p. 

192. 
Swinfen  r.  Swinfen,  18  C.  B.  485.    p.  192. 
Swinnerton  r.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.,  37  N.  Y. 

174.    p.  996. 
Swinnerton  v.    Stafford,  3   Taunt.    232.    p. 

2065. 
Swires  v.  Parsons,  5  AVatts  &S.  (Pa.)  357.    p. 

888 
Swiss  V.  Stockstill,  30  Ohio  St.  418.    p.  126. 
Switland  v.  Holgate,  8   Watts  (Pa.),  385.    p. 

1668. 
Swofford  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  76.  pp.  17,  30. 
Sv.'ope  V.  Shafer  (Ky.),  4  S.  W.  Rep.  300.  p. 

l(i8K. 
Sword  V.  Keith,  31  Mich.  248.    p.  1758. 
Svods  V.  Hav,  4  T.  R.  260,    p.  1330. 
Sykes  v.  Dixon,  9  Ad.  &  El.  693.    p.  891. 
Sykcs  V,  Dunbar,  1  Cam)).  202,  note.    p.  1172. 
Sylvester  f.  Rawlston.  31  Barb.,(N.  Y.)  286. 

p.  891. 
Sylvester  v.  State.  71  Ala.  18.    pp.  1552,  1890. 
Sylvester  v.  State,  72  Ala.  201.    p.  48. 
Svmmes  r.  Brown,  13  Ind.  318.    pp.  827.  838. 
Symonds  v.  Pain,  6  Hurl.  &  N.  709.    p.  1094. 
Sj'inons  V.  Clark,  Barnes,  457  (1790).    p.  699. 


T.  V.  D.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  Dlv.  127.    pp.  646, 

649,  651. 
T.  V.  M.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  Div.  31.    p.  646. 
T.  V.  N.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  Div.  31.    p.  650. 
Taber  v.  Hutson,  5  Ind.  322.    p.  1479. 
Tabor  v.  Stanniels.  2  Cal.  240.    p.  547. 
Taft  r.  Fiske,  140  Mass.  250;  s.  c.  54  Am.  Rep. 

459.     p.  794. 
Taft  r.  Hoppin,  Anth.  N.  P.  255.    p.  188. 
Taft  V.  Wildnian.  15  Ohio,  123.    p.  1698. 
Taggart  v.  McKinncv,  85  Ind.  392.    p.  1698. 
Tait  V.  Sherman,  10  la.  60.    p.  892. 
Talbert  v.  Berkshire  Life  Ins.  Co..  80  Ind. 

434.     p.  2052. 
Talbot  V.  Cains,  5  Mete.  (Mass.)  .520.    p.  351. 
Talbot  V.  Cusack,  17  Ir.  L.  (N.  S.)  216.     p.  353. 
Talbot  V.  Mearns,21  Mo.  427.    p.  1681. 
Talbott    V.   McGee,  4  T.  B.  Mou.  (Ky.)  377. 

l)p.  193,  196. 
Talcott   r.  Commercial   Ins.   Co.,  2  Johns. 

(X.  V.)]24.     p.  993. 
Tallis  r.  T.allls,  1  El.  &  Bl.  391;  s.  c.  22  L.  J. 

Q.  B.  185;  18  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  151.    pp.849, 

1149. 
Talmadgc  i\  Davenport,  31  N.  J.  L.  561.    pp. 

1713,  1714. 
Talmadgc  v.  Northrop,  I  Root  (Conn.),  454. 

11.  118. 
Tallman    v.  Woodworth,  2  Johns.  385.    pp. 

29,  112. 
Tallon  V.  Grand  Portage  Copper  Mining  Co., 

,5.i  Mich.  147.     pp.  811,  854. 
Tancey  v.  Kemp,  4  llarr.  &  J.  (Md.)  348.    p. 

265. 
Tansill  v.  Brlnkman,  16  Mo.  App.  .S57.    p.  842. 
Tapley  v.  Tapley,  10  Minn.  458.    p.  1007. 
Tarbcll  i:  Central  Pacilic  R.  Co.,  34  Cal.  616. 

p.  1294. 
Tarbox  c.  Eastern  Steamboat  Co.,. 50  Me. 345. 

PI).  1319,  1321,  1322,  1345,  1367. 
Tarbox  v.  Golziau,  20  Minn.  139.    p.  2034. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clv 


Tardos  r.  Ship  Toulon,  14  La.  Ann.  429.    pp. 

1322,  1343. 
Tarling  v.  Baxter,  6  Barn.  &  Cres.  360.    p. 

909. 
Tarpenning  v.  Cannon,  28  Kan.  665.    p.  1090. 
Tasker  v.  Cilley,  59  X.  H.  575.    p.  1077. 
Tarver  v.  State,  43  Tex.  564.    p.  313. 
Tatum  V.  Mohr,  21  Ark.  349.    p.  1780. 
Tatum  V.  Preston,  53  Miss.  654.    pp.  91,  92. 
Tatuni  V.  Young,  1  Porter  (Ala.),  298.    p.  12S. 
Taussig  V.  Rairroad  Co.,  8  Mo.  App.  578.    p. 

2112. 
Taussig  V.  Sliields,  26  Mo.  App.  318.    p.  794. 
Tavloe  V.  Riggs,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  591.    p.  294. 
TaVloe  V.  Sandiford,  7  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  13.    p. 

870. 
Taylor  v.  Allen,  36  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  294.    p.  952. 
Taylor  v.  Ashton,  11  Mees.  &  W.  401 ;  s.  c.  12 

L.  .J.  Exch.  363.     p.  1643. 
Tavlor  V.  Atchison,  54  111.  196.    p.  1663. 
TaVlor  V.   Betsford,   13  Johns.   (X.  Y.)   487. 

pp.  1723,  1915. 
Taylor  v.  Burk,  91  Ind.  252.    pp.  239,  2029. 
Taylor  v.  California  Stage  Co.,  6  Cal.  229.    p. 

1920. 
Taylor  v.  Carew  Manf.  Co.,  140  Mass.  150;  s. 

c.  3N.  E.  Rep.  21.     p.  1241. 
Tavlor  v.  Church,  8  X.  Y.  452.    p.  1479. 
Tavlor  v.  Collins,  51  Wis.  123.    p.  2026. 
Tavlor  V.  Cook,  14  la.  501.    p.  1748. 
Tavlor  r.  Everett,  2  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  23.    pp. 

1917,  1918,  1924,  1983, 1985. 
Tavlor  v.  Fletcher,  15  Ind.  SO.    pp.  2107,  2108: 
Taylor  v.  Genail,  10  Uo.  App.  250.    p.  2068. 
Tavlor  V.  Giger,  1  Hardin  (Kv.),586.    p.  1083. 
Tavlor  r  Grand  Trunk  II.  Co.,  48  X.  H.  304. 

pp.  12S5,  1286,  1287. 
Taylor  v.  Greely,  3  Me.  204.    pp.  119, 120, 124, 

1990. 
Tavlor  V.  Hords,  1  Burr.  60.    p.  1043. 
Tavlor  c.  Mclrwin,  94  111.  488.    p.  2f)l. 
Tavlor  v.  McXutt,  58  Tex.  71.    p.  839. 
Tavlor  v.  Middleton,  67  Cal.  656.    p.  1062. 
Tavlor  v.  Parker,  18  Minn.  79.    p.  2099. 
Taylor  v.  People,  12  Hun  (X.  Y. ),  212.    p.  524. 
Tavlor  v.  Shemwell,  4B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  575.    pp. 

310,  311,718. 
Tavlor  v.  Smith,  16  Ga.  7.    pp.  476,  478. 
Tavlor  v.  State,  16  Ga.  7.    p.  456. 
Tavlor  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  169.    pp.  89,  93. 
Taylor  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  46.    p.  1680. 
Tayon  r.  Ladew,  33  Mo.  205.    p.  1070. 
Teague  r.  Irwin,  127  Mass.  217.    p.  975. 
Teal  v.  State,  22  Ga.  75.    p.  1548. 
Teall  v.  Barton,  40  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  137.    p.  338. 
Tebbetts  r.  Estes,  53  Me.  566.    p.  1077. 
Tebo   V.  Baker,  16  Hun  (X.  Y.),  182;  s.  c.  19 

Alb.  L.  .J.  ex.  Y.)  39S.    p.  167. 
Tedrowe'  v.  Esher,  56  Ind.  443.    p.  551. 
Teese  r.  Huntingdon,  23  How.  (U.  S.)  2.    pp. 

319,  448,  4.50. 
Tegler  r.  Shipman,  33  Iowa,  194.    p.  922. 
Temple  v.  Com.,  75  Va.  892.    pp.  268,  284. 
Temple  V.  Pullen,  8  Exch.  389.    p.  12.50. 
Temple  1-.  Sumner,  Smith  (X".  H.),226.    pp. 

99,  119,121. 
Templcton  v.  People,  3  Hun  (X'.  Y'.),  3.57.    p. 

1780. 
Templeton  v.    State,    5  Tex.  App.    399.    p. 

1925. 
Templeton  v.  Wolf,  19  Mo.  101.    p.  1588. 
Tomplin  v.  Rothweiler,  .56  la.  259.    p.  629. 
Tom  pi  in  r.  Snvder,  6  Xeb.  491.    j).  2U60. 
Tenlirook  v.  Brown,  17  Ind.  410.    p.  1727. 
Tennant  v.  Bell,  9  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  s.)  684.    p. 

1121. 
Tennant  v.  Hamilton,  7  CI.  &  Fin.  122.    p. 

407. 
Tenuey  v.  Butler,  32  Me.  2G9.    p.  1GU8. 


Tennev  v.  Evans,  13  N.  H.  462.    pp.  117, 124, 

199(1. 
Tennev  v.  Foot,  4  Bradw.  (111.)  594;  s.  c.  95 

111.  99.    p.  882. 
Tenney's  Case,  23  X.  H.  162.    p.  132. 
Tenpeiiuinff  i\  Gallup,  8  la.  75.    j).  2058. 
Terhune  r.lDever,  36  Ga.  648.    p.  1750. 
Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bissell,  108  Ind. 

113.    p.  2138. 
Terre  Haute  Ac.  R.  Co.  v.  Buck,  96  Ind.  346; 

s.  c.  49  Am.  Rep.  169.    p.  1485. 
Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  73  Ind.  168. 

p.  2039. 
Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  81  Ind. 

19.    p.  1293. 
Terre  Haute  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pierce,  95  Ind. 

496.     p.  576. 
Terrell  v.  Com.,  13  Bush  (Ky.),  246.    p.  126. 
Terrell  v.  Frazier,  79  Ind.  473.    p.  2042. 
Territory  v.  Baker  (X.  Mex.),13  Pac.  Rep. 

31.     p.  117. 
Territory  v.  Bannigan,  1  Dak.  Ter.  152.    p. 

1825. 
Territory  v.  Doty,  1  Pinney  (Wis.),  396.    pp. 

26,  94. 
Territory  v.  Harding  (Mont.),  12.  Pac.  Rep. 

750.    p.  49. 
Territory  v.  Hart  (Mont.),  14  Pac.  Rep.  768. 

p.  49. 
Territory  v.  Kennedy,  3  Mont.  520.    p.  121. 
Territory  i-.  Lopez  (Xew  Xex.),2  Pac.  Rep. 

364.    p.  1825. 
Territory  r.  Tavlor,  1  Dak.  479.    p.  1985. 
Terry  r.  Shively,  64  Ind.  106.    pp.  853, 1660. 
Terry  v.  Wheeler,  25  X.  Y.  520.    p.  910. 
Teter  v.  Hinders,  19  Ind.  93.    p.  2058. 
Tetlow  V.  Savournln,  15  Phil.  (Pa.)  170.    p. 

280. 
Texas  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Chapman,  57  Texas,  78. 

11.1302. 
Texas  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  62  Tex.  515.    p. 

1678. 
Tliacher  v.  Jones,  31  Me.  528.    p.  1755. 
Thacher  v.  Phinney,  7  Allen  (Mass.), 146.  pp. 

345,  528. 
Thames  &c.  Co.  v.  Beville,  100  Ind.  309.    pp. 

2004,2113,2114. 
Tharp  v.  Witham,65  Iowa,  .566.    pp.  2,  3. 
Thatcher  r.  Olmstead,  110  111.  26.    p.  390. 
Thatcher  v.  State,  48  Ark.  60.    p.  2110. 
Thatcher  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.  4  Upper 

Canada  C.  P.  543.    p.  1207. 
Thaver  r.  Boston,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  511.    pp. 

1019, 1021. 
Thayer  v.  Burger,  100  Ind.  262.    p.  2005. 
Thaver  r.  Commonwealth,  12  Mete.  (Mass.) 

9.  "  p.  141. 
Thaver  r.  Davis,  38  Vt.  163.    p.  310. 
Thaver  v.  Felt,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  3.54.    p.  2080. 
Thaver  v.  Societv  &c..  30  Pa.  St.  60.    p.  2007. 
Thayer  v.  State,  52  Miss.  85.    ]>.  1919. 
Thayer  v.  Stevens  44  X.  H.  484.    p.  1752. 
Thayer  V.  Thayer,    101    Mass.    111.    pp.  299, 

300. 
Thayer   v.  Van  Vleet,  5  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  HI. 

pp.  1915,  1916,  1962. 
Theel  V.  Com.  (Pa.),  12  Atl.  Rep.  148.   p.  1531. 
Thelusson  v.  Coppinger,  3  Esp.  283.    p.  178. 
Theobald  v.  Hare,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  43.    p. 

2095. 
Third   Xat.  Bank  v.  Hall,  1  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

479.     p.  489.      • 
Thoin  r.  Bigland,  8  Exch.  725.    p.  1419. 
Thomas  r.  Babb,  45  Mo.  3S4.     p.  1045. 
Thomas  r.  Chapman,  45  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  98.  pp. 

1917,  1924. 
Thomas  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  479.    p.  1908. 
Thomas  v.  David,  7  Carr.  .i  P.  350.      pp.  257, 

418. 


clvi 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Thomas  v.  De"  Oraffenreid,  3  Nott  &  M.  (S. 

C.)  143.    p.  lins. 
Thomas  v.  Dunawav,  30  111.  373.    pp.  1461, 

14t)6. 
Thomas  v.  Freleigh,  9  ^Xo.  App.  151.    p.  1416. 
Thomas  I'.  Godfiey,  3  (.iill  &  J.  (Md.)  143.  p. 

1077. 
Thomas  v.  Jones,  SSGratt.  (Va.)  383.    p.  19S5. 
Thomas  r.  People.  311  :siich.  309.    p.  13. 
Thomas  t'.  People,  (i7  N.  Y.  218.    pp.  78,126. 
Thomas  v.  Perrv,  4  Pet.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  49.    p. 

918. 
Thomas  r.  Kevnolds,  29  Kan.  304.    p.  2036. 
Thomas  r.  Sta'te,  27  Ga.  287.    pp  81,  2.')7. 
Thomas  r.  State,  5  How.  (Miss.)  20.    p.  33. 
Thomas  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  493.    p.  18.i5. 
Thomas  r.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  200.    p.  1889. 
Thomas  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  260.    pp.  1537, 

1538 
Thomas  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  535.    p.  1890. 
Thomas  r.  State,  17T''X.  Aj.p.  437.    p.  1744. 
Thomas  r.  State,  36  Tex.  31(i.    pp.  (iO,  75,  76. 
Thomas  v.  State,  40  Tex.  65.-    pp.  17e0,  1884. 
Thomas  r.  State,  43  Tex.  6.5S.    p.  1895. 
Thomas  r.  Tanner, 6  T.  B.Mon.  (Ky.)  61.    p. 

1747. 
Thomas  r.  Thomas,  15  B.   Mon.   (Ky.)   178. 

pp.  801,825,  1.^)06. 
Thomas  v.  Thomas,  6  T.  R.  671.    p.  8)1. 
Thomas  r.  AVesteni  Union  Tel.  Co.,  100  Mass. 

156.     p.  1222. 
Thomas,  In  re,  1  Dill.  (U.  S.)  420.    p.  168. 
Thomason  v.  Odum,  31    Ala.    108.     pp.   293, 

1506. 
Thompson  v.  Armstronaf,  5  Ala.  383.    p.  1670. 
Thompson  v.  Blauchard,4  2^.  Y.303.    pp.  443, 

1441, 1445. 
Thompson  v.  Botts,  8  Mo.  710.    p.  1646. 
Thompson  v.  Campbell,  Hempst.  (U.  S.)  8. 

p.  15S5. 
Thompson  r.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  22  Mo.  App. 

321.    p.  1160. 
Thomi>son   v.    ChicJago  &c.  R.    Co.,  14  Fed. 

Rep.  564.     p.  1240. 
Thompson   r.   Com.,  8  Gratt.   637.     pp.   118, 

1926,  1930,  1964,  1965. 
Thompson  v.  Dulf,    119    111.    226.    pp.    1674, 

1708. 
Thompson  v.  Eagleton,  33  Ind.  .300.    p.  2141. 
Thompson  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  9  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  S.) 

(N.  Y.)212.     pp.605,  606. 
Thompson  t>.  Farr,   1  Spears  (S.  C),  93.    ii. 

2009. 
Tliompson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  111  U.  S.  529. 

p.  1099. 
Thompson  v.  Fisher,  13  Pa.  St.  310.    p.  1131. 
Thompson  r.  Force,  65  111.  370.    p.  16.53. 
Thompson  v.  Gibson,  8  Mees.  &  W.  281.    p. 

1120. 
Thompson  r.  Jones,  4  Wis.  106.    p.  1072. 
Thompson  r.  Keokuk,  61   Iowa,  187.    p.  1503. 
Thompson  v.  Lyle,  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  166.    p. 

1.36. 
Thompson    v.  Lynch,  43  Cal.  482.    pp.  2062, 

2064,2086. 
Thompson  v.  Mallet,  1   Bay  (S.  C),  94.    p. 

1969. 
Thompson  v.  Mills,  39  Ind.  .528.    p.  219. 
Tiiomi)Son  v.  Modes,  46  Mi<;h.  42.    p.  373. 
Thompson  c.  Myrick,  24  Minn.  4.    p.  20.50. 
Thompsons.  North  Missouri  R.  Co.,  50  3Io. 

190.    |).  1225. 
Thompson  v.  Paige,  10  Cal.  78.    pp.  117, 118. 
Thompson  r.  People,  24  111.  60.    p.  70. 
Thompson  r.  People,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  467. 

p.  103. 
Tliompson  v.  Pershing,  86  Ind.  304.     )).  193. 
Thompson   v.  Richards,  14    Mich.  172.     i)p. 

388,  827. 


Thompson  v.  Shannon,  9  Tex.  536.    pp.  1669, 

1670,  1672. 
Thompson  v.  State,  26  Ark.    323.    pw.  1919, 

1974,  1981. 
Thompson  v.  State,  24  Ga.  297.    p.  74. 
Thompson  r.  State,  15  Ind.  473.    p.  433. 
Tliompson  r.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  .593.    p.  70. 
Tliompson  v.  State,  43  Tex.  268.    pp.  728,  747, 

752,  1896. 
Tliompson  v.  Trevanion,  Skin.  402.    pp.  487, 

497. 
Tliomiison  v.  Updegraff,  3  W.  Va.  629.    p.  69. 
ThomiLson  v.  AVliite,  18  Ind.  373.    p.  2108. 
Thomiison's  Case,  122  Mass.  428.     p.  188. 
Tliompsou's    Case,  8   Gratt.    (Va.)    641.    p. 

19S5. 
Thomson  v.  Brothers,  5  La.  277.    p.  566. 
Tliorn  V.  Bell,  Lalor  Supp.  (N.  Y.)  430.    p. 

1026. 
Thornlnirg  v.  Cole,  27  Kan.  490.    p.  1997. 
Thornlmrgli  /•.  Hand,  7  Cal  .5.54.    p.  372. 
Thoniburgh  r.  Mastiu,  93  N.C.  258.    pp.  802, 

lo(;i. 
Thome  r.  Deas,4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  84.    p.  889. 
Thome  r.  Fuller,  Cro.  Jac.  397.    p.  1139. 
Thornton  v.  Davis,  4  Cranch  C.   C.  500.    p. 

144. 
Thornton  v.  Gibson,  14  Cal.  395.    p.  1600. 
Tliornlon  v.  Hook,  36  Cal.  223.    p.  392. 
Thornton  v.  Jett.  1  Wash.  (Va.)  138.    p.  1584. 
Thornton  v.  Lane,  11  (Ja.  4.59.    ]))).  16;V1,  1760. 
Thornton  v.   Slate,    20   Tex.    App.    519.    p. 

1795. 
Tliornton  v  Thompson,  4  Gratt.   (Va.)  121* 

p.  927. 
Tliornton  v.  Wynn,  12  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  183.  p. 

947. 
Thorp  V.  Craig,  10  la.  461.    p.  1620. 
Thorp  V.  (ioewev,  85  111.  612.     p.  1653. 
Thrall  v.  Lincoln,  28  Vt.  ,3.56.     p.  123. 
Thrall  v.  Smiley,  9  Cal.  529.    pp.   Ill,  1924, 

1945. 
Thrift  r.  Redman,  13  la.  25.    p.  1914. 
Thrings  r.  Central  Park  R.  Co.,  7  Robt.  616. 

pp.  1207,  1223. 
Thurber  r.  Harlem  &c.  R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y.  331. 

pp.  1211,  1232. 
Thurston  v.  Cornell,  38  N.  Y.  281.    pp.  344, 

528,  8S6. 
Thurston  v.  Kcnnett,  22  N.  H.  151.    pp.  217, 

218,219,231. 
Thurston  v.  M'Kown,  6  Mass.  428.    p.  939. 
Thurston  v.  Slate,  18  Tex.  27.    p.  1784. 
Tliwing  r.  Dennie,  Quiucy  (Mass.),  338.    p. 

142. 
Tibbelts  v.  Sternberg,  66  Barb.  201.    p.  363. 
Tibbv  r.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  80  Mo.  292. 

p.  1296. 
Tibeau  v.  Tibeau,  22  Mo.  77.    p.  214. 
Tidd  r.  Smith,  3  N.  H.  178.    p.  11U8. 
Tidewater  Canal  Co.  v.  j\rcher,  9  Gill  &  J. 

(Md.)479.     pp.  118,  119,  123. 
Tierney  r.  Spiva,  76  Mo.  279.    p.  311. 
Tiernan  r.  Trewick,  2  Utah,  393.    p.  1914. 
Tiftt  V.  Harton.  4  Denio  (N.  Y.).  171.    p.  1440. 
'lift  r.  Towns,  63  Ga.  267.     p.  1951. 
Tilford  r.  Ramsey,  37  Mo.  563.    ]i.  1074. 
Tilgliman  r.  Fislier,  9  Watts  (Pa.),  441.    p. 

622. 
Tiller  v.  Abernathv,  37  Mo.  196.    p.  1015. 
Tillev  i:  .^ladisou  lilver  R.  Co.,  24  X.  Y.  471. 

p.  1488. 
Tilley  r.  Movers,  43  Pa.  St.  404.    p.  108i. 
Tillinghast.Exparte,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  108.    p. 

148. 
Tillion  V.  State,  5  Neb.  3.51.    p.  126. 
Tillman  i:  Allies,  5  Smcdes  &  M.  (Miss.)  378. 

Tlliiiiau  V.  Stringer,  26  Ga.  171.    p.  1749. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clvii 


Tllton  V.  Am.  Bible  Society,  60  N.  H.  377.    p. 

403. 
Tilton  r.  Kimball,  52  Me.  500.    p.  113. 
Tilton  Safe  Co.  v.   Tisdale,   48   Vt.    83.    p. 

11-29. 
Tilton  V.  United  States  Life  Ins.  Co.,  8  Daly 

(N.  Y.),84.    p.  192. 
Timbrook  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  1.    p.  1737. 
Timon  v.  Claflfey,  45  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  438.    p. 

1008. 
Tinckler  v.  Prentice.  4  Taunt.  549.    p.  1128. 
Tindal  v.  Brown,  1  T.  R.  167.    p.  941. 
Tiudall  r.  State,  71  Ind.  314.    p.  2088. 
Tingley  r.  Providence,  9  R.  I.  388.    pp.  696, 

1976. 
Tinkham  r.  Thomas,  2  Jones  &  Sp.  (N.  Y.) 

236.    p.  1916. 
Tinklepaugh  v.  Rounds,  24  Minn.  298.    p.  4.32 
Tiunev  v.  New  Jersey  &c.  Co.,  12  Abb.  Pr. 

(N.  S.)  (X.  Y.)  1.     p.  17SIJ. 
Tinsley  r.  Carey,  26  Tex.  350.    p.  321. 
Tipping  r.  St.  Helen's  Smelting  Co.,  4  Best& 

S.  60S ;  s.  c.  11  H.  L.  Cas.  642.     p.  1388. 
Tipton  r.  Triplett,  1  Mete.   (Ky.)  570.     pp. 

221,  222,  l(i67. 
Tisdale  r.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  444.     p.  1779. 
Tison  V.  Yawn,  15  Ga.  491.  pp.  1586,  1598,  1599, 

1605. 
Titford  V.  Knott,  2  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  211. 

p.  879. 
Titus  r.  Ash,  24  N.  H.  319.    p.  456. 
Tobie  r.  Commissioners  &c.,  20  Kan.  14.    p. 

2036. 
Tobin  r.  Bass,  85  Mo.  654.    p.  873. 
Tobin  t'.  Gregg,  34  Pa.  St.  446.    p.  854. 
Tobin  V.  Jenkins,  20  Ark.  151.     pp.  215,  227. 
Tobin  v.  Shaw,  45  Me.  331.    p.  775. 
Todd  r.  Boone  Co.,  8  Mo.  432.    pp.  1600,  1971. 
Todd  V.  Brenner,  30  la.  439.    p.  1979. 
'lodd  V.  Teuton,  66  Ind.  25.    p.  2124. 
Todd  r.  Grav,  16  S.  C.  635.     p.  53. 
Todd  r.  Kerrich,  8  Exch.  151.    pp.  1136, 1137. 
Toddr.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  3  Allen  (Mass.), 

18;  s.  c.  7  Allen  (Mass.),  207.    pp.  1235, 1298, 

1603,  1605. 
Todd  i:  Philhower,  24  N.  J.  L.  797.    p.  1085. 
Todd  r.  Todd,  3  Hun  (N.  Y'.),  298.    p.  1739. 
Todd  r.  Trov,  61  X.  Y.  506.    pp.  1248,  1249. 
Tolandr.  Sprague,  12  Pet.   (U.  S.)   300.     p. 

1133. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Baddeley,  54  Dl.  19 ;  s.  c. 

5  Am.  Rep.  71.     p.  516. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Beggs,  85  111.  80.    pp. 

12,30,  1237,  12«?8,  1610. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bevin,  26  Ind.  443.    p. 

1224 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bray,  .57  111.  515.    p.  1309. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Brooks.  81  111.  245.     p. 

1298. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Conroy,  68  111.  560.    p. 

1287. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Craft,  62  Ind.   395.    p. 

2039. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Daniels,  21  Ind.  256.    pp. 

1726  1727. 
Toledo  &c.   R.   Co.  v.  Dunlap,47  Mich.  456. 

pp.  682,  688,  698. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilvin,  81  111.  513.    p. 

922. 
Tofedo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Goddard,  25  Ind.  185. 

p.  551. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Grable,  88  111.  441.    p. 

1232. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammond,  33  Ind.  379. 

|)  1154. 
Toledo   &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingraham,  77  lU.  300. 

pp.  1675,  1757. 
Toledo  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  76  111.  316.    p. 

1300. 


Toledo  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Maine,  67  lU.  299.    p. 

13l»;. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  76  111.  278.    p. 

1232. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Milligan,  52  Ind.  505.    p. 

2012. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Pindar,  53  111.  447.    p. 

1221. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Riley,  47    111.  514,    p. 

1300. 
Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Shuckman,  50  Ind.  42. 

p.  1682. 
Tollett  r.  State,  44  Tex.  95.    p.  1855. 
Tolman  v.  Johnstone,  2  Post.  &  Fin.  66.    p. 

418. 
Tolman  v.  Phelps,  12  Wash.  L.  Rep.  587.    p. 

1186. 
Tomer  v.  Densmore,  8  Xeb.  384.  pp.  113,2097. 
Tomlin  v.  Cox,  19  X.  J.  L.  76.    p.  1923. 
Tomlin  v.  Hilvard,  43  III.  300.    pp.  339,  340. 
Tomlinson  v.  Crooke,  E.  10  Jac.  1.    p.  1936. 
Tomlinson  v.  Wallace,  16  Wis.  224.    pp.  1698, 

1740. 
Tomlinson  Carriage  Co.  v.  Kinsella,  31  Conn. 

2G9.    p.  938. 
Tompson  i\  Mussey,  3  Me.  305.    p.  1197. 
Tonawanda  R.  Co.  r.  Munger,  5  Denio  (X. 

Y.),266.    p.  1206. 
Toney  v.  Tonev,  73  Ind.  34.     p.  2101. 
Tooei  V.  Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  714.    p.  85. 
Toogood  i\  Spyring,4  Tyrwh.  582.    pp.1459, 

1462. 
Toohey  v.  Sarvis,  78  Ind.  474.    p.  1946. 
Tool  r.  Com.,  11  Leigh  ( Va. ),  714.    p.  1909. 
Tooley  r.  Bacon,  70  X.  Y'.  34.    p.  561. 
Toomey  v.  London  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 

146.    pp.  1601,  1605. 
Toouey  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  452.    pp.  115, 

116. 
Topeka  v.  Tuttle,  5  Kan.  311.    pp.  2023,  2027. 
Topham  r.  McGregor,  1  Carr.  &  K.  320.    p. 

360. 
Toppan  V.  Jenness,  21  X.  H.  232.    p.  219. 
Torbert  v.  Hayden,  11  Iowa,  435.    p.  1443. 
Torkelson  v.  Jorgenson  (Minn.),  10  X.  W. 

Rep.  416.     p.  925. 
Torpey  v.  WiUiams,  3  Daly  (X.  Y\),I62.    p. 

1151. 
Torrv  r.  Holmes,  10  Conn.  499.    p.  1977. 
Toulman  v  Swain,  47  Mich.  82.    pp.  810,  20.30, 

2038. 
Tourtellot  r.  Rosebrook,  11  Mete.   (Mass.) 

460.     p.  1319. 
Tower  v.  Hewitt,  11  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  134.    p. 

1975. 
Tower  r.  Moore,  52  Mo.  118.    pp.  2,  3. 
Towle  V.  Blake,  48  X.  H.  2.    p.  497. 
Towae  v.  Campbell,  3  Com.  Bench,  921.    p. 

1135. 
Townly's  Case,  Foster,  C.  L.  7.    p.  93. 
Towns  V.  O'Brien,  2  Ala.  381.    p.  569. 
Towusend  r.  Chapin,  8  Blackf.    (Ind.)   328. 

Iip.  1726,  1727. 
Towusend  v.  Chas.  H.  Heer  Dry  Goods  Co., 

85  .Mo.  503.     p.  946. 
Townsend  v.  Des  Moines,  42  Iowa,  657.    p. 

1249. 
Townsend  v.  Doe,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  328.    p. 

1720. 
Townsend  v.  Jeffries,  17  Ala.  276.    p.  109. 
Townsend  v.  Lorani  Bank,  2  Oh.  St.  345.    p. 

943. 
Townsend  v.  Xorthwestern  Ins.  Co.,  IS  X. 

Y.  168.    p.  978. 
Townsend  v.  State,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  151.    pp. 

732,  1515,  1517,  1520. 
Townshi))  r.  Keller,  100  Pa.  St.  105;  s.  c.  43 

Am.   Rep.  42.     p.  iva. 
Tracev  v.  Altmever,  46  X.  Y.  598.    p.  2075. 


clviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Pracv  r.   Swartout,  10  Pet.    (U.  S.)   SO.    p. 

lt>44. 
Tracv  v.  Whipple,  8  Jolius.   (N.  Y.)  379.    p. 

1016. 
Tralton  v.  Pitts,  73  Mc.  408.    pp.  1970, 1985. 
Trail  v.  Somerville,  '22  Mo.  App.  1.     p.  -2. 
Train  r.  Collins,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  145.    p.  1977. 
Train  r.  Holland  Purchase  Ins.  Co.,  62  N.  Y. 

.598.     p.  I(i2(i. 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Downer.  11  Wall.  (U. 

S.)  129.     p|..  1328   1356,  1359. 
Transportation  Line  v.    Hope,  95  U.  S.  297. 

pp.  502,  503,  513. 
Trasher  v.  Everhart.  3  Gill  &  J.   (Md.)  234. 

p.  S~yt 
Travis  v.  Com.,  106  Pa.  St.  ,597.    p.  71. 
Travnor  v.  Johnson,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  51.  pp. 

10o7,  1069. 
Treadwav  v.  .State,  1  Tex.  App.  668.    pp.  312, 

313,  437." 
Treadwell  v.  Goodwin,  6  Hosw.   (N.  Y.)  180. 

p.  313. 
Treadwell  r.  Wells,  4  Cal.  260.     pp.  358,  1102. 
Treat  v.  Lord,  42  Me.  5.V2.    p.  1670. 
Trembly  r.  State,  20  Kan.  116.     pp.  20,  21. 
Trenor'r.  Central  Pac.  R.   Co.,  50  Cal.  222. 

pp.  64,  116. 
Trentman  v.  Eldridge,  98  Ind.  525.    pp.  2015, 

2016,2017. 
Trentman  v.   Wiley,   85  Ind.    33.    pp.  1730, 

2038. 
Tre.sca  r.  Maddox,  11  La.  Ann.  206.    p.  1515. 
Trew  V.  Kailwav  I'assenger  Assurance  Co., 

6  Hurl.  &  N.  838.     p.  991. 
Trice  v.  Hannibal  &c.  K.  R.  Co.,  35  Mo.  416. 

pp.  705,706. 
Trice  r.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  43.    p.  1538. 
Trichet    v.    Hamilton    Ins.    Co.,    14    Gray 

(Mass.),  456.     p.  639. 
Trihav  r.   IJrooklvn   Lead  Min.  Co.   (Utah), 

11  Pac.  Rep.  612."    p.  1239. 
Trigg  V.  Taylor,  27  Mo.  245.    p.  1034. 
Trimble  r.  Foster,  87  Mo.  49.     p.  702. 
Trimble  v.  State,  2  G.  Greene  (la-),  404.    pp. 

74,  75. 
Trimble  v.  Thorne,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  151.    p. 

948. 
Trinidad  v.  Simpson,  5  Colo.  65 ;  s.  c.  22  Alb. 

L.  J.  409;  10  Cent.  L.  J.  149.     pp.  49,  51. 
Tripp    r.    Commissioners,  2  Allen    (Mass.), 

556.    pp.    696,   1928,    1930,    1932,    1970,    1974, 

1978. 
Tritlipo  V.  Lacv.  .55  Ind.  287.    p.  2039. 
Tritz  V.  City  of"  Kansas,  84  Mo.  632.    pp.  1268, 

1269,1271,1277,  1279,  1280. 
Trohan  v.  McManus,  2  La.  209.    p.  1990. 
Trott  V.  West,  Meigs  (Tenn.),  163.    p.  2065. 
Trotter  v.  Curtis,  19  Johns.   (X.  Y.)  161.    p. 

886. 
Trotter  v.  Latson,  7  How.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  261. 

pp.  182,  278. 
Troxdale   r..  State,  9  Humph.    (Tenn.)  411. 

pp.  70, 121. 
True  r.  Plumley,  36  Me.  466.    p.  1997. 
Trueblood  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  650.    pp.  113, 

118, 122. 
Trneman  v.  Fenton,  Cowp.  .544.    p.  889. 
Truesdale  r.  Ford,  37  111.  210.     p.  1046. 
Truitt  r.  Trultt,  :!7  Ind.  .514.    pp.  2028,  2059. 
Trullinger  v.  Webb,  3  Ind.  19s.    pp.  63,  .54, 99, 

100. 
Trussell    v.  Scarlet,   18  Fed.  Rep.  214.    p. 

627. 
Trustees  v.  Bledsoe,  5  Ind.  133.    p.  364. 
Trustees  t'.  I'.rookhn  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  23  How. 

Pr.  448.     pp.  .551,076. 
Trustees  v.  Hill,  12  la.  462.    p.  1670. 
Trustees  v.  Kirk,  68  N.  Y.  459.     p.  1626. 
Trustees  v.  Reynolds,  61  Ind.  104.    i».  2101. 


Tryon  v.  Oxley,  3  G.  Greene  (la.),  289.    p. 

167(1. 
Tticliin's  Case,  cited  p.  1521. 
Tucker  ?•.  Cracklin,  2  Stark.  385.    pp.  1321, 

1332,  1345. 
Tucker  r.  Ely,  37  Hun  (X.  Y.),  565.    p.  1559. 
'Pucker  r.  Hamlin,  60  Tex.  171.    p.  315. 
Tucker  r.  Hennikor,  41  N.   H.  317.    pp.  728, 

729,  739,  747,  7.50,  773. 
Tucker  V.  Morclaud,  10  Pet.   (U.   S.)  72.    p. 

1130. 
Tucker  v.  Newman,  11  Ad.  &  El.  40.    p.  1404. 
Tucker  r.  I'acific  K.  Co.,  ,50  Mo.  385.    p.  1123. 
Tucker  r.  State,  72  Ind.  242.    p.  1006.  . 
Tucker  v.  South  Kingston,  5  R.  1.  558.    pp. 

1921,1983. 
Tucker  r.  Welsh,  17  Mas.s.  160.    p.  328. 
Tucker  r.  White,  27  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  97;  S.c. 

28  How.  Pr.  tX.  Y.)  78.     p.  2075. 
Tucker  c.  Wilamouicz,  8  Ark.  157.    p.  885. 
Tutf  V.  Warman,  5  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  573.    pp.  1221, 

1229. 
Tufts  V.  Newton,  119  Mass.  476.    p.  2136. 
Tufts  r.  Seabury,  II   Pick.   (Mass.)   142.     p. 

17.54. 
Tuggle  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  62  Mo.  427.    p. 

1372. 
Tull  r.  Anderson,  15  Nev.  42.    p.  2099. 
Tuller  r.  Talbot,  23  111.   358.    pp.   721,  1284, 

1285,  1286,  1483. 
TuUidge  r.  Wade,  3  Wils.  18.    pp.  585,  1477. 
Tullis  r.  Brawley,  2  ^Minn.  277.    p.  2048. 
Tully  1-.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  134  Mass.  499.    p. 

815. 
Tully  V.  Harlow,  35  Cal.  303.    p.  1438. 
Tunhell  v.  Watson,  2  Munf.   (Va.)   283.    p. 

2013. 
Turbeville  r.  State.  40  Ala.  715.    pp.  1734, 1820. 
Turnbull  v.  Citizens'  Bank,  16  Fed.  Rep.  145. 

pp.  1321,  1345. 
Turnbull  v.  Rivers,  3  McCord  (S.  C),  131.    p. 

1.5Sfi. 
Turnbull  v.  Schroeder,  29  Minn.  49.    p.  1090. 
Turner  r.  Ambler,  10  Ad.  &   El.  (N.  S.)252. 

pp.  1164,  1172. 
Turner  v.  Austin.  16  Mass.  181.    p.  397. 
Turner  v.  Baker,  42  Mo.  13.    p.  I(i69. 
Turner  r.  Baker.  64  Mo.  219.    pp.  794,  1042. 
Turner  v.  Booker,  2  Dana  (Kv.),  335.    p.  2069. 
Turner  v.  Burrows,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  627.    p. 

199. 

Turner  v.  Cariienter,  83  IMo.  333.    p.  873. 
Turner  v.  Chillicotlie  &c.  R.  Co.,  51  Mo.  501. 

I).  1609. 
Turner  r.  Com.. 86  Pa.  St.  54.    p.  1797. 
Turner  r.  Dartmouth,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  291. 

p.  1266. 
Turner  v.  Foxall,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  324. 

p.  1720. 
Turner  c.  TIahn.  1  Colo.  23.    pp.  117,  120. 
Turner  r.  Hall,  60  Mo.  271.    i)p.  1049,  1050. 
Turner  ?•.   Kansas  City  &c.   R.  Co.,  78  Mo 

.578.     p.  1.3(17. 
Turner  r.  Kelly,  9  Ta.  322.    p.  1956. 
Turner  v.  Mas.!)n.  14  Mees.  &  W.  116.    p.  1137 
Turner  v.  Rawson,  5  (ia.  399.     p.  2099. 
Turner  v.  Ross,  1  Humph.   (Tenn.)  16.    p 

2065. 
Turner  v.  State,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  119.    p 

125. 
Turner  v.   State,  68  Tenn.  (4  Lea)  206.    pp, 

708,  737,  743,  744.  765,  18.59,  1874. 
Turner  r.  Stale,  11  Tex.  App.  .587.    p.  1560. 
Turner  v.   Tuolumne  Co.,  25  Cal.  397.    pp 

1964,  liHJC,  1967,  1995. 
Turner  v.  Turner,  15  Jur.  218.    p.  1.58. 
Turner  r.  Strange,  .56  Tex.  142.     p.  343. 
Turner  r.  Walker,  3  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  377.    pp 

1195,  1197,  1198. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clix 


Turner  v.  Yates,  16  How.  (U.  S.)  14.    pr).  622, 

827,  839,  2126. 
Turnev  v.  t^tute,  8  Smed.  &  M.   (Miss.)  104. 

pp.  322,  334. 
Turnev  v.  State  ,  9  Tex.  App.  193.    p.  430. 
Turuev  r.  Wilson,  7  Verg.  (Tenn.)  340.    pp. 

l;521,"]322,  1345,  1356,  1357. 
Turnipseed  r.  Cuuniugliam,  16  Ala.  501.    p. 

809. 
Turnpike  Co.  r.  Loomis,  32  X.  Y.  127.    p.  396. 
Turns  v.  Com.,  6  Mete.  (Mass.)  224,  235.    p.  4. 
Turpin  v.  State  cMd.),  2  Crini.  L.  Mag.  532. 

pp.  37,  91. 
Turquand  v.  Guardians,  8  Dowl.  P.  C.  201. 

p.  667. 
Tuskaloosa  Co.  r.  Logan,  50  Ala.  H03.    p.  2119. 
Tutt  r.  Cloney,  62  Mo.  116.    p.  1598. 
Tutt  1-.  Price,  7  Mo.  App.  194.    p.  1074. 
Tuttle  r.  Brown,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  457.    p.  927. 
Tuitlc  v.  Robinson,  33  X.  H.  104.    i>.  365. 
Tut' lee.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  556.    pp.  30,  50, 

115,116,1930. 
Tweed's  Case,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  (N.  s.)  371. 

p.  85. 
Tweedy  v.  Briggs,  31  Tex.  74.    p.  118, 120. 
Tweedv  v.  Brusli,  Kirby  (Conn.),  13.    p. 
TweedV  v.   State,  5  la.  433;    s.    c.  Horr.  & 

Thomp.  Cas.  Self-Def.  905.    p.  1848. 
Twentyman  v.  Barnes,  2  De  Gex  &  Sm.  225. 

p.  657. 
Twiford  v.  Warenp,  Finch,  311.    p.  918. 
Twigg  V.  Potts,  1  Cromp.  Mees.  &  R.  89.    p. 

1748. 
Twogood  V.  HoTt,  42  Mich.  609.    p.  1090. 
Twomblv  V.  Monroe,  136  Mass.  464.    pp.  1456, 

1457,  1458. 
Twvman  v.  Knowles,  13  C.  B.  222.    pp.  1473, 

1.559. 
Twvne's  Case,  1  Sm.  L.  Cas.  1.    p.  1442. 
Tyler  v.  Hammerslev.  44  Conn.  393.    p.  150. 
Tyler  v.  Marcelin,  8  La  Ann.  312.    p.  629. 
Tyndal'.s  Case,  Cro.  Car.  291.    p.  86. 
Tyra  v.  Com..  2  Mete.  (Kv.)  1.    pp.  6, 1534. 
Tyre  v.  Morris,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  3.    p.  244. 
Tyree  v.  Parham,  66  Ala.  424.    p.  1731. 
Tvson  V.  Reynolds,  52  la.  431.    p.  817. 
Tyson  v.  Richard,  3  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  109.  pp. 

1507, 1596. 
Tyson  v.  Tyson,  92  N.  C.  288.    p.  929. 

U. 

U.  V.  J.,  L.  K.  1  Prob.  &  Div.  460.    pp.  646, 

649. 
Udderzook  v.  Com.,  76  Pa.  St.  340.    p.  661. 
Uhl  r.  Com.,  6  Gratt.  ( Va.)  606.    p.  4.56. 
Uhl  V.  Harvey,  78  Ind.  26.    pp.  1099, 1103. 
Uland  I'.  Carter,  34  Ind.  344.    p.  2141. 
Ulmer  v.  Hills,  8  Me.  326.    p.  1442. 
Uhner  f.  Lelaud,  1  Me.  135.    p.  1181. 
Uliuer  V.  Leland,l  Greenl.  (Me.)  136.    p.  1199. 
Ulrich  V.  People,  39  INlich.  245.     i>p.  73,78,378. 
Umangst  v.  Kraemer,  8  Watts  &  S.  391.    p. 

585. 
Um|)hrey  v.  State,  63  Ind.  223.    p.  1566. 
Underwood  v.  Eastman,  18  N.  H.  582.    p.  966. 
Underwood  r.  Linton,  .54  lud.  4li8.    p.  563. 
Underwood  v.  Parrott,  2  Tex.  168.    ]>.  642. 
Underwood  r.  State,  72  Ala.  220.    p.  1894. 
Unger  I'.  Fortv- second  St.   R.   Co.,  51  N.  Y. 

497 ;  s.  c.  1  Thomp.   Neg.   (1st  ed.)  392.    p. 

1625. 
Unger  v.  State,  42  Miss.  642.    p.  1892. 
Union  Bank  v.  Ezell,  10  Hum))h.  (Tenn.)  385. 

p.  937. 
Union  Bank  v.  Geary,  5  Pet.  (U.  S.)  99.    pp. 

192,  193,  196. 
Union  Bank  v.  Grnnshaw,  15  La.  321.    p.  947. 
Union  Bank  v.  Heyward,  15  S.  C.  296.    p.  825. 


Union  Bank  ^j.  Magmder,  7  Peters  (U.  S.), 

287.    p.  949. 
Union  Bank  v.  Smizer,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.),  501. 

pp.  956,  959. 
Union  Bank  v.  Torrey,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  269. 

p.  569. 
Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co.  r.  Cheever,  .36 

Oh.  St.  201 ;  s.  c.  38  Am.  Rep.  573.    pp.  728, 

747,  753,  781,  785. 
Union  County  r.  Smith,  34  Ark.  6S4.    p.  205.5. 
Union  Express  Co.  v.  Graham,  26  Oh.  St.  695. 

pp.  1322,  1344,  1345,  1347,  1374. 
Union  Gold  M.  Co.  v.  Kockv  Mountain  Xat. 
-  Bank,  2  Colo.  565.    pp.  74, '99. 
Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Groom,  1  Bush  (Ky.),  2S9. 

p.  2053. 
Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shaw,  2  Dill.  (U.  S.)  14. 

pp.  1356,  1359. 
Union  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Buchanan,  100 

Ind.  63.     pp.  192,  14S2,  1642,  1674,  1709,  1756. 
Union  Nat.  Bank  v.  Balderwick,  45  111.  375. 

pp.  1132,  1133. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Fray,  35  Kan.  700.    p. 

2041. 

Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Hand,  7  Kan.  380.    p. 

1610. 
Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  9  Colo.  379;  s. 

c.  12  Pac.  Rep.  516.    p.  1312. 
Union  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  80  Ind.  458.    p. 

317. 
Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Rollins,  5  Kan.  167. 

p.  1255. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon,  38  Kan.  476; 

s.  c.  16  Pac.  Rep.  836.    p.  2040. 
Union  Savings  Assn.  v.  Clayton,  6  Mo.  App. 

587.    p.  747. 
Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Cuppv,26  Kan.  762.    p. 

1313. 
Union  TYater  Co.  v.  Crary,  25  Cal.  504.    p. 

309. 
Uuis  V.  Charlton,  12  Gratt.  (Va.)  484.    p.  324. 
United  Society  t\  Wmkley,  7  Gra3- (Mass.), 

460.     p.  9114. 
United  States  v.  Alden,  Sprague  (U.  S.),  95. 

p.  1171. 
United  States    v.  Anthony,  U  Blatchf.   (U. 

S.)  200.    p.  1530. 
United  States  v.  Attaching  Creditors,  2  Brev. 

(S.  C.)  8.5.    p.  2013. 
United  States  v.  Babcock,  3  DilL  (U.  S.)  566. 

p.  181. 
United  States  v.  Baker,  3  Bened.  (U.  S.)  63. 

pp.  119, 120. 
United  States  v.  Bank  of  Metropolis,  15  Pet. 

(U.  S.)  377.     p.  1705. 
United  States  v.  Barefleld,  23  Fed.  Rep.  136. 

p.  179. 
United  States  v.  Battiste,  2  Sumn.  240.    pp. 

732,  1505,  1510,  1517. 
United  States  v.  Benner,  Baldw.  (U.  S.)  234. 

p.  1016. 
United  States  r.   Benson,  31  Fed.  Rep.  896. 

p.  14. 
United  States  v.  Black,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.;  195.    p.  37. 
United  States  v.  Black,  12  Nat.  Bk.  Reg.  340. 

p.  523. 
United  States  v.  Blodgett,  35  Ga.  .336.    p.  101. 
United  States  v.  Borger  (U.  S.  Cir.  Ct.  S.  D. 

N.  Y.),  7  Fed.  Rep.  193.    pp.  58,  63. 
United  States  v.  Boyden,  1  Lowell  (U.  S.), 

266.     p.  1976 
United  States  v.  Breitling,  20  How.   (U.  S.) 

2.52.     pp.  1669,  2135. 
United  States  v.  Burnham,  1  Mason  (U.  S.), 

57.    p.  1644. 
United  States  v.  Bnrr,  1  Burr  Tr.  245.    p.  284. 
United  States  c  Butler,  1  Hughes   (U.  S.), 

457.     pp.  46,88. 


clx 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


United  Statesr. Byrne  (U.  S.Cir.  S.  D.  X.  Y.), 

7  Fed.  Hep.  455. "  u.  li'J, 
United  States  v.  Caldwell, 2  Dall.  (U.S.)  334. 

p.    itH. 

United  States  r.  Cullender,  AVhart.  St.  Tr. 

68S.    pp.  1()'2, 103. 
United  States  v.  Carlton,  1  Gall.  (U.  S.)  400. 

pp.  801, 1506. 
United  States  v.  Carnot,  2  Cranch  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)409.     p.  7. 
United  Slates  v.  Carrigo,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.),49.     p.  36. 
United  States  r.  Caton,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  150.     p.  171. 
United  States  v.  Chaflfee,  2  Bond  (U.  S.),  147. 

p.  1023. 
United  States  v.  City  Bank,  21  How.   (U.  S.) 

356.     p.  1022. 
United  States  v.  Clarke,  2  Cranch  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)152.     p.  1946. 
United  States  r.  Collier,  AVliart.  on  Iloni. 

Api).  4811.    p.  41. 
United  States  v.  Collins,  1  Woods   (U.S.), 

409.    pp.  14,  IS. 
United  status  r.  Columbus,  5  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.S.)  304.     pp.  721,725. 
United  States  v.  Coolidge,  2  Dall.  (U.  S.)  364. 

l)p.  143,  I'.H),  330. 
United  stali-s  v.  Cooper,  4  Dall.   (U.  S.)  341. 

pp.  u;i;,  is9. 
United  States  v.  Coppersmith,  4  Fed.  Rep. 

198.    J).  30. 
United  States  v.  Coppersmith,  2  Flip.  (U.  S.) 

546.    p.  44. 
United  States  v.  Cornell,  2  Mason    (U.  S.), 

91.    pp.  65,  83,  lUO. 
United  States  *-.  Cottingham,  2  Blatchf.  (U. 

S.)470.    pp.  36,39. 
United  States  v.  Craig,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

729.    p.  264. 
United  States  v.  Crandell,  4  Cranch    C.    C. 

(U.  S.J  683.    p.  777. 
United  States  r.  Dashicl,  4  Wall.  (U.  S.)  182. 

pp.  1665,2063. 
United  States  v.  Daubner,  17  Fed.  Rep.  793. 

p.  44. 
United  States  v.  De  Vanghan,  3  Cranch  C. 

C.  (U.S.)  84.     ])p.  67,  1923. 
United  States  v.  Devaughn,  3  Cranch  C.  C. 

501.    p.  284. 
United  States  v.  Devlin,  6  Blatchf.  71 ;  s.  c.  7 

Int.  Rev.  Rec.  94.    p.  39. 
United    States    v.     Dickinson,    2    McLean 

(U.S.),  325.    p.  264. 
United  Statesr.  Doebler,  1  Baldw.   (CJ.  S.) 

519.    p.  300. 
United  States  v.  Douglas,  2  Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 

207.    p.  45. 
United  States  v.  Dow,  Taney  Dec.  34.    p. 

14. 
United  States  v.  Duff  (U.  S.  Cir.  Ct.  S.  D.  X. 

Y.j,  0  Fed.  Rep.  45.     pp.  58,  62,  71, 105,  612, 

613. 
United  States  v.  Eighteen  Barrels  of  High 

Wines.  8  Blatch.  (('.  S.)  475.    p.  421. 
United  States  r.  Emerson,   4   Cranch  C.   C. 

d'.  S.)  188.    p.  143. 
United  States  v.  Fenwick,  4   Cranch    C.    C. 

([■.  S.)675.     p.  1.575. 
United  Slates  r.  Foulke,  6  McLean   (U.  S.), 

439.     pp.  1842.  1843. 
United  States  v.  Fourteen  Packages,  GIlp. 

( U.  S. )  2.35.     pp.  68,  1644, 1698. 
United  States  v.  Fries,  3  Dall.  (U.  S.)  515. 

PI).  14,20,  117. 
United  States  v.  Fries,  AYhart.  St.  Tr.  610. 

p.  102. 
United  States  v.  Gamble,  10  Mo.  4.57.    pp. 

1980,  2121. 


United  States  v.  Gardner,  1  AYoods  (U.  S.), 

514.    p.  14. 
United    States  v.  Gibert,  2  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  19. 

pp.    40,  331,    332, 551,    1715,  1913,  1924,  1937, 

1979. 
United  States  r.  Gillies,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

1.59;  s.  f.  3  Wheeler  C.  C.  (N.  Y.)  308.    p. 

1979. 
United  States  r.  Greathouse,  4  Sawv.  (U.  S.) 

4.57 ;  .s.  c.  2  Abb.  (U.  S.)  3(>4.     p.  1.529. 
United  States  v.  Green,  3  Mason  (U.  S.),482. 

p.  148. 
United  States  r.  Guiteau,  3  Crim.  L.  Mag. 

347;  s.  ('.  II)  Fed.  Re)).  161.    i).  1879. 
T'niled  Slates  r.  Hand,  3  Phila.  403.    p.  36. 
United  Statesr.  llanway,2  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.) 

139.     pp.  58,  62,  67,  75. 
United  States  r.  Haskell,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (Va.j 

412  n.     p.  40. 
United  States  r.  Hawthorn,  1  Dill.  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  422.    p.  523. 
United  States  v.  IIill,l  Brock.  (U.  S.)  156.  p. 

171. 
United  States  v.  Hodge,  6  How.  (U.  S.)  279. 

p.  2068. 
United  States  r.  Holmes,  1  Cliff.  (U.  S.)  98. 

p.  484. 
United  States  r.  Horn,  5  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  105. 

p.  1953. 
United  States  v.  Hunter,  15  Fed.  Rep.  712. 

p.  180. 
United  States  v.  Hulton,  10  Ben.  (U.  S.)  2G8. 

PI).  .592,  593,  594. 
United   States  v.  Insurgents,  2  Dall.  (U.S.) 

335.    pp.  14,  20. 
United  states  v.  Jackalow,  1  Black  (U.  S.), 

484      p.  1090. 
United  States  v.  Jackson,  29  Fed.  Rep.  .503; 

s.  c.  9  Crim.  Law  Mag.  325.    pp.  1824,  1829, 

1833,  1860,  1861. 
United  Stales  r.  Johns,  4    Dall.  (U.    S.)  412. 

P)).  36,  40. 
United  States   v.  Johnson,  1  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  371.     p.  99. 
United  States  v.  Johnson,  26  Fed.  Rep.  682. 

pp.  1829.  18:53. 
United  States   v.  Keller,  19  Fed.  Rep.  633. 

p.  1833. 
United  States  v.  Kelly,  4  AVash.  C.  C.  528. 

p.  40. 
United    States   v.  Krouse,  2   Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.S.)  2.52.    p.  37. 
United  States  r.  Lee,  4  Mackey  (D.  C.),489; 

s.  c.  .54  Am.  Rep.  293.    p.  11. 
United  States  r.  Loughery,  13  Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 

267.     pp.  27,  87. 
United  Slates  v.  Lynn,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  309. 

p.    261. 
United  States  r.  !>rarchant,  4  Mason  (U.  S.) 

158;  s.  c.  12  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  482.    pp.  20,  37, 

40,  45. 
United  State.s  r.  McCarthv,  18  Fed.  Rep.  87; 

s.  c.  21  Ulatchf.  (U.  S.)  469.     pp.  262,  268. 
United   States   r.  INlcGlue,  1  Curtis  C.  C  1. 

pp.  498,, 502,  .503,  1780. 
United  st;ites  v.  McHcury,  6  Blatchf .  (U.  S.) 

503.     pj).  74.  99. 
United  Slates  v.  McKee,  3  Cent.  L.  J.  258. 

p.  1924. 
United  States  v.  McMahon,  4  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.S.)  ,573.     pp.  7,65. 
United  States  r.  Mcl'herson,  1  Cranch  C.  0. 

(F.  S.)5I7.    p.  36. 
United  Slates  r.  Miles,  2  Ctah,  19;  s.  c.  103 

V.  S.  304.    p.  .57. 
United  States  v.  Miller,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

247.    J).  284. 
United  States  v.  Mingo,  2  Curt.  C.C.I,  p. 

7n. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxi 


United  States  v.  Montgomers",  2  Dall.  (U.  S.) 

335.    p.  170. 
United  States  v.  Moore,  3  Cranch  (U.  S.J,  159. 

p.  178. 
United  States  v.  Moore,  Wall.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

23.    p.  166. 
United  States  v.  Morris,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

23.     pp.  So,  725,  1508. 
United  .States  v.  Moses,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

170.    p.  26]. 
United  States  v.  Nardello,  4  Mackev  (D.  C), 

503.     p.  9. 
United  States  v.  Xeverson,  1  Mackey  (D.  C), 

152.    pp.  130, 1777. 
United  States  I'.  Noelke,  17  Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 

554;  s.  c.  1  Fed.  Rep.  426;  9  Reporter,  505. 

pp.  58,  62,  63. 
United  States  v.  Pacific  Express  Co.,  15  Fed. 

Kep.  867.    pp.  1321,  1345. 
United  States  v.  Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.,  123 

U.  S.  113 ;  s.  c.S  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  77.    p.  1644. 
United  Slates  V.  Porter,  2  Dall.    (U.  S.)  345. 

p.  90. 
United  States  v.  Randall,  1  Deadv  (U.  S.),  524. 

p.  37. 
United  States  v.  Randall,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  412.     p.  85. 
United  States  v.  Reed,  2  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  435. 

pp.  20,  39. 
United  States  i>.  Reid,  12  How.   (U.  S.)  361. 

p.  1924. 
United  Stalest?.  Reynolds,  1  Utah,  319.    pp. 

71,  101. 
United  Stales  v.  Riley,  5  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  204. 

pp.721,V22. 
United  States  v.  Rindskopf ,  105  U.  S.  418.    p. 

2114. 
United  Stales  v.  Rose,  6  Fed.  Rep.  136.    p.  24. 
United  Slates  v.  Ross,  1  GaU.  (U.  S.)  625.    p. 

1565. 
United  Stales  v.   Salentlne,  8   Biss.    C.    C. 

(U.S.)  404.     p.  1974. 
United  States  v.  Sanders,  Hempst.  (U.  S.) 

483.     p.  1558. 
United  States  v.  Scholfleld,  1  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)130.    p.  169. 
United  Slates  v.  Searcy,  26  Fed.  Rep.  435. 

p.  1840. 
United    Stales    v.    Shackleford,     IS     How. 

(U.  S.)  588.     pp.  39,  45. 
United  Slates  v.  Shaw,  1  Cliflf.   (U.  S.)  317. 

p.  1507. 
United  States  r.  .Shar]i,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  (U.S.) 

lis.    p.  41. 
United  States  v.  Simmons,  14  Blatch.  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  473.     pp.2073,  2U79. 
United  .states  v.  Small,  2  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

241.     pp.  1553,  1562. 
United  States  v.  Smith,  1  Sawyer  (U.  S.), 

277.     pp.  113,  121. 
United  States  v.    Smithers,  2  Cranch  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  38.    p.  36. 
United    States  v.  Strother,  3  Cranch    C.  C. 

432.     )).  261. 
United  Slates  v.  Tallman,  10  Blatchf.  C.  C. 

21.     pp.  14,  39. 
United   States  v.  Taylor,  3  McCrarv  (U.  S.) 

500.     p.  1531. 
United  States  v.  Tenney  (Ariz.),  8  Crim.  L. 

Mag.  486.     1).  175(i. 
United  States  r.  Three  Railroad  Cars,  1  Abb. 

(U.S.)  196.    p.  1537. 
United  Stales  v.  Toms,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

607.    p.  36. 
United  Slates  Trust  Co.  v.  Harris,  2  Bosw. 

(N.  Y.)75.     p.  2036. 
United  Stales  v.  Upham,2  Mont.  170.    p.  121. 
United     States   v.   Van    Sickle,   2   McLean 

(U.  S.),219.    D.  456. 


United  Stales  v.  Wagner,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  582.    p. 

594. 
United  States  v.  Ware,  2  Cranch  C.  C.   (U. 

S.)477.    p.  65. 
United  Slates  v.  Walkins,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S. )  443.     pp.  26,  46,  60,  67,  82,  86,  97,  98,  725. 
United  States  r.  AVhile,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  116.    pp.  37,  1720. 
United  States  v.  Wiggins,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  334. 

p.  1892. 
United  Slates  v.  AVilson,  6  McLean  (U.  S.), 

604.    p.  14. 
United  States  v.  Wilson,  Baldw.  (U.  S.)   78. 

pp.  40,  45,  60,  65,  67,  75,  732,  1530,  1553. 
United  Stalest'.  AViltberger,  3  Wash.  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  515;  s.  c.  Horr.  &  Thomp.  Cas.  Self- 

Def.  35.     p.  1539. 
United  Slates  v.  Winchester,  2  McLean  (U. 

S.),135.    p.  607. 
United  Stales  v.  Wood  (Dak.),  33  N.  W.  Rep. 

59.    p.  411. 
United  Stales  v.  Wright,  16  Fed.  Rep.  112. 

pp.  1824,  1869. 
United  Stales  f.  Wright,  1  McLean  (U.S.), 

509.     pp.  1671,  1746. 
United  States  r.  Yates,  6  How.   (U.S.)  605. 

p.  1059. 
United  States  v.  Youngs,  10  Ben.  (U.  S.)  264. 

pp.  593,  594. 
United  States  Express  Co.  f.  Backman,  28 

Oh.  St.  144.     pp.  1321,  1344,  1345,  1347,  1360, 

1374. 
Unruh  v.  State,  105  Ind.  118.    pp.  1783, 1803. 
Updegrove  v.  Zimmerman,  13  I'enu.   (X.  J.) 

619.     p.  1470. 
Upson  r.  Raiford,  29  Ala.  188.    p.  140S. 
Upstone  f.  People,  lo9  111.  170.    p.  1678. 
Upton  V.  Slate,  5  Iowa,  465.    p.  464. 
Upton  f.  Towuend,  17  C.  B.  30;  s.  c.  33  Eng. 

L.  &  Eq.  212.     pp.  1003,  1004. 
Urbanck  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  47  Wis.  59. 

pp.  2035,  2041. 
Urie   r.  Johnston,  3  Pa.  (Penr.  &  W.)  213. 

pp.  888,  895. 
Urkett  V.  Coryell,  5  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  61.    p. 

1668. 
Urquhart  f.  Powell,  59  Ga.  721.    p.  118. 
Usher  v.  Hiatt,  18  Kan.  19.5.    p.  2037. 
Utica  Ins.  Co.  v.  Badger,  3  Wend.  CN.  Y'.) 

102.    p.  878. 

V. 

Vaden  v.  Ellis,  IS  Ark.  355.    p.  109. 

Vail  V.  Jacob,  7  ^Mo.  App.  571.    p.  823 

Vail  V.  Stone,  13  Iowa,  284.    p.  197. 

Vale  V.  Bliss,  50  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  358.    p.  1209. 

Valentine  r.  Hickle,  39  Ohio  St.  23.    p.  878. 

Valentine  r.  Stewart,  15  Cal.  396.    p.  2099. 

Valiente  v.  Bryan,  66  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y'.J  302. 

p.  1975. 
Valton  V.  National  &c.  Life  Insurance  So- 
ciety, 23  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  10.    p.  989. 
Van  Alstyne  r.  Commercial  Bank,  4   Abb. 

App.  Dec.  (X.  Y.)  449.    p.  620. 
Van  Ankiu  v.    Westfall,  14  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 

233.    p.  1467. 
Vanauken  t'.  Beemer,  4  X.  J.  L.  364.    p.  29. 
Van  Blarcom  v.  Frike,  29  N.  J.  L.  516.    p- 

1379. 
Van  Blaricum  v.  State,  16  111.  364.    pp.  82, 129. 
Van  Buren  v.  Wells,  19  AVend.  (X.  Y.)  202. 

p.  316. 
Van  Buskirk  v.  Dausrherlv,  44  la.  42.    p.  1929. 
Van  Buskirk  v.  Levy,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  183.    p. 

951. 
Vance  r.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  162.    p.  31. 
Vance  v.  Harlett,  4  Bibb  (Ky.),  191.    pp.  117, 


11a 


clxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Vance  v.  Phillips, 6  Hill  (N.  Y.),433.   p.  1441. 
Vance  v.  Schuyler.  6  111.  160.    p.  2066. 
Vance  r.  Vance,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)581.    pp.231, 

467, 471. 
Van  Cleave  v.  Beam,  2  Dana  (Ky.),  165.    pp. 

215,  228,230. 
Vanderford  r.  Foster,  65  Cal.  49.    p.  1605. 
Vanderplank  v.  31iller,  1  Mood.  &M.  169.    p. 

1223. 
Vanderwerker  v.  People,  5  "Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

530.    p.  21. 
Vaudike  v.  Townsend,  6  Week.  Notes  Cas. 

(Pa.)  55.    p.  309. 
Van  Diemen's  Land  Bank  r.  Victoria  Bank, 

40  L.J.  (C.  P.)28.    p.  1144. 
Vandoren  v.  Kimes,  29  Ind.  582.    p.  2134. 
Van  Doren  v.  Walker,  2  Caines  (X.  Y.),373. 

p.  1902. 
Vanduzor  v.  Linderman,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 

106.    p.  1161. 
Van  Eman  v.  Stanchfleld,  8  Minn.  518.    pp. 

825,  826. 
Van  Hoesen  v.  Cameron  (Mich.),  20  N.  W. 

Rep.  609.     pp.  929,  930. 
Van  Horn  v.  Redmou,  67  la.  689.    p.  2068. 
Van  Hook  v.  Walton,  28  Tex.  59.    pp.  874, 

1093. 
Van  Hook,  Ex  parte,  3  N.  Y.  City  Hall  Eec. 

64.    p.  172. 
Van  Lien  v.  Scoville  Man.  Co.,  4  Daly,  554 

p.  1207. 
Vanmeter  v.  Kitzmeller,  5  W.  Va.  381.    p. 

1914. 
Vanness  v.  Bradley,  29  Ind.  388.    p.  2141. 
Van  Ness  v.  Pacard,  2  Pet.  (U.  S.)   137.    p. 

1644. 
Vannov  v.  Duprez,  72  Ind.  26.    p.  2052. 
Vannoy  r.  Giveus,  23  N.  J.  L.  201.    p.  53. 
'  Vanover  v.  Turner,  41  Ga.  577.    pp.  2067,  2099. 
Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport,  42  Iowa,   308.    pp. 

1267, 1268, 1273. 
Vansickle  v.  Brown,  68  Mo.    627.    pp.   528, 

1168. 
Van  Vacter  V.  McKillip,7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  578. 

p.  73. 
Van  Valkenburg  v,  Rogers,  IS  Mich.  180.    p. 

831. 
Vanvaukenberg  v.  Vanvaukenberg,  90  Ind, 

433.     p.  508. 
Van  Vetchen  v.  Griffiths,  4  Abb.  App.  (N.  Y'.) 

487.    p.  1705. 
Vanrexen  v.  Rose,  7  Ind.  222.    p.  1748. 
Van  Voorhees  v.  Leonard,   1   Thomp.   &  C. 

tX.  Y.)  148.    p.  1195. 
Vanwey  v.  State,  41  Tex.  639.    p.  728. 
Van  Winkle  r.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  38  Ga. 

32.     pp.  1321,  1345. 
Van  ^^■vck  v.  Mcintosh,  14  N.  Y.  439.  p.  1940. 
Van  Za'ndt  V.  Mutual  IJenefit  Ins.  Co.,55N. 

Y.  169;  s.  c.  14  Am.  Rep.  215.     p.  509. 
Van  Zant  v.  Jones,  3  Dana  (Ky.),  405.    p.  221. 
Varick  v.  Jackson,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  166;  s.  c. 

19  Am.  Due.  571.    p.  383. 
Varner  v.  Core,  20  W.  Va.  472.    pp.  2096,  2097. 
Vastbinder  r.  Metcalt,  3  Ala.  100.    p.  361. 
Vasie  v.  Delaval,  1  T.  R.  11.    pp.  1964,  1966, 

1964. 
Vater  v.  Lewis,  36  Ind.  288.    pp.  1911,  2034, 

2035. 
Vaughan  v.  Six  Hundred  and  Three  Casks, 

7  Ben.  (U.S.)  51)6.    p.  1344. 
Vaughan  v.  Webster,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  256.    p, 

1329. 
Vaughan  v.  Westover,  4  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y.) 

316.    p.  397. 
Vaughn  v.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)   758.     p. 

1535. 
Vaughn  v.  Dotson,  3  Swan  (Tenn.),  348.  pp. 

1921, 1929, 1930,  1974. 


Vaughn  r.  Fuller,  2  Strange,  1246.    p.  948. 
Vauglin  V.  Paine,  3  N.  J.  L.  728.    p.  264. 
Vauglin  V.  Porter,  16  Vt.  266.    p.  1716. 
Vaughn  v.  Scade,  30  Mo.  600.    p.  4. 
Vaughn  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  562.    pp.  1744, 

1855. 
Vaughn  v.  Tracy,  22  Mo.  415.    p.  1092. 
Vaughn  v.  AVestover,  2  Hun  (K.  Y.  43.    p.  402. 
Vaulx  V.  Campbell,  8  Mo.  224.    pp.  1669,  1750- 
Veal  V.  Brown,  2  X.  J.  L.  72.    p.  19. 
Veatch  v.  Stale,  56  Ind.  584.    p.  1642. 
Veatch  V.  State,  60  Ind.  291.    p.  2082. 
Vedder  v.  Fellows,  20  N.  Y.  126.    p.  1146. 
Veeder  v.  Baker,  83  N.  Y.  156.    p.  265. 
Vegeant  v.  Scully,  20  Bradw.  (111.)  437.    p. 

12,2. 
Veiths  V.  Hagge,  8  Iowa,  163.    p.  218,  219. 
Velott  V.  Lewis,  102 1'a.  St.  326.    p.  357. 
Venable  v.  McDonald,  4  Dana  (Ky.),  336.    p. 

827. 
Venine  v.  Archibald,  3  Colo.  163.    p.  2. 
Venuall  v.  Garner,  1  Cromp.  &  M.  21.  p.  1223. 
Vennum  v.  Harwood,  6  111.  659.    pp.  120,  121. 
Vent  V.  Osgood,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  672.    p.  895. 
Vermilyea,  Ex  parte,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y^.  555.    pp. 

66,  68,  70,  96,  98, 125. 
Verner  v.  Sweitzer,  32  Pa.  St.  208.    pp.  1321, 

1330,  1345,  1348. 
Vernon  v.  Haukey,  2  T.  R.  113.    p.  2082. 
Vernon  v.  Keys,  i2  East,  632.    p.  926. 
Vernon  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  22  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

183.    pp.  1103, 1104. 
Vernon  v.  Manners,  3  Dyer,  319.    a.    (13). 

p.  29. 
Vernon  Co.  v.  Stewart,  64  Mo.  408.    p.  967. 
Vernor  v.  Henry,  3  Watts  (Pa.),  385.  pp.  839, 

841. 
Verplanck  v.  Sterry,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  558. 

p.  1445. 
Verzan  v.  McGregor,  23  Cal.  339.    p.  627. 
Vessey  v.  Pike,  3  Car.  &  P.  512.    p.  1467. 
Vest  V.  Cooper,  68  X.  C.  131.    p.  1978. 
Vezain  v.  People,  40  111.  397.    p.  106. 
Vicars  v.  Laugham,  Hob.  235.    pp.  86, 125. 
Vicary  v.  Farthing,  M.  1695.  Cro.  Eliz.   411. 

pp.  1936,  1952. 
Vicksburg  v.  Hennessey,  54  Miss.  391.    pp. 

1224, 1246. 
Vidal  V.  Thompson,  11  Mart.  (La.)  23.    p.  110. 
Viele  V.  Germania  Ins.  Co.,  26  Iowa,  9.    pp. 

214,  219,  221,  224. 
Vlerling  r.  Stifel  Brewing  Co.,  15  Mo.  App. 

125.    p.  2048. 
Vifquain  v.  Finch,  15  Neb.  505.    p.  220. 
Vigus  V.  O'Bauuon,  6  West.  Rep.  219;  s.  c.  118 

111.  334.    p.  1678. 
Vilas  V.  Burton,  12  Vt.  56.    pp.  150, 152. 
VUhac  V.  Biven,  28  Cal.  409.    p.  2099. 
Vinal  V.  Core,   18  W.  Va.  1.    pp.  1194,  1197, 

1198,  1200,  1201,  1202,  1203. 
Viucennes  University  v.  Embree,  7  Blackf. 

(Ind.)  461.     p.  2117. 
Vincent  tJ.  Hurt,  8  Serg.  &  R.    (Pa.)  381.    p. 

825. 
Vincent  t'.  Watson,  1  Rich.  194.    p.  188. 
Vincett  r.  Cook,  4  Hun  (X.  Y.),  318.    p.  1222. 
Vinegard  r.  Matnev,  68  Mo.  105.     p.  2051. 
Vinton  v.  Baldwin," 95  Ind.  433.    p.  2010. 
Vinton  r.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  11  Allen  (Mass.), 

304;  s.  c.  Thomp.  Carr.  Pass.  6.    p.  1294. 
Vinton  v.  Peck,  14  Mich.  287.    p.  1940. 
Vinton  v.  Schwab,  32  Vt.  612.    pp.  1208, 1212, 

1.599. 
Virgie  v.  Stetson,  73  Me.  452.    p.  626. 
Virginia  v.  Rives,  100  U.  S.  313 ;  s.  c.  sub  nom. 

Re  Com.  Virginia,  12  Cent.  L.J.  229.    p.  8. 
Vitrifled  Wheel  &  Emery  Co.  v.  Edwards, 

135  Mass.  591.    p.  2. 
Volmer  v.  Stagerman,  25  Minn.  234.    p.  2050. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


clxiii 


Votaw  V.  Dlehl,62  la.  676.    p.  551. 

Von  Latham  v.  Libby,  38  Barb.  N.  Y.  339. 

pp.  1171,1173. 
Voorhis  v.  Langsdbrf ,  31  Mo.  451.    p.  U36. 
Voorman  v.  Voight,  46  Cal.  397.    p .  563. 
Vorisr.  Smith,  13  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)   135.    p. 

1941. 
Vose  V.  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cush.    (Mass.)  42.    p.  977. 
Vose  V.  Reed,  1  Woods  (U.  S.)  647.    p.  13S. 
Voss  V.  Eller,  109  Ind.  '260.    P-  2102. 
Voss  V.  Prier,  71  Ind.  128.    p.  1642. 
Voullaire  v.  Voullaire,  45  Mo.  602.    p.  2061. 
Vuyton  V.    Brenell,  1  Wash.  C.  C.   (U.    S.) 

467.    p.  219. 
Vyyyan  v.  Vyvyan,  30  Beav.  65.    p.  122. 

W. 

"W.  V.  H.,  2  Swab.  &  Tr.  240.    pp.  646,  651. 
Wabash  &c.  Canal  v.  Mayer,  10  Ind.  400.    p. 

1224. 
Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  98  111.  481.    p.  1208. 
Wabash   R.  Co.  v.  Savage,  110  Ind.  156.    p. 

2037. 
Wabash    R.  Co.  v.  Tretts,  96  Ind.  450.    p. 

2028. 
Wabash    R.   Co.    v.   Williamson,    104    Ind. 

154.    p.  1619. 
Wachstetter  v.  State,  99  Ind.  290;  s.  c.  50  Am. 

Rep.  94'.    pp.  375,  479. 16S8, 1708. 
Waddell  v.  Magee,  53  Miss.  687.    p.  128. 
Waddingham  r.  Gamble,  4  Mo.  465.    ]).  1669. 
Wade  V.  De  Wilt,  20  Tex.  398.    pp.  727,  783, 

Wade  V.  Halligan,  16  111.  512.    p.  1005. 
Wade  V.  Guppius^er,  60  Ind.  376.    p.  2110. 
Wade  V.  Hardy,  75  Mo.  394.    p.  1661. 
Wade  V.  Leroy,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  34.    p.  1481. 
Wade   V.  Ordway,  1  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  229.    p. 

1983. 
Wade  V.  Scott,  7  Mo.  509.    p.  214. 
Wade  V.  State,  65  Ga.  756.    pp.  259,  730. 
Wade  V.  State,  12  Ga.  25.    p.  117. 
Wade  V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  358.    p.  130. 
Wade  V.  State,  71  Ind.  535.    pp.  1688, 1709. 
Wade  V.  Thayer,  40  Cal.  578.    p.  464. 
Wade  V.  Walden,  23  111.  425.    pp.  1161, 1170, 

1173,  1197. 
Wadhams  v.  Gav,  73  111.  415.    p.  191. 
Wadleigh  v.  .JanVrin,  41  N.  H.  512.    p.  344. 
WaiHe  V.  Dillenbock,  39  Barb.   (N.   Y.)  123. 

pp.  1473,  1559. 
Wafford  v.  State,  44  Tex.  439.    p.  453. 
Wager  v.  Stickle,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  407.   p.  199. 
Wagner  v.  Egleston,  4'.t  Mich.  218.    p.  861. 
Wagner  v.  People,  30  Mich.  384.    pp.  425,  426. 
AVait  V.   Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  13  Hun  (N. 

Y.),371.     p.  1211. 
Wait  r.  Day,  4  Den.  (N.  Y.)  439.    p.  1446. 
Wait  V.  Maxwell,  5   Pick.   (Mass.)   217.    p. 

1977. 
Wait  V.  Pomerov,  20  Mich.  425.    p.  1663. 
Waite  r.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  El.  Bl.  &  El. 

719;  s.  c.  Exchequer  Chamber,  El.  Bl.  &  El. 

728.    p.  1231. 
Wakefield  w.  Ross,  5  Mason  (U.  S.),  16.    p. 

294. 
Wakefield  v.  Smithwick,  4  Jones  L.  (N.  C.) 

327.    p.  1668. 
Wakefield   v.  State,  41   Tex.  556.    pp.   1903, 

1906,  1975. 
Wakeman  v.  Dailey,  44  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  498.    p. 

1406. 
Wakeman  v.  Sprague,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  720.    p. 

Waland  v.  Elkins,  1  Stark.  272.    p.  1612. 
Walbridge  v.  State,  13  K.  W.  Rep.  209.    p. 
1869. 


Walcott  V.  Kimball,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  460. 

pp.  793,  794. 
Walcott  V.  Yeager,  11  Ind.  84.    p.  561. 
Walden  v.  Bouhen,  55  Mo.  405.    p.  191. 
Waldheim  v.  Sichel,  1  Hilton  (M.  Y.),  45.    p. 

1173. 
Waldhier  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  71  Mo.  514. 

pp.  1607, 1609,  1610. 
Waldhier  v..  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  87  Mo.  38. 

p.  1475. 
Waldron  v.  Chase,  37  Me.  414.    p.  909. 
AVales  v.  Miner,  89  Ind.  118.    p.  1491. 
Walker  v.  Allen,  72  Ala.  456.    p.  1381. 
Walker  t'.  Armstrong,  2  Kan.  198.    p.  560. 
Walker  v.  Bank  of  Washington,  3  How.  (U. 

S.)62.     p.  825. 
Walker  v.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush.  (Mass.) 

1.    p.  110. 
Walker  r.  Butler,  6  El.  &  Bl.  506;  s.  c.  37  Eng. 

L.  &  Eq.  13.     p.  968. 
Walker  v.  Collier,  37  111.  362.    pp.  94,    106, 

328. 
Walker  v.  Davis,  1  Gray    (Mass.),  506.    pp. 

8il0,  895. 
Walker  v.  Dunspaugh,  20  X.  Y.  170.    p.  321. 
Walker  v.  Ebert,  29  Wis.  194.     p.  1662. 
Walker  v.  Erie  R  .  Co.,  63  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  260. 

p.  1237. 
Walker  v.  Fields,  28  Ga.  237.    pp.  310,  505. 
Walker  i'.  Granite  Bank,  19  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 

111.     pp.  603,  604. 
Walker  v.  Green,  3  3Ie.  215.    pp.  119, 120. 
Walker  I'.  Herron,  22  Texas,  55.    p.  1225. 
AValker  v.  Hunter,  17  Ga.  364.    pp.  1927, 1945, 

1974. 
Walker  v.  Kennison,  34  X.   H.  257.    pp.  81, 

84, 1983. 
Walker  v,  Moores,  122  Mass.  501.    p.  2137. 
Walker  v.  Orange,  16  Gray  (Mass.),  193.    p. 

892. 
Walker  v.  Rostron,9Mee8.  &  W.  411.    p.  1018. 
Walker  v.  Sawver.  13  X.  H.  191.    p.  2021. 
Walker  v.  State,  35  Ark.  3S6.    p.  2144. 
Walker  v.  State,  102  Ind.  502.    pp.  71,  1756, 

1884. 
Walker  v.  State,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  1.    pp.  451, 

728,  747,  761. 
Walker  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  326.    p.  1784. 
Walker  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  246.    p.  660. 
Walker  r.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  576.    p.  17. 
Walker  v.  State,  37  Tex.  366.    p.  1924. 
Walker  v.  State,  42  Tex.  360.    pp.  1647,  1767, 

1790,  1873. 
Walker  v.  Swiggart,  21  Ark.  404.    p.  2053. 
Walker  v.  Walker,  11  Ga.  206.    pp.  1321, 1927, 

1974. 
Walker  v.  Walker,  14  Ga.  242.    pp.  307,  309, 

312,  314. 
Walker  v.  AVildman,  6  Madd.  37.    p.  276. 
Walker  r.  Westlield.  39  Vt.  246.    p.  1225. 
Walkup  V.  Pratt,  5  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  51.    p. 

.566. 
Wallace  v.   Auer,   10  Phila.  (Pa.)  356.    pp. 

1383,  1389. 
Wallace  v.  Breeds,  13  East, 522.    p.  900. 
AVallace  v.  Columbia,  48  Mo.  436.    pp.  27, 123. 
AVallace  V.  Duffield,2  Serg.  &R.  (Pa.)  521.  p. 

1044. 
AVallace  v.  Fairman,  4  AVatts  (Pa.),  379.    p. 

958. 
Wallace  v.  New  A'ork,  2  Hilt  (X.  Y.),  440:  s. 

c.  18  How.  Pr.  169.     ]).  124r). 
AA'allace  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  299.    pp.  1832, 

1855. 
AVall  V.  Fife,  37  Pa.  St.  394.    p.  878. 
AVall  V.  Goodenough,  16  111.  416.    p.  1646. 
AVall  v.  Livezav,  6  ("olo.  465.    p.  1483. 
AVall  r.  State,  80  Ind.  146.    p.  2101. 
AVallace  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App.  360.    p.  1680. 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


\rallace  v.  Tannton  Street  Rv.  Co.,  119  Mass. 

91.    pp.  375,  401. 
Wallace  v.  Wren,  32  111.  14S.     pp.  930,  1498. 
Waller  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  83  Mo.  60S. 

pp.  1229, 1297. 
Waller  r.  Morgan,  IS  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  137.    p. 

215. 
Waller  v.  State,  40  Ala.  32.5.    pp.  (i5,  S3,  129. 
Waller  r.  Von  Pliul.  U  Mo.  SI.    p.  1413. 
Wallinj;  r.  State,  7  Tox.  App.  625.     p.  253. 
Wallingrford  r.  Duulop,  14  Pa.  St.  31.     pp. 

1640,  2011,  2013. 
Wallis  c.  Alpine,  1  Camp.  204,  note.    p.  1172. 
Wallis  r.  Murray,  4  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  399.    p.  589. 
M'allis  V.  Randall,  81  N.  Y.  164.    p.  566. 
Wallis  r.  AVallis,  Winst.  L.   (N.  0.)   78.    p. 

1137. 
Wallop,  Ex  parte,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  90.    p.  fU7. 
Walls  V.  Gates.  4  Mo.  Apj).  1.    pp.  1129,  2109. 
Walls,  Ex  parte.  73  Ind.  95.    pp.  2008,  2052. 
Walpole  V.  Alexander,  3  Doug.  45.    p.  188. 
Walrath  v.  State,  8  Neb.  88.    pp.  2051,  208", 

2093. 
Walsh  V.  ]Morse,  SO  Mo.  .568.    p.  925. 
Walsh  V.  People,  SS  N.  Y.  458.    p.  714. 
Walsh  V.   Sayre,  52  How.  Pr.  334.  pp.  654, 

655. 
Walsh  V.  Str.  H.  M.  Wright,  1  Newb    Adm. 

494.    p.  1154 
Walsh  v.  Sun  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  2  Rob   (N.  Y.) 

646;  s.  c.  17  Abb.  I'r.  (X.  Y.)  3.56.  p.  7. 
Walsh  V.  Trevanion,  15  Sim.  578.  p.  277. 
Walsh  V.   Washington    Marine  Ins.   Co.,  32 

X.  Y.  427.     pp.  513,  993,  994. 
AValsoniJ.  Moore,  1  Car.  &  K.  626.    p.  639. 
Walstou  V.  Com.,  16 B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  15.    p.  43. 
Walter  v.  Alexander,  2  Gill  (Md.),  204.    p. 

1670. 
Walter  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  Iowa,  36. 

p]).  1254, 1296. 
Walter  v.  Gernant,  13  Pa.  St.  515.    p.   1417. 
Walters.  People,  32  N.  Y'.  147;   s.  c.  6  Park. 

Cr.  (X.Y.)15;  18  Abb.  Pr.  147.    pp.  42,  64, 65. 
Walters  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  41  la.  71.    p. 

1646. 
Walters  v.  Junkins,  16  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  415. 

p.  1911. 
Waltheim  v.  Artz,  70  Iowa,  609.    pp.  420,  859. 
Walthman  v.    Weaver,  11  Price,  257  n.     p. 

1466. 
Walton  V.  Augusta  Canal  Co.,  54  Ga.  245.    p. 

117. 
Walton  V.  United  States,  9  Wheat.  (U.  S.) 

651.    p.  2133. 
AValtzv.  Robertson,  7  Blackf.  (Ind.)  499.    p. 

1947. 
Walworth  v.  Seaver,  30  Vt.  728.    p.  1093. 
Wannack  v.   Mayor  of  Macon,  53  Ga.  162. 

pp.  1633, 1637. 
Wanser  v.  Atkinson,  43  N.  J.  L,  571.    p.  2. 
Ward  V.  Bateman,  34  Ind.  110.    pp.  2110,  2113. 
Ward  V.  Busack,  46  Wis.  407.    pp.  2028,  2031, 

2032. 
AVard  V.  Carlton,  26  Ark.  662.    p.  2055. 
Ward  V.  Clark,  6  Wis.  509.    p.  2057. 
Wara  V.  Gibljs,  37  Mi.ss.  560.    p.  1748. 
Ward  V.  Herrin,  4  Jones  L.   (X.  C.)  23.    p. 

1698. 
Ward  V.  Jefferson,  24   Wis.  342.    pp.  1246, 

1249. 
Ward  V.  Lattimer,  2  Tex.  245.    p.  836. 
Ward  V.  Eewis,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  518.    p.  876. 
AV ard  v:  Railroad  Co.,  19  S.  C.  .521.    p.  114. 
Ward  V.  Shaw,  15  Vt.  115.    p.  2C5. 
Ward  V.  State,  10  Tex.  Ai>p.  293.    p.  18,55. 
Ward  V.   State,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  253.    pp. 

85,  86. 
Ward  v.  State,  2  Mo.  120.    pp.  171, 1S7,  261, 

266,  267,  286. 


Ward  V.  States  Blackf.  (Ind.)  101.    p.  1983. 
Ward  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  664.    p.  73. 
Ward  V.  Steamboat.  7  Mo.  .582.    p.  1615. 
Wai'd  i\  The  Law  Property  Assurance  and 

Trust  Society,  37  Eng.    Law  and  Eq.  47. 

p.  9S3. 
Ward  V.  Ward,  41  Iowa,  687.    p.  1479. 
AVard  r.  Washington  Ins.  Co.,  o  Bosw.  (N. 

Y.)  229.     1).  .oCfi. 
Warden  v.  lluirhes,^  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  418.    p. 

17.55, 
Warder  v.    Bowen  (Minn.),  17  N.  ^y.  Rep. 

943.    )i.  025. 
Warden  v.  Green,   6  Watts    (Pa.),  424.    p. 

l:«>7, 
AVarden  r.  Reser,  58  Kan.  86.    pp.  2034, 2043. 
^\arden  v.  ^Vardou.  22  Vt.  563.  pp.  1943,  1957, 

11158. 
AVardlow  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  11  Rich. 

L.  (S.  C.)  337.    1).  1360. 
Wardwell  v.  llaight,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y'.)  549.  pp. 

iUl.i,  1104. 
Ware  i\  Gay,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  106.    pp.  1236, 

12,i7,  161>, " 
Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  42.      pp.  81,  84,  228,  414, 

484,1114,  104."),  1685, 
Wareham  i-.  Sellers;9  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  98.    p. 

829. 
Warfleld  ivLiudell,  30  Mo.  272;  s.  c.  38  Mo. 

51)1.     1).  1051. 
Warlick  v.  Peterson,  58  Mo.  408.    p.  669. 
Warlick  v.  White,  76  N.  C.  179.    p.  652. 
Warnrock   v.    State,   56   Ga.    503.    pp.    727, 

1651. 
Warner  v.  Dunnavan,  23  111.  380.    p.  1702. 
Warner  v.  Myrick,  10  Minn.  94.    p.  877. 
Warner  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  52  X.  Y.  437. 

p.  1912. 
Warner  v.  Xew  Y'ork  &c.  R.  Co,,  44  N,  Y.  465; 

s.  c.   45  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  299,    pp,  1225,  1997. 
Warner  r.  Xortou,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  448.    p. 

1450. 
Warner  v.  Robinson,  1  Root  (Conn.),  194. 

pp.  1963,  196S. 
Warner  v.  Haines,  6  Carr.  &  P.  666.    pp.  221, 

222. 
Warner  v.  Thompson,  35  Kan.  27.    p.  825. 
Warnick  v.  Grosholz,  3  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  236. 

pp.  851,  852. 
Warrell  v.  Parmlee,  1  N.  Y'.  519.    p.  577. 
AVarren  v.  Buckminster,  24  N.  H.  336,   p.  909. 
Warren  v.  Childs,  11  Mass.  222.    p,  1044, 
Warren  v.  Com,,  37  Pa.  St.  45.    pp.  42.  46. 
Warren  v.  Dickson,  27  111,  115,    p,  1815. 
Warren  v.  Glvnu,  37  X,  H .  340,    p,  1060. 
"Warren  v.  Joiies,  51  Me.  140.    p.  825. 
Warren  v.  Kaufman,  2  Phila.  (Pa.)  259.    p. 

1222. 
Warren  v.  State,  4   Blackf.  (Ind.)  150.    pp. 

732,  1606,  1515,  1520. 
AVarren  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  619.    pp.  1903, 

1965. 
Warren  v.  Wallis,  42  Tex.  472.    p.  729. 
Warrington  v.  Earlv,  2  El.  it  Bl.  763.    p.  1032. 
Washburn  v.  Cuddiby,  8  Gray  (Mass.).  431. 

p.  783. 
Washburn  v.  Cutter,  17  Minn.  361.    p.  1044. 
Washburn  v.  Gould,  3  Story  (U.  S.),  122.    p. 

830. 
Washburn  v.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Wis. 

364.     pj).  682,  687. 
AVashburn  v.  Nashville  &c.  R.  Co..  3  Head 

(Tenn.),  638.     )).  1298. 
Washburn  v.  People,  10  Mich.  372.    p.  .540. 
AVashburton  v.  i;rouch,  108  Ind.  83.    p.  2102. 
AVashington  v.  Burnett,  4  W,  Va,  85.    p,  963, 
Washington  v.  State,  63  Ala,  135 ;  «.  c.  36  Am, 

Uep,  8,     pp,  1.508,  1518,  1533,  1,534, 
Washington  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  377.    p.  18. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxv 


Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Lay,  103  Ind.  48.    p. 

2108. 
Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Webster,  68  Me.  449. 

p.  218. 
Washington  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Merchants' &c. 

Ins.  Co.,  5  Oh.  St.  450.     p.  1747. 
Washington  Mat.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Mary's 

Seminary,  52  Mo.  480.    p.  1647. 
Washington  Savings  Bank  v.  Ecky,  51  Mo. 

272.    p.  1034. 
Washington  &c.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hobson,  15  Gratt. 

(Va.)122.     pp.  2126,  2132. 
Wason  V.  Rowe,  16  Vt.  525.    p.  825. 
Wasson  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  474.    pp.  89,  93. 
Wassum  v.  Feeney,  121  Mass.  93.    pp.  118, 

122. 
Watchman,  The,  1  Ware  (U.  S.),  232.    p.  328. 
Water  Imp.  Co.  v.  Gildersleeve  (N.  M.),  16 

Pac.  Rep.  278.     pp.  2048,  2064. 
Waterford  &c.  Twp.  v.  People,  9  Barb.   (X. 

Y.)161.    p.  45. 
Waters  v.  State,  51  Md.  430;  s.  c.  8  Reporter, 

560.    pp.  68,  74. 
Waterman  v.  Buckland,  1  Mo.  App.  45.    p. 

882. 
Waterman  v.  Johnson,  13  Pick.  261.    p.  1085. 
Waters  v.  Gilbert,   2  Cush.  (Mass.)  29.    p. 

559. 
Waters  v.  McClellan,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.)  208.    p. 

1440. 
Waters  v.  Wing,  59  Pa.  St.  211.    p.  1225. 
Watertown  Bank  &  Loan  Co.  v.  Mix,  51  N.  Y. 

55S.     pp.  1723,  1914,  litl5. 
Watford  V.  Forester,  66  Ga.  738.    p.  829. 
Watkinson  v.  Laughton,  S  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  213. 

p.  1476. 
Watkins  v.  Birch,  4  Taunt.  823.    p.  1443. 
Watkins  v.  Holman,  16  Pet.  fU.  S.)  25.    p. 

819. 
Watkins  v.  State,  37  Ark.  370.    p.  206. 
AVatkins  v.  State,  60  Ga.  601.    p.  85. 
AVatkins  v.  Towers,  2  T.  R.  275.     p.  1584. 
Watkins  v.  Tru.^tees,  41  Mo.  303.    p.  898. 
Watkins  v.  Wallace,  19  Mich.  57.    pp.   344, 

345. 
Watkins  v.  Weaver,  10  Johns.    107.    pp.  29, 

112. 
Watkins,  Ex  parte,  3  Pet.   (U.  S.)  193.    pp. 

136,  157. 
Watrous  v.  Kearnev.  79  X.  Y.  496.    p.  151. 
Watson  V.  Bennett,"  12  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  196.    p. 

1023. 
Watson  V.  Blaine,  12  Serg.  &  E.   (Pa.)  131. 

pp.  838,  839. 
Watson  V.  Brainard,  33  Vt.  88.    p.  891. 
Watson  V.  Citizens'  Bank,  5  S.  C.  159.    pp. 

145,  146. 
Watson  V.  Clark,  1  Dow.  (Pari.  Rep.)  336.    p. 

993. 
Watson  V.  Davis,  7  Jones L.  (X.  C),  178.    pp. 

1938  1939. 
Watson  V.  Gilday,  11  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  337.    p. 

1064. 
Watson  V.  Hoosac  Tunnel  Line  Co.,  13  Mo. 

App.  263.    pp.  1017,  1018. 
Watson  r.  McCharen,  19  Wend.  (X.  Y'.)557. 

p.  560. 
Watson  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  57   AVis. 

332.    p.  2043. 
Watson  V.  Musick,  3  Mo.  29.    p.  1681. 
Watson  V.  Xelson,  Matter  of,  69  X.  Y.  536. 

pp.  137, 133. 
Watson   V.  State,  63  Ind.   548.    pp.    81,   82, 

129. 
Watson  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  237.    p.  465. 
AVatson  V.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  76.    p.  1534. 
AA"at.<on  V.  Stever,  25  Mich.  386.    p.  891. 
AVatson  v.  Tarpley,  IS  How.  (U.  S.)  517.    pp. 

942,  946. 


Watson  V.  Tripp,  11  R.  I.  98;  s.  c.  15  Am.  L. 

Reg.  282.    p.  55. 
AA'atson  v.  Turner,  Bull.  X.  P.  147.    p.  889. 
AVatson  V.  Twombly,  60  X.  H.  491.    pp.  396, 

397,  402,  409. 
AVatson  v.  AValker,  23  X.  H.  471.     pp.  365. 

1939,  1956. 
AA'atson  v.  Walker,  33  X.  H.  131.    pp.  84, 1246. 
AVatson  V.  AVhitnev,23  Cal.  375.    p.  100. 
AVatson  v.  AA'illianis,  36  Miss.  331.     pp.  132, 

150. 
AA'atson  V.  AVilson,  36  Miss.  .331.    p.  ].37. 
Watson  V.  AA'oolvertou.  41  111.  241.    p.  1750. 
AVatterson     v.  Moore,   23   AV.  \'a.  403.    pp. 

2064,  20(35. 
AA'atts  V.  Green,  30  Ind.  98.    p.  561. 
AVatts  V.  Holland,  56  Tex.  54.    p.  254. 
AVatts  V.  Ruth,  30  Ohio  St.  32.    pp.  118, 121. 
AVaugh  I'.  Carver,  2  H.  Bl.  235.    p.  1099. 
AVauRh  r.  Fielding,  48  X.  Y.  681.     p.  346. 
AVaughop  V.  AVeeks,  22  111.  350.    p.  328. 
AVausaw  Boom  Co.  v.  Plumer,  49  AVis.  118. 

p.  2043. 
AVay  V.  Arnold,  18  Ga.  181.    p.  1947. 
AVay  V.  Butterworth,  106  Mass.  75.    p.  1109. 
AVay  V.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  35  la.  485.    p. 

KiOO. 
AA'ay  v.  Illinois  &c.  R.  Co.,  40  Iowa,  341.    pp. 

1224, 1263. 
Way  r.  Sperry,  6  Cush.  (Alass.)  238.    p.  966. 
AVayman  v.  Southard,  10  AVheat.  (U.  S.)  1. 

p.  8S3. 
AA'ayne  Countv  v.  Delaware  &c.  R.  Co.,  15 

Pa.  St.  351.    p.  1087. 
AVayne  &c.  Co.  v.  Berry,  5  Ind.  286.    p.  1670. 
AVeatherly  i\  Higgins,  6  Ind.  73.    .p.  2027. 
AVeaver  v.  Crocker,  49  111.  461.    p.  608. 
AVeaver  v.  State,  24  Ohio  St.  584.    pp.  705, 

707,  710,  711. 
AVebb  V.  Hill,  3  Carr.  &  P.  485.    p.  1197. 
Webb  V.  Page,  1  Car.  &  K.  23.    p.  176. 
AVebb  V.  Richardson,  42  A't.  465.    p.  1U43. 
AVebb  V.  Robinson,  14  Ga.  216.    p.  1669. 
AVebb  V.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  351.    pp.  34,  307, 471, 

472,  473. 
AA^ebb  v.  State,  5  Tex.   App.  596.    pp.  1878, 

1884,  1930. 
AVebb  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  491.    pp.  225,1788, 

1789,  1880, 1884. 
AVebb  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  490.    p.  255. 
AVebber  v.  Hankey,  4  Mich.  198.    p.  457. 
AVeber  v.  Armstrong,  70  Mo.  217.    pp.  1410, 

1437. 
Weber  v.  Illing,  66  AA'is.  79.    p.  1074. 
AVebster  v.  Clark,  30  X.  H.  245.    p.  365. 
AVeljster  College i'.  Tyler,  35  Mo.  268.    p.  1668. 
AVebster  v.  Lee,  5  Mass.  335.    p.  383. 
AVeddeuburu's  Case,  Fost.  Cr.  L.  23.    p.  86. 
AVeed   v.  Armstrong,  6  McLean  (U.  S.)  44. 

p.  572. 
Weed   V.  Panama  R.  Co.,  17  X.Y.  362.    p. 

1290. 
Weed  V.  Saratoga  &c.  R.  Co.,  19  Wend.  (X.  Y.) 

5.34.     pp.  1151,  11.52. 1606. 
Weeks  v.  Loighton,  5  X.  H.  343.    p.  895. 
Weeks  i'.  Medler,  20  Kan.  57.    p.  6U. 
^Veeks  V.  State,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  323.    p.  2096. 
AVeeton  r.  Hodd,  26  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  278.    p.  950. 
AVehrkamp    v.   Willett,   4   Abb.   App.    Dec. 

(X.Y.)  548.     pp.  319,449. 
AVeick  V.  Lander,  75  HI.  93.     p..  1232. 
AVeide  v.  David.^ou,  15  Minn.  330.    p.  560. 
AVeiderkind  v.  Tuolumne  Water  Co.,  65  Cal. 

431.    p.  1IJ39. 
AA^eidler   v.  Farmers'  Bank,  11  Serg.  &  R. 

(Pa.)   134.     pp.  554,  555. 
AVoidmau  v.  Kohr,  13  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  17.    p. 

219. 
AVeidncr  v.  Conner,  9  Pa.  St.  78.    p.  630. 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Wegel,  Snccesslon  of,  18  La.  Ann.  49.    p.  328. 
Weightman  v.  Washington,  1  Black  (U.  S.), 

39.     pp.  1246,  1249. 
Weil  V.  Schwartz,  21  Mo.  App.  372.    p.  834. 
Wetland  v.  Wevhiud,  64  Mo.  168.    p.  1668. 
Weir  V.  Burlington  &c.  K.  Co.,  19  Neb.  212. 

p.  2090. 
Weir  V.  Weir,  3  13.  Mon.  (Kv.)  645.    p.  900. 
Weir  Plough  Co.  v.  Wolnislev,  110  lud.  243. 

p.  2112. 
Weis   V.  Madison,  75  lud.  241;  s.  c.  39  Am. 

Uep.  135.     p.  1265. 
Weisenberg  r.  Appleton,  26  Wis.  56.    p,  1209. 
Wei.^s  V.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  79  Pa.  St.  387. 

p.  1225. 
Weisse  v.  Citv,  10  La.  Ann.  46.    p.  193. 
Welch  r.  Ins."  Co.,  23  W.  Va.  289.    pp.   1941, 

1942. 
Welch  r.  Welch,  9  Rich.  L.   (S.  C.)   133.    p. 

1910. 
Welch  V.  Wesson,  6  Grav  (Mass.),  505;  s.  c.  2 

Thomp.  Keg.  1077.    p.  "1210. 
Welcome  r.  Batchelder,  23  Me.  85.    p.  281. 
Weld  V.  Came,  98  Mass.  152.    p.  912. 
Welden  v.  Buck,  Anthou.  (X.  Y.)  15.    p.  328. 
Weldon  V.  Burch,  12  111.  374.    p.  268. 
Weldon  Hotel  Co.  v.  Seymour,  54  Vt.  582.    p. 

201. 
Wellborn  v.  Spears,  32  Miss.  138.    pp.  108, 

174S,  1750. 
Welling  V.  Judge,  40  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  193.    p. 

1209. 
Wells  V.  American  Express  Co.,  49  Wis.  224. 

p.  195. 
Wells  r.  Fairbanks,  5  Tex.  585.    p.  335. 
Wells  V.  Gatv,  8  Mo.  681.    pp.  1584, 1565 
Wells  r.  Halpiu,  59  Mo.  92.    p.  1668. 
Wells  V.  Kelsev,  37  N.  Y.  143.    p.  397. 
AVells  V.  Preston,  3  Neb.  444.    p.  2u51. 
AVells  V.  Railroad  Co.,  56  la.  620.    pp.  2119, 

2120. 
Wells  V.  Sharp,  57  Mo.  56.    pp.  1609, 1614. 
Wells  V.  State,  11  Neb.  409.    p.  1983. 
AVells  V.  Wells,  33  N.  J.  Eq.  4.    p.  176. 
Wells  V.  Zallee,  59  Mo.  509.    p.  1474. 
Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.  v.  Preston,  3  Xeb.  444. 

p.  2071. 
Welmau,  Matter  of,  20  Vt.  653.    p.  819. 
Welsh  V.  P.arrett,  15  Mass.  380.    p.  642. 
Welsh  V.  Dusar,  3  Binn.  (Pa.)  329.    p.  825. 
Welsh  V.  Railroad  Co..  10  Oh.  St.  65.    pp. 

1344,  1374. 
Welstead  v.  Le^T.  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  138.    p. 

810. 
Wendell  v.  Moulton,  26  X.  H.  41.    p.  1671. 
Wendell  v.  Troy,  39  Barb.   (X.  Y.)  335.    p. 

1246. 
Wenman  v.  Ash,  22  L.  J.  C.  P.  190.    p.  1461. 
Weuuall  V.  Adney,  3  Bos.  &  P.  247.    pp.  889, 

899. 
Wenrick  v.  Hall,  11  Scrg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  153.    p. 

92. 
Wentworth  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  3  Xew  Eng. 

Rep.  355 ;  s.  c.  143  Mass.  248.    p.  337. 
Wentworth  v.  Farmington,  51  N.  H.  128.    p. 

110. 
AVerner  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  81  Mo.  368;  s.  c. 

11  Mo.  App.  601.     pp.  1305,  1306. 
Werner  v.  Kdmiston,  24  Kan.  147.    p.  2083. 
Werner  v.  State,  44  Ark.  127.    pp.  113,  2048, 

2055. 
Wertheim  v.  Continental  &c.  Co.,  21  Blatchf. 

246.     p.  182. 
Wertheinier    v.     Pennsylvania    R.    Co.,    17 
Blatchf.   (U.    S.)  421.    pp.  1322,  1345,  1346, 
13.56,  1359. 
Wertz  V.  May,  21  Pa.  St.  274.    pp.  471, 1699. 
Weslev  V.  State,  37  Miss.  327.    pp.  1548, 1747, 
1905,"19U6. 


Wesson  v.  Washburn   Iron   Co.,   13   Allen 

(Mass.),  95.     p.  1384. 
West  V.  Anderson,  9  Conn.  107.    p.  1748. 
West  V.  Baxeudale,  9  Com.  Bench,  141.    p. 

1172. 
West  V.  Cavino,  74  Ind.  265.    pp.  2038,  2041. 
West  r.  Ilendrix,  28  Ala.  226.    p.  869. 
West  V.  Lynch,  7  Daly  (X.  Y.),  247.     pp.  409, 

459. 
West  V.  State,  4  S.  E.  Rep.  325.  p.  124. 
West  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  150.  p.  94. 
West  V.  State,  1  AVis.  209.  pp.  166,  167. 
West  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  199.  p.  69. 
AVest  V.  AA'hite,  56  Mich.  126.  pp.  1011, 1012. 
AA'est  Chester  &c.  R.  Co  r.  McElwee,  67  Pa. 

St.  311.     pp.  1209, 1211,  1218. 
AVest  Chester  Gas  Co.  v.  County  of  Chester, 

30  Pa.  St.  232.     p.  1087. 
AVest  Mahouey  Tp.  v.  Watson,  112  Pa.  St. 

574  ;  s.  c.  3  Atl.  Rep.  866.    p.  1222. 
AVest  Mahouey  T)).  Co.    v.  Watson,  9  AtL 

Rep.  430.     |i.  1222. 
AA'est  St.  Louis  Sav.  Bank  v.   Shawnee  Co. 

Bank,  95  U.  S.  557;  s.  c.  5  Rep.  .33;  2  Cent. 

L.  J.  46 ;  16  Alb.  L.  J.  473.    p.  1023. 
AVester  v.  Cedar  Rapids  &c.  R.   Co.,  27  111 

315.    p.  2054. 
AVestern  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Johnson,  59  Ga.  626. 

pp.  1229,  2076. 
Western  Baukof  Scotland  r.  Needell,  1  Fost. 

&  Fin.  461.     p.  1096. 
Western  Building  Assn.  v.  Fitzmaurice,  7 

Mo.  App.  2S3.    p.  1032. 
AA^estern  Historical  Co.  v.  Schmidt,  56  AA'is. 

681.     p.  664. 
AVe.stern  Alassachusetts  Ins.  Co.  v.  Duffey,  2 

Kan.  348.    p.    1008. 
AVesteru  Stage  Co.  v.  Walker,  2  la.  503.    p. 

1408. 
AA'estern  Union  Tel.  Co.    v.   Buchanan,  35 

Ind.  429 ;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  744.    p.  955. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.   Trissal,  98  Ind. 

566.     pp.  2016,  2126,  2130. 
Western  Union  Tel.   Co.  v.  Young,  93  Ind. 

lis.    p.  1756. 
AVestfall  v.    Hudson  River  F.  Ins.   Co.,    12 

N.  \.  289.     p.  980. 
AVestmoreland  v.  State.  45  Ga.  225.    pp.  1907, 

1913, 1930, 1981. 
AVeston  v.  Com.,  Ill  Pa.  St.  251.    p.  77. 
AVeston  v.  Dobiniet,  Cro.  Jac.  432.    p.  795. 
AVeston  v.  Johnson,  48  Ind.  1.    p.  2089. 
AVeston  &c.  R.  Co.  r.  Cox,  32  Mo.  456.    p.  560. 
AVellierall    v.  Harris,  51  Mo.   65.    pp.   2051, 

2052. 
Wetherbee   v.    Dunn,  32    Cal.    106.    p.    392. 
AVethey  V.  Andrews,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),682.    p. 

939. 
AA'eybright  v.  Fleming,  40  Oh.  St.  52.    p.  2091. 
Whaleii  r.  Centenary,  62  Mo.  326.    p,  1239. 
Whaleyr.  Gleason,  40  Ind.  405.   pp.  2076,  2086, 
W  haley  v.  I'eak,  49  Mo.  80.    p.  899. 
AVharton'3  Case,  A'elverton,  24.    p.  86. 
AVhartonr.  Fitzgerald,  3  Dall.  (U.  S.)  603. 

p.  891. 
AA  heatou  v.  Railroad  Co.,  36  Cal.   591.     p. 

1483. 
AVheeldcn  v.  AVilson,  44  IMe.  11.    p.  344. 
AVheeler  v.  Nesbit,  24  How.   (U.  S.)  545.    p. 

1195. 
AVheeler  v.  Robb,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)   330.    p. 

1468. 
AVheeler  v.  Schroeder,  4  R.  I.  383.    pp.  812, 

839,  1.5%. 
AA'heeler  v.  State,  42  Ga.  306.    p.  15. 
AVIieeler  v.  State,  42  Md.  570.    p.  725. 
AVheelerr.  Train,  3  Pick.  2.55.    j).  1442. 
AVheeler  v.  AVestport,  30  AVis.  392.    pp.  1246, 

1247. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxvii 


Wheelton  v.  Hardisty,  8  El.  &  Bl.  231.    pp. 

1601,  1605. 
Whelan  v.  Reg.,  28  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  2.    pp.  88, 

11.5, 116,  122. 
Whelchell  v.  State,  23  Ind.  89.     p.  1974. 
Whelstone  v.  Bowser,  29  Pa.  St.  6.5.    p.  1381. 
Whipple   V.  Blackiugton,   97  Mass.  476.    p. 

968. 
Whipple  V.  Walpole,  10  X.  H   130.    p.  342 . 
Whipple  V.  Whitniai),  13  R.  I.  .512.    p.  192. 
W^hlrleyi'.  Whiteman,  1  Head  (Teun.),  610. 

p.  1229. 
Whitaker  v.  McCluug,  14  Minn.  170.    p.  2102. 
Whitcher  t'.  Peachaiii,  52  Vt.  242.    p.  694. 
Whitcomb's  Case,  120  Mass.  118.     pp.    132, 

137, 139, 171. 
Whitcomb  v.  Barre,  37  Vt.  148.    p.  1235. 
Whitcomb  v.  Fairlee,  45  Vt.  671.    pp.   1681, 

1687. 
Whitcomb  v.  Hovt,  20  Pa.  St.  443.    p.  1066. 
Whitcomb  I'.  Wiiliams,  4  Pick.   (Mass.)   228. 

p.  2137. 
White  V.  Bailey,  10  Mich.   155.    pp.  341,  343, 

513,515,1780. 
White  V.  Beem,  80  Ind.  239.    p.  17.56. 
White  V.  Bisbing,  1   Yeates  (Pa.),  400.    p. 

1941. 
White  V.  Brooks,  43  X.  H.  402.    p.  S90. 
W^hite  f.  Brown,  1  Wall.  -Juu.  217.    p.  1014. 
While  V.  Burnlev,  20  How.   (U.  S.)   235.    p. 

1079. 
White  V.  Caldwell,  17  Mo.  App.  691.    pn.  2048, 

2049. 
White  V.  Carroll,  42  X.  Y.  161.    p.  1461. 
White  r.  Casten,  1  Jones  L.  (X.  C.)  197.    p. 

1008. 
White  V.  City  of  Boston,  122  Mass.  491.    p. 

1376. 
White  V.  Cohen,  1  Drewrr,  312.    p.  1385. 
White  V.  Com.,  6  Biuu.  (Pa.)  179.    p.  19. 
White  V.  Crutcher,  1  Bush  (Ky.),  472.    pp. 

2071,  2080. 
White  V.  Dingley,  4  Mass.  435.    p.  1161. 
White  V.  Harlow,  5  Gray  (Mass.) ,  563.    p.  324. 
White  V.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  46  Wis.  493. 

p.  1364. 
White  V.  Graves,  68  Mo.  219.    p.  1708. 
White  V.  Hass,  32  Ala.  430.    p.  1642. 
White  V.  Hermann,  51  111.  243.    p.  1078. 
AVhite  V.  Leightou,  15  Neb.  426.    p.  1027. 
White  v.  Martin,  3  111.  69.    p.  1911. 
White  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  E.  Co.,  61  Wis.  536. 

p.  654. 
White  r.  Moses,  11  Cal.  68.    p.  75. 
White  V.  Parker,  8  Barb.  (X.  Y'.)  48.    p.  842. 
AVhite  V.  People,  90  111.  117.     pp.  705,  707,  726. 
White  V.  Perkins,  16  Ind.  35S.    p.  2064. 
White  r.  Prigmore,  28  Ark.  450.    p.  2128. 
White  V.  Smith,  54  Iowa,  233.    p.  1429. 
White  V.  State,  16  Tex.  206.    pp.  19,  65. 
White  V.  State,  18  Tex.    App.    57.      pp.   356, 

1695,  1855. 
White  V.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  343^    pp.  1873, 

18(4. 
White  V.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  3,39.    p.  1647. 
While  ■y.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  1.54.    p.  1851. 
White  V.  State,  52  Miss.  216.    pp.  11,  65,  71,  S2, 

83 
White  V.  State,  63  Ind.  595.    pp.  345,  .528,  529. 
AVhite  V.  Stillman,  25  X.  Y'.  541.    p.  885. 
AVhite  V.  Stoner,  18  Mo.  App.  540.    p.  643. 
AVhite  r.  Tucker,  9  Iowa,  100.    p.  358. 
AVhite  V.  Tucker,  16  Oh.  St.  468.    p.  344. 
AVhite  V.  AValker,  31  111.  422.    p.  10,58. 
AVhite  V.  AVallen,  17  Ga.  106.    p.  2097. 
AVhite  V.  White,  5Rawle  (Pa.),  61.    p.  1983. 
AVhite  V.  AVhite,  6  Xev.  20.    p.  2099. 
AVhite  r.  AA'iunisiraniet,  7  Cash.  (Mass.)  153. 

p.  1343. 


White  V.  AVright,  16  Mo.  App.  551.    p.  1061. 
AVhitefleld  v.  Aland,  2  Carr.  &  K.  1015.    p. 

354. 
Whitefleld  v.  Hurst,  9  Ired.  L.  (N.  0.)  175.   p. 

1589. 
Whiteford  v.  Burckmeyer,  1  Gill  (Md.^,  127. 

p.  349. 
Whiteford  r.  Munroe,  17  Md.  135.  pp. 827, 1670. 
AVhitehead  v.  Keys,  3  Allen   (Mass.),  495;  s. 

c.  1  Am.  L.  Reg.  (N.  S.)  471.     pp.  1016,  1942. 
Whitehead  r.  Scott,  1  Mood.  &  R.  2.      p.  60S. 
AVhitehead  v.  AVells,  29  Ark.  99.    pp.  9, 118. 
AVhitehouse  v.  Frost,  12  East,  614.    p.  909. 
AVhitehurst  v.  Davis,  2  Hayw.    (N.  C.)   113. , 

p.  5. 
AVhitemore  v.  Haroldson,  2  Lea  (Tenn.),  313. 

p.  2065. 
AA'hiteside  v.  Adams,  26  Ind.  250.    pp.  2107, 

2108. 
AVhiteside  r.  Jackson,  1  Wend.   (N.  Y'.)  418. 

AVhitesides  v.  Russell,  8  AA'atts  &  S.  (Pa.)  44. 

pp.  1321,  1345,  1347,  2013,  2014,  2017. 
AVhitewater  R.  Co.  v.  Bridgette,  94  Ind.  216. 

p.  1308. 
AA'hitewater  A'alley  Canal  Co.  v.  Dow,  1  Ind. 

141.     p.  329. 
AA'hitewater  A"alley  R.  Co.  v.  McClure,   29 

Ind.  536.     p.  1501. 
AVhitfleldr.  AVestbrook,  40  Miss.  311.    p.  1682. 
AVhitford  v.  County  of  Clark,  7  Sup.  Ct.  Rep. 

306;  s.  c.  13  Fed.  Rep.  837.    pp.  571,  572. 
AA'hitlev  v.  State,  38  Ga.  50.    pp.  84, 1632. 
AA'hitman  v.  Freese,  23  Me.  185.    p.  340. 
AVhitmore  v.  Ball,  9  Lea  (Tenn.)  35.    p.  1993. 
AVhitmore  v.  Str.   Caroline,  20  Mo.  513.    p. 

1151. 
AVhitner  v.  Hamlin,  12  Fla.  21.    pp.  60,  122, 

1669. 
AA^hitney  v.  Bigelow,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  110.    p. 

967. 
Whitney  v.  Cumberland,  64  INIe.  541.    p.  1209. 
AVhituey  v.  Karner,  44  AVis.  563.    p.  2072. 
AVhitney  v.  Peckham,  15  Mass.  243.    p.  1171. 
AVhitney  i\  Snvder,  2  Lans.  447.     p.  1663. 
Whitney  v.  State,  8  Mo.  165.    pp.  1903,  1906. 
AVhitney  v.  Swett,  22  X.  H.  10.    p.  853. 
AVhitney  v.  AVhltman,  5  Mass.  405.    pp.  1944, 

1955. 
AA'hitney,  In  re,    14  Nat.  Bank  Reg.  1.    p. 

1068. 
AVhittaker  v.  Morris,  Esp.  Dig.  58.    p.  948. 
AVhittaker  v.  Pullen,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  466. 

p.  1670. 
Whitten  v.  State,  36  Ind.  196.    p.  133. 
AVhittlesey  v.  Kellogg,  28  Mo.  404.    p.  827. 
AVhitwell   v.  A'incent,  4   Pick.   (Mass.)    449. 

p.  916. 
Whitworth  r.  Erie  R.  Co.,  87  N.  Y.  413.    pp. 

1318,  1346.  1347,  1356.  1359. 
AA'hltwortn  v.  Sour,  57  Ind.  107.    p.  2141. 
AVhizenant  r.  State,  71  Ala.  383.    p.  345. 
AVichita  &c.  R.  Co.   r.  Fechheimer,  36  Kan. 

45;  s.  c.  12  Pac.  Rep.  362.    p.  2027. 
AVicker  r.  Dresser,  13  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y'.)  331. 

pp.  132,  171. 
Wickersham  r.  People,  2  111.   128.    pp.    118, 

123. 
AA'ickes  v.  Clutterbuck,  2  Bing.  483;   8.  c.  10 

Moore,  63.     ]■..  174>. 
AVidder  r.  Buttalo  &.c.  R.  Co.,  24  Up.  Can.  Q. 

B.  534.     p.  114. 
AA'idner  v.  State,  28  Ind.  394.    pp.  1726, 1727. 
Wieland  v.  AVhite,  109  Mass.  392.    p.  192.   ' 
AViggen  v.  Plummer,  13  X.  H.  251.    p.  121. 
AViggiu   V.    Coffin,   3    Story    (U.    S.),  1.     p. 

1197. 
AViggins  V.  Burkhem,   10  AVall.   (U.   S.)   129. 

p.  1133. 


clxviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


"Wiggins  V.  Downer,  67  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  65. 

pp.  173-2, 1918,  lliyi. 
"Wiggins  V.  Holley,  11  Ind.  2.    p.  1048. 
"Wii^ginsr.  State,  1  Lea  (Tenn.),  738.    p.  41. 
Wiggins  f.  Wiffglus,  6  N.  H.  298.    p.  891. 
Wigglesworth  V.  Atkins,  5  Cueh.  (Mass.) 212. 

p.  241. 
"Wiglitman  v.  Overhiser,  S  Daly  (N.  Y.),  282. 

p.  365. 
AVigle  V.  AVlgle,  6  Watts  (Pa.),  522.    p.  829. 
AVilliorn  V.  Odell,  29  111.  456.    p.  1469. 
AVilbur  V.  Flood,  16  Mich.  40.    pp.  371, 405. 
"Wilbur   V.   Johnson,  58   Mo.  600.    pp.  1473, 

1475. 
"Wilcox  V.  School  Dist.,  20  N.  H.  303.    p.  110. 
"Wilcoxeu  V.  Bowles,  1  La.  Ann.  230.    p.  838. 
Wild  r.  Bank  of  Passamoquoddy,  3  Mason 

(U.  S.),  505.     pp.  10-22,  10-23. 
Wild's  Case,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  214.    p.  1543. 
Wild  V.  Gibson.  1  H.  L.  Cas.  605.    p.  1419. 
Wilde  V.  Trainer,  59  Pa.  St.  439.    p.  803. 
Wilder  v.  Peabody,  21  Hun  (N.  Y.),  376.    pp. 

348,  417,  440,  467. 
Wilder  v.  Sprague,  50  Me.  354.    pp.  1122, 1124, 

1131. 
Wilder  v.  State,  29  Ark.  -294.    p.  1908. 
AVilder  v.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  555.    pp.  119,  120. 
Wilder  V.  St.  Paul,  12  Minn.   19-2.      pp.   1012, 

1013. 
AVilder  v.  ATheeldon,  56  A^t.  344.    p.  I.i97. 
AVilds  V.  Bogan,  57  Ind.  453.    pp.  194S,  1955. 
AA'ilds  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24  X.  Y.  430; 

s.  c.  33  Barb.    (N.  Y.)   503.     pp.  1-2-23,  1224, 

1585,  1605. 
Wildy  V.  Bonnev,  35  Miss.  77.    p.  2066. 
AViles  V.  Suvdam,  64  N.  Y.  173.    p.  265. 
AViley  v.  Keokuk,  6  Kan.  94.    pp.  115,116,1489 
AA'iley  v.  Paver,  61  Ind.  457.    p.  2036. 
AViley  v.  State,  1  Swan  (Tenn.),  '25H.    p.  1905, 
AViley  V.  AVllson,  77  Ind.  .596.    p.  1130. 
AVilhelm  v.  People,  72  111.  468.    pp.  15,  32. 
AVilhoit  V.  Hancock,  5  Bush   (Ky.),  567.     p 

1491, 
Wilkes  V.  Jacks,  Peake  N.  P.  Cas.  203.    p 

948. 
AVilkie  v.  Bolster,  3  E.  D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),327 

p.  1236. 
Wilkins  v.  Anderson,  11  Pa.  St.  399.    pp.  704 

709. 
Wilkins  v.  Jadl8,2  Barn.  &  Adolph.  188.    pp 

939  940. 
AVilk'ins  v.  Maddrey,  67  Ga.  766.    p.  1945. 
AVilkins  v.  Malone,  It  Ind.  153.     p.  268. 
AA'ilkinson     v.    Griswold,    12    Snied.    &   M. 

(Miss.)  669.    p.  1747. 
AVilkinson  v.  Holiday,  33  Mich.  386.    p.  912. 
AA'ilkinson   v.  Jett,  7  Leigh   (Va.),  115.    p. 

667. 
AVilkinson  v.  Parne,  4  T.  R.  468.    p.  1747. 
AVilkinson  v.  Searcy,  76  Ala.  176.    p.  1650. 
AVillard  r.  Bridge,  4  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  361.    pp. 

1321,1330. 
Willard  v.  Germer,  1  Sandf.  S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  50. 

p.  958. 
AA^illard  v.  Goodenough,  30  Vt.  393.    pp.  450, 

451. 
AVillard  v.  Newbury,  22  Vt.  468.    p.  1247. 
AA'illard  v.  Pinard,  44  Vt.  34.    p.  12-23. 
Willard  r.  Reinhardt,  2  E.  D.  Smith  (X.  Y.), 

148.    p.  1340. 
AVillard  v.  Stevens,  24  X.  H.  271.    p.  2021. 
Willard  v.  Sumner,  7  iAIo.  Ap]).  577.    p.  828. 
Willcuts  V.  Xorlhwcstcru  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co., 

81  Ind.  300.     p.  1621. 
WJlles  V.  Farley,  3  Carr.  &  P.  395.    p.  351. 
Willey  J'.  Belfast,  61  Me.  569.    pp.  1221,  1247, 

1965,  1967. 
Willey  V.  Portsmouth,  35  X.  H.  303.    p.  334. 
"Wllley  V.  State,  46  Ind.  363.    p.  1574. 


Willey  V.  State,  52  Ind.  421.    p.  251. 
AVilliams  v.  Allen,  40  Ind.  295.    p.  219. 
Williams  v.  Bentley,  29  Pa.  St.  2'22.    p.  1415. 
AVilliams  v.  Benton,  12  La.  Ann.  91.    p.  607. 
AA'llliams  v.  Bridge,  14  La.  Ann.  721.    p.  1086. 
AVilliams  v.  Brobst,  10  AVatts  (Pa.),  111.    p. 

948. 
AA'illiams  v.  Brown,  28  Oh.  St.  547.    pp.  495, 

505,  506. 
Williams  v.  Brvant,  4  Ala.  44.    pp.  1617, 1618. 
AVilliams  v.  Cannon,  9  Ala.  348.    p.  1642. 
AA'illiams  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  t8. 

p.  2099. 
AVilliams  v.  Circuit  Ct.,  5  Mo.  248.    pp.  2049, 

2076. 
Williams  v.  Com.,  82  Kv.  640.    pp.  707,  708. 
AVilliams  v.  Com.,  91  Pa.  St.  493.    p.  26. 
AVilliams  v.  Currie,  1  C.  B.  841.    p.  1477. 
AVilliams  v.  Davis,  1  Penn.  (X.  J.)  177.    p.  879. 
AA'illiams  v.  Delafleld,  2  Caiues  (X.  Y.),  329. 

p.  974. 
Williams  v.  DeAVitt,  12  Ind.  309.    p.  308. 
AA'illiams  v.  Donaldson,  8  Iowa,  108.    p.  931. 
Williams  v.  East  India  Co.,  3  East,  192.    p. 

1331. 
Williams  r.  Eikenberrv,  22  Xeb.  210;  s.  c.  34 

X.  AV.  Rep.  373.     p.  2U37. 
AVilliams  v.  Finch,  2  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  208.    p. 

888. 
AVilliams  v.  Oilman,  71  Me.  21.    p.  425. 
AVilliams  v.  Godfrey,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  299. 

p.  10-2, 
Williams  v.  Gray,  39  Mo.  201.    pp.  908,  920. 
Williams  v.  Grand  Rapids,  53  Mich.  271.    pp. 

50,  582. 
Williams  v.  Grealy,  112  Mass.  79.    p.  1209. 
AVilliams  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  3  Hurl.  & 

X.  869;  s.  C.  -28  L.  J.  (Exch.)  2.     pp.  118,  122. 
Williams  v.  Griffiths,  5  Mees.  &  AV.  300.     p. 

968. 
Williams  v.  Hartshorn,  30  Ala.  211.  pp.  1407, 

1408. 
AVilliams  v.  Hays,  20  N.  Y.  58.    p.  310. 
AVilliams  v.  Herschman,  5  Xev.  263.    p.  2099. 
AVilliams  v.  Hollis,  19  Ga.  313.    p.  891. 
AVilliams  v.  Hutchinson,  3  X.  Y.  312.  pp.  888, 

894. 
Williams  v.  Jarrot,  6  111.  120.    p.  323. 
AVilliams  v.  Keats,  2  Stark.  '290.    p.  1097. 
Williams  v.  Miller,  10  Iowa,  344.    p.  106. 
AVilliams  v.  Xolan,  54  Tex.  708.    p.  19'2. 
AVilliams  v.  Xorris,  2  Litt.  157.    p.  109. 
AVilliams  v.  0'Keefe,9  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  536.   p. 

1209. 
AVilliams  v.  Poppleton,  3  Ore.  139.    p.  113. 
AVilliams  v.  Port,  9  Ind.  551.    p.  1585. 
AA'illiams  r.  Porter,  51  Mo.  441.    p.  893. 
AVilliams  v.  Rcvnolds,  10  Md.  57.  pp.  884,885. 
AVilliams  v.  Rice,  13  Xev.  235.     p.  2099. 
AVilliams  v.  Smith,  6  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  1H6.   p.  56. 
AVilliams  v.  Smith,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  496.  i).943. 
AVilliams  v.  Spaulding,  29  Me.  112.    p.  1090. 
AVilliams  V.  State  (Ala.),  1  South.  Rep.   179. 

p.  111. 
AAMlliams  V.  State,  45  Ala.  57.    p.  1905. 
Williams  v.  State,  52  Ala.  412.    pp.  1800,  1820, 

1S39,  1819. 
AVilliams  r.  State,  3  Ga.  453.    pp.  58,  62,65, 

89,91,  103. 
AVilliams  t'.  State,  60  Ga.  367.    p.  99. 
AVilliams  v.  State,  10  Ind.  503.    pp.  1515, 1520. 
AVilliams  v.  State,  16  Ind.  461.    p.  609. 
AA'illiams  v.  State,  45  Ind.  299.    p.  .50. 
AVilliams  I.  State,  32  Miss.  389.    pp.  65,  85, 

1-29,  1700. 
AVilliams  v.  State,  37  Miss.  407.    p.  118. 
AVilliams  v.  State,  6  Xeb.  336.    pp.  1548.  1891, 

2002. 
Williams  v.  State,  12  Oh.  St.  622.    p.  6. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxix 


"Williams  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  376.    pp. 

154S,  1668. 
Williams  v.  State,  8  Humph.  (Tenn.)  5S5.    p. 

300. 
Williams  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  271.    p.  1539. 
Williams  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  255.    p.  2093. 
Williams  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  163.    p.  18S4. 
Williams  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  102.    p.  1695. 
Williams  v.  State,  44  Tex,  34.    pp.  8,  30,  51, 

103. 
Williams  v.  Thames  &c.  Co.,  105  Ind.  420.    p. 
.      21 n2. 
Williams  r.  Thomas,  78  N.  C.  47.    p.  1937. 
Williams  v.  Tiedemann,  6  Mo.  App.  269.    p. 

882. 
Williams  r.  Vanmeter,  8  Mo.  339.    p.  1197. 
Williams  v.  Waters,  36  Ga.  454.    p.  825. 
Williams  v.  AVillis,  7  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  90.    p. 

2007. 
Williams  v.  Woods,  16  Md.  220.    p.  844. 
Williamson  v.  Carroll,  16  X.  Y.  217.    p.  330. 
Williamson  V.  Com.,  4  Gratt.   (Va.)  547.    p. 

351. 
Williamson  v.  Fischer,  50  Mo.  198.    p.  1598. 
Williamson  v.  McClure,  37  Pa.  St.  402.     p. 

&38. 
Williamson  17.  McGinnis,  11  B.  Monr.   (Ky.) 

74.    p.  1474. 
Williamson  v.  Reddish,  45  la.  550.    pp.  1929, 

1933. 
Williamson  v.  Wachenheim,  62  la.  196.    p. 

2059. 
Williamson  r  Yingling,80  Ind.  379.  pp.2027, 

2041. 
Williamson's  Case,  26  Pa.  St.  9;  s.  c.  27  Pa 

St.  18.     pp.  152,  154. 
Williamson  -  Stewart  Paper  Co.  v.  Bosby 

shell,  14  Mo.  App.  534.    pp.  192,  193. 
Willings  V.  Swasey,  1  Browne  (Pa.),  123.   pp 

1911,  1913,  1983. 
Willis  V.  Ba-ilev,  19  Johns.  (X.  Y.)  268.  p.  689. 
Willis  V.  Bullitt.  22  Tex.  3.30.    p.  1670. 
Willis  V.  Forrest,  2  Duer  (X.  Y.),  310.    p.  246 
Willis  V.  Lowry  (Tex.),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  449.    p 

747. 
Willis  V.  -McXeill,  57  Tex.  465.    pp.  738,  739, 

762. 
Willis  V.  People,  32  X.  Y.  715.    p.  715. 
Willis  V.  State,  12  Ga.  444.    pp.  62,  63. 
Willis  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  297.    pp.  60,  70. 
Willis  V.  Whitsitt,  4  S.  W.  Rep.  253.    p.  1626. 
Willis  r.  Willis,  18  Ga.  13.    p.  1681. 
Williston  V.  Morse,  10  Mete.  (Mass.)  17.    pp. 

1077, 1083. 
Wills  V.  Fo  wkes,  5  Bing.  X.  C  4.55.    p.  968. 
Wills  V.  Xoyes,  12  Pick.  (Mass.)  324.    p.  1197. 
Wills  V.  Ru  ssell,  100  U.  S.  621.    p.  384. 
Wills  V.  State,  69  Ind.  286.    p.  48. 
Willson  r.  Whitefield,  38  Ga  269.    p.  827. 
Wilmarth  v.  Mouutford,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)  82.     p.  1199. 
Wilmerdiugs  v.  Fowler,  14  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 

(N.  S.)249.     p.  146. 
Wilmont  r.  Miserole,  40  X"'.  Y.  Sup.  (8  Jones 

&  Sp.)  322.    p.  580. 
Wilson  V.  Abrahams,  1  Hill  (X.  Y.),  207.    pp. 

1902,  1926, 1929. 
Wilson   V.  Berryman,  5  Cal.    44.    pp.  1964, 

1966,  1967. 
Wilson    V.  Board  of  Education,  63  Mo.  137. 

pp.  850.  1621. 
Wilson  V.  Carson,  12  Md.  54.    p.  819. 
Wilson  V.  Cochran,  31  Tex.  677.    p.  817. 
Wilson  V.  Codman,  3  Cranch  (U.  S.)  193.    p. 

1615. 
Wilson  V.   Coles,  2  Blackf.   (Ind.)    402.    p. 

2111. 
Wilson  V.  Conway  F.  Ins.  Co.,  4  R.  I.  143.    p. 
976. 


Wilson  V.  Denver,  S.  P.  &  P.  R.  Co.  (Col.),  2 

Pac.  Rep.  1.    p.  1239. 
Wilson  V.  Forsyth,  24  BarD.   (X.  Y.)  106.    p. 

1443. 
Wilson  V.  Fuller,  9  Kan.  176.    p.  560. 
AVilson  V.  Grand  Trunk  B.  Co.,  56  Me.   6a 

p.  1154. 
Wilson  V.  Hamilton,  4  Oh.  St.  722.    p.  1374. 
Wilson  V.  Hanson,  20  X.  H.  375.    p.  957. 
AVilson  V.  Hoare,  10  Ad.  &  El.  236.    p.  1147. 
Wilson  V.  Hudson,  8  Yerg.   (Tenn.)  398.    p. 

1080. 
AVilson  V.  Inloes,  6  Gill  (Md.),  121.    p.  1078. 
AVilson  1-.  Irish,  62  Iowa,  260.    p.  812. 
AA'ilson  V.  Jennings,  3  Oh.  St.  528.    p.  194. 
AA'ilson  V.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  60 Mo.  184, 

p.  1708. 
Wilson  V.  Kestler,  34  Kan.  61.    p.  2051. 
Wilson  V.  Mavor  of  Xew  York,  1  Denio  (X. 

Y.),595.     p"l266. 
Wilson  i\  Xatious,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  211.    pp. 

1463,  1470,  1708. 
AA'ilson  r.  Pearson,  20  III.  81.    p.  1439. 
Wilson  r.  People,  94  111.  299.    pp.  95.  115. 
AVilson  V.  People,  39  X.  Y.  459.    p.  1566. 
AVilson  V.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  256.    p. 

1952. 
AVilson  V.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  619.  pp. 

1506,  1991. 
Wilson  V.  Russell,  136  Mass.  211.    p.  915. 
Wilson  r.  Shoenberger,  31  Pa.   St.  295.     pp. 

869,  S70. 
AVilson  V.  Smith,  5  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  379.  p.  1003. 
AVilson  r.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  62  Cal.  164. 

pp.  1321,1359. 
Wilson  V.  State,  31  Ala,  371.    p.  81. 
Wilson  v.  State,  94  111.  299.    p.  75. 
Wilson  V.  State,  16  Ind.  392.    p.  411. 
AVilson  v.  State,  57  Ind.  71.    p.  167. 
AA'ilsou  I'.  State,  20  Oh.  26.    p.  2002. 
AVilson  r.  State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  206.  p.  1927. 
AA'ilson  V.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  5'.'4.    p.  1560. 
AA'ilson  V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  270.    p.  1697. 
AVilson  r.  State,  35  Tex.  365.    p.  9. 
AVilson  V.  State,  3  AVis.  798.    p.  456. 
AA'ilson  V.  State  Bank, 3  La.  Ann.  196.    p.  34. 
AA'ilson  V.  Steamboat  Tuscarora,  25  Pa.  St. 

317.    p.  803. 
Wilson  r.  Trafalgar  &c.  Co.,  93  Ind.  287.    pp. 

127,  1276,  1278,  1281,  1483,  1698,  2110. 
Wilson  v.  Truelock,  19  Ind.  389.    p.  2107. 
AA'ilson  i\  A'ance,  55  Ind.  394.    pp.  2071,  2076. 
Wilson  v.  AA'adleigh,  36  Me.  496.    p.  194. 
AVilson  r.  AVagar,  26  Mich.  452.    pp.  368,  385, 

386  425. 
Wilson  v.  Watertown,3Hun  (X.Y'.),50S.    p. 

1248. 
AVilson  V.  AA'atterson,  4  Pa.  St.  214.    p.  1065. 
AA'ilson  V.  Wheeling,  19  AV.  A'a.  323.    p.  1481. 
AVilson  f.  AA'illiams,  52  Miss.  487.    p.  1681. 
Wilson's  Case,  7  Q.  B.  984  ;  s.  e.  9  Jur.  393;  14 

L.  J.  Q.  B.  105,201.     pp.  132,  143, 152. 
Wilt  V.  Vickers,  8  AVatts  (Pa.),  227.    pp.  516, 

891. 
Wilton  V.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  107  Mass.  108;  s. 

c.  125  Mass.  130.     p.  1298. 
Wimberly,  Ex  parte,  57  Miss.  437.    p.  152. 
AA'inans  v.  Sierra  Lumber  Co.,  66  Cal.  61.    p. 

1750. 
Winch  V.  AA'inchester,  1  A'es.  &  B.  375.    p.  918' 
AA'inchell  v.  Hicks,  18  X.  Y.  558.    pp.  1626, 

1737,  1739. 
AVinchesterr.  Bennett,  54  Pa.  St.  510.    p.  803. 
AVinchester  v.  Cox,  3  Iowa,  575.    p.  1060. 
AVindham  v.  State,  19  Tex.  App.  413.    pp. 

1896,  1897. 
Wing  V.  Burgis,  13  Me.  111.    p.  1085. 
AVing  V.  Grav,  36  A't.  261.    p.  1245. 
Wing  V.  Mill',  1  Barn.  &  Aid.  101.    p.  899. 


clxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Winkleraan  v.  People,  50  111.  449.    p.  145. 
Winkler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  21  Mo.  App.  109.   p. 

342. 
Winkler  r.  State,  32  Ark.   539.    pp.  727,  728, 

733. 
"Winlock  V.  Hardy,  4  Litt.  (Kx.)  272.    p.  554. 
Winn  V.  Lowell.  1  Allen  (Mass.),  177.  p.  1246. 
"Winn  V.  Madden,  8  Mo.  App.  2G1.    p.  1440. 
Winn  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.   169.    pp.   1777, 

1779. 
Wiune  v.  McDonald,  39  N.  Y.  233.    p.  1645. 
Winnesbeik  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sclmeller,  60  111.  465. 

l>p.  62,  63,  126. 
Winsett  r.  8tate,  ,57  Ind.  26.    p.  21. 
AVinship  V.  Bank  of  U.  f«.,  5  Pet.   (U.  S.)  561. 

p.  1024. 
Wmship  V.  Buzzard,  9  Rich.  L.   (S.  C.)  103. 

p.  855. 
Winship  V.  Enfield,  42  N.   H.  74.    pp.  1246, 

1280, 1379. 
Wiuship  r.  Neale,  10  Gray  (Mass.),  382.    p. 

375. 
Wiuship  r.  Waterman,  56  Vt.  181.    p.  1157. 
Winslow  V.  Bailev,  16  Me.  319.    p.  548. 
Wiuslowr.  Campbell,  46  Vt.  746.    pp.  1921, 

1944,  1945. 
Winslow  r.  Draper,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  170.    p. 

1911. 
Winslow  V.  Morrill,  68 Me.  362.    p.  1969. 
Winslow  V.  Railroad  Co.,  42  Vt.  700.    p.  1374. 
AVinsor  v.  Savage,  8  T.  R.  290.    p.  898. 
"NVinstour.  Miller,  12  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  550. 

p.  15S5. 
Winston  r.  Wales,  13  Mo.  569.    p.  1600. 
Winston,  Ex  parte,  7  Nev.  71.    p.  152. 
Winter  v.  Norton,  1  Ore.  42.    p.  1001. 
AVinter  v.  Peterson,  24  N.  J.  L.  524.    p.  1377. 
Winters  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  39  Mo.  468. 

pp.  1236, 1296,  1483, 1669, 1677. 
AVintz  V.  Morrison,  17  Tex.  372.    p.  1648. 
AVircbach  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  12  Reporter, 

571.    p.  98. 
AA'ise  V.  Bosley,  32 la.  34.    pp.  1919, 1923. 
AA'ise  V.  Joplin  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  178.     pp.  1310, 

1311. 
Wise  V.  Wismer,  23  Mo.  237.    pp.  1410, 1437. 
Wiser  V    Chelsev,  53  Mo.  547.    p.  1341. 
AA'ishmier  v.  State,  110  Ind.  523.    p.  2138. 
AA'iswell  V.  First  Congregational  Church,  14 

Oh.  St.  31.    p.  1588. 
Witham  v.  Derbv,  1  Wils.  48.    p.  2009. 
AAltherlee  v.  Oce"an  Ins.  Co.,  24 Pick.  (Mass.) 

67.    p.  204. 
Witherlv  v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.,  12  C.  B.  (N. 

S.)  2;  s.  C.6  L.  T.  (N.  S.)  255;  3  Fost.  &  Fin. 

61.     p.  1223. 
Withers  v.  Drew,  Cro.  Eliz.  676.    p.  1127. 
AA'ithers  v.  Fisous,  40  Ind.  131.    p.  1983. 
AA'ithers  v.  North    Kent   R.    Co.,  27   L.    J. 

(Exch.)  417;  subnom.  Kent  v.  Great  North- 
ern R.  Co.,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  165.    p.  1237. 
Witherspoon  v.  AAitherspoon,  2  McCord  (S. 

C.),520.    p.  829. 
AA'itkouskv  v.  AA'a§son,  71  N.  C.  451.    pp.  288, 

1603,  1604. 
AA'itt  V.  State,  9  Mo.  671.    p.  1535. 
AVlttcnbrock  v.  Belmer,  .57  Cal.  12.    p.  2085. 
AA'itter  v.  Latham,  12  Conn.  392.    ]>.  294. 
AVitter  v.  Lvon,  34  AA"is.  564.    ]i.  151. 
AVol.iiru  r.  lllenshaw,  101  Mass.  193     p.  272. 
AVolcott  V.  Hall,  6  Mass.  514.    p.  1466. 
AVolf  r.  American  Express  Co.,  43  Mo.  422. 

pp.  1318,  1369,  1370. 
AVolf  r.  Tel.  Co.,  62  Pa.  St.  S3,    p.  1150. 
AVolf  V.  Trinkle,  103  Ind.  35.5.    p.  1478. 
AVolf  V.  AVasher,  32  Kan.  533.    )'.  1621. 
AVolf  r.  AVlllits,  35  la.  95.    p.  1765. 
AVolfe  V.  Goulard,  15  Abb.  Pr.   (N.  Y.)  336. 

p.  268. 


Wolfe  V.  Kable,  107  111.  165.    p.  2058. 

AVolfe  r.  Martin,  1  How.  (Miss.)  30.    pp.  6, 

12S.    • 
AVolfe  V.  Parham,  18  Ala.  442.    p.  1058. 
AVolfe  r.  Pugh,  101  Ind.  293.    p.  .584. 
AVoltfe  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  34  Minn.  215 

s.  c.  25  N.  AV.  Rep.  63.    p.  1312. 
Wolff e  V.  Mlunis,  74  Ala.  3S6.    pp.  741,  762. 
AVollastou  V.  Barnes,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  386 

p.  242. 
AVollev,  In  re,  11  Bush  (Ky.),  95.   pp.  145, 146 

147.  ■ 
Wombough  V.  Cooper,  4  Thomp.  &  C.  586 

p.  1603. 
AVood  V.  Aldrich,  25  AVis.  695.    pp.  1724,  1949 
AVood  V.  Barker,  49  Mich.  295.    p.  1780. 
AVood  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  59  Iowa,  196 

p.  1022. 
AVoodv.  Coggeshall,  2Metc.  (Mass.)  89.    p 

891. 
Wood  V.  Cooper,  1  Carr.  &  K.  645.    p.  354. 
AVood  v.  Crocker,  18  AVls.  345.    p.  1374. 
AVood  r.  Figard,  28  Pa.  St.  403.     p.  1699. 
AVood  V.  Hopkins,  3  N.  J.  507.    p.  194. 
AVood  r.  Mackinson,  2  Mood  &  Rob.  273.    p. 

Wood  V.  Mann,  2  Sunm.  (U.  S.)  316.    p.  649. 
AVood  V.  Matthews,  73  Mo.  477.    p.  869. 
AVood  r.  Neale,  5  Gray  (Mass.),  538.    p.  188. 
AVood  V.  Nortman,  85  Mo.  298.    i).  1588. 
AVood  V.  Southwick,  97  Mass.  354.    p.  2002. 
AVood  V.  State,  34  Ark.  341.    pp.  1907, 1930. 
AVood  V.  State,  92  Ind.  269.    p.  382. 
AVood  v.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  574.    p.  1538. 
AVood  V.  Steele,  6  AVall.  (U.  S.)  80.    pp.  1029, 

1031. 
Wood  V.  Stewart,  7  A"t.  149.    p.  1943. 
Wood  V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  109.    p. 

1308. 
AVood  V.  Stoddard,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  194.    p. 

55 
Wood  v.  Weir,  5  B.  Mon.  (Ky.):544.    pp.  1195, 

1197. 
AVood  r.  Willard,  36  A't.  82.    pp.  778, 1947. 
AVood  V.  AVood,  52  N.  H.  422.    p.  54. 
AVood  V.  AVvlds,  11  Ark.  754.    p.  1750. 
AVoodard  v'.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  412.    p.  129. 
AVoodbridge  v.  Raymond,  Kirby  (Conn.),  280. 

pp.  58,  117. 
AVoodburn  r.  Cogdal,  39  Mo.  222.    p.  560. 
AVoodbury  v.  Fr^nk,  14  111.  279.    pp.  1331,  1332, 

1334. 
AA'oodburv  v.  Earned,  5  Minn.  339.    p.  lti~. 
AVoodburV  r.  Obear,  7  Gray  (Mass.)  467.    pp. 

498,  499,"500,  512,  519,  1780. 
Woodbury  v.  Taylor,  3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  504. 

pp.  802,  "961,  962: 
AVoodlill  V.  Patton,  76  Ind.  575.    p.  2010. 
AVoodling  V.  Knickerbocker,  31  Minn.  268. 

p.  14,58. 
AVoodman  v.  Chesley,  39  Me.  45.    p.  825. 
AVoodman   v.  Dutton,  49  la.  398.    pp.  2093, 

2100. 
Woodruff  V.  Richardson,  20  Conn.  238.    pp. 

1113,  1977. 
AVoods  r.  Atlantic  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  50  Mo. 

112.     pp.  1600.  1021. 
AVoods  V.  P.oston,  121  Mass.  337.    p.  1209. 
Woods  r.  Figaniere,  25  How.  Pr.  (N.  1.)  522. 

pp.  000,  605: 
AVoods  r.  Rowan,  5  Johns.  (N.  \.)  13.    p.  29. 
AVoods  V.  State,  43  Miss.  364.     pp.  1907,  1982. 
AVoodsides  v.  State,  2  How.  (Miss.)  665.    pp 

18,  30. 
AVoodward  r.  Rlanchard,  16  111.  424.    p.  1049, 
AVoodward  v.  Booth,  7  Barn.  &  Cres.  301.    p. 

1612. 
AVoodward  r.  Dean,  113  Mass.  297.    p.  119. 
AVoodward  v.  Horst,  10  la.  120.    p.  2082. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxi 


Woodward  v.  Laverty,  14  Iowa,  381.    p.  214. 
Woodward  v.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  453.    pp.  124, 

1934. 
Woodward  v.  McReynolds,  1  Chandl.  (Wis.) 

244.     p.  1586. 
Woodward  v.  Trask  Fish  Co.,  38  Kan.  284; 

s.  c.  16  Pac.  Rep.  456.    p.  2073. 
Woodworth  v.  Bank  of  America,  19  Johns. 

(N.  Y.)391.    pp.  1032,  1034. 
Woolen  V.  Whitacre,  91  Ind.  502.    pp.  1642, 

1784,  1803,  2029. 
Woolen  V.  Wire  (Ind.),  11  North  East.  Rep. 

236.     p.  102. 
Woolen  V.  Wishmier,  70  Ind.  108.    pp.  2036, 

2112,  2113. 
Woolery  v.  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.,  107  Ind. 

381.    p.  1751. 
Wooley  V.  Constant,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  54.    p. 

1033. 
Wooley  V.  Fry,  30  111.  158.    pp.  1250, 1448. 
Woolf  V.  Beard,  8  Car.  &  P.  373.    p.  1223. 
Woolfolk  V.  Wright,  28  Ark.  1.    p.  2122. 
Woolley,  lu  re,  11  Bush  (Ky.),  95.    pp.133, 

145,  146, 147. 
Woolmer  v.  Caston,  Cro.  Jac.  113.    p.  2013. 
Woolnoth  V.  Meadows,  5  East,  463.    p.  1456. 
Woolsey  V.  White,  7  Bradw.  (111.)  277.      p. 

1914. 
Wooster    v.   Proprietor   Canal    Bridge,   16 

Pick.  (Mass.)  547.    p.  1483. 
Wooten  V.  Barton,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  518.    p. 

217. 
Worcester  V.  Marchant,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  510. 

p.  894. 
Worcester  Medical  Institution  v.  Harding, 

11  Cush.  (Mass.)  285.    p.  832. 
Word  r.  Commonwealth,  3  Leigh  (Va.),  743. 

pp.  704,  735. 
Wordell  v.  Smith,  1  Camp.  332.    p.  1440. 
Worford  v.  IsbeU,  1  Bibb   (Ky.),  247.    pp. 

1977,  2011. 
Work  V.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  296.    p.  4. 
Works  V.  Stephens,  76  Ind.   181.      pp.  1642, 

1784,  1803. 
Worlcy  V.  Moore,  97  Ind.  15.    pp.  738,  2041. 
Worlev  V.  Watson,  22  Mo.  App.  546.    p.  1440. 
Wormley's  Case,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  658.    pp.  70, 

85. 
Wormouth  v.  Cramer,  3  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  399. 

p.  1467. 
Worrall  v.  Rhoads,  2  Whart.  (Pa.)  427.    p. 

1013. 
Worsely  v.  De  Mattos,  1  Burr.  467.    pp.  1407, 

1440. 
Worsham  v.  Goar,  4  Port.   (Ala.)  441.    pp. 

239,  240. 
Worster  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co.,  50  N.  Y'. 

203.     p.  1222. 
Worth  r.  McConnell  (Mich.),  4  N.  W.  Rep. 

198.    p.  927. 
Worthiugton  v.  Mason,  101 U.  S.  149.    p.  2109. 
Worthmgton  v.  Welch,  27  Ark.  464.    p.  2055. 
Wragg  V.   Penn.    Township,   94    111.    11.    p. 

1014. 
Wriifht  V.  Abbott,  85  Ind.  154.    pp.  215,  224. 
Wright  V.  Adams,  12  Mo.  App.  376.    p.  2065. 
Wright  V.  Boiling,  27  Ala.  259.    p.  362. 
AVright  V.  Burchlield,  3  Oh.  54.    p.  1906. 
Wright  V.  Cabot,  89  X.  Y.  57.    p.  569. 
Wright  V.  Carpenter,  49  Cal.  607.    pp.  679,681. 
Wright  V.  Clark,  50  Vt.  130.    p.  1953. 
Wriglit  V.  Columbian  Ins.  Co.,  2  Johns.  (X. 

Y.)  211.    p.  7. 
Wright  V.  Com.  (Ky.),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  905.    p. 

1809. 
Wright  V.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  (Va.)  141.    pp.  66, 

69,  75. 
Wright  V.  Compton,  53  Ind.  310.    pp.  1316, 
1482. 


Wright  V.  De  Klyne,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  199. 

p.  485. 
Wright  V.  Tatham,  7  Ad.  &  El.  313.    p.  296. 
Wright  V.  Fort  Howard,  60  Wis.  119.    pp. 

1648,  1676. 
Wright  V.  Gully,  28  Ind.  475.     p.  2110. 
Wright  V.  Haddock,  7  Dana  (Ky.).  254.    p. 

2069.  ^    J  "  *» 

Wright  V.  Hardv,  22  Wis.  348.    p.  504. 
Wright  V.  Illinois  &c.   Tel.   Co.,  20   la.  195. 

pp.  1945,  1964,  1968,  1983, 1984,  1993,  1994. 
Wright  v.  Jacobs,  61  Mo.  19.    p.  1473. 
Wright  V.  Lattin,  38  111.  293.    p.  1005. 
Wright  V.  Maiden  &c.  R.  Co., 4  Allen  (Mass.), 

283.     pp.  1232,  1605. 
Wright  V.  Mayer,  0  Ves.  280.    p.  279. 
Wright  V.  McCormick,  67  Mo.  426.    p.  1440. 
Wright  V.  People,  112  111.  540.    p.  284. 
Wright  V.  Phillips,  2  G.  Greene  (la.),  191,  p. 

1998. 
Wright  V.Pindar,  Stvle,  34,     p.  1622. 
Wright  V.  Rogers,  2  N.  J.  L.  547.    p.  1954. 
Wright  V.  Salisbury,  46  Mo.  26.    p.  1074. 
Wright  17.  Saunders,  58    Barb.    (X.   Y'.)  214: 

s.  c.  3  Keyes  (X.  Y.),  323.    p.  1209. 
Wright «;.  Shawcross,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  501  n. 

p.  944. 
Wright  V.  State,  35  Ark.  640.    pp.  349, 1908. 
Wright  V.  State,  18  Ga.  383.    p.  69. 
Wright  V.  State,  30  Ga.  325.    p.  1537. 
Wright  V.  State,  5   Blackf.    (Ind.)   358.      p. 

1562. 
Wright  V.  State,  5  Y'erg.  (Tenn.)  154.    p.  1566. 
Wright  t).  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.)  194.     p. 

74. 
Wright  V.  State,  12  Tex,  App.  163.    p.  50. 
Wright  V.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  358.    p.  1855. 
Wright  V.  State,  43  Tex.  170.    p.  465. 
Wright  V.  Stuart,  5  Blackf.   (Ind.)  120.    p. 

21. 
Wright  V.  Wright.  5  Ind.  389.    p.  1008. 
Wright,  Ex  parte,  65  Ind.  504.     pp.  148, 149. 
Wrockledge  v.  State,  1  Clarke  (Iowa),  167. 

p.  108. 
Wroe  V.  State,  20  Oh.  St.  460.    pp.  403,  409, 

530. 
AVustum  V.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Wis.  138.    p.  981. 
Wyandotte    r.   Gibson,    25    Kan.    236.    pp. 

2027,2031,2033. 
Wyandotte  v.  White,  13  Kan.  191.    p.  2038. 
Wyandotte  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Waldo,  70  Mo.  629. 
■  p.  1499. 
AVyatt  V.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  55  Mo.  485.    pp. 

1208,  1212,  1229. 
Wyatt  V.  Hertford,  3  East,  147.    p.  842. 
AVvatt  V.  Magee,  3  Ala.  94.    pp.  150,  649. 
AVvatt  V.  Xoble,  8  Blackf.  (lud.)  507.    p.  89. 
Wvatt  V.  State,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  257.    p.  1905. 
Wyatt  V.  Steele,  20  Ala.  639.    p.  830. 
AVybourn  v.  Wybourn,  1  Hagg.  Ecc.  725;  s.  c. 

3  Eng.  Ecc.  308.     ]).  650. 
Wyckoff  r.  Ferry  Co.,  52  X.  Y'.  32.    p.  1369. 
AA^yers  r.  State  (T'ex.),2  S.  AA'.  Rep.722.    p.  27. 
AVyley  v.  Stanford,  22  Ga.  385.    p.  1634. 
AVylie  v.  Smithermans,  8  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  236. 

p.  1475. 
AA'yman  v.  Adams,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  210.     p. 

938. 
Wyman  v.  Gould,  47  Me.  159.    p.  349. 
Wynehamer  v.  People,  13  X.  Y.  378,  p.  4. 
AA'ynn  v.  Lee,  5  Ga.  217.    pp.  716,  717. 
AA'yune  r.  Glidewell,  17  Ind.  446.    p.  1438. 
Wynne  v.  Raikes,  5  East,  515.    p.  966. 

Y. 

Yancv  v.  Downer,  5  Litt.  (Ky.)  8.    p.  1920. 
Y'auez  V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  429.    pp.  49, 118, 
120. 


clxxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Yankee  v.  Thompson,  51  Mo.  234.    p.  1591. 
Yarnall  v.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  581 

p.  1305. 
Yater  v.  Mullen,  23  Ind.  562.    p.  1477. 
Yates  V.  Alden,  45  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  172.    pp 

1414, 1415. 
Yates  V.  Lansing,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  395.    p 

154. 
Yates  V.  People,  38  111.  527.    p.  1969. 
Yates  V.  People,  6  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  337.    p 

154. 
Yates  V.  Pym,  6  Taunt.  446.    p.  925. 
Yates,  Ex  parte,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  317.    p.  154 
Yeats  V.  Ballentiue,  56  Mo.  530.    pp.  892,  893 
Yeldoll  V.  Shinholster,  15  Ga.  189.    p.  1721. 
Yelm  Jim  v.  Territory,  1  Wash.  Terr.  76.    p 

27. 
Yerkes  v.  Soloman,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.),  471.    p 

346. 
Yingling  v.  Hesson,  16  Md.  112.    pp.  215,  239, 
Yoe  V.  People,  49  111.  410.    pp.  728,  747,  784 

786, 1694. 
Yoemans  v.  Yoemans,  3  S.  E.  Rep.  354.    p 

2107. 
Yonge  V.  Kinney,  28  Ga.  111.    pp.  1236, 1237. 
Youge  V.  Paciflc  Mail  S.  S.  Co.,  1  Cal.  353.    p 

1754. 
York  V.  Central  Railroad,  3  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

107.    p.  1348. 
York  V.  Chilton,  4  La.  Ann.  377.    p.  1195. 
Yorkr.  Pease,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  282.    p.  308. 
York  V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  441.    p.  1895. 
York  Co.  V.  Central  R.  Co.,  3  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

113.    p.  568. 
Yosti  V.  Laughran,  49  Mo.  .594.    p.  1410. 
Youmans  v.  Carney,  62  Wis.  580.    p.  389. 
Young  V.  Black,  7  Cranch   (U.  S.),568.    p. 

1622. 
Young  V.  Bridges,  34  La.  Ann.  333.    p.  62. 
Young  V.  Cannon,  2  Utah,  560.    p.  151. 
Young  V.  Clegg,  93  Ind.  371.    p.  1756. 
Young  V.  Fewson,  8  Carr.  &  P.  55.    p.  1612. 
Young  V.  Gregory,  3  Call  (Va.),  446.    p.  1198. 
Young  V.  Grote,  4  Bing.  253.    pp.  1034,  1036. 
Young  V.  Highland,  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  16.    pp. 

214,218,221. 
Young  V.  Hill,  67  N.  Y.  167.    p.  880. 
Young  «.  King,  33  Ark.  745.    p.  2051. 
Young  V.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

S.)452.    pp.  54,  7L 


Young  V.  Rosenbaum,  39  Cal.  646.    p.  2099. 
Young  V.  Slaughterford,  11  Mod.  228.    p.  52. 
Young  V.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  577.    p.  84. 
Young  V.  State,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  200.    p. 

1554. 
Young  V.  Thompson,  14  111.  380.    p.  819. 
Young  V.  Tibbitts,  32  Wis.  79.    p.  1102. 
Young,  Estate  of,  39  Mich.  429.    p.  854. 
Younge  v.  Booe,  11  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  347.    pp. 

1440,  1441,  1443. 
Youngs  V.  Youngs,  5  Redf.  (N.  Y.  Surr.)  505. 

p.  284. 
Younger  v.  Welch,  22  Tex.  417.    p.  865. 
Youse  V.  Norcoms,  12  Mo.  549.    p.  1130. 

Z. 

Zabriskie  v.  Smith,  13  N.  Y.  322.    pp.  1698, 

1703.. 
Zaleski   v.  Clark,    45   Conn.  401.    pp.   2046, 

2047. 
Zehuer  v.  Aultman,  74  Ind.  24.    p.  2110. 
Zehuer    v.    Kepler,    16  Ind.    290.     pp.    219, 

1711. 
Zeigler  v.  Zeigler,  2  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  286.    p. 

19S8. 
Zeller  v.  Eckert,  4  How.  (U.  S.)  289.    p.  2114. 
Zellweger  v.  Caffee,  5  Duer  (N.  Y.),  100.    p. 

509. 
Zemp  V.  Wilmington  &c.  R.  Co.,  9  Rich.  L. 

(S.  C.)  84.    pp.  1207. 1237,  1238. 
Zenger,  Case  of,  cited  p.  1512. 
Zickefoose  v.  Kuykendall,  12  W.  Va.  23.    pp. 

118,  123. 
Ziegler  v.  Maddox,  26  Mo.   575.    pp.   1436, 

1440. 
Zimmerman  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  71  Mo. 

476.     pp.  1226,  1305. 
Zimmerman  v.  Lamb,  7  Minn.  421.    p.  197. 
Zimmerman  v,  Marchland,  23  Ind.  474.    pp. 

528,  2059. 
Zimmerman  v.  State,  56  Md.  536.    p.  78. 
Zollar  V.  Janvrin,  47  N.  H.  324.    p.  1101. 
Zolllcoffer  V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  312.    pp, 

1777,  1778, 1779. 
Zollicoffer  v.  Turney,  6  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  297. 

p.  265. 
Zouch  V.  Clay,  1  Vent.  185.    p.  1031. 
Zuber  v.  Geigar,  2  Yeates  (Pa.),  523.    p.  1965. 


I 


THE  LAW  OF  TRIALS. 


TITLE  I. 
IMPAXELIXG  THE  JURY. 


Chapter     I. 
Chapter    II. 


Chapter  til. 
Chapter  IV, 


Of  Juries  and  the  Qualification  of  Jurors. 
Of  Selecting,  Drawing  and  Summoning  the 

Panel;    and  herein  of  Special  Venires 

and  Talesmen. 
Of  Challenges. 

Of  the  Details  of  Practice  in  Challenging 
AND  Impaneling. 


CHAPTER     I. 

OF  JURIES  AND  THE  QUALIFICATIONS  OF  JURORS. 
Section' 

1.  Preliminary. 

2.  "Waiviug  a  Jury. 

3.  Regularly  the  Jury  must  consist  of  TTvelve  Men. 

4.  What  if  it  consists  of  more  than  Twelve. 

5.  What  if  the  Record  is  Contradictory  as  to  the  Number  of  Jurors. 

6.  Waiver  of  Right  to  Jury  of  Twelve  Men. 

7.  Special  or  Struck  Juries. 

8.  Juries  de  Mediatate  Lingua?. 

9.  Juries  of  Mixed  Races. 

10.  Qualiflcatious  for  Jury  Duty. 

11.  Exemptions  from  Jury  Duty. 

§  1.  Preliminary. —  Counsel  at  the  outset  are  confronted  with 
the  task  of  getting-  an  impartial  jury.     It  will,  therefore,  be  use- 

(1) 


i:\JPANELING   THE    JURY. 


[I  Thomp.  Tr 


ful  to  give  a  sketch  of  the  various  steps  that  usually  take  place 
in  the  organization  of  a  trial  jury, —  dwelling  especially  upon  the 
subjects  of  challenges  and  objections  and  the  time  and  manner 
of  makinii'  the  same. 


§  2.  Waiving-  a  Jury. —  It  may  be  premised  that  the  right  of 
trial  by  jury  may  be  waived  in  civil  cases/  but,  according  to  the 
better  opinion,  not  in  criminal  cases,^  though  there  is  some  opin- 
ion to  the  contrary.^  A  statute  authorizing  such  a  w^aiver  in 
criminal  cases  has  been  held  nof  unconstitutional.^  This  may 
be  done,  under  various  constitutions,  statutes  and  judicial  hold- 
ings, by  not  demanding  a  jury;^  by  making  no  objection^  or 
consenting"  to  an  order  of  reference;  by  failing  to  advance  the 
jury    fee   prescribed  by  statute ;  ^   by  consent   entered    of   rec- 


1  Harris  v.  Shaffer,  92  N.  C.  30; 
Eailroad  Co.  v.  Foreman,  24  West  Va. 
662;  Chapline  v.  Robertson,  44  Ark. 
202;  Heacock  v.  Hosmer,  109  111.  245; 
Vitrified  Wlieel  &  Emery  Co.  v.  Ed- 
wards, 135  Mass.  591;  Pasour  v.  Liue- 
berger,90  N.  C.  159;  Franklin  v.  Mc- 
Corkle,  llLea  (Tenu.),  190;  Lealiy  v. 
Duulap,  6  Colo.  552;  Heacock  u.  Lnb- 
ukee,  108  HI.  641;  Wanser  v.  Atkin- 
son, 43  N.  J.  L.  571 ;  Crump  v.  Tliomas, 
85  N.  C.  272 ;  Tliarp  v.  Witham,  65  la. 
566;  Gregorys.  Lincoln,  13  Neb.  352; 
Bamberger  v.  Terry,  103  U.  S.  40; 
Grant  v.  Reese,  82  N.  C.  72;  Coulter  v. 
AVeed  Serving  Machine  Co.,  3  Lea 
(Tenn.),  115;  Davison  v.  Jersey  Com- 
pany Associates,  71  N.  Y.  333;  Baird 
V.  Mayor,  74  N.  Y.  382;  King  v.  Bur- 
dett,  12  West  Va.  688;  Cushman'^. 
Flanagan,  50  Tex.  389;  Sutton  v.  Mc- 
Connell,  46  Wis.  269;  Merrill  v.  St. 
Louis,  83  Mo.  244;  s.  c,  aff'd,  12  Mo. 
App.  466;  Trail  v.  Somerville,  22  Mo. 
App.  1 ;  Bruner  v.  Marcnm,  50  Mo.  405; 
Tower  v.  Moore,  52  Mo.  118;  Brown  v. 
Home  Savings  Bank,  5  Mo.  App.  1. 

2  State  V,  Carman,  63  la.  130;  s.  c, 
50    Am,  Rep.  741    (Seevers,    J.,  dis- 


senting) ;  State  V.  Stewart,  89  N.  C. 
563;  State  v.  Holt,  90  N.  C.  749;  s.  c, 
47  Am.  Rep.  544. 

3  State  V.  White,  33  La.  Ann.  1218; 
State  V.  Askins,  Id.  1253. 

*  Re  Staff,  63  Wis.  285;  s.  c,  53 
Am.  Rep.  285. 

5  Heacock  V.  Hosmer,  109  111.  245; 
Mich.  Const.,  art.  6,  §'  27.  See  Odell  v. 
Reynolds,  40  Mich.  21 ;  Cushman  v. 
Flanagan,  50  Tex.  389;  Wanser  v.  At- 
kinson, 43  N.  J.  L.  571.  When  the  de- 
mand is  in  time:  Gallagher  v.  Baton 
Rouge  Hebrew  Congregation,  34  La. 
Ann.  526;  Hall  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co., 
65  la.  258;  Vitrified  Wheel  &  Emery 
Co.  V,  Edwards,  135  Mass.  591;  Bon- 
ham  V.  IVIills,  39  Oh.  St.  534.  When 
failing  to  demand,  under  a  rule  of 
court,  not  a  waiver:  Biggs  v.  Lloyd 
(Cal.),  11  Pac.  Rep.  831. 

6  Baird  v.  Mayor,  74  N.  Y.  382. 

7  Grant  v.  Reese,  82  N.  C.  72;  Har- 
ris V.  Shaffer,  92  N.  C.  30. 

8  Venine  v.  Archiljald,  3  Colo.  163. 
But  payment  of  the  jury  fee  at  the 
time  the  demand  for  a  jury  is  made  is 
not  necessary  to  make  the  demand 
valid.     Odeil  v.  Reynolds,  40  Mich.  21. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.  I.]       JURIES    AND    QUALIFICATION    OF    JURORS.  3 

ord  ;^  by  ;i  stipulation  in  writing  signed  b}'  the  parties  and  filed  with 
the  clerk  that  the  case  shall  be  tried  by  the  court ;  ^  by  failing  to 
appear  at  the  trial;  ^  by  not  filing  a  notice  under  a  statute  of  a 
desire  for  a  jury  trial;  *  by  waiving  a  jury  orally  in  open  court;  ^ 
by  demanding  a  jurj'' without  specifying  the  issues  to  be  tried  by 
the  jury,  where  there  are  issues  triable  by  the  court;  ^  by  failing 
to  take  an  appeal  from  the  decision  of  a  board  of  supervisors  to 
the  circuit  court. ^  The  prevailing  opinion  seems  to  be  that  a 
waiver  of  a  jury  at  one  terra,  will  not  estop  the  party  from 
claiming  it  at  a  subsequent  lerni,^  or  after  a  neiu  (rial  has  been 
granted;  ^  though  there  are  holdings,  influenced  by  statute,  to 
the  effect  that  a  Avaiver  once  made  is  a  waiver  for  all  subsequent 
trials.^''  It  has  been  held  that,  although  in  a  case  regularly  tria- 
ble by  jury  the  parties  waive  a  jury,  the  court  is  not  bound  by 
the  waiver,  but  may  refuse  to  perform  the  office  of  a  jury,  with- 
out assigning  any  reason  therefor.^^ 


Althoiigh  the  statute  requires  that  the 
fee  be  deposited  on  the  first  day  of  the 
term  (Rev.  Stat.  Tex.,  art.  30(JG),  a  de- 
posit on  the  second  day  will  be  suffi- 
cient, no  prejudice  appearing,  the 
statute  being  directoi'y  as  to  time. 
Gallagher  v.  Goldfrauk,  G3  Tex.  473. 

1  West.  Va.  Act  of  1872,  chap.  47, 
§  35;  Md.  Const.,  art.  4,  §4;  Desche  v. 
Gies,  56  Md=  135  (holding  that  the 
record  must  show  the  consent.)  A  re- 
cital in  the  record  that  "  neither  party 
requires  a  jury,  and  the  court  is  sub- 
stituted in  lieu  of  a  jury  to  try  the 
case," —  satisfies  such  a  statute.  King 
V,  Burdett,  12  W,  Va.  GS8 ;  Tower  v. 
Moore,  52  Mo.  118 ;  Bruner  v.  Marcum, 
50  Mo.  405.  "Claim"  of  jury  of 
twelve  men  under  New  York  LaAvs  of 
1869,  chap.  410:  Foyer  v.  New  York 
Central,  etc.,  R.  Co=,  7  Abb.  New  Case, 
(N.  Y.)  371.  A  record  entry,  "  Neither 
party  requiring  a  jury,"  —  imports  a 
waiver  of  the  right.  Chapline  v.  Rob- 
ertson, 44  Ark.  202. 

2  Bamberger  v.  Terry,  103  U.  S.  40. 


Compare  Supervisors  of  Wayne  Co.  v. 
Kennicott,  Id.  554. 

3  2  Ind.  Rev.  Stat.  1876,  §  340; 
Love  V.  Hall,  76  Ind.  326;  Leahy  v. 
Dunlap,  6  Colo.  552. 

*  Bailey  v.  Joy,  132  Mass.  356. 

^  Gregory  v.  Lincoln,  13  Neb.  352. 

6  Greenleaf  v.  Egan,  30  Minn.  316. 

'  Tharp  v.  Witham,  65  la.  566. 

8  Cross  V.  State,  78  Ala.  430 ;  Dean 
V.  Sweeney,  51  Tex.  242;  Brown  v. 
Chenoworth,  Id.  469. 

9  State  V.  Touchet,  33  La.  Ann. 
1154;  Carthage  v.  Buckner,  8  Bradw. 
(111.)  152. 

JO  Coulter  V.  Weed  Sewing  Machine 
Co.,  3  Lea  (Tenn.),  115;  Nashville  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  roster,  10  Lea  (Tenn.),  351; 
Heacockv.  Lubukee,  108  111.  641  (Scott, 
J.,  dissenting). 

"  McCarthy  v.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  15 
Mo.  App.  385.  As  to  the  right  to  trial 
by  jury,  and  its  waiver,  see  Biggs  v. 
Lloyd  (Cal.),  11  Pac.  Rep.  831,  and 
note;  Lewis  v.  Klotz  (La.),  1  South. 
Rep.    539 ;     Railroad    Co.    v.    Morris 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§   3.   Regularly  the  Jury  must  Consist  of  Twelve  Men.  — 

According  to  the  common  law,  a  legal  petit  jury  consists  of  nei- 
ther more  nor  less  than  twelve  men/  and  the  ancient  law  was  so 
precise  that  if  the  trial  were  by  a  jury  consisting  of  more  or  less 
than  twelve  men  it  was  a  mistrial.'^  In  criminal  trials  this  is 
undoubtedly  the  law  in  this  countiy  at  the  present  time.  The 
constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  it  is  believed  the  constitu- 
tions of  all  the  States,  contain,  with  some  variation  of  words, 
the  declaration  that  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  remain  invio- 
late. The  constitutional  juiy  thus  guaranteed  is  a  common-law 
jury  of  twelve  men.^  In  the  face  of  this  constitutional  guaranty 
an  act  of  the  legislature  providing  for  the  trial  of  common-law 
cases  before  a  jury  of  less  than  twelve  men  is  void.*     Moreover 


(Tex.),  3  S.  W.  Rep.  457;  Eailroad  Co, 
V.  Martin  (Tenu.),  2  S.  W.  Eep.  381; 
Caldwell  Co.  v.  Crocket  (Tex.),  4  S. 
W.  Eep.  e07. 

1  Hale,  P.  C.  161;  Bac.  Abr.  Juries 
A. ;  1  Chit.  Cr.  L.  505. 

2  Trials  per  Pais  (anuo  1725)  79. 

3  Cancemi  v.  People,  18  N.  Y.  128, 
135;  May  v.  Milwauliee,  etc.,  E.  Co.,  3 
Wis.  219;  State  v.  Cox,  8  Ark.  43(5; 
Work  V.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  29G ;  Brazier 
V.  State,  44  Ala.  387,  392;  Turns  v. 
Com.,  G  Mete.  (Mass.)  224,235;  Lamb 
V.  Lane,  4  Oh.  St.  1G7;  People  v. 
Kennedy,  2  Park  Cr.  E.  (X.  Y.)  312 ; 
Byrd  v.  State,  1  How.  (Miss.)  1<;3, 
177;  Carpenter  v.  State,  4  How. 
(Miss.)  1G3,  IGG;  Eedus  v.  Wofford,  4 
Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.),  579,  692;  State  v. 
McClear,  11  Nev.  39;  Smith  v.  Atlan- 
tic, etc.,  E.  Co.,  25  Oh.  St.  91,  102; 
Gibson  v.  State,  IG  Fla.  291,  300;  Wyne- 
hamer  v.  People,  13  N.  Y.  378,  427; 
Cruger  v.  Hudson,  etc.,  E.  Co.,  12  X. 
Y.  190,  198;  People  v.  Lane,  G  Abb.  Pr. 
(x.  s.)  105,  115. 

4  Vaughn  v.  Scade,  30  Mo.  GOO; 
Work  V.  State,  2  Oh.  St.  29G ;  Byrd  v. 
State,  1  How.  (Miss.)  177;  Dowling 
V.  State,  5  Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.)  GG4;  Nor- 


val  V.  Eice,  2  Wis.  23;  May  v.  Mil- 
waukee, etc.,  E.  Co.,  3  Wis.  219;  Foster 
V.  Kirby,  31  Mo.  49G ;  Allen  v.  State* 
51  Ga.  2G4;  Henning  v.  Hannibal,  etc., 
E.  Co.,  35  Mo.  408.  But  as  justices  of 
the  peace  do  not  form  any  part  of  the 
ordinary  judicial  machinery  of  the 
common  law,  it  is  held  that  such  con- 
stitutional provisions  do  not  inhibit 
the  legislature  from  authorizing  a  jury 
of  less  than  twelve  in  justices'  courts, 
especially  since  tlie  riglit  to  a  jury  of 
twelve  men  is  secured  in  the  unlimited 
right  of  appeal  to  a  superior  court  of 
record.  Emerick  v.  Harris,  1  Binu. 
(Pa.)  41G;  Work  v.  State,  2  Oh.  St. 
29G ;  Bryan  v.  State,  4  Iowa,  349 ;  State 
V.  Beneke,  9  Iowa,  203;  Norton  v.  Mc- 
Leary,  8  Oh.  St,  205;  Dawson  r.  Ho- 
ran,  51  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  549;  Knight  v. 
Campbell,  G2  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  IG  (over- 
ruling Baxter  v.  Putney,  37  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  140)  ;  People  v.  Lane,  G  Abb. 
Pr.  (x.  s.)  105;  Ward  v.  People,  30 
Mich.  IIG;  State  v.  Gutierrez,  15  La. 
Ann.  190.  The  statutes  generally  pro- 
vide that  a  justice's  jui'y  shall  consist 
of  six  men,  unless  the  parties  agree 
upon  a  less  number.  So,  also,  in 
cases  in  courts  which  exercise  their 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  I.]       JURIES    AND    QUALIFICATION    OF    JURORS.  5 

the  rule  in  civil  as  well  as  in  criminal  cases  is  that  the  record 
must  shoiu  that  the  case  was  tried  by  a  jury  of  twelve  men  (ex- 
cept by  consent  of  the  parties),  or  the  verdict  will  be  a  nullity, 
and  the  judgment  entered  thereon  will  be  reversed  and  a  new 
trial  irranted.^ 


§  4.  What  if  it  Consists  of  3Iore  than  Twelve.  —  The  same 
consequences  will  follow  where  the  record  shows  that  the  verdict 
was  rendered  by  a  jury  of  thirteen  except  by  consent  of  parties. ^ 
This  rule  has  not  been  accepted  in  America  in  civil  cases  without 
some  qualification.  In  one  case,  an  action  of  assumpsit,  it  was 
held  that  the  verdict  by  a  jury  of  thirteen  was  good.^  The 
Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky  have  adopted  what  seems  to  be  a 
just  and  reasonable  qualification  of  the  rule,  by  holding  that  the 
objection  that  the  verdict  was  rendered  by  a  jury  of  thirteen 
will  be  waived  unless  made  in  the  trial  court  on  a  motion  for  a 
new  trial,  and  that  it  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time  on  ap- 


fiinctions  without  the  tvicl  of  a  jury  by 
the  ancient  common  hiw,  a  trial,  even 
in  a  criminal  case  by  a  jury  of  less 
than  twelve,  will  be  legal.  Duffy  v. 
People,  G  Hill  (X.  Y.),  75;  People  r. 
Justices,  74  X.  Y.  400;  People  v.  Clark, 
23  Hun  (X.  Y.),  374.  The  constitu- 
tions of  many  of  the  States  moreover, 
provide  that  in  criminal  cases  trial 
before  courts  not  of  record  or  before 
inferior  courts,  the  number  of  the 
jury  may  be  less  than  twelve  as  pre- 
scribed by  law.  Colo.  Const.,  1875; 
art.  2,  §  23;  Ga.  Const.,  ISOS;  art. 
5,  §  4,  sub  sec.  5;  Iowa  Const.,  1857, 
art.  1,  §  9;  Amend,  to  Fla.  Const., 
18r,8,  art.  6,  §  12,  ratified  1875;  Mich. 
Const.,  1850,  art.  6,  §  28;  Mo,  Const., 
1875,  art.  2,  §  28;  Neb.  Const.,  18(50- 
<'7,  art.  1,  §  5  (Const.  1875,  art.  1, 
§  0) ;  S.  C.  Const.,  1805,  art.  9,  §  7. 
The  La.  Act  of  1880,  Nos.  35  and  35, 
providing  for  trial  of  certain  crim- 
inal cases  by  a  jury  of  five  is  valid. 
State    V.   Everage,    33   La.    Ann.  120; 


State    V.  Dcmouchet  (La.),   3    S.    W. 
Rep.  505. 

>  Cancemi  v.  People,  18  N.  Y.  128; 
s.  c,  7  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  271;  Brown  v. 
State,  0  Blackf .  (Ind.)  501 ;  Jackson  v. 
State,  0  Blackf.  (Ind.)  401;  Maduska 
V.  Thomas,  (;  Kan.  153;  Brown  v.  State, 
10  Ind.  490;  Allen  v.  State,  54  Ind. 
401;  Hill  V.  People,  10  Mich.  351;  Com. 
V.  Shaw,  7  Am.  Law.  Reg.  289;  Dixon 
V.  Ricliard,  3  How.  (Miss.)  771;  Ayres 
V.  Barr,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  280; 
Oldham  v.  Hill,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.), 
300;  Bone  v.  McGinley,  7  How. 
(Miss.)  071;  Briant  V.  Russell,  2  N. 
J.  L.  107;  Denman  v.  Baldwin,  3  N.  J. 
L.  945;  State  v.  Van  Matre,  49  Mo. 
208:  State  v.  Myers,  08  Mo.  200. 

2  Wolfe  V.  Martin,  1  How.  (Miss.) 
30;  McCormick  v.  Brookfield,  4  N.  J. 
L.  09 ;  Whitehurst  v.  Davis,  2  Hayw. 
(X.  C.)  113;  Parke,  B.,  in  Muirhead  v. 
Evans,  0  Exch.  447,  449, 

3  Tillman  v.  Allies,  5  Smede.»  &  M. 
(Miss.)  373. 


6  IMPANELING-   THE   JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

peal^  Moreover,  it  is  a  rule,  applicable  alike  in  civil  and  crimi- 
nal cases,  that,  if  a  jury  of  more  than  twelve  men  has  been 
impaneled  and  the  last  juror  sworn  can  be  pointed  out  during 
the  trial,  he  may  be  dismissed  from  the  panel  and  the  trial  may 
proceed.^ 

§  5.  What  if  the  Record  is  contradictory  as  to  Xumber  of 
Jurors. — "Where  the  entries  of  the  record  are  contradictory  as 
to  the  number  of  jurors  who  sat  at  the  trial,  so  much  of  the 
record  as  states  that  the  jury  consisted  of  twelve  men  will  be  re- 
garded as  stating  the  truth,  and  the  contrary  statement  will  be 
rejected  as  a  clerical  error, — the  legal  presumption  being  that 
the  portion  of  the  record  is  true  which  answers  the  requirements 
of  the  law,  unless  the  contrary  be  made  to  appear  by  the  bill  of 
exceptions.'^ 

§  6.  Waiver  of  right  to  Jury  of  Twelve  Men. — While  in 
cases  of  felony  the  constitutional  right  to  be  tried  by  a  jury  of 
twelve  men  cannot  be  waived  by  the  accused,*  in  cases  of  misde- 
meanor^ the  rule  is  different,  especially  where  the  punishment  is 
a  pecuniary  fine  merely. 

§  7.  Special  or  Strucls  Juries.  —  This  jury  differs  from  the 
common  jury  in  respect  of  the  fact  that  it  is  not  impaneled  in 
the  ordinary  manner.  It  is  ordinarily  formed  by  each  party 
striking  a  designated  number  from  a  list  of  names,  the  remaining 
composing  the  juiy  which  is  to  try  the  cause.     No  general  direc- 

1  Eoss  V.  Neal,  7  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  ■*  Cancemi  v.  People,  18  N.  Y.  128; 
408;  Berry  v.  Kemiey,  5  B.  Mou.  (Ky.)  State  v.  Mansflekl,  41  Mo.  470;  Wil- 
122.  lu  a  criminal  case  a  legal  ver-  liams  ?;.  State,  12  Ohio  St.  622;  Allen  v. 
diet  cannot  be  rendered  by  a  jury  of  State,  54  Ind.  461;  Hill  v.  People,  16 
more  than  -  twelve  men  (Bullard  v.  Mich.  351.  But  see  State  v.  Kaufman, 
State,  38  Tex.  504),  and  as  hereafter  51  Iowa,  578;  s.  c.  9  Cent.  L.  J.  313. 
seen  this  defect  in  cases  of  felony  can-  s  Com.  v.  Dailey,  12  Cush.  (Mass.) 
not  be  waived.     Posi,  §  6.  80;    States.  Borowsl^y,  11  Nev.  119; 

2  Muirhead  v.  Evans,  6  Exch.  447;  State  v.  Cox,  8  Arls.  436,  447;  Sarah  v, 
Bullard  v.  State,  38  Tex.  504;  Davis  State,  28  Ga.  576;  State  v.  Van  Matre, 
V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  631.  49   Mo.    268;    Tyra   v.    Com.,  2  Mete. 

3  Larillian    v.    Lane,    8    Arlv.    372;  (Ky.)  1. 
Eoote  V.  Lawrence,  1  Stew.  (Ala.)  483. 


Tit.    I,  Ch.  I.]       JURIES    AND    QUALIFICATION    OF   JURORS.  7 

tion  concerning  the  impaneling  of  a  fc-pecial  jury  can  be  given  in 
a  brief  compass.^  In  America  the  subject  is  generally  one  of 
statutory  regulation,  the  policy  of  the  statutes  being,  like  that  of 
the  rule  of  the  common  law,  to  allow  either  party  the  privilege 
of  such  a  jury  in  cases  of  exceptional  difficulty  or  importance. ^ 
Under  some  systems,  special  juries  are  composed  of  persons, 
otherwise  qualitied  for  jury  duty,  who  are  possessed  of  certain 
special  qualifications  demanded  by  the  peculiarities  of  the  case 
on  trial. ^  Under  some  systems,  challenges  for  cause  are  allowed 
before  the  striking  begins.* 

§  8.  Juries  tie  Mediatate  Linguas. — This  kind  of  jury  was 
allowed  to  an  alien.  Its  distinctive  feature  was  that  half  of  its 
members  were  composed  of  citizens  or  denizens,  and  the  other 
half  of  foreigners.  It  was  used  in  England  under  various  stat- 
utes until  recently  abolished.*  The  riiilit  to  this  kind  of  jury 
was  recognized  in  a  few  early  cases  in  this  country.'^  denied  in 
others,^  and  is  generally  abolished  by  statute,^  though  in  one 
State  it  may  still  be  directed  by  the  court. ^ 


1  See  Thomp.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  §§12, 
13,  14. 

2  Patchiu  V.  Sands,  10  Wend.  (X. 
Y.)  570;  People  v.  McGuire,  43  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  67.  As  to  what  are  such 
causes  and  how  the  fact  is  to  be 
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  court, 
see  Poucher  v.  Livingstone,  2  Wend. 
(X.  Y.)  296;  Anon.,  1  Jolins.  (X.  Y.) 
314;  Wright  v.  Colurabiau  Ins.  Co.,  2 
Jolius.  (X.  Y.)  211;  Murpliy  v.  Kipp, 
1  Duer  (N.  Y.),  659;  Livingston  v. 
Smith,  1  Jolms.  (X.  Y.)  141;  Walsh  v. 
Sun  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  2  Hob.  (X.  Y.) 
646;  s.  c.  17  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  350; 
Nesmith  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  8  Abb. 
Pr.  (X.  Y.)  423;  Strylier  v.  Turnbull, 
3Caiues  (X.  Y.),  103;  Hartshorn  v. 
Gelstcn,  3  Caines  (X.  Y.),  84;  People 
V.  MoGuire,  43  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  67. 

^  Golding  V.  Petit,  27  L:i.  Ann. 
86. 

^  K.  S.  Mo.  1879,  §  2802;   K.  S.  Del. 


1874,    chap.    109,    §    18;    2   Ind.    Rev. 
Stat.  1876,  p.  159,  §  1,  note. 

5  By  tlie  Stat.  33  Vict.-,  chap.  14, 
§  5.  See  Thomp.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  §  10, 
and  authorities  cited. 

6  Ilespublica  v.  Mesca,  1  Dall.  (IT. 
S.)  73;  Peoples.  McLean,  2  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)381;  United  States  v.  Carnot,  2 
Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  409;  Ricliards  v. 
Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  690;  Brown  v. 
Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  711. 

'  State  V.  Antonio,  4  HawivS  (X. 
C),  200;  United  States  v.  McMahon,  4 
Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  573;  Stale  v. 
Fuentes,  5  La.  Ann.  427. 

8  X.  Y.  Code.  Rem.  Jus.,  §  1190; 
Code  Ala.  1876,  §  4886;  R.  C.  Md.  1878, 
art.  62,  §  17;  R.  S.  HI.  1880,  ch.  38, 
§  429;  Gen.  Laws  Colo.  1877,  §  818;  R. 
S.  Mo.  1879,  §  1892;  Comp.  L.  Mich. 
1871,  §  6012;  1  Brigiit.  Purd.  Dig.,  p. 
837,  §  71;  lb.,  p.  385,  §  45. 

9  G.  S.  Ky.  1879,  p.  571,  §  6. 


8  IMPANELING   THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  9.  Juries  of  3Iixed  Races. — While  persons  of  the  negro 
race  can  not  demand  as  a  right/  even  under  the  fourteenth 
amendment  of  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  and  the  Civil 
Eights  Law, 2  that  juries  to  try  causes  to  which  they  are  parties 
shall  be  composed  in  part  of  persons  of  their  own  race ;  yet  a 
State  law  ^  which  confines  eligibility  to  jury  duty  to  loJiite  male 
persons,  etc.,  is  obnoxious  to  the  fourteenth  amendment  to  the 
Federal  constitution,  as  denying  to  colored  persons  the  equal 
protection  of  the  laws,  and  hence  void.* 

§  lO.  Qualifications  for  Jury  Duty.  —  Counsel  cannot  pro- 
ceed with  the  work  of  impaneling  a  jury  without  having  in  mind 
the  qualifications  of  jurors  prescribed  by  the  common  law,  by 
constitutional  provisions,  or  liy  statute.  The  common-law  quali- 
fications may  generally  be  disregarded,^  and  constitutional  pro- 
visions prescribe  the  qualifications  of  jurors  in  three  States  only, 
80  far  as  the  writer  has  observed.^  It  is  generally  the  subject  of 
legislation,  and  the  power  to  prescribe  qualifications  other  than 
those  of  the  common  law,  by  abolishing  the  freehold  qualifica- 
tion," or  the  property  qualification,*^  is  fully  established.^     But 

1  Nashville  v.  Shepherd,  3  Baxt.  also,  Cases  of  the  Comity  Judges,  3 
(Tenn.)  373.  See,  also,  Vv^illiams  v.  Hughes  (U.  S.),  57(3,  Where  a  State 
State,  44  Tex.  34.  constitution    limited     the     right    of 

2  Virginia  v.  Rives,  100  U.  S.  313;  suffrage  to  the  white  race,  and  a 
s.  c.  sub  nom.  Be  Com.  Virginia,  12  statute  conlined  the  selection  of  jurors 
Cent.  L.  J.  229;  Bush  u.  Kentucky,  107  to  electors,  t\\Q  adoption  of  the  Fif- 
U.  S.  110.  teenth  Amendment  operated  to  enlarge 

3  Laws  West  Va.  1872-3,  p.  102.  the  list  of  electors  and  to  qualify 
Several  State  statutes  confine  the  colored  citizens  for  jury  service, 
selection  of  jurors  to  white  persons  Neal  v.  Delaware,  103  U.  S.  370. 

and  are  to  that  extent  invalid.     K.  S.  ^  These  ordinarily  touch  the  ques- 

W.  Va.  1879,  ch.  109,  §  1;    G.  S.  Ky,  tion  of  citizensiiip  or  freehold.   Thomp. 

1879,  p.  571,  §  2;    G.   S.   Neb.  1873,  p.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  §§  16,  21. 
G42,    §    Go7;    Gen.    Laws    Ore.    1S72,  6  Const.  Tia.   1808,  art.  VII,  §  12; 

§  918.     See,  also,  Rev.  Code  Md.  1878,  Const.  Ga.  18(38,  art.  V,  §  13,  subsec. 

p.  558,   §§    1  and  2.     Others  provide  2;  Const.  N.  H.  1792,  part  I,  art.  21. 
against  disqualification  on  account  of  '  Kirwin  v.  People,  96  111.  206. 

color.     Stat,  Tenn.  1871,  §  4002rt;  R.  »  Com.  v.  Dorsey,   103  Mass.   412; 

S.  La.  1876,  §  2125.  State  v.  Wilson,  48  N.  II.  398. 

4  Strauder  v.  State,  100  U.  S.  303,  ^  See  also  Byrd  v.  State,  1  How, 
307;    s.   c.    10   Cent.  L.  .J.    225..     See,  (Miss.)  I63j  176.     So,  tlie  legislature 


Tit.  I,   Ch.   I.]       JURIES    AXD    QUALIFICATIOX    OF    JURORS. 


9 


where  the  constitution  prescribes  the  qualification,  it  is  not  com- 
petent for  the  legishiture  to  resirict  it,  —  as  if  the  constitution 
makes  all  qualified  voters  qualified  jurors,  and  the  legislature 
attempts  to  restrict  the  qualification  to  householders  or  free- 
holders.^ By  some  State  constitutions  religious  or  political  tests 
are  forbidden.^  Others  provide  more  generally  that  "  the  civil 
rights,  privileges,  or  capacities  of  any  citizen,  shall  in  no  way  be 
diminished  or  enlarged  on  account  of  his  religious  principles,"  ^ 
and  by  others  particular  disqualifications  are  provided  for.^  The 
statutes  generally  disqualify  those  convicted  of  scandalous  crime 
or  guilty  of  gross  immorality.^  Alienage  is  a  ground  of  dis- 
qualification at  common  law,  except  in  the  case  of  mixed  juries,^ 
already  considered ;  ^  and  many  statutes  provide  that  jurors  shall 
be  citizens  of  the  United  States,^  •'  residents  "  of  the  district,^ 
qualified  voters,^**  of  fair  character,  approved  integrity,  sound  judg- 


may  define  the  mode  of  ascertain- 
ing sucli  qualifications.  Whitehead  v. 
Wells,  29  Ark.  99. 

1  Maloy  V.  State,  33  Tex.  599;  Wil- 
son v.  State,  35  Tex.  3(55;  Brennan  v. 
State,  33  Tex.  2G6.  But,  contra,  see 
Lester  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  432. 

2  Const.  Tenn.  1870,  art.  1,  §  G; 
Const.  AV.  Va.  1872,  art.  Ill,  §  11. 

3  Const.  Ala.  1819,  art.  I,  §  4; 
Const.  Ala.  18G5,  art.  I,  §  4;  Const. 
Ala.  1875,  art.  I,  §  4;  Const.  Ark. 
1864,  art.  II,  §  4;  Cal.  Const.  1879, 
art.  IV,  §  9;  Const.  la.  1857,  art.  I, 
§  4;  Const.  la.  1846,  art.  I,  §  4;  Const. 
Ky.  1799,  §  4;  Const.  Ky.  1850,  art. 
XIII,  §  6;  Const.  Kans.  1857,  art.  XV, 
Bill  of  Rights,  §  4;  Const.  Tenn.  1870, 
art.  I,  §  6. 

4  Const.  Ala.  1819,  art.  VI,  §  5; 
Const.  Tex.  1876,  art.  XVI,  §  2;  Cal. 
Const.  1879,  art.  XX,  §  11. 

«  Code  Va.  1873,  p.  1059,  §  4;  R.  S. 
W.  Va.  1879,  ch.  109,  §  8;  R.  S.  So. 
Car.  1873,  p.  520,  §  9.  See,  also,  R.  S. 
Wis.  1878,  §  2525;  Gen.  Laws  Ore. 
1872,  Civil  Code,  §  918;  Cal.  Code.  Civ. 


Proc,  §  199;  Code  Ala.  1876,  §  4733; 
Comp.  Laws  Utah,  1876,  §  1073;  R.  S. 
Tex.  1879,  §  3010;  Comp.  L.  Nev.  1873, 
§  1051;  G.  S.  Neb.  1873,  p.  642,  §  657; 
Comp.  L.  Ariz.,  ch.  47,  §  10;  Gen. 
Laws  Colo.  1877,  §  1460;  R.  C.  Miss. 
1880,  §  1661;  R.  S.  Me.  1871,  ch.  106, 
§2. 

«  Post,  §  54. 

'  Ante,  §  8;  Co.  Litt.  156?;;  Judson 
V.  Eslava,  Minor  (Ala.),  3;  State  v. 
Primrose,  3  Ala.  646;  Boyingtou  v. 
State,  2  Port.  (Ala.)  100. 

»  Cal.  Code,  Civ.  Proc,  §  198;  R.  S. 
Wis.  1878,  §  2524;  Comp.  L.  Arizona, 
ch.  47,  §  10;  Gen.  Laws  Colo.  1877, 
§  1460;  Gen.  Laws  New  Mexico,  1880, 
p.  366;  N.  Y.  Code  Rem.  Jus.,  §  1027; 
Gen.  Laws  Ore.  1872,  Civil  Code, 
§  918;  G.  S.  R.  I.,  p.  36,  §  1 ;  Comp.  L. 
Utah,  1876,  §  1073. 

9  Rev.  St.  U.  S.,  §  872;  construed 
in  United  States  v.  Nardello,  4  Mackey 
(D.  C),  503. 

^0  R.  S.  Tex.  1879,  art.  310;  Miller's 
R.  C.  Iowa,  1880,  ch.  10,  §  227;  Comp. 
L.    Nev.    1873,     §     1051;     Code    Va. 


10 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


ment,  well  informed  and  the  like  ;  ^  and  neither  mentally  nor  bodily 
disabled, 2  and  not  more  than  sixty, -^  or  seventy,^  years  of  age. 
Freehold,^  household  ^  and  property^  qualifications  are  retained  in 
some  States.  Educational  qualifications  are  rarely  prescribed,^ 
though  in  one  State  inability  to  read  or  ivrile  is  made  a  ground 
of  challenge,^  and  in  others  inability  to  understand  the  language 
in  which  the  proceedings  are  conducted  disqualifies.^^     It  should 


1873,  p.  1058,  §  1;  Comp.  L.  Kan. 
1870,  §  29G4;  Bush  Diji.  Tla.,  ch. 
104,  §  1;  K.  S.  DfL  1874,  cli.  109, 
§  1;  Ark.  Dig.,  1874,  §  3654;  Comp.  L. 
Arizona,  cli.  47,  §  10;  E.  S.  Wis.  1878, 
§2524;  Corap.  L.  Mich.  1871,  §  5978; 
H.  S.  La.  187G,  §  2125;  G.  S.  Mass. 
18C0,  cli.  132,  §  1;  K.  S.  Me.  1871,  cli. 
lOG,  §  2;  Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  198; 
G.  S.  E.  L  1872,  p.  430,  §  1 ;  E.  S.  So. 
Car.  1873,  p.  519,  §§  3,  G;  2  Eev.  Incl. 
187G,  p.  31. 

1  N.  y.  Code  Eem.  Jus.,  §  1027; 
Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  198;  E.  S.  111. 
1880,  ell.  78,  §  2;  Supp.  to  Ga.  Code, 
1873,  §  654;  Bush  Dig.  Pla.,  ch.  104, 
§  3;  G.  S.  Ky.  1879,  p.  573,  §  4;  Comp. 
L.  Mich.  1871,  §  5978;  Code  Ala.  1876, 
§  4733;  E.  S.  Wis.  1878,  §  2530;  Ark. 
Dig.  1874,  §  3669;  Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879, 
§  2964;  G.  S.  Neb.  1873,  p.  642,  §  657; 
G.  S.  E.  I.  1872,  p.  432,  §  14;  E.  C. 
Miss.  1880,  §  1681;  G.  S.  Ky.  1879:  p. 
571,  §  2;  E.  S.  So.  Car.  1873,  p.  519,  §§ 
3,  6;  Stat.  Tenn.  1871,  §  3990.  It  Avas 
held  not  erroneous  to  allow  a  juror  to 
sit  in  a  case,  although  "  he  did  not 
read  the  newspapers  and  could  not 
tell  what  age  he  was,"  where  the 
statute  required  simply  that  jurors 
should  lie  "  solier,  intelligent  and 
judicious  persons."  Com.  v.  "\Vinne- 
niore,  1  Brewst.  356;  s.  c.  2  Brewst. 
378. 

2  N.  y.  Code  Eem.  Jus.,  §  1027;  E. 
S.  111.  1880,  ch.  78,  §  2 ;  Comp.  L.  Jlich. 
1871,  §  5978;  Comp.  L.  Arizona,  ch. 
47,  §  10;  Code  Ga.  1873,  §§  3930,  3996; 


Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879,  §  2964;  G.  S 
Neb.  1873,  p.  642,  §  657;  Comp  L. 
Utah,  1876,  §  1073;  Gen.  Laws  Ore. 
1872,  Civil    Code,   §    918;    E.    S.   Tex 

1879,  art.  3010. 

'•^  N.  y.  Code  Eem.  Jus.,  §  1027; 
Code  Va.  1873,  p.  1058,  §  1;  E.  S.  W. 
Va.  1879,  ch.  109,  §  1;  Code  Ga.,  §§ 
3930,  3906;  Comp.  L.  Arizona,  ch.  47, 
§  10;  E.G.  Miss.  1880,  §  1G61;  E.  S.  111. 

1880,  ch.  78,  §  2. 

*  E.  S'.  Me.  1871,  ch.  106,  §  2.  In 
New  Jersey,  sixty-tive  years  is  the 
limit.     Eev.  N.  J.  1877,  p.  532,  §  6. 

fi  N.  y.  Code  Eem.  Jus.,  §  1027;  B. 
S.  Tex.  1879,  §  3010;  Stat.  Tenn.  1871, 
§  4002;  Gen.  Laws  New  Mexico,  1880, 
p.  366;  2  Eev.  Ind.  1876,  p.  31;  Code 
Ala.  1876,  §  4732.  A  tenant  by  the 
curtesy  initiate  is  a  freeholder.  State 
i\  Mills,  91  N.  C.  581. 

c  E.  8.  Tex.  1879,  §  3010;  Gen.  Laws 
New  Mexico,  1880,  p.  366;  Stat.  Tenn. 
1871,  §  4002;  G.  S.  Ky.  1879,  p.  571, 
§  2;  2  Eev.  Ind.  1876,  p.  31;  Code  Ala. 
1876,  §  4732. 

'  N.  y.  Code  Eenie  Jus.,  §  1027; 
Comp,  Laws  Utah,  1876,  §  1073, 
Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879,  §  2964;  Cal.  Code 
Civ.  Proc,  §  198;  G.  S.  E.  I.  1872,  p. 
36,  §  1;  E.  S.  Del.  1874,  ch.  109,  §  2; 
Code  Ga.  1873,  §  3907;  Battle's  Eev. 
N.  C,  p.  194,  §  229rt. 

**  Comp.  Laws  Utah,  1876,  p.  55, 

8  Texas  Code  Grim,  Proc,  art, 
636,  sulisec.  14,  See  Nolen  v.  State,  9 
Tex.  App.  419o  See;)0*•^  §  56. 

J"  Cal.    Code.  Civ.  Proc,  §    198;    R, 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  I.]       JURIES   AND    QUALIFICATION   OF   JURORS. 


11 


be  borne  in  mind  that  inability  to  read  and  write  was  no  dis- 
qimlitication  at  common  law,  since  in  ancient  times  very  few 
persons  possessed  this  qualification.^ 

§  11.  Exemption  from  Jury  Duty.  — The  right  of  exemptior. 
from  jury  duty  need  not  l)e  much  considered;  2  because,  unless 
the  statute  creating  the  exemption  is  couched  in  such  terms  as 
to  create  a  disqualification,  it  will  be  a  personal  privilege  merely 
which  may  be  waived,  provided  the  person  is  not  otherwise  sub- 
ject to  challenge.^  INlany  of  the  statutes  enact  in  terms  that 
the  exemption  by  thcni  created  sliall  not  ))e  considered  as  a 
ground  of  challenge  ;  ^  and  others  are  framed  in  such  terms  as  to 
carry  the  same  imi)lication.^ 


S.  111.  1880,  ch.  78.  §  2;  Comp.  L.  Mich. 
1871,  §  51178.     Scej)os<,  §  55. 

1  See  Com.  v.  Vv'inueniore,  1  Brewst. 
(Pa.)  356,380;  s.  c.  2  Brewst.  (Pa.) 
378;  White  v.  State,  52  Miss.  21G,  224; 
American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mahone,  56  Miss. 
180;  Citizens  Bank  v.  Strauss,  26  La. 
Ann.  736;  State  v.  Lewis,  28  La.  Ann. 
84;  Campbell  v.  State,  48  Ga.  353. 

2  The  subject  is  discussed  in 
Thomp,  &  r,Ier.  Jur.,  §§  34-40,  inclu- 
sive. 

3  Mulcahy  v.  Reg.,  Irish  Rep.  1  C. 
L.  12 ;  s.  c.  affirmed  in  L.  R.  3  II.  L. 
306;  State  v.  Forslnier,  43  X.  H.  81); 
State  v^  Wright,  53  Me.  328;  Moore  v. 
Cass,  10  Kan.  288;  Davis  v.  People,  19 
111.  74  •,  Murphy  v.  People,  37  111.  447; 
Chasr  V.  People,  40  111.  352;  Davidson 
V.  P^^oj'.e,  90  111.  221;  EdAvards  v. 
Farm,  2   La.  Ann.  307;    Breeding  v. 


State,  11  Tex.  257;  Greer  v.  Norvill.  3 
Hill  (S.  C),  262;  Booth  v.  Com.,  16 
Gratt.  (Va.)  519;  United  States  v. 
Lee,  4  Mackey  (D.  C),  489;  s.  c.  54 
Am.  Rep.  293. 

■»  Cal.  Penal  Code,  §  1075;  Comp.  L. 
Ariz.,  ch.  11,  §  321;  Stat,  at  L.  Minn. 
1S73,  p.  1056,  §  23S;  Bullitt's  Ky. 
Code  (Cr.),  p.  42,  §  211;  R.  S.  La. 
1876,  §  2131;  Ark.  Dig.  Stat.  1874,  § 
1914;  Miller  R.  C.  Iowa,  1880,  §  2777; 
R.  S.  111.  1880,  ch.  78,  §  14;  Comp.  L. 
Nev.  1873,  §  1965;  Gen.  Laws  Ore. 
1872  (Civil  Code),  §  186;  Laws  Utah, 
1878  (Code  Cr.  Proc),  §  243. 

5  Bush  Dig.  Fla.,  ch.  104,  §2;  R. 
S.  Del.  1874,,  ch.  109  §  1;  Supp.to  Ga. 
Code  of  1873,  §§  415,  416,  417.  That 
it  is  not  a  ground  of  challenge,  see 
Green  v.  State,  59  Md.  123;  s.  c.  43 
Am.  Rep.  542. 


12  IMPANELING   THE    JURY.  [L  ThOLUp.  Tr., 


CHAPTER     II. 

OF  SELECTING,  DRAWING  AND  SUMMONING  THE  PANEL;  AND 
HEREIN  OF  SPECIAL  VENIRES  AND  TALESMEN. 

Section. 

13.  Selecting  the  Jury  List. 

U.  [Coiltiuuecl.]     In  the  Federal  aud  Territorial  Courts. 

15.  Drawing  the  Panel. 

IG.  Publication  of  the  Panel. 

17.  Service  of  it  upon  the  Accused. 

18.  [Continued.]     Nature  and  Extent  of  this  Right. 

19.  Summoning  the  Jurors. 

20.  Special  Venire  in  Default  of  Jurors. 

21.  Special  Venire  in  Capital  Cases. 

22.  Venire,  by  whom  Executed  aud  Returned. 

23.  Of  Talesmen. 

24.  [Continued.]     Under  what  Circumstances  Summoned. 

25.  [Continued.]     Contlicting  Rulings  on  this  Subject. 

26.  [Continued.]     Further  of  this  Subject. 

27.  [Continued.]     By  Whom  and  How  Summoned. 

§  13.  Selecting  the  Jury  List.  —  At  common  law  no  such 
thing  was  known  as  the  preparation  of  a  list  of  persons  who  were 
liable  to  be  summoned  to  serve  as  jurors  at  a  succeeding  term  of 
court ;  but  the  uncontroUed  discretion  was  vested  in  the  sheriff, 
in  tlie  coroner,  or  in  officials  called  elisors,  of  summoning  such 
"  good  and  lawful  men  "  as  they  might  choose  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  writ  of  venire  facias.^  This  led  to  enormous  abuses, 
chiefly  in  the  packing  of  juries  and  the  blackmailing  of  citizens  ;  ^ 
to  remedy  which,  American  statutes  have  generally  provided, 
with  more  or  less  particularity,  for  the  preparation,  a  given 
time  before  the  commencement  of  any  term  of  court,  or  at  other 
stated  periods,  of  a  list  of  persons,  within  the  county  or  other 
jurisdiction,  froni  whom  jurors  are  to  be  summoned.  The  prep- 
aration of  this  list   is  generally,  though  not  always,*   confided 

1  See  Thomp.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  §  44.  R.  S.  La.  1870,  §  2127;  Rev.  N.  J.  1877,. 

2  Rex  V.  Whittalcer,  Cowp.  752.  p.  532,  §  7. 

3  Code  Ala,  187G,  §§  4732,  4733; 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   II.]       SELECTING,  DRAWING,  ETC.,  THE    PANEL. 


13 


to  officials  other  than  the  sheriff,  such  as  the  judges  of  general 
elections,  or  the  county  canvassers  of  the  votes  polled  at  general 
elections ;  ^  the  trustees  of  the  township  or  the  councilmeu  of 
wards  ;  ^  other  town  officers;  ^  special  boards,^  county  courts,^  or 
jury  commissioners."  Penalties  are  frequently  imposed  upon 
the  designated  officers  for  the  non-performance  of  this  duty,^ 
though  in  respect  of  the  manner  of  performing  it  the  statutes 
^re  sometimes,  though  not  always,^  regarded  as  directory.^ 

§  l-t.  [Continued.]    In  the  Federal  and  Territorial  Courts. — 

In  the  Federal  courts  the  practice  is  now  chietly  reguhited  by  a 
recent  statute,^"  which  commits  this  duty  to  the  clerk  of  the 
court,  and  to  a  juiy  commissioner  appointed  by  the  judge,  who 
shall  be  a  well  known  member  of  the  principal  political  party 
within  the  district  opposed  to  that  to  which  the  clerk  belongs. 
Practitioners  in  those  courts  should  direct  their  attention  to  this 
statute,  at  the  same  time  bearing  in  mind  that,  under  section 
800,  of  the  Eevised  Statutes  of  tlie  United  States,  those  courts 


1  R.  C.  Iowa  1880,  §  234,  et  seq. 

2  K.  S.  Ohio  1880,  §  olG4. 

3  G.  S.  Mass.  1860,  chap.  132,  §  6, 
^tseq.;  N.  Y.  Code  Rem.  Just.,  §  1035, 
etseq.;  Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879,  §  2G93;  R. 
S.  Wis.  1878,  §'2520:  R.  S.  Mich.  1871, 
§  5977;  G.  S.  Vt.  App.  1870,  p.  117,  § 
89;  R.  S.  Me.  1871,  ch.  lOG,  §  1;  G.  S. 
X.  H.,  ch.  194,  §§  1  and  2;  G.  S.  Conn. 
1875,  ch.  X,  §  1 ;  G.  S.  R.  I.  1872,  p. 
432,  §  14. 

■*  Gen.  Laws  Colo.  1877,  §  14G2;  Cal. 
Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  204;  Bush  Dis. 
Fla.,  ch.  104,  §  3;  Battle's  Rev.  X^.  C, 
p=  194,  §  229a;  R.  S.  111.  1889,  ch.  78, 
§1;  R.  S.  Wis.  1880,  §  1681;  Stat. 
Minn,  at  L.  1873,  p.  221,  §  23,  etseq.; 
R,  C.  Miss,  1880,  §  1681;  G.  S.  Neb. 
1863,  p.  042,  §  658;  Code  Ala.  1876,  § 
4733;  Comp.  L.  Ariz,,  ch.  47,  §  13; 
€omp.  L.  Nev.  1873,  §  1052;  2  Ind. 
Rev,  1876,  p,  29,  §  1 ;  Code  Ga.  1873,  § 
.3907;  R.  S.  So.  Car.  1873,  p.  518,  §  U 


Comp.  L.  Utah,  1876,  p,  55;  R,  S,  La, 
1876,  §  2127;  Gen,  Laws  Xew  Mexico, 
1880,  ch,  68,  §  1 :  1  Bright.  Purd.  Dig., 
829,  §  2, 

5  R,  C.  Del.,  ch.  109,  §  2:  Code  A"a, 
1873,  p.  1059,  §  3;  R,  S.  Mo,  1879,  § 
2784;  Stat,  Tenn,  1871,  §  3981;  R,  S. 
W.  Va.  1879,  ch.  109,  §  7;  Gen.  Laws 
Ore.  1872,  Civil  Code,  §  921;  R.  C. 
M<1.  1>!78,  art.  62,  §  2. 

6  G.  S.  Ky.  1879,  p.  573,  §  4;  R.  S. 
Tex.  1879,  art.  3030, 

J  Comp,  L.  Kan.  1879,  §  2693. 

«  Gladden  v.  State,  13  Fla.  623; 
Buhol  V.  Boudousquie,  8  Mart.  (x.  s.) 
(La.)  425, 

9  Forsythe  v.  State,  6  Oh,  19:  Bur- 
lingame  v.  Burliugame,  18  Wis.  285; 
Colt  V.  Eves,  12  Conn.  243;  Thomas 
V.  People,  39  Mich.  309, 

1"  Act  Cong,  June  30,  1879;  Laws  U, 
S,  1879  (Sess.  I.),  chap.  52;  21  U.  S, 
Stat,  at  Large,  143, 


14  IMPANELING    THE    JURY  [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

ma}',  by  rule  or  order,  conform  the  designation  and  impaneling^ 
of  jm'ies,  in  substance,  to  the  hiws  and  usages  relating  to  jurors 
in  the  State  courts.^  In  the  territories,  the  selection  and  sum- 
moning of  jurors  is  governed  by  territorial  statutes, ^  or,  in  the 
absence  of  statutory  regulation,  by  the  usages  and  holdings  of 
the  common  law,  —  in  accordance  with  which  an  open  venire 
facias  is  directed  to  the  marshal,  who  summons  such  good  and 
lawful  men  as  he  will."^ 

§  15.  Drawing  the  Panel. — From  the  general  list  thus 
selected  of  persons  eligible  or  liable  to  serve  as  jurors  at  the  suc- 
ceeding term  of  court,  the  list  of  names  actually  to  be  summoned, 
called  either  the  array  or  the  panels  is  drawn  by  lot  from  a  box 
or  wheel,  at  a  time  and  at  a  place,  either  in  open  court  or  other- 
wise, upon  public  notice,  by  the  designated  official  or  officials, 
and  sometimes  in  the  presence  of  other  designated  officials,  in  a 
designated  manner, —  all  the  conditions  and  details  of  the  pro- 
ceeding being  generally  prescribed  by  statute.*  Although,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  general  list,^  penalties  are  frequently  prescribed 

1  See  Alston  v.  Manning,  Chase's  Canter,  1  Pet.  511;  Beuuer  v.  Porter, 
Dec.  460.  For  the  mode  of  selection  9  How.  235;  Clinton  v.  Euglebrecht, 
before  the  passage  of  the  act  of  1879,      13  Wall.  434. 

see  United  States  v.  Collins,  1  Woods  ^  Beery  v.  United    States,  2  Colo. 

(U.   S.),   499,    503;  United    States   v.  186.      The  acts    of    Congress    which 

Tallman,  10  Blatchf.  C.  C.  21;  United  regulate  the  procuring  of  juries  for 

States  V.  Gardner,  1  Woods   (U.  S.),  Federal  courts  are  not  applicable  to 

514,  519;  United   States  v.  Wilson,  6  the    territories.      Clinton    v.    Engle- 

McLean   (U.    S.),  604;  Eich  v.  Camp-  brecht,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.)  434.     See  also 

bell,  1    Woods    (U.    S.),   509;  United  Reynolds  v.   United   States,  98  U.  S. 

States  V.  Dow,  Taney  Dec.  34;  United  145,  154;  American  Ins.  Co.  u.  Canter, 

States  V.   Insurgents,  2  Dall.  (U.  S.)  1  Pet.  (U.S.)  511;  Benner  u.  Porter,  9 

335,   341;    United   States   v.  Fries,   3  How.  (U.S.)  235. 

Dall.  (U.  S.)  515.     The  Federal  courts  *  See  N.  Y.  Code  Rem.  Jus.,  §  1042 

have  the  power,"  and   it  is  their  duty,  et  seq.;  Rev.  N. -J.    1877,  p.  533,  §  13; 

to  enforce  other  well  founded  objec-  G.    S.  Mass.  18(;n,   p.  G80,  §  10  et  seq.; 

tions  than  those  available  in  the  State  Gen.    Stat.   N.  H.,  chap.  194,  §  10;  G. 

courts.     United   States   ?;.  Benson,  31  S.    Conn.    1875,  tit.   19,  chap.    10,  §  G; 

Fed.  Rep.  896.  G.  S.   Vt.    1862,    chap.    37,    §5;  R.  S. 

2  Per  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Waite  in  .  Me.  1871,  chap.  106,  §  9;  Gen.  Stat. 
Reynolds  v.   United  States,  98  U.  S.  R.  I.  1872,  p.  432,  §  15. 

145,  154,  citing  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  ^  Ante,  §  13. 


Tit.   I,    Cll.   II.]         SELECTING,  DRAWING,   ETC.,  THE    PANEL. 


15 


for  failing  to  make  a  drawing,^  3'et  a  literal  eomplianee  with  the 
terms  of  the  statute  is  not  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  panel. ^ 
On  the  contrary,  the  statutes  are  generally  regarded  as  direc- 
tory,^ the  object  being  to  secure  a  proper  apportionment  of  jury 
duty  among  those  liable  to  perform  such  dut\',  as  well  as  to  se- 
cure impartial  juries;  ^  and  the  usual  presumption  of  right  action 
on  the  part  of  the  otfieiais  charged  with  this  duty  is  generally 
sufficient  to  cure  irregularities  in  its  performance,^  though  obvi- 
ously a  general  disregard  of  the  essential  provisions  of  the  stat- 
ute mav  have  the  effect  of  vitiating  the  arrav.'' 


§  IG.  Publication  of  the  Panel.—  The  pane,  thus  drawn  is, 
under  some  statutory  regulations,  subject  to  public  inspection;  ^ 
under  others,  any  person  may  have  a  copy  of  it  by  applying  to 
the  clerk  or  sheriff  and  pacing  the  fee  allowed  by  law.^ 

§  17.  Service  of  it  upon  the  Accused. —  By  statute  in  some 
jurisdictions  persons  held  to  answer  for  capital,''  or  other  serious 


1  G.  S.  Mass.  18G0,  chap.  132,  §  37; 
G.  S.  Vt.,  p.  332,  §  9;  Code  Va.  1873, 
p.  10C2,  §  22;  G.  S.  N.  IL,  chap.  194,  § 
17;  Bush  Dig.  Fla.,  chap.  10-1,  §  29;  E. 
S.  W.  Va.  1879,  chap.  109,  §  2(J ;  Miller's 
R.  C.  Iowa,  1880,  §  243;  R.  S.  Del. 
1874,  chap.  109,  §  23;  R.  S.  Me.  1871, 
chap.  106,  §  IG;  Code  Ala.  187(5,  §  4762. 

-  See,  in  addition  to  the  cases  pre- 
viously cited,  Ferris  v.  People,  35  N. 
Y.  125;  s.  c.  31  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  140; 
48  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  17;  1  Abb.  Pr.  (n. 
s.)  193;  State  r.  Guidry,  28  La.  Ann. 
630;  Pratt  v.  Grappe,  12  La.  451; 
State  v.  Miller,  20  La.  Ann.  579 ;  Mapes 
V.  People,  69  111.  523;  Wilhelm' ?;. 
People,  72  111.  468;  Prieri  v.  People,  2 
Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  230,  231  (fail- 
ure to  give  notice  of  the  drawing) ; 
Friend  v.  Hamill,  34  Md.  298  (infor- 
mality in  the  certificate  of  the  draw- 
ing). 

3  United  States  v.  Collins,  1  Woods 
(Uc  S.),  499,  504. 


*  Rafe  r.  State,  20  Ga.  64.  Cora- 
pare  State  V.  Revells,  31  La.  Ann.  387. 
See,  also,  State  v.  Williams,  3  Stew. 
(Ala.)  454. 

^  Wheeler  v.  State,  42  Ga.  306; 
Brown  v.  Cora.,  73  Pa.  St.  322;  Pa- 
sauka  v.  Daus,  31  Tex.  72. 

«  Cox  V.  People,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
430;  s.  c.  aff'd.  80  X.  Y.  500;  19  Hun, 
439.  See  also  Jones  v.  State,  3 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  37;  Campbell  v.  State, 
48  Ga.  353;  People  v.  Labadie  (Mich.), 
33  N.  W.  Rep.  806. 

'  R.  S.  La.  1876,  §  2127.  In  Nevada 
by  any  officer  or  attorney  of  the  court, 
Conip.  L.  Xev.  1873,  §  1054. 

=  X.  Y.  Code  Rem.  Jus.,  §  1049. 
See,  also,  Cal.  Code  Civ.  Pro6.,  §  221; 
Comp.  L.  Mich.  1871,  §  5992;  Corap. 
L.  Kan.  1879,  §  2978;  Comp.  L.  Ariz., 
chap.  47,  §  27. 

9  Stat.  7  Will.  III.,  chap.  3,  §  7  (trea- 
son and  misprision  of  treason) ;  Stat. 
7  Anne,  chap.  21,  §  11.     See  Code  Ala, 


16 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY 


[1  Tbomp.  Tr., 


offenses,  are  entitled  to  a  copy  of  the  panel  a  designated  num- 
ber of  days  before  their  trial.  These  statutes  vary  in  their 
terms,  some  providing  for  the  service  of  the  copy  of  the  panel 
or  array  assembled  to  serve  generally  for  the  term,  and  others 
for  a  copy  of  the  special  panel  assembled  to  serve  in  the  partic- 
ular case.  Some  of  them  provide  for  the  service  of  the  list  of 
those  who  have  been  actually  summoned ;  ^  others  for  the  serv- 
ice of  a  list  of  those  who  have  been  drawn.  Under  the  former 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  serve  a  list  of  those  who  have  been  drawn 
merely;^  nor  under  the  latter  will  the  statutory  right  be  ac- 
corded by  the  service  of  a  long  list  of  persons,  most  of  whom, 
to  the  knowledge  of  the  officer,  have  been  excused.^  No  such 
privilege  existed  at  common  law;  it  can  only  be  claimed  where 
there  is  a  statute  granting  it,  and  in  cases  within  such  statute.^ 
The  statutes  are  generally  drawn  upon  the  conception  of  extend- 
ing a  privilege  to  the  accused,  which  he  may  waive  by  not  de- 
manding it,^  though  the  right  is  a  valuable  one,  of  which  he  can 
not  be  deprived  against  his  consent."^ 


1876,  §  4782;  G.  S.  N.  H.  18G7,  chap. 
243,  §  1;  R.  C.  MiSS.  1880,  §  3057;  R.  S. 
Ohio,  1880,  §§  7271,  7273. 

1  R.  S.  Mo.  1879,  §§  li)00, 1904.  See, 
also,  R.  S.  Me.  1871,  chap.  134,  §  14; 
R.  S.  La.  1876,  §  992;  R.  S.  1879,  chap. 
55,  §  1.  It  is  clear  that  the  prisoner 
can  have  no  right  to  a  list  of  the 
jurors  in  an}- other  case  than  that  pro- 
vided by  statute.  Reg.  v.  Dowling,  3 
Cox  C.  C.  509 ;  Driskill  v.  State,  45  Ala. 
21.  Compare  R.  S.  111.,  chap.  38,  § 
421;  R.  S.  Ohio  1880,  §  7273;  Rev. 
Code  Miss.  1880,  §  3057;  Rev.  Stat. 
West  Va.  1879,  chap.  55,  §  1;  Gen. 
Stat.  N.  H.  1867,  ch.  243,  §  1;  Stat. 
Tenn.  1871,  §§  5212,  5251. 

-  Pasch.  Dig.  Tex.  Stat.,  art.  3022: 
Tex.  Code  Crim.  Proc.  art.  611;  Mur- 
ray ?;.  State  (Tex.),  3  S.  W.  Rep.  104. 

3  Harrison  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App. 
558;  Drake  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  649. 


*  State  V.  Howell,  3  La.  Ann.  50,  52. 
Compare  State  v.  Guidry,  2S  La.  Ann. 
631. 

5  Reg.  V.  DoTvling,  3  Cox  C.  C.  509; 
Driskill  v.  State,  45  Ala.  21. 

6  State  V.  Kliuger,  46  Mo.  224,  227; 
State  V.  Fisher,  2  Nott  &  McCord  (S. 
C),  261,  264;  State  v.  Cook,  20  La. 
Ann.  145;  State  r.  Jackson,  12  La.  Ann. 
679;  State  v.  Hernandes,  4  La.  Ann. 
379;  Peterson  v.  State,  45  "Wis.  535; 
Craft  V.  Com.,  24  Gratt.  (Va.)  602, 
609;  State  v.  Waters,  1  Mo.  App.  7;  s. 
c.  62  Mo.  196.  For  stronger  reasons, 
by  going  to  trial  without  objection,  he 
waives  any  informality  or  inaccuracy  in 
the  list  known  to  him  to  exist.  State 
V.  Shay,  30  La.  Aun.  114;  Bell  r.  State, 
59  Ala.  55;  Pressley  v.  State,  19  Ga. 
192. 

^  State  V.  Buckuer,  25  Mo.  167. 


Tit.   1,  Ch.   11. J       SELECTING,  DUAWIXG,    ETC.,  THE    PANEL.  17 

§  18.    [Continued,]       Xature  and   Extent  of   this   Rigrht.  — 

From  this  it  follows  that  the  prisoner,  on  the  one  hand,  can  re- 
quire nothing  more  than  the  statute  grants  to  him.  lie  cannot, 
for  instance,  rec^uire  that  the  list  shall  be  read  to  him,  if  he  is 
unable  to  read ;  nor  that  the  trial  shall  be  delayed  in  order  that  he 
may  have,  for  the  prescribed  period  of  time,  a  list  of  the  talesmen 
who  may  have  been  summoned  to  supply  deficiencies  in  the  reg- 
ular panel. ^  He  cannot,  on  the  other  hand,  comi)lain  that  more 
has  been  dene  for  him  than  the  statute  accords,  —  as  that  the  list 
was  served  upon  him  a /o;<ve7' period  before  the  trial  than  therein 
prescribed;  ^  or  that  there  is  a  defect  in  the  regular  list  of  ju- 
rors summoned  for  the  term  (furnished  to  him  as  a  matter  of 
grace,  merely),  he  being  entitled  onl}'  to  a  list  of  those  summoned 
for  his  trial. ■"*  Nor  can  he  insist  that  all  named  in  the  list  shall 
attend,*  nor  that  talesmen  shall  not  })e  called  to  su])i)ly  the 
place  of  absentees;  ^  nor,  in  the  ease  of  uninipoitant  errors  in  the 
list,  that  the  trial  shall  be  delayed  until  he  shall  have  been  sup- 
plied, for  the  statutory  length  of  time,  with  a  })erfected  list ;  ^ 
nor  (in  the  absence  of  prejudice),  that  the  Christian  names  are 
not  given  in  full.  l)ut  only  by  initials  ;  ^  nor  that  the  nanie  of  a 
toivihs/tip  from  which  a  jurcr  is  drawn  has  been  abbreviated, 
provided  it  is  intelligible;  ^  nor  that  the  caption  contains  uei- 


1  Gardeuhirc  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App. 
147;  Harris  v.  State,  C  Tex.  App.  1)7; 
Johnsou  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  208; 
Drake  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  649 ;  Sliarp 
V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  650;  State  v. 
Buckuer,  25  Mo.  1<;7,  171;  Green  v. 
State,  17  Fla.  669;  State  v.  Price,  3 
Mo.  App.  586;  State  v.  Keeves,  11  La. 
Aim.  685;  State  v.  Bunger,  14  La.  .\un. 
401;  State  r.  Bennett,  14  La.  Ann.  051; 
State  V.  Henry,  15  La.  Ann.  297;  State 
V.  Gunter,  30  La.  Ann.  539;  Colt  v. 
People,  1  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  R.  Oil. 
But,  see,  People  v.  Coyodo,  40  Cal. 
586. 

2  State  V.  Toby,  31  La.  Ann.  730. 
s  Chaney  v.  State,  31  Ala.  342. 

♦  Jackijon    v.    State,    4    Tex.    App. 


292,    298;     Walki'r     r.    State,     0    Tex. 
App.   576. 

5  Stewart  v.  Stale,  13  Ark.  720,  735; 
Bates  V.  State,  19  Tex,  122;  State  w- 
White,  7  La.  Ann.  531 ,  State  v.  Ben- 
nett, 14  La.  Ann.  051;*  State  v.  Ferx'ay, 
22  La.  Ann,  423 

6  Goodhue  v.  People.  94  111.  37; 
States.  Turner,  25  La.  Ann.  573;  Mc- 
Carty  v.  State,  26  Miss.  299;  States. 
Kane,  32  La.  Ann.  999  ;  State  v.  Dubord, 
2  La.  Ann.  732;  Swofford  f.  State,  3 
Tex.  App.  76.  In  Alabama  such  de- 
fects are  cured  by  statute.  Hall  v. 
State,  51  Ala.  9. 

'  Aikin  v.  State,  35  Ala.  399 ;  Bill  v. 
State,  29  Ahi.  34. 

*  State  V.  Brooks,  30  N.  J.  L.  356. 


18 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr.» 


ther  the  name  of  the  county,  the  court,  nor  the  case.^  In 
short,  technical  objections  to  the  caption  of  the  hst  are  not  fa- 
vored.^ The  sheriff's  return  on  the  venire  may  be  amended  after 
a  motion  to  quash,  so  as  to  show  a  due  service  of  a  coj^y  of  it; 
and  the  record  need  not  affirmatively  show  the  fact,  in  order  to 
sustain  a  conviction  on  error  or  appeal.^ 

i 

§  19.  Summoning  the  Jurors.  —  Under  the  common  hiw  and 
early  English  statutes  the  writ  of  venire  facias,  under  which  the 
sheriff,  at  his  ow^n  discretion,  selected  and  summoned  the  panel, 
assumed  great  importance,  and  technical  accuracy  was  required  in 
respect  of  it.^  But,  since  in  nearly  all  the  American  States,^  the 
drawing  of  the  panel  precedes  the  issuing  of  the  process,  by 
whatever  name  called  J  by  virtue  of  which  the  jurors  are  sum- 


1  Ibid. 

2  State  ■?;.  Ward,  14  La.  Anu.  673; 
Aikin  v.  State,  35  Ala.  399. 

3  Gray  v.  State,  55  Ala.  86;  Wash- 
ington V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  377.  In 
Woodsides  v.  State,  2  How.  (Miss.) 
665,  it  was  held  that  the  return  of  the 
sherifE  that  he  had  served  the  prisoner 
with  a  correct  list  of  the  jury  could 
not  be  collaterally  questioned. 

1  Benton  v.  State,  30  Ark.  328,  34-4; 
Freel  v.  State,  21  Ark.  212;  Dawson  v. 
State,  29  Ark.  IIG;  Durrah  u.  State, 
44  Miss.  789;  Logan  v.  State,  50  Miss. 
269;  Lewis  u.  State,  51  Ala.  1;  Mitchell 
V.  State,  58  Ala.  417;  Paris  v.  State, 
36  Ala.  232;  Rash  v.  State,  61  Ala.  89. 
As  to  the  comjnUatiou  of  the  time  dur- 
ing which  the  accused  is  entitled  to 
have  the  list  before  the  trial,  see  1  East 
P.  C.  112;  State  v.  McLendon,  1  Stew. 
(Ala.)  195;  Robertson  v.  State,  43  Ala. 
325;  Craft  v.  Com.,  24  Gratt.  (Va.) 
602. 

5  See  Rogers  v.  Smith,  1  Ad.  &  El. 
772,  and  many  cases  there  cited.  Peo- 
ple V.  McKay,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  212, 
217;   State  v.  Dozier,  2  Speers  L    (S. 


C.)  211;  State  v.  Williams,  1  Rich.  L. 
(S.  C.)  188;  2  Hale  P.  C.  260;  2  Hawk. 
P.  C,  chap.  41,  §  1. 

«  The  States  of  Maine,  New  Hamp- 
shire, Vermont,  Massachusetts,  Penn- 
sylvania and  West  Virginia  seem  to 
form  exceptions:  in  these  a  writ  of 
venire  facias  issues  before  each  draw- 
ing, and  this  is  the  only  i^rocess.  R. 
S.  Me.,  chap.  106,  §9;  G.  S.N.  H.  1867, 
§  7;  G.  S.  Vt.  1863,  ch.  37,  §  2;  G.  S. 
Mass.  1860,  p.  681,  §  10;  1  Bright. 
Purd.  Pa.  Dig.  833,  §  34;  2  R.  S.  Va., 
chap.  106,  §  11.  In  Connecticut  a  "war- 
rant" is  issued  to  th(i  town  constable 
directing  the  drawing.  G.  S.  Coun= 
1875,  p.  433,  §  6. 

'  R.  C.  Miss.  1880,  §  1692;  R.  S. 
Ohio,  1880,  §  5167;  R.  C.  Md.  1878,  p. 
560,  §  3;  Comp.  L.  Nev.  1873,  §  1054; 
Bush  Dig.  Fla.,  chap.  104,  §  6;  R.  S. 
Wis.  1878,  §  2535:  G.  L.  Colo.  1877, 
§  1471;  R.  S.  La.  1876,  §  2127;  Code 
Va.  1873,  p.  1060,  §  7;  G.  S.  Neb.  1873, 
p.  643,  §  660;  Code  Ala.  1876,  §  4744; 
Battle  Rev.  N.  C,  p.  196,  §  2291;  Code 
Ga.  1873,  §  3931;  Miller's  R.  C  Iowa, 
1880,  §  241;  R.  S.  111.  1880,  chap.  78, 


Tit.  I,  Cll.  II. J  SELECTING,  DRAWING,  ETC.,  THE    PANEL. 


19 


moned,    irregularities   in  this    process,^    or  'in  the  mode  of   its 
execution-  or  return'  lose  their  importance;   nor,  in  general,  is 


§  10;  R.  S.  Mo.  1879,  §278(;;  2Iik1.  Rev. 
187(;,  p.  30,  §  2;  N.  Y.  Code  Rem.  Jus.» 
^  1047;  Comp.  L.  Ariz.  1877,  §  2418; 
G.  S.  Ky.  1879,  p.  574,  §  (i;  Ark.  Dij:. 
Stat.  1874,  §  3677;  Geu.  Laws  Oreti. 
1872,  Civ.  Code,  §  980;  Comp.  L.  Jlich. 
1871,  §  5991;  Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879, 
§  2970;  Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  225; 
Rev.  N.  J.  1877,  p.  533,  §  13;  R.  S.  Del. 
1874,  chap.  109,  §  8;  Stat.  Tenn.  1871, 
§  3991.  Ill  Texas  this  list  must  be 
under  the  seal  of  tlie  court.  R.  S. 
Tex.  1879,  §  304(J. 

1  Peri  V.  People,  ('.5  III.  17;  State  v. 
Cole,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  (;2(;;  White  v. 
State,  16  Tex,  206;  Murray  v.  State 
(Tex.),  3  S.  AV.  Rep.  104;  s.  c.  1  S. 
W.  Rep.  522.  White  v.  Com.,  G 
Binn.  (Pa.)  179;  State  v.  Pliillips,  2 
.Ahi.  297;  Louw  v.  Davis,  13  Johns, 
(N.  Y.)  227.  Compare  State  v.  Sted- 
man,  7  Port.  (Ala.)  495;  State  v.  Cole, 

9  Humph.  (Tenn.)  627;  Bartow  v. 
Murry,  2  N.  J.  L.  97,  Kirkpatrick,  C. 
J.  diss.,  (overruling  also  the  opinion 
of  the  latter  in  Sayres  v.  Scudder,  and 
Veal  V.  Brown,  Ibid.  pp.  53,  72) ;  Sharp 
V.  Hendrickson,  2  N.  J.  L.  686;  Cox  v. 
Haines,  Ibid.  687;   State  v.  Alderson, 

10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  523;  Bill  v.  State,  29 
Ala.  34;  Hallu.  State,  51  Ala,  9;  Fields 
V.  State,  52  Ala.  348;  Aikin  v.  State,  35 
Ala.  399;  State  v.  Simmons,  6  Jones 
L.  (N.  C.)  309;  Cordova  v.  State,  6  Tex. 
App,  207,  222;  Haiglit  v.  Ilolley,  3 
Wend,  (N.  Y.)  258,  262.  Contra,  a  few 
old  cases  which  blindly  adhere  to  the 
ancient  strictness :  People  v.  McKay, 
18  Jolins.  (N.  Y.)  212,  217;  State  v. 
Dozier,  2  Speers  L.  (S.  C.)  211;  State 
V.  Williams,  1  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  188. 

2  People  V.  Williams,  24  Mich.  156, 
i61.  See,  also,  Kemiedy  v.  Com.,  14 
Bush  (Ky.),340. 


3  People   V.   Jones,   24  Mich.   215; 
State  V.  Stokely,  16  ^liun.  282;  Maples' 
W.Park,   17  Conn,  338;  Fellow'?^  Case, 
5  Me,  333 ;  Davis  v.  State,  25  Oh.  St. 
369;  Anon.,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  196.    Al- 
though a  return  Is  necessary  for  the 
purpose    of    identifying    the    juror's 
drawn,  with  those  present  in  court  or 
failing  to  attend   (People  v.  Jones,  24 
Mich.  215),  yet  even  the  omission  of  a 
return  does  not  vitiate  the  array  (Rol- 
land  V.  Com.,  82  Pa.  St.  306,  322),  or 
prevent  a  juror  from  taking  his  seat 
upon  sliowing    that  he   was  in  fact 
summoned.    Patterson's  Case,  ('>  Mass. 
48(;.     A  neglect  to  sign  the  return  will 
not  vitiate  the   array,  but  the  court 
may   order  it  to  be   indorsed  on  the 
writ  and  signed.     Duwar  v.  Spence,  2 
AVhart.   (U.  S.)  211;  Com.  v.  Miller,  4 
Phila.   210;   Com.  v.  Green,    1  Ashm. 
(Pa.)  289,  291;   Com.  v.  Chauncey,  2 
Ashm.    (Pa.)    90;    Com.   v.   Parker,  2 
Pick.  (Mass.)  549.     If  it  omit  to  name 
the    day   of    summoning,   the    jurors 
being  in  attendance,  may  testify  that 
they  have  ))eeu  duly   summoned  and 
thereafter  be  sworn.     Anon.,  I  Pick. 
(Mass.)  196.     Where  the  issue  of  the 
venire  precedes  the  drawing,   it  has 
been  held  unnecessary  to  recite  in  the 
return  that  the  panel  was  drawn  ac- 
cording  to  law,  for  this  will  be  pre- 
sumed.    Com.  V.  Green,  1  Ashm.  (Pa.) 
289.     Contra,  Eaton  v.  Com.,  G  Binn. 
(Pa.)  447.     The  statutory  provision  as 
to   the  time  within   which  the  return 
shall  be  made  has  been  regarded  as 
directory,  so  that  it  is  made  In  time  to 
afford  an  opportunity  for  Inspecting 
the  panel.     Mowry  v.  Starbuck,  4  Cal. 
274;    State   v.    Squaires,    2   Kev.   226. 
Contra,   State  v.   Vegas,  19  La.  Ann. 
105.     Net  error  to  permit  sheriff  to 


20 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


it  necessary  that  it  issue  at  all;  ^  since,  if  the  designated  jurors 
assemble,  it  is  wholly  immaterial  how  they  were  brought  in. 
The  number  to  be  summoned,  when  not  fixed  by  statute, ^  rests 
in  the  discretion  of  the  court  ;^  and,  where  fixed  by  statute,  a 
want  of  literal  compliance  with  its  terms'  will  not  vitiate  the 
array.*  Parties  cannot  insist  upon  the  attendance  atone  time  of 
the  full  panel,  so  that  enough  attend  for  the  selection  of  a  jury 
in  the  particular  case.^ 


amend  return:  MuiTay  v.  State  (Tex.), 
3  S.  W.  Rep.  104;  s.  c.  1  S.  W.  liep. 
522;  Mulliu's  Appeal  (Pa.)  5  Atl.  Rep. 
738. 

1  Bird  V.  State,  14  Ga.  43.  To  the 
same  effect  see  State  r.  Crosby,  Harper 
Const.  Rep.  (S.  C.)  90;  Malier  v.  State, 

1  Port.  2(15;  Johnson  v.  Cole,  2  N.  J.  L. 
266;  (contra,  Howell  v.  Robertson,  6 
N.  J.  L.  142);  State  v.  Williams,  3 
Stew.  (Ala.)  454;  Lyon  v.  Commercial 
Ins.  Co.,  2  Rob.  (La.)  267;  State  v. 
Folke,  2  La.  Ann.  744  ;Trembly  v.  State, 
20  Kan.  116,  120;  State  v.  Harris,  30 
La.  Ann.  90;  McDermott  u.  Hoffman, 
70  Pa.  St.  31 ;  State  v.  Perry,  Bnsbee 
(N.  C.)  330;  Bennetts.  State,  Mart.  & 
Yerg.  (Tcnn.)  133;  Macliey  u.  People, 

2  Colo,  13,  17;  United  States  v.  Reed, 
2  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  435,  452i  Samuels  v. 
State,  3  Mo.  68;  State  v.  Marshall,  36 
Mo.  406;  State  ?;.  Jones,  61  Mo.  232; 
People  V.  McCann,  3  Parker,  Cr.  R. 
(N.  Y.)  272;  People  v.  Cummings,  3 
Park.- Cr.  R.  (N.  Y.)  343;  People  v. 
Robinson,  2  Park.  Cr.  R.  (N.  Y.)  235, 
(overruling  McGuire  v.  People,  2  Park. 
Cr.  R.  (N.  Y.)  148);  State  v.  Cava- 
naugh,  76  Mo.  54. 

2  It  was  limited  by  Stat.  Will.  II., 
chap.  38,  225,  but  tliis  was  held  not  to 
apply  to  crown  cases. 

3  United  States  v.  Insurgents,  2 
Dall.  (U.  S.)  335.  See,  also.  United 
States  V.  Fries,  3  Dall.  (U.  S.)  515. 

*  Anderson  v.  State,  5  Ark.  444,  453; 


Ramos  V.  Bringier,  2  Mart.  (x.  s.)  La. 
192;  Debuys^;.  Mollere,  2  Mart.  (x.  s.) 
La.  625;  Prall  v.  Peet,  3  La.  274,  280. 
But  contra  see  Harrison  v.  State,  3 
Tex.  App.  558;  Burfey  v.  State,  3  Tex. 
App.  519;  Jones  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App. 
575;  Calthorp  v.  Newton,  Cro.  Jac^ 
647.  In  Louisiana  it  is  provided  by 
statute  that  it  shall  not  be  deemed  a 
good  cause  of  challenge  to  the  array, 
that  the  uum1)er  of  jurors  actually 
drawn  at  any  time  is  not  the  exact 
number  required  by  law.  R.  S.  La. 
1876,  §  2130. 

6  Odom  V.  Gill,  59  Ga.  180;  State  v. 
Loveustein,  9  La.  Ann.  313;  Rolland  v. 
Com.,  82  Pa.  St.  306,  321;  Sands  v. 
Com.,  21  Gratt.  (Va.)  871;  State  v. 
Brown,  12  Minn.  538;  State  v.  Ste- 
phens, 13  So.  Car.  285 ;  State  v.  Klinger, 
46  Mo.  224.  But  see  Flower  v.  Living- 
ston, 12  Mart.  (La.)  681.  In  Anon.,  1 
Bro.  (Penn.)  200.  it  is  stated  that  "all 
the  persons  who  may  be  indicted  will 
be  entitled  to  their  challenges  out  of 
the  whole  panel;  if  one  single  juror 
neglects  to  attend,  in  consequence  of 
being  illegally  summoned,  the  right  of 
challenge  is  infringed."  This,  how- 
ever, is  now  contradicted  by  the  set- 
tled rule  that  the  right  of  challenge  is 
a  right  to  reject,  and  not  a  right  to 
select.  United  States  v.  Marchant,  4 
Mason,  (U.  S.)  158;  s.  c.  12  Wheat.' 
(U.  S.)  482.  Persons  jointly  indicted, 
who  elect  to  be  jointly  tried,  cannot 


Tit.    I,  Cll.    II.]       SELECTING,  DRAWING,  ETC.,  THE    PANEL.  21 

§  20.  Special  Venire  in  Default  of  Jurors.  —  If  the  regular 
panel  is  not  drawn,  or  i.s  quashed  or  exhausted,  the  business  of 
the  court  is  not  therefore  to  stop,  but  the  court  may,  under  most 
statutory  systems,  award  a  special  venire  facias,  returnable  forth- 
with, under  which  a  sufficient  number  of  jurors  are  summoned 
to  proceed  with  the  public  business.^  A  new  jury  may,  it  has 
been  held,  be  thus  impaneled  while  the  regular  jury  is  out  delib- 
erating ui)()n  a  verdict,^  or  for  the  immediate  retrial  of  a  criminal 
case  where  a  jury  have  failed  to  agree. ^  As  in  the  case  of  the 
regular  venire,^  irregularities  in  the  special  venire,^  or  in  its  exe- 
cution,® are  in  general  disregarded;  though  matters  of  substance 
are  insisted  upon,  —  as,  where  the  statute  prescribes  that  the 
jurors  be  drawn  by  the  clerk  and  this  is  omitted,  a  venire  is  is- 
sue<l  directino;  the  sheriff  to  summon  a  certain  number.^ 

§  21  Special  Venire  in  Capital  Cases.  —  In  many  of  the 
States  the  issuing  of  a  special  venire  in  capital  cases  is  provided 
for  by  statute.  This  is  in  the  nature  of  a  j^^'iviler/e  to  the  accused, 
and  under  some  statutes  the  venire  is  issued  only  upon  the  de- 
mand of  the  accused.  This  right  cannot  be  demanded  where, 
from  some  cause,  the  offense  has  ceased  to  be  capital.®  It  is 
ivaived  by  going  to  trial  without  objection,  with  a  jury  selected 

demand  a  more  numerous  panel  than  derwerker   v.  People,  .3  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

■Roukl   be  awarded    in  the   case   of  a  530. 

single   defendant.     State    v.   Phillips,  ■•  See  preceding  section. 

24  Mo.  475.  5  state   v.  Coleman,  8  So.  Car.  237; 

1  Russel  V.  State,  53  Miss.  3';7;  People  u.  Jones,  24  Mich.  215. 
Trembly  v.  State,  20  Kan.  IKi;  People  «  state  v.  Arthur,  39  la  031  (sum- 
V.  Stuart,  4  Cal.  225;  People  v.  Vance,  moniug  **  from  the  body  of  the  coun- 
21  Cal.  400;  People  v.  Williams,  43  ty");  Cavanah  v.  State,  5(5  Miss.  299 
Cal.  344 ;  People  V.  Divine,  4(5  Cal.  4(!;  (summoning  from  the  assessment 
People  V.  Davis,  47  Cal.  93.  What  is  roll).  See,  also,  People  v.  Colt,  3 Hill 
"an  entire  absence    of    the    regular  (N.  Y.)  432. 

panel,"  so  as  to  authorize  a  special  '  Gladden    v.    State,    13    Fla.  623; 

venire:  State  ?7.  McCartey,  17  Minn.  70;  Gropp  v.   People,  67  111.  154;  Lincoln 

Blemer  v.  People,  76  111.  265;  Reed  v.  v.  Stowell,  73  111.  246;    Rockford  Ins. 

State,  15  Oh.  217.  Co.  v.   Nelson,   75  111.   548;  Wright  w. 

2  Evartsu.  State,  48  Ind.  422;  Win-  Stuart,  5  Blackf.  (lud.)  120;  Hight  w. 
sett   V.   State,  57  lud.   26;  ^lerrick  u.  Langdon,  53  Ind.  81. 

State,  63  Ind.  327.  «  State  v.  Bullock,  63  N.  C.  570. 

3  Pierce  v.  State,  67  Ind.  354;  Van- 


22  IMPANELING  THE  JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

from  the  regular  panel. ^  It  is  proper  that  the  accused  should 
be  present  when  the  names  of  the  jurors  who  are  thus  to  be  sum- 
moned are  drawn,  where  the  statute  provides  for  a  drawing, ^ 
though  it  has  been  held  that  he  cannot  demand  this  as  a  right, -^ 
Although  the  statute  provides  that  the  clerk  of  the  court  shall 
make  the  drawing,  this,  it  has  been  held,  may  be  done  by  a 
deputy  sheriff  in  open  court.*  As  in  the  case  of  the  regular 
panel, ^  the  disqualification  of  one  or  more  jurors  is  no  ground 
for  quashing  the  venire,  but  is  a  ground  of  individual  challenge 
merely.^  While  the  accused  cannot  insist  that  all  persons  named 
in  the  special  venire  shall  be  brought  iu,^  yet  the  neglect  to  sum- 
mon a  large  number  of  them  ought,  it  should  seem,  to  vitiate  the 
panel ;  '^  since  in  this  way  the  sheriff  might  omit  to  summon  per- 
sons supposed  to  be  favorable  to  the  accused,  while  summoning 
others  unfavorable  to  him.^ 

§  22.  Venire,  by  Whom  Executed  and  Returned.  —  As  the 

summoning  officer  at  common  law  possessed  the  entire  power  of 
selecting  the  venire-men  who  were  to  be  brought  in,  the  impar- 
tiality of  this  ofiicer  was  a  matter  of  great  importance,  and  his 
disqualification  constituted  in  general  the  only  ground  for  chal- 
lenging the  array. ^'^  Under  American  statutes,  where  the  panel 
is  selected  and  drawn  and  a  list  of  the  names  to  be  summoned  is 
furnished  to  the  officer,  it  can  be  of  little  importance  whether  he 
is  the  proper  officer,  or  whether  he  is  for  any  reason  disqualified, 
where  he  summons  all  the  persons  named  in  the  list.^^     But  a 

1  Jefferson  v.  State,  52  Miss.  7G7;  'i  Logan  v.  State,  53  Miss.  431.- 
State  V.  Perry,  Busbee  (N.  C),  830.  ^  In  a  case  of  murder  it  is  not  error 

2  Henry  v.   State,  33  x\la.  389;  Hall  for  the   court  to  refuse  to    cause   a 
V.  State,  40  Ala.  698.  venire  to  be   summoned  from  another 

s  Pocket   V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  552;  coiui^/ because  of  prejudice  against  the 

Cordova  v.    State,  G   Tex.    App.  207 ;  accused,  until  an  effort  has  been  made- 

Haudline   v.    State,    6   Tex.    App.  347,  to  obtain  a  jury,  free  from  exception, 

358.  from  the   venire    already   summoned. 

4  Pocket  V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  552.  Puryear  v.  Com.    (Va.),  1  South  East. 

5  Post,  §  31.  Rep.  513. 

«  Durrah  v.  State,  44  Miss.  789.  ^^  Post,  §  32." 

"^  Stewart  v.  State,  13  Ark.  720,  735;  "  See  Forniau  v  Com.  (Ky.),  G.  S.  W. 

Bates  V.  State,  19  Tex.  122:  Jackson  v.  Rep.  579. 
State,  4  Tex.  App.  292,  298. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  11. ]       SELECTING,  DRAWING,  ETC.,  THE    PANEL. 


23 


fraudulent  omixsion  to  summon  a  portion  of  those  whose  names 
are  on  the  list  may  create  a  necessity  for  the  issuing  of  a  special 
venire,  or  for  tlie  summoning  of  talesmen,  which  may  throw 
into  the  hands  of  the  otficer  the  })ower  of  selecting,  or  otherwise 
prejudice  the  accused.  In  such  a  case,  it  is  still  a  matter  of 
moment,  as  it  was  at  common  law,  that  the  summoning  officer 
be  the  lawful  officer,  and  not  for  any  reason  disqualified  for  the 
performance  of  the  duty.  We  accordingly  find  a  good  many 
modern  holdings  which  still  emphasize  the  importance  of  the 
venire  facias,  or  other  process  by  which  jurors  are  brought  in, 
being  executed  by  the  proper  officer ;  though  some  of  them  pro- 
ceed in  deference  to  the  ancient  rule  of  the  common  law  after 
the  reason  of  it  has  ceased,  and  do  not  put  their  conclusions  upon 
the  correct  ground.  By  that  law,  when  the  sheriff  was  for  any 
reason  incompetent,  the  corontr  acted  in  his  place;  ^  thouo-h  the 
coroner  could  not  act  where  the  sheriff  was  merely  sick  ^  or  dead.^ 
His  absolute  disqualification  was  necessary  to  qualify  the  coroner.* 
In  case  of  the  gross  ignorance  of  the  sheriff,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  court  may  direct  his  deputy  to  summon  tales  jurors ;  ^ 
and,  where  the  sheriff  can  act,  the  deputy  usually  can.^  If  there 
be  two  slierifs  and  one  a  party,  the  other  may  act.^  Statutes 
are  found  authorizing  the  court,  when  the  sheriff  or  his  deputies 
are  disqualified,  to  direct  the  coroner  or  any  disinterested  person 
to  summon  the   jurors,^  and  this   may  be    shown    by  affidavit 


1  Cc.  Litt.  158a;  Res  v.  Smith,  2 
Shower,  288 ;  Res  v.  Dolby,  1  Dow.  & 
Ry.  145;  s.  c.  2  Baru  &  Cress.  104. 

2  State  V.  Mouk,  3  Ala.  415. 

3  Res  V.  Warrington,  1  Salk:.  152. 
*  Reg   V.  Delme,  10  Mod.  108. 

5  Kelly  V.  State,  3  Siued.  &.  M. 
(Miss.)  518. 

'^  Cora.  V.  Carson,  3  Phila.  21D,  223; 
Conner  ^•.  State,  25  Ga.  515. 

^  Res  V.  Warrington,  1  Salk.  152; 
Rich  V.  Player,  2  Shower,  286. 

8  Crim.  Code  Ky.,  §  103;  Johns  v. 
Com.  (Ky.),3  S.  W.  Rep.  369;  Forraau 
V.  Com.  (Ky.),6  S.  W.  Rep.  579. 
Phillips  v.   State,  20  Ga.    105;  Ilauna 


V.  People,  8G  111.  243;  Stale  v.  Hardin, 
46  Iowa,  623.  A  Statute  providing 
that  "  if  the  case  requires  it,"  the 
court  may  appoint  two  citizens  for 
the  summons  of  jurors,  wi»s  liberally 
interpreted.  '•  If  from  any  cause," 
said  the  court,  "  bias  or  partiality, 
sickness,  absence,  death,  removal  or 
resignation  from  office,  refusal  to 
obey  the  order  to  summon  si)ecial 
jurors,  or  if  for  any  other  sufllcient 
cause  the  court  determine  tliat  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  require  it, 
they  may  appoint  two  citizens  to  per- 
form the  duty  mentioned  in  the  act." 
Com.  V,  Carson,  3  Phila.  219. 


24  IMPANELING  THE  JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

merely.^  Where  the  sheriff  and  the  coroner  were  both  incom- 
petent, under  the  English  practice,  the  court  might,  on  applica- 
tion, appoint  officers  called  elisors  to  perform  the  duty  ;2  but  this 
practice  seems  not  to  have  gained  a  footing  in  this  country.^ 

§  23.  Of  Talesmen.  — Where  the  requisite  number  of  venire- 
men did  not  attend,  or  the  i)anel  became  reduced  by  claims  of 
exemption  or  by  challenges,  or  where  otherwise  an  emergency 
arose  for  the  summoning  of  additional  jurors,  the  practice  sprang 
up  and  was  sanctioned  by  early  statutes,*  of  summoning  tales- 
men,^ or  bystanders.  In  this  country  the  power  of  summoning 
such  persons  seems  to  be  regarded  as  possessed  by  courts  of 
record,  where  not  prohibited  by  statute.®  The  abuses  which  may 
spring  from  the  exercise  of  such  a  power  are  too  obvious  to  be 
pointed  out ;  and  we  accordingly  find  that  statutes  exist  prohib- 
iting the  summoning  of  talesmen  from  the  bystanders.^  There 
seems  to  be  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  courts  to  retain  this 
power,  evidently  regarding  it  as  advantageous  to  the  dispatch  of 
the  public  business.**  Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  unaffected 
in  the  Federal  courts  by    the  recent  act  of  Congress  ^  already 


1  Harrimau  v.  State,  2  G.  Greeiu-,  §  30;  R.  S.  Ohio,  1880,  §  5173;  Miller's 
271 ;  State  v.  Hardin,  46  Iowa,  «23.  R.  C.  la.  1880,  §  2775.  As  to  penalty 
Compare  People  v.  Welch,  49  Cal.  174.  for    seeking    jury    service,    see  ante, 

2  Co.  Litt.  158a;  Rex.  v.  Edmunds,  §  84,  subsec.  2.  Construction  of  a  stat- 
4  Barn  &  Aid.  471,  480.  ute  prohibiting  tales  jurors  from  being 

3  Statutory  provisions  against/ra?((i  summoned  from  persons  found  in  tlie 
in  procuring  jurors:  Thoinp,  &  iler.  court-house  or  yard  if  procurable 
Jur,,  §  84.  Punishment  by  fine  of  elsewhere:  Balder  v.  State,  4  Tex. 
non-attending  jurors:  /6td.,  §  83.  App.  223;    Matthew's  v.  State,  6  Tex, 

*  St.  Hen.  VIII.,  c.  6;  4  &  5  PhiL  &  App.  23;  Johnson  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App. 

M.,  c.  7.  2G8.     See  also  Frye  v.  State,  7  Tex. 

^  Tales  decirc%iinstantibus,—V[iAt  I?,,  App.  94;   HicliS  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App. 

such  of  those  standing  around  as  were  488;  Samschen  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  45. 

probi  et  legates  homines.  s  Matthews  v.  State,  sttpra;  Frye  v. 

6  R.    S.   111.    1880,   cliap.    78,   §    13;  Statt-,  supra;   State  v.  Moncla(La.),2 

Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879,  §  2991  -,  2  Ind.  Rev.  South  Rep=  814 ;  Mullin's  Appeal  (Pa.), 

1876,  p.  392,  §  80,  5  Atl.  Rep.  738. 

^  Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  227 ;  Comp.  »  Ante,  §  14;  United  States  v.  Rose, 

L.  Nev.  1873,  §  1222;  Comp.  L.  Utah,  6  Fed.  Rep.  136.     The  power  is  given 

1876,  §  1385;  Comp.  L.  Ariz.,  chap:  4  7,  by  §  804,  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   II.  J       SELECTING,   DRAWING,   ETC.,  THE    PANEL  25 

referred  to.     Unless  otherwise  provided  by  statute,  it  exists  in 
the  case  of  special  Juries,  as  well  as  in  that  of  common   juries.^ 

§  24.  [Coutinued.]  Under  what  Circumstances  Sum- 
moned. —  The  true  theory  of  summoning  talesmen  is  that  such 
persons  are  to  be  summoned  only  where  it  is  necessary  to  supple- 
ment or  JiJl  up  a  jury  which  remains  incomplete  after  the  ex- 
haustion of  the  regular  panel  by  excuses,  challenges  or  otherwise. 
They  ought  not  to  be  summoned  on  the  one  hand,  until  the  regu- 
lar panel  has  been  exhausted, ^  though  the  court  may  summon 
them  without  awaiting  the  return  of  attachments  issued  to  brin^ 
m  members  of  the  regular  panel. ^  And  where  separate  panels 
are  summoned  and  in  attendance  for  separate  weeks  of  the  term, 
It  is  better,  and  hence  proper,  where  the  first  panel  is  exhausted 
without  procuring  a  jury,  to  resort  to  the  panel  for  the  second 
week,  rather  than  summon  talesmen.*  So,  where  the  sheriff  is 
ordered  by  the  court  to  summon  duly  qualified  jurors  "  from  the 
county  at  large,"  he  complies  with  the  first  order  by  summoning 
them  from  the  first  names  remaining  on  the  jury  list  of  the 
county.^  Nor  is  it  improper,  although  not  authorized  by  statute, 
for  the  court  to  direct  such  additional  jurors  to  be  drawn  by  the 
clerk  in  the  usual  way.*^ 

§25.  [Continued.]      Conflicting  Rulings  on  this  Subject. — 

It  is  to  be  regretted,  however,  that  no  general  rule  on  this  sub^ 

»  Rex  V   Hunt,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  430;  pare  State  v   Bentou,  2  Dev.  &  B.  196, 

Snook   v.   Soutlnvood,    Ryau    &   Moo.  States   Nash,  8  Ired.   L,   (N.   C.)  35; 

429:  Gatliff  v.  Bourne,  2  Moo   &  Rob.  State   v-  Lytic,   5   Ired.  L.  (X   C.)  .58 

100;  Atty.  Gen.  v.  Parsons,  2  Mee.  &  Compare  Bayoujon  v.  Criswell,  5  Mar- 

W.  23;   Rex  V.  Hill,  1  Car.  &  P.  (MM ■  tin  (x.  s.)  (La.)  2;i2. 
Res  V.  Tipping,  1  Car.  &  P.  6G8 ;  Buron  =,  Barthet    ..    Estebene  ,  5  La.  Ann, 

V.  Deuman,    1   Exch.   769;    People  v.  315. 

Tweed,   50    How.    Pr.    (N.    Y.)    286;  *"  Lambertson  w.  People,  5  Park.  C 

Anou.,2Dall.  (U.  S.)  382;    Ranking.  «.    (X.  Y)    200.     See    also    Smith  v 

Goddard,  4  Allen  (N.  B.)  155;  Atlee  v  state,  55  Ala.  1. 

Shaw,4  Yeates  (Pa.),  236;  Rex  a;.  Perry,  .  people  v.  Colt,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  432. 

5  Term  Rep=  453;  Sparrow  v.  Turner,  gee,  also,  Cavauah  v.  State,  56  Miss. 

2  Wils,  366:  Denu  v.  Evaul,  1  N.  J.  L.  ^O'J. 

283;  Hubley  v.  White,  2  Yeates  (Pa.)  '^'l  people  v.    Cumraings,    3  Park.  C 


133. 

2  Barker  v.  Bell,  49  Ala.  281,     Com- 


R.  (X.  Y.)  343,  354. 


26  IMPANELING  THE   JURY.  [1  TllOllip.  Tr., 

ject,  applicable  in  all  jurisdictions,  can  he  stated.  It  has  been 
held,  on  the  one  hand,  in  a  court  of  the  United  States,  that  it  is 
ground  of  new  trial  to  order  a  tales  where  there  is  no  deficiency 
of  regular  jurors. ^  On  the  other  hand,  a  territorial  court  has 
held  that  whether  a  proper  emergency  exists  for  summoning 
talesmen  is  for  the  court  to  decide  according  to  the  nature  and 
amount  of  the  business  pending.'^  Coming  to  the  State  courts, 
we  find  the  same  difference  of  opinion.  It  has  been  denied  by 
some,^  and  allowed  by  others,*  that  talesmen  may  be  summoned 
to  supply  a  total  default  of  regular  jurors.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  has  been  ruled  that,  where  the  regular  panel  is  absent  in  the 
jury  room  making  up  their  verdict  in  a  case,  the  court  can- 
not call  another  cause  for  trial  and  proceed  to  impanel  a  jury 
composed  entirely  of  bystanders. °  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  j^or- 
tion  only  of  the  regular  jurors  are  so  absent,  talesmen  may  be 
summoned  to  form  a  jury  for  the  remainder  of  the  panel. ^  If 
but  a  single  -member  of  the  regular  panel  remains,  talesmen  may 
be  summoned  to  form  a  jury  with  him  alone  ;  ^  and  if  he  be 
challenged  off,  a  jury  may  nevertheless  be  formed  entirely  from 
the  talesmen.** 

§  2G.  [Continued.]  Further  of  this  Subject. — The  num- 
ber of  talesmen  to  be  summoned  to  supply  a  deficiency  is  gener- 
ally regarded  as  a  matter  resting  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the 
trial  court :  ^  and  the  court  may  even  direct  the  sheriff,  in  antici- 

1  United  States  I'.  "Watkius,  3  Crauch  ^  Kogers  v.  State,  33  La.  Ann. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  508.  543. 

2  Territory  t;.  Doty,  1  Pinney  (Wis.),  '^Bradley  v.  Bradley,  45  Ind.  67; 
396  Rondeau  v.  New  Orleans  Imp.  Co.,  15 

3  Rogers    V.    State,    33    Ind.    543;  La.  Ann.  160. 

Williams  v.  Com.,  Dl  Pa.  St.  493.  ^  Fuller  v.  State,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.) 

•»  Suttle  V.  Batie,  1  la,  141;  Hunt  v.  63;  Emericli  v.  Sloan,  18  Iowa,  13'.).  ' 
Scobie,  6  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  469.     In  Lou-  ^  Fuller  v.  State,  supra. 

isiana  it  is  ruled  that  there  can  be  no  »  People  v.  Colt,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  432; 

objection    to      summoning    talesmen  McGuffee  u.  State,  17  Ga.  497;  State  W: 

TVhere  the  regular  panel  lias  been  ex-  Lamon,  3  Hawks  (N.  C),  175;  State  v. 

hausted    without    procuring  a  single  Buckner,   25    Mc.    167,    171;  Burk  v. 

juror.     State  v.  Reeves,  11   La.  Ann.  State,  2  Har,  &  J.  (Md.)  426;  Daytonv. 

G86;  State  w.  Desmoucliet,  32  La.  Ann.  State,  11)  Ohio  St.  584;  Colt  v.  Peopie, 

1241.  1  Park.  Cr.  R.    (N.  Y,^  611;    Com.©. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   II.]       SELECTING,  DRAWING,  ETC.,  THE    PANEL. 


27 


pution  of  emergency,  to  bring  in  a  sufficient  number  of  qutilitied 
persons  to  act  as  talesmen  whenever  a  dclieiency  may  occur  ;  ^  and 
these  are  not  summoned  for  aparticuhir  case,  but  for  the  business 
of  the  courtgenerally.2  While  talesmcnare  ordinarily  summoned 
for  a  particular  case,'^  yet  if  they  sit  in  a  su})sequent  case,  it  is 
an  irregularity  which  is  tcaivedhy  not  objecting  before  verdict."* 

§  27.    [Continued.]      By  whom  and   liow   Summoned.  —  By 

the  common  law,  the  selection  of  talesmen  was  contided  entirely 
to  the  discretion  of  the  sheriff  as  was  the  selection  of  reo-ular 
jurors;  and  this  is  still  the  law  where  not  changed  by  statute  ;5 
though  an  order  of  court  controlling  his  discretion  in  this  matter 
is  no  ground  for  now  trial  unless  prejudice  appears.''  There- 
fore, the  sheriff  and  his  deputies  who  perform  this  duty  ought  to 
bQ  properly  qualified;  and  where  there  is  a  statute  prescribing  the 
oatJi  which  they  shall  take,Uhe  omission  to  administer  it  will  be 
error  for  which  a  conviction  will  beset  aside. ^  Talesmen  should 
possess  the  qualiticat  ions  of  regular  jurors,  which  will  be  presumed 
until  the  contrary  is  shown ;  '^  and  while  the  summoning'-  officer 
nust,  of  course,  judge  of  their  qualitications  in  the  tirst  instance, 
jet  he  ought  not  to  interrogaie  them  as  to  their  opinions  or  bias.^" 


Ilaton,  8  Phila.  428;  Com.  r.  Twitcn- 
ell,  1  Brewst.  (Pa.)  551. 

1  Bac.  Abr.,  Juries  D,  337;  State  v. 
Lamon,  3  Hawks  (X.  C),  175;  United 
States  V.  Loughery,  13  Blatch.  (U.  S.) 
207;  State  r.  Kane,  32  La.  Ann.  999, 
State  V.  Allen,  47  Conn.  121.  The 
sheriff,  orcoroner,  Avhen  discharging 
tlie  duties  of  that  ollicer,  may  of  his 
own  motion  specially  request  the  atten- 
dance of  persons  to  serve  as  talesmen 
if  necessary.  Rex  v.  Dolby,  2  Barn,  & 
Cress.  104.  The  statutes  of  a  large 
number  of  the  States  now  provide  that 
talesmen  may  be  taken  from  the  by- 
standers or  from  the  l)ody  of  the  county. 

^  Birdv.  State,  14  Ga.  43.  See  also 
State  V.  Dale,  8  Ore.  22'J;  United 
States  V.  Lougliery,  13  Blatch.  (U  S). 
2(j7;  O'Connor  v.  State,  9  Fla.  215 


^  Wallace  v.  Columbia,  48  Me  436; 
Sliields  V.  Niagara  Sav.  Bank,  3  II un 
(X.  Y,),  477;  s  c.  5  Th.  &  C.  (N.  Y.) 
585- 

*  Rowland  v.  Giflford,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  42,  note;  Wallace  r.  Colum- 
bia, 48  Me.  436 

^5  People  ?7.  Cummiugs,  3  Park.  C. 
II    (X.  Y.)  343,  353 

«  Capehart  v.  Stewart,  90  N.  C.  101 

^  Rev.  St.  Tex.  art.  3056. 

8  Wyers  v,  State  (Tex.)  2  S.  W. 
Rep.  722 

9  Yelm  Jim  v.  Territory,  1  Wash 
Terr.  76;  O'Connor  v  State,  9  Fla. 
215;  Lee  v.  Lee,  71  N.  C.  139;  Mc- 
Guffle  V.  State,  17  Ga.  497. 

1"  :.  Burr's  Triai,  p  421;  State  v. 
McCartey,  17  Minn.  76;  Joy  v  State, 
14  ImL  139 


28  '  IMPANELING   THE   JURY.  [1  ThoUip.  Tl.. 


CHAPTER     TIL 

OF  CHALLENGES 

Article      I.  — Challenges  to  the  Array. 
Article    II.  - — ^Peremptory  Challenges. 
Article  III. — Challenges  for  General  Disqualification, 
Article   IV.  —  Challenges  for  Disqualification  in  Respect  of  the 
Particular  Case. 
Subdivision  1.  —  Challenges  Grounded  on  Consanguinity,  Affin- 
ity, Interest,  Affection. 
Subdivision  2. — Challenges    Grounded     on    Bias,     Prejudice, 
Scruple,  Opinion. 


Article  I. — Challenges   to  the  Array. 

Section 

3L  Of  the  Various  kinds  of  Cliallenges. 

32.  Partiality  of  tlie  Sumraouiug  Ofiicer. 

33.  Irregularities  or  Frauds  iu  Selecting  the  Genera]  List. 

34.  Irregularities  iu  Drawing  the  Panel. 

35.  Objection  to  the  Officer  who  Conducts  the  Drawing, 

36.  In  the  Case  of  Special  or  Struck  Juries. 

37.  Time  of  Conducting  the  Drawing. 

38.  Irregularities  in  Summoning  the  Panel. 

39  Resummoning  Members  of  Quashed  Panel. 

40  Kinds  of  Challenges  to  the  Polls. 

§  31.  Of  the  Various  kinds  of  Challenges.  — ^  There  are  two 
general  divisions  of  challenges:  1.  Challenges  to  the  arraij . 
2.  Challenges  to  the  polls.  In  the  broadest  sense,  challenges  to 
the  array  are  grounded  upon  some  objection  which,  if  well  taken, 
vitiates  the  whole  panel  or  venire^  and  requires  its  discharge  •, 
while  challenges  to  the  polls  are  grounded  upon  objections  to  par- 
ticular jurors.  As  the  entire  ofEce  of  selecting  the  panel  was,  at 
common  law,  committed  to  the  sheriff  or  other  summoning  offi- 
cer, the  usual  ground  of  challenging  the  array  under  that  system 


Tit.    I,  Ch.   III.]       CHALLENGES    TO    THE    ARRAY 


29 


related  to  the  partiality,  '*  unindifferency,"'  as  it  was  called,  or 
other  disqualitication  of  this  officer.  This  ground  of  challenging 
the  array  still  subsists  in  some  American  jurisdictions;  hut  the 
more  important  and  frequent  ground  is  a  non-compliance  with  the 
law  in  some  substantial  particular  in  the  selection  of  the  general 
jury  list  or  in  the  drawing  of  the  panel  therefrom. 

§  32.  Partiality  of  the  Suimuoniug  Officer. —  The  })artiality 
of  the  summoning  officer,  grounded  upon  his  sustaining  such  re- 
lations to  a  })arty  as  subjected  him  to  the  intluence  of  the  latter,^ 
or  ui)on  his  being  related  to  the  adverse  party  by  consanguinity 
or  affinity, 2  at  least  within  the  ninth  degree^^  or  himself  the  ad- 
verse party  to  the  suit,^  or  interested  therein,*  or  the  prosecu- 
tor in  a  criminal  case,*"'  or  the  advocate  of  the  opposing  party 
is,  at  conunon  law,  a  good  ground  of  quashing  the  array*  ^ 
though  the  mere  fact  that  he  has  expressed  an  opinion  adverse  to 
the  case  of  the  challenging  party,  will  not  be.**     Attempts  by  a 


1  Bac.  Al>r.  Juries  E.;  Co.  Litt. 
l.jiia;  Trials  per  Pais  (ed.  of  ITi!."*;,  p. 
123. 

2  Co.  Litt.  \o^ia•,  Bac.  Abr.  Juries,  E. 

2  3  Bla.  Com.  3i;3;  Vernon  v.  Man- 
ners, 3  Dyer,  319.  a.  (13);  Ouiton  v. 
Morse,  2  Kerr  (X.  B.),  77;  Vanaukea 
r.  Beemer,  4  N.  J.  L.  3G4;  Kector  «. 
Hudson,  20  Tex.  234;  Munshower  r. 
Patton,  10  Serj;.  &K.  (Pa.)  334:  Moun- 
seu  f.  West,  1  Leon.  8t>;  Markliani  r. 
Lee,  cited  Ibid.  See  also  Foot  v. 
Morgan,  1  Hill  (X.  Y.),  054.  But  not 
that  he  was  a  sou  of  the  prosecuting 
attorney  (State  v.  Cameron,  2  Chand. 
(Wis.)  172),  or  married  to  the  sister 
of  one  who  was  surety  for  costs  and 
who  had  supported  the  plaintiff's  ac- 
tion with  his  money  (Murchison  v. 
Marsh,  2  Kerr,  N.  B.  608),  or  cousin 
of  the  lessor  of  the  plaintiff  in  eject- 
raeat,  the  lessor  not  being  a  party  in 
interest'  Anon.,  3  Dyer,  300.  b.  (35) ; 
Goodtitle   v.  Thrustout,  2    Stra.  1023. 

<  Cowgill    V.    Wooden,    2    Blackf. 


(Ind.)  332;  Cranmer  r.  Crawley,  1  N. 
J.  L.  43;  Woods  r.  Kowan,  5  Johns. 
(X.  Y.)  133;  Munsiiower  i;.  Patton,  10 
Seri;.  &  li.  (Pa.)  334.  But  see  State  v. 
Judge,  11  La.  Ann.  79;  Prince  u.  State, 
3  Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.)  253. 

5  People  V.  Tweed,  50  How.  Pr.  (X. 
Y.)  2.s().  See  also  liex  v.  Johnson, 
2  Stra.  1000. 

«  Kex  V.  Shepherd,  I  Leach,  C.  C. 
11 'J. 

'  Co.  Litt.  15(1.  b. :  Baylis  r.  Lucas, 
Cowp.  112;  Watkins  v.  Weaver,  10 
Joims.  (X.  Y.)  107;  Tallraan  v.  Wood- 
worth,  2  Johns.  (X.  1'.)  385;  Stubber 
V.  Wall,  1  Craw.  &  Dix  (Irish)  Cir. 
54;  Chapman  v.  Macutchin,  1  Craw.  & 
Dix  (Irish)  Cir.  121. 

<*  Friery  f.  People,  2  Keyes  (X.  Y.), 
424;  s.  c.  2  Abb.  App.,  Dec.  (X.  Y.) 
215;  54  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  319;  Ferris  v. 
People,  35  X.  Y.  125;  s.  c.  31  How.  Pr. 
(X.  Y.)  140;  48  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  17;  1 
Abb.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  (N^.  Y.)  193.  In  Texas 
the   only   ground   of    challenging  tlie 


30 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


party  to  influence  the  summoning  ofiicer  in  the  performance  of 
his  duties  will  have  this  effect,  without  discriminating  nicely  as  to 
whether  prejudice  has  resulted  or  not ;  ^  though  where  the  party 
is  a  corporation,  the  mere  fact  of  giving  to  the  sheriff  at  his  re- 
quest information  as  to  who  the  stockholders  are,  so  that  he  may 
avoid  summoning  them,  will  not  have  this  effect.^ 

§  33.  Irregularities  or  Frauds  in  Selecting-  the  General 
List.  — As  already  seen,  statutes  which  prescribe  the  manner  of 
selecting,  by  county,  town,  or  other  officers,  the  general  list  of 
persons  liable  to  jury  duty  from  which  the  panel  is  drawn,  are 
generally  treated  as  directory  merely.^  It  is  hence  a  general 
rule  that  irregularities  in  the  discharge  of  this  duty  constitute  no 
ground  for  challengino:  an  arrav.*  If  the  jurors  who  have  been 
selected  and  drawn  arc  individually  qualified,  that  is  generally 
deemed  suflicient,^  and  objections  to  particular  jurors  are  made 
by  challenge  to  the  polls.     It  has  been  so  held  in  case  of  a  delay 


array  in  criminal  cases  is  tliat  "  the 
otticer  summoning  the  jury  lias  acted 
corruptly,  aucl  has  willfully  summoned 
persons  upon  the  jury  kuown  to  ha 
prejudiced  against  the  defendant,  and 
with  a  view  to  cause  him  to  be  con- 
victed." Pasc.  Dig.,  art.  3034;  E.  S. 
Tex.  1879  (Code  Cr.  Proc),  art.  024. 
See  Tuttle  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  550 ; 
Coker  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  83;  Cast- 
ancdo  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  582.  See 
also  Harris  v.  State,  fi  Tex.  App.  97 ; 
Swofford  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  88; 
Williams  v.  State,  44  Tex.  34;  Bowman 
V.  State,  41  Tex.  417. 

1  McDonald  v.  Shaw,  1  N.  J.  L.  C 
See  also  State  v.  Johnson,  1  N.  J.  L. 
219. 

-  Quinebaug  Bank  v.  Tarl3.ox,  20 
Conn.  510. 

3  Ante,  §  13. 

■»  People  V.  Tweed,  50  Hew.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  280;  Maffett  v.  Tonkins,  (;  N.J. 
L.  228;  Dolan  v.  People,  64  N.  Y.  485; 
Foust     V.     Com.,    33     Pa.     St.    338; 


Jewell  V.  Com.,  22  Pa.  St.  94;  Com.  v. 
Walsh,  124  Mass.  32;  Woodsides  v. 
State,  2  How.  (Miss.)  655;  Malone  v. 
State,  49  Ga.  210;  Brinkley  v.  State, 
54Ga.  371;  Foster  v.  Speed,  32  La. 
Ann.  34;  Sumrall  v.  State,  29  Miss. 
202;  State  v.  Neagle,  (35  Me.  408.  But 
see  Compton  v.  Legras,  24  La.  Ann. 
259.  Irregularities  in  tilling  the  jury 
wheel  in  Pennsylvania;  Com.  v.  Lip- 
pard,  0  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  395;  in  the 
custody  of  the  wheel:  Curlcy  u.Com., 
84  Pa.  St.  151;  Rollaud  v.  Com.,  82  Pa. 
St.  300. 

*  State  V.  Massey,  and  State  v. 
Baldwin,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  379;  Rafe  r. 
State,  20  Ga.  80;  Perry  v.  State,  9 
Wis.  19:  Gettwerth  v.  Teutonia  Ins. 
Co.,  29  La.  Ann.  30;  State  y.  Petrie, 
25  La.  Ann.  380;  Com.  v.  Walsh,  124 
Mass.  32;  State  v.  Hascall,  6  N.  H. 
352.  Conti'a,  that  a  selection  under 
the  provisions  of  a  repealed  law  is 
void:  State  v.  Da  Rocha,  20  La.  Ann. 
350;  State  v.  Morgan,  20  La.  Ann.  442, 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]       CH.\LLENGES    TO    THE    ARRAY.  31 

in  returning  the  list  to  the  clerk  of  the  court,'  and  of  informali- 
ties of  the  certificate  of  selection ;  -  though  a  total  failure  to  re- 
cord the  list,  so  as  to  allow  the  public  inspection  of  it,  has  been 
held  a  ground  of  such  challenge,"^  and  so  has  a  total  departure 
from  the  provisions  of  the  law.^  That  the  selection  was  not 
made  by  the  officer  appointed  by  the  statute,^  or  that  it  was 
made  by  an  officer  who  had  never  qualified,''  or  by  persons  to 
Mhom  the  proper  officers  assumed  to  delegate  their  functions/ 
will  sup})ort  such  a  challenge;  but  the  objection  that  it  was 
made  by  an  officer  whose  term  had  expired,  will  not,  since  he 
was  still  an  officer  defacto^  and  the  court  will  not,  on  such  chal- 
lenge, try  the  title  to  ti  public  office.^  That  a  great  dispropor- 
tion exists  between  the  number  of  persons  of  different  religious 
beliefs  on  the  panel,^  or  that,  a  ricJt  man  being  defendant,  there 
are  many  poor  men  on  the  })ancl,'°  are  not,  /;er  .se,  grounds  of 
such  challenge.  Decisions  arc  found  to  the  effect  that  a  list^ 
valid  on  its  face,  is  conclusive  upon  a  prisoner  as  to  its  regularity :  " 
and  a  monstrous  political  case  resulted  in  establishing  the  doc- 
trine in  England  that  it  will  be  noground  of  challenge  to  the  array 
that  the  list  is  incomplete  through  frcntd .^'^  But  it  is  confidently 
believed  that  the  doctrine  in  this  country  is  otherwise.'^ 

1  State  V.  Gut,  13  Minn.  341.  La.  Ann.   423.     So,  under  the  old  law, 

-  Carter  u.  State,  5<!  Ga.  403;  Brink-  it  was  no  ground  of  challense  that  the 

ley  V.  State,  54  Ga.  371.     See  also  Gar-  array  was  made  by  a  person  two  days 

diner  v.  People,  a  Park.  C.  R.  (X.  Y.)  after  he  had  received  his  discharge  as 

157,  198;  State  ^•.  Clarkson,  o  Ala.  378.  sheriff.     Hoare  v.  Broom,   Cro.   Eliz. 

^  Mitchell     V.     Likens,    3    Blackf.  3(;!).     But  compare  Anou.,  Dyer,  177. 

(Ind.)  2.J8;  Mitchell  v.  Denbo,  //..  2.5;».  b.  pi.  (34). 

^  State  V.  Da  Kocha,  20  La.  Ann.  35(; ;  »  Reg.  v.  Mitchel,  3  Cox,  C.  C.  1 . 

State  ij.  Morgan,  20  La.  Ann.  442.     As  i"  Ibid.,  p.  30,  per  Lefroy,  B. 

a  failure  to  select  from  the  assessment  ''  Gardiner  v.  People,  fi  Park.  C.  R. 

roll.     State  v.  Jenkins,  32  Kan.  477.  (N.  Y.)  157,  108;  State  v.  Allen,  1  Ala. 

5  Elkins  V.   The  State,  1  Tex.  App.  442;    State  v.   Clarkson,   3  Ala.   378: 
539.     See    also    Shackleford    v.     The  State  v.  Brooks,  9  Ala.  9. 

State,  2  Tex.  App.  385.  12  ijeg,  v.   O'Connell,   11   CI.  &  Fin. 

6  State  V.  Vance,  31  La.  Ann.  39s.  155;  s.  c.  1  Cox,  C.  C.  394,  See  also 
'  StateD.Newhouse,29La.Ann.821.  Reg.  v.  Fitzpatrick,  Craw.  &  Dix 
8  State  V.  McJunkin,   7   S.    C.    21;  (Irish),  513;  Reg.  t?.  Conrahy,  1  Craw. 

Vance  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  1(52;  Car-  &  Dix  (Irish)  Cir.  50.  Compare  Peo- 
peuter  v.  People,  r.4  N.  Y.  483;  Dolan  pie  v.  Jewett,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  314,  320. 
V.   People,  lb.  485;  State  v.  Ferray,  22  i3  People  v.  Tweed,  50  How.  Pr.  (N. 


32 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  34.  Irregularities  in  Drawing  the  Panel.  —  In  like  man- 
ner, statutory  provisions  respecting  the  drawing  of  the  panel  are 
generally  regarded  as  directory  mercl}'/  so  that  irregularities 
therein,  unless  plainly  operating  to  the  prejudice  of  the  challeng- 
ing party,  form  no  ground  for  challenging  the  array. ^  Cases 
are  found,  however,  Avhere  a  palpable  disregard  of  the  statutory 
provisions  have  been  held  sufficient  ground  for  such  challenge.*^ 
Thus,  if  the  clerk  put  upon  the  panel  the  names  of  persons,  at 
their  own  request,  who  have  not  been  regularly  drawn,  the  pres- 
ence of  these  interlopers,  called  non-jurors,  they  not  being  sub- 
ject to  challenge  personally,  vitiates  the  whole  panel.'*  Stat- 
utes are  found  which  enact  that  only  a  material  departure 
from  the  forms  prescribed  for  the  drawing,  or  the  intentional 
omission   of  the  sheriff  to   summon  one  or  more  of  the  jurors 


Y.)  204;  People  v.  Dolan,  CA  N.  Y.  485; 
Maffett  V.  Tonkius,  (i  N.  J.  L.  228. 

'  Ante,  §  15. 

2  Rafev.  State,  20  Ga.  G4;  State  v. 
Williams,  3  Stew.  (Ala.)  454;  Friery 
V.  People,  2  Abb.  App.  (N.  Y.)  Dec. 
215;  s.  c.  2  Keyes  (N.  Y.)  424;  54 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  319;  Ferris  v.  People, 
35  N.  Y.  125;  s.  c.  31  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
140;  48  Barb.  (N.Y.)  17;  1  Abb.  Pr.  (x. 
s.)  (N.  Y.)  193;  State  v.  Guidry,  28  La. 
Ann.  630;  Pratt  v.  Grappe,  12  La.  451; 
State  V.  Miller,  2G  La.  Ann.  579;  Mapes 
V.  People,  09  111.  523;  Wilhelm  v.  Peo- 
ple, 72  111.  468;  Dotson  v.  The  State, 
62  Ala.  141.  See  also  Crane  v.  Dy- 
gert,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  675;  Rolland  v. 
Cora.,  82  Pa.  St.  306,  321.  Contra, 
Jones  V.  State  (Sup.  Ct.  Ohio  1851),  8 
West.  L.  J.  508 ;  Lindley  v.  Kindall,  4 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  189;  Friery  r.  People, 
Abb.  App.  (N.  Y.)  Dec.  215;  s.  c.  2 
Keyes  (N.  Y.),  424;  54  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
319;  Gardiner  v.  People,  0  Park.  C.  R. 
(N.  Y.)  155;  People  v.  Rogers,  13  Abb. 
Pr.  (n.  s.)  (N.  Y.)  370;  State  v. 
Squaires,  2  Nev.  227;  People  v.  Ah 
Chung,  54  Cal.  398;  Piersou  v.  People, 


18  Hun  (N.Y.),  239;    Cox  v.   People, 

19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  430;  Dolan  v.  People, 
24  N.  Y.  485;  Claussen  v.  La  Franz,  1 
Iowa,  226,  241;  State  v.  Seaborn,  4 
Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  305. 

3  .Jones  V.  State,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
37;  Anon.,  1  Bi'own  (Penn.),  121 ;  Baker 
V.  Steamer  Milwaukee,  14  Iowa,  214; 
Priugle  V.  Huse,  1  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  432; 
McCloskey  v.  The  People,  5  Park.  C. 
R.  (N.  Y.)  308.  Such  persons  are 
termed  non-jurors;  they  are  mere  in- 
terlopers,, and  not  being  subject  to 
challenge  personally,  their  presence 
vitiates  the  Avhole  panel.  Norman  v. 
Beaumont,  Willes,  484;  Abbott,  C.  J., 
in  Rex  v.  Tremaine,  7  Dowl.  &  Ry. 
684,  687;  s.  c.   16  Eng.  C.  L.  318;  s.  c. 

,sub  nom.  Res  v.  Tremearne,  5  Barn.  & 
Cress.  254;   11  Eng.  C.  L.  218. 

4  McCloskey  v.  People,  5  Park.  C. 
R.  (X.  Y.)  308;  Norman  r.  Beaumont, 
Willes,  484;  Rex  v.  Tremaine,  7  Dowl. 
&  Ry.  684,  687;  s.  c.  16  Eng.  C.  L.  318; 
s.  c.  sub  nom.  Rex  v.  Tremearne,  5 
Barn.  &  Cress.  254;  11  Eng.  C.  L. 
218. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]       CHALLENGES    TO    THE    ARRAY.  33 

drawn,  .<liull  afford  ground  of  challenge ;  i  and  still  other  statutes 
in  various  terms,  uphold  the  conclusion  that  irregularities  or  infor- 
malities in  the  discharge  of  this  duty  will  not  ^afford  ground  for 
challenging  the  array. ^ 

§  35.   Objections    to    the  Officer  who  Conducts   the  Draw- 
ingr.  —  Although  the  officer  who  conducts  the  drawing  is  re<rarded 
for  many  purposes  as  the  substitute  of  the  sheriff  at  co'inmon 
law,3  yet  he  has  not  the  same  power  which  was  possessed  by  that 
officer  corruptly  to  influence  the  selection  of  the  jury;  and  there- 
fore challenges  to  the  array,  grounded  on  an  objection  that  the 
drawing  was    conducted  by  a  different  officer  from  the  one  ap- 
pointed   by  law,  have  not  the  same  force  as  such  a  challcno-e 
under  the  old  system.     Plainly,  it  will  be  no  objection  that  the 
drawing  took  place  by  a  deputy  of  the  statutory  officer,  if  the 
latter  was  duly  appointed;  '  nor  that  an  officer  other  than  the 
statutory  officers  attended  and  participated  in  it,^  nor  that  one 
of  the   statutory  officers  was  temporarily  absent,  provided  no 
names  were  drawn  during  his  absence."     Objections  to  the  ;;ar- 
hahly  of  the  officer  conducting  the  drawing,  such  as  prevailed  on 
a  challenge  to  the  array  at  common  law,  have  been  abroo-ated  by 
statute  in  some  of  the  States  ; '  and  in  one  State  there  Tre  hold- 
ings to  the  effect  that  the  fact  that  the  officer  who  served  the  jury 
process,  or  drew  and  arrayed  the  panel,  was  the  atlorney  of  the 

^Cal.    Penal   Code,  §  1059;    Comp.      730;    Laws    N.    Y.    igsi,    chap     449 

c^C'c ''p' ''  ''t"  '"^" '''"'' ''"''  ^' ''-'  '^^•-^-  c-1^' ^'--- 1^'---.  -'t.  62^: 

Code  Cr.  Proc,  §  227;    Miller,  R.  C.  3  Gardner  r.  Turner,  9  Johns    (N 

Iowa,    1880,   §§   27G4,    4400;    Stat,   at  Y.)    360;    Jones  v.    State,   3    Blackf' 

Large   Minn    1873,  p.  1054,  §221;  Ark.  (Ind.)  37;  Mitchell  ..Likens,  M.  258;' 

Dig.  Stat.   1874.  §  1902;  Bullett's  Ky.  Mitchell  v.  Denbo,  Id  '>5<) 

Codes    (Crira.),   p.    40,    §    199.     The  «  State  v.   Gav,   25   La"    Ann    47'>- 

grounds  of  challenge  stated  in  such  People  v.  Fuller,  "2  Park   C   IJ    rx   y"^' 

statutes  are   exclusive.     State  r.  Ar-  ](;. 

nold,  12  Iowa,  479;   State  v.  Raymond,  'a  Hunt  v.  Mavo,  27  La.  Ann.   197- 

2  f;  ^f 'o  ^^^^'^  ^-  ^ohan,  19  Kan.  28. 
ro  1  \]                 '''''  P-  ^''   §  ^'  ^'''-  '  S*^t^  «•  ^'-^^ta,  32  La.  Ann.  103. 

Code  M,ss.  1880,  §  1.94.     See  Hare  v.  r  j,.  y.  Code  Rem.  Jus.,  ,.§    1177, 

S  ate,  4_Ho>v.  TMiss.)  189;  Thomas  v.  1178.     See  also  Comp.  L.  Mich.  1871 

&-ite,   o   Id.    20;  King   v.  State,  5  Id.  §§  G013,  G014. 


34  iMPANELiNa  THE  JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

party,  did  not  disqualify  him  for  the  diity.^  But  in  another 
State  it  is  enacted  that  a  person  interested  in  a  suit  cannot  par- 
ticijjate  in  tlie  drawing  of  the  panel  by  which  it  is  to  be  tried ;  ^ 
and  in  still  another  State  such  a  challenge  has  been  upheld  on 
the  ground  that  the  jury  commissioner  who  assisted  in  the  draw- 
ing was  ix  first  cousin  to  the  challenging  party. '^ 

§  36.  Ill  the  Case  of  Special  or  Struck  Jviries.  —  It  seems 
that  "  unindifferency  "  in  the  officer  by  whom  a  special  or  struck 
jury  has  been  nominated  is  no  ground  for  challenging  the  array,* 
though  fraud  in  the  preparation  of  the  list  from  which  such  a 
jury  is  struck  will  be.^ 

§  37.  Time  of  Conducting  the  Drawing.  —  Statutory  pro- 
visions prescribing  the  time  of  conducting  the  drawing  are  gen- 
erally treated  as  directory,^  and  it  has  been  held  no  ground  of 
challenging  the  array  that  the  drawing  took  place  a  greaterlengih. 
of  time  ^  prior  to  the  session  of  the  court  than  that  prescribed ; 
but  otherwise  where  it  took  place  within  a  shorter  period  of 
time,^  the  object  of  the  statute  being  to  aiford  parties  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  inspection  of  the  list.^ 

§  38.  Irregularities  in  Summoning  the  Panel. —  From  what 
has  preceded, ^"^  the  conclusion  follows  that  irregularities  in  the 

1  Miles  V.  Pulver,  3  Deu.  (N.  Y.)  jury,  that  it  was  returned  by  the  sher- 
84;  Wakeman  v.  Sprague,  7  Cow.  (N.  iff's  deputy,  who  had  not  taken  the 
Y.)  720.  oath  of  office.     Denn  v.  Evall,  1  N.  J. 

2  2  Ind.  Stat.  1876,  p.  29,  §  1.  L.  283.     In  New  York  it  has  been  held 

3  State  V.  McQuaige,  5  So.  Car.  429.      that  the  statutory  mode  of  obtaining 
*  Eex  V.  Edmunds,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.      a  special  jury  must  be   strictly  pur- 

471.     See  also  Rex 'y.  Despard,  2  Man.  sued.     People  v.  Tweed,  50  How.  Pr. 

&  Eyl.  40Gr  Webb  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  (N.  Y.)  2(J2,  2G3. 

351;  Rex  v.  Johnson,  2  Str.  1000;  Rex  ^  Wilson  v.  State  Bank,  3  La.  Ann. 

V.    Burridge,  1    Str.  593;    s.   c.  2  Ld.  196,   198;   State  v.  Pitts,  58   Mo.  556; 

Raym.  125.     See  Thomp.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  State  v.  Knight,  61  Mo.  373. 

§  144,  subsec.  2.  '  Crane  v.  Dygert,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

5  Maffett  V.  Tonkins,  6  N.  J.  L.  224.  675.     But  see    State   v.    Hascall,  6   N. 

In  New  Jersey,  where  the  sheriff  exer-  H.  352,  360. 

cises  powers  in  respect  of  juries  analo-  *  Powell  v.  People,  5  Hun  (N.  Y.), 

gous  to  those  possessed  at  common  69. 

law,  it  has  been  held  a  good  ground  ^  Ante,  §  16. 

for  challenging  the  array  of  a  special  ^'^  Ante,  §  19. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  III.]       CHALLENGES    TO    THE   ARRAY.  35 

procedure  by  Avliich  tlie  panel,  selected  and  drawn,  are  brought 
into  court,  afford  no  ground  for  challenging  the  array;  ^  and  ob- 
jections to  particular  persons  summoned  are  not  properly  taken 
by  challenge  to  the  array,  but  by  challenge  to  ihe  polls? 

§  39.  Resummoning    3Iembers  of    Quashed    Panel. —  The 

inutility  of  challenging  the  array  on  the  ground  of  irregularities 
merely,  is  illustrated  by  a  class  of  cases  which  hold  that,  where 
such  a  challenge  is  sustained  and  a  special  venire  facias  issues 
for  Avant  of  jurors,  the  sheriff  may  resummon  the  members  of 
the  quashed  panel, ^  unless  it  has  been  quashed  by  reason  of 
fraud.* 

§  40.  Kinds  of  Challenges  to  the  Polls.  —  It  will  serve  no 
use  to  refer  to  the  confusing  divisions  and  subdivisions  of  chal- 
lenges to  the  polls  at  common  law.^  All  such  challenges  fall 
into  two  classes:  1.  Peremptory  challenges,  —  that  is,  chal- 
lenges for  which  no  reason  need  be  o-iven.  2.  Challenffes  for 
disqualitication, — that  is,  challenges  for  which  a  legal  reason 
must  be  given.  The  latter  obviously  again  fall  into  two  subdi- 
visions: 1.  Challenges  grounded  upon  general  disqualification. 
2.  Challenges  grounded  upon  disqualification  in  respect  of 
the  particular  case.     By  a  common-law  classification,  challenges 

1  Hartt7.  Tallmadge,  3 Day  (S.  C),  <;0  Ala.  1;  Baker  v.  Harris,  1  Winst. 
381;  Rex  v.  Eclmuiuls,  4   Barn.  &  Aid.       (N.  C.)  277. 

471,    489.      See  also  Rex    f.  Himt,  4  ^  Caperton  r.  Nickel,  4  W.  Va.  137; 

Bam.  &  Aid.  430;  People  v.  McGeery,  State  v.  Degonia,  09  Mo.  485;  State  v. 

6  Park.  Cr.   (N.  Y.)  G53.,  As  a  niisde-  Owen,  Phill.  L.  425;  State  u.  McCurry, 

scription  in  the  ventre /acias  by  which  GS  N.  C.  33;    Smith  v.  State,  4  Neb. 

the  act    is  called  "civil"  instead  of  277.    But   see    Combs    v.    Slaughter, 

"criminal:"     State    v.    Nerbovig,    33  Hard,  (Ky.)  C2.     It  has  been  held  that, 

Minn.  480.     Compare  under  the  stat-  upon  process  directed  to  the  coi'oner, 

nte  of  California:   People  v.  Coyodo,  that  officer  can  suramon-the  same  panel. 

40    Cal.    580;    People    v.    Welch,    49  Payne  v.  McLean,  1    Up.  Can.  K.    B. 

Cal.  174;  People  v.  Rodriguez,  10  Cal.  (o.  s.)  444.     Compare  Norbury  u.  Ken- 

50.  nedy,    3    Crawf.     &    Dix    (Ir.),    Cir. 

2  Mitchell  V.  State,  43    Tex.   517;  124. 

Gray  v.  State,  55  Ala.  86;  Hall  v.  State,  ^  Kell  v.  Brilliuger,  84  Pa.  St.  276. 

40  Ala.  698.     See  also  Hayes  v.  Reg.,  =  See  Thorap.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  §§  152, 

10  Ii'ish  L.   53;   Commander  v.  State,       153. 


30  IMPANELING   THE   JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

for  cause  "were  divided  into  challenges  for  jr;7'inc2paZ  cause^ 
and  challenges  to  the  favor.  The  chief  importance  of  this  dis- 
tinction lay  in  the  fact  that  the  former  were  tried  by  the  couri, 
.whose  decision  was  revieivahle  on  error,  while  the  latter  were 
tried  by  triors^  whose  decision  was  conclusive}  With  the  aboli- 
tion of  triors,  the  distinction  has  become  unimportant,,  though 
still  to  some  extent  kept  up. 

Article  II. — Peremptory  Challenges. 
Section' 

42.  In  what  Cases  Allowed. 

43.  Nature  of  this  Right. 

44.  Number  of  such  Challenges. 

45.  Number  in  Cases  of  Persons  Jointly  Indicted. 

4G.  [Continued.]     In  Case  of    Several  Parties  Plaintiffs  or  Defendants  In 
a  Civil  Action. 

47.  Power  of  Legislature  to  Increase  or  Diminish  Number. 

48.  Canons  of  Construction  Touching  the  Number  of  Challenges. 
tO.  Eight  of  Prosecution  to  Stand  Jurors  Aside. 

§  42.  Ill  what  Cases  Allowed.  — According  to  early  writers, 
peremptory  challenges  were  allowed  in  capital  felonies  only,  in 
favorem  vitae?  This  statement  was  not  far  out  of  the  way,  in 
early  times;  since  all  felonies,  though  strictly  punishable  hj  for- 
feiture, were  generally  also  punished  by  death?  But,  as  non- 
capital felonies  were  created  and  multiplied,  the  statements  of 
these  writers  became  misleading,  and  they  in  fact  misled  manj 
American  courts  into  the  conclusion  that  the  right  of  peremptory 
challenge  existed  only  in  the  case  of  capital  felonies.'^     It  was 

1  Pos^,  §  89.  W.   2 ;    Finch   Law,   Bk.  4,  c.    36,   p. 

2  Co.  Litt.  15(5.  b.;   2  Hawk.  P.  C.      414. 

570,  B.  2,  c.  43,  §  5;  2  Hale  P.  C.  2G7;  ^  4  Bla.  Com.  98. 

4   Bl.  Com.  353;    1  Chit.   Cr.  L.  535;  *  See  United    States    v.    Hand,    3 

Trials  per  Pais  (1725),  455;  Bac.  Abr.  Phila.  403;   United  States  v.  Cotting- 

Juries  E.  2;  7Md.,  9;  Doctor  &  Stu-  ham,   2  Blatch.    (U.  S.)  470;    United 

dent,   29.      See    comments  upon  the  States  v.  Carrigo,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

foregoing  by  Lord  Chief  Baron  Pollock  S.)  49;  United  States  v.  McPherson,  1 

in  Reg.  ».  Gray,  11  CI.  &  Fin.  427,  479;  Cranch  C.C.     (U.S.)    517;    United 

Reading's  Case,  7  How.  St.  Tr.  264.  States  v.  Toms,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

See   also  Com.    Dig.  Challenge,  c.  1;  607;    United    States    v.    Smithers,    2 

Ihid.,  Indictment  M. ;    Ihid.^  Justices  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  38;  United  States 


Tit.    I,  Ch.    III.]         PEREMPTORY    CHALLENGES.  37 

long  tlie  practice  in  England,  though  not  in"  Ireland,^  to  admit 
this  right  in  trials  for  felonies  which  were  not  capital;  but  tinally 
it  was  settled  in  1843  by  the  House  of  Lords,  in  a  ease  arising 
in  Ireland,  that  it  was  a  right  incidental  to  all  felonies,  whether 
capital  or  not,  both  in  England  and  in  Ireland.-  Such  challenges 
are  now  aUowed  by  statute  in  all  American  jurisdictions  in  all 
cases  of  felony,  whether  capital  or  not;  and  in  most  American 
jurisdictions  in  cases  of  misdemeanor,  and  in  some  in  civil  cases.^ 

§  43.  Nature  of  this  Right.  —  It  is  a  fundamental  principle 
that  the  right  of  peremptory  chaUenge  is  a  right  to  reject  and  not 
a  right  to  select.^  Therefore,  a  party  cannot,  in  general,  com- 
plain that  the  court  has  excused  jurors  without  cause,^  or  sus- 
tained untenable  challenges  of  the  other  party,  thus  driving  the 
objecting  party  to  exhaust  his  peremptory  challenges  upon  othei' 
members  of  the  panel,  or  upon  s[)ecial  venire-men  or  talesmen. 
The  practice  of  allowing  the  crown  to  stand  jurors  aside^  was 
supported  by  the  same  conception,  —  the  idea  being  that,  so  long 
as  the  prisoner  enjoyed  the  full  number  of  peremptory  challenges 
allowed  him  by  law,  he  was  not  prejudiced.  This  w'as  illusory; 
since  the  sheriff  had  the  power  of  arraying  the  panel  in  such 
order  as  suited  his  discretion,  so  that,  by  placing  at  its  head 

».  Johns,  4:  DaU.  (U.  S.)  412;  United  Fisher,  9  Exch.  472.  The  plaintiff  in 
States  V.  Black,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  a  civil  action  cannot  peremptorily 
195 ;  United  States  v.  Krouse,  2  Cranch  challenge  a  juror  drawn  to  fill  the  place 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  252;  United  States  v.  of  one  removed  for  cause.  Huff  v. 
White,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  73;  Walkius,  15  S.  C.  82;  Guntery.  Granite- 
United  States  V.  Randall,  1  Deady  (U.  ville  Man.  Co.,  Id.  443. 
S.),  524;  Shuster  v.  Com.,  38  Pa.  St.  •*  United  States  v.  Marchant,  4  Ma- 
20G.  son  (U.  S.),  158;  .s.  c.  12  Wheat.  (U. 

1  Rex  V.  Phelan,  and  Rex  v.  Whelan,  S.)  480;  State  v.  Wise,  7  Rich.  L,  412; 
1  Craw.  &  Dix  C.  C.  189,  and  note;  State  v.  Cazeau,  8  La.  Ann.  109;  State 
Eex  V.  Adams,  Jebb  C.  C.  135,  and  u.  Cardoza,  11  So.  Car.  195, 249;  Maton 
other  unreported  cases  cited  in  G  Irish  v.  People,  15  111.  53(5,  539;  Cruce  v. 
C.  L.  281,  288.  State,  59  Ga.  83,  90;   State  v.  Smith,  2 

2  Gray  v.  Reg.,  11  CI.  &  Fin.  427;  Ired.  L.  402;  State  v.  Arthur,  2  Dev. 
reversing  Reg.  v.  Gray,  0  Ir.  C.  L.  482.  217;  Turpin  v.   State   (Sup.  Ct.  Md., 

3  In  recent  times  they  have  been  Oct.  1880),  2  Crim.  L.  Mag.  532;  Hes- 
allowed  in  cases  of  misdemeanor  and  kew  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  IGl. 

in  civil  cases  in  England,  though  as  a  ^  Ante,  §  10;  post,'^  102. 

matter    of    (/race    merely.      Creed    v.  ^  Post,  §  49. 


38 


IMPANELING   THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


thirty-five  persons  publicly  known  to  be  obnoxious  to  the  accused 
he  could  drive  him  to  exhaust  his  peremptory  challenges  against 
these,  after  which  he  would  be  completely  at  the  mercy  of  the 
crown.  Moreover,  this  right  of  peremptory  challenge  is  confined 
to  the  tnain  issue,^  and  does  not  extend  to  the  trial  of  collateral 
issues,  such  as  the  issue  of  identity,'^  or  insanity;^  though,  where 
it  exists  in  civil  cases  by  statute,  the  defendant  may  exercise  it 
upon  jurors  impaneled  to  execute  a  writ  of  inquiry.^  Finally, 
this  right  does  not  exist  in  the  case  of  special  or  str'uck  juries,  for 
the  right  of  striking  takes  the  place  of  it.^ 

§  44.  Number  of  such  Challenges.  —  At  common  law,  the 
number  of  such  challenges  allowed  to  the  accused  was  thirty-five, 
that  is,  one  short  of  three  complete  juries.^  If  he  challenged  a 
greater  number  than  that  allow^ed,  the  barbarism  of  that  law 
pronounced  death  in  cases  of  treason,  and,  in  case  of  felony  or 
petit  treason,  subjected  him  to  peine  forte  et  dure,  that  is,  press- 
ing to  death, '^  though  sometimes  he  was  mercifully  hanged.^     In 


1  2  Hale,  P.  C.  267;  Bac.  Abr.  Juries 
E.  9;  Foster  Cr.  L.  42;  4  Bl.  Cora. 
353,  396;  Co.  Litt.  156.  b. ;  Rex  v.  Eat- 
cliffe,  1  W.  Bl.  3,  6;  s.  c.  18  How.  St. 
Tr.  429 ;  Eex  v.  Okey,  1  Leviuz,  61 :  s.  c. 
Sid.  72;  Sir  J.  Kelyug,  13;  1  Keble, 
244 ;  Reg.  v.  Key,  Temple  &  Mew,  623. 

-  Res  V.  Oakey,  1  Levinz,  61;  s.  c. 
Sid.  72;  Sir  J.  Kelyug,  13;  1  Keble,  244 
(case  of  Regicides) .  See  also  Res  v. 
Ratcliffe,  1  W.  Bl.  3;  s.  c.  IS  How.  St. 
Tr.  429. 

^  Freeman  I?.  People,  4  Deuio(N.  Y.), 
1,  22. 

4  Opothle-Yoholo  v.  Mitchell,  2 
Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.)  125. 

5  Schweuk  v.  Umsted,  6  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  351;  Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.  v.  Farr, 
4  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  362;  Blauchard  v. 
Brown,  1  Wallace  Jr.  (U.  S.),  309; 
State  v.  Moore,  28  Ohio  St.  595; 
O'Byrne  v.  State,  29  Ga.  36;  Cleveland, 
etc.,  R.  Co.  V.  Stanley,  7  Ohio  St.  155. 
But  see  McDermottu.  Hoffman,  7(1  Pa. 


St.  31.  And  where  less  than  twelve 
of  the  special  jurors  appeared,  and 
the  jury  was  completed  by  talesmen, 
peremptory  challenges  were  allowed. 
Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stanley,  supra. 
For  this  reason  a  struck  jury  was  . 
never  granted  at  common  law  for  the 
trial  at  bar  of  a  capital  case  (Far- 
riugton's  Case,  Sir  T.  Jones,  222), 
since  this  would  deprive  the  prisoner 
of  his  challenges.  Res  v.  Duucombe, 
12  Mod.  224. 

6  Co.  Litt.  156.  b;  2  Hawk.  P.  C, 
chap.  43,  §  7 ;  2  Hale  P.  C.  268 ;  Trials 
per  Pais  (1725),  455. 

"  2  Hale  P.  C.  268. 

8  Kel.  36.  It  is  inconceivable  that 
this  should  have  been  regarded  as  a 
matter  of  importance,  since  the  court 
clearly  had  the  right  to  proceed  in 
disregard  of  such  escessive  challeng- 
ing. State  V.  Gainer,  2  Hayw.  (N. 
C.)  140;  Funk  v.  Ely,  45  Pa.  St.  444. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]        PEREMPTORY    CHALLENGES. 


39 


criminal  cases  the  number  allowed  to  the  State  and  to  the 
accused  is  regulated  by  statute  in  every  American  jurisdic- 
tion/ and  can  seldom  be  the  subject  of  doubt  except  in  the 
case  of  two  or  more  persons  jointly  indicted.  In  civil  cases 
the    number    Is    variously     fixed    at    (wo,^    three, '^  four^   and 


1  Code   Ala.    187G,    §§    4879,    4880; 
Ark.  Dig.   1874,    §§    li)12,    1913;    Cal. 
Peual  Code,  §  1070;  People  v.  Clough, 
59    Cal.    428;    People    v.   Harris,    Gl 
Cal.  13(i;   People  v.     O'Neil,   61  Cal, 
435;    Laws   Colo.    1877,  §   873;    G.  S. 
Coun.    1875,    p.    538,    §     6;    State   v. 
Neuner,   49    Conn.   232;     Sess,    Laws 
Conu.  1879,   p.  303;    Laws   Del.   1874, 
chap.  133,  §    10;    Bush's   Dig.  Fla.,  p. 
444,  §   34;    Code   Ga.  1873,  §  4643;  R. 
S.    111.    1880,   chap.  38,  §   432;  2   Ind. 
Rev.  1876,  p.  893,  §§  81   and  82;   Mil- 
ler's R.  C.  Iowa,  1880,  §  4413;  Comp. 
L.  Kau.  1879,  §§  4690  and  4691 ;  Bul- 
litt's Cr.  Code,  p.  41,  §§  203,  204;    R. 
S.  La.  1876,  §§   997,   998;  La.  Act  of 
1880,  No.  35;  State  v.  Everage,  33  La. 
Ann.  120;  State  v.  Deraouchet  (La.),  3 
S.  W.  Rep.  565;  R.  S.  Me.  1871,  chap. 
134,  §  12;  R.  C.  Md.  1878,  p.  563,  §  18; 
G.  S.  Mass.  1860,  chap.  172,  §  4;  Acts 
of   1875,  chap.  167,  §    1;    R.  C.    Miss. 
1880,  §    3076;    R.  S.  Mo.  1879,  §§  1900, 
1902;    Comp.    L.    Mich.   1871,  §    7951; 
Stat,  at    Large,    Minn.   1873,  p.  1055; 
§  231;  G.  S.  Neb.,  p.  826,  §  467;  Comp. 
L.  Nev.  1873,  §   1960;   Gen.  Stat.  N.  H. 
1867,  p.  493,  §§   8  and  9;   Rev.  N.  J. 
1877,  p.  280,  §  71;  p.  530,  §  40;  p.  531, 
§  41;    Rev.    Stat.   N.  Y.  (6th  ed.),  p. 
1029,  §  9  ef  seq.;  N.  Y.  Code  Cr.  Proc. 
(chap.  442,  Laws  of  1881),  §  370;  Bat- 
tle's  Rev.  N.  C,  p.  338,  §   77;    R.  S. 
Ohio,  1880,  §§   7272,  7274,  7277;    Gen. 
Laws   Ore.  1872  (Cr.  Code),  §    155;    1 
Bright.  Purd.  (Pa.)  Dig.  §§  39  and  40; 
Gen.  Stat.  R.  I.  1872,  p.  434,  §  34;  R. 
S.  So.  Car.    1873,   p.  ?47,    §  2;    Stat. 
Tenn.  1871,  §§  4013,  4014;  R.  S.  Tex. 
1879  (Code   Cr.  Proc),  arts.  635  and 


652;  R.  L.  Vt.  1880,  §§  1653,  1654; 
Code  Va.  1873,  p.  1246,  §§  7  and  9; 
Rev.  Stat.  W.  Va.  1879,  chap.  65,  §§  3 
and  4;  R.  S.  Wis.  1878,  §  4690.  Federal 
Courts:  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.,  §  819.  Con- 
strued in  United  States  v.  Copper- 
smith, 4  Fed.  Rep.  198.  Cases 
removed  from  State  courts  are  gov- 
erned by  the  Federal,  and  not  by  the 
State  statute.  State  v.  O'Grady,  3 
Woods  (U.  S.),496.  Construction  of 
former  Federal  statutes:  Thomp.  & 
Mer.  Jur.,  §  164;  United  States  v. 
Shackleford,  18  How.  (U.  S.)  588; 
United  States  r.  Reed,  2  Blatclif.  (U. 
S.)  435;  United  States  v.  Cottingham, 
2  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  470;  United  States  v. 
Tallmau,  10  Blatclif .  (U.  S.)  21;  United 
States  V.  Devlin,  6  Blatchf.  (U.  S.) 
71;  s.  c.  7  Int.  Rev.  Rec.  94. 

2  R.  S.  Me.  1871,  chap.  82,  §  66; 
Comp.  L.  Mich.  1871,  §  6027;  Supp.  to 
G.  S.  Mass.,  Acts  of  1862,  chap.  84, 
§  1;  G.  S.  Vt.  App,  1870,  p.  1031,  No. 
39;  R.  S.  So.  Car.  1873,  p.  523,  §  26; 
Gen.  Stat.  N.  H.,chap.  212,  §  10;  R. 
S,  Ohio,  1880,  §  5177;  N.  Y.  Code  Rem. 
Jus.,  §  1176;  Stat.  Tenn.  1871,  §  4012; 
G.  S.  Conu.  1875,  title  19,  chap.  10, 
§  16. 

3  Rev.  N.  J.  1877,  p.  530,  §  40;  R. 
S.  111.  1880,  chap.  110,  §  49;  Laws 
Minn.  1878,  chap.  21,  §  1;  Comp.  L. 
Kan.  1879,  §  3799;  R.  S.  Wis.  1878, 
§  2851 ;  Bush  Dig.  Fla.,  chap.  104,  §  33; 
Gen.  Laws  Ore.  1872  (Civil  Code), 
§  187;  R.  S.  Del.  1874,  chap.  109,  §  19; 
Ark.  Dig.,  Stat.  1874,  §  3702;  R.  S. 
Laws  New  Mexico,  1880,  chap.  G8, 
§  18;  Comp.  L.  Utah',  1876,  §  1771. 

*  Code  Ala.  1876,  §  3016;  Cal.  Code 


40 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


Jive^  and  in  one  jurisdiction  at  one-fourth  of  the  jurors  sum- 
moned.^ 

§  45.   Number    in    Cases    of    Persons    Jointly    Indicted.  — 

Though  formerly  doubted,-^  it  is  now  generally  settled^  that, 
where  several  persons  are  jointly  indicted,  they  must  join  in  their 
challeno-es,  and  cannot  claim  for  each  the  number  accorded 
by  the  common  law  or  by  statute,  except  in  cases  where  the  stat- 
ute accords  them  this  right,  which  it  does  in  some  jurisdictions,^ 
either  in  express  terms  or  by  reasonable  interpretation.^  Many 
statutes,  on  the  other  hand,  expressly  require  that  defendants 
jointly   indicted    shall   join  in  their  challenges;  ^  and  it    would 


Civ.  Proc,  §  601;  Rev.  Stat.  W.  Va., 
chap.  lO'J,  §  23;  Civil  Code  Prac.  La., 
art.  512;  Battle's  Rev.  N.  C,  p.  8G1, 
§  229t(;  1  Bright.  Purd.  (Penu.)  Dig.,  p. 
837,  §  72;  R.  C.  Miss.  1880,  §  1708; 
Comp.  L.  Nev.  1873,  §  1224;  Colo. 
Civil  Code,  §  IGl. 

1  Miller's  R.  C.  Iowa,  1880,  §  2771. 

2  G.  S.  Ky.  1879,  p.  572,  §  12. 

3  2  Hale,  P.  C.  2G3;  1  Cliitty  C.  L. 
535. 

<  United  States  v.  Marchant,  4  Ma- 
sou  (U.  S.)  158;  s.  c.  affirmed,  12 
Wheat.  (U.  S.)  480;  United  States  v. 
Wilson,  Baldw.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  81; 
Hawkins  v.  State,  9  Ala.  137;  Bixbe  v. 
State,  (J  Oh.  86 ;  State  v.  Wise,  7  Rich. 
L.  (S.  C.)  412;  Hillw.  State,  2  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  24G;  Matou  u.  People,  15  111. 
53C;  State  v.  McGrew,  13  Rich.  L.  (S 
C.)  31G;  United  States  v.  Gibert,  2 
Sumn.  19;  United  States  v.  Kelly,  4 
Wash.  C.  C.  528;  State  v.  Soper,  16 
Me.  293;  State  v.  Conley,  39  Me.  78; 
State  V.  Smith,  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  402; 
State  V.  Stoughton,  51  Vt.  362;  s.  c. 
8  Reporter,  762;  People  v.  Loughlin, 
3  Utah,  133. 

5  R.  S.  Oh.  1880,  §  7281;  G.  S.  Neb. 
1873,  p.  827,  §  470;  1  Bright.  Purd.  Pa. 
Dig.,  p.  384,  §  43;  Battle's  Rev.  N.  C, 


p.  338,  §  77;  R.  S.  Wis.  1878,  §  4689- 
In  Texas  persons  jointly  indicted  are 
entitled  to  challenge  separately,  but  not 
to  the  same  number  as  is  allowed  to  a 
single  defendaut.  R.  S.  Tex.  1879 
(Code  Crim.  Proc),  Art.  635,  652. 

^  United  States  v.  Marchant,  4  Ma- 
son (U.  S.),  158;  s.c.  12  Wheat.  (U. 
S.)  480;  United  States  v.  Johns,  4 
Dall.  (U.  S.)  412;  Hill  v.  State,  2 
Yerg.  (Tenn.)  246;  Hawkins  v.  State, 
9  Ala.  137 ;  Brister  v.  State,  26  Ala. 
107;  United  States  v.  Haskell,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  (Va.)  412,  n;  Bixbe  v.  State,  6 
Oh.  86;  Maton  v.  People,  15  111.  536; 
State  V.  McLean,  11  La.  Ann.  54G; 
State  V.  Reed,  47  N.  H.  466;  Cruce  v. 
State,  59  Ga.  83;  State  v.  Stoughtou, 
51  Vt.  3i;2;  s.  c.  8  Reporter,  762; 
Smith  V.  State,  57  Miss.  822;  State  v. 
Durien,  29  Kan.  688.  Compare  State 
V.  Ford,  37  La.  Ann.  443. 

7  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.,  §  819;  R.  S.  Mo. 
1879,  §  1902;  Comp.  L.  Nev.  1873, 
§  1944;  R.  C.  Miss.  1880,  §  3070;  Stat, 
at  Large,  Minn.  1863,  p.  1054,  §  219; 
Gen.  Laws  Ore.  1872  (Cr.  Code), 
§  154;  Code  Va.  1873,  p.  1247,  §  14;  Bul- 
litt's Ky.  Cr.  Code,  p.  40,  §  198;  Cal. 
Penal  Code,  §  1056;  Ark.  Dig.  Stat. 
1874,  §  1920:  R.  S.  Del.  1874,  cliap.  133, 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  III.]    PEREMPTORY  CHALLENGES.  .41 

seem  tluit,  where  the  question  i.s  not  governed  by  statute,  if,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  court,  good  cause  exists  for  trying  the  de- 
fendants severally,  the  court  may  order  a  severance,  although 
they  may  prefer  to  be  tried  jointly.^  By  some  statutes  the  right 
of  election  is  given  them,  either  to  be  tried  separately  or  jointly. - 
Although  the  defendants,  so  jointly  indicted,  may  severally  be 
permitted  the  statutory  number  of  challenges,  this  does  not  in- 
crease the  number  allowed  to  the  State  beyond  the  number 
allowed  to  it  in  the  case  of  a  single  defendant.^  The  prosecu- 
tion cannot  complain  of  this,  since  it  is  a  matter  of  its  own 
choice  to  proceed  against  the  defendants  jointly,  when  it  might 
have  proceeded  against  them  severally.^  It  should  be  addotl  that 
whatever  view  is  taken  of  this  question,  it  has  been  usual,  and  it 
is  hence  proper,  to  allow  them  to  elect  to  be  tried  jointly  and 
hence  to  join  in  their  challenges,  or  to  be  tried  separately.^ 

§  46.  [Continued.]  In  Case  of  Several  Parties  Plaintiffs  or 
Defendants  in  a  Civil  Action.  — Where  several  persons  are 
joined  as  plaintiffs  or   defendants  in  a  civil  action,  the  general 

§16;     Laws    Utah,    1878    (Code    Cr.  which  may  be  exercised  by  each  of  the 

Proc),  §  225;  Rev.  Stat.  W.  Va.  1879,  joiut    defendauts.     li.    S.    Tex.    1879 

chap.  55,  §8:  Corap.  L.  Ariz.,  p.  1077,  (Code   Cr.   Proc),  arts.  G35,  G52.     So 

chap.  11,  §  300.  in  Louisiana:   La.  Acts   1878,  No.  24; 

1  Stewart  v.  State,  58  Ga.  577.     See  State  r.  Green,  33  La.  Ann.  U08. 
Cruce  V.  State,  .VJ  Ga.  83,  SS.     In  tlie  *  Wiggins  u.  State,   1  Lea  (Tenu.), 
earlier  case  of   Hawkins  v.  State,  13  738. 

Ga.    322,  it  was  lield  that,  where  the  ^  i    chitty  Cr.    L.  535;  Charnock's 

evidence  was  of  such  a  nature  that  the  Case,  3    Salk,    81;    s.   c.  Holt,  133;  12 

acquittal  of  one  would  be  the  acquittal  How'.  St.  Tr.  1378;  Swan  and  Jeffrey's 

of  both,   they  might  be  required   to  Case,  Foster  Cr.  L.  104,  106;  Grahme's 

join  in  their  challenges.  Case,  12  How.  St.   Tr.  673;    State   v. 

2  People  V.  :McCalla,  8  Cal.  301;  Monaquo,  T.  U.  P.  Cliarlt.  (Ga.)  22; 
Caldwell  i'.  State,  34  Ga.  10;  Horno  People  r.  McCalla,  8  Cal.  301 ;  State  v. 
V.  State,  .37  Ga.  80;  R.  S.  Oh.  1880,  Yancey,  3  Brev.  (S.  C.)  306;  Com.  v. 
§  7271;  Rev.  Stat.  W.  Va.  1879,  chap.  .Tames,  99  Mass.  438;  United  States  v. 
55,  §  8.  Collyer,  Wliart.    on   llom.    App.    489. 

3  Mahan  V.  State,  10  Oh.  232;  Sav-  In  one  okl  case  It  was  held  that  they 
age  V.  State,  18  Fla.  909;  State  v.  could  not  insist  on  separate  trials. 
Earle,  24  La.  Ann.  38;  State  u.  Gay,  Noble's  Case,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  731,  746. 
25  La.  Ann.  472.  The  statute  of  Compare  People  v.  Howell,  4  .Johns. 
Texas  allows  the  State  o«e-half  the  (X.  Y.)  296,  and  United  States  i'.  Sharp, 
number     of     peremptory     challenges  1  Pet.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  118. 


42  IMPANELING   THE   JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

rule,  arising  upon  the  express  terms  or  the  reasonable  interpre- 
tation of  statutes,  is,  that  the  number  of  peremptory  challenges 
is  restricted  to  each  aggregate  party  considered  as  a  unit, — that 
is  to  say,  all  the  j^arties  plaintiff  or  defendant  must  join  in  their 
challenges.^  But  in  one  jurisdiction,  this  rule  is  restricted,  in 
the  case  of  defendants,  to  instances  where  they  plead  jointly  ^"^ 
and  where  they  plead  separately  by  different  counsel,  they  are 
allowed  to  challenge  separately,  on  the  theory  that,  if  the  right 
of  challenge  could  not  be  exercised  without  agreement  among 
the  parties  on  either  side,  it  might  be  lost  altogether.^  But  this 
conception  would  seem  not  to  apply  to  parties  plaintiff,  since 
they  generally  join  as  such  by  their  voluntary  action. 

§  47.  Power  of  Legislature  to  Increase  or  Diminish  Num- 
ber. —  Statutes  increasing  or  diminishing  the  number  of  chal- 
lenges allowed  by  the  common  law,  do  not  infringe  the  provision 
of  American  constitutions  that  "  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall 
remain  inviolate;"  *  and  there  is  much  authority  for  the  conclu- 
sion that  this   may  be  done  by  a  statute  enacted  after  the  com- 

1  Schmidt  v.    Chicago   &c.    R.  Co.,  before   it  cau   be   made,  "unless  the 

83  111.    405.     To   the  same  effect,  see,  court    otherwise     order    or    direct." 

Snodgrass  v.    Huut,  15  lud.  274;  So-  §1224.      See  also  Comp.  L.  Utah,  1876, 

dousky  V.  McGee,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  §  1387. 

267,    2G9;    Stone   v.    Segur,    11   Allen  2  gtroh  i7.  Hinchman,  37  Mich.  490. 

(Mass.),   5GS;    Bryan  v.  Harrison,  76  ^  g^^  Frazer  v.  Jennison,  42  Mich. 

N.  C.  360;  State  v.  Reed,  47  N.  H.  466;  206. 

Blackburn  r.  Hays,  4  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  *  AYalter   v.   People,  32   N.  Y.   147, 

227.     The  statutes  of  the  United  States  159.     See   also  Jones   v.  State,  1    Ga. 

and  of  many  of  the  States  expressly  610;  Boon  v.  State,  1  Ga.  618;  Com.  v. 

require  the  parties  plaintiff  or  defend-  Walsh,  124  Mass.  32;  State  r.  Wilson, 

ant  in  a  civil   case  to  join  in  making  48  N.  H.  398;  State  ?;.  Pike,  49  N.  H. 

their    peremptory    challenges.      Rev.  406;  Com.  v.  Dorsey,   103  Mass.  412; 

Stat.  U.  S.,  §  819;  Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1879,  Hartzell  v.  Com.,  40  Pa.  St.  462;   War- 

§  2795;    Gen.    Laws   Ore.    1872  (Civil  ren  i'.  Com.,  37  Pa.  St.  45;  Mountfort 

Code),  §  187;  Miller's  Rev.  Code  Iowa,  v.  Hall,  1  Mass.  443;  Hudgins  v.  State, 

1880,  §§  2763,   4399;    Stat,   at  Large,  2  Ga.    173;  State  v.  McClear,  11  Nev. 

Minn.    1873,   p.  812,  §  153;  Gen.  Laws  39,  49;    Cregier  u.   Buuton,   2  Strob. 

NewMexico,  1880,  chap.  68,  §  19.     The  L.    (S.   C.)  487;  Dowliug  v.  State,  5 

Compiled  Laws    of    Nevada    provide  Sra.  &  M.   (Miss.)  664;  State  u.  Ryan, 

that  the   several  persons  plaintiffs  or  13  Minn.  370;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N. 

defendants  must  join   in   a  challenge  Y.  164;   State  ?'.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518. 


Tit.   1,  Cb.  III.]         PEREMPTORY    CHALLENGES. 


43 


mission  of  the  offense  for  which  the  prisoner  is  brought  to  trial, 
without  infringing  his  constitutional  rights.^ 

§  4S.  Canons  of  Construction  touching  tlie  Xumber  of 
Challenges.  —  Construing  these  statutes,  it  is  a  settled  principle, 
in  determining  the  number  of  peremptory  challenges  to  which 
the  parties  are  entitled,  to  consider  the  extent  of  the  punishment 
to  which  the  prisoner  may  be  subjected,  and  not  the  punishment 
which  actually  ivas  assessed,"^  and  to  disregard  the  fact  that  the 
offense  charged  against  him  is  one  for  which  the  court  may  im- 
pose a  shorter  term  of  imprisonment,^  unless  the  prosecuting  at- 
torney announces  that  he  will  ask  merely  for  a  conviction  for  a 
loiver  grade  of  the  crime.*  In  determining  whether  the  action  is 
a  civil  or  criminal  action  within  the  meaning  of  such  statutes, 
regard  is  generally  had  to  its /or»i.  If  it  proceeds  by  indict- 
ment or  information  for  a  public  offense,  it  is  a  criminal  action; 
if  in  any  other  mode,  it  is  a  civil  action.*^  This  is  not,  however, 
an  unvarying  test;  for  we  find  that  it  has  been  held  that  a  bas- 
tardy proceeding,  prosecuted  l)y  the  State  by  information,  is  a 
civil  suit;  ^  and  so  is  a  coftiplaint  under  a  statute  for  a,  forcible 
entry  and  detainer,"'  and  an  action  prosecuted  for  the  violation 
of  a  municipal  ordinance  ii'i  selling  intoxicating  liquors ;  ^  while 
another  court  has  taken  the  view  that  a  proceeding  in  rem  by 
the  State  against  certain  intoxicating  liquors  'kept  and  sold  con- 
trary to  law,  to  procure  their  forfeiture  under  a  statute,  is  crim- 
inal   in    its    nature.*     The    offense    of  jyrosecnting  false  claims 


1  State  V.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518;  Wal- 
ston  V.  Com.,  1(5  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  15; 
State  V.  Ryan,  13  Minn.  370.  Compare 
Dowling  V.  State,  5  Sraed.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  6(54;  Rafe  v.  State,  20  Ga.  GO; 
Jesse  V.  State,  20  Ga.  156;  Beers  v. 
Beers,  4  Conu.  535,  539;  Colt  v.  Eves, 
12  Conu.  243;  Re  Peuu.  Hall,  5  Pa.  St. 
204,  208;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N.  Y. 
164. 

2  Fowler  v.  State,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
573. 

3  Dull  V.  People,  4  Deuio  (N.  Y.) ,  91. 


*  People  V.  Comstock,  55  Mich.  405. 

5  See  State  v.  Pate,  Bush.  (N.  C.) 
244. 

6  Ibid  ;  Dorgan  v.  State,  72  Ala. 
173:  Kremliug  v.  Lallmau,  16  Neb. 
280. 

7  Quinebaug  Bank  v.  Tarbox,  20 
Conn.  510;  Miuer  v.  Brown,  20  Conu. 
519. 

8  Kleinback  v.  State,  2  Speers  L. 
(S.  C.)  418. 

9  Com.  V.  Certain  Intoxicating 
Liquors,  107  Mass.  216. 


44 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


ao"ainst  the  government/  or  of  counterfeiting,'^  is  not  2i  felony, 
within  the  meaning  of  §  819  of  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.,  and  therefore 
the  accused  is  not  entitled  to  more  than  tliree  peremptory  chal- 
lensres.  The  fact  that  the  indictment  contains  two  counts,  stating 
^  similar  offenses  separately,  does  not  increase  the  number  of  the 
defendant's  peremptory  challenges.^ 

§  49.  Rigbt  of  Prosecution  to  stand  Jurors  aside.  —  Orig- 
inally the  crown  had  an  unlimited  right  of  peremptory  challenge.* 
This  was  remedied  by  statute  o3  Edw.  I.,  Stat.  4,  called  the  "  Or- 
dinance for  Inquests,"  which  restricted  the  right  of  the  crown  to 
challenges  for  cause  shown. ^  It  applied  to  all  causes,  civil  and 
criminal;  and,  as  it  was  found  in  practice  to  put  the  crown  at  a 
disadvantage,  it  was  evaded  by  thetiction  of  allowing  the  crown's 
counsel  to  direct  successive  jurors  to  stand  aside,  w'ithout  showing 
any  cause  against  them„  until  the  whole  panel  had  been  gone 
over;  after  which,  in  case  of  a  deficiency,  the  crown  was  obliged 
to  show  cause  in  respect  of  such  members.^     As  the  court  had 


1  United  States  u.  Daubncr,  17  Fed. 
Rep.  793. 

2  United  States  v.  Coppersmitli,  2 
Flip.  (U.  S.)  546.  In  a  case  of  murder 
in  Maine,  the  State  is  entitled  to  five: 
State  V.  Chadboui-ue,  74  Me.  506.  No 
right  to  challenge  talesmen  supplied  in 
place  of  jurors  challenged,  under  Gen. 
St.  S.  C.  523:  Burckhalter  v.  Coward, 
16  S.  C.  435. 

3' Smith  V.  State,  8  Lea  (Tenn.), 
386;  State  17.  Skinner,  34  Kan.  256. 

4  1  Chitty  Cr.  L.  533. 

5  The  following  is  the  text  of  the 
statute:  "  Of  inqiiests  to  be  taken  be- 
fore any  of  the  justices,  and  wherein 
our  lord  the  King  is  party,  howsoever 
it  be,  it  is  agreed  and  ordained  by  the 
King  and  all  his  council,  that  from 
henceforth,  notv.ithstanding  it  be  al- 
leged, by  them  that  sue  for  the  King, 
that  the  jurors  of  those  inquests,  or 
some  of  them,  be  not  indifferent  for 
the  King,  yet  such  inquests  shall  not 


remain  untaken  for  that  cause ;  but  if 
they  that  sue  for  the  King  will  chal- 
lenge any  of  those  jui-ors,  they  shall 
assign  of  their  challenge  a  cause  cer- 
tain, and  the  truth  of  the  same  claal- 
leuge  sliall  be  inquired  of  according  to 
the  custom  of  the  court."  This  statute 
was  te-enacted  in  6  Geo.  IV.,  c.  50, 
§  29.  See  Reg.  v.  Frost,  9  Car.  &  P.  129, 
137.  It  was  ruled  in  a  nisi  prius  case 
sliortly  after  the  passage  of  this  last 
act,  that  the  crown  must  show  cause 
upon  making  the  cliallenge.  See  Saw- 
don's  Case,  2  Lewin  C.  C.  117.  Such, 
however,  is  not  the  law.  The  later 
statute  made  no  change  in  the  rule. 
Mansell  v.  Reg.,  8  El.  &  Bl.  54;  Rex  v. 
Parry,  8  Car.  &  P.  836. 

6  Staunford  P.  C.  162,  b. ;  2  Hawk. 
P.  C,  chup.  43,  §  3;  2  Hale  P.  C.  271; 
1  Chitty  Cr.  L.  534;  Bac.  Abr.  Juries 
E.  10;  4  Bl.  Com.  353;  Fitzliarris' 
Case,  8  How.  St.  Tr.  436 ;  Count  Con- 
igsmark's   Case,   9  How.   St.   Tr.  12: 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  III.]    PEREMPTORY  CHALLENGES. 


45 


the  power  of  directing  the  sheriff  to  suininon  any  number  of 
jurors  in  its  discretion,  this  power  of  standing  them  aside  phiced 
the  prisoner,  where  the  court  was  disposed  to  side  with  the  crown, 
at  an  enormous  disadvantaji^e.  Nevertheless,  the  iiractice,  thouo-h 
often  and  ably  challenged,  has  apparently  stood  in  Eno-land  to 
the  present  time;^  was  adopted  in  this  countr}^  together  with 
the  ancient  statute  of  Edward  on  which  it  was  founded, ^  and  has 


Stapletou's  Case,  8  How.  St.  Tr.  503; 
Lord  Grey\s  Case,  9  How.  St.  Tr.  128; 
s.c.  Skill.  82;  Cook's  Case,  13  How.  St. 
Tr.  318;  Cowper's  Case,  13  How.  St. 
Tr.  1108;  Layer's  Case,  16  How.  St. 
Tr.  13.j;  Brandreth's  Case,  32  How. 
St.  Tr.  755,  772;  Reg.  v.  Geach,  9  Car. 
&  P.  4'J9 ;  Reg.  v.  Frost,  9  Car.  &  P. 
129;  Mansell  r.  Keg.,  8  EL  &.  Bl.  54; 
Reg.  V.  Dougall,  18  Low.  Can.  Jur.  Ho. 
The  panel  liaving  been  gone  over  and 
a  jury  not  procured,  the  proper  prac- 
tice was  to  call  over  the  whole  of  the 
panel  in  the  same  order  as  before, 
omitting  tliose  who  had  previously 
been  challenged  by  the  prisoner,  and, 
as  each  juror  appeared,  for  the  prose- 
cuting counsel  to  state  the  crown's 
cause  of  challenge.  If  this  challenge 
was  not  allowed,  and  the  juror  re- 
mained unchallenged  by  the  accused, 
he  was  sworn.  Reg.  v.  Geach,  9  Car. 
&  P.  499.  The  panel  might  be  gone 
over  a  second  time  and  the  same 
jurors  stood  aside  a  second  time,  if 
certain  members  of  the  panel,  absent 
when  their  names  were  first  called, 
returned  in  season  for  the  second  call- 
ing. Cook's  Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr. 
311,  317;  Mansell  v.  Reg.,  8  EI.  &  Bl. 
54.  In  cases  of  misdemeanor  this  right 
of  standing  jurors  aside  was  exercised 
by  thii  private  proseaitor.  Reg.  v.  Mc- 
Gowen,  cited  in  Reg.  v.  McCartie,  11 
Ir.  C.  L.  (N.  s.)  188.  By  the  Canada 
statute  (Can.  Stat,  37  Vict.,  chap.  38, 
§  11)  this  right  cannot  be  exercised  by 


a  private  prosecutor  in  a  criminal 
prosecution  for  libel.  See  Reg.  v. 
Patteson,  36  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  129. 

1  Home  Tooke's  Case  (Anno  1794), 

25  How.  St.  Tr.  1,  25;  O'Coigly's  Case, 

26  How.  St.  Tr,  1191,  1231;  Mansell  v. 
Reg.,  8  El.  &  Bl.  54,  72;  s.  c.  Deers  & 
B.  375,  See  also  Reg.  v.  Benjamin, 
4  Up.  Can.  C.  P.  179;  Reg.  v.  Fellows, 
19  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  48. 

-  Com.  V.  Addis,  1  Bro.  (Penn.)  285, 
and  cases  cited  in  note;  State  v.  Bar- 
rontine,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  553; 
United  States  v.  Marchant,  12  Wheat. 
(U.  S.)  480;  United  States  v.  Wilson, 
Bald.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  78,  82;  Cora.  v. 
Marrow,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  402;  s.  c.  sub 
mm.  Com.  v.  Marra,  8  Phila.  (Pa.) 
440;  Jewell  v.  Com.,  22  Pa.  St.  94; 
Cora.  V.  Jolliffe,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  585; 
State  V.  Arthur,  2  Dev.  (N,  C)  217; 
State  V.  Cratou,  6  Ired.  L.  (N,  C.)  164; 
State  V.  Benton,  2  Dev,  &  Bat,  (N,  C.) 
196;  State  v.  Stalraaker,  2  Brevard, 
(S.  C.)  1;  Sealy  v.  State,  1  Ga.  213; 
United  States  v.  Douglass,  2  Blatch. 
(U.  S.)  207;  Cora.  v.  Twitchell,  1 
Brewst.  (Pa.)  551;  Waterford  &c. 
Tp.  V.  People,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  161; 
People  V.  Atchinson,  7  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  241;  People  v.  Henries,  1  Park.  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  579;  State  v.  Shaw,  3  Ired.  L. 
(N.  C.)  532:  State  v.  Bone,  7  Jones,  L. 
(N.  C.)  121.  But  see  Montague  v. 
Cora.,  10  Graft.  (Va.) 767:  United  States 
V.  Shackleford,  18  How,  (U.  S.)  588. 


46  IMPANELING    THE   JURY.  [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

been  retained  in  some  States  even  after  the  passage  of  statutes 
giving  peremptory  challenges  to  the  prosecution/  though  in  such 
cases  its  retention  cannot  be  defended  upon  principle.^ 

Article  III.  —  Challenges  tor  General  Disqualification. 

Section 

52.  Of  Challenges  for  Cause. 

53.  Lack  of  the  Statutory  Qualificatious. 

54.  Alienage. 

55.  Ignorance  of  the  English  Language. 

56.  Inability  to  Read  and  Write. 

57.  Party  to  Another  Suit  at  Same  Term. 

58.  Prior  Service  as  a  Juror  within  a  Stated  Period. 

§  52.  Of  Challenges  for  Cause.  — These  were  divided  in  the 
old  law  into  two  classes:  1.  Principal  Challenges.  2.  Chal- 
lenges to  the  favor.  The  former  were  tried  by  the  court  ;^  the 
latter  by  persons  sworn  specially  to  try  them,  called  triors.*  The 
former  class  seems  to  have  included  all  causes  of  challeno;e  which 
were  such  as  matter  of  law,  and  which,  upon  being  shown,  could 
accordingly  be  allowed  by  the  court ;  the  latter  appears  to  have 
included  the  almost  infinite  mass  of  grounds  of  challenge  of  a 
nature  so  dubious  as  not  to  fall  within  the  former  class.  The 
second  ground  seems  to  have  included  everything  that  might  give 
rise  to  a  suspicion  of  partiality  springing  out  of  the  relations  of 
the  parties  to  the  venire-man  and  the  circumstances  of  the  par- 

1  Warren  v.    Com.,  37   Pa.   St.  45;  Y.)  71,  109;   State  v.  Potter,  18  Conn- 

Haines  v.  Com.,  100  Pa.  St.  317;  Smith  166,  171. 

V.  Com.,  Id.  324;  State  v.  McNinch,  12  *  Rex  v.  Kirwan,  cited  in  Finlay's 

So.  Car.  89;  State  v.  Benton,  2  Dev.  &  I^isli  ^^S-^  P-  347;  People  v.  Dewick, 

B.    (N.  C.)  200;   State  v.   Stephens,   13  ^  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  230;  Mima  Queen 

'So   Car   '>85  ^-  Hepburn,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  3; 


2  Sealy  v.  State,  1  Ga.  213;  Reynolds 
V.   State,  1  Ga.  222 ;  United  States  v. 


United  States  v.  Watkins,  3  Cranch 
(U.  S.),  443;  Boon  v.  State,  1  Ga.  618; 
Copenhaven  v.  State,  14  Ga.  22;  Mc- 


Butler,   1  Hughes   (U.   S.),  457.     The  Cxuffie  t^.  State,  17  G«.  497;  McCormick 

latter  case    was    tried    before    Chief  ^_  Brookfield,  4  N.  J.  L.   69;  Joice  v. 

Justice  Waite    in   the  United    States  Alexander,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  528; 

Circuit  Court  for  the  District  of  South  Reason  v.  Bridges,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

Carolina,  April,  1877.  S.)  478;   McCormick  v.  Brooktield,  4: 

3  People  V.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.    (N.  N.  J.  L.  69,  72. 


Tit.  1,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOK    CAUSE. 


47 


ticuliir  case.^  AVith  the  general  abolition  of  the  practice  of 
swearing  triors  to  determine  challenges  to  the  favor ,2  the  dis- 
tinction between  these  two  kinds  of  challenges  has  so  far  disap- 
peared in  this  country  that  it  may  now  be  disregarded ;  ^  and 
these  hitter  are  in  turn  divided  into  challenges  for  "  implied 
bias  "'  and  challenges  for  "  actual  bias.''  ^ 

§  53.  Lack  of  the  Statutory  Qualifications. —  First,  then, 
as  to  challenges  for  general  disqualification;  and  of  these  a 
numerous  class  is  grounded  upon  a  lack  of  the  statutory  qualifi- 
cations for  jury  duty.  Here  it  may  be  premised  that  in  general 
it  must  ajipear  that  the  juror  is  qualified  at  the  time  of  service^ 
and  not  merely  that  he  was  qualified  when  the  jury  list  was  pre- 
pared.^ Such  challenges  have  been  made,  and  allowed  or  denied, 
under  various  statutes,  according  to  the  facts  of  the  case  on  the 
ground  of  non-residence;^  not  a  voter ^  though  if  he  has  qualified 


1  Co.  Litt.   157a. 

-  The  practice  of  ascertaining  the 
qualifications  of  jurors  by  triors  seems 
to  have  been  abolislietl  in  some  States 
at  an  early  date.  State  v.  Bahhvin,  1 
Const.  Kep.  (S,  C.)  29G;  McGowan  u. 
State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  184;  State  v. 
Wall.  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  349;  Rollins  v. 
Ames,  2  N.  H.  350;  State  v.  "Potter,  18 
Conn.  IGO,  171;  State  v.  Knight,  43 
Me.  11. 

3  The  distinction  is  retained  in  sev- 
eral jurisdictions,  by  statutes  (cited 
in  the  next  note),  drawn  upon  the 
model  of  the  statute  of  New  York, 
under  the  name  of  "General  Causes 
of  Challenge  and  Particular  Causes  of 
Challenge." 

•*  New  Y'"ork  Code  Crira.  Proc.  1881, 
§§  374-378;  Ark.  Dig.  1874,  §§  1907- 
1911;  Cal.  Penal  Code,  §§  1071-1074; 
Bullitt's  Ky.  Cr.  Code,  p.  41,  §j  20(5- 
210;  Gen.  Laws  Ore.  1872  (Civil 
Code),  §§  181-185;  Stat,  at  Large, 
Minn.  1873,  p.  1055,  §§  233-237;  Sess. 
Laws,  Mmn.  1878,  chap.  24;  Comp.  L. 


Nev.  1873,  §§  1961-19(34;  Comp.  L.  Ariz. 
1877,  chap.  11,  §§  317-320;  Sess.  Laws, 
Utah,  1878  (Code  Cr.  Proc),  §§  239- 
242.  This  system  is  found  in  the  Iowa 
Kevision  of  18(10  (§§  47(58-4771),  but 
not  in  the  later  codes  of  1873  and  1880. 

5  2  Hawk.  P.  C,  c.  43,  §  13;  Kelley 
V.  People,  55  N.  Y.  5G5;  Armsby  v. 
People,  2  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y".)  157; 
State  V.  Williams,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  381; 
Orcuttt'.  Carpenter,  1  Tyler  (Vt.),  250; 
Conway  v.  Clinton,  1  Utah,  215.  But 
see  State  v.  Middletou,  5  Port.  (Ala.) 
484,  48G;  State  v.  Ligon,  7  Port.  (Ala.) 
1G7.  Compare  People  v.  Shafer,  1 
Utah,  2G0. 

o  This  happens  where  the  venire- 
man, having  been  a  resident,  has  left 
the  county  with  the  purpose  of  not  re- 
turning; but  otherwise  where  he  has 
left  it  for  a  tempoi-ary  purpose,  in- 
tending to  return  (People  v.  Stoucifer, 
G  Cal.  405,  410) ;  or  where,  after  re- 
moval, he  has  acquired  a  new  resi- 
dence outside  the  county.  Graham  v. 
Trimmer,  G  Kan.   231.     Residence  foi 


48 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY, 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


he  need  not  be  registered ;  ^  not  a  freeholder,  which  means  a 
freeliolder  of  the  county  wherein  the  issue  is  tried, ^  though  it 
will  be  sufficient  if  he  has  an  equitable  interest  in  land,^  as  where 
he  holds  it  by  an  ordinary  title  bond;  "*  not  a  householder,  which 
term  does  not  refer  to  the  holding  of  a  house, ^  but  is  used  to 
designate  the  head  or  master  of  a  family;^  not  a  taxpayer, 
which  means  one  who  has  not  been  assessed  for  taxes,  and  not 
one  who  possesses  taxable  property  not  listed.^ 


two  months,  animo manendi,  sufficient: 
State  V.  France,  70  Mo.  681.  Where 
an  unorganized  county  is  attached  to  an 
organized  county  for  judicial  purposes, 
a  resident  of  the  former  is  qualified 
in  respect  of  the  latter.  Groom  v. 
State  (Tex.)~,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  GG8. 

i  Craft  u.  Com.,  24  Graft.  G02;  State 
V.  Courtney,  28  La.  Ann.  789;  State  v. 
Salge,  1  Nev.  455.  The  constitution- 
ality of  a  statute  prescribing  this 
qualification  has  been  denied.  Gibbs 
V.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenu)  72 ;  Gunter 
V.  Pattou,  2  Heisk.  (Tenu.)  257.  Under 
the  Micliigau  statute  imalien  is  quali- 
fied, if  a  voter.  People  Vi  Scott,  5() 
Mich.  154;  Peoples.  Rosevear,  Id.  158. 

2  2  Hawk.  P.  C,  c.  43,  §  13;  Day  v. 
Com.,  3  Graft.  630;  Wills  v.  State,  69 
Ind.  286.  See  also  State  v.  Cooper, 
83  N.  C.  671;  21  Vin.  Abr.  250,  §  21. 
But  contra,  see  New  Orleans  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Hemphill,  35  Miss.  17.  A  stat- 
utory requirement  of  freeliold  qualifi- 
cation for  talesmen  will  not  by  impli- 
cation be  extended  to  members  of  the 
regular  panel.  State  v.  Wincroft,  76 
N.  C.  38-  See  also  State  v.  Wiley,  88 
N.  C.  691.  In  Texas  a  juror  is  dis- 
qualified who  is  not  a  freeholder  in  tlie 
State  or  a  householder  in  the  county. 
Rev.  St.  Tex.,  art.  3009;  Boren  v. 
State  (Tex.),  4  S.  W.  Rep.  463,  466. 

3  Com.  V.  Helmondoller,  4  Graft. 
(Va.)  536;  State?;.  Raglaud,  75  N.  C. 
12;  Com.  -v.  Carter,  2  Va.  Cas.  319. 


^  Hawkins,  ubi  supra;  New  Orleans 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Hemphill,  35  Miss.  17. 
See  also  Com.  v.  Burcher,  2  Rob. 
(Va.)  826;  Kerby  v.  Com.,  7  Leigh 
(Va.),  747;  Com.  v.  Cunningham,  6 
Graft.  (Va.)  695.  But  one  who  has 
sold  all  the  land  owned  by  him  when 
his  name  was  put  upon  the  list  of 
jurors,  and  has  taken  a  mortgage 
thereof  to  secure  payment  of  the  pur- 
chase money,  is  no  longer  a  competent 
juror.  Kelley  v.  People,  55  N.  Y.  565; 
2  Th.  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  157. 

•''  Nelson  v.  State,  57  Miss.  286 ;  State 
V.  Wincroft,  76  N.  C.  38.  One  court 
has  lield  that  one  who  "  rents  a  room 
and  boards  "  is  a  householder  within 
such  a  statute  (Robles  v.  Stjate,  5 
Tex.  App.  347)  ;  but  this  is  an  obvious 
judicial  aberration. 

6  Bowne  v.  Witt,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
475;  Sylvester  v.  State,  72  Ala.  201 
(house  in  wife's  name).  Compare 
Calhoun  v.  Williams,  32  Graft.  (Va.) 
19;  Bradford  v.  State,  15  Ind.  347; 
Thomp.  Homest.  &  Ex.,  §  65. 

"  People  V.  Thompson,  34  Cal.  671. 
Compare  State  v.  Doan,  2  Root  (Conn.) , 
451;  State  v.  Heaton,  77  N.  C.  505 
(taxes  assessed  but  collector  enjoined) ; 
State  V.  Wincroft,  76  N.  C.  38  (con- 
clusiveness of  finding  of  trial  court  on 
the  question)  :  State  v.  Jennings,  15 
Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  176  (excludes  those 
who  pay  po?/  taxes  only).  In  North 
Carolina  tales  jurors  and  nieml)eri^  't  the 


Tit.   I,   Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


49 


§  54.  Alienagre.  — 'JMiis  has  always  been  held  good  ground  of 
challenge,  though  the  objection  is  ivaived  if  not  taken  before  the 
juror  is  sworn. ^ 


§  55.  Ignorance  of  the  English  Language.  —  Unquestion- 
ably the  court  has  power  to  discharge  a  vcnire-nian  Avho  is  igno- 
rant of  the  English  language, ^  although  such  a  disqualitication  is 
not  mentioned  in  the  statute;  '  and  the  better  opinion  is  that  this 
is  a  ground  of  challenge,*  though  one  court  has  held  the  contrary.*^ 


original  pauel  must  have  paid  tlicir 
taxes  for  tlie  preceding  year;  otlierwise 
as  to  special  veuire-nieu.  State  v.  Car- 
laud,  'JO  X.  C.  COS.  That  is,  for  tlie 
year  p!vtLHllii<r  tlie  time  wheu  he  was 
placed  on  tla-  jury  list,  though  uot  for 
the  year  precediui:  the  trial:  Sellers 
V.  Selless  (N.  C),  .i  South  East.  Kep. 
017. 

>  Ilolliu^sworth  v.  Duaue,  4  Dall. 
(U.  S.)  3.53;  Rex  v.  Suttou,  8  Barn.  & 
Cress.  417:  s.  c.  1.5  En^.  L.  &  Eq.  2.52; 
Com,  r. Thompson,  4  Phila.  (Pa.)  21.5; 
Borst  r.  Beecker,  C.  .Johns.  332.  It  has 
l)een  held  tlnit  the  objection  may  be 
made  even  after  verdict,  if  the  fact 
was  not  discovered  until  then:  (Schu- 
macker  v.  State,  .5  \Vis.  324;  State  v. 
Vogel,  22  Wis.  471);  but  we  shall 
hereafter  see  (post,  §  IIG),  that  the 
weiL'ht  of  authority  is  greatly  the 
other  way.  It  is  stated  in  one  case  to 
have  been  decided  tliat  alienage  was 
not  a  good  cause  of  challenge,  (Mima 
Queen  r.  Hej.burn,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 
S.)  3)  :  but  it  seems  from  a  conflicting 
report  of  the  same  case  on  appeal 
that  the  question  was  one  of  non- 
residence  merely,  and  besides  tlie 
objection  was  not  taken  until  after 
the  juror  had  been  sworn.  S.  c.  7 
(•ranch  (U.  S.),  290,  297.  The  ol)jec- 
tion, though  taken  at  the  proper  time, 
has  been  held  unavailing  where  the 
accused  went  to  trial  loithoxit  exhaust- 


ing his  peremptory  challenges.  Terri- 
tory r.  Hart  (Mont.),  14  Pac.  Kep. 
7<i8,  774.  Under  some  systems  one 
who  has  declared  his  intention  of  be- 
coming a  citizen  under  the  Act  of 
Congress,  is  competent.  State  v. 
Pagels  (Mo.),  4  S.  W.  Kep.  931;  Kev. 
St.  Mont.,  §  780;  Territory  v.  Hard- 
ing (Mont,),  12  Pac.  Rep.  750. 

-  State  V.  Ring,  29  Minn.  78;  Atlas 
Mining  Co.  v.  Jolinstou,  23  Mich.  3f; ; 
State  V.  Rousseau,  28  La.  Ann.  579; 
People  r.  Arceo,  32  Cal.  40;  State  v. 
Marsliall,  8  Ala.  302;  Montague  v. 
Com.,  10  Graft.  (Va.)  707,  772. 

■^  Sutton  V.  Fox,  55  AYis.  531;  s.  c. 
42  Am.  Rep.  744. 

*  Lyles  V.  State,  41  Tex.  172;  Vanez 
V.  State,  (5  Tex.  App.  429;  Etheridge 
V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  133;  McCampljell 
V.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  124;  Nolen  v. 
State,  9  Tex.  App.  419.  The  same  view 
was  taken  at  nisi  prius  in  Fisher  v. 
Philadelphia,  4  Brewst.  (Pa.)  395,  and 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Louisiana  in 
State  V.  Push,  23  La.  Ann.  14  (disre- 
garding Gay  V.  Ardry,  14  La.  288); 
State  V.  Gay,  25  La.  Ann.  472;  State  v. 
Tazwell,  30  La.  Ann.  884. 

•'-  Trinidad  v.  Simpson  (Colo.)  22 
Alb.  L.  J.  409;  s.  c.  10  Cent.  L.  J.  149; 
5  Colo.  ('>-,.  This  last  decision  had 
reference  to  trials  in  a  portion  of  the 
State  of  Colorado  in  which  nearly  all 
the  inhabitants  spoke  and  understood 


50 


IMPANELING   THE   JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  56,  Inability  to  Read  and  Write. — This,  though  not  a 
disqualification  at  common  hiw/  is  made  such  by  statute  in  one 
State,-  and  perhaps  in  others.  Although  such  a  statute  excepts 
cases  where  the  requisite  number  who  can  read  and  write  are  not 
to  be  found  in  the  county,  the  judge  has  no  right  to  dispense 
with  the  statutory  qualification  because  the  county  is  sparsely 
populated.^ 

§  57.  Party  to  another  Suit  at  same  Term.  —  It  has  been 
made  a  statutory  cause  of  challenge  that  a  juror  has  a  suit  pend- 
ing for  trial  at  the  term  of  court  for  which  he  has  been  sum- 
moned  as  a  juror.* 

§   58.  Prior  Service   as  a  Juror  within  a  Stated  Period. — 

Prior  service  as  a  juror  within  a  stated  period  is  made  by  some 
statutes,  levelled  against  a  well  known  class  of  persons  called 
"  professional  jurors,"  a  ground  of  challenge.^ 


only  the  Spanish  langnage.  It  pro- 
ceeded upon  the  impracticability  of 
administering  justice  without  the  aid 
of  the  inhabitants  of  those  counties; 
suggested  that  the  proceedings  could 
be  made  known  to  the  jurors  by 
means  of  interpreters;  and  held  that 
the  statute  of  the  State  which  pro- 
vided that  judicial  proceedings  must 
be  conducted  In  the  English  language 
(Civil  Code  Colo.,  §  405),  would  be 
satisfied  by  a  record  in  that  language. 

1  Ante,  §  10. 

2  The  Texas  statute  has  been  con- 
strued to  mean  inability  to  read  and 
write  the  English  language.  AVright 
V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  163. 

3  Garcia  v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  335. 

4  Riley  u.  Bussell,  1  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
294;  Plummer  v.  People,  74  111.  3G1. 


■"'  Brooks  V.  Bruyn,  35  111.  392;  Bis- 
sell  V.  Ryan,  23  111.  56(j;  Barker  v. 
Hine,  54  Ind.  542;  Christie  v.  State, 
44  Ind.  408;  Kassebaum  v.  State,  45 
Ind.  277;  Demaree  v.  State,  45  Ind. 
299;  Williams  v.  State,  45  Ind.  299. 
For  the  construction  of  such  statutes, 
see  Burden  v.  Peoplej  26  Mich.  162; 
Gracia  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  337;  Tut- 
tle  V.  State,  G  Tex.  App.  556;  Myers  v. 
State,  7  Tex.  App.  640;  Etheridge  v. 
State,  8  Tex.  App.  133;  State  v. 
Thorne,  81  N.  C.  555.  See  Prov.  Inst. 
V.  Burnham,  128  Mass.  458;  Famul- 
ener  v.  Anderson,  15  Oh.  St.  473. 
That  such  a  statute  applies  to  one 
who  had  been  summoned  as  a  talesman 
in  a  street-opening  case:  William& 
V.  Grand  Rapids,  53  Mich.  271. 


Tit.    I,   Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  51 


Akticle  lY.  —  Challenges  fok  Disqualificatiox  in  Respect  of  the 
Pakticular  Case. 

Subdivision  I.  —  Challenges  Groimded  on  Consanguinity ,  Affinity, 
Interest,  Affection. 

Section 

5a    Grounds  of  Principal  Cliallenge  at  Common  Law. 
60.  ^Member  of  the  Grand  Jury. 
6L  Consanguinity  and  Artinity. 

62.  [Continued.]     Wliether  the  Party  so  Related  to  the  Venire-man  must  be 

a  Party  to  the  Kecord. 

63.  Members  of  rul)lic  Corporations. 

64.  Members  of  I'rivate  Corporations  and  Soeieties. 

65.  Interest  in  the  Suit. 

66.  Membership  in  Associations  for  the  Suppression  of  Crime. 

67.  Business  Relations. 

GS.  Prior  Sei'vice  in  the  Same  or  a  Similar  Case. 

§  59.   Grounds  of  Principal  Challenge  at  Common  Law. — 

These  .statutory  groinuls  of  cliiillenge  arc  not,  in  the  view  of 
some  courts,  exclusive  of  others  which  existed  at  common  law.^ 
Indeed,  it  has  been  held  not  within  the  power  of  the  legislature, 
under  a  constitution  preserving  the  right  of  trial  by  jury,  to  de- 
prive an  accused  person  of  the  right  of  challenge  for  actual  biaSy 
which  was  a  challenge    to    the    favor    at    common    law.-     It    is 

^  Birdsong  v.  State,  47  Ala.  68;  every  one  whom  the  judge  desired  to 
Smith  17.  State,  55  Ala.  1  (overruling  convict,  and  also  that  he  "would  as 
Boggs  jj.  State,  45  Ala.  30;  Lyman  u.  lief  swear  on  a  spelling  hookas  a 
State,  45  Ala.  72,  and  restoring  State  bible,  because  he  was  a  Tom  Paine 
V.  Marshall,  8  Ala.  302);  Chouteau  v.  man."  McFadden  v.  Com.,  23  Pa.  St. 
Pierre,  9  Mo.  3;  State  v.  West,  69  Mo.  12,  17.  At  nisi  prius,  however,  it  was 
401;  Lyles  v.  State,  41  Tex.  172;  ruled  by  Coleridge, , J.,  to  be  no  ground 
Lester  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  433;  for  a  challenge,  that  the  juror  had 
"Williams  v.  State,  44  Tex.  34;  Cald-  sat  on  several  cases  during  the 
well  V.  State,  41  Tex.  Sij ;  Trinidad  v.  assize,  and  in  no  instance  had  con- 
Simpson  (Sup.  Ct.  Col.),  22  Alb.  L.  sentcd  to  a  verdict  for  the  croAvn. 
J.  409;  s.  c.  10  Cent.  L.J.  149;  Quesen-  Sawdon's  Case,  2  Lewin,  C.  C.  117. 
berry  v.  State,  3  Stew.  &  Port.  (Ala.)  Nor  that,  in  a  pi-evious  case,  the  juror 
308;  Dumas  v.  State,  63  Ga.  600.  had  shown  some  dissatisfaction  with 
Thus,  it  has  been  held  a  good  ground  the  law  as  laid  down  by  the  judge  in 
of  challenge  that  a  juror  had  grossly  favor  of  the  challenging  party.  Pearse 
misbehaved  on  a  former  occasion,  by  v.  Rogers,  2  Fos.  &  Fin.  137. 
declaring  that  he  had  tried  to  acquit  -  State     v.   McClear,    11     Nev.   89. 


52  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

important,  then,  to  bear  in  mind  what  were  the  grounds  of  chal- 
lenge for  principal  cause  at  common  law.  These,  according  to 
Chief  Baron  Gilbert,  were  as  follows:  "All  causes  of  objection 
from  partiality  or  incaj^acity,  consanguinity  and  affinity,  are  con- 
tained in  the  writ;  if  the  juror  be  under  the  power  of  either 
party,  as  if  counsel,  serjeant  of  the  rf)bes,  or  tenant,  these  are 
expressly  within  the  intent  of  the  writ ;  so  that,  if  he  has  de- 
clared his  opinion  touching  the  matter,  or  has  been  chosen  arbitra- 
tor b}"  one  side,  or  done  any  act  by  which  such  an  opinion  might  be 
conceived,  as  if  he  has  eaten  and  drank  at  the  expense  of  either 
party  after  he  is  returned.  All  incapable  persons,  as  infants, 
idiots  and  people  of  non-sane  memory,  are  likewise  excluded."  i 

§  60.  Member  of  the  Grand  Jury. — To  these  may  be 
added  another  which  has  come  down  to  the  present  day,  namely, 
that  the  person  challenged  was  a  member  of  the  grand  jury  which 
returned  the  indictment;^  but  the  mere  fact  that  he  was  the 
bailiff  Viho  attended  upon  the  grand  jury  which  returned  the  in- 
dictment is  not  a  disqualification,  unless  it  appears  that  he  knew 
something  of  their  proceedings  touching  the  particular  case.^ 

The  statutory  causes  of  challenge  for  feiture  which  would  eusue  from  the 

"implied   bias"  are  held  to   be   ex-  conviction:    had  declared  an  opinion 

elusive  of  all  others  under  this  head,  beforehand  of  the  defendant's   guilt, 

People  V.  Cotta,  49  Cal.  1G6;  People  v.  or  had  "  given  his  dogs  the  names  of 

Welch,   49   Cal.    174,    178.     See    also  the  King's  witnesses."     2  Hav^k.  P.  C, 

State   V.  Thomas,   19   Minn.  484.     But  chap.  43,  §  27,  et  seq. 

the     definition     of   "actual  bias"  is  -  So  enacted  by  Stat.  25  Edw.  III., 

sufficiently    broad     to    embrace    the  e.  3.     See  Gates'  Case,  10  How.  St.  Tr. 

most  important    objections  formerly  1082;  Cook's   Case,    13    How.  St.  Tr. 

taken  to  the  favor.  311,  339;  Eex  v.  Percival,  1  Sid.  243; 

1  Gilb.   Hist.  C.  P.  95.     Other   old  Young  w.  Slaughterford,  11  Mod.  228; 

authorities,  show  that  all  of  the  fore-  Com.  v.  Hussey,  13  Mass.  221.     In  an 

going  viere  principal  grounds  of  dial-  action  for  malicious  prosecution,  for 

lenge.     Co.   Litt.    157.   a;    Bac.    Abr.  causing  the  plaintiff  to  be  indicted,  he 

Juries    E.    5;    Trials    per    Pais    (ijth  may  challenge  any  of  the  jurors  who 

ed.),  137,  et  seq.     Serjeant   Hawkins  were  on  the  grand  jury  that  found  the 

enumerates  still  others  as  allowed  in  indictment.    Rogers  r.  Lamb,  3  Blackf. 

criminal  cases,  namely,  that  the  per-  155. 

sou   challenged   had  been  a  member  ^  Spittorff  v.  State  (Ind.),  8  North 

of  the   grand  jury  that  returned  the  East.  Rep.  911. 
indictment;    had  a   claim  to  the  for- 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  53 

§  Gl.  Consanguinity  and  Affinity.  — This  is  reckoned  ac- 
cording to  the  rule  of  the  civil  law,^  as  dif<tingui:^hed  from  that 
of  the  canon  laio,  Avhieh  latter  was  the  English  law  of  descent. ^ 
In  so  reckoning,  we  reckon  from  one  of  the  persons  up  to  the 
common  ancestor  and  then  down  to  the  other. "^  Thus,  under 
this  rule//-s^  cousins  are  related  to  each  other  in  the  fourth  de- 
gree.* Afmity  is  the  relationship  which  springs  from  the  mar- 
riage tic,  and  which  subsists  between  one  marital  partner  and 
the  blood  relatives  of  the  other,^  The  rule  will  be  best  illus- 
trated by  the  statement  that  the  blood  relatives  of  the  wife  stand 
in  the  same  degree  of  affinity  to  the  husband  as  they  stand  in 
consanguinity  to  her.  It  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that,  in 
theory  of  law,  if  one  of  the  parties  to  the  marriage  which  created 
the  affinity  be  dead,  the  affinity  still  subsists  if  there  be  issue 
living;^  otherwise  the  tie  is  broken  and  the  disqualification  re- 
moved.^ This  consanguinity  or  affinity  between  ii  party  and  a 
juror  disqualified  the  latter  at  common  law,  when  it  existed  within 
the  ninth  degree.^ 


1  4  Kent  Com.  412,  413. 

~  4  Kent  Com.  374. 

3  Ibid.  See  an  instructive  note  by 
the  reporter  to  Hardy  v.  Sprowle,  32 
Me.  310. 

■4  For  illustrations  of  the  rule  in  its 
application  to  challenges,  see  Hardy  v. 
Sprowie,  32  Me.  310;  Hudspeth  v. 
Herston,  04  Ind.  133;  Rust  v.  Shackle- 
ford,  47  Ga.  538;  Morrison  v.  McKin- 
non,  12  Fla.  552;  Hartford  Bank  v. 
Hart,  3  Day  (Conn.) ,  491 ;  Churchill  v. 
Churchill,  12  Vt.  GGl;  State  ?;.  Perry,  I 
Busb.  (X.  C.)  330;  Trullinger  v.  ^yebb, 
3  Ind.  l!)8;  Denn  v.  Clark,  1  X.  J.  L. 
440;  O'Connor  v.  State,  9  Fla.  215. 
That  the  father  of  the  venire-man  is 
second  cousin  to  the  defendant's 
mother  disqualifies  under  Mo.  R.  S., 
§  1894:   State  v.  Walton,  74  :\ro.  270. 

'=  See  the  definition  of  Chancellor 
Walworth  in  Paddock  v.  Wells,  2 
Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  331,  333;  also  Dailey 
V.  Gaines,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  529. 


<5  Co.  Litt.  150a;  Ibid.  157a,-  Pad- 
dock V.  Wells,  2  Barb.  Ch.  (X.  Y.) 
331;  Mounson  v.  West,  1  Leon.  88; 
.Taques  v.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  090; 
Dearmond  v.  Dearmond,  10  Ind.   191. 

7  Cain  V.  Ingham,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.) 
478;  Carman  v.  Xewell,  1  Den.  (X.  Y.) 
25;  Vannoy  v.  Givens,  23  N.  J.  L.  201; 
State  V.  Shaw,  3  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.)  532. 

8  3  Bl.  Comm.  303;  1  Chitty  Cr.  L. 
541;  Tidd's  Pr.  853.  Lord  Coke 
stated  tlie  rule  to  be  that  if  a  juror  be 
of  kin  to  either  party  in  any  degree, 
however  remote,  he  is  disqualified  to 
serve.  Co.  Litt.  157a.  But  this,  if 
ever  the  common  law,  is  certainly  not 
such  at  the  present  day.  Xo  disquali- 
fication that  venire-man  is  husband  of 
third  cousin  of  defendant.  Todd  v. 
Gray,  10  S.  C.  035.  Xor  that  uncle  of 
party  married  aunt  of  venire-man,  and 
that  two  uncles  of  venire-man  married 
aunts  of  the  party,  —  all  the  marriages 
being  dissolved  by  death,  and  no  issue 


54  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

§  62.  [Continued.]  Whether  the  Party  so  related  to  the 
Venire-man  must  be  a  Party  to  the  Recoi-d. — The  general 
rule  is  that,  in  order  that  a  juror  shall  be  disqualified  for  this 
cause,  he  must  stand  so  related  to  a  party  to  the  suit.  It  is  or- 
dinarily not  enough  that  he  is  so  related  to  one  of  the  counsel,^ 
or  to  a  brother,"^  or  sister,^  or  nepheio^  of  the  party.  So,  it  has 
been  held  not  a  ground  of  such  challenge  that  a  juror  was  mar- 
ried to  the  widow  of  the  prosecutor's  uncle, ^  or  that  he  was  the 
father-in-law  of  the  prosecuting  attorney,"  or  a  half-uncle  of  the 
plaintiff's  imfe?  But  it  has  been  h(;ld  not  necessary  that  the 
party  who  stands  in  this  relationship  to  the  challenged  juror 
should  be  the  beneficial  party  in  the  full  sense  ;  and  accordingly 
the  rule  applies  so  as  to  sustain  the  challenge  where  an  adminis- 
trator is  the  part}'  related  to  the  juror. ^  On  the  other  hand,  the 
reason  of  the  rule  excludes  the  juror  where  he  is  related  to  one 
who  is  a  beneficial  party,  though  not  a  party  to  the  record,  — as 
where  a  corporation  is  a  party  and  the  juror  is  related  to  a  mem- 
ber or  shai-eholder.^  Other  cases  extend  the  rule  still  further, — 
holding  that  a  juror  is  excluded,  in  a  prosecution  for  arson,  who 
is  related  to  the  person  whose  house  is  alleged  to  have  been 
burned;  ^^  or  who,  in  the  case  of  a  slave  indicted  for  robbery,  is 
related  to  the  owner  of  the  slave;  "  or  who,  in  the  case  of  a  jail- 
keeper  indicted  for  a  negligent  escape,  is  related  to  the  prisoners 
who  escaped. ^2     But,  in  an  action  by  a  municipal  corporation  to 

liviiii^.     Bigelow  v.  Spragiie,  140  Mass.  «  State  v.  Joues,  64  Mo.  301. 

425.  ■^  Eggleston    v.    Smiley,  13    Johus. 

1  Funk  V.  Ely,  45  Pa.  St.  444;  Wood  (N.  Y.^  133. 

V.    Wood,    52    N.    H.    422;     Piper  v.  »  Trullinger  v.  Webb,  3  Ind.  198. 

Lodge,    Ifi    Serg.    &    R.    214.     Aliter,  ^  Co.  Litt.   157a;  Quiuebaugh  Bauk 

where    the   coimsel    have    a    lieu  for  u.  Leavens,  20  Conu.  87;  Georgia  Rail- 

their  fees  upon  the  proceeds  of  the  road    v.  Hart,  GO    Ga.  550;  Youug  v. 

suit.     Melsoii  V.  Dicksou,  63  Ga.  G85;  Marine  Ins.    Co.,  1  Cranch  C.    C.  (U. 

s.  c.  36  Am.  Rep.   128.  S.)  452. 

^  Johnson  v.  Richardson,    52    Tex.  ^  Jaques    r.  Com.,  10  Gratt.   (Va.) 

481.  690. 

=*  Chase  ?-.  Jennings,  38  Me.  44.  "  State  v.    Anthony,  7    Ired.  L.  (X. 

*  Rank   ?'.  Shewey,  4    Watts    (Pa.),  C.)  234. 

218.  i2  ^xate   v.    Baldwin,    80   N.  C.    390. 

5  Oueal  V.  State,  47  Ga.  229.  But,  in  an  action  against  a  sheriff  for 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   III.  J  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  55 

ret'ovor  over  against  a  wrong-doer  the  damages  which  it  had  been 
compelled  to  j)ay  through  his  negligence,  the  husband  of  the 
])laintiff  in  the  original  action  is  not  comi)etent  hy  reason  of 
affinity.^ 

§  G3.  Members  of  Public  Corporutioiis.  —  The  rule  of 
the  coninion  law,  established  by  Lord  ^lanstield,'-'  and  gen- 
erally followed  in  this  country,'^  where  not  changed  by 
statute,    as    it    frequently    has    been,^   excludes  from    the    jury 


the  act  of  his  deputy,  a  release  of  the 
(.k'lmty  itiulered  the  deputy's  father 
conipeteut  as  a  juror.  Seavy  r.  Dear- 
born, 1!»N.  H.  3.31. 

'  Faith  V.  Atlanta  (Ga.),  4  Soutli 
East.  Kep.  3. 

2  Hesketh  v.  Braddoclv,  3Burr.  1847. 
See  also  Day  v.  Savadge,  Hob.  85. 
Compare  Martiu  v.  Kes;.,  12  Irish  L.  399. 

3  Wood  V.  Stoddard,  2  Johus.  (X. 
Y.)  194;  Garrison  v.  Portland,  2  Ore. 
123:  Boston  r.  Tlleston,  11  Mass.  4()8; 
Hawkes  w.  Kenuebeck,  7  Mass.  4(.!1; 
Watson  r.  Tripp,  11  K.  I.  98;  s.  c.  15 
Am.  L.  Reg.  282;  Alexandria  r.  Brock- 
et!, 1  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  605; 
Diveuy  v.  Elmira,  51  X.  Y.  507;  Hawes 
V.  Gustiu,2  Allen  (Mass.),  402;  State  v. 
Williams,  30  Me.  484;  Dively  v.  Cedar 
Falls,  21  Iowa,  505;  Cramer  t'.  Burling- 
ton, 42  Iowa,  31,5;  Kendall  v.  Albia 
(Iowa),  34  N.  W.  Rep.  833;  Ford  r. 
Umatilla  County  (Ore.),  1(3  Pac.  Rep. 
33;  Davenport  Gas  Company  I'.  Daven- 
port, 13  Iowa,  229;  Gibson  v.  Wyan- 
dotte, 20  Kan.  15(>;  Eberle  r.  St.  Louis 
Public  Schools,  II  Mo.  247;  Fine  v. 
St.  Louis  Public  Schools,  30  Mo.  106; 
Columbus  V.  Goetchius,  7  Ga.  139; 
Russell  r.  Hamilton,  3  111.  5G:  Bailey  v. 
Trumbull,  31  Conn.  oSl;  Hearn  v. 
Greensburgh.  51  Ind.  119;  .Johnson  r. 
Americus,  46  Ga.  80;  Rose  v.  St. 
Charles,  49  Mo.  509:  Fuhveilei  r.  St. 
Louis,    61   Mo.    479.     But  contra,  see 


Middletowu  v.  Ames,  7  A't.  166;  Omaha 
V.  Olmstead,  5  Neb.  446;  s.  c.  16  Am. 
L.  Reg.  356;  Kemper  v.  Louisville, 
14  Bush  (Ky.),  87.  Member  of  city 
council  disqualifled,  if  city  a  party. 
Boston  V.  Baldwin,  139  Mass.  315. 
Cases  not  vnthin  the  rule:  Pliillips  v. 
State,  29  Ga.  105;  Phipps  v.  Manstield, 
G2  Ga.  209.  Holder  of  municipal  bonds, 
incompetent  where  municipality  is  a 
party:  Jefferson  County  v.  Lewis,  20 
Fla.  980. 

*  New  York  Code  Rem.  Just.,  §  1179 ; 
1  Briglit.  Purd.  (Penu.)  Dig.,  p.  837, 
§73;  G.  S.  Mass.  1860,  chap.  132,  §30; 
Gen.  Stat.  R.  I.  Is72,  p.  434,  §  32; 
Bush's  Dig.  Fla.,  chap.  104,  §  25;  R. 
S.  So.  Car.  1873,  p.  53,  §  27;  Comp. 
L.  Mich.  1871,  §  6015;  R.  S.  Me.  1871, 
chap.  82,  §  76;  Rev.  N.  J.  1877,  p.  530, 
§  39;  Comp.  L.  Mich.  1871,  §§  460, 
3329;  R.  S.  111.  1880,  cliap.  24,  §  174; 
lb.,  chap.  139,  §  47;  //;.,chap.  34,  §32; 
R.  S.  La.  1876,  §  2134;  Supp.  to  Ga. 
Code  of  1873,  §  409;  R.  S.  W.  Va. 
1879,  chap.  33,  §  63 ;  R.  S.  Wis.  1878, 
§  2850;  Stat,  at  Large,  Minn.  1873,  p. 
217,  §  5;  G.  S.  Neb.  1873,  p.  232,  §  5; 
R.  S.  Mo.  1879,  §  2801;  Comp.  L.  Kan. 
1879,  §  1391.  Such  statutes  have  been 
held  not  unconstitutional  as  invading 
the  riglit  of  trial  by  an  impartial  jury. 
Com.  V.  Reed,  1  Gray,  472.  See  also 
Com.  V.  Worcester,  3  Pick.  462;  Cora. 
V.  Ryan,  5  Mass.  90;  State  v.  Wells,  46 


56 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[I  Thomp.  Tr., 


the  inhabitants  of  a  town  or  city  which  is  a  party  to  the  ac- 
tion.^ 

§  64.   Members   of    Private    Corporations   and  Societies. — 

The  same  rule  cxchides  from  the  jury  box  a  member  of  a  pri- 
vate corporation  which  is  a  party  to  a  suit,  or  immediately  inter- 
ested in  the  question  to  be  tried. ^  Thus,  in  an  action  betAveen 
the  trustees  of  two  religious  societies,  involving  the  right  of  pos- 
session of  lands,  the  members  of  each  society  are,  by  reason  of 
interest,  incompetent  as  jurors.'^  But  the  rule  does  not  dis- 
qualify a  juror  who  has  been  active  in  forming  a  company,  but 
who  has  never  been  a  shareholder  in  it.^  And  it  is  no  objection 
that  the  juror  is  an  officer  or  stockholder  in  another  corporation, 
organized  for  a  similar  purpose  to  that  of  the  corporation  which 
is  a  party  to  the  suit.^  Nor,  according  to  the  better  opinion, 
does  the  fact  that  the  venire-man  and  the  opposite  party  to  the 
suit  are  members  in  the  snYne  benevolent  organization,  such  as  the 


loAva,  662.  Construction  of  such  stat- 
utes: Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  U.Pitts- 
burgh &c.  R.  Co.,  17  W.  Va.  812; 
Doyal  V.  State,  70  Ga.  134.  Oue  who 
would  find  for  the  city  if  the  evidence 
was  equally  balanced  is  disquaiihed. 
Omaha  v.  Kane,  15  Neb.  657. 

^  A  city  defendant  has  no  right  of 
challenge  on  the  ground  that,  tliough 
a  resident,  the  venire-man  is  not  a  tax- 
payer. Hollenbeck  v.  Marshalltown, 
62  Iowa,  21.  Nor  on  the  ground  that 
he  is  a  tax-payer.  Conkliu  v.  Keokuk 
(Iowa),  35  N.  W.  Rep.  444.  But  it  is 
a  good  ground  of  challenge  by  the 
party  adverse  to  tlie  city.  Kendall  v. 
Albia  (Iowa),  34  N.  W.  Rep.  833;  and 
see  note  to  same. 

2  Respublica  v.  Richards,  1  Yeates 
(Pa.),  480;  Silvis  v.  Ely,  3  Watts  &  S. 
(P^.)  421;  rieesou  v.  Savage  S.  M. 
Co.,  3  Nev.  157.'  Compare  Williams  v. 
Smith,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  166;  Peninsular 
R.  Co.  V.  Howard,  20  Mich.  18;  Page 


V.  Contocook  Valley  R.  Co  ,  21  N.  H. 
438.  So,  of  a  juror  who  has  given  his 
note  to  a  railway  company  to  aid  m 
building  its  road:  Michigan  &c.  R. 
Co.  V.  Barnes,  40  Mich.  383. 

3  Cleage  v.  Hyden,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
73. 

*  Portland  &c.  Ferry  Co.  v.  Pra,tt, 
2  Allen  (N.  B.) ,  17.  Compare  Williams 
V.  Smith,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  166;  Com.  v. 
Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  '3  Cush.  (Mass.) 
25. 

5  Craig  V.  Feun,  Car.  &  M.  43;  Mil- 
ler V.  Wild  Cat  Gravel  Rd.  Co.,  52  Ind. 
51.  No  objection  that  a  party  and  a 
juror  are  both  stockholders  hi  the  same 
corporation,  it  not  being  interested  in 
the  suit:  Brittain  v.  Allen,  2  Dev.  L. 
(N.  C.)  120.  On  a  trial  of  an  indict- 
ment for  passing  counterfeit  money,  it ' 
is  no  objection  that  a  juror  is  a  direc- 
tor in  the  bank  whose  money  was 
counterfeited:  Billis  v.  State,  2  Mc- 
Cord  (S.  C),  12. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  57 

Masonic  Fra(ei')iit)/,  disqnaWfy.^  Nor,  iu  an  action  by  a  grand 
lodge  of  this  order,  are  members  of  subordinate  lodges  di:^quali- 
fied  by  reason  of  interest  in  the  suit.-  So,  a  cJiurcJi  member  is 
not  incompetent  as  a  juror  in  a  case  to  which  a  church  of  his  de- 
nomination is  a  pai'ty.-^  But  if  the  church  is  such  an  important 
one  that  its  tenets  arc  above  the  law  of  the  land,  and  if  belief  iu 
those  tenets  renders  it  unconscientious  for  him  to  enforce  the 
human  as  against  the  divine  law,  the  venire-man  will  be  disqual- 
ified, —  especially  in  a  case  where  the  venire-man  is  a  member  of 
the  Mormon  churc/t^  and  the  accused  is  on  trial  for  bigamy,  and 
the  divine  law,  as  gracioush^  revealed  to  the  saints  of  that  church, 
commands  ijolygamy,  while  the  human  law  is  so  wicked  as  to 
condemn  it.*  On  the  trial  of  a  criminal  action  for  unlawfully 
selling  intoxicating  li([uors,  members  of  a  social  club,  apparently 
organized  for  the  purpose  of  getting  litpior  for  their  own  use,  — 
are  not,  for  that  reason,  subject  to  challenge  by  the  defendant.^ 

§  03.  Interest  in  the  Suit.  —  Any  direct  or  contingent  inter- 
est in  the  result  of  the  suit  about  to  be  tried,  disqualitics  the 
venire-man.  Thus,  if  he  is  interested  in  a  similar  ^mt ,  or  in  one 
depending  on  the  event  of  the  particular  suit,''  or  if  he  is  under 
indictment  for  an  offense  similar  to  that  charged  against  the 
prisoner,"  this  will  disqualify  him;  but  the  fact  that  the  plaint- 
iff has  had  a  suit  against  the  challenged  venire-man,  similar  to 
the  one  about  to  be  tried,  will  at  most  support  a  challenge  to  the 
favor.^  So,  if  the  venire-man  is  an  executor,  though  not  a  party, 
and  the  recovery  will  benefit  the  estate  ;  ^  or,  if  he  is  bound  as  a 

1  Purple  y.  Horton,  13  Wend.  ^N.  345;  Davis  y.  Allen,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 
Y.)  11,  23.  Confm.  Brittaiu  w.  Allen,  4(16;  Flagg  v.  Worcester,  8  Cush. 
2Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  120.  (Mass.)  69;  Gardner  v.  Launing,  2  N. 

2  Burdine  v.  Grand  Lodge,  37  Ala.  j.  l.  G51.  But  see  Com.  v.  Boston 
478.  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush.  (Mass.)  25. 

3  Barton  v.  Erickson.  U  Neb.  1G4.  7  McGuire  v.  State,  37  Miss.  3G9. 
■*  United   States  v.  Miles,   2   Utah,  s  Austin  v.  Cox,  60  Ga.  .520. 

19;  s.  c.  103  U.  S.  30i.  9  Smull  v.   .Tones,   (;    Watts    &    S. 

5  Boldtu.  State  (AVis.),  35  N.  W.  (Pa.)  122.  Compare  Gratz  u.  Benner, 
Rep.  935.  13   Serg.   &  R.  (Pa.)   110,  a  decision 

6  Courtwright  u.  Strickler,  37  Iowa,  ^hich  it  is  difficult  to  understand. 
382;   Lord  v.  Brown,  5  Den.  (N.  Y.)  For  a  further  illustration  of  disquali- 


:58 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY, 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


surety  for  the  costs  of  the  suit/  or  for  the  apj)earance  of  the 
accused.^  Moreover,  if  the  venire-man  once  hiid  a  direct  in- 
terest in  the  pending  suit,  he  is  disqualified  since  the  fact  of  his 
ceasiuo-  to  have  such  an  interest  would  not  purge  him  of  the  bias 
which  he  thereby  acquired,'^  though  this  objection  would  not  be 
good  after  verdict.* 

§  66.  Meuibership  in  Associations  for  the  Suppression  of 
Crime.  —  The  decisions  on  this  branch  of  the  inquiry  are  not  in 
a  satisfactory  state.  AVe  shall  see  hereafter  that  prejudice  against 
the  particular  crime  with  which  the  accused  stands  charged  does 
not  disqualify  a  venire-man.^  Upon  analogous  grounds,  some 
courts  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  membership  in  a  society 
organized  for  the  prosecution  of  crimes  of  the  nature  of  the  one 
with  which  the  accused   is  charged,  does  not  disqualify,*^  unless 


lication  of  au  administrator  by  reason 
of  contingent  interest  in  tlie  event  of 
tlie  suit,  see  Meeker  v.  Potter,  5  N.  J. 
L.  586.  A  juror  lias  been  permitted  to 
release  his  interest  in  lands  claimed 
in  ejectment,  in  order  that  he  might 
sit  upon  the  trial.  Isaac  v.  Clarke,  2 
Gill.  (Md.)  1. 

1  Glover  v.  Woolsey,  Dudley  (Ga.), 
85. 

2  State  r.  Prater  (S.  C),  2  South 
East.  Pep.  108;  Brazleton  v.  State,  11 
Reporter,  291;  People  v.  McCollister, 
1  Wheeler  C.  C.  (N.  Y.)  391;  Anderson 
V.  State,  03  Ga.  675.  This  objection 
was  held  to  be  good  as  against  the 
son-in-lavj  and  brother -in-law  of  the 
surety  (Sehorn  i\  Williams,  6  Jones 
L.  (N.  C.)  575;  Woodbridge  v.  Ray- 
mond, Kirby  (Conn.),  279),  l)ut  de- 
nied as  against  tenant.  Brown  v. 
Wheeler,  18  Conn.  199. 

»  Phelps  V.  Hall,  2  Tyler  (Vt.),  401. 

*  Bradshaw  v.  Hubbard,  6  111.  390, 
394. 

^  United  States  v.  Hanway,  2  Wall. 
Jr.  139;  Williams  v.  State,  3  Ga. 
453;     Parker    v.    State,    34    Ga.    262; 


United  States  v.  Noelke,  17  Blatch. 
(U.  S.)  554 ;  s.  c.  1  Fed.  Rep.  426 ;  9  Re- 
porter, 505;  United  States  v.  Borger(U. 
S.  Cir.  Ct.  S.  D.  N.  Y.,  May,  1881),  7 
Fed.  Rep.  193;  United  States  r.  Duff 
(same  court,  Jan.,  1881),  6  Fed.  Rep. 
45,  48. 

6  State  V.  Wilson,  4  la.  407;  Boyle 
V.  People,  4  Colo.  176;  Com.  v.  Liver- 
more,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  18;  Com.  v. 
O'Neil,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  343;  Musick 
V.  People,  40  111.  268.  Compare  Mis- 
souri &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Munkers,  11  Kan. 
223;  Reg.  v.  Nicholson,  8  Dowl.  P.  C. 
422;  s,  c.  4  Jur.  558;  United  States  v. 
Borger,  7  Fed.  Rep.  193;  s.  c.  12  Re- 
porter, 134.  The  refusal  of  the  judge 
to  ask  venire-men  whether  they  be- 
long to  any  association  formed  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  the  law  under 
which  the  defendant  is  indicted,  has 
been  held  no  ground  of  exception,  if 
the  defendant's  counsel  disclaims  any 
knowledge  or  suspicion  of  such  con- 
nection and  assigns  no  ground  for 
making  the  request.  Com.  ». Thrasher, 
1 1  Gray,  55 ;  Reg.  v.  Stewart,  1  Cox  C.  C. 
174.   Contra,  l^ixyinv.  People,  69 111.  303. 


Tit.   I,   Cll.    III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


59 


the  relation  of  the  veniie-iuaii  to  the  society  is  such  as  to  render 
him  liable  to  contribute  towards  the  expenses  of  the  prosecution.^ 
But  he  is  disqualified  if  he  has  participated  in  the  prosecution  of 
the  accused  i)crson,  or  belongs  to  a  committee  the  members  of 
which  have  agreed  to  indemnify  each  otiicr  against  any  action 
which  the  accused  might  prosecute  against  anj^of  them  for  false 
imprisonment.'- 

§  C7.  Business  Relations. — That  the  venire-man  is  the  2n- 
ferior  ov dependent  in  business  rehitions  of  the  opposite  party  to 
the  suit,  will  generally  disipuilify.  Thus,  if  he  is  his  surety,  and 
the  rendition  of  u  judgment  against  him  will  diminish  the  prob- 
ability of  his  being  exonerated;^  or  if  he  is  his  ^e;<a?<^,*  although 
distress  for  rent  may  have  been  abolished  ;  ^  or  is  his  derk,^  or 
other  employe,''  or  even  his  partner  in  business.^  But  the  mere 
fact  that  an  innkeeper  is  a  party  and  the  venire-man  is  his 
guest  does  not  disqualify  the  latter  ;^  and  while,  as  elsewhere 
seen,^'^  a  sliareJiolder  in  a  corporation  is  disqualified  from  serving 


1  Some  cases  make  no  mention  of 
this  distinction.  Musick  v.  People,  40 
111.  2t)8.  Compare  Mjiock  v.  Saladiue, 
1  W.  Bl.  480;  People  v.  Lee,  5  Cal. 
353;  People  v.  Graham,  21  Cal.  2G1. 

2  Fleming  v.  State,  11  lud.  234; 
Pierson  v.  State,  11  Ind.  341.  Contra, 
that  subscribers  to  a  general  fitml  to  se- 
cure counsel  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  defendant  are  not  disqualilied : 
Heacock  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  ;t7. 
That  members  of  the  ^'  Law  and  Or- 
der League,"  who  contribute  to  its 
funds  are  not  disqualiried  on  trial 
of  a  complaint  for  selling  intoxicating 
liquors:  Com.  v.  Burroughs  (Mass.), 
13  North  East.  Rep.  884.  AUter,  if  the 
League  had  initiated  or  was  conduct- 
ing the  particular  prosecution.  Ibid.; 
Com.  V.  Moore,  143  Mass.  136;  s.  c.  9 
North  East.  Eep.  884. 

3  FerridaytJ.  Selser,  4  How.  (Miss.) 
506, 


*  Co.  Litt,  ir.7.  a.;  Bac.  Abr.  Juries 
E.  343;  Anon.,  2  Dyer,  170.  a.  pi.  (27)  ; 
Pipher  V.  Lodge,  16  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
214;  Harrisburg  Bank  v.  Foster,  8 
"Watts  (Pa.),  304.  But  that  the  oppo- 
site party  to  the  suit  is  a  tenant  to  the 
juror  is  ground  of  challenge  to  the 
favor  only.  People  v.  Bodine,  1  Deuio 
(N.  Y.),  306.    . 

^  Hathaway  r.  Helnier,  25  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  20. 

**  Hub))ard  v.  Rutledge,  57  Miss.  7. 

'  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  63  Ga. 
173.  See  Co.  Litt.  157.  b. ;  Gilb.  Hist, 
C.  P.  95;  3  Bl.  Com.  363;  Bac.  Abr. 
Juries  E. :  2  Tidd  Pr.  853.  But  not  if 
he  was  merely  in  his  employ  a  year 
Ijefore.  East  Line  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Briuker  (Tex.),  3  S.  W.  Rep.  99. 

**  Stumm  V.  Hummell,  39  la.  478. 

^  Cummiugs  v.  Gauu,  52  Pa.  St.  484. 

1    Ante,  §  64. 


60  IMPANELING    THK    JUKY,  [1   Thoilip.  Tr., 

as  a  juror  where  the  corporation  is  a  party,  yet  this  does  not  ex- 
tend so  far  as  to  exclude  from  such  service  an  employe  of  a 
shareltoldtr  } 

§  68.   Prior  Service  in  tlie   Same  or  a  Similar  Case.  — It  is 

a  ground  of  challenge  that  the  venire-man  has  sat  as  a  juror  upon 
a  former  trial  of  the  same  action.'^  But  the  fact  of  having  sat  at 
the  same  term  upon  the  trial  of  an  action  brought  by  the  same 
plaintiff  against  other  defendants  and  having  returned  a  verdict 
for  tlie  plaintiff,  does  not  disqualify,'^  unless  the  cause  involves 
the  same  questions,  determinable  on  the  same  evidence  as  the  one 
about  to  be  tried.*  One  court  holds,^  and  others  deny^  that  the 
fact  of  the  juror  having  sat  on  a  former  trial  of  the  same  action, 
which  resulted  in  a  mistrial,  will  operate  to  exclude  him,  where 
not  discovered  until  after  he  has  been  impaneled  and  sworn. 
Nor  does  this  rule  extend  so  far  as  to  disqualify  venire-men  who 
have  sat  on  the  trial  of  other  defendants  jointly  indicted  with 
the  defendant  in  the  particular  case,  btit  who  had  severed  for 
the  purposes  of  their  trial.'  Nor  is  a  venire-man,  who  has  sat 
on  a  jury  which  has  found  the  defendant  guilty  ujjon  one  indict- 
ment, thereby  disqualified  from  sitting  upon  his  trial  under 
another  indictment  at  the  same  term,  although  for  a  similar 
offense.^ 

'  Eredericktou  Boom    Co.    v.    Mc-  Ark.  336.     But  see  Sheppard  v.  Cook, 

Phersou,  2  Hauuay  (N.  B.),  8.  2  Hayw.  (N.  C.)  238. 

2  Co.  Litt.  157.  b. ;  Argent  v.  Dar-  ^  Weeks  v.  Medler,  20  Kan.  57. 
rell,  2  Salk.  648.     For  the  construction  «  Whitner  v.  Hamlin,    12   Fla.  18; 
of  statutes  asserting  this  disqualifica-  Atkinson  v.  Allen,  12  Vt.  619. 

tion,  see   Dunn  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  '  Regicide's   Case,  5   How.  St.  Tr. 

600;  Jacobs  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  278;  978  (Resolution  7) ;  s.  c.  Sir  J.  Kelyng, 

Willis  ij.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  297;  State  9.      S,ee   also   Cranburne's     Trial,    13 

V.    Sheeley,    15  Iowa,   404;     State    v.  How.    St.   Tr.    222,    235;    Thomas   v. 

Leicht,  17  Iowa,  28.  State,  36  Tex.  315;  Bowman  v.  State, 

3  Dewu.  McDivitt,  31   Oh.  St.  139;  41  Tex.  417;  United  States  v.  Wilson, 
s.  c.    17   Am.    L.   Reg.    621;    Algier   v.  Baldwin,  C.   C.    84;    Rex   v.    Hanly,   1 
Steamer  Maria,  14  Cal.  167;  Nugent  v.  Craw.  &  Dix  Cir.  (Irish),  188,  note. 
Trepagnier,     2     Martin     (La.),     205;  «  United     States    v.     Watkins,     3 
Smith  V.  Wagenseller,  21  Pa.  St.  491.  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  578;  Com.  v.  Hill,. 

*  Spear    v.    Spencer,   1    G.    Greene      4  Allen  (Mass.),  591. 
(Iowa),  534;   Garthwaite  v.  Tatum,  21 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   ]II.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  61 

Subdivision  2.  —  Challenges  Grounded  on  Bias,  Prejudice,  Scru- 
ple, Opinion. 
Section 

71.  Grounds  of  Chalieu2:e  tin.-  sanu-  for  the  State  as  for  the  Accused. 

72.  Bias,  Prejudice,  Opinion. 

73.  Kinds  of  Bias  and  Prejudice  that  do  not  Excuse. 

74.  Conscientious  Scruples  against  Capital  Punishment. 

75.  Conscientious  Scruples  against  Capital  Punishment  on  Circumstantial 

Evidence. 
711.  Opinions  Touchinic  the  Merits  of  the  Particular  Case. 

77.  Nature  of  the  Opinion  which  Disqualifies. 

78.  [Continued.]     Must  be  of  a  Fixed  and  Positive  Cliaracter. 
7'J.  Opinions  Avliich  do  not  Disqualify. 

80.  Opinions  winch  will  Require  P>vidence  to  Kemove  them. 

81.  Newspaper  Reports  of  Former  Trial. 

82.  Statutes  Kemovini:  Common-Law  Di^squaliticatiou. 

83.  Declaration  of  Venire-Man  tliat  lie  can  Render  an  Impartial  Verdict. 

§  71.  Grounds  of  Challenge  the  same  for  the  State  as  for 
the  Accused.  —  Here  it  .should  be  observed  that,  in  respect  of 
the  grounds  of  challeuge,  though  not  always  in  respect  of  the 
mimber  of  the  challenges,  the  rights  of  the  State  and  the  accused 
are  precisely  the  same.  The  bias,  i)rejudice  or  opinion  which 
will  disqualify  the  venire-man  when  entertained  against  the  case 
of  the  accused,  will  e(]ually  disqualify  him  when  entertained 
against  the  case  of  the  prosecution.^  Indeed,  it  has  been  held, 
under  a  statute  which  is  little  less  than  declaratory  of  the  gen- 
erally accepted  ride,  that  a  juror  cannot  be  interrogated  as  to 
ivhich  side  his  opinion  favors  or  disfavors,  and  accordingly  that 
it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  reverse  a  judgment  for  overruling 
a  challenge  to  a  juror  entertaining  a  disqualifying  opinion,  to  show 
that  the  opinion  was  unfavorable  to  the  com})l:iining  party'.^ 
But  the  better  opinion  would  seem  to  be  that  the  party  complain- 
ing of  the  disallowance  of  his  challenge  ought  to  show  that  the 
juror  was  prejudiced  ciriainM  him,  and  therefore  that  he  tvaives 
his  ground  of  comi)laint  by  not  interrogating  the  juror  as  to  the 
directiofio^  his  opinion.^ 

1  state   r.  West,   G9   Mo.  401,403;  2  people  v.    Williams,   C  Cal.  20d. 

Com.   V.  Lesher,  17  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)       State  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  477. 
155;  Commander  v.  State,  60  Ala.  1 ;   1  3  3^^^^  ^  Efler,  85  N.  C.  585. 

Burr.   Tr.  495;     Piersou   v.  State,  18 
Tex.  App.  524. 


62  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

§  72.  Bias,  Prejudice,  Opinion.  —  Some  useless  casuistry 
has  been  expended  upon  a  supposed  distinction  between  preju- 
dice and  bias,  resulting  in  the  conclusion  that,  while  prejudice  is 
a  prejudgment  of  the  particular  case,  bias  is  a  predisposition  or 
leaning,  from  some  other  cause,  toward  one  side  or  the  other  of 
it.^  As  the  usual  mental  conception  vrhich  is  conveyed  by  the 
word  prejudice  is  a  condition  of  the  mind,  founded  in  opinion, 
which  has  resulted  in  bias  more  or  less  complicated  with  ill  feel- 
ing^ and  as  plain  men  on  a  jury  panel  will  not  ordinarily  taka 
any  essential  distinction  between  the  two  expressions,  —  it  must 
follow  that  refinements  upon  this  subject  can  serve  no  useful 
purpose  in  the  administration  of  justice. 

§  73.  Kinds  of  Bias  and  Prejudice  that  do  not  excuse.  —  A 

general  prejudice  against  crime, •^  or  prejudice  against  the  partic- 
ular crime  with  which  the  accused  stands  charged,^  or  against  the 
criminal  business  for  which  he  is  prosecuted;^  or  against  the 
particular  unlawful  act  for  the  alleged  doing  of  which  the  action 
is  brought,  it  being  a  civil  action  ;^  or  against  the  class  of  actions 
to  which  his  suit  belongs;  ^  or  even  a  prejudice  against  the  de- 
fendant himself,  arising  solely  from  the  fact  of  his  being  engaged 
in  a  criminal  or  unlawful  business,  and  therefore  tantamount  ta 


1  Thomp.  &  Mer.  Jur.,  §  191.     Com-  ^  United  States  v.  Noelke,  17  Blatchf . 
pare  the    following    cases:    Com.    v.  (U.  S.)  554. 

Webster,  5  Cush.   (Mass.)  297;  Win-  ^  Davis  v.  Hunter,  7  Ala.   135.     In 

nesheik  Ins.    Co.  v.  Schueller,  60  111.  an  action  for  the  killing  of  sheep  by 

473;  People  ■;;.  Keyes,  5  Cal.  847,  349;  clogs,  a  juror  Avho  said  that  he  had 

Willis  V.  State,  12  Ga.  444,  448;  Mc-  such  a  bias   or  prejudice  about  the 

Causland    v.    McCauslaud,    1    Yeates  matter  of  dogs  killing  sheep  as  would 

(Pa.),  372,  378;  Willis  v.  State,  12  Ga.  interfei-e  with  his  impartial  judgment 

444,  448,  per  Nisbet,  J.  in  the  case,  was  held  to   have   been 

2  State  V.  Burns,  85  Mo.  47;  s.   c.  properly    excused,   upon  a   challenge 
aff' d,  16  Mo.  App   555.  for  cause.     Anson  v.  Dwight,  18  Iowa, 

3  United  States  v.  Hanway,  2  Wall.  241. 

Jr.    (U.  S.)    139;   Williams  v.  State,  3  "  That    is,    against    slander    suits, 

Ga.  453;  Parker  v.  State,  34  Ga.  262;  Young  v.  Bridges,   34  La.   Ann.   sm. 

United   States  v.   Noelke,    17  Blatch.  Or    against    personal    damage    suits. 

(U.S.)   554;  s.  c.   1  Fed.  Eep.    426;  9  McCarthy  v.  Railway  Co.  (Mo.),  4  S.W 

Reporter,  505;  State  v.  Nelson,  58  Iowa,  Rep.  516. 
208. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


63 


a  prejudice  against  the  business  merely;  ^  or  a  prejudice  against 
the  kind  of  defense  whieh  he  sets  up,  e.  g.,  insaniti/ ;  -  or  an  unfav- 
orable opini(»n  of  his  natio)ialit//,'^ov  of  his  cJiarader,  derived  from 
general  reputation,*  —  Avill  not  excuse  the  venire-man,  provided 
he  is  able,  for  the  time  being,  to  lay  aside  his  unfavorable  opinion 
and  give  the  accused  a  fair  trial  according  to  the  evidence.^  So, 
on  a  trial  for  nmrdcr,  the  result  of  an  anarchical  conspiracy,  a 
prejudice  against  socialists,  communists  and  anarcltists  is  not  of 
itself  a  disciualitication.^  On  the  other  hand,  a  })elief  that  the 
accused  is  innocent,  although  the  law  })resumcs  him  to  be  such;  ^ 


1  Uuited  States  v.  Borger,  7  Fed. 
Rep.  rJ3;  Uuited  States  v.  Duff,  C  Fed. 
Rep.  45,  48.  The  fact  that  the  veuire- 
iiiau  is  prejudiced  agaiust  the  business 
of  the  challeugiug  party  but  uot  against 
him,  is  uot  a  siillicieut  grountl  of  ciial- 
lenge  for  priucipal  cause.  Maretzek 
V.  Cauldwell,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  407; 
s.  c.  5  Pvobt.  fiiiO;  Uuited  States  v. 
Noelke,  17  Blatclif.  (U.  S.)*554;  Elliott 
V.  State,  73  lud.  10.  Though  it  has 
beeu  held  that  a  mau  who  iu  order  to 
suppress  liquor -selling,  would  stop 
short  of  mob  violence  ouly,  ought  to  lie 
excused.  Albrecht  v.  Wallcer,  73  111. 
69.  See  also  Wiuueshcik  Jus.  Co.  v. 
Schueller.t;0  111.  4i;.-.:  Swigart  v.  State, 
67  lud.  287;  s.  c.  21  Alb.  L.  J.  278; 
Reiser  v.  Liues,  57  Iiid.  431.  Compare 
Elliott  V.  State,  73  lud.  10.  In  a  simi- 
lar case  a  juror  is  properly  rejected 
whose  prejudice  against  the  defend- 
ant's business  is  such  that  he  cannot 
give  the  testimony  of  a  person  engaged 
iu  the  same  business  as  the  defendant 
the  same  weight  whicii  he  could  the 
testimony  of  other  persons.  Robiuson 
V.  Randall,  82  111.  515.  Contra,  Shields 
V.  State,  95  lud.  299.  AUte.r,  where  the 
business  is  perse  unlawful.  This  dis- 
tiuctiou  was  overlooked  iu  Meaux  v. 
Whitehall,  8  Bradw.  (111.)  173.  One 
who  believes  that  only  an  immoral  mau 
would  sell  liquor  is  iucompeteut  on  the 


trial  of  au  application  for  a  license. 
Chaudler  v.  Ruebett,  83  lud.  139. 

2  People  V.  Carpenter,  38  Hun  (N. 
Y.),  490;  s.  c.  102  N.  Y.  238;  Hall  t>. 
Com.  (Pa.),  12Atl.  Rep.  163;  s.  c.  11 
Ceut.  Rep.  183;  Butler  v.  State,  97 
lud.  378:  provided  the  prejudice  is  uot 
uureasonable.     Ibid. 

s  Balbo  V.  People,  19  Huu  (N.  Y.), 
424;  s.  c.  affirmed,  80  N.  Y.  484.  Com- 
pare People  ».  Christie,  2  Park.  Cr. 
(N.  Y.)  579;  s.  c.  2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
256;  People  v.  Keyes,  5  Cal.  347;  Peo- 
ple V.  Gar  Soy  (Sup.  Ct.  Cal.,  Dec. 
1880).  23  Alb.  L.  J.  418. 

■»  People  V.  Lohman,  2  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
450;  People  v.  Knickerbocker,  1  Park. 
Cr.  (N.  Y.)  302;  People  v.  Allen,  43  N. 
Y.  28;  Anderson  v.  State,  14  Ga.  710; 
Willis  V.  State,  12  Ga.  444;  State  v. 
Schnapper,  22  La.  Ann.  43;  People  v. 
:Mahouey,  18  Cal.  180;  State  v.  Davis, 
14  Nev.  439,  450;  Monroe  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  210. 

^  See  preceding  cases,  and  also 
Martin  v.  State,  25  Ga.  494. 

6  The  Anarchists'  Case  (Spies  v. 
People),  122  111.  1;  s.  c.  12  North  East. 
Rep.  865. 

^  1  Burr.  Tr.  425,  per  Marshall,  C. 
J.;  State  v.  West,  69  Mo.  401,  403,  per 
Henry,  J,  See  also  Com.  v.  Lesher, 
17  Serg.  &R.  (Pa.)  155;  Commander 
V.  State,  60  Ala.  1. 


64 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


an  expressed  wish  or  desire  that  he  may  prevail ;  ^  an  expressed 
opinion  by  one  who  has  signed  a  petition  for  his  pardon,  that  he 
has  been  already  sufficiently  punished ;  ^  a  feeling  of  unwilling- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  venire-man  to  t,rust  himself  as  a  juror  on 
the  trial ;  ^  a  preference  in  case  the  evidence  is  evenly  balanced,^ 
such  as  would  incline  the  mind  of  the  juror  to  lean  one  way 
or  the  other,^  —  have  generally,  though  not  always,  been  held 
ofood  o;rounds  of  clialleno;e.  It  is  not  oround  of  rejecting  a 
venire-man  that  he  has  an  unfriehdly  feeling  towards  one  of  the 
attorneys  of  the  challenging  party ."^ 

§  74.    Couscientioiis  Scruples  against  Capital  Punishment. — 

It  is  now   settled  that  these  are  good  grounds  of  challenge  in  a 


1  Mason  v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  oSi; 
Pike  County  v.  GrifBu  &c.  Plank  Road 
Co.,  15  Ga.  39. 

-  Asbury  Ins.  Co.  v.  Warren,  66  Me. 
523. 

3  Com.  V.  Webster,  5  Cash.  (Mass.) 
295,  298;  Montague  v.  Com.,  10  Gratt. 
(Va.)  767,  overruling  upon  this  point 
Lithgow  V.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297;  Mc- 
Laren V.  Birdsong,  24  Ga.  265;  Ed- 
wards V.  Parrar,  2  La.  Ann.  307;  De- 
jaruette  v.  Com.  (Va.),  11  Reporter, 
653;  O'Brien  v.  People,  36  N.  Y.  276; 
s.  c.  in  court  below,  48  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
274;  Walter  v.  People,  32  N.  Y.  147;  s. 
c.  6  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  15;  18  Abb.  Pr. 
147.  See  the  dissenting  opinion  of 
Brockenbrough,  J.,  in  Lithgow  v. 
Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297. 

•*  Mima  Queeu  r.  Hepburn.  7  Cranch 
(U.  S.),  290;  Meaux  v.  Whitehall,  8 
Bradw.  (111.)  173.  Accordingly,  it  lias 
been  held  that  venire-men  may  be  in- 
terrogated as  to  which  way  they  woiild 
be  inclined  to  decide  the  case,  if,  upon 
liearing  the  testimony,  tliey  sliould 
find  it  evenly  balanced.  Cliicago  &c. 
R.  Co.  r.  Adler,  56  111.  345;  Chicago 
&c.  R.   Co.  V.  Buttoff,  66  111.  347 ;   Ga- 


lena &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Haslan,  73  III.  494; 
Richmond  r.  Roberts,  98  111.  472.  Tills 
seems  to  be  an  exception  to  the  gen- 
eral rule  that  hypothetical  questions 
are  not  to  be  put  to  the  venire-man  on 
his  -voir  dire  with  a  view  of  testing  his 
competency.  See  State  v.  Arnold,  12 
Iowa,  479;  State  v.  Davis,  14  Nev.  439.; 
State  V.  Leicht,  17  Iowa,  28 ;  State  v. 
Ward,  14  La.  Ann.  673;  State  v.  Ben- 
nett, 14  La.  Ann.  651;  State  v.  Bill,  15 
La.  Ann.  114.  But  in  one  jurisdiction 
such  a  disposition  does  not  disqualify, 
provided  the  venire -man  states  that  if 
the  evidence  were  against  the  party 
toward  whom  he  would  be  inclined  if 
it  were  equally  balanced,  he  would  do 
his  duty  as  a  juror  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  court.  McFadden  r.  Wal- 
lace, 38  Cal.  51:  Trenor  v.  Central 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  222. 

5  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Adler,  56 
111.  345,  witli  whicli  compare  Richmond 
V.  Roberts,  98  111.  472.  See  also  Curry 
V.  State,  4  Neb.  545;  Sam  v.  State,  13 
Sm.  &M.  (Miss.)  189,  193;  Richey  y. 
Missouri  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  Mo.  App.  581. 

6  Hutchinson  v.  State,  19  Neb.  262. 


Tit.   I,  CI).   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


65 


capital  case,^  without  reference  to  the  grouiuls  upon  which  such 
scruples  arise ;  ^  though  some  courts  have  held  such  venire-men 
competent  where  they  were  confident  of  their  ability  to  do  jus- 
tice between  the  State  and  the  accused,  notwithstanding  such 
scruples,'^  but  this  seems  to  be  an  unsound  view.^     This  rule  of 


»  L'uited  States  r.  Coruell,  2  JIusou 
(U.  S.),  91,  104;  Uuited  States  v. 
Ware,  2  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  477; 
O'Brien  v.  The  People,  3f>  N.  Y.  270; 
s.c.  48  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  274;  Loweu- 
Ijurg  V.  The  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  414,  425;  Uuited  States  v.  Wilsou, 
Baldwin,  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  83;  Clore's 
Case,  8  Gratt.  (Va.)  flOG;  Lewis  v. 
State,9Smod.  &  M.  (Miss.)  115;  Will- 
iams V.  State,  32  Miss.  381);  State  v. 
Kennedy,  8  Rob.  (La.)  590;  Cora.  v. 
Tworably,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  480,  note; 
Burrell  v.  State,  IS  Tex.  713;  Hvde  v. 
State,  113  Tex.  445;  White  v.  State,  1(5 
Tex.  207;  Kennedy  r.  State,  19  Tex. 
App.  618;  Jackson  r.  State,  74  Ala.  2*;; 
Garrett  r.  State,  7G  Ala.  18;  Moutairue 
r.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  7(>7;  People 
V.  Sanchez,  24  Cal.  17;  Waller  v. 
State,  40  Ala.  325;  People  ».  Tanner, 

2  Cal.  257;  Pierce  v.  State,  13  N.  H. 
53(!,  556;  State  v.  Ward,  39  Vt.  225; 
Etheridge  r.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  133; 
Com.  V.  Sherry,  Whart.  on  Hom.  481; 
Martin  v.  State,  16  Ohio,  364;  Hay- 
wood i?.  Calhoun,  2  Ohio  St.  164;  St. 
Louis  V.  Sttvte,  8  Neb.  405;  Williams 
t\  State,  3  Ga.  453;  Russell  v.  State, 
53  Miss.  367;  White  v.  State,  52  Miss. 
216;  Portenberry  v.  State,  55  Miss. 
403;  Jones  v.  State,  2  Blackf.  (lud.) 
475;  Gross  v.  State,  2  Ind.  329;  Dris- 
kill  r.  State,  7  Ind.  338;  Fahuestock 
V.  State,  23  Ind.  231;  Greeuley  v. 
State,  60  Ind.  141;  Stepheuson  v. 
State  (Ind.),  4  North  East.  Rep.  360; 
Mondays.  State,  32  Ga.  672;  State  v. 
West,  69  Mo.  401 ;  People  v.  Wilson, 

3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  199;  State  r.  Mul- 


len, 14  La.  Ann.  570;  State  v.  Reeves, 
11  La.  Ann.  ('>So;  State  v.  Clark,  32 
La.  Ann.  559;  Metzger  v.  State,  ISFla. 
481;  States.  Hing,  16  Nev.  307;  Peo- 
ple ?7.  Damon,  13  AA'end.  (N.  Y.)  351. 
Contra,  Com.  v.  Gross,  1  Ashra.  (Pa.) 
281,  287  (overruled  by  Com.  v.  Lesher, 
17  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  155).  In  United 
States  V.  McMahon,  4  Crauch  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  573,  the  question  was  sub- 
mitted to  triors.  Compare  People  v. 
Ryan,  2  Wheel.  Cr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  47; 
People  V.  Jones,  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  (N. 
Y.)  112.  It  was  so  established  by 
statute  in  New  York  as  early  as  1801, 
in  respect  of  Quakers.  2  Rev.  Stat. 
N.  Y.  734,  §  12. 

-  Walter  r.  People,  32  N.  Y.  147,  161 ; 
O'Brieu  V.  People,  36  N.  Y.  276,  278; 
Gordon  v.  People,  33  N.  Y.  501;  Peo- 
ple V.  Stewart,  7  Cal.  140,  143,  per 
Murray,  C.  J.  See  also  Com.  v.  Web- 
ster, 5  Cush.  (Mass.)  295,298;  Atkins 
V.  State,  16  Ark.  568.  It  is  no  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  the  consci- 
entious scruples  in  question  that  a 
juror,  when  interrogated  upon  the 
subject,  simply  says  that  he  "  would 
not  like  for  a  man  to  be  hung."  Smith 
V.  State,  55  Miss.  410. 

3  Williams  v.  State,  32  Miss.  389; 
People  V.  AVilson,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  199;   Stratton  v.   People,  '  5   Colo. 

27(;. 

*  Waller  v.  State,  40  Ala.  325.  A 
juror  wlio  stated  upon  the  voir  dire 
tliat  he  did  not  think  he  could  do  the 
prisoner  justice,  Avas  held  incompe- 
tent, although  he  subsequently  stated 
that  he  could  come  to  the  trial  with  an 


66  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1   Thoilip.   Tl'., 

exclusion  applies,  although  the  offense  is  one  for  which  capital 
punishment  may  be  given,  although  a  lower  degree  of  punish- 
ment may  be  assessed  ^  by  the  jury.^ 

§  75.  Conscientious  Scruples  against  Capital  Punishment 
on  Circumstantial  Evidence.  — For  the  same  reason  the  venire- 
man w^ill  be  excused  where  he  declares  that  his  conscientious 
scruples  against  capital  punishment  are  limited  to  cases  in  which 
circumstantial  evidence  is  relied  upon  for  a  conviction,  '^  since 
the  law  recognizes  such  evidence  as  of  equal  value  with  other 
evidence,*  although  the  particular  case  depends  on  direct  testi- 
mony.^ But  it  has  been  held  that  some  j^rejudice  against  con- 
victing on  circumstantial  evidence  is  not  sufficient  ground  of 
challenge  for  cause. ^ 

§  76.  Opinions  Touching  the  3Ierits  of  the  Particular 
Case.  —  This  is  by  far  the  most  frequent  ground  of  challenge  in 
criminal  cases.  The  American  law  in  respect  of  it  is  in  such  a  state 
of  confusion  that  no  success  can  be  hoped  for  in  reconcding  con- 
flicting 0})inions,  or  even  in  arraying  the  decisions  in  logical 
order. ^  A  disqualifying  opinion  is  at  common  law  a  principal 
cause  of  challenge,  as  distinguished  from  a  cause  of  challenge  to 
the  favor ;  ^  though  under  that  system  a  challenge  to  the  favor  may 

unbiased    aud      uuprejudiced    miud.  Reg.  (J71;  State  u.  Bunger,  11  La.  Ann. 

Wright  V.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  (Va.)  941.  607;  State  v.  Pritcliard,  15  Nev.  74. 

^  People  V.  Tanner,  2  Cal.  257.     See  *  Smith  v.  State,  55  Ala.  1 ;  People 

also    Caldwell  v.    State,   41   Tex.  87;  v.   Ah   Chung,  54   Cal.   398;    State  v. 

State  V.  Melvin,  11  La.  Ann.  535;  Dris-  West,  m  Mo.  401;  Gates  v.  People,  14 

kill  V.  State,  7   lud.    338;  Greeuley  v.  111.  433;  Jones  v.  State,  57  Miss.  (385; 

State,  CO  lud.  141;  People   v.  Majors,  State  v.  Buuger,  11  La.  Ann.  607. 
G5  Cal.  138.  5  Coleman  v.  State,  59  Miss.  484. 

2  Spain  V.  State,  59  Miss.  19;  «  State  v.  Shields,  33  La.  Ami.  991. 
Cooper  y.  State,  Id.  267.  '  See  the  observations  of  Clark,  J., 

3  Schafer  V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  239;  in  Rothschild  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 
Clanton  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  139;  519,  542;  also  People  v.  Reynolds,  16 
Jones  w.  State,  57   Miss.  684;  State  v.  Cal.  128. 

Pritchard,  15  Nev.  74;  Smith  v.  State,  ^  Pringle  v.  Huse,  1    Cow.   (N.  Y.) 

55  Ala.  1;  Peoples.  Ah  Chung,  54  Cal.  432;    Ex  parte  Vermilyea,  6  Cow.  (N. 

398;  State  v.  West,  69  Mo,  401;  Gates  Y.)  555;  People  v.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow. 

V.  People,  14   111.  433;    s.  c.  2    Am.  L.  (N.   Y.)  108;  People  v.  Allen,  43  N.  Y 


Tit.   I,  Ch.  III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


67 


be  taken  on  this  ground  and  .submitted  to  triors,^  whose  decision  in 
favor  of  competency  will  be  conclusive,  notwithstanding  the  court 
might  have  ruled  otherwise  on  a  challenge  for  principal  cause. ^  At 
common  law,  it  was  necessary  not  merely  that  the  venire-man 
should  have  formed^  but  also  that  he  should  have  expressed  a 
disqualifying  opinion,  in  order  to  support  a  challenge  for  prin- 
cipal cause, -^ —  the  reason  being  that  one  Avho  has  expressed  an 
opinion  is  likely  to  be  restrained  by  his  own  pride  from  recant- 
ing it.  But  numerous  American  holdings  make  the  existence 
of  such  an  opinion,  admitted  by  the  venire-man  on  his  voir  dire, 
a  sood  cause  of  challensfe.^ 


28;  Rice  v.  The  State,  1  Yerg.  (Teuu.) 
432;  McGowau  v.  The  State,  9  Yerg. 
(Teuu.)  184;  Com.  v.  Lesher,  17  Serg. 
&  R.  (Pa.)  15(5. 

1  Freeman  v.  People,  4  Deu.  (N.  Y.) 
9,  35;  People  v.  Houeymau,  3  Deu.  (N. 
Y.)  121;  Smith  v.  Floyd,  18  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  522;  People  -y.  McMahou,  2  Park. 
Cr.  (N.  Y.).0(J3;  Audersou  v.  State,  14 
Ga.  709;  Ray  v.  State,  15  Ga.  223; 
Stout  V.  People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 
132;  Schoeffler  V.  State,  3  Wis.  823. 

''  People  V.  Alleu,  43  N.  Y.  28. 

3  1  Burr.  Tr.  44,  per  Marshall,  C.  .J. ; 
State  V.  Godfrey,  Brayt.  (Vt.)  170; 
United  States  v.  Watkius,  3  Crauch  C. 
C.  (U.  S.)  505;  Uuited  States  v. 
Devaughau,  3  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 
84;  State  v.  Madoil,  12  Fla.  151; 
Boardmau  v.  Wood,  3  Vt.  570;  State  v. 
Clark,  42  Vt.  (329;  State  v.  Pliair,  48 
Vt.  3(;(J;  State  v.  Tatro,  50  Vt.  483; 
Noble  V.  People,  1  111.  29;  Hudgius  v. 
State,  2  Ga.  173;  Boon  v.  State,  1  Ga. 
619;  Reynolds  v.  State,  1  Ga.  228; 
Baker  y.  State,  15  Ga.  498;  Griffin  v. 
State,  15  Ga.  47G.  Oue  of  the  grounds 
alleged  against  Mr.  Justice  Chase  on 
the  trial  of  his  impeachment  was  that, 
in  the  trial  of  Calleuder's  Case,  he  had 
coupled  these  two  elements  together, 
though  he  had  put  the  question  iu  the 


disjunctive  on  the  previous  trial  of 
Fries'  Case  (Cliase  Tr.  117;  Fries' 
Case,  Whart.  St.  Tr.  610,  614;  Cal- 
ender's Case,  Wliart.  St.  Tr.  688, 
G9<)) ;  and  the  invective  launched 
agaiust  the  traverser  by  John  Ran- 
dolpli  ou  this  grouud  showed  that 
distinguished  mau  to  be  a  better 
orator  than  lawyer ;  for  it  was  only  the 
expression  of  a  disqualifying  opinion 
at  common  law  that  afforded  ground 
of  challenge.  Hawk.  P.  C,  chap.  43, 
§  28;  Rex  v.  Edmunds,  4  Barn.  &  Aid. 
471,  492. 

^  Osiauder  v.  Com.,  3  Leigh  (Va.), 
780;  Arraistead's  Case,  11  Leigh 
(Va.),  657;  State  v.  Wilson,  38  Conn. 
126;  United  States  v.  Hamvay  (Walsh's 
Case),  2  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)  139; 
United  States  v.  Wilsou,  Bald.  C.  C. 
84 ;  People  v.  Christie,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  579;  s.  c.  2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  256; 
Com.  V.  Kuapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  496, 
498 ;  Com.  V.  Webster,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 
295,  298 ;  People  v.  Hettick,  1  Wheeler 
Cr.  C.  (N.  Y.)  399;  People  v.  Melvin,2 
AVlieeler  Cr.  C.  (N.  Y.)  265;  People  v. 
Johnson,  2  Wheeler  Cr.  C.  (N.  Y.) 
361,  367;  Eomaine  v.  State,  7  Ind.  63; 
Stewart  v.  State,  13  Ark.  720;  Maize 
V.  Sewell,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  447;  Front 
V.  Williams,  29  Ind.  18. 


68 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§   77.   Nature  of  the  Opinion  which  Disqualifies. — By  the 

common  law  the  fact  that  a  venire-man  had  declared  his  opinion 
that  the  accused  was  guilty,  that  he  would  be  hanged,  and  the 
like,  was  good  cause  of  challenge,^  unless  it  should  appear  that  the 
declaration  was  made  from  his  own  knowledge  of  the  cause,  and 
not  out  of  any  ill-will  to  the  party. ^  This  exception  carries  us 
back  to  the  early  days  of  jury  trial,  when  jurors  were  summoned 
devicineto,  because  they  had  knowledge  of  the  controversy  to  be 
tried,  and  therefore  sat  in  the  character  of  witnesses  as  well  as 
in  that  of  triors.  It  is  unsuited  to  modern  conceptions,  and, 
though  approved  in  England  as  late  as  1821,^  and  in  a  few  instances 
in  this  country,*  it  is  not  in  general  the  law  with  us  ;  but  here 
the  question  usuallj'  is  whether,  from  any  cause,  the  juror  has 
such  a  bias  of  mind  as  may  disqualify  him  from  deciding  impar- 
tially.^ In  some  States  the  fact  that  the  venire-man  has  been 
summoned  as  a  witness,  is  a  o;ood  cause  of  challenge." 


1  2  Hawk.  P.  C,  chap.  43,  §  28: 
Cook's  Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  333; 
Barbot's  Case,  18  How.  St.  Tr.  1233; 
Layer's  Case,  16  How.  St.  Tr.  137; 
O'Coigly'sCase,  2G  How.  St.  Tr.  1227; 
Home  Tooke's  Case,  25  How.  St.  Tr. 
17. 

2  2  Hawk.  P.  C,  chap.  43,  §  2^.  See 
also  Brooke's  Abr.,  Challenge,  pi.  90, 
citing  21  Hen.  VII.  29;  Bac.  Abr., 
Juries,  E.  5;  Eex  v.  Edmunds,  4  Barn. 
&  Aid.  471,  490.  See  also  Brook's 
Abr.,  Challenge,  55,  and  Fitzherbert's 
Abr.,  Challenge,  22,  citing  the  charge 
of  Babington  to  the  triors  in  the  Year 
Book,  7  Hen.  VI.  fol.  25;  Trials  per 
Pais  (1725),  189. 

3  By  Lord  Tenterden  in  Rex  v.  Ed- 
munds, supra. 

<  State  V.  Spencer,  21  N.  J.  L.  19C, 
198;  State  v.  Pox,  29  N.  J.  L.  506; 
Pettis  V.  Warren,  Kirby,  426.  See  also 
State  V.  Howard,  17  N.  H.  171,  192. 

s  Trial  of  Aaron  Burr,  vol.  I,  p. 
414,  opinion  of  Marshall,  C.  .T. ;  Blake 
'J.  Millspaugh,    1   Johns.    (N.  Y)   316; 


Durell  V.  Mosher,  8  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
445;  Ex  parte  Vermilyea,  6  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  555;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  229,  241;  People  v.  Van  Al- 
styne,  MS.,  cited  in  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
565;  People  r.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow.  108; 
Solander  v.  People,  2  Col.  48,59;  Boon 
V.  Georgia,  1  Ga.  618,  622;^  State  v. 
Williams,  3  Stew.  (Ala.)  454;  Wa- 
ters V.  State,  51  Md.  430;  Hudgins  v. 
State,  2  Ga.  173.  If  a  juror  has  A,7ioioZ- 
edge  of  the  facts  in  controversy,  he 
should  be  sworn  and  examined  as  a 
witness,  so  that  he  may  be  cross- 
examined,  and  so  that  his  testimony 
shall  not  be  given  for  the  first  time  in 
the  jury  room  out  of  the  presence  of 
the  parties.  Rex  v.  Perkins,  Holt,  403; 
Hauser  v.  Com.,  5  Am.  L.  Reg.  (n.  s.) 
668;  Dunbar  r.  Parks,  2  Tyler  (Vt.), 
217;  Green  r.  Hill,  4  Tex.  465;  United 
States  r.  Fourteen  Packages,  Gilp.  (U. 
S.)  236;  Fellows'  Case,  5  Me.  333; 
Rondeau  v.  New  Orleans  &c.  Co.,  15  La. 
160. 

«  Com.   V.   Joliffe,   7   Watts    (Pa.), 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


69 


§  78,  [Contiimed.]  3Iiist  be  of  a  Fixed  and  Positive  Char- 
acter.—  Expressed  in  the  vaiying  terms  of  judicial  opinions, 
the  opinion  concerning  the  merits  of  the  case  on  trial  which  dis- 
qualifies the  venire-man  must  be  a  j^.x-ecZ,  settled,  absolute,  i^ositive^ 
decided,  subst ant ialf  deliberate  ov  unconditional  opinion/ no  mat- 
ter from  \\\\)xt  source  derived.'-^     But  the  source  is  so  far  material 


585;  Atkins  I'.  State,  60  Ala.  45;  Com- 
mander V.  State,  60  Ala.  1 ;  State  v. 
Underwood,  2  Overton  (Tenn.),  92; 
Hook  V.  Page,  1  Overton  (Tenn.),  250. 
But  see  FelloTVs's  Case,  5  Me.  333; 
Handly  v.  Call,  30  Me.  9;  Bell  v.  State, 
44  Ala.  393;  Rondeau  v.  New  Orleans 
Co.,  15  La.  IGO.  Whei-ethis  is  so,  the 
juror  does  not  render  himself  compe- 
tent by  disclaimino;  all  kuowledire  of 
the  case.  "West  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
119.  Nor  is  the  error  of  putting  him 
on  the  juiy  cured  by  omitting  to  call 
him  as  a  witness.  Atkins  v.  State, 
60  Ala.  45.  But  it  has  been  held  no 
cause  of  challenge  that  the  venire-man 
was  examined  as  a  witness  on  a  former 
trial  of  the  same  cause  before  arbitra- 
tors. Harper  v.  Keen,  11  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  280.  Nor  that,  in  a  criminal 
case,  he  had  been  called  on  a  former 
trial  as  a  witness  for  the  State  to  tes- 
tify against  the  general  character  of 
the  prisoner.  Fellows's  Case,  5  Me. 
333. 

1  Schoeffler  v.  State,  3  Wis.  823; 
People  V.  King,  27  Cal.  507;  Jackson 
V.  State,  77  Ala.  18;  People  v.  Bodine, 
1  Den.  (N.  Y.)  308;  State  v.  Howard, 
17  N.  H.  192;  Staup  v.  Com..  74  Pa. 
St.  458;  Rafe  v.  State,  20  Ga.  60; 
Osiander  v.  Com.,  3  Leigh  (Va.),  780; 
Arraistead  v.  Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.), 
657;  Lithgow  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297; 
Sprouce  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  375;  Jack- 
son V.  Com.,  23  Graft.  (Va.)  919; 
Thompson  v.  Updegraff,  3  W.  Va.  629; 
Brown  v.  Com.,  2  Leigh  (Va.),  769; 
State  V.   George,  8    Rob.   (La.)    535; 


State  V.  Brown,  4  La.  Ann.  505 ;  Wright 
V.  State,  18  Ga.  383;  People  v.  Stout, 
4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  71,  117.  See  also 
State  V.  Kingsbury,  58  Me.  238. 
Judges  frequently  tise  the  term 
•'  opinion  "  as  synonymous  with 
"  tixed  opinion."  See  Reynolds  v. 
State,  1  Ga.  222,  with  which  decision 
compare  Hndgins  v.  State,  2  Ga.  173, 
180;  Maddox  v.  State,  32  Ga.  581. 

'^  Boon  V.  State,  1  Ga.  631;  Logan 
V.  State,  50  Miss.  269,  275;  Lycoming 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ward,  90  111.  545; 
Leach  v.  People,  53  111.  311;  Smith  v. 
Fames,  4  111.  76;  Carson  v.  State,  50 
Ala.  134;  Hall  v.  State,  61  Ala.  9; 
State  V.  Davis,  14  Nev.  439,  450;  Payne 
V.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  375;  Rice 
V.  State,  1  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  432;  Mc- 
Gowan  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  184; 
Coleman  v.  Hagerman,  MS.,  cited  in  6 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  564;  People  v.  Mather,  4 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  229,  244;  Greenfield  v. 
People,  74N.  Y.277;  Norfleet  v.  State, 
4   Sneed  (Tenn.),  340;   Sam  v.  State, 

31  Miss.  480;  Goodwin  v.  Blachley,  4 
lud.  438;  Meyer  v.  State,  19  Ark.  156; 
Fonts  V.  State,  7  Ohio  St.  471 ;  Armi- 
stead  V.  Com.,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  657; 
Staup  V.  Com.,  74  Pa.  St.  458;  People 
V.  Mallon,  3  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  224;  Lith- 
gow V.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297;  Sprouce 
V.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  375;  Conway  v. 
Clinton,  1  Utah,  215;  Wright  v.  Com., 

32  Gratt.  (Va.)  941;  Jackson  v.  Com., 
23  Gratt.  (Va.)  919;  Gardner  v.  Peo- 
ple, 4  111.  84;  Neely's  Case,  13  111.  685. 
But  see  Clore's  Case,  8  Gratt.  (Va.) 
607;    Trial    of    Aaron    Burr,    p.  370; 


70 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Tliomp.  Tr., 


that  disqualifying  opinions  which  have  been  derived  from  an 
auihentiG  source,^  as  from  hearing  the  evidence  tijjon  a  former 
(rial  of  the  same  case,^  or  from  conversations  ivith  witnesses^  or 


Moses  V.  State,  10  Humph.  (Teun.) 
4oG;  s.  c.  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  232; 
McGowan  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
184;  Payne  v.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
375;  Balbo  v.  People,  80  N.  Y.  484, 
492,  493,  per  Andrews,  J. ;  State  v. 
McClear,  11  Nev.  39,  G7;  Logan  v. 
State,  50  Miss.  2G9,  275;  State  v. 
Brette,  C  La.  Ann.  652;  Gray  v.  People, 
26  111.  344;  ArmisteaO  v.  Com.,  11 
Leigh  (Va.),G57;  Maddox  v.  State,  32 
Ga.  581;  Neely  v.  People,  13  111.  685; 
People  V.  Cottle,  6  Cal.  227;  People  v. 
Edwards,  41  Cal.  640;  People  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 16  Cal.  128,  133;  People  v. 
Brotherton,  43  Cal.  530;  s.  c.  1  Green's 
Cr.  L.  739;  People  v.  Gehr,  8  Cal.  359; 
Ruff  V.  Rader,  2  Mont.  211.  The 
juror's  statement  that  the  opinion  is 
"unqualified"  receives  weighty  con- 
sideration. State  r.  Gillicli,  10  Iowa, 
98.  The  source  of  the  opinion  is  ma- 
terial only  as  throwing  doul^t  upon  its 
disqualifying  character,  where  doubts 
arise  on  that  question.  "Wormeley  v. 
Com.,  10  Graft.  (Va.)  658,  687.  The 
numerous  cases  which  hold  that  opin- 
ions based  upon  rumor  merely  do  not 
disqualify,  are  reconcilable  with  the 
foregoing  only  upon  the  ground  that 
such  opinions  are  not,  from  their  na- 
ture, of  that  tixed  character  which  will 
not  yield  to  evidence.  Alfred  r.  State, 
3  Swan  (Tenn.),  581.  See  also 
Major  V.  State,  4  Sneed  (Ky.),  597; 
People  V.  Hayes,  Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  (X. 
Y.)  582;  Carson  v.  State,  50  Ala.  134; 
Curley  v.  Com.,  84  Pa.  St.  151.  In  the 
view  of  these  cases  "  belief  "  is  syn- 
onymous with  a  "tixed  opinion." 
But  see  Neely  v.  People,  13  111.  685; 
Bales  V.  State,  63  Ala.  30,  36.  In  the 
California  Penal    Code    "  belief "    is 


used  as  synonymous  with  "  unquali- 
fied opinion."  Cal.  Penal  Code,  §  1074, 
subsec.  8. 

1  Troxdale  v.  State,  9  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  411. 

2  Ex  parte  Vermilyea,  6  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  555;  People  V.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  121;  Grissom  t\  State,  4  Tex. 
App.  374;  Jacol)s  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App. 
278;  Willis  v.  State, /d.  297;  Jackson 
V.  Com.,  23  Graft.  (Va.)  919;  Apper- 
son  V.  Logwood,  12  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
262;  Lloyd  v.  Nourse,  2  Rawle  (Pa.), 
49;  Garthwaite  17.  Tatum,  21  Ark.  336; 
Irvine  v.  Kean,  14  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
292;  State  v.  McClear,  11  Nev.  39,  67; 
McGuffie  V.  State,  17  Ga.  497;  State  v. 
AVebster,  13  N.  H.  491;  Studley  v. 
Hall,  22  Me.  198;  Sara  v.  State,  13 
Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  189.  One  who 
has  formed  an  opinion  from  reading 
the  evidence  on  the  trial  of  an  accom- 
plice is  so  disqualified.  Brown  v.  State, 
70  lud.  576.  Contra,  that  the  mere  fact 
of  having  heard  such  evidence  does 
not  disqualify.  Thompson  r.  State,  19 
Tex.  App.  593. 

3  People  V.  Johnson,  46  Cal.  78; 
Logan  V.  State,  50  Miss.  275;  State  v. 
George,  8  Rob.  (La.)  535,  537;  Good- 
win I'.  Blachley,  4  Ind.  438;  Dugle 
V.  State,  100  Ind.  259  (by  statute); 
Bishop  V.  State,  9  Ga.  121.  But  see 
State  V.  Guidry,  28  La.  Ann.  630.  The 
mere  circumstance  that  a  juror  has 
listened  to  the  testimony,  or  has  con- 
versed with  witnesses  in  ^  case,  is  not 
a  cause  of  challenge,  if  he  has  formed 
no  opinion  based  upon  such  testimony 
or  conversation.  Page  v.  Com.,  27 
Graft,  (Va.)  954;  Thomson  v.  People, 
24  111.  60;  Parchmau  v.  State,  2  Tex. 
App.    228;    Shields    v.  State,    8   Tex. 


Tit.   I,   Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


71 


with  a  jx(r(^,^  or  with  one  who  heard  the  witnesses  testify  on  a 
former  trial  or  examination.^  will  be  a  grood  ground  of  challenge. 
Within  this  rule,  a  mere  impression,  not  amounting  to  a  fixed  or 
settled  o})ini()n,"^  will  not  disqualify;  though  if,  on  examination, 
what -the  juror  calls  an  impression  appears  to  be  a  fixed  opinion, 
the  challenge  will  be  sustained.*  Conversely,  what  the  juror 
calls  an  opiuion  may  turn  out  on  examination  to  be  a  slight  im- 
pression which  will  yield  to  evidence,  in  which  case  the  chal- 
lenge will  be  overruled.'^  It  is  but  another  expression  of  the  same 
idea  that  an  in<lpji)iite  opinion  does  not  disqualify.®  In  short, 
the  rule  cannot  be  better  stated  than  in  the  language  of  Chief 
Justice  Shaw  in  the  celebrated  trial  of  Professor  "Webster  for 
the  murder  of  Dr.  Parkman:  "■  The  o})inion  or  judgment,"  said 
he,  ''  must  be  something  more  than  a  vague  impression,  formed 
from  casual  observation  with  others,  or  from  reading  imperfect, 
abbreviated  newspaper  reports.  It  nuist  be  such  an  opinion 
upon  the  merits  of  the  question  as  would  })e  likely  to  bias  or 
pervert  a  candid  judgment  \.\\)o\\  a  full  hearing  of  the  evidence. 
If  one  has  formed  what  in  some  sense  might   be  called  an  opin- 


App.  427;  Harper  v.  Kean,  11  Sersi.  & 
R.  (Pa.)  •2sO:  Kay  r.  State,  2  Kau. 
405;  Lycoming  lus.  Co.  v.  Ward,  90 
111.  545;  State  v.  Aver,  23  N.  H.  301; 
Com.  V.  Reid,  8  Phila.  (Pa.)  3^15; 
Uuited  States  v.  Duff  (U.  S.  Cir.  Ct. 
S.  D.  New  York,  Jan.  1881,  Benedict, 
D.  J.),  6  Fed.  Rep.  45;  McCune  v. 
Com.,  2  Rob.  (Va.)  777;  JSIouroe  v. 
State,  23  Tex.  10.  Compare  IMoran  u. 
Com.,  9  Leigh  (Va.),  r.51.  Such  con- 
versations as  to  incidental  or  collat- 
eral matters  do  not  disqualify.  Walker 
V.  State,  102  lud.  502. 

1  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  14  Wend.  (X. 
Y.)  131:  Young  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  1 
Cranch  C.    \  (U.  S.)  452. 

2  Nelms  V.  State,  13  Smed.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  500,  504;  Quesenberry  v. 
State,  3  Stew.  &Port.  (Ala.),  308;  Sam 
V.  State,  13  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  ISO: 
Nedv.  State,  7  Porter  (Ala.),  187.     But 


see  Jackson  v.  Com.,  23  Gratt.  (Va.) 
919. 

*  People  r.  Honeyman,  3  Denio  (N- 
Y.),  121;  People  v.  Symonds,  22  Cal. 
348;  Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Nat.  Bank,  90 
U.  S.  040;  Noe  v.  State,  4  How- 
(Miss.)  330;  White  v.  State,  52  Miss- 
21G;  State  v.  Ward,  14  La.  Ann.  673; 
State  V.  Coleman,  27  La.  Ann.  G91; 
State  V.  Ilugel,  27  La.  Ann.  375;  State 
V.  Medlicott,  9  Kau.  257;  Travis  v. 
Com.,  lOi)  Pa.  St.  597. 

*  Greentield  v.  The  People,  74  N.  Y. 
277,  2.S3. 

5  Payne  v.  The  State,  3  Humph. 
(Teun.)  375;  State  v.  Wilson,  38 
Conn.  120,  138;  Norfleet  r.  The  State, 
4  Sneed  (Tenn.),  340,  343;  Palmer  v. 
The  People,  4  Neb.  68,  75;  Com.  v. 
Leuox,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  249;  United 
States  r.  Reynolds,  1  Utah,  319. 

«  State  w.  Hoyt,  47  Conu.  518. 


72 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


ion,  but    which  yet  fell    far  short  of   exciting  any  bias  or  preju- 
dice, he  might  conscientiously  discharge  his  duty  as  a  juror."  ^ 

§  79.  Opinions  which  do  not  Disqualify.  — Lord  Mansfield's 
standard  that  "  a  juror  should  be  as  ivhite  as  jyaper,''  ^  jias  long 
since  been  discarded  as  impracticable,-^  and  that  of  Chief  Justice 
Marshall,  laid  down  in  the  trial  of  Aaron  Burr,  has  been  generally 
substituted  in  its  place.  "  Were  it  possible,"  said  he,  "  to  obtain 
a  jury  without  any  prepossessions  whatever,  respecting  the  guilt 
or  innocence  of  the  accused,  it  would  be  extremely  desirable  to 
obtain  such  a  jury;  but  this  is  perhaps  impossible,  and  therefore 
will  not  be  required.  The  opinion  which  has  been  avowed  by 
the  court  is,  that  light  impressions  which  may  fairly  be  supposed 
to  yield  to  the  testimony  that  may  be  offered,  which  may  leave 
the  mind  open  to  a  fair  consideration  of  that  testimony,  consti- 
tute no  sufficient  objection  to  a  juror;  but  that  those  strong 
and  deep  impressions  which  will  close  the  mind  against  the  testi- 
mony that  may  be  offered  in  opposition  to  them,  which  will 
combat  that  testimony,  and  resist  its  force,  do  constitute  a  suffi- 
cient objection  to  him."  *  Improper  expressions  of  opinion, 
shown  to  have  been  made  in  a  spirit  of  levity,  have  been  often 
overlooked;^ but  if  the  venire-man  has  talked  about  the  case  and 


1  Com.  V.  Webster,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 
295,  297.  See  also  State  v.  Pike  (Sup. 
Ct.  N.  H.),llAm.  L.  Reg.  233,  aud 
particularly  the  opinion  of  Lomax,  J., 
in  Clore's  Case,  8  Gratt.  (Va.)  GOG,  G17. 

2  Mylock  V.  Saladiu,  1  W.  Bl.  480, 
481. 

^  McCausland  v.  McCausland,  1 
Yeates  (Pa.),  372,  378;  O'Mara  v.  Com., 
75  Pa.  St.  424,428;  Reynolds  v.  United 
States,  98  U.  S.  145,  156. 

*  Trial  of  Aaron  Burr,  vol.  1,  p. 
41G.  See  also  Boon  v.  State,  1  Ga. 
618,625;  Nelms  v.  State,  13  Smed.  & 
M.  (Miss.)  500,  504;  Smithy.  Eames, 
4  111.  7G;  Leach  v.  People,  53  111.  311; 
Black  V.  State,  42  Tex.  377;  Stater. 
Desmouchet,  32  La.  Ann.  1241. 


3  John  V.  State,  16  Ga.  200;  Mou- 
ghon  V.  State,  59  Ga.  308;  Com.  v. 
Flanagan,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  415,  421; 
Lovett  r.  State,  60  Ga.  257;  Simms  v. 
State,  8  Tex.  App.  230;  Com.  v.  Hail- 
stock,  2  Gratt.  (Va.)564;  State  ?;.Dis- 
kin,35La.  Ann.  46  ;  Johnson  v.  State,  11 
Lea  (Teun.) ,  47.  Compare  State  ^.'.Rev- 
ells,  35  La.  Ann.  342 ;  State  v.  Coleman, 
20  S.  C.  441.  It  was  so  held  in  the 
case  of  one  of  the  venire-men  sum- 
moned on  the  trial  of  Aarou  Burr, 
who  on  his  voir  dire,  admitted  as  fol- 
lows: "I  met  an  intimate  friend  to 
whom  I  observed  that  I  had  come  to 
town  with  a  hope  of  being  placed  on 
this  jury,  and  if  I  were,  I  would  hang 
Colonel  Burr  at  once  without  further 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  73 

has  strong  opinions,  he  should  bo  rejected,^  Accordingly  it  is 
no  longer  a  ground  of  disqutdilictition  that  the  juror  has  heard 
much  about  the  case,  provided  he  has  formed  no  opinion  thereon ;  ^ 
nor  that  what  he  has  heard  has  impressed  itself  upon  his  mind 
as  a  fact,  provided  the  impression  is  such  as  will  readily  yield  to 
the  evidence  presented  in  the  case.'^  Of  this  character  are  many 
opinions  formed  from  reading  newspapers  *  and  from  other 
sources  of  so  unsubstantial  a  character  that  a  contradiction  from 
the  same  source  would  be  as  readily  accepted  as  true,^  —  but,  as 


inquiry.  1  Burr.  Tr.  423.,  Contra, 
Braketield  v.  State,  1  Sueed  (Teuu.), 
21.").  Compare  State  v.  Colemau,  20  S. 
C.  441. 

1  Ward  V.  State,   19  Tex.  App.  Mi. 

2  State  V,  Howard,  17  N.  II.  171; 
State  V.  Potter,  18  Couu.  IGG;  Com.  v. 
Thrasher,  11  Gray  (Mass.),  .57. 

3  Scrautou  v.  Stewart,  52  lud.  (!S ; 
McGresrg  v.  State,  i  Bhickf.  (lud.) 
101 ;  Vau  Yacter  v.  McKillip,  7  Blackf. 
(lud.)  578;  Morirau  v.  Steveusou,  (> 
lud.  109;  Rice  v.  State,  7  lud.  332; 
Lithiiow  V.  Coui.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297,  31-3; 
Ulrich  V.  People,  39  Mich.  245;  State 
P.  George,  8  Rob.  (La.)  535;  State  v. 
Colemau,  27  La.  Auu.  691,692;  State 
V.  De  Ranee,  34  La.  Anu.  186;  State  v. 
Dugay,  35  La.  Auu.  327;  State  v.  Wal- 
tou,  74  Mo.  270;  State  v.  Bahar,  Id. 
292.  Compare  State  v.  .Johnsou,  33  La. 
Aun.  889;  Guetig  v.  State,  G(;  lud.  94; 
Noe  V.  State,  92  Ind.  92;  Conaster  v. 
State,  12  Lea  (Teuu.),  436.  A  juror 
whose  frame  of  miud  is  such  that  he 
is  iu  doubt  as  to  Avhether  the  opiuiou 
he  has  formed  would  readily  yield  to 
the  evidence  ought  to  be  excluded. 
Dejaruette  v.  Com.,  11  Reporter,  (;53; 
s.  c.  75  Va.  867.  Compare  Stout  v. 
People,  4  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  71,  111. 

*  State  V.  Meyer,  58  Vt.  457 ;  Speuce 
V.  State,  15  Lea  (Teuu.),  539;  Bohauau 
V.  State,  18  Neb.  57;  State  v.  Wilsou, 
85  Mo.  1.30:   Dolan  v.  State,  40  Ark 


454;  Allison  u.  Com.,  99  Pa.  St.  17; 
Gradle  v.  Hoffman,  105  111.  147;  State 
V.  Meaker,  54  Yt.  112;  State  v.  Hoyt, 
47  Coun.  518;  People  v.  Oyer  &  Ter- 
miner Court,  83  N.  Y.  436.  Contra,  iu 
McIIugh  V.  State,  38  Oh.  St.  153,  it  is 
held  that  oue  who  has  formed  and 
expressed  an  ojuniou  of  guilt,  from 
newspaper  accounts,  iu  a  capital  case, 
is  disqualitied. 

5  People  V.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  71;  Peoi)le  v.  .Johnson,  2  Wheeler 
Cr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  361,  369;  Loweuberg 
V.  People,  5  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  414,  423; 
Easou  V.  State,  6  Baxter  (Teuu.),  466, 
477;  State  v.  Potter,  18  Conn.  166; 
State  V.  Wilsou,  38  Couu.  126;  O'Con- 
nor u.  State,  9  Fla.  215;  Montague  v. 
State,  17  Fla.  662;  Bradford  v.  State, 
15  lud.  347;  State  v.  Benton,  2  Dev.  & 
B.  (N.  C.)  196;  Morgan  v.  State,  31 
lud.  193;  Clem  v.  State,  33  lud.  418; 
Cluck  V.  State,  40  lud.  2»;3;  Scrautou 
V.  Stewart,  52  Ind.  GS;  Pahnestock  v. 
State,  23  Ind.  231;  Meyer  v.  State, 
19  Ark.  156;  State  v.  Spaulding,  24 
Kan.  1;  People  v.  Reynolds,  16  Cal. 
128;  Shoeffler  v.  State,  3  Wis.  823; 
People  V.  Mallon,  3  Laus.  (N.  Y.)  224; 
Lithgow  V.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297;  Holt 
V.  People,  13  Mich.  224 ;  King  v.  State, 
5  How.  (Miss.)  730;  State  v.  Flower, 
Walker  (Miss.),  318;  State  v.  Ray- 
mond, 11  Nev.  98;  People  v.  King,  27 
Cal.  507;    People   v.  Williams,  17  Cal. 


74 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thonip.  Tr., 


all  opinions,  founded  on  the  belief  of  facts  derived  from  the 
testimony  of  others,  are  of  this  character,  it  is  obvious  that  we 
get  no  safe  rule  from  the  use  of  this  expression.  Such  opinions 
may  involve  the  rankest  prejudice.  Great  care  should  therefore 
be  exercised  in  interrogating  the  venire-man  who  entertains 
them,  as  to  the  strength  of  his  belief  in  them.^  Such  opinions 
are  frequently  disregarded  in  the  venire-man,  on  the  ground  of 
their  being  hypothetical  opinions  merely."^ 


142;  State  v.  Morea,  2  Ala.  275; 
Hudgins  v.  State,  2  Ga.  133;  State  v. 
Cockinau,  2  Wiust.  (N.  C.)  95;  State 
V.  Ellington,  7  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  61; 
Waters  v.  State,  51  Md.  430;  s.  c.  8 
Eeporter,  560;  Little  v.  Com.,  25  Gratt. 
(Va.)  921;  United  States  v.  McHeury, 
6  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  503;  Brown  v.  Com., 
2  Leigh  (Va.),  769;  McCune  v.  Com., 
2  Eol).  (Va.)  771;  Irvine  v.  Lumber- 
men's Bank,  2  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  190; 
Wright  V.  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
194;  Cooper  v.  State,  16  Ohio  St.  328; 
Erazier  v.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  551; 
State  V.  Dove,  10  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  469; 
Hart  V.  State,  57  Ind.  102;  State  v. 
Bone,  7  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  121;  State  v. 
Collins,  70  N.  C.  241;  Sanchez  v.  Peo- 
ple, 4  Park.  Cr.'(N.  Y.)  535;  Union 
Gold  M.  Co.  V.  Rocky  Mountain  Nat. 
Bank,  2  Colo.  565;  State  x>.  Johnson, 
Walker  (Miss.),  392;  Sam  ??.  State,  13 
Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  189 ;  Lee  v.  State, 
45  Miss.  114;  State  v.  Bunger,  14  La. 
Ann.  461;  State  v.  Lartigue,  29  La. 
Ann.  642;  State  x.  Hinkle,  6  lov^a, 
380;  State  v.  Sater,  8  Iowa,  420;  State 
V.  Lawrence,  38  Iowa,  51;  McGregg  v. 
State,  4  Blackf .  (Ind.)  101 ;  Plummer  v. 
People,  74  111.  361 ;  Thompson  v.  State, 
24  Ga.  297;  People  v.  McCauley,  1  Cal. 
379;  Skinner  v.  State,  53  Miss.  399; 
State  V.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518.  Within 
this  category  are  impressions  formed 
from  vague  and  floatiug  rumors,  of 
whose    authenticity  the    venire-man 


has  no  just  grounds  of  'belief.  Payne 
V.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  375; 
People  V.  O'Loughlin,  3  Utah,  133. 
It  is  obvious  that  this  rule  must  be 
guardedly  applied.  Eason  v.  State,  6 
Baxt.  (Tenn.)  466,  477. 

1  Trimble  v.  State,  2  G.  Greene 
(la.),  404;  Armistead  v.  Com.,  11 
Leigh  (Va.),  657;  People  v.  Johnston, 
46  Cal.  78 ;  Gardner  v.  People,  4  111. 
83;  Rothschild  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 
519;  Moses  v.  State,  10  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  456;  Neely  «.  People,  13  111. 
685;  Brown  v.  State,  70  Ind.  577; 
State  V.  Ricks,  32  La.  Ann.  1098. 
But  see  Epes'  Case,  5  Gratt.  (Va.) 
676;  Smith  v.  Com.,  6  Gratt.  (Va.) 
696;  Smith  v.  Com.,  7  Gratt.  (Va.) 
593;  Dejarnette  v.  Com.,  75  Va.  867. 

2  Durell  V.  Mosher,  8  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  445.  See  also  Com.  v.  Hughes,  5 
Rand.  (Va.)  655;  State  v.  Farrow,  74 
Mo.  531 ;  People  v.  Johnson,  2  Wheeler 
Cr.  Cas.  361,  369;  People  v.  Fuller,  2 
Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  16;  Mann  v.  Glover, 
14  N.  J.  L.  195;  State  v.  Spencer,  21  N. 
J.  L.  197;  Burk  v.  State,  27  Ind.  430; 
State  V.  Williams,  3  Stew.  (Ala.)  454; 
Osianderv.  Com.,  3  Leigh  (Va.),  780; 
State  V.  Flower,  Walker  (Miss.),  318; 
People  V.  Murphy,  45  Cal.  137;  Jack- 
sou  V.  Com.,  23  Gratt.  (Va.)  919; 
Moran  v.  Com.,  9  Leigh  (Va.),651; 
Loeffener  v.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  598; 
State  V.  Ostrander,  18  Iowa,  435 ;  State 
V.    Hoyt,   47   Conn.   518;     Jackson  v. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.  III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE. 


75 


§  80.     Opinions    which  will  require    Evidence    to  Remove 

them.  —  Opinions  -wliich  will  require  evidence  to  remove  them  dis- 
qualify the  juror  in  the  oi)ini()n  of  many  courts.^  Other  courts, 
following  the  lead  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall  in  Burr's  case,  lay 
this  test  aside,  reasoning  that  "  the  fact  that  it  would  take  evi- 
dence to  remove  an  opinion  would  appear  to  be  only  the  natural 
adjunct  of  every  opinion  formed  upon  rumor."  ^  But  not  only 
the  opinion  of  Chief  tJustice  Marshall,-^  })ut  all  other  judicial 
opinion,  so  far  as  known,  is  to  the  effect  that,  if  the  venire-num 
has  acquired  that  fixed  and  jmsitive  opinion  which  disqualifies 
him  —  if,  in  other  words,  he  has  made  up  his  judgment  in  the 
case — the  law  will  not  trust  him  to  change  that  opinion  or  that 
judgment  after  hearing  the  evidence.*     A  venire-man  entertain- 


Com.,  23  Gratt.  (Va.)  iati,  tiL'S; 
"Wright  r.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  (Va.)  !i41, 
943;  Balding  v.  State  (Tex.),  9  S.  W. 
Eep.  579. 

1  Uuited  States  v.  Wilson,  Baldwin 
(U.  S.),  85;  People  r.  Mather,  4 
Wend.  (X.  Y.)  229;  Easou  v.  The 
State,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  4CG,  47G;  Com. 
V.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  49(i;  Cotton 
V.  State,  31  Miss.  504;  White  i-.  Moses, 
11  Cal.  G8;  Fahnestock  v.  State,  23 
Ind.  231;  Armistead  v.  Com.,  11  Leigh 
(Va.),  657;  People  v.  Mallou,  3  Lans. 
(N.  Y.),  224;  Stephens  «.  People,  38 
Mich.  739;  People  v.  Cottle,  6  Cal. 
227;  Peoples.  Gehr,  8  Cal.  359;  Con- 
way I'.  Clinton,  1  Utah,  215;  Roth- 
schild V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  519; 
Uuited  States  v.  Hanwav,  2  AVall.  Jr. 
(U.  S.)  139;  Rufe  v.  Rader,  2  Mont. 
211;  Moses  v.  State,  10  Hnmph. 
(Tenn.)  45G;  Sam  v.  State,  13  Smed.  & 
M.  (Miss.)  189 ;  Alfred  v.  State,  37  Miss. 
296;  State  r.  Buuger,  11  La.  Ann.  607; 
Collins  V.  People,  48  111.  145;  Gray  v. 
People,  26  111.  344;  Caucemi  v.  Peo- 
ple, 16  K.  Y.  501;  Olive  v.  State,  11 
Neb.  1;  Polk  r.  State,  45  Ark.  1G5 
(overruling  Casey  v.  State,  37  Ark. 
G7). 


2  Per  Lewis,  P.  J.,  in  State  v.  Bar- 
ton, 8  Mo.  App.  15,  17;  s.  c.  71  Mo. 
288.  See  also  State  v.  Core,  70  Mo. 
491;  State  v.  Greeuwade,  72  Mo.  298; 
State  V.  Davis,  29  Mo.  397;  State  ?j. 
Carson,  50  Ala.  134;  Bales  t.  State,  63 
Ala.  30;  Reynolds  v.  L'nited  States,  98 
U.  S.  145;  Curley  v.  Com.,  84  Pa.  St. 
151  (the  juror  Lorah) ;  Ortweiu  v. 
Com.,  76  Pa.  St.  414;  Estes  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 6  Nev.  128;  People  v.  King,  27 
Cal.  507;  Wilson  v.  State,  94  111.  299; 
Ogle  r.  State,  33  Miss.  383;  Thomas  v. 
State,  36  Tex.  310;  Post  v.  State,  10 
Tex.  App.  579;  O'Mara  v.  Com.  75  Pa. 
St.  424;  Myers  v.  Com.,  79  Pa.  St.  308; 
State  V.  Lawrence,  38  Iowa,  51;  State 
V.  Medlicott,  9  Kan.  257;  Guetig  v. 
State,  66  Ind.  94;  People  r.  Brown,  48 
Cal.  253;  People  v.  Welch,  49  Cal.  174; 
Stout  V.  State,  90  Ind.  1. 

^  1  Burr  Tr.  41G. 

4  Com.  V.  Lesher,  17  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  ],-;5,  156;  United  States  v.  Wil- 
son, Bald.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  84;  Rothschild 
■c.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  619;  People  v. 
Johnson,  46  Cal.  78;  State  v.  Ricks, 
32  La.  Ann.  109^;  Burr's  Trial,  vol.  I, 
p.  416.  See  also  Fonts  r.  State,  7  Ohio 
St.  471 ;  Trimble  v.  State,  2  G.  Greene 


76 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


ing  such  an  opinion  is  not  to  be  put  upon  the  jury  in  the  confi- 
dence that  he  can  render  an  impartial  verdict;  since,  under 
such  circumstances,  his  effort  to  justify  such  a  confidence  might 
incline  him  too  far  in  the  opposite  direction.^  Therefore,  if  he 
has  an  opinion  whicli  it  would  require  strong  evidence  to  change, 
it  is  an  abuse  of  discretion  to  admit  him,  although  he  may  testify 
that  he  believes  he  can  render  an  impartial  verdict.^  If  his 
opinion  of  guilt  is  so  strong  that  he  can  only  admit  the  j^ossibilily 
of  innocence,  he  must  be  rejected.^  An  iritimate  friend  of  the 
deceased,  who  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  defendant  is 
guilty  of  his  murder,  is  incompetent,  although  he  states  on  his 
voir  dire  that  he  can  give  the  accused  a  fair  trial.* 

§   81.   Newspaper  Reports  of    Former   Trial. — Again,    one 
court  has  taken  the  view  that  opinion  derived  from  reading  news- 


(la.),  40-t;  Staixp  v.  Com.,  74  Pa.  St. 
458;  People  v.  Gehr,  8  Cal.  359;  Baker 
V.  Harris,  1  Wiust.  (N.  C.)  277;  Cou- 
way  V.  Cliutou,  1  Utah,  215;  Cottou  v. 
State,  32  Tex.  614;  Black  v.  State,  42 
Tex.  377;  GoocIt^'Iu  v.  Blachley,  4  lud. 
438;  Irvine  v.  Keau,  14  Serg.  &  E. 
(Pa.)  292;  Sam  v.  State,  13  Smed.  & 
M.  (Miss.)  189,  194;  Alfred  v.  State, 
37  Miss.  296 ;  Logan  v.  State,  50  Miss. 
275;  State  v.  Bunger,  11  La.  Ann.  607; 
Eason  v.  State,  6  Baxter  (Teun.),  466, 
476;  Peoples.  Weil,  40  Cal.  268;  Ste- 
phens V.  People,  38  Mich.  739;  State  v. 
Miller,  29  Kan.  43;  State  v.  Carrick,  6 
Nev.  120.  The  mind  of  the  court  must 
be  satisfied  that  the  challenged  juror 
is  free  from  bias  and  prejudice  and  not 
merely  that  of  the  juror  himself. 
Morton  v.  State,  1  Kan.  468 ;  Cooper  v. 
State,  16  Ohio  St.  328,  332;  Peoples. 
Woods,  29  Cal.  135.  But  see  Thomas 
V.  State,  36  Tex.  315.  It  seems  that 
the  fact  that  the  venire-man  has 
formed  an  unqualified  opinion  does  not 
noAV  disqualify  in  California.  People 
V.  Cochran,  61  Cal.  548. 

1  Rice  V.  State,  1  Yerg.  (Teun.)  432, 


434;  State  v.  Allen,  46  Conn.  531,  549. 
The  penetrating  mind  of  Aaron  Burr, 
■ftheu  oif  trial  for  treason  against  the 
United  States,  appreciated  the  force  of 
this  last  proposition,  as  Avill  be  seen 
from  the  following  extract  from  the 
report  of  his  trial:  "Mr.  Bott  (a 
juror)  :  '  I  have  gone  as  far  as  to  de- 
clare that  Col.  Burr  ought  to  be 
hanged.'  Mr.  Burr:  <Do  you  think 
that  such  declarations  would  now  in- 
fluence your  judgment?  Would  not 
the  evidence  alter  your  opinion? ' 
Mr.  Bott:  'Human  nature  is  very 
frail.  I  know  that  the  evidence 
ought,  but  it  might  or  might  not  influ- 
ence me.  I  have  expressed  myself  in 
this  manner,  perhaps,  within  a  fort- 
night ;  and  I  do  not  consider  myself  a 
proper  juryman.'  Mr.  Burr:'*  *  * 
I  will  take  Mr.  Bott  under  the  belief 
that  he  will  do  me  justice.'  "  1  Burr's 
Trial,  426. 

2  Palmer  v.  State,  42  Ohio  St.  596 
(Johnson,  J.,  dissenting). 

3  Olive  u.  State,  11  Neb.  1. 

*  State  V.  Jackson,  37  La.  Ann.  768, 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   III.]  CHALLENGES    FOR    CAUSE.  77 

paper  reports  of  a  former  trial  may  or  may  not  disqualify,  ac- 
cording to  the  fullness  of  the  re})orts,  the  attention  with  which 
they  have  been  read,  and  other  circumstances.  Accordingly,  we 
find  that  such  opinions  have  operated  to  disqualify^  or  not,"  ac- 
cording to  the  circumstances,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  par- 
ticular courts  were  disposed  to  relax  the  strict  rule.  FolloAving 
back  and  forth  the  oscillations  of  the  pendulum,  we  find  that  one 
court  has  hit  upon  the  conce})tion  that  the  inquiry  is  to  be  ad- 
dressed to  the  present  condition  of  the  mind  of  the  venire-man, 
and  that  a  disqualifying  opinion,  formerly  entertained,  which  has 
changed  and  passed  away,  furnishes  no  ground  of  exclusion.-^ 
Another  court  has  taken  the  view  that,  after  a  venire-man  has 
expressed  a  positive  opinion,  he  ought  not  to  be  heard  on  his 
voir  dire  to  say  that  he  t/ie)i  had  no  opinion.* 

§82.    Statutes   removinj?    Common-law  Disqualification. — 

The  advance  in  the  popular  intelligence  and  the  wide  dissemina- 
tion of  a  knowledge  of  current  events  through  the  medium  of 
the  press,  have  rendered  it  impracticable  to  secure  a  jury  of  in- 
telligent men  for  the  trial  of  causes  which  have  excited  much 
public  attention,  and  have  resulted  in  the  necessity  of  trying  such 
causes  before  juries  composed  of  the  more  ignorant  portion  of 
the  community.  To  remedy  this  evil,  statutes  have  recently  been 
passed  in  several  States,  removing  the  common-law  ground  of 

1  Staupv.  Com.,  74  Pa.  St.  458.  Com-  2  Grissom  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  374. 

pare  with  this  case  Myers  v.  Com.,  79  See    also    Smith  v.   Com.,    6     Gratt. 

Pa.  St.  308.      See   al^o  State  u.  Clark,  (Va.)    G!;i7;    Smith  v.   Cora.,  7  Gratt. 

42Vt.  029;  GreentieUlr.  People,  74  N.  (Va.)    593;   State    v.    Brown,    71   Mo. 

Y.  277   (compare  Balbo  v.  People,   19  454;   Reynolds  r.  United  States,  98  U. 

Hun  (X.  Y.),  424;  s.  c.  80  N.  Y.  484);  S.   145:  Ortweiu  r.  Com.,  76   Pa.    St. 

Carroll  v.  State,  5  Neb.  31;  Smith  v.  414;  Weston  v.  Com.,  Ill  Pa.  St.  251 

State,  5  Neb.  181;  Guetig  v.  State,  06  (newspaper  account    of   trial   of   one 

Ind.    94;     State     v.    Culler,    82    Mo.  jointly  indicted  with  defendaut) . 
623.     In  Ohio  a  juror  is  rendered  in-  ■''  Rothschild  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 

competent  by  statute  who  forms  an  544;  Grissom  i\  State,  8  Tex.  App.  386, 

opinion  from  reading  reports  of  the  3!»(;. 

testimony  of  witnesses  as  to  the  facts  *  Norfleet  v.  State,  4  Sueed  (Tenu.), 

of  the  case.     Laws  1872,  p.  11.     This  340,  345. 
includes  newspaper  reports.     Fraziei"  v. 
State,  23  Ohio  St.  551. 


78 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


challenge  explained  in  the  preceding  sections,  provided  the  venire- 
man shall  declare  on  oath  that  he  verily  believes  that  he  can 
render  an  impartial  verdict  according  to  the  evidence,  and  that 
his  previously  formed  opinion  or  impression  will  not  bias  or  in- 
fluence his  verdict.^  Such  statutes  have  been  held  not  unconsti- 
tutional as  invading  the  right  of  trial  by  jury.^ 

§  83.  Declaration  of  Venire-man  that  he  can  render  an 
Impartial  Verdict. —  It  has  come  to  this,  under  many  recent 
statutes  and  holdings,  especially  in  cases  where  the  opinion  was 
formed  from  newspaper  reports,  that  it  is  not  error  to  seat  the  ve- 
nire-man, where  he  declares  on  oath  that,  notwithstanding  his  pre- 
vious opinion,  he  believes  that  he  can  render  an  impartial  verdict 
on  the  evidence,  —  a  statement  w^hich  the  natural  pride  of  many 
men  would  lead  them  to    make.^     But  if  he  hesitates  in  saying 


1  Laws  of  New  York  1872,  chap. 
475,  p.  1133;  Laws  of  Michigan  1873, 
act  117,  p.  1G2;  Laws  Colo.  1877,  §  872; 
111.  Stat.  1885,  p.  1422.  The  Michigan 
statute  has  been  interpreted  as  declara- 
tory of  tlie  previously  existing  law  in 
that  State.  Stevens  v.  People,  38  Mich. 
739;  Ulrich  v.  People,  39  Mich.  245. 
See  also  Palmer  v.  People,  4  Neb.  (J8, 
75,  construing  a  similar  statute  in  that 
State.  For  the  construction  of  the 
New  Yorii  statute  see  Thomas  v.  Peo- 
ple, 67  N.  Y.  218;  Abbott  v.  People,  86 
N.  Y.  4(;0;  People  v.  Otto,  101  N.  Y. 
690;  8.  c.  5  North  East.  Rep.  788;  Peo- 
ple V.  Crowley,  102  N.  Y''.  234;  s.  c.  6 
North  East.  Eep.  384;  People  v.  Car- 
penter, 102  N.  Y.  238;  s.  c.  6  North 
East.  Rep.  584;  People  v.  Biiddenseick 
(N.  Y.),  9  North  East.  Rep.  44;  Balbo 
V.  People,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  421;  s.  c.  80 
N.  Y.  484;  Phelps  v.  People,  6  Hiin  (N. 
Y.),  401;  s.  c.  72  N.  Y.  334;  Cox  v. 
People,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  430;  s.  c.  af- 
firmed, 80  N.  Y.  500;  Manke  v.  People, 

17  Hun  (N.  Y.),  410;  Pender  v.  People, 

18  Hun  (N.  Y.),  560;  Greenfield  v.  Peo- 


I^le,  13  Hun  (N.  Y.),  242;  s.  c.  reversed, 
74  N.  Y.  227.  Cases  construing  the 
Nebraska  statute :  Carroll  v.  State,  5 
Neb.  32;  Smith  v.  State,  5  Neb.  181. 

-  Stokes  V.  People,  53  N.  Y.  164, 
173;  Jones  v.  People,  2  Colo.  351; 
Cooper  V.  State,  16  Oh.  St.  328. 

3  People  V.  Willett,  36  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
500;  People  v.  Casey,  96  N.  Y.  115 
(under  N.  Y.  Cod(!,  §  376)  ;  Jones  v. 
People,  6  Colo.  452  (under  a  statute)  ; 
State  V.  Kilgore,  93  N.  C.  533;  State  v. 
George,  37  La.  Ann.  786 ;  Allison  v. 
Com.,  99  Pa.  St.  17  (Mercur,  J.,  dis- 
senting) ;  State  v.  Spaulding,  24  Kan. 
1;  State  v.  Core,  70  Mo.  491;  Zimmer- 
man V.  State,  56  Md.  536;  Stout  v. 
State,90Iud.  1;  People  v.  Cornetti,  92 
N.  Y.  85;  Murphy  v.  State,  15  Neb. 
383;  Doll  v.  State  (Ohio),  15  North 
East.  Rep.  293;  State  v.  Sopher 
(Iowa),  30  N.  W.  Rep.  917;  State  v. 
Bryant  (Mo.),  6  S.  W.  Rep.  102;  State 
V.  Walton,  74  Mo.  270;  State  v.  Bar- 
ton, 71  Mo.  288;  State  v.  Brow]K  71 
Mo.  .454;  Hall  v.  Com.  (Pa.),  12  Atl. 
Rep.   163;    s.   c.    11   Centr.    Rep.    183. 


Tit.   1,  Ch.   111.]  CHALLENGES    FOK    CAUSE. 


79 


whether  his  previously  formed  opinion  would  influence  his  ver- 
dict, he  should  be  rejected. 


Aud  the  judge  may  still,  iu  his  dis- 
cretion, reject  him.  State  v.  Barues, 
34:  La.  Auu.  395  (Bermudez,  C.  J., 
and  Levy,  J.,  disseutiug).  The  fact 
that  a  large  number  of  venire  men 
were  called  before  the  juiy  was  finally 


obtained,  does  not  show  that  the  jury 
was  prejudiced  against  the  accused, 
or  unfavorable  to  him,  or  moved  by 
improper  motives.  People  v.  Beck- 
with  (N.  Y.),  15  North  East.  Rep.  53. 


80  IMPANELING    THE   JURY.  [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 


CHAPTER     IV. 

OF  THE  DETAILS  OF  PRACTICE  IX  CHALLEXGING  AXD  IMPAXELING. 

Article     I.  —  Challenging,  Impaneling,  Swearing. 
Article  II.  —  Objections    and   the    Waiver    and    Review    of    the 
Same. 


Article     I.  —  Challenging,  Impaneling,  Swearing. 

Section 

88.  Discretion  of  tlie  Court  in  Respect  of  Iinpaueling  tlie  Jury. 

81).  [Coutiuued.]     Illustratious. 

90.  Power  of  Court  to  Discharge  Jurors  after  they  have  been  Sworn. 

91.  Time  and  Order  of  Challenging. 

92.  [Continued.]     Right  to  hold  Peremptory  Challenges  in  Reserve. 

93.  Retraction  of  Challenge  or  of  Acceptance. 

94.  Order  of  Cliallenging  as  between  the  Parties. 

95.  Mode  of  Imjianeling 

96.  Impaneling  by  Lot. 

97.  Challenging  the  Polls  of  a  Special  Jury. 

98.  Ground  of  Challenge  must  be  Specifically  Stated. 

99.  Triors  of  Challenges. 

100.  The  Court  as  a  Substitute  for  Triors. 

101.  Examination  of  tlie  Venire -man  on  the  Voir  Dire. 

102.  What  Questions  may  be  put  to  the  Venire-man. 

103.  [Continued.]     Questions  Touching    Religious    or    Political    OpinionSj 

Affiliations,  etc. 

104.  Swearing  Singly  or  in  a  Body. 

105.  Time  of  Swearing. 

106.  Reswearing  the  Jury. 

107.  Swearing  for  the  Term. 

108.  Form  of  the  Oath.  ' 

109.  [Continued.]     In  Particular  Cases. 

§  88.  Discretion  of  the  Court  in  respect  of  Impaneling  the 
Jury. —  In  the  superintendence  of  the  process  of  impaneling  the 
jury,  a  large  discretion  is  necessarily  contided  to  the  judge,  which 
discretion  will  not  be  revised  on  error  or  appeal,  unless  it  appears 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  IV.]   CHALLENGING  AND  IMFANELING. 


81 


to  have  beon  grossly  abused  or  exercised  contrary  to  law.^  The 
exercise  of  this  discretion  is  generally  uphold,  in  excusina  juror, 
on  grounds   personal  to  him,-'  or  because  he  is  manifestly    dis- 


1  Head  v.  State,  4+  Miss.  731,  750. 
See  also  Gilliam  v.  Brown,  43  Miss. 
(i41;  McCarty  i\  State,  2()  Miss.  30-2; 
Marsh  r.  State,  30  Miss.  n27;  State 
i\  Marshall,  s  Ala.  302;  Smith  v.  State, 
55  Ala.  1,  10;  McAllister  r.  State,  17 
Ala.  434;  Johusou  v.  State,  58  Ga.  491 ; 
Thomas  v.  State,  27  Ga.  287 ;  Powers 
r.  Presgroves,  38  Miss.  227;  Grady  v. 
Early,  18  Cal.  108;  Garrisou  v.  Port- 
laud,  2  Ore.  123;  State  r.  Shelledy, 
8  Iowa,  477;  Chase  r.  State,  4G  Miss. 
(183;  State  v.  Ostrauder,  18  Iowa,  435; 
Pierce  v.  State,  13  N.  H.  53ij;  Ilubotter 
V.  State,  32  Tex.  479 ;  Kay  v.  State,  4 
Tex.  App.  450;  Gardeuhire  v.  State,  0 
Tex.  App.  147;  Dixou  v.  State,  2  Tex. 
App.  530;  Harkius  r.  State,  0  Tex. 
App.  452;  Walker  r.  Keiinisou,  34  N. 
H.  257;  Wilsou  r.  State,  31  Ala.  371; 
Funkhouser  v.  Pogue,  13  Ark.  2'.t5; 
Heyl  V.  State  (lud.),  10  North  East. 
Hep.  91fi;  s.  c.  109  lud.  58'J;  Deig  v. 
Morehead  (lud.),  11  Id.  458;  s.  c.  110 
lud.  451.  Eveu  where  a  statute  makes 
it  "the  imperative  duty  of  the  court, 
before  admiuisteriug  to  the  juror  the 
oath,  to  ascertain  tliatlie  is  possessed 
of  the  qualiticatious  required  by  law," 
it  is  uot  necessary  that  it  should  ap- 
pear, on  appeal  or  error,  that  the 
judge  plied  him  with  questions;  but 
if  he  was  satisfied  from  his  personal 
knowledge  of  the  man,  his  answers  to 
otlier  questions,  or  his  reputation  for 
integrity  and  intelligence,  or  other- 
wise, that  he  was  qualitied,  it  will  be 
sutticient,  and  his  judgment  will  uot 
l)e  reviewed.  .Tames  v.  State,"  53  Ala. 
380. 

2  Ante,  §  11;  State  v.  Moncla  (La.), 
2  South.  Rep.  814;  Ray  v.  The  State,  4 
Tex.   Ai^p.   450;  Com.  v.    Livermore, 


4  Gray  (Mass.),  18;  Atlas  Mining  Co. 
V.  .Johnston,  23  Mich.  37;  Ware  v. 
Ware,  8  Me.  42;  Hurley  r.  State,  2!) 
Ark.  17,  22;  State  v.  Ward,  3'J  Vt. 
225;  Maner  w.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  Stil; 
O'Brien  v.  Vulcau  Iron  Works,  7  Mo. 
App.  257;  Watson  v.  State,  fiS  Ind. 
548;  State  v.  Dickson,  (i  Kan.  20!); 
Dodge  V.  People,  4  Neb.  220;  Ander- 
son V.  Wasatch  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Utah, 
518.  But  contra^  see  Montague  v. 
Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  7(:7;  Boles  v. 
State,  13  Sraed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  398; 
Parsous  v.  State,  22  Ala.  50.  The  ac- 
tion of  the  court  iu  excusiug  jurors 
will  be  regarded  as  proper,  although 
uo  cause  appears  of  record.  State  v. 
Whitniau,  14  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  113; 
State  r.  Breaux,  32  La.  Ann.  222.  It 
was  so  held  where  it  appeared  from 
the  record  tiiat  the  juror  was  excused 
''  to  relieve  him  from  embarrassment." 
Johu  V.  State,  Ifi  Fla.  554.  But  see 
Montague  v.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.) 
7(17.  A  sheriff  has  no  power  to  excuse 
jurors.  But  an  appellate  court  will 
not  infer  that  a  sheriff  who  has  ex- 
cused a  portion  of  the  panel  did  so 
from  improper  motives,  nor  that  such 
action  prejudiced  any  party.  Ayers  v. 
Metcalf,  30  111.  307.  The  power  of  the 
court  to  excuse  a  juror  for  satisfac- 
tory reasons,  is  not  impaired  by  a 
statutory  provision  to  tlie  efifect  that 
"  the  tirst  twelve  persons  who  shall 
appear,  as  their  names  are  draAvn  and 
called,  and  sliall  be  approved  as  in- 
different between  parties,  shall  be 
sworn,  and  shall  be  the  jury  to  try 
the  cause."  Atlas  &c.  Co.  v.  John- 
ston, 23  Mich.  37.  A  struck  juror  may 
be  excused  for  a  sufficient  reason. 
Stewart  v.  S'         1  Ob.    St.   CO.     But 


82 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


qualified  by  reason  of  physical  or  mental  infirmities,^ — as  where 
he  is  deaf^  intoxicated  '^  or  ill^^  or  because  of  serious  illness  in  his 
family.^  So,  the  court  may,  ex  mero  motu^  examine  venire-men 
for  grounds  of  partiality  and  direct  them  to  stand  aside ^  although 
not  challenged  by  either  party ,^  and  although  not  subject  to  chal- 
lenge ; '  though  in  some  jurisdictions  venire-men  thus  stood  aside 
are  not  excused,  but  may  be  called  and  tried  upon  challenges,  if 
the  regular  panel  is  exhausted  without  securing  a  jury ;  ^  and  the 
court  has  authority,  either  to  examine  the  venire-man  or  any 
other  witnesses,  to  ascertain  such  matters  of  fact  as  will  enable 
it  to  exercise  this  power  discreetly.^  It  may  exercise  this  power 
where  the  venire-man  is  ignorant  of  the  Enijlish  lansuage,^"  unless 


where  jurors  are  suramoued  upou  a 
special  venire,  it  has  beeu  held  that  uo 
veuire-man  can  be  excused  until  his 
name  is  regularly  called  in  court. 
Foster  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  248; 
Robles  V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  346.  Ex- 
cusing talesmen  who  reside  moi-e  than 
two  miles  from  the  court-house  under 
a  recent  Ala.  statute.  Steel  v.  State 
(Ala.),  3  South.  Rep.  547. 

1  Mansellw.  Reg.,  8  El.  &  Bl.  54,  80. 

2  Atlas  Mining  Co.  v.  Johnston,  23 
Mich.  36;  Jesse  v.  State,  20  Ga.  156. 

3  Bullard  v.  Spoor,  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
430;  Pierce  v.  State,  13  N.  H.  536,  555; 
Noleu  17.  State,  2   Head   (Tenn.),   520. 

*  Jewell  V.  Com.,  22  Pa.  St.  94; 
Ray  ^.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  450;  Hub- 
bard V.  Gale,  105  Mass.  511. 

5  Parsons  v.  State,  22  Ala.  50,  53. 
It  has,  however,  been  held  that  the 
juror  should  be  excused  only  in  those 
cases  of  such  a  serious  character  as 
to  demand  his  personal  attention,  and 
that  the  decision  of  the  court  upon 
this  point  may  be  reviewed.  Boles  v. 
State,  13  Smed.  &  M.  398;  Parsons  v. 
State,  supra. 

<■'  Atlas  Mining  Co.  v.  Johnston,  23 
Mich.  36;  Lore  v.  State,  4  Ala.  173; 
Pierce  o.  State,  13  N.  H.  536;  State  v. 


Jones,  80  N.  C.  415;  State  v.  Prater 
(S.  C),  2  S.  E.  Rep.  108;  State  v. 
Dodsou,  16  S.  C.  459;  State  ».  Cole- 
man, 20  S.  C.  448 ;  White  v.  State,  52 
Miss.  216;  Stagner  v.  State,  9  Tex. 
App.  440,  455;  Lewis  v.  State,  9  Smed. 
&  M.  (Miss.)  115;  Marsh  v.  State,  30 
Miss.  627 ;  State  v.  Van  Waggoner 
(La.),  3  South.  Rep.  119.  Contra,  Van 
Blaricum  v.  State,  16  111.  364;  Deun 
V.  Pissant,  1  N.  J.  L.  220. 

'  Hartford  Bank  v.  Hart,  3  Day,  491 ; 
Goodrich  v.  Burdick,  26  Mich.  39; 
State  V.  Lewis,  28  La.  Ann.  84;  State 
V.  Williams,  30  Me.  484;  Watson  v. 
State,  63  Ind.  548 ;  Stout  !0.  Hyatt,  13 
Kan.  232;  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Franklin,  23  Kan.  75. 

*  Boardman  v.  Wood,  3  Vt.  570, 
577;  United  States  v.  Watkins,  3 
Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  578;  State  t).  How- 
ard, 17  N.  H.  171, 180.  See  in  this  con- 
nection ante,  §  49. 

9  State  V.  Benton,  2  Dev.  &  B.  (N. 
C.)  196,  221 ;  White  v.  State,  52  Miss. 
217;  Pierce  v.  State,  13  N.  H.  536. 

'0  Atlas  Mining  Co.  v.  Johnston,  23 
Mich.  36;  O'Neil  y.  Lake  Superior  Iron 
Co.  (Mich.),  35  N.  W.  Rep.  162;  State 
V.  Rosseau,  28  La.  Ann.  579 ;  People  v. 
Arceo,  32  Cal.  40;  State  v.  Marshall,  8 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


83 


in  the  particular  jurisdiction  this  constitutes  no  disqualification :  ^ 
and,  in  capital  cases,  -where  the  venire-man  discloses  a  tixetl 
opinion  against  capital  })unishnient ;  -  and,  according  to  a  case 
applicable  to  a  period  in  our  political  history  through  which  we 
have  hai)pily  passed,  where  the  venire-man  entertains  a  present 
and  unrelenting  hostility  against  the  government  of  the  United 
States.^  Caution  should  obviously  be  observed  in  the  exercise 
of  this  discretion;  since,  at  least  under  some  systems,  by  excus- 
ing or  discharging  a  great  number  of  the  regular  panel,  the  court 
and  the  parties  may  be  driven  to  tilling  it  up  by  sunnnoning 
talesmen  from  that  well-known  disreputable  class  of  court  idlers 
called  "  professional  jurors."'^  A  remedy  for  excusing  an  un- 
reasonable number  of  venire-men,  thereby  reducing  the  panel 
below  the  number  recpiin-d  to  make  a  jur\-,has  been  conceded  in 
one  jurisdiction  to  exist  in  the  form  of  a  challenge  to  the  array 
of  those  remaining;  ^  though  the  right  to  make  this  challenge  is 
waived  by  objecting  in  another  form,  and  if  the  jury  are  sworn 
without  a  challenge  to  the  array,  it  seems  that  it  becomes  a  legal 
jury,  although  the  objection,  taken  in  another  form,  was  erro- 
neously overruled.^     The  failure  of  the  court  to  exercise  this  dis- 


Ala.  301.';  State  v.  Guidry,  28  La.  Auu. 
630.  lu  Ciinipbell  v.  State,  48  Ga.  353, 
it  was  held  that  the  court  had  no  riiiht 
to  purtie  the  panel  of  jurors,  returned 
for  service  durin<j;  tiie  term,  of  .such 
jurors  as  could  neither  write  the  Eng- 
lish language  nor  read  the  Constitution 
ofHhe  United  States,  and  of  the  State 
of  Georgia.  It  was  held  that  a  chal- 
lenge to  the  array  after  .such  purging 
ought  to  have  been  sustained.  Wheth- 
er this  decision  can  be  supported  is 
doubtful.  It  is  certainly  true  that  the 
grounds  upon  which  these  jurors  were 
excused  do  not  constitute  a  cause  of 
challenge.  White  v.  State,  52  Miss. 
216,  224;  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mahoue, 
56  Miss.  180;  Citizens'  Bank  v.  Strauss, 
26  La.  Ann.  736 ;  State  v.  Lewis,  28  La. 
Ann.  84;  Cora.  v.  Winneraore,  1  Brewst. 
(Pa.)  35G;   s.  c.   2  Brewst.   (Pa.)   378. 


But  it  has  been  held  that  althougii  a 
challenge  is  allowed  upon  this  ground, 
a  new  trial  will  not  be  granted,  unless 
it  appears  that  the  defendant  has  suf- 
fered in  consequence  of  such  ruling. 
Citizens'  Bank  v.  Strauss,  supra. 

1  Ante,  §§  10,  55. 

2  United  States  v.  Cornell,  2  Mason 
(U.  S.),  91;  Waller  v.  State,  40  Ala. 
325;  Russell  v.  State,  53  Miss.  367; 
White  V.  State,  52  Miss.  216;  Forten- 
berry  v.  State,  55  Miss.  403. 

^  Klinger  v.  State,  13  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
257. 

*  State  V.  Ostrauder,  18  Iowa,  485, 
44<J ;  Bissell  v.  Ryan,  23  111.  566 ;  People 
V.  Honeyman,  3  Denio  (N.  Y.),  121. 

5  Smith  V.  Clayton,  29  N.-J.  L.  358. 

6  Smith  V.  Clayton,  29  N.  J.  L.  358; 
Gropp  V.  People,  67  111.  154;  Emerick 
V.  Sloan,  18  Iowa,  140;  Suttle  v.  Batie. 


84  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tl"., 

cretion  of  standing  jurors  aside  of  its  own  motion,  for  a  cause  of 
challenge  known  to  the  court  and  to  the  parties,  cannot,  of 
course,  be  assigned  for  error;  since  the  objection  is  waived  by 
failino;  to  challeng-e.^  Moreover,  statutes  prescribinsi:  the  formal 
details  of  impaneling  are  frequently  regarded  as  directory,  and 
hence  as  yielding  to  this  judicial  discretion,  w^here  no  prejudice 
appears.'^ 

§  89.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. —  It  is  within  the  discretion 
of  the  court  to  direct  the  names  of  twelve  of  the  regular  panel  in 
attendance  to  be  omitted  in  impaneling  a  jury  for  a  given  cause,  — 
as,  for  example,  where  such  jurors  are  deliberating  in  the  jury 
room,^  or  have  recently  rendered  a  verdict  in  another  case.^  In 
the  absence  of  statutory  provisions,  according  to  one  view,  after 
the  jurors  are  returned  into  court,  all  subsequent  proceedings  in 
the  process  of  impaneling  the  jury  are  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
court.^  The  court  may,  accordingly,  in  its  discretion,  when  a 
case  comes  on  for  trial,  })reak  up  and  re-arrange  the  panels,  if 
more  than  one  is  in  attendance.^  Within  the  scope  of  this  dis- 
cretion are  such  questions  as  the  order  in  which  the  name  of 
the  jurors  shall  be  called.^  But  the  court  cannot,  of  course, 
depart  from  the  essential  requirements  of  the  law.  Thus, 
where  jurors  have  been  summoned  upon  a  special  venire  for  the 
trial  of  a  capital  case,  the  court  cannot  take  a  portion  of  them 
for  the  trial  of  another  case;^  and  a  trial  justice  has  no  right, 

1  Iowa,  Ul.    A  challenge  to  the  array  -^  State  v.  Pitts,   58  Mo.  556;  Kim- 
may  be  waived  after  it  has  been  taken,  brough  v.  State,  62  Ala.  248. 
by  the  challenging  party  consenting  to  *  Alexander   v.    Oslikosh,   33   Wis. 
the  removal  of  the  objectionable  per-  277. 

sons  from  the  panel.     "Whitley  v.  State,  ^  Walker  v.  Kenuison,  34  N.  H.  257. 

38  Ga.  50.  6  Watson  v.  Walker,  33  N.  H.  131, 

1  State  V.  Benton,  2  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  144;  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  42;  Duraut 
C.)  VM;  Murphy  v.  State,  37  Ala.  142;  v.  Ashmore,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  184. 
Bellows  V.  Weeks,  41  Vt.  590;  Young  "^  State  v.  Sims,  2  Bailey  (S.  C), 
V.  State,  23  Ohio  St.  577;  Skinner  r.  20;  State  v.  Crank,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  66; 
State,  53  Miss.  399 ;  State  v.  Christian,  Kleiuback  v.  State,  2  Speers  L.  (S 
30  La.  Ann.  367.  C.)  418;    State  ?;.  Brown,  3   Strob.  L. 

2  Murray  V.  State   (Tex.),  3  S.  W.  (S.  C.)  508. 

Kep=  104.  ^  Bates  v.  Bates,  19  Tex.  124. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.  IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


85 


of  his  own  motion,  without  ;iny  exception  being  taken  by  eithe 
party,  to  quash  a  panel  and  issue  a  new  venire.^ 


§  90.  Power  of  Court  to  Discharge  Jurors  after  they  have 
been  Sworn.  —  Ahhouixh  there  are  some  lioKlinirs  to  the  con- 
trary,-  the  sound  and  prevailing  opinion  is  that  the  court  is  not 
bound  to  suffer  the  cause  to  proceed  after  discovering  a  fact  go- 
ing to  the  disqualiticatiou  of  a  juror,  in  consequence  of  which  any 
verdict  which  may  be  rendered  may  be  set  aside. ^  The  obnox- 
ious juror  may  be  excluded,^  although  sworn,  at  any  time  before 
evidence  has  been  introduced.'     So,  the  court    niav  discharge  a 


1  Cross  V.  Moultou,  l.l  Johus.  (N. 
Y.)  470. 

-  See  State  v.  Williams,  3  Stew. 
(Ala.)  454;  Ward  v.  State,  1  Humph. 
(Temi.)  253;  Sm-.hr.  State,  55  Ala.  1, 
7;  State  v.  ilorea,  2  Ala.  275;  Gear- 
hart  r.  Jordan,  11  Pa.  St.  325;  State  v. 
Stepheux,  11  So.  Car.  31!);  United 
States  V.  Randall,  2  Crauch  C.  C.  (U. 
S.)  412. 

3  Mitchell  u.  State,  43  Tex.  512, 
51(5;  Wormeley's  Case,  lOGratt.  (Va.) 
t>58;  Muirhead  v.  Evans,  (5  Exch.  447. 
In  this  last  case,  it  was  discovered, 
during  the  examination  of  the  tirst 
witness,  that  thei'e  were  thirteen 
jurors  in  the  box.  It  was  impossible 
to  ascertain  which  juror  was  last 
sworn.  Twelve  of  this  jury  were  aft- 
erwards re-sworn,  and  the  trial  of  the 
case  proceeded.  This  practice  was 
held  to  be  correct.  See  upon  this 
point  Davis  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  G34 : 
Bullard  v.  State,  38  Tex.  .504. 

*  State  V.  Reeves,  U  La.  Ann. 
685;  Robinson  v.  State,  33  Ark.  180; 
State  V.  Vestal,  82  N.  C.  5(J3;  State  v. 
Vaun,  82  N.  C.  631 ;  Nolen  v.  State,  2 
Head  (Tenn.),  520:  Hines  v.  State,  8 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  597;  State  v.  C«ra- 
mings,  72  N.  C.  469;  Pannell  v.  State, 
29  Ga.  681;  Isaac  v.  State,  2  Head 
(Tenn.),  458:  Lewis  v.  State,  3  Head 


(Tenn.),  127.  The  court  may,  in  its 
discretion,  givu  the  prosecution  in  a 
criminal  case  the  privilege  to  re-ex- 
amine a  juror  after  his  acceptance  by 
the  State's  attorney,  but  before  his 
acceptance  by  the  defendant.  The 
allowance  of  a  challenge  for  cause 
shown  upon  the  re-examination  con- 
stitutes no  error.  Belt  v.  People,  97 
111.  4(;i. 

■'  Spoford's  Case,  Clayton,  78;  Peo- 
ple w.  Damon,  13  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  351; 
Lewis  V.  State,  9  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.) 
115;  McGuire  v.  State,  37  Miss.  369; 
Tooel  V.  Cora.,  11  Leigh  (Va.),  714; 
Spong  V.  Lesher,  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  326; 
Smith  V.  State,  55  Miss.  513;  State  v. 
Adair,  m  N.  C.  298;  Com.  v.  Twora- 
bly,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  480,  note;  State 
V.  Davis,  80  N.  C.  412;  Haynes  v. 
Crutchtield,  7  Ala.  189;  Edwards  v. 
Farrar,  2  La.  Ann.  307;  Tweed's  Case, 
13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (n.  s.)  371,  note; 
People  V.  Wilson,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 
199;  United  States  v.  Morris,  1  Curt. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  23;  Gilliam  v.  Brown,  43 
Miss.  641 ;  Williams  v.  State,  32  Miss. 
389;  Cornelius  v.  State,  12  Ark.  782; 
Evans  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App,  513;  Stone 
V.  People,  3  111.  326;  Jefferson  v.  State, 
52  Miss.  767;  Jackson  v.  State,  5i  Ga. 
402;  Dilworth  v.  Com.  12  Gratt.  r^a.) 
689,   705;    Watkins  v.   State,   6a  G», 


86 


IMPANELING   THE   JURY. 


[I  Thomp.  Tr., 


juror  who  has  been  sworn,  if  it  appear  that  he  will  be  physically 
unable  to  sit  throuo;h  the  trial. ^  The  discharge  or  excusino:  of  a 
juror  after  the  jury  has  been  sworn  and  charged  with  the 
prisoner,  will  not  operate  to  discharge  him,  but  will  operate  as  a 
mistrial  merely.  A  new  jury  may  be  called.  The  eleven  who 
remain  may,^  except  where  the  rule  has  been  changed  by  statute,'^ 
be  put  upon  the  prisoner  again,  and  he  may  be  allowed  to  exer- 
cise upon    them  his  right  of  challenge  anew. 

§  91.  Time  and  Order  of  Challenging. — There  can  be  no 
challenge,  either  to  the  array  or  to  the  polls,  until  a  panel  suf- 
ficiently numerous  to  compose  a  full  jury  appears.^  By  the 
common  law,  all  challenges  must  be  made  before  the  juror  is 
sworn ;  ^  but  statutes  exist  in  several  American  jurisdictions  which 


601.  It  has  been  held  by  one  coiu't 
that  the  sufflciency  of  the  reasons  for 
such  an  exclusion  will  be  examined  on 
appeal,  and  unless  they  are  found  to 
be  sound,  the  judgment  will  be  re- 
versed. Black  V.  State,  9  Tex.  App. 
328. 

1  Fletcher  v.  State,  6  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  24!» ;  Silsby  v.  Foote,  14  How. 
(N.  Y.)  218:  s.  c.  1  Blatch.  444. 

2  Rex  V.  Edwards,  Russ.  &  Ry.  223; 
s.c.  4  Taunt.  309;  3  Camp.  207;  Rex 
V.  Scalbert,  2  Leach  C.  C.  700;  Greer 
V.  Norvill,  3  Hill  (S.  C),  2(32,  263. 
Upon  the  discharge  of  a  jury  after  be- 
ing charged  with  the  prisoner,  see 
notes  to  Eex  v.  Scalbert,  supra,  and  to 
Rex  V.  Edwards,  3  Camp.  207;  Rex  v. 
Kinlock,  1  Wils.  157;  s.  c.  Fost.  Cr. 
L.  16;  Wedderburn's  Case,  Fost.  Cr. 
L.  23;  Rex  v.  Delany,  .Jebb  C.  C.  106; 
Rex  V.  Barrett,  Jebb  C.  C.  103. 

3  See  Garner  v.  State,  5  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  160;  States.  Curtis,  5  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  601;  Snowden  r.  State,  7 
Baxter  (Tenii.),  482. 

4  Clark  V.  Goode,  6  J.  J.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  637,  638. 

^  Wharton's    Case,   Yelvertou,  24; 


Vicars  v.  Langham,  Hob.  235;  Blew- 
ett  V.  Bainard,  1  Stra.  70;  Tyndal's 
Case,  Cro.  Car.  291.  However,  the 
juror  might  be  withdrawn  by  consent 
of  the  adverse  party.  Gates'  Case,  10 
How.  St.  Tr.  1082.  A  juror  may  be 
cliallenged  for  a  cause  happening  since 
he  was  sworn.  Co.  Litt.  158.  a. ;  Vi- 
cai's  V.  Langham,  Hob.  235;  United 
States  V.  Watkins,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 
S.)  441.  Not  so  the  panel;  for  as 
stated  by  Hol)art,  "  no  ill  affection  of 
the  sheriff,  arising  since  the  jury 
sworn  can  make  the  jury  suspect- 
ed, that  was  impaneled  before." 
Vicars  v.  Langham,  Hob.  235.  This 
is  the  practice  in  England  at  the  pres- 
ent time.  Reg.  v.  Sullivan,  1  Per.  & 
Dav.  96;  s.  c.  8  Ad.  &  El.  831;  Reg.  v. 
Wardle,  Car.  &  M.  647;  Rex  v.  Des- 
pard,  2  Man.  &  Ry.  406,  409;  Reg.  v. 
Key,  3  Car.  &  K.  371;  s.c.  15  Jur. 
1065.  The  same  rule  prevails  in  some 
American  jurisdictions.  United  States 
V.  Watkins,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 
443;.Epps  v.  State,  19  Ga.  102;  State 
V.  Williams,  2  Hill  (S.  C),  381;  Ward 
V.  State,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.)  254:  Mc- 
Faddeu  v.  Com.,    23  Pa.   St.    12,   17; 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]        CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


87 


authorize  the  court,  for  reasons  satisfactory  to  itself,  to  hear  any 
objection  to  a  juror,  even  after  he  is  sworn,  before  the  jury  is 
completed. 1  The  challenge  to  the  array  and  the  challenge  to 
the  polls  are  taken  separately.  The  challenge  to  the  array  al- 
ways precedes  challenges  to  the  polls.  If  challenges  to  the  polls 
are  made  without  challenging  the  array,  the  right  to  challeno'e 
the  array  is  waived. ^  So,  the  challenge  for  principal  cause  pre- 
cedes the  challenge  to  the  favor.-^ 


Queeu  r.  Hepburn,  7  Crauch  (U.  S.), 
2'JO;  State  r.  Auderson,  4  Nev.  2<55; 
Rash  V.  State,  61  Ala.  89;  State  v. 
Morea,  2  Ala.  275;  State  v.  Patrick,  3 
Joues  L.  (N.  C.)  4i3;  Nugeut  v.  Tre- 
paguier,  2  ]Martiu  (La.),  205;  Com.  v. 
Gee,  (]  Cush.  (Mass.)  174.  Under  this 
practice  the  rule  is  that  challenges 
must  be  made  as  the  jurors  come  to 
the  booli,  before  they  are  Sivoru.  The 
moment  the  oath  is  beguu  it  is  too 
late;  and  the  oath  is  begun  by  the 
juror  taking  the  book,  havinir  been  di- 
rected by  the  officer  of  the  court  to  do 
so.  Reg.  V.  Frost,  9  Car.  &  P.  129, 
137.  See  also  Braudreth's  Case,  32 
How.  St.  Tr.  755,  777:  Morris'  Case, 
4  How.  St.  Tr.  1255;  State  v.  Davis, 
80  N.  C.  412;  Com.  v.  Marrow,  3 
Brewst.  402.  This  differs  from  the 
Irish  practice.  By  that  practice  it  has 
been  generally  held  that  the  oath  is 
not  commenced  until  after  the  clerk 
of  the  Crown  has  said:  '-Juror,  look 
upon  the  prisoner :  prisoner,  look  upon 
the  juror."  Reg.  v.  Hughes,  2  Craw. 
&  Dix,  Cir.  39(J.  Likewise,  if  the 
juror  is  to  affirm,  after  he  has  been 
called  to  his  feet  to  take  the  atBrma- 
tiou,  it  is  too  late  to  challenge  him. 
Com.  r.  Marrow,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  402 : 
s.  c.  sitb  nom.  Com.  v.  Marra,  8  Phila. 
(Pa.)  440.  In  Drake  v.  Stixte,  51  Ala. 
30,  the  juror  had  been  accepted,  and, 
as  he  rose  from  his  seat  in  the  box  to 
be   sworn,  the   defendant    challenged 


him  peremptorily.  It  was  held  that 
the  challenge  was  not  taken  too  late. 
The  point,  however,  that  the  swearing 
liad  beguu  was  not  raised. 

1  Stat,  at  Large,  Minn.  LS73,  p. 
1055,  §  229;  Gen.  Laws  Ore.  1872, 
Civ.  Code,  §  188;  Comp.  L.  Nev.  1873, 
§  195S;  Ark.  Dig.  Stat.  1874,  §  1905; 
Miller's  R.  C.  la.  1880,  §  2769;  Bul- 
litt's Cr.  Code  Ky.,  p.  41,  §  202;  Cal, 
Penal  Code,  §  10(i8.  See  People  v. 
Rodriguez,  10  Cal.  50.  Or  before  evi- 
dence is  introduced  to  the  jury, 
Comp.  L.  Kan.  I,s79,  §  4698;  Code  Ga. 
1873,  §  4681  ;*R.  S.  Mo.  1879,  §  1898. 
See  also  G.  S.  Mass.,  ch.  132,  §  31 ;  R. 
S.  Me.  1871,  ch.  82,  §  77;  Laws  N.  Y. 
1881,  ch.  44-2,  §  371;  Code  Ya.  1873,  p. 
1062,  §  20;  Rev.  Stat.  W.  Va.  1879,  ch. 
109.  §  24:  Gen.  Stat.  R.  I.  1872,  p.  424, 
§  33. 

2  Cooley  V.  State,  38  Tex.  636,  638; 
People  r.  Rol)erts,  6  Cal.  214;  People 
V.  McKay,  18  Juhns.  (N.  Y.)  218; 
Gropp  V.  People,  67  111;  154;  St.  Louis 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Casner,  72  111.  384;  Muel- 
lerr.  Rebhau,94  111.  142;  United  States 
V.  Loughery,  13  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  267; 
State  V.  Bryan,  40  Iowa,  379;  State  v. 
Davis,  41  Iowa,  311;  State  t;.  Davis, 
14  Xev.  439,  448.  A  challenge  to  the 
I>olls  cannot  be  taken  upon  grounds 
which  would  have  supported  a  chal- 
lenge to  the  array.     Co.  Lift.  157.  b. 

3  Carnal  v.  People,  1  Park.  Or. 
(N.  Y.)  272;  Stout  v.  People,  4  Park. 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr. 


§  92,  [Continued.]  Right  to  Hold  Peremptory  Challenges 
in  Reserve. — By  the  common  law,  a  party  is  not  compelled 
to  make  his  peremptory  challenges  before  his  challenges  for 
cause;  but,  after  making  his  challenges  for  cause,  he  may  hold 
his  peremptory  challenges  in  reserve  up  to  the  time  of  swearing 
the  jury,  to  be  used  in  excluding  from  the  panel  such  jurors  as, 
though  challenged  for  cause,  have  been  accepted,  or  such  as  for 
other  reasons  he  may  wish  to  exclude.^     This  is  a  very  important 


Cr.  71;  Canceini  v.  People,  IG  N. 
Y.  501;  People  v.  Freeman,  i  Deu. 
(N.  Y.)  9;  People  v.  Honeyman,  3  Den. 
(N.  Y.)  121;  People  v.  Mather,  4 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  2-i!i.  It  is  laid  down  in 
books  of  the  common  law  that  if  a 
party  has  more  than  one  cause  of 
challenge,  he  must  take  them  all  at 
once.  Co.  Litt.  158.  a.;  Bac.  Abr. 
Juries  E.  11;  Trials  per  Pais  (1725), 
p.  149;  1  Chatty  Cr.  L.  545.  The 
meaning  of  this  rule  seems  to  be  that 
a  party  must  prefer  all  of  his  chal- 
lenges, which  are  of  the  same  nature 
and  triable  l)y  the  same  forum,  i.e.,  by 
the  court,  or  by  triors,  at  ouce.  Mann 
V.  Glover,  14  N.  J.  L.  195,  202;  Carnal 
V.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  272. 

1  4  Bl.  Com.  353;  1  Chit.  Cr.  L.  545; 
Co.  Litt.  158.  a  ;  Reg.  v.  Hughes,  2  Craw. 
&  Dix  Irish  Cir.  39G ;  Whelan  v.  Reg.,  28 
Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  2;  Hooker  v.  State,  4 
Ohio,  348;  State  v.  Fuller,  39  Vt.  74; 
Barber  v.  State,  13  Fla.  G75;  s.  c.  1 
Green  Cr.  L.  Rep.  723;  Cooley  v.  State, 
38  Tex.  G38;  United  States  v.  Butler,  1 
Hughes  (U.  S.),  457.  See  Parkyu's 
Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  75;  Cook's  Case, 
13  How.  St.  Tr.  313;  Layer's  Case,  10 
How.  St,  Tr.  137;  Barbot's  Case,  18 
How.  St.  Tr.  1233;  O'Coigly's  Case,  26 
How.  St.  Tr.  1227;  Jackson's  Case,  25 
How.  St.  Tr.  804;  Rex  v.  Stone,  6 
Term  Rep.  527.  In  Braudreth's  Case, 
32  How.  St.  Tr.  773  (anno  1817),  this 
principle  was  challenged  by  the  i-ittor- 


uey-geuei'al,  but  on  grounds  obviously 
untenable,  as  shown  by  the  last  pre- 
ceding cases.  lu  Massachusetts  it 
was  established  by  judicial  decision 
that  the  right  of  peremptory  chal- 
lenge, if  exercised  at  all,  must  be  ex- 
ercised in  the  first  instance,  before 
the  juror  is  interrogated  as  to  his  bias 
or  opinions.  Com.  v.  Rogers,  7  Met. 
(Mass.)  500;  Com.  v.  AYebster,  5  Cush. 
(Mass.)  295  (overruling  upon  this- 
point.  Com.  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.) 
49(;);  Com.  v.  McElhaney,  111  Mass. 
439.  But  this  rule  has  been  repealed 
and  the  common-law  rule  restored  in 
that  State  by  statute.  LaviS  of  Mass 
1873,  chap.  317,  §  1.  It  Avas  formerly 
held  in  ^Missouri  that  the  trial  court 
might  compel  both  parties  in  a  cap- 
ital case  to  make,  at  the  same  time 
and  ouce  for  all,  the  peremptory  chal- 
lenges allowed  to  each  by  law,  each  be 
iug  ignorant  of  the  challenges  made 
by  the  other.  State  v.  Hays,  23  Mo. 
287.  But  now  by  statute  (R.  S.  Mo. 
1879,  §  1905.),  the  prosecution  is  re- 
quired to  announce  its  challenges  be- 
fore the  defendant  can  be  required  to 
make  his.  State  v.  Steeley,  65  ]Mo. 
218;  State  v.  Degonia,  69  :Mo.  4S5. 
Calling  over  the  names  of  those  re- 
maining unchallenged  has  been  held 
to  give  the  accused  sufficient  informa- 
tion as  to  whom  the  prosecution  has 
challenged.  Phillips  v.  State,  6  Tex. 
App.  44. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


8R 


right ;  ;>ince  the  fact  of  having  unsucces^sfully  challenged  a 
venire-man  for  cause  may  have  excited  ill  feelino;  in  his  breast 
against  the  challenging  party,  and  it  may  be  desirable  to  ex- 
clude him  from  the  jury  by  a  peremptory  challenge.  Accord- 
ing to  the  American  })ractice,  and  contrary  to  that  in  England, 
the  swearing  of  the  jury  is  generally  deferred  until  a  full  jury 
has  been  procured.  The  jurors,  as  fast  as  they  are  accepted, 
are  directed  to  take  their  places  in  the  box.  It  often  happens 
that  much  time  is  consumed  in  impaneling  a  jury,  and  that, 
during  this  time,  a  party  may  discover  some  reason  for 
challenging  peremptorily  a  juror  who  has  been  accepted.  In 
many  American  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  he  has  no  such 
right,  but  that  all  right  of  challenge  is  at  an  end  as  soon  as  the 
juror  has  taken  his  seat  ;^  though  the  court  may  still,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  a  fZ;'.s"c7v^^'ou,  for  cause  shown,  re^uoye  the  juror  from  the 
panel.-'  Other  American  authorities  hold  that  the  right  of  per- 
emptory challenge  should  be  kept  open  to  the  latest  possible 
period,  that  is,  until  the  actual  swearing  of  the  jury.^ 


1  State  V.  Potter,  18  Couu.  Mti:  Ilor- 
bach  V.  State,  43  Tex.  242  (overruliusi 
ou  this  point  Coolev  v.  State,  38  Tex. 
t;3(>;  Hiibotter  i\  State,  32  Tex.  479); 
Cora.  V.  :Marrow,  3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  402, 
412;  Sparks  v.  State,  59  Ala.  82;  State 
V.  Caraerou,  2  Chand.  (Wis.)  172; 
Com.  V.  Kosrers,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  500; 
State  17.  Hays,  23  Mo.  287;  McMillau 
V.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  142;  Smith  u. 
Browu,  8  Kau.  G09;  State  v.  Audersou, 
4  Xev.  2i!5;  State  v.  Roderigas,  7  Nev. 
328;  State  v.  Schuffliu,  20  Ohio  St. 
233;  Mitchell  v.  State,  43  Tex.  512; 
Wassou  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  474; 
Taylor  u.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  1G9;  Ba- 
ker V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  525;  Drake 
V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  (349. 

2  State  V.  Potter,  18  Couu.  1(50; 
Horbach  v.  State,  43  Tex.  242;  Mit- 
chell V.  State,  43  Tex.  512;  McMillau  v. 
State,  7  Tex.  App.  142;  Baker  v.  State, 
3  Tex.  App.  525;    Sparks  v.   State,  .59 


Ala.  82:  Drake  v.  State,  .".Tex.  App.  (;49. 
For  a  modified  rule  see  Speuceru.  De- 
Frauce,  3  G.  Greeue  (la.),  21(j. 

3  Hooker  v.  State,  4  Ohio,  348,  350; 
Beaucharap  v.  State,  6  Blackf,  (lud.) 
299,  308;  Muuly  v.  State,  7  Blackf. 
(lud.)  593;  Morris  v.  State,  7  Blackf. 
(lud.)  (507;  Wyatt  v.  Noble,  8  Blackf. 
(lud.)  507;  People  v.  Reynolds,  16 
Cal.  128;  People  v.  Ah  You,  47  Cal. 
121;  Edelen  v.  Gough,  8  Gill,  87;  Will- 
iams u.  State,  3  Ga.  453,  459;  Drake 
V.  State,  51  Ala.  30,  aud  Bell  v.  State, 
cited  Ibid.,  p.  31;  Kleiuback  v.  State, 
2  Speers  (S.  C),  418;  Heudrick  v. 
Com.,  5  Leigh  (Va.),  707;  Jacksou 'j. 
Pittsford,  8  Blackf.  (lud.)  194;  Huu- 
ter  17.  Parsous,  22  Mich.  Oi!;  Johns  v. 
People,  25  Mich.  500;  O'Connor  v. 
State,  9  Fla.  215;  State  v.  Pritchard, 
15  Nev.  74;  s.  c.  10  Reporter,  273; 
Jones  V.  Vanzandt,  2  McLean  (U.  S.), 
611;  People  V.  Kohle,  4  Cal.  199;  Peo- 


90 


IMPANELING   THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  93.    Retraction    of    Challenge    or    of    Acceptance.  —  In 

strict  law  a  party  cannot,  after  having  once  taken  a  peremptory 
challenge,  retract  it  and  accept  the  juror,  so  that  it  shall  not  be 
counted  against  him  in  reducing  the  number  of  peremptory  chal- 
lenges which  he  is  allowed.^  But  this  matter  in  modern  practice 
j'ields  to  the  discretion  of  the  court ;  ^  and  where  the  panel  has 
been  gone  over  without  procuring  a  jury,  the  prisoner  has  been 
allowed  to  retract  one  of  his  challenges,  in  order  that  the  chal- 
lenged venire-man  might  be  available  to  complete  the  jury."^  A 
challenge  to  the  array  may  be  waived  after  allowance,  by  the 
challenging  part}-,  and  he  will  be  bound  by  such  waiver,  although 
the  case  for  trial  be  a  capital  one.*  But  a  prisoner  having  chal- 
lenged a  juror  peremptorily^,  cannot  subsequently  withdraw  the 
challenge  and  insist  that  he  shall  sit  upon  the  jury,  or  substitute 
a  challenge  for  cause,  so  that  the  peremptory  challenge  shall  not 
be  counted  in  reducing  his  number ;  although  the  grounds  on 
which  he  seeks  to  challenge  for  cause  may  have  come  to  his 
knowledge  after  the  peremptory  challenge  had  been  taken.® 
When  a  venire-man  has  been  challenged  for  favor  and  excluded, 
the  challenging  party  cannot  change  his  ground  and  say  that  he 
ought  not  to  have  been  discharged ;  nor  can  he  thereafter  insist 
upon  examining  him  on  oath,  to  make  it  appear  that  he  is  really 


l)\e  V.  Jeuks,  24  Cal.  11;  People  v.  Mc- 
Cartj,  48  Cal.  557;  Liudsley  v.  People, 
(>  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  233;  Drake  v. 
State,  51  Ala.  30.  It  is  a  necessary 
corollary  of  this  rule  tliat  the  court 
has  a  diacretiou  to  deuy  the  right  of 
peremptory  clialleuge  after  the  juror 
has  taken  his  seat,  but  before  the 
panel  is  sworn.  Schumacher  v.  State, 
5  Wis.  324.  Under  certain  statutory 
systems  the  proper  practice  is  for  the 
clerk  to  draw  twelve  names  from  the 
box:  for  the  court  to  permit  the  de- 
fendant separately  to  examine  each  ju- 
ror whose  name  Is  so  drawn,  and  ex- 
haust his  challenges  for  cause  before 
challenging  any  one  of  the  twelve  per- 


emptorily. People  V.  Scoggins,  37 
Cal.  67();  People  v.  Russell,  4(5  Cal. 
121.  See  also  Com.  v.  Hartzell,  40  Pa. 
St.  462:  Lee  v.  Peter,  6  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 
447. 

1  2  Dyer,  198  b.  pi.  51. 

2  Morrison  v.  Lovejoy,  6  Minn.  319; 
Santry  v.  State  (Wis.),  30  N.  W.  Rep. 
22(!. 

3  United  States  v.  Porter,  2  Dall. 
(U.  S.)  345.  See  also  Garrison  v. 
Portland,  2  Ore.  123. 

4  Piersou  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424. 

^  State  V.  Price,  10  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.) 
351;  State  v.  Coleman,  8  So.  Car.  237; 
Rex  V.  Parry,  7  Car.  &  P.  838 ;  Furmau 
V.  Applegate,  23  N.  J.  L.  28. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]        CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


91 


iudifferont  and  therefore  competent.^  In  general,  it  has  been  ob- 
served, i)ermis.sion  to  withdraw  a  challenge  ought  to  be  given 
cautiously;  otherwise  the  right  to  reject  may  be  converted  into 
a  right  to  select,  which  is  contrary  to  its  meaning  and  purpose.^ 
It  ought  not  to  be  permitted  where  it  will  operate  as  a  fraud  on 
the  other  party,  who  has  exhausted  his  peremptory  challenges.'^ 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  that  a  party  may,  for  a  pro^x-r  rea- 
son, retract  his  acceptance  of  a  juror,  and  challenge  him  for 
cause;  *  at  least,  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  allow 
the  party  to  challenge  members  of  the  panel  after  he  has  once 
passed  them.'  But  if  a  known  objection  to  a  juror  be  improp- 
erl}'  or  capriciously  kept  back,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion, 
refuse  this  right,  on  the  ground  that  the  right  of  challenge  has 
been  waived.® 

§  94.  Order  of  Challenj^iiijf  as  between  the  Parties.  —  This, 
in  like  manner,  seems  to  be  committed  to  the  discretion  of  the 
court,  which  discretion  will  not  be  reviewed,'  uidess  it  plainly  a})- 
pears  that  it  has  been  abused  to  the  prejudice  of  the  jiarty  com- 
plaining.^    In  the  absence  of  a  contrary  statute,  the  court  may 


1  State  1-.  Creasmau,  lo  Ired.  L.  (N. 
C.)  3[t5. 

2  Ante,  §  43. 

^  Com.  V.  Twitchell,  1  Brewst.  (Pa.) 
5:.i. 

*  :McFadcleu  r.  Com.,  23  Pa.  St.  12, 
17;  Smith  v.  State,  55  Ala.  1  (over- 
ruliug  Stalls  v.  State,  28  Ala.  25) ; 
Sparks  v.  State,  59  Ala.  82;  State  v. 
Adair,  GO  N.  C.  298;  State  v.  Perkins, 
G(J  N,  C.  120;  State  v.  Davis,  80  N.  C. 
412;  Scripps  v.  Eeilly,  38  Midi.  10. 

^  Foimtaiu  v.  AVest,  2'i  Rnva,  10; 
Com.  V.  Piper,  120  Mass.  185;  Hu- 
botter  V.  State,  32  Tex.  479;  Williams 
V.  State,  3  Ga.  453,  459. 

6  McFaddeu  v.  Cora.,  22  Pa.  St.  12, 
17,  per  Black,  C.  J.  See  also  tlie 
other  authorities  cited  supra. 

'  Com,  V.  Piper,  120  Mass.  185:  Ta- 
tura  V.  Preston,  53  Miss.  G54;  State  v. 


Pike,  49  N.  H.  400;  Ossipe  Man.  Co.  v. 
Cauney,  54  N.  H.  295;  St.  Anthony 
Falls  W.  P.  Co.  V,  Eastman,  20  INIinu. 
277;  Turpin  v.  State  (Sup.  Ct.  Md., 
Oct.  1880),  2  Crim.  L.  Mag.  532. 

8  State  V.  Ivey,  41  Tex.  38;  Dixon 
V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  530;  Eay  v.  State, 

4  Tex.  App.  450;  State  v.  Cummings, 

5  La.  Ann.  330;  Stater.  Florez,  5  La. 
Ann.  429;  State  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa, 
480:  State  r.  Pierce,  8  Iowa,  231 ;  State 
V.  Boatwright,  10  Kich.  L.  (S.C.)  407; 
Schufflin  V.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  233; 
State  V.  Dumphey,  4  Minn.  438;  Dris- 
kell  V.  Parish,  10  Law  Reporter,  395; 
Jones  V.  State,  2  Blackf.  (lud.)  475, 
478;  Williams  v.  State,  3  Ga.  453,  459; 
Beachamp  v.  State,  G  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
299.  However,  it  has  l)eeu  considered 
that  a  departure  from  a  well  estab- 
lished practice  might  afford  good  cause 


92 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr.^ 


require  the  parties  to  take  their  peremptory  challenges  one  at  a 
time  and  alternately.^  In  such  a  case^  according  to  some  hold- 
ings, a  failure  of  a  party  to  challenge  when  his  turn  conies,  is  a 
waiver  of  his  right  of  challenge  at  that  time,  in  such  a  sense  that 
it  counts  against  him  in  reducing  the  number  of  peremptory  chal- 
lenges allowed  him,  as  though  he  had  actually  made  it.^  But 
the  waiver  of  the  first  challenge  is  not  to  be  construed  as  a  waiver 
of  subsequent  challenges.^  Nor  can  the  court  fix  up  a  rule  or 
method  of  challenging  which  may  operate  to  deprive  the  prisoper 
of  his  number  of  peremptory  challenges  without  his  consent. 
Thus,  the  court  cannot,  by  arranging  that  the  State  shall  chal- 
lenge one  and  the  prisoner  thereafter  two,  make  the  prisoner's 
right  of  challenging  contingent  upon  the  State  challenging  in  the 
first  instance.* 


for  granting  a  new  trial.  State  v. 
Florez,  5  La.  Ann.  429.  For  illustra- 
tions of  this,  see  State  v.  Pierce,  8  Iowa, 
231;  Dixon  u.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  529; 
State  V.  l\y,  41  Tex.  35.  It  has  been 
held  no  abuse  of  discretion  for  the 
judge  to  compel  either  party,  upon 
the  full  panel  of  twelve  being  pre- 
sented to  him,  to  strilie  off,  then,  once 
for  all,  every  one  to  Avhora  he  has  ob- 
jection, granting  him  only  the  oppor- 
tunity of  objecting  to  new  venire-men 
as  fast  as  they  shall  be  introduced  to 
supply  the  places  of  those  challenged 
off  by  himself  or  hy  his  adversary. 
Tatum  V.  Preston,  53  Miss.  654;  Hotz 
V.  Hotz,  2  Ash.  (Penu.)  245. 

1  Driskell  v.   Parish,    10  Law   Re- 
porter, 395. 

2  Patton  V.  Ash,  7  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
IIG;  Com.  v.  Frazier,  2  Brewst.  (Pa.) 

'  490;  Wenrick  v.  Hall,  11  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  153;  Fountain  v.  West,  23  Iowa, 
9.  But  see  Schumacker  v.  State,  5 
Wis.  324;  Hartzell  v.  Com.,  40  Pa.  St. 
462;  Kleinback  V.  State,  2  Speers  (S. 
C.),418;  Koch  v.  State,  32  Ohio  St. 
352;   State  u.  Pritchard,  15  Nev.  74. 

3  Kennedy   v.   Dale,  4   Watts  &  S. 


(Pa.)  176;  Fountain  v.  West,  23  Iowa, 
9. 

*  Smith  V.  State,  4  G.  Green  (Iowa), 
189.  See  also  State  v.  Pritchard  15 
Nev.  74.  Under  a  statute  requiring 
that  the  State  shall  first  exhaust  its 
peremptory  challenges  or  waive  the 
same,  and  the  defendant  afterwards 
(Iowa  Rev.  1860,  §  4780) ,  the  court  can- 
not arrange  an  alternative  order  of 
challenging.  State  v.  Bowers,  17 
Iowa,  46.  On  the  other  hand,  under  a 
statute  prescribing  that  "all  chal- 
lenges to  an  individual  juror  shall  be 
taken  first  by  the  defendant,  and  then 
l)y  the  State,  and  each  party  shall  ex- 
haust all  his  challenges  before  the 
other  begins"  (G,  S.  Minn.,  chap. 
lOi;,  §  32),  it  has  been  held  erroneous 
to  compel  the  defendant  to  exhaust  all 
of  his  challenges  to  each  and  all  of  the 
persons  upon  the  panel  before  the 
State  began.  The  meaning  of  the  stat- 
ute was  that  the  defendant  should  first 
exhaust  all  of  his  challenges  to  a  sin- 
gle juror,  who  was  then  to  be  turned 
over  to  the  State,  if  remaining  upon 
the  panel.  State  v.  Smith,  20  Minn. 
376. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  IV.]   CHALLENGING  AND  IMPANELING. 


93 


§  95.  Mode  of  Impaneling. —  At  common  law,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  ascertaining  whether  a  full  panel  was  present  and  of  aid- 
ing the  accused  in  making  his  challenges,  the  court,  upon  the 
request  of  the  accused,  would  order  the  whole  panel  to  be  called 
over  once  in  his  hearing.^  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that, 
under  American  constitutions,  the  prisoner  is  entitled  to  the  as- 
sistance of  counsel  in  making  his  challenijes.  In  one  American 
case,  a  nisi  prius  judge  was  found  so  ignorant  as  to  deny  this 
right,  but  his  decision  was  reversed  on  a})i)eal."^  The  right  of 
counsel  would  obviously  be  abridged  by  rulings  which  would 
unnecessarily  hamper  them  in  discharging  their  duties  toward 
their  client.  While  a  nisi  j)rins  court  has  held  that  counsel  will 
not  be  i)ermitted  to  argue  before  triors  the  question  of  the  com- 
petency of  a  juror  ui)on  a  challenge  to  the  favor, ^  another  has 
gone  so  far  the  other  way  as  to  hold  that,  where  there  are  two 
counsel  the  hasty  acceptance  of  a  juror  by  one  without  consulta- 
tation  with  the  other,  will  not  conclude  the  rights  of  the  client, 
but  if  the  acce]>tance  be  at  once  withdrawn,  a  peremptory  chal- 
lenge ought  to  be  allowed.^  At  common  law,  jurors  were  sei)a- 
rately  accepted  and  sworn.  The  venire-man  was  presented  to  the 
accused  or  to  his  counsel,  that  a  view  of  his  person  might  be  had. 
The  otficer  of  the  court  then  looked  first  to  the  counsel  of  the 
prisoner,  to  know  whether  he  wished  to  challenge  him.  He  next 
turned  to  the  counsel  of  the  crown,  to  know  whether  the  crown 
desired  to  offer  a  challenge;  if  neither  made  any  objection,  the 
oath  was  administered.^     It  seems  that  this  rule  of  practice  is 


1  Townly's  Case,  Foster  C.  L.  7; 
Layer's  Case,  K!  How.  St.  Tr.  132. 

2  State  V.  Cummiuiis,  5  La.  Auu. 
330,  332. 

'  .Joice  V.  Alexaudor,  1  Crauch  C. 
C.  (U.  S.)   528. 

*  Clarke  v.  Goode,  0  J.  .T.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  G37,  038. 

5  Braudreth's  Case,  32  How.  St.  Tr. 
755,  771;  Layer's  Case,  16  How.  St. 
Tr.  135.  This  has  been  held  to  be  the 
proper  practice  under  statutes  in 
Texas  (Pasch.  Dig.  Tex.  Stat.,  jj  2034; 


Tex.  Code  Cr.  Proc,  §  550;  Horbach 
V.  State,  43  Tex.  242,  200,  overruling 
Cooley  V.  State,  38  Tex.  033,  030.  The 
case  of  Horbach  v.  State,  supra,  is  re- 
garded as  settling  the  practice  in 
Texas.  Mitchells.  State,  43  Tex.  512; 
Wasson  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  474; 
Taylor  V.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  100,  190; 
Baker  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  525;  Har- 
din V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  355;  Drake 
V.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  040 ;  Ray  v.  State, 
4  Tex.  App.  450;  Garza  v.  State,  3 
Tex.  App.  280.     See  in  this  connection 


94  IMPANELING  THE  JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

one  of  those  which  yield  to  judicial  discretion;  though  we  find 
that  it  has  been  held  that,  although  the  practice  has  been  to  call 
a  certain  number  of  jurors  at  a  time,  for  the  purpose  of  putting 
them  upon  the  parties,  the  court  may  call  a  greater  or  a  less 
number  and  require  the  parties  to  pass  upon  them.^ 

§  96.  Impaneling  by  Lot. —  Under  some  statutory  systems,, 
each  jury  is  selected  by  lot  from  the  whole  number  summoned. 
The  names  of  the  venire-men  are  written  upon  slips  of  paper, 
which,  after  being  folded,  are  placed  in  a  box.  When  the  case 
is  called,  the  twelve  whose  names  are  first  drawn  from  the  box, 
if  present,  and  not  challenged  or  excused,  are  sworn.  This 
statutory  form  must  be  followed,^  although  slight  and  imma. 
terial  departures  will  be  tolerated.^  A  juror  who  does  not  appear 
when  drawn,  may  be  refused  his  seat,  although  he  appears  and 
answers  before  the  drawing  is  completed.^  If,  in  compliance 
with  the  statute,  his  name  is  returned  to  the  box,  neither  party 
can  demand  that  he  shall  take  his  place  upon  the  jur}^^  Unless 
there  be  a  statute  requiring  the  selection  of  jurors  by  lot,  a 
party  cannot  demand  this  mode  of  impaneling.®  For  stronger 
reasons,  if,  w^ithout  a  statutory  authorization,  the  clerk  takes  it 
upon  himself  to  adopt  a  fortuitous  mode  of  selection,  a  party 
cannot  object  that  a  more  fortuitous  mode  of  selection  might  have 
been  adopted.^ 

Speideu   v.  State,  3    Tex.   App.    15f);  accepted  in  panels  of /ojo',  after  twelve 

West  u.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  150;  State  are  in  the   box.     Sterling  Bridge  Co. 

V.  Ivey,  41  Tex.  35;  Griffin  v.  Stadler,  v.  Pearl,  80  111.  250,  254. 

35  Tex.  695).     And  so  in  other  States  i  Walker  v.     Collier,    37   111.    302; 

(Smith  V.  Brown,  8  Kan.  608 ;  State  v.  Sellers  v.  State,  52  Ala.  368. 

Roderigas,    7    Nev.    328;    Schufflin  v.  2  grazier  v.  State,  44  Ala.  387. 

State,  20  Ohio  St.  233;  State  u.  Brown,  »  People  v.  Rogers,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (n. 

12   Minn.  538);    though  it  has    been  s.)  (N.  Y.)  370. 

disapproved    iu    Wisconsin,    on    the  *  People    v.     Vcrmilyca,    7     Cow. 

ground  that  it  would    unnecessarily  (N.  Y.)  361). 

hamper  the  prisoner's  right   of  per-  ^  People  v.  Larned,  7  N.  Y.  445. 

emptory  challenge,  by  depriving  him  Territory     v.     Doty,     1     Piuney 

of  adequate  opportunity  for  corapari-  (Wis.),  396;  State  v.  Green,  20  Iowa, 

son  and  choice.     Lamb  v.    State,  36  424. 

Wis.  424.     One  State  is  found  which  '  Benoway    v.    Conyue,    3     Chaud. 

requires  jurors  to  be  passed  upon  and  (Wis.)  214. 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLEXGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


95 


§  97.  Challenging  the  Polls  of  a  Special  Jnry.  —  In  !>ome 
States,  challenges  may  be  made  to  the  polls  of  a  panel,  arrayed 
for  the  purpose  of  striking  a  special  jury,  before  the  formality 
of  striking  begins,  on  the  theory  that  the  parties  have  a  right  to 
a  panel  of  tAventy-four  impartial  men  from  which  to  strike  such 
as  they  Avill  exchide.^  This  seems  to  be  the  safer  and  better 
practice;  since  the  right  of  peremptory  chaUenge  does  not  exist 
in  the  case  of  a  s})ecial  or  struck  jury,  the  striking  being  substi- 
tuted for  this  kind  of  challenge.'^  There  seems  to  be  no  reason, 
in  the  nature  of  things,  why  the  right  of  striking  should  displace 
the  right  of  challcn2in»T  for  cause. 

§  98.   Ground  of  Challenge  must  be  specifically  stated. — 

Much  particularity  is  recjuired  in  setting  out  the  grounds  of  chal- 
lenge.^ A  challenge  to  the  array  must  be  i)i  ivriting,^  but  chal- 
lenges to  the  i)olls  are  taken  orally.  The  grounds  of  all  challenges 
must  be  specifically  stated.  To  say,  "  I  challenge  the  array," 
"  I  challenge  for  principal  cause,"  or  "  I  challenge  to  the  favor," 
is  in  general  not  sufficient ;  ^  though  in  one  jurisdiction  the  prac- 


1  Melson  v.  Dicksou,  03  Ga.  082. 
To  test  their  competeucy,  the  jurors 
may  be  examiuecl  upon  the  voir  dire 
before  the  strikiuii  begins.  Howell  v. 
Howell,  59  Ga.  145. 

2  See  liex  v.  Despard,  2  Man.  &  Hy. 
40(j,  410;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  But  see  Bar- 
rett V.  Long,  8  Irish  L.  331 ;  s.  c.  7  Irish 
L.  439;  O'Counell  v.  Manstield,  9  Irish 
L.  179;  Mayu.  Hoover  (Ind.),  14  North 
East.  Rep.  472;  Branch  v.  Dawsou 
(Minn.),  30  N.  W.  Rep.  545;  Railroad 
Co.  17.  Stanley,  7  Oh.  St.  155;  State  v. 
Moore,  28  Oh.  St.  195;  Thomp.  &  Mer. 
Jur..  §  280;  ante,  §  7.  Compare  Schweuk 
V.  Umstead,  6  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  351 ; 
McDermott  v.  Hoffman,  70  Pa.  St.  31. 

^  Rex  V.  Edmunds,  4  Barn.  &  Aid. 
471;  Carmarthen  «.  Evans,  10  Mee.  >i 
W.  274;  Brown  v.  Esmonde,  Irish  Rep. 
4  Eq.  630;  Reg.  v.  Hughes,  1  C.  &  K. 
235;  Pearse  v.  Rogers,  2  Fos.  &  F.  137. 


*  People  V.  Doe,  1  Mich.  453;  Ryder 
V.  People,  38  Mich.  209. 

*  Manu  V.  Glover,  14  X.  J.  L.  195, 
203.  See  to  this  effect:  People  v. 
lieynolds,  10  Cal.  128;  Freeman  v.  Peo- 
ple, 4  Den.  (N.  Y.)  9;  People  v.  Ren- 
frow,  41  Cal.  37;  People  v.  Walsh,  44 
Cal.  440;  s.  c.  1  Green  Cr.  L.  487; 
State  V.  Knight,  43  Me.  11;  Powers  v. 
Presgroves,  38  Miss.  227;  State  v. 
Squaires,  2  Nev.  220;  Paige  v.  O'Neal, 
12  Cal.  483;  Estes  v.  Richardson,  0 
Nev.  128;  State  v.  Chapman,  0  Nev. 
320;  State  v.  Raymond,  11  Nev.  98; 
People  V.  McGuugill,  41  Cal.  429;  Peo- 
ple V.  Hardin,  37  Cal.  258;  People  v. 
Dick,  37  Cal.  277;  People  v.  Buckley, 
49  Cal.  241;  Wilson  v.  People,  94  111. 
299;  Cable  v.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
531;  Conkey  v.  Northern  Bank,  G  Wis. 
447;  People  v.  Doe,  1  Mich.  453;  State 
V.  Dove,  10  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  4G9. 


96  IMPANELING  THE  JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

tice  of  making  the  last  kind  of  challenge  by  simply  saying,  "  I 
challenge  to  the  favor,"  has  grown  up  and  has  finally  been  held 
sufficient.^  In  challenges  to  the  polls,  there  is  authority  to  the 
effect  that  such  general  statements  of  the  grounds  of  challenge 
as  that  the  venire-man  "  does  not  stand  indifferent  between  the 
parties,"  or  "entertains  and  has  manifested  a  strong  bias  and 
prejudice  against  the  defendant,"^  or  "is  a  neighbor  to  the 
plaintiff,"  ^  or,  "  I  challenge  the  juror  for  implied  bias,"  *  —  are 
not  sufficient.  The  challenge  should  state  facts  which,  if  true, 
show  a  disqualification.^  In  auc'^nt  times  the  steps  upon  a  chal- 
leno-e  of  a  venire-man  advanced  with  the  regularity  of  pleadino;s, 
demurrers  and  counter-pleadings ;  ^  but  this  strictness  has  been 
o-enerallv  relaxed  in  American  courts. 

§  99.  Triors  of  Challenges.  —  The  common-law  practice  of 
appointing  triors  to  try  challenges  to  the  favor, ^  still  prevails  in 
some  American  jurisdictions.  In  some  of  these  jurisdictions,  the 
determination  of  the  facts,  under  a  challenge  for  actual  bias,  as 
contradistinguished  from   imjoUed  bias,  is   assigned  to  triors ;  ^ 

1  See  People  v.  Freeman,  4  Deu.  then  v.  Evaus,  10  Mee.  &  W.  274.  See 
(N.  y.)  i);  People  v.  Lohman,  2  Barb.  also  Clark  v.  Vau  Vraukeu,  20  Barb. 
(N.  y.)  216;  s.  c.  1  N.  y.  280;  People  (N.  y.)  278,  where  it  was  said  that  a 
V.  Houeymau,  3  Den.  (N.  y.)  121;  Peo-  challenge  for  principal  caupe  was  in 
pie  V.  Bodine,  1  Den.  (N.  y.)  281;  the  nature  of  a  pleading  which  must 
Rogers  v.  Rogers,  14  Wend.  (N.  y.)  be  answered  by  denial  or  demurrer; 
131;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  (N.  also  People  v.  Stout,  4  Park.  Cr. 
Y.)  229;  Mechanics'  &c.  Bank  v.  Smith,  (N.  y.)  71,  109;  Ex  parte  Vermilyea,  6 
19  Johns.  (N.  y.)  115;  Carnal  v.  Peo-  Cow.  (N.  y.)  555. 

pie,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  y.)  272.  '  Challenges  to  the  anmj  and    for 

2  Mann  v.  Glover,  14  N.  J.  L.  195.  principal  cause  to  the  polls,  were  tri- 

3  Jones  V.  Butterworth,  3  N.  J.  L.  able  by  the  court.     Ante,  §§  40,  52. 
345.  ^  Comp.    L.    Nev.     1873,    §   1968;  2 

4  People  V.  Reynolds,  16  Cal.  128.  Stat,   at  Large,    Minn.    1873,  p.   1055, 
'"  So  a  challenge  for  consanguinity      §    234;    Gen.    Laws    Ore.  1872    (Civil 

or  affinity  must  state  Aoto  and  to  ?o/iow  Code),  §    168.     See  also  Sess.  Laws, 

the  venire-man  is  related.  Stephenson  Utah,  1878,  §  246.     Where,  by  consent 

V.  Stiles,  3  N.  J.  L.  43.  of  the  parties,  the  court  is  substituted 

*5  Rex  V.  Edmunds,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  for  triors  upon  a  challenge  for  actual 

471,  474;  AUeway  v.  Rowdeu,  2  Show.  bias,  its  decision  will  be  liual.     State 

422;    Rex  v.    Worcester,    Skin.    101;  r.  Mims,  26  Minn.  183. 
Rich  V.  Player,  2  Show.  261;  Carniar- 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IxMPANELING.  97 

but,  under  the  statutory  systems  prevailing  in  most  American 
jurisdictions,  botli  of  these  forms  of  challenge  are  tried  by  the 
court. ^  Under  the  old  practice  the  court  in  the  first  instance  ap- 
pointed two  unexceptionable  persons  to  act  as  triors.^  When 
one  juror  had  been  procured,  he,  with  the  two  triors  who  had 
passed  upon  his  qualifications,  or  with  any  other  two  unexcep- 
tionable persons  selected  by  the  court,  passed  upon  the  qualifica- 
tions of  the  next  venire-man  called.^  When  two  jurors  had 
been  procured,  they  ordinaril}'  acted  as  triors  for  the  remaining 
ten.*  The  triors  were  sworn  thus:  "  You  shall  well  and  truly 
try  whether  A.  [the  venire-man]  stands  indifferent  between  the 
parties  to  this  issue."  ^  As  the  court  is  the  trior  of  challenges 
for  principal  cause,  it  is  obvious,  on  principle,  that  the  court 
must  decide  all  questions  of  fact  which  arise  on  tlic  trial  of  such 
a  challenge.  But  there  is  questiona])le  authority  to  the  effect 
that  in  such  cases  disputed  questions  of  facts  are  submitted  to 
triors.*'  The  relation  of  the  court  and  triors  is  analogous  to  that 
of  court  and  jury.  The  court,  upon  a  challenge  to  the  favor,  de- 
cides what  evidence  is  admissilile  for  the  consideration  of  the 
triors;   but  its  sutiiciency  or  insufficiency  as  establishing  the  chal- 

1  New  York  Code  Crim.  Proc.  (Laws  lenge.     Thus,  in  one  case,  five  acted 

1881,    chap.   4-12),    §  SKi;    Ark.    Dig.  as    triors     (Joice     v.    Alexander,      1 

Stat.   1874,    §  1910;    Bullitt's  Ky.  Cr.  Cranch  C.   C.    (U.    S.)   528);    and  in 

Code,  p.  41,  §  209.     See  also  Comp.  L.  another,  eiglit.    Reason  v.  Bridges,  Id. 

Ariz.  1877,  chap.  11,  §  319.  478.       But    this    practice     has    been 

2  Two  officers  of  the  court  might  be  strongly  condemned.     McCormick   v. 

appointed.     Rex  v.  Kirwan,   cited   in  Brookfield,  4  N.  J.  L.  09,  72. 
Finlay's  Irish  Dis.,p.  347.  *  Anou.,  1  Salk.  152.     In  People  v. 

»  People  V.  Dewick,   2     Park.    Cr.  Bodiue,  Edm.   Sel.   Cas.    (N.  Y.)    36, 

(N.  Y.)  230.  38,    the    following  form    was    used: 

*  Mima  Queen  v.  Hepburn,  2  Crancn  "  You  shall  well  and  truly  try  whether 

C.  C.  (U.  S.)  3;  United  States  v.  Wat-  A.  [the  venire-man]  stands  indifferent 

kins,  3  Cranch    (U.  S.)  443;  Boon  tJ.  between  the  people  of  New  York  and 

State,  1  Ga.  618;  Copenhavenc.  State,  Mary  Bodine,  the  prisoner  at  the  bar, 

15  Ga.   22;  McGuffie   v.  State,  17  Ga.  and  a  true  verdict  render  according  to 

497;  McCormick  v.  Brookfield,  4  N.  J.  the  evidence." 

L.  69.     There  are   cases,  however,  in  ^  People  v.  Dewick,  2  Parker  Cr.  (N. 

which  all  the  jurors,  sworn  up  to  the  Y.)  230.     See  also  Solauder  v.  People, 

time  of  a  juror  being  challenged  to  the  2  Colo.  48,  58. 
favor,  have  acted  as  triors  of  the  chal- 


98 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


lenge,  is  for  their  determination  alone. ^  Tlie  triors  decide  ac- 
cording to  their  "discretion  and  conscience,"  ^  and  their  decis- 
ion is  conchisive,^  even  where  a  principal  cause  of  challenge  is 
submitted  to  them  (the  parties  not  objecting),  which  might  have 
been  decided  by  the  court.  If  the  triors  disagree,  what  takes 
place  is  analogous  to  a  mistrial;  there  must  be  a  neiu  trial  of  the 
challenges  before  new  triors, —  the  court  appointing  for  that  pur- 
pose the  third  or  fourth  jurors,  if  so  many  have  been  impaneled, 
or  two  unexceptionable  bystanders.* 

§  100.  The  Court  as  a  Substitute  for  Triors. — In  most 
American  jurisdictions  the  practice  of  appointing  triors  has  been 
discontinued,  and  the  court  acts  as  the  trior  of  all  challenges. 
Moreover,  where  parties  have  the  right  to  demand  triors,  if 
neither  party  makes  such  a  demand,  and  the  evidence  is  sub- 
mitted to  the  judge,  they  cannot  afterwards  object  to  his  compe- 
tency to  decide  the  issue. ^  In  such  cases,  the  determination  by  the 
court  of  the  questions  of  fact  submitted  to  it  is  equally  final  with 
that  of  triors;   it  cannot  be  excepted  to  or  reviewed  upon  error. '^ 


1  Freeman  v.  People,  4  Denio  (N. 
Y.),  9,  35;  People  v.  Houeyman,  3 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  121;  Smith  w,  Floyd,  18 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  522. 

2  Co.  Litt.  156a. 

3  People  V.  Dewick,  2  Parker  Cr. 
(N  .Y.)  130;  State  v.  Benton,  2  Dev.  & 
B.  (N.  C.)  1!)G;  State  v.  Ellington,  7 
Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  Gl;  State  v.  Dove,  10 
Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  469.  Ex  parte  Ver- 
milyea,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  559 ;  Freeman 
V.  People,  4  Den.  (N.  Y.)  33 ;  Schoeffler 
ij.  State,  3  Wis.  828. 

•i  People  V.  Dewick,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  230.  See  also  People  v.  Bodine, 
Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  38,  39.  In  the  view  of 
other  conrts,  where  the  triors  cannot 
agree,  the  challenge  is  not  made  ont, 
and  the  venire-man  must  be  sworn  as 
a  juror.  United  States  v.  AVotkhis,  3 
Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  443,  579;  Com. 
V.  Fitzpatrick,  3  Clark    (Penn.),  520. 


This  is  in  conformity  with  the  princi- 
ple that  a  venire-man  is  presumed  to 
be  qualified  and  Impartial  until  the 
contrary  is  shown,  and  that  the  bur- 
den of  proving  the  challenge  rests  up- 
on the  party  making  it.  Eeynolds  v. 
United  States,  98  U.  S.  145,  157;  Holt 
V.  People,  13  Mich.  224. 

5  Ex  parte  Vermilyea,  6  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  555;  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  229,  240;  People  v.  Rathbun, 
21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  509;  O'Brien  v.  Peo- 
ple, 36  N.  Y.  276 ;  Stout  v.  People,  4 
Parker  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  132;  People  v.  Doe, 
1  Mich.  451 ;  Wirebach  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  12  Reporter,  571. 

8  Stout  V.  People,  4  Parker  Cr,  (N. 
Y.)  132;  Sanchez  v.  The  People,  22  N. 
Y.  147;  People  v.  Bodine,  1  Denio  (N. 
Y.),  281,  309;  State  v.  Wincroft,  76  Nc 
C.  38;  Dew  v.  McDivitt,  17  Am.  L. 
Reg.  623;  s.  c.  31  Ohio  St.  139;  Morri- 


Tit.   I,  Ch.    IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING.  99 

It  has  been  held  ^  and  denied  ^  that,  where  the  judge  acts  as 
the  ^trior,  his  rejection  of  testimony  offered  in  support  of  the 
charge  is  immaterial,  and  not  subject  to  review.  Where  he 
thus  acts,  it  is  immaterial  u})on  v^hat  form  of  challenge  venire- 
men are  set  aside,  provided  they  are  incompetent.  A  judgment 
will  not  be  reversed  because  a  challenge,  good  for  the  favor, 
was  sustained  in  form  for  principal  cause. ^ 

§  101.   Examination  of  the  Venire-man  on  the  Voir  Dire.  — 

Venire-men  are  examined  one  by  one,  and  not  by  squads  or 
platoons.*  A  challenge  assigning  some  specific  ground  of  dis- 
qualification, which  ground  is  denied  by  the  opposite  party,  must 
precede  any  examination  of  the  venire-man;  for,  until  this  is 
made  there  is  no  issue  for  the  decision  of  the  triors  or  the  court.* 
As  a  general  rule,  a  party  has  no  right  to  examine  the  venire- 
man by  way  of  Jkhing  for  some  ground  of  challenge  ;^  but  this 
rule  should  be  accepted  with  caution.^  In  some  States,  amotion 
or  request  of  a  party  that  the  venire-man  be  put  to  answer  is 
understood  to  be  in  itself  a  challenge.^  Within  reasonable 
limits,  each  party  has  a  right  to  put  pertinent  questions  to  show, 
not  only  that  there  exist  proper  grounds  for  a  challenge  for 
cause,  but  to  elicit  facts  to  enable  him  to  decide  whether  or  not 

son  V.  Lovejoy,  6  Minn.  319;  People  u.  son,    1    Crauch    C.    C.    (U.    S.)    371; 

Tweed,  11  Hun  (N.  Y.),  li)5;  United  Matilda  v.  :Mason,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U. 

States  V.  McHenry,  G  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  S.)   343;    Lord   v.  Brown,  5   Den.  (N. 

503;    Union    Gold  I^I.    Co.   v.   Rocky  Y.)    345;   Trulliuger  v.  Webb,  3  Ind. 

Mountain    Nat.   Bank,    2    Colo.    5G5;  198;   Powers  v.  Presgrove,   38  Miss. 

Stewart  v.  State,  13  Ark.  720.  227;  Eeg.  v.  Stewart,  1  Cox  C.  C.  174; 

1  Costigau  V.  Cuyler,  21  N.  Y.  134.  Com.   i;.  Thrasher,  11   Gray    (Mass.), 

2  Sehorn  v.  Williams,  6  Jones,  L.  55;  State  v.  Flower,  Walker  (Miss.), 
(N.  C.)575;  People  v.  Cotta,  49  Cal.  319;  King  u.  State,  5  How.  (Miss.) 
16G.  730;    State   v.  Zellers,  7   N.  J.  L.  220; 

3  Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U.  and  note  by  the  reporter.  Ibid,  223. 

S.  145.  6  Reg.  V.  Dowling,  3  Cox  C.  C.  509; 

*  1  Chit.  Cr.  L,  547;  Arch.  Cr.  PI.  &  Bales  v.  State,  G3  Ala.  30,  38. 

Pr.  1G2;  Williams  V.  State,  GO  Ga.  3(i7,  '  People  v.  Brown    (Cal.),  14  Pac. 

372;   Driskell  t?.  Parish,  10  Law  Re-  Rep.  90;   People  v.  Hamilton,  C2  Cal. 

porter,  395.  377. 

M  ChittyC.L.  546;  State  v.Creas-  »  Howell   v.   Howell,    59    Ga.    145; 

man,   10    Ired.   L.     (N.    C.)    395,    per  Temple  r.  Sumner,  Smith  (N.  H.),  22G, 

Ruffiu,  C.  J.;  United    States  v.  John-  234;  People  v.  Backus,  5  Cal.  275,  277. 


100  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tv., 

he  will  exercise  his  right  of  peremptory  challenge. ^  There  is 
much  authority  for  the  conclusion  that  the  trial  judge  has  a,  dis- 
cretion, either  to  examine  the  juror  without  putting  him  upon 
oath,  and  to  reject  him  if  he  finds  him  disqualified,  although  no 
challenge  has  been  made,^  or  to  allow  either  party  to  interrogate 
him  without  first  interposing  a  challenge ;  and  this  seems  to  be 
the  general  practice  of  the  courts.^  The  challenge  may  be  tried 
by  the  examination  of  the  venire-man  himself  on  the  voir  dire, 
or  by  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  or  both.*  It  is  a  general  rule 
that  the  challenged  venire-man  may  ])e  sworn  as  a  witness  to 
state  or  explain  any  facts  which  do  not  impeach  his  character  or 
his  motives  ;  ^  but  the  parties  may  waive  the  administration  of 
the  oath,  and  if  a  party  permits  him  to  be  examined  without 
oath,  making  no  objection  thereto,  his  consent  will  be  implied.*' 
Upon  this  examination,  the  venire-man,  like  any  other  witness 
in  a  judicial  investigation,  answers  under  the  risk  of  an  indict- 
ment for  perjury;^  and  he  therefore  may,  as  other  witnesses 
may,  correct  any  error  in  his  previous  statements  on  a  re-exam- 
ination.^ As  already  seen,^  the  grounds  of  a  challenge  must  or- 
dinarily be  stated  when  the  challenge  is  made.     If  the  challenged 

1  Watson  V.  Whitney,  23  Cal.  375;  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  528,  a  hasty  nisi  prius  de- 
State  V.  Godfrey,  Brayt.  (Vt.)  170.  cisiou.     In  Connecticut,   the   practice 

2  United  States  v.  Cornell,  2  Mason  has  been  to  examine  the  challenged 
(U.  S),  91.  venire-man  without  putting  him  under 

3  State  V.  LaiTtenschlager,  22  Minn,  oath,  though  it  has  been  said  that  the 
514;  Carnal  v.  People,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  cause  him 
Y.)  272,  282.  to  be   sworn  upon  request,  and  that 

*  In  an  early  case  in  Ohio,  the  rule  this  will  be    done  in  cases  of  very 

was   laid  down   that  the  party  chal-  grave  importance.     State  v.  Hoyt,  47 

lenging  a  venire-man  "on   suspicion  Conn.  518. 

of  bias  or  partiality  "  miglit  examine  ^  Lord    v.  Brown,    5   Den.  (N.  Y.) 

him,  or  call  witnesses,  but    that    he  345,  348 ;  Carnal  v.  People,  1  Pari:.  Cr. 

could  not  do  both.     State  v.  Ankrira,  (N.  Y.)  272,  282;  TruUinger  v.  Webb, 

Tappan  (Ohio),  80.     But  this  concep-  3  lud.  198.     But  see  State  v.  Flower, 

tion was  plainly  erroneous,  and  is uni-  Walker  (Miss.),  318;  King  «.  State,  5 

versally  discarded.  How.  (Miss.)  730. 

5  1  Chitty  Cr.  L.  550;  Ogden  v.  Parks,  '  State  v.  Howard,  63  Ind.  502. 

16   Johns.    (N.   Y.)    180;    Penwick    v.  s  jjeudrick  y.  Com.,  12  Leigh  (Va.), 

Parker,   3  Code'  Rep.    254;  People  v.  708. 

Fuller,  2  Parker  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  16.     Cora-  ^  A7Ue,  §  101. 
pare    Joice    v.   Alexander,    1     Crauch 


Tit.   I,  Cll.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


101 


venire-man  admits  the  truth  of  the  grounds,  he  will  not  be  ex- 
amined on  his  voir  dire,  but  the  court  will  determine  their 
sufficiency  as  matter  of  law.^  So,  whenever  a  good  cause  of 
challenge  is  interposed  by  one  party  and  admitted  by  the  other, 
there  is  nothing  to  try,  and  the  venire-man  must  stand  aside. - 
The  court  may  conduct  the  examination  for  its  own  information,^ 
though  this  cannot  be  done  so  as  to  deprive  a  party  of  his  right 
to  re-examination.*  The  court  may  exercise  a  sound  legal  dis- 
cretion in  respect  of  the  pertinency  of  the  questions  put  and  the 
limits  to  which  the  examination  shall  be  extended.  The  ques- 
tions must  be  pertinent  and  of  a  nature  to  show  that  the  venire- 
man is  not  sufficiently  free  from  bias  to  sit  as  an  impartial 
juror  .^ 

§  102.   What    Questions    may    be    put    to   a  Venire-man. — 

Questions  tending  to  degrade  the  venire-man,*^  or  to  show  him 
guilty  of  crime, ^  cannot  be  put.     Anciently  in  England  a  venire- 


1  Morrisou  v.  Lovejoy,  (J  Miuu.  310. 

2  State  V.  Lautenschlager,  22  Miuu. 
514. 

3  State  V.  Ludwig,  70  Mo.  412. 

♦  Stephens  v.  People,  38  Mich.  739. 
Au  exception  taken  to  the  refusal  of 
the  court  to  permit  a  certain  question 
to  be  put  to  a  venire-man  on  the  voir 
dire,  may  be  waived  by  counsel  omit- 
ting again  to  insist  upon  the  exception 
when  the  court  propounds  a  substi- 
tute. Loeffler  v.  Keokuk  Packet  Co., 
7  Mo.  App.  185. 

5  State  V.  Coleman,  8  So.  Car.  237; 
Reg.  V.  Lacey,  3  Cox  C.  C.  517.  See 
as  to  the  mode  of  conducting  such  an 
examination,  tlie  judicious  observa- 
tions of  Winkler,  J.,  in  Stager  v. 
State,  9  Tex.  App.  440. 

6  Anon.,  1  Salk.  153;  Farmers'  Bank 
V.  Sraith,19  Johns. (N.  Y.)  115;  Hudson 
V.  State,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.)  317;  State  v. 
]Mann,  83  Mo.  590.  Though,  if  the  juror 
chooses  to  answer  sucli  questions,  it 
is  only  a  waiver  of  his  privilege  of  re- 


fusal, and  gives  the  prisoner  no  right 
to  complain.  Spruce  v.  Com.,  2  Va. 
Cas.  375.  It  has  even  been  held  that  a 
juror  cannot  be  asked  whether  he  has 
subscribed  money  towards  carrying  on 
the  prosecution  in  a  criminal  case. 
Reg.  V.  Fitzpatrick,  Crawf.  &  D. 
(Irish)  513.  Contra,  that  he  may  be 
asked  whether  he  belongs  to  an  asso- 
ciation for  the  prosecution  of  crime. 
State  V.  Mann,  83  Mo.  590.  See 
ante,  §  66. 

"  As,  for  instance,  -whether  he  had 
aided  or  abetted  the  late  rebellion 
against  the  United  States.  Burt  v. 
Panjaud,  99  U.  S.  180.  And  so,  a  juror 
might  refuse  to  take  the  test  oath  pre- 
scribed by  §  821  of  the  Revised  Stat- 
utes of  the  United  States,  designed  to 
purge  the  panel  of  such  jiirors  as  had 
voluntarily  engaged  in  the  late  rebel- 
lion. Atwood  V.  Weems,  99  U.  S.  183. 
Compare  United  States  v.  Blodcett, 
35  Ga.  336 ;  United  States  v.  Reynolds, 
1  Utah,  319. 


102 


IMPANELING   THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


man  could  not  be  asked  whether  he  had  expressed  a  belief  that 
the  accused  was  guilty,  would  be  hanged,  or  the  like;  since  to 
prejudge  a  man  of  a  heinous  matter  was  scandalous,  and  such  a 
question  tended  to  degrade  the  venire-man .  ^  This  rule ,  which  was 
more  tender  to  the  feelino;s  of  the  venire-man  than  to  the  rights  of 
the  accused,  has  been  unwisely  adopted  to  some  extent  in  this  coun- 
try ;  '^  but,  as  it  was  founded  on  a  principle  of  the  common  law 
which  has  not  been  generally  admitted  with  us,  namely,  that  the 
expression  of  an  opinion  unaccompanied  with  personal  ill-will  is 
no  ground  of  challenge,^  it  has  not  generally  been  followed  in  this 
country.*  In  civil  cases  venire-men  may  be  questioned  on  their 
oath  as  to  whether  or  not  they  have  formed  or  expressed  an 
opinion  in  reference  to  the  case,^  or  whether  they  have  "  made 
up  their  minds"  about  the  case.^  Hypothetical  questions,  that 
is,  questions  as  to  what  the  juror  would  or  would  not  decide  in  a 
supposed  state  of  the  evidence, — are  not  allowed.^  The  court 
may  restrict  the  form  of  the  questions,  so  that  they  shall  not  be 


1  Cook's  Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  334; 
Rex  V.  Edmunds,  4  Barn.  «&  Aid.  471, 
492;  Ees  v.  Kerwan,  cited  in  Finlay's 
Irish  Dig.,  p.  347;  Reg.  v.  Hughes, 
2  Craw.  &  Dis,  Irish  Cir.  306. 

2  State  V.  Baldwin,  1  Const.  Rep. 
(S.  C.)  289,  293;  State  v.  Sims,  2 
Bailey  (S.  C),  29;  State  v.  Spencer, 
21  N.  J.  L.  197;  State  v.  Fox,  25  N.  J. 
L.  566. 

3  Ante,  §77;  2  Hawk.  P.  C,  chap. 
43,  §  28. 

■*  People  V.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  108,  125;  United  States  v.  Fries, 
Whart.  St.  Tr.  610,  614;  United  States 
V.  Callender,  Whart.  St.  Tr.  688,  696 ; 
1  Burr's  Tr.  426,  et  passim.  In  a 
modern  English  case,  the  venire-man 
was  tlius  questioned  by  counsel  for  the 
accused  witliout  opposition.  Reg.  v. 
Lacey,  3  Cox,  C.  C.  517. 

^  Spear  v.  Spencer,  1  G.  Greene 
(la.),  535.  See  also  Dcav  v.  McDivitt, 
31  Ohio  St.  139;  s.  c.  17  Am.  L.  Reg. 
621;  Williams  v.    Godfrey,  1    Heisk. 


(Tenn.)  299.  Compare,  as  to  the  an- 
cient, restricted  and  obsolete  prac- 
tice. Anon.,  1  Salk.  153;  Pringle  v. 
Huse,  1  Cow.    (N.  Y.)  432. 

«  Houston  V.  Terrell  (Tex.),  7  S. 
W.  Rep.  670. 

7  Woolen  V.  Wire  (Ind.),  11  North 
East.  Rep.  236;  State  v.  Arnold,  12 
Iowa,  479;  State  v.  Davis,  14  Nev. 
439;  State  v.  Leicht,  17  Iowa,  28: 
State  V.  Ward,  14  La.  Ann.  673;  State 
V.  Bennett,  14  La.  Ann.  651;  State  v. 
Bell,  15  La.  Ann.  114.  But  see  Chi- 
cago &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Adler,  56  111.  344 ; 
Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Buttolf,  66  111. 
347;  Galena  &c.  R.  Co.  r>.  Haslam,  73 
111,494;  Riclimond  tJ.  Roberts,  98  111. 
472.  In  these  cases  it  was  held  tliat 
the  representative  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany had  a  right  to  ask  jurors  this 
question:  "  If  upon  hearing  the  testi- 
mony, they  should  find  it  evenly  bal- 
anced, which  Tvay  they  would  be 
inclined  to  decide  the  case?" 


Tit.   1,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    LMPANELING. 


103 


unnecessarily  ji^'o/Za;  or  minute  in  their  details.^  Where  the  stat- 
ute prescribes  the  questions  which  shall  be  put,  it  rests  in 
the  discretion  of  the  court  to  allow  otlier  questions  to  be  pro- 
pounded or  to  allow  other  evidence  to  be  adduced ;  though  au- 
thority is  not  quite  harmonious  on  this  point.-  But  it  should  be 
remembered  in  this  connection  that,  according  to  the  prevailing 
view,  the  causes  of  challenge  })rescribcd  ])y  statutes  are  not  exclu- 
sive of  others.^  Where  a  venire-man  is  challenged  on  the  ground 
of  bias,  prejudice-  or  opinion,  a  very  wide  range  of  inquiry  is 
permissible,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  real  extent  to 
which  his  mind  is  affected  for  or  against  either  party.  Circum- 
stances may  be  gone  into,  including  those  which  relate  to  a  period 
subsequent  to  his  coming  to  court;  *  but  irrelevant  questions, — 
as  whether  the  venire-man  believes  in  a  future  state  of  rewards 
and   punishments,^  or  whether  he  has  formed  or  expressed  an 


1  Thus,  it  is  sufficient,  on  a  trial 
for  murder,  to  ask  the  venire-man 
whether  he  has  formed  or  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  prisoner  is  truilty, 
without  extending  it  to  the  different 
grades  of  homicide.  State  v.  Mat- 
thews, 80  N.  C.  417.  See  also  Burr's 
Tr.  418;  United  States  v.  Callender, 
Whart.  St.  Tr.  688. 

2  Com.  V.  Gee,  6  Cash.  (Mass.)  174, 
177, 1'tej'  Dewey,  J. ;  Com.  v.  Thi-asher, 
11  Gray  (Mass.),  55,  oG;  Pierce  v. 
State,  13  N.  H.  536;  Jones  v.  State,  2 
Blackf .  (Ind.)  475,  478.  Contra,  Will- 
iams V.  State,  3  Ga.  453,  where  Lump- 
kin, J.,  delivering  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  held  it  to  be  improper  to  ask 
any  other  questions  of  a  juror  than 
those  authorized  by  statute,  with  a 
view  to  ascertaining'  whether  he  is 
objectionable  for  favor.  See  also 
King  r.  State,  21  Ga.  220;  Pines  v. 
State,  21  Ga.  227;  Monday  r.  State,  32 
Ga.  672;  Bishop  v.  State,  9  Ga.  121; 
Dumas  v.  State,  63  Ga.  600.  Compare 
State  V.  Wilson,  7  Iowa,  407.  The 
statutory  form  of   questions   may  be 


varied,  in  order  to  make  their  import 
clear  to  the  juror.  Mitchell  v.  State, 
22  Ga.  211;  Henry  v.  State,  33  Ga. 
441;  Carte  v.  State,  56  Ga.  463. 

3  Block  r.  State,  100  Ind.  357;  Lester 
r.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  433;  Williams  v. 
State,  44  Tex.  34;  Caldwell  v.  State, 
41  Tex.  86;  Etheridge  r.  State,  8  Tex. 
App.  133.  Compare  Jones  v.  State,  8 
Tex.  App.  648 ;  Hanks  v.  State,  21  Tex. 
526.  A  statute  which  prescribes  that 
ou  giving  an  affirmative  answer  to  a 
prescribed  question,  the  venire-man 
"  shall  be  discharged,"  is  mandatory, 
and  no  further  examination  or  ex- 
planation is  permissible.  Staguer  v. 
State,  9  Tex.  App.  440. 

4  See,  for  statements  and  illustra- 
tions of  this  doctrine  People  v.  Bodine, 
Edm.  Sel.  Cas.  36,  77;  s.  c.  1  Denio 
(N.  Y.),  281;  People  v.  Houeyman,  3 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  121,  124;  Freeman  v. 
People,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.),  9,  35;  Smith  v. 
Floyd,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  522;  Thomp- 
son V.  People,  3  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 
467. 

5  State  V.  Hamilton,  27  La.  Ann.  45a. 


104  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.   Tr. » 

opinion  as  to  the  credibility  of  a  particular  witness/  are  not  al- 
lowed. 

§  103.  [Continued.]  Questions  touching"  Religious  or  Po- 
litical Opinions,  Affiliations,  etc.  —  Questions  touching  the 
scruples  of  the  venire-man,  whether  religious  or  otherwise,  if 
the  answers  would  probably  disclose  facts  affecting  his  impar- 
tiality as  a  juror,  ought  to  be  put.^  So,  on  the  trial  of  certain 
foreigiipn^^  it  was  held  proper  to  ask  the  venire-man,  suspected 
of  belono-ino;  to  the  so-called  Know-Nothinq  organization, 
whether  he  had  taken  an  oath  or  obligation  of  such  a  character 
as  caused  a  prejudice  in  his  mind  against  foreigners;  ^  and,  on 
the  trial  of  persons  engaged  in  a  riot  between  foreign  Roman 
Catholics  and  native  Americans,  it  was  held  that  a  venire-man 
could  not  refuse,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  disgrace  him,  to 
answer  whether  he  had  any  bias  against  Roman  Catholics,  or 
whether  he  belonged  to  the  order  of  United  Americans.^  On 
the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  on  a  trial  for  participat 
ing  in  the  destruction  of  a  convent  by  mob  violence  (many  of- 
the  witnesses  being  Roman  Catholics),  a  venire-man  could  not 
be  asked  whether  he  entertained  the  opinion  that  a  Roman  Cath- 
olic was  not  to  be  believed  on  oath;  whether  the  destruction 
of  the  building  under  certain  circumstances  constituted  a  crime ; 

1  Com,  I?.  Porter,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  423.  -niiether  he  was  not  a  Methodist,  and 

Where  the  issue  to  be  tried,  under  an  whether  the  Methodists  liad  religious 

indictment    for  murder,   arose   on  a  scruples  touching  the  legality  of  slav- 

special  plea  of    former  acquittal,   it  ery.     But  this,  like  many  other  cases 

was   held  that  the  venire-man   could  m  those  reports,  is  of  slight  authority, 
not  be   asked  whether  he  had  formed  ^  People  v.  Keyes,  5  Cal.  347. 

or   expressed  an  opinion    as   to  the  *  Peoples.  Christie,  2  Abb.  Pr,  (N.. 

guilt  or  innocence  of  the   accused  as  Y.)    251];     s.    c.  2  Park.    Cr.   (N.  Y.) 

charged    in  the     indictment.      Jose-  579.     But  it  has  been  held  that  a  ve- 

phiue  V.  State,  39  Miss.  613.  nire-man  iu  a  prosecution  for  counter- 

2  Jones  V.    State,   3  Blackf.    (Ind.)  feitiug,  cannot  be  asked   whether  he 

475,  478.     See  also  Driskell  v.  Parish,  has  not  taken  an  oath   to  acquit  all 

10  Law  Reporter,  395.    Contra,  Keason  persons  of    counterfeiting,  and    that 

V.  Bridges,    1  Cranch  C.    C.    (U.    S.)  he   may  properly   decline    to   answer. 

477,  where  on  the  trial  of   a  petition  Fletcher  v.  State,  6  Humph.    (Teun.) 

for  freedom,  the  court  refused  to  al-  249. 
low    a   juror  to   be   examined  as  to 


Tit.   I,  Cll.   IV.]       CHALLEXGIXCr    AND    IMPANELING.  105 

or  whether  such  ;iu  offeuse  ought  to  be  punished  by  hiw,  or  in 
the  same  measure  prescribed  by  hiw  for  other  offenses  of  the 
same  kiud.^  So,  on  the  trial  of  one  charo-ed  with  beino"  ens^aijed  in 
an  illegal  calh'ng,  a  venire-man  cannot  be  asked  whether  he  would 
give  less  credit  to  the  testimony  of  one  proved  to  be  engaged 
in  such  calling  than  to  that  of  other  persons.'^  But  it  has  been 
held  proper,  on  the  trial  of  m  white  man  for  the  murder  of  a 
negro,  to  ask  venire-men  whether  they  could,  upon  the  same 
evidence,  return  the  same  verdict  against  a  icliite  tiian  for  kill- 
ing a  negro  as  for  killing  another  white  man."^  In  California, 
upon  the  trial  of  a  Clnnaman  for  a  criminal  offense,  the  following 
questions  may  be  put  to  a  venire-man:  "Other  things  being^ 
equal,  would  you  take  the  word  of  a  Chinaman  as  soon  as 
you  would  that  of  a  white  man?"  "If  the  defendant,  a 
Chinaman,  should  be  sworn  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf, 
would  you  give  his  testimony  the  s.ime  credit  that  you  would 
give  to  the  story  told  by  a  white  person  under  the  same  circum- 
stances ?  "  ^ 

§  104.  Swearing  Singly  or  in  a  Body.  —  Some  writers  cast 
doubt  upon  the  question,^  3'ct  the  common-law  practice  clearly 
was  to  swear  each  juror  as  soon  as  he  was  accepted.^  By  the 
American  practice,  the  jurors  are  not  generally  sworn  until  a  full 
jury  is  completed,  and  then  they  are  sworn  in  a  body.^  But  this 
practice  is  so  far  flexible  that,  unless  a  different  rule  is  pre- 
scribed by  statute,  each  juror  may  be  sworn  as  he  is  accepted,  or 

1  Com.  V.  Buzzell,  (J  Pick.   (Mass.)  143,  150,  152;  Joy  on  Confessions  and 

153.  Challenges,  220;  1  Chit.  Cr.  L.  54,  77; 

-  United  States  v.  Duff,  6  Fed.  Rep.  Count  Conigsmark's  Case,  9  How.  St. 

45,48.     But  see  a««e,  §  73.  Tr,    12;  Cook's    Case,    13   How.    St. 

»  Lester  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  432.  Tr.    318;    Layer's  Case,  16  How.  St. 

See  also  State  v.  McAfee,  C4  N.  C.  33'J.  Tr.  135,  and  especially  the  remarks  of 

Pobjgamist  not  disqnalifled  under  Act  Mr.  Justice  Abbot  in  Braudretli's  Case, 

of  Cong,  of  March  22,  1882:  People  v.  32  How.  St.   Tr.  G94;  State  v.  Potter, 

Hoyt,  3  Utah,  396.  18  Conn.  lOG,  17(3,  per  Williams,  C.  J. ; 

*  People  V.  Gar  Soy,  57  Cal.  102;  Lamb  v.  State,  86  Wis.  424,  428,  per 
s.  c  28  Alb.  L.  J.  418.  Ryan,  C.  J. 

5  1  Chit.  Cr.  L.  551 ;  2  Hale  P.  C.  293.  '  Ante,  §  92. 

*  Trials   per  Pais    (ed.    1725),   pp. 


106  IMPANELING   THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

the  administration  of  the  oath  may  be  delayed  until  the  jury  is 
completed.^  But,  since  in  either  case  the  parties  must  exercise 
their  right  of  i^eremptory  challenge  before  the  jurors  are  sworn, 
it  has  been  considered  the  better  practice  in  criminal  cases  to 
have  the  jury  full  before  any  of  them  are  sworn,  so  as  to  give 
the  parties  the  benefit  of  their  peremptory  challenges  down  to 
the  latest  possible  point  of  time.- 

§  105.  Time  of  Swearing, — In  a  civil  case,  the  jury  cannot 
be  properly  sworn  until  a  plea  has  been  filed  and  an  issue  joined 
thereon,^  nor  before  the  suit  has  been  called  for  trial;  *  nor  in  a 
criminal  case,  before  the  accused  has  pleaded  to  the  indictment.^ 
And  if  the  whole  or  a  portion  of  them  have  been  sworn  before 
his  arraignment,  he  may  ask  that  they  be  resworn,  though  he 
waives  the  irregularity  by  not  preferring  the  request.^ 

§  106.  Reswearing  the  Jury.  — Where,  upon  the  trial  of  two 
persons  jointly  indicted,  there  is  a  severance  after  the  jury  and 
witnesses  have  been  sworn,  both  the  jury  and  the  witnesses  must 
be  sworn  again. ^  The  better  opinion,^  though  denied  by  one 
court,^  is  that,  if  the  issue  is  changed  by  an  amendment  of  the 
pleadings  during  tlie  progress  of  the  trial,  a  failure  to  reswear 
the  jury  will  not  be  error,  at  least  unless  the  complaining  party 

1  People  V.  Reynolds,  16  Cal.  128;  Rose,  Hemp.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  37;  Balti- 
O'Counor  v.  State,  9  Fla.  215,  226.  more  &c.  R.    Co.    v.    Christie,    5   W. 

2  State  V.  Anderson,  4  Nev.  265;  Va.  325;  Brown  v.  Warner,  2  J.  J. 
O'Connorv.  State,  9  Fla.  215.     Unless  Marsh.  (Ky.)  39. 

prescribed  l)y  statnte,  there  is  no  rule  ^  Marshall  v.  Krngg,  2  A.  K.  Marsh. 

of  pi'actice  reqiiiring/o»r  jurors  to  be  (Ky.)  36. 

called  at  a  time,  for  the  purpose  of  ^  Vezaiu  v.  People,  40  111.  397. 

being  sworn.     According  to  that  opin-  ^  Ihid. 

ion,  a  greater  or  less  number  may  be  ^  Babcock  v.  People,  15  Hun  (N.Y.), 

called  at  any  one  time,  and  the  parties  347. 

may  be  required  to  pass  upon  them.  ^  Williams  v.  Miller,  10   Iowa,  344 

Walker  v.  Collier,  37  111.  362.  (overruling  Cole  v.  Swan,  4  G.  Greene, 

3  Everhart    v.     Hickman,    4    Bibb  32);  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  20  Iowa,  273; 
(Ky.),  341;  Clagget  v.   Force,  1  Dana  Hinkle  ??.  Davenport,  38  Iowa,  355- 
(Ky.),  429;  Shaiu  v.  Markham,  4  J.  J.  ^  Kerschbaugher  v.  Slusser,  12  Ind. 
Marsh.    (Ky.)    580;  Hopkins  r.  Pres-  453;  Hoot  w.  Spade,  20  Ind.  326. 

ton,  2  A.  K.  Marsh,  (Ky.)  64;  Miles  v. 


Tit.   I,  Cll.    IV.]        CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


107 


requests  that  this  be  done,  which  request  is  refused.  But  if  the 
anicndnuMit  does  not  change  the  issues,  it  is  not  necessary  to  re- 
swear the  jury.^ 

§  107.  Swearing  for  the  Term.  — There  is  some  loose  opin- 
ion to  the  effect  that,  where  all  the  jurors  selected  and  drawn  are 
sworn  at  the  coniinencenient  of  the  term,  to  try  the  several  is- 
sues upon  which  they  may  sit  as  jurors  during  the  term,  this 
will  be  sufficient,''  at  least  unless  the  complaining  party  insisted 
upon  having  the  jury  which  was  impaneled  sworn  in  the  particu- 
lar case."^  But  this  is  clearly  contrary  to  the  course  of  the  com- 
mon law;  and  the  better  opinion  is  that,  where  a  different 
practice  is  not  prescribed  by  statute,  it  lacks  the  necessary 
solemnity,  and  each  jury  should  be  sworn  to  try  the  issues  in 
each  particular  case.* 

§  108.  Form  of  the  Oath.  — AVhere  the  form  of  the  oath  is 
prescribed  by  statute,  none  other  can  be  administered.  The  oath 
used  at  connnon  law,  as  well  as  that  prescribed  by  statute  in 
criminal  cases,  is  essentially  different  from  that  used  in  civil 
cases,  and  the  better  opinion  therefore  is  that  it  is  erior  in  a 
criminal  case  to  use  that  prescribed  for  civil  cases,^  though  an 
objection  for  such  an  irregularity  will  not  })e  available  if  taken 


^  Kuowles  V.  Rexroth,  07  lud.  59; 
Merrill  v.  St.  Louis,  83  Mo.  244;  s.  c. 
aflfd,  12  Mo.  App.  400. 

-  People  V.  Albauj,  G  Weud.  (X. 
Y.)  548. 

^  Hardeuburgli  v.  Crary,  15  How. 
Pr.  (X.  Y.)  307. 

*  Barney  v.  People,  22  111.  KJO.  This 
too  much  resembles  the  practice  of 
the  economical  deacon  who  blessed 
the  pork  barrel  instead  of  asking  a 
blessing  at  each  meal. 

5  State  V.  Rullius,  22  N.  H.  528; 
Sutton  V.  State,  41  Tex.  513;  Bray  v. 
State,  41  Tex.  5G0.  Where  two  oaths 
are  prescribed  by  statute,  one  to  be 
administered  to  jurors  on  the  trial  of 


"any  civil  action  or  proceeding,"  the 
other  in  criminal  trials,  tlie  former 
oath  must  bo  used  in  a  bastardy  pro- 
ceeding. "The  use  of  tiie  latter  is 
contined  exclusively  to  the  trial  of 
cases  wholly  and  essentially  criminal 
in  their  nature  and  character.  The 
former  is  applicable,  not  only  to  the 
trial  of  civil  actions,  properly  so  called, 
but  to  all  sue  h  other  actions  and  special 
proceedings  as,  strictly  speaking  are 
neither  civil  nor  criminal  actions,  and 
hence  cannot  properly  be  classified 
under  either  head."  State  v.  "Worth- 
ingham,  23  Minn.  528,  537.  See  also 
State  V.  Pate,  Busb.  244. 


108 


IMPANELIXG    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


after  verdict}  Therefore,  although  the  oath  which  was  admin- 
istered may  not  have  conformed  to  the  statutory  form,  yet  it  will 
be  sufficient  that  the  record  states  that  the  Jury  were  duly  sworn, 
and  a  party  will  not  be  permitted  to  contradict  it.^  In  civil 
cases,  the  common-law  form  is:  "  You  solemnly  swear  that  you 
shall  well  and  truly  try  the  issues  joined  between  A.  B.,  plaintiff, 
and  CD.,  defendant,  and  a  true  verdict  give  according  to  the 
evidence."  ^  Under  many  American  State  constitutions,  as 
hereafter  seen, ^  J i«ror.s  in  criminal  cases  are  judges  of  the  law,  as 
well  as  of  the  fact.  There  is  hence  some  opinion  that  it  is  neces- 
sary in  a  criminal  case  to  swear  the  jury  a  true  verdict  to  render 
according  to  the  law  and  the  evidence.^  But  it  should  be  said  that 
no  authoritative  common-law  precedent  sanctions  such  a  form ;®  and 
as,  in  most  of  the  American  States,  the  jurors  are  bound  to  take 
the  law  from  the  court,  it  is  apprehended  that  in  most  such  jurisdic- 
tions, the  common-law  form  need  not  be  varied  in  this  particular.' 


1  State  V.  Robinson,  36  La.  Ann. 
873;  Seymour  v.  Parnell  (Fla.),  2 
South.  Eep.  312;  State  ■«.  Wilson,  36 
La.  Ann.  864.  See  also  Harriman 
V.  State,  2  G.  Greene  ■  (Iowa) ,  285; 
Wrockledge  v.  State,  1  Clarke  (Iowa), 
167;  Candler  v.  Hammond,  23  Ga. 
493;  Looper  u.  Bell,  1  Head  (Tenu.), 
373. 

2  Candler  v.  Hammond,  23  Ga.  493; 
Cornelius  v.  Boucher,  1  111.  12;  Ap- 
plegate  v.  Boyles,  10  Ind.  435;  Looper 
V.  Bell,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  373.  In  any 
case,  if  a  party  would  object  to  the 
form  of  the  oath  as  actually  adniinis- 
terc<l,  he  must  incorporate  it  into  his 
bill  of  exceptions,  in  order  that  a  court 
of  error  may  see  whether  the  form 
used  was  proper  or  not.  Bartlett  v. 
State,  28  Ohio  St.  669,  672;  Preston  v. 
State,  8  Tex.  App.30;  Dyson  v.  State, 
26  Miss.  362;  Barfield  v.  Inipson,  1 
Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.)  326;  Cato  v.  State,  9 
Fla.  163;  Wellborn  v.  Spears,  32  Miss. 
139. 

^  3  Bl.  Comm.  365.     It  is  sufficient 


if  the  jury  are  sworn  "well  and  truly 
to  try,  and  the  truth  to  speak  upon  the 
issues  joined."  Burk  v.  Clark,  8  Fla. 
9.  Where  a  jury  is  sworn  to  try  "  the 
issue  "  in  a  case  presenting  severa) 
issues,  the  word  "issue"  will- be 
taken  collectively,  all  the  issues  being 
considered  as  one.  Hatcher  v.  Fow- 
ler, 1  Bil)b  (Ky.),  337;  Bate  v.  Lewis, 
1  J.  J.  M:irsh.  (Ky.)  316;  Pointer  v. 
Thompson,  7  Humph.  (Tenn.)  532. 
But  see  Adams  v.  State,  11  Ark.  466. 
The  practitioner  should  be  cautioned 
that  this  form  may  be  modified  by 
statute  in  his  jurisdiction,  and  he 
should  look  to  that. 

^  Post,  §  2140,  et  seq. 

5  Patterson  v.  State,  7  Ark.  59; 
Sandford  v.  State,  11  Ark.  328;  Bell  v. 
State,  10  Ark.  536;  Bivens  v.  State,  11 
Ark.  455. 

*^  See  Trials  per  Pais  (1725),  pp. 
192,  193. 

7  O'Connor  v.  State,  9  Fla.  215;. 
State  V.  Jones,  5  Ala.  666. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING   AND    IMPANELING.  109 

§  109.  [Continued.]  In  Particular  Cases. —  On  an  inquiry 
of  damages,  or,  to  use  the  ancient  form  of  expression,  a  lurit  of 
inquiry,  after  a  judgment  by  default,  the  jurors  are  sworn  not 
"  to  try  the  issues,"  but  "to  assess  the  phiintiff 's  damages," 
though  an  irreguhirity  in  this  particuhir,  will  not  reverse  the 
judgment.^  But  where  an  issue  has  been  joined,  to  swear  a  jury 
to  inquire  of  damages,  will  be  reversible  error;  since,  in  such  a 
case,  they  are  clearly  not  sworn  to  try  the  contested  issues  of 
fact.'^  The  practice  of  swearing  the  jury,  as  well  to  try  the 
i-sue  of  fact,  as  to  inquire  of  the  damages,  on  an  issue  of  law 
previously  found  for  the  plaintiff,  o))tains  only  where  the  decis- 
ion of  the  issue  of  law  entitles  the  plaintiff  to  damages  without 
regard  to  the  trial  of  the  issue  of  fact.-^  In  suits  on  penal 
bonds,  where  breaches  have  been  assigned,  swearing  the  jury  to 
inquire  into  the  truth  of  the  breaches,  is  equivalent  to  swearing 
them  to  try  the  issues.*  And  so,  swearing  them  to  try  the 
issues  joined,  is  equivalent  to  swearing  them  to  inquire  into  the 
truth  of  the  breaches;  although  strict  practice  would  require 
them  to  be  sworn  to  inquire  into  the  truth  of  the  breaches  and 
to  assess  the  damages  as  to  the  party  in  default,  as  well  as  to  try 
the  issues  and  assess  the  damages  as  to  the  defendants  Avho  have 
pleaded  to  the  action.^ 

Article  II.  —  Objections  and  the  Waiver  and  Review  of  the  Same. 

Section'    113.  Time  of  takinj?  Objections  to  Irregularities. 
Hi.  Waiver  of  Causes  of  Cliallenge. 

115.  Waiver  of  Exceptions  for  Disallowance  of  Challenges. 

116.  Objections  to  Incompetency  after  Verdict. 

117.  Evidence  iu  Support  of  sucli  Objections. 

118.  Question,  lio^v  viewed  on  Error  or  Appeal. 

119.  What  the  Record  must  show. 

120.  No  Vested  Riirht  in  a  particular  Juror. 

121.  Juror  no  Vested  Right  to  serve. 

1  Colorado  Springs  v.  Hewitt,  3  see  Caldwell  v.  Irvine,  4  J.  J.  Marsh. 
Colo.   275;    Denny    v.    Hutclieson,    1       (Ky.)  108. 

Bibb  (Ky.),57G;  Roberts  v.  Swearen-  3  Swann  v.  Rary,  3  Blackf.   (Ind.) 

gen,  Hard.  (Ky.)  121.  298,    300;    Vaden  v.    Ellis,    18    Ark. 

2  W^illiaras  v.  Norris,  2   Litt.  157;      355. 

Townsend  V.    Jeffries,    17    Ala.    270;  *  McCoy  r.  State,  22  Arlv.  308. 

Adams  v.  State,  G  Ark.  497,  505.     But  ^  gtate  r.  Gibson,  21  Ark.  140. 


110 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  113.  Time  of  taking  Objections  to  Irregularities.  — Irreg- 
ularities in  selecting  the  general  jury  list,  in  drawing  the  panel, 
and  in  summoning  those  whose  names  have  been  drawn,  as  already 
seen,'  are  properly  objected  to  by  a  challenge  to  the  array.  Such 
an  objection  ou^ht  not  to  be  listened  to  after  trial  begun,  except 
for  cogent  reasons  and  upon  a  clear  showing  that  it  could  not 
have  been  made  sooner;  though  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  court 
may  entertain  it  in  its  discretion?  As  already  seen,^  in  many 
jurisdictions  the  statutes  governing  these  steps  in  the  selection 
of  a  jury,  are  regarded  as  directory  merely.  In  these  and  in 
other  jurisdictions,  the  analogous  doctrine  exists  that  informali- 
ties of  this  kind  will  not  be  permitted  to  vitiate  a  verdict,  although 
they  did  not  sooner  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  complaining 
party,  unless  positive  injury  is  shown  to  have  accrued  therefrom.* 
In    like    manner,  a   knovm    or    obvious  irregularity  in  the  pro- 


1  Ante,  §  31,  et  seq. 

-  Dovey  v.  Hobsou,  2  Marsh.  154; 
s.  c.  6  Taunt.  4G0;  State  v.  Stephens, 
11  So.  Car.  319;  Steele  v.  Malony,  1 
Minn.  347. 

3  Ante,  §§  33,  34. 

4  Doolittle  V.  State,  93  Incl.  272; 
Buford  V.  McGetchie,  60  Iowa,  298; 
CaklwcU  V.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  358; 
Page  V.  Danvers,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  326, 
327.  See  also  Reed  v.  State,  1  Tex. 
App.  1 ;  Mikell  v.  State,  62  Ga.  368. 
The  same  rule  was  applied  in  the  fol- 
lowing cases  where  objection  was 
made,  after  verdict,  to  the  legality  of 
the  drawing.  Ray  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App. 
450;  Amlierst  v.  Hadley,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  38;  State?;.  Hascall,  6  N.  H. 

■352;  Bodge  v.  Foss,  39  N.  H.  406; 
Pittsfield  V.  Barnstead,  40  N.  H.  477; 
Wilcox  V.  School  Dist.,  26  N.  H.  303; 
Gormley  v.  Laramore,  40  Ga.  253; 
Wentworth  v.  Farmington,  51  N.  H. 
128,  135;  Hasselmeyer  v.  State,  1  Tex. 
App.  690;  State  v.  Williams,  2  Hill 
(S.  C),  381;  State  v,  Douglass,  63  N. 
C.  500;  Anderson  v.  State,  5  Ark.  445; 
Walker  v.  Boston  &c.  R.  Co.,  3  Cush. 


(Mass.)  1,  19;  State  v.  Beasley,  32  La. 
Ann.  1162;  New  York  v.  Mason,  4  E. 
D.  Smith  (N.  Y.),  142;  State  v.  Under- 
wood, 6Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  96;  State  i?. 
Courtney,  28  La.  Ann.  794;  State  v. 
Rigg,  10  Nev.  284;  Com.  v.  Sallager,  3 
Clark  (Penn.),  127;  People  v.  Cum- 
mings,  3  Park.  C.  (N.  Y.)  343.  And 
so  with  respect  to  objections  affecting 
the  validity  of  tlie  summons.  Bennett 
V.  Matthews,  40  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  428; 
Vidal  V.  Thompson,  11  :\Iart.  (La.)  23; 
Kennedy  v.  Com.,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  340; 
Daniel  v.  Frost,  62  Ga.  697;  Stone  v. 
People,  3  111.  326;  State  v.  Boon,  80 
N.  C.  461;  Bronson  v.  People,  32  Mich. 
34;  Fowler  v.  Middlesex,  6  Allen 
(Mass.),  92;  Sohmder  v.  People,  2 
Colo.  48;  New  York  v.  Mason,  4  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y.),  142;  Dayharsh  v.  Enos, 
5  N.  Y.  581;  Green  v.  State,  17  Fla. 
669;  Brunskill  v.  Giles,  9  Bing.  13; 
Rector  v.  Hudson,  20  Tex.  234;  Jame- 
son V.  Androscoggin  R.  Co.,  52  Me. 
412.  A  statute  of  Louisiana  requires 
all  objections  to  the  manner  of  draw- 
ing juries,  or  to  any  defect  or  irregu- 
larity tUat  can  be  pleaded  against  any 


i 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLEXGIXa    AND    IMPANELING. 


HI 


cess  of  impaneling  must  be  objected  to  at  the  time  when  it  is 
committed;  it  will  be  too  late  to  make  the  objection  for  the 
first  time  on  a  motion  for  new  triaJ  ^  or  in  arrest  of  judo-ment.^ 


array  or  venire,  to  be  urired  on  the  lirst 
day  of  the  term;  otherwise  such  ob- 
jections are    considered    as    waived. 
State  V.   Thomas,   32  La.   Ann.    3-1!); 
State  V.  Given,  32  La.  Ann.  782;  State 
V.  Harris,  30  La.  Ann.  90.     A  statute 
of  South  Carolina  provides  that  "no 
irregularity  in  any  writ  of  venire  facias, 
or  in  the  drawings,  summoning,  re- 
turning or  impaui'ling  of  jurors,  shall 
be  suUlcient  to  set  aside  the  verdict, 
unless  the  party  making  the  objection 
was  injured  by  the  irregularity,    or 
unless  the  objection  was  made  before 
the  returning  of    the  verdict."     See 
State    r.    Coleman,    8    So.   Car.    237. 
Similar  statutes  are  found   in  other 
States.     See   1  Bright.  Purd.  (Penn.) 
Dig.,  p.  838,  §  82;  Code  Va.   1873,  p. 
1002,  §   21;   Rev.    Stat.   W.   Va.   187!l, 
chap.    109,    §    25;    R.    S.    Wis.     1878, 
§  2881 ;  Bush  Dig,  Fla.,  chap.  104,  §  26; 
G.  S.  Mass.  1860,  chap.  131,   §  32;  R. 
S.  :Me.  1871,  chap.  82,  §  78.     That  the 
name  of  the  same  juror  appeared  twice 
upon  the  venire,  without  any  collusion 
or  improper  design,  is  no  ground  of 
error.     McCarty  v.  State,  2(5  :Miss.  302. 
Xor  is  it  that  the  name  of  one  of  the 
jurors,  -who  sat  upon  the  trial  of  the 
case,  was  not  upon  the  vcnjVe  returned 
by  the  sheriff,  where  it  appears  tiiat 
he  had  been  summoned  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  term,  and  his  name 
entered  on  the  minutes  and  tlrawn  from 
the  box,  like  those  of  the  other  jurors. 
Thrall  v.  Smiley,  9  Cal.  529. 

1  Com.  V.  Stowell,  9  Mete.  (Mass.) 
572;  Bristow's  Case,  15  Gratt.  (Va.) 
634;  Ilardenburgh  v.  Crary,  15  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  307;  State  v.  Slack,  1 
Bailey  (S.  C),  330;  Clough  v.  State,  7 
Neb.  320;  Gardenhire  v.  State,  6  Tex. 


App.  117,  l.'.l;  :Muuroe  v.  Brlgham,  19 
Pick.    (Muss.)   368;   Boyd  v.  State,  17 
Ga.  194;   State  v.  Ward,  2  HaAvks  (X. 
C),  443;  State  v.  Belcher,  13  So.  Car, 
459;    Ray  v.  State,   4  Tex.  App.  450; 
State  V.  Boon,  80  N.  C.  461 ;  s.  c.  82  N. 
C.  637;  Dayharsh  v.  Enos,  5  N.  Y.  531 ; 
State  V.  Turner,  25  La.  Ann.  573 ;  Par- 
sons   V.  Harper,    16  Gratt.    (Va.)  64; 
Grant  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  1 ;  People 
V.  Ransom,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  417;  Cole 
V.  Perry,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  584;  Grant  v. 
State,  3  Tex.  App.  1 ;  State  v.  Brown, 
12  Minn.  538;  Williams  «.  State  (Ala.), 
1  South  Rep.    179;   Brown  v.  Autrey 
(Ga.),  3  S.  E.  Rep.  669.     It  has  been 
so  held  in  a  case  of  a  talesman,  sum- 
moned to  complete  a  particular  iianel, 
being  sworn  for  tiie  term  and  allowed 
to  sit  in  otlier  cases  (Howlaud  v.  Gif- 
f ord,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  43,  note) .    Where 
the  judge,  during  the  process  of  imi)an- 
eliugthe  jury,  permits  those  who  have 
been  selected  to  go  at  liberty  and  min- 
gle with  the  crowd,  during  a  delay  in 
the   proceedings    resulting   from  the 
summoning  of  talesmen,  it  is  the  duty 
of  a  party,  having  objections  to  such 
action  of  the  court,   to    make  them 
known  at  the  time,  or  at  least  before 
the  selection  of  jurors  from  the  tales- 
men i)egins.     Such  o1)jections  will  not 
avail,  if  held  back  until  after  the  jury 
are  sworn.     James  v.    State,  53  Ala. 
380;    Rol)bins    v.   State,   49  Ala.   394. 
But  see  Grissom  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App. 
374.     Allowing  the  jurors  impaneled, 
but  not  sworn,  to  separate  for  the 
night  is  not  an  irregularity  in  civil 
cases.     Miller  r.   Wilson,  24  Pa.  St. 
114;  Spencer  v.  DeFrance,  3G.  Greene 
(Iowa),  216. 

2  State  i:  White,  35  La.  Ann.  96. 


112 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  114.  Waiver  of  Causes  of  Challenge.  —  A  party  is  entitled 
to  waive  a  cause  of  challenge  which  he  may  have  against  a  juror, 
and  suffer  the  juror  to  sit  in  the  case/  and  the  other  party  can 
derive  no  advantage  from  such  waiver.'-^  So,  if  one  party  waive 
a  cause  which  disqualifies  the  venire-man  as  against  him,  the 
other  party  cannot  malve  the  disqualification  a  ground  of  chal- 
lenge.^ If  both  the  prisoner  and  the  State's  counsel  waive  an 
objection  for  bias,  the  judge  cannot  reject  the  venire-man^  sua 
sponte.^  As  already  seen,  the  right  to  challenge  the  array  is 
ivaived  by  a  challenge  to  the  polls. ^  So,  a  right  of  challenge  for 
cause,  or  what  is  in  substance  the  same,  an  exception  to  the  over- 
ruling of  such  a  challenge,  is  waived  by  a  peremptory  challenge 
of  the  same  juror. ^  But,  if  a  challenge  to  the  array  has  been 
once  taken,  an  exception  to  the  overruling  of  it  i^not ivaived  by 
an  effort  to  secure  an  impartial  jury  by  challenges  to  the  polls.' 
A  hiown  cause  of  challenge  is  always  waived  by  withholding  it, 
and  raising  it  as  an  objection  after  verdict;  since  such  a  practice 
is  incompatible  with  the  good  faith  and  fair  dealing  which  should 
characterize  the  administration  of  justice.^     Therefore,  in  order 


1  People  V.  Mather,  4  Weud.  (N. 
Y.)  229,  246.  Compare  the  old  cases 
of  Kuyaston  v.  Shrewsbury,  Audrews, 
85;  Anon.,  Aiidersou,  272;  Alleway  w. 
Rowden,  2  Show.  423. 

2  Thus,  if  the  State  have  a  cause  of 
clialleuge,  because  the  venire-mau  has 
a  fixed  opinion  against  capital  or  peni- 
tentiary punishment,  it  is  a  matter  of 
choice  with  the  prosecuting  counsel 
whether  he  Avill  challenge  for  this 
cause.     Murphy  v.  State,  37  Ala.  142. 

3  Such  as  consanguinity  or  affinity. 
State  V.  Ketchey,  70  N.  C.  G21. 

*  Greer  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  179. 

^  Ante,  §  91;  Co.  Litt.  158.  a.; 
Watkins  v.  Weaver,  10  Johns.  107; 
Tallmaa  v.  W^oodwortli,  2  Johns.  385. 
After  a  failure  to  mal^e  such  a  chal- 
lenge at  the  proper  time,  any  ol)jec- 
tion  to  the  legality  of  subsequent 
proceedings  must  ])e  addressed  to  the 
discretion  of  the  court;  which  will  not 


be  exercised  to  the  relief  of  the  party 
complaining,  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence showing  some  positive  injury  to 
have  been  suffered.  Barton  v.  Quinn, 
Batty  (Irish  Rep.),  552. 

6  Ford-y.  Umatilla  Co.  (Ore.),  IGPac. 
Rep.  33 ;  Minich  v.  State,  8  Colo.  440. 

'  Clinton  v.  Englebrecht,  13  Wall. 
434.  An  exception,  formally  taken  to 
the  decision  of  the  court  in  disallowing 
challenge,  is  not  Avaived  by  a  negative 
answer  to  the  inquiry  of  the  court,  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  impaneling,  as 
to  whether  the  parties  have  any  objec- 
tion to  the  jurors  as  they  stand.  Hath- 
away V.  Ilelmer,  25  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  29. 

8  Dent  V.  Ilurtford,  2  Salk.  645; 
Fox  V.  Ilazelton,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  275, 
278,  opinion  by  Shaw,  C.  J.;  Hallock 
?;.  Franklin,  2  Mete.  (Mass.)  558;  Lady 
Herbert  v.  Shaw,  11  Mod.  118;  Fal- 
mouth V.  Roberts,  9  Mee.  &  W.  469; 
Carew  v.  Howard,  1  Root,  323;  Lisle 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMTANELING. 


113 


to  make  an  objection  to  a  juror  available  after  verdict,  the  ob- 
jecting party  must  prove  that  it  was  unknown  to  him,  and  that 
it  would  not  have  been  disclosed  to  him  by  a  proper  inquiry  be- 
fore the  jury  was  sworn. ^  For  the  pur{)()ses  of  this  rule,  tlie 
knoivledge  of  the  attorney  is  the  knowledge  of  his  client.'-     Hence, 


V.  State,  6  Mo.  42f.:  Bell  r.  Howard,  4 
Litt.  117;  Craig  r.  Elliott,  4  Bibb,  272 ; 
Jordan  ?'.  Meredith,  1  Binii.  (Pa.)  27; 
McCorkler.  Biims,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  340; 
Bellows  V.  Gallup,  Kirby  (Conn.),  106; 
"Williams  v.  Foppletou,  3  Ore.  139; 
Tomer  v.  Densmore,  8  Neb.  384;  Sel- 
leck  V.  Sugar  Hollow  Tp.  Co.,  13  Conn. 
453;  Bailey  v.  Trumbull,  31  Conn.  581 ; 
Brown  V.  State,  52  Ala.  345;  People  v. 
Stonecifer,  (>  Cal.  405;  People  r.  Sand- 
ford,  43  Cal.  29;  Eakman  r.  Sheaffer, 
48  Pa.  St.  17(;;  Parmele  v.  Gutliery,  2 
Root  (Conn.),  185;  Woodruffs.  Rich- 
ardson, 20  Conu.  238 ;  Lane  v.  Scoville, 
16  Kan.  402;  State  v.  Shay,  30  La.  An. 
114;  Hussey  v.  Allen,  59  Me.  269; 
DollofE  V.  Stimpson,  33  Me.  546;  Wer- 
ner V.  State,  44  Ark.  122;  State  v.  An- 
derson, 4  Nev.  265;  Lowe  v.  MeCorkle, 
8  West.  L.  J.  64;  United  States  v. 
Smith,  1  SaAvyer  (U.  S.),  277;  Bron- 
son  V.  People,  32  Mich.  34;  People  v. 
Scott,  56  Mich.  154;  State  t'.  Benton, 
2  Dev.  &  Bat.  (X.  C.)  196;  State  v. 
Groome,  10  la.  808.  If  any  objection 
exists  to  the  competency  of  a  trior,  it 
should  be  made  at  the  time  of  his  ap- 
pointment, when,  if  overruled,  an  ex- 
ception may  be  reserved.  It  cannot 
for  the  first  time  be  made  upon  a  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial.  People  v.  Voll, 
43  Cal.  166.  This  rule  is  also  applica- 
ble to  objections  affecting  the  impar- 
tiality of  referees.  Ipswich  v.  Essex, 
10  Pick.  (Mass.)  519;  Merrill  v.  Berk- 
shire, 11  Pick.  (Mass.)  269. 

1  Seal  V.  State,  13  Sraed.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  286;  Roseborough  v.  State,  43 
Tex.  570;  Brill  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App. 
572;  Maniou   v.  Flyun,  39  Conu.   330; 


Bradshaw  v.  Hubbard,  6  111.  390: 
Jameson  v.  Androscoggin  R.  Co.,  52 
Me.  412;  Tilton  v.  Kimball,  52  Me. 
500;  Goodwin  v.  Cloudman,  43  Me. 
577;  PowelH'.  Haley,  28Tex.  52;  Fal- 
mouth V.  Roberts,  9  Mee.  &  W.  469;  s. 
c.  1  Dowl.  (x.  s.)  G33;  Stewarts.  Ew- 
bank,  3  Iowa,  191.  Knowledge  that  a 
juror  is  a  man  of  intemperate  habits 
does  not  include  knowledge  of  the 
fact  that  he  is  subject  to  dclirinm 
tremens.  Hogshead  v.  State,  6  Humph. 
(Teuu.)  59 ;  Dent  v.  Hertford,  2  Salk. 
645.  Judgment  was  arrested,  where 
it  appeared  that  a  juror  who  had 
been  challenged  and  withdrawn  was 
brought  in  on  a  tales,  and  sat  upon 
the  trial  of  the  cause.  II ungate  v. 
Ilamond,  Cro.  Eliz.  188.  But  see  Koe- 
uigr.  Bauer,  1  Brewst.  (Pa.)  304. 

2  Russell  V.  Quiun,  114  Mass.  103; 
Kent  V.  Charlestowu,  2  Gray  (Mass.), 
281;  Orroku.  Com.  Ins.  Co.,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  456,  471;  Parks  v.  State,  4 
Ohio  St.  234;  Eastman  v.  Wight,  4 
Ohio  St.  156,  160;  State  v.  TuUer,  34 
Conn.  294;  Falmouth  v.  Roberts,  9 
Mee.  &  W,  469;  Clough  v.  State,  7 
Neb.  324;  Anderson  v.  State,  14  Ga. 
709;  Parker  v.  State,  55  Miss.  414; 
Jameson  v.  Androscoggin  R.  Co.,  52 
Me.  412;  Goodwin  v.  Cloudman,  43 
Me.  577;  State  v.  Bowden,  71  Me,  89; 
Powell  V.  Haley,  28  Tex.  52;  Pryme  v. 
Titchraarsh,  10  Mee.  &  W.  605;  True- 
blood  V.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  650;  Scott 
V.  Moore,  41  Vt.  205.  In  one  case,  the 
knowledge  of  the  attorney's  clerk 
seems  to  have  been  imputed  to  the 
client.  Falmouth  v.  Roberts,  9  Mee. 
&  W.  469 ;  s.  c.  1  Dowl.  (x.  s     63 


8 


114 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr 


an  affidavit  in  support  of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  upon  the 
ground  of  the  disqualification  of  a  juror,  should  unequivocally 
allege  that  the  moving  party  and  his  attorneys  were  themselves 
ignorant  of  the  matter  affecting  the  juror's  competency,  so  that 
the  olijection  could  not  be  seasonably  made.^  After  a  party  has 
announced  that  he  has  no  challenges  to  make,  he  cannot  resume 
the  right  of  challenge  merely  because  the  other  party  has  exer- 
cised the  right;  ^  though  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  allow 
him  to  do  so.  For  counsel  to  sit  in  silence  when  the  court  is 
embarrassed  in  the  process  of  impaneling  a  jury,  declining  to 
take  action  upon  the  suggestions  of  the  court,  and  answering 
that  they  have  nothing  to  say,  and  then  raising  the  proper  ob- 
jection in  case  the  verdict  goes  against  them,  —  is  a  trifling  with 
the  court  and  with  the  administration  of  justice,  which  will  not 
be  tolerated  on  the  trial  of  the  gravest  offenses.^  After  a  juror 
is  once  sivorn,  objections  to  his  competency  which  might  have 
been  taken  by  challenge  are  addressed  to  the  discretion  of  the 
court.* 


1  Achey  v.  State,  64  Ind.  5G;  Kooby 
V.  State,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  Ill;  State  v. 
Tuller,  34  Couu.  280;  Clough  v.  State, 
7  Neb.  324;  Morrison  v.  McKinuou,  12 
Fla.  552.  A  new  trial  will  not  be 
granted  upon  tlie  sole  affidavit  of  a 
stranger  to  the  case,  wlio  deposes 
to  a  positive  expi'ession  of  opinion 
against  tlie  defendant  by  one  of  the 
jurors,  previous  to  the  trial;  and 
further,  t-hat  he  did  not  inform  the  at- 
torneys of  the  defendant  of  this  fact 
until  the  trial  was  concluded.  ISfon 
constat,  but  that  the  defendant  and  his 
attorneys  were  also  aware  of  the 
juror's  prejudice,  Achey  v.  State,  (54 
Ind.  5G. 

2  Ward  V.  Railway  Co.,  19  S.  C. 
521. 

3  Norfleetv.  State,  4  Sueed  (Tenn.), 
340,  343.  See  also  Com.  v.  Gross,  1 
Ashmead  (Pa.),  281,  286;  State  v. 
Coleman,  8  So.  Car.  237 ;  Com.  v.  Mar- 
row, 3  Brewst.  (Pa.)  402;   Gardiner  r. 


People,  6  Parlv.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  155;  Ma- 
loue  V.  State,  8  Ga.  408;  Ham  v. 
Lasher,  24  Up.  Can,  Q,  B.  533,  note; 
Widder  v.  Buffalo  &c.  R.  Co.,  24  Up. 
Can,  Q.  B.  534;  People  v.  Doe,  1  Mich. 
451 ;  Livingston  v.  Heerman,  9  Martin 
(La.),  656;  Stewart  r.  State,  15  Ohio 
St.  155.  See  also  State  v.  Allen,  4G 
Conn.  531 ;  s.  c.  10  Reporter,  107 ;  Reg. 
V.  Coulter,  13  Up.  Can.  (C.  P.)  299. 
The  result  would  have  been  otherwise, 
if  the  prisoner  had  made  no  objection 
to  proceeding  with  the  jury  as  con- 
stituted. In  such  a  case  the  court 
cannot,  witliout  the  consent  of  the 
prisoner,  and  of  its  own  will,  rcith- 
drato  a  juror.  Such  action  operates 
as  a  discharffe  of  the  jury,  and  an 
acquittal.  O'Brian  v.  Com.,  9  Busli 
(Ky.),  333.  Compare  Cochran  v. 
State,  62  Ga.  731 ;  Cox  v.  People,  19 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  430;  s.  c.  80  N.  Y.  500. 

•1  Henry  v.  State,  77  Ahi.  75.     See 
also  Simmons  v.  State,  73  Ga.  609. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING 


115 


§  115.  AVaiver  of  Exceptions  for  Disallontiiue  of  Chal- 
lenge. —  The  sound  and  prevailing  view  is  that  a  i)aity  cannot, 
on  error  or  appeal,  complain  of  a  ruling  of  the  trial  court  in 
overruling  his  challeuge  for  cause,  if  it  api)ear  that,  when  the 
jury  had  been  completed,  his  peremptory  challenges  ivere  not 
exhausted;  since  he  might  have  excluded  the  obnoxious  juror  by 
a  i)ereinptory  challenge,  and  therefore  the  error  is  to  be  deemed 
an  error  without  injury. ^  For  the  same  reason,  if  the  court 
erroneously  overrules  a  challenge  for  cause,  and  thereafter  the 
challenging  party  excludes  the  obnoxious  juror  by  a  peremptory 
challenge,  he  cannot  assign  the  ruling  of  the  court  for  error  ^ 
unless  it  appear  that,  before  the  jury  was  sworn  his  quiver  of 
peremptory  challenges  was   exhausted ;  ^  in   which  case  there  is 


1  State  V.  Elliott,  45  Iowa,  48(;; 
State  V.  Davis,  41  Iowa,  311 ;  Barnes  v. 
Newton,  id  Iowa,  5(!7;  St.  Louis  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Lux,  (13  III.  523;  Tuttle  v. 
State,  ()  Tex.  App.  o5(i;  Sharp  v.  State, 
(j  Tex.  App.  G50;  McKinuey  v.  State,  8 
Tex.  App.  Oi'O;  Toouey  v.  State,  8  Tex. 
App.  452;  Krebs  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
1 ;  Palmer  v.  People,  4  Neb.  G8 ;  State 
V.  Gill,  14  So.  Car.  410;  Preswood  v. 
State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenu.)  468.  There  is 
some  slight  and  ill-considered  author- 
ity to  the  effect  that  uo  oblisatiou 
rests  upon  a  party  to  make  use  of  his 
peremptoi-y  challenges,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  excluding  a  juror,  unsuccess- 
fully challenged  for  cause,  but  that  he 
has  a  right  to  accede  to  the  decision 
of  the  court  ujion  such  a  challenge, 
■which,  if  erroneous,  must  be  corrected 
by  awarding  him  a  new  trial.  People 
V.  Bodine,  Edra.  Sel.  Cas.  (X.  Y.)  36, 
78;  s.  c.  1  Den.  (N.  Y.)  281;  Freeman 
V.  People,  4  Den,  (X.  Y.)  9,  31 ;  Brown 
V.  State,  57  Miss.  424;  s.  c.  10  Cent.  L. 
J.  376;  People  v.  Stewart,  7  Cal.  140; 
Sampson  v.  Schaffer,  3  Cal.  107. 

-  Schoeffler  v.  State,  8  Wis.  823, 
836;  Burt  i'.  Panjaud,  99  U.  S.  180;  s.  c. 
18  Am.  L.  Reg.  660;  Freeman  v.  People, 


4  Denio  (X.  Y.),  9;  Stewart  v.  State, 
13  Ark.  720;  Benton  v.  State,  30  Ark. 
328;  Friery  v.  People,  2  Abb.  App.  (X. 
Y.)  Dec.215;s.c.  2Keyes  (X.  Y.),424; 
54  Barb.  319;  Ferriday  v.  Selser,  4 
How.  (Miss.)  506;  People  v.  Kuicker- 
))ocker,  1  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  302; 
Whelan  v.  Reg.,  28  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  2, 
108;  State  v.  Raymond,  11  Nev.  98; 
State  V.  Davis,  41  Iowa,  311;  Morton 
V.  State,  1  Kan.  4G8;  Wiley  v.  Keokuk, 
6  Kan.  95;  People  v.  Stonecifer,  6  Cal. 
405;  Robinson  v.  Kaiidull,  82  III.  522; 
AVilsou  V.  People,  94  111.  299;  Carter/. 
State,  8  Tex.  App.  372;  Conway  v. 
Clinton,  1  Utah,  215;  Krebs  v.  State,  8 
Tex.  App.  1 ;  Brown  v.  State,  57  Miss. 
424 ;  State  v.  Cockman,  2  Winst.  (X.  C.) 
95;  Minims  v.  State,  16  Ohio  St.  221; 
Erwin  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  186 ;  State 
V.  Hamilton,  27  La.  Ann.  400;  Bejarauo 
V.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  265.  Contra, 
Lithgow  V.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  297; 
Sprouce  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  375; 
Dowds  V.  Com.,  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  727; 
Birdsong  v.  State,  47  Ala.  68;  Iverson 
V.  State,  52  Ala.  170,  174;  Brown  v. 
State,  70  Ind.  576. 

*  McGowan  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
184;    Barrel!    v.    State,    18    Tex.    713; 


116 


IMPANELING    THE    JURt 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


room  for  the  inference  that  the  erroneous  ruHng  of  the  court 
may  have  resulted  in  leaving  upon  the  panel  oilier  obnoxious 
jurors  whom  the  party  might,  but  for  the  ruling,  have  excluded 
by  peremptory  challenge.  Some  courts,  therefore,  hold  that  it 
is  enough,  in  such  a  juncture,  to  show  that  his  peremptory  chal- 
lenges were  exhausted  before  the  jury  was  sworn.^  But  others 
take  what  seems  to  be  the  better  view,  that  it  nuist  also  appear, 
not  only  that  his  peremptory  challenges  were  exhausted,  but 
that  some  objectionable  person  took  his  place  on  the  jury,  who 
otherwise  would  have  been  excluded  by  a  peremptory  challenge.^ 

§  IIG.  [Continued.]  Objections  to  Incompetency  after 
Verdict.  —  Although  there  is  considerable  American  authority, 
following  in  the  wake  of  a  leading  case  in  Maryland,  in  favor  of 


Johusou  V.  State,  27  Tex.  7G4;  Bow- 
man V.  State,  41  Tex.  417;  Lester  v. 
State,  2  Tex.  App.  43L>,  443;  Carroll  v. 
State,  3  Humph.  (Teim.)  315;  Robin- 
son V.  Randall,  82  111.  521;  People  v. 
Gaunt,  23  Cal.  156 ;  People  v.  Gate- 
wood,  20  Cal.  146;  Wiley  v.  Keokuk,  6 
Kan.  04 ;  Morton  v.  State,  1  Kan.  468 ; 
People  V.  McGungill,  41  Cal.  429; 
Stout  V.  Hyatt,  13  Kan.  232 ;  State  v. 
McQuaige,  5  So.  Car.  421);  Tuttle  v. 
State,  G  Tex.  App.  556;  Ogle  v.  State, 
33  Miss.  383;  Brown  v.  State,  57  Miss. 
424;  Mimms  v.  State,  16  Ohio  St.  221; 
Erwiu  V.  State,  2U  Ohio  St.  186;  State 
V.  Buuger,  14  La.  Ann.  461;  State  v. 
Caulfield,  23  La.  Ann,  148;  State  v. 
Lartigue,  29  La.  Ann.  642,  646 ;  State 
V.  Hoyt,  47  Conn.  518. 

1  People  V.  Weil,  40  Cal.  268; 
Treuor  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50 
Cal.  222,  226;  Hubbard  v.  Rutledge, 
57  Miss.  7;  State  v.  Brown,  15  Kan. 
400. 

-  Fleeson  v.  Savage,  S.  M.  Co.,  3 
Nev.  157,  163;  State  v.  Raymond,  11 
Nev.  98 ;  Rothschild  v.  State,  7  Tex. 
App.  519;  Grissoniw.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
;586;  Hollis  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  620; 
Cock  r.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  659;  Tooney 


V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  452;  Cotton  v. 
State,  32  Tex.  614;  Myers  v.  State,  7 
Tex.  App.  641;  Holt  v.  State,  9  Tex. 
App.  571;  Loggins  v.  State,  12  Tex. 
App.  65;  Balding  v.  State  (Tex.),  4  S. 
W.  Rep.  579;  Meaux  v.  Wiiitehall,  8 
Bradw.  (HI.)  173.  luWhelanv.  Reg., 
28  Up.  Can.  Q.  B.  2,  the  Canadian 
courts,  certain  judges  dissenting,  held 
that,  even  under  the  circumstances 
stated  in  the  text,  a  prejudice  to  the 
cliallenging  party  would  not  be  pre- 
sumed. In  considering  this  case,  it  is 
to  be  remembered  that  the  prisoner 
was  a  member  of  the  Fenian  organiza- 
tion so  obnoxious  to  the  Canadian 
people;  that  the  crime  for  which  he 
was  tried  was  the  assassination  of  the 
Hon.  Thomas  D'Arcy  McGee,  a  mcAi- 
ber  of  the  Canadian  Parliament;  and 
that  he  had  been  fairly  convicted  upon 
the  evidence,  as  he  himself  admitted 
at  the  close  of  tlie  trial.  See  28  Up.  , 
Can,  (Q.  B.)  p.  141.  It  is  not,  there- 
fore, surprising  tliat  tlie  majority  iu 
both  the  appellate  courts  were  in- 
clined to  find  from  the  record  that  the 
prisoner  had  suffered  in  no  respect 
from  the  error  of  the  court  in  disallow- 
ing a  legal  cause  of  challenge. 


Tit.   I,   Cb.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    BIPANELING. 


117 


the  rule  that  the  discovery  that  a  disquahfied  person  sat  on  the  jury 
gives  to  the  unsuccessful  party  the  same  right  of  new  trial,  as  the 
right  which  he  would  have  had  to  challenge  the  juror,  if  the  discov- 
ery had  been  made  before  the  jury  were  sworn,  on  the  ground  that 
such  a  person  is  no  juror  at  all,  —  a  non-jui-or,  —  and  that  the 
presence  of  a,  non-juror  vitiates  the  whole  panel;  ^  yet  the  mass 
of  American  authority,  grounded  upon  considerations  of  conven- 
ience and  public  policy,  is  opposed  to  this  strict  rule.  It  has 
been  repeatedly  held  that  a  cause  of  challenge  not  discovered 
until  after  verdict,  wdiether  the  case  be  civil  or  criminal,  —  as 
that  some  of  the  jurors  Avere  aJieiis;  -  or  not  of  the  jury  list  as  se- 


1  Shaue  v.  Clarke,  3  Har.  &  McH. 
(Md.)  101,  103.  It  was  so  held  where 
oue  of  the  jurors  was  an  alien.  Quinn 
V.  Halbert,  52  Vt.  353;  Guykowski  v. 
People,  2  111.  476  (overruled  in  Chase 
V.  People,  40  111.  352,  358)  ;  was  lack- 
ing in  statutory  qualifications.  Briggs 
V.  Georgia,  15  Vt.  61;  State  v.  Bab- 
cock,  1  Conn.  401;  jMann  v.  Fairlee,  44 
Vt.  673;  Eastman  v.  'Wright,  4  Ohio 
St.  156;  State  v.  Groome,  10  Iowa, 
315;  was  connected  with  one  of  the 
parties  by  relationship  within  the  de- 
gree constituting  a  cause  of  challenge. 
Hardy  v.  Sproule,  32  Me.  310;  Lane  v. 
Goodwin,  47  Me.  593;  Brown  r.  State, 
28  Ga.  439;  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  60 
Ga.  550;  Woodbridge  v.  Raymond, 
Kirby  (Conn.) ,  280 ;  had  expressed  his 
opinion  upon  the  issue  to  be  tried,  or 
upon  the  guilt  of  the  defendant  in  a 
criminal  case.  ^McKinley  v.  Smith, 
Hard.  (Ky.)  167;  United  States  v. 
Fries,  3  Dall.  (U.  S.)  515;  Stste  v. 
Hopkins,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  372;  Tenney  v. 
Evans,  13  N.  H.  462;  IMonroev.  State,  5 
Ga  85;  Wader.  State,  12Ga.  25;  Rayr. 
State,  15  Ga.  223;  IVIoncrief  v.  State,  59 
Ga.  470;  Pierce  r.Bush,  3  Bibb  (Ky.), 
347;  French r.  Smith,  4  Vt.  363;  Vance 

V  Haslett,  4  Bibb  (Ky.),  191 ;  Herndon 

V  Bradshaw^  4 Bibb  (Ky.),  45;  Tweedy 


r.  Brush,  Kirby  (Conn.),  13;  Demingv. 
Hurlburt,  2D.  Chip.  (Vt.)  45;  or  was 
interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit. 
Page  V.  Coutoocook  &e.  R.  Co.,  21  N. 
H.  438.  But  an  objection  to  a  juror, 
which  is  not  good  as  a  principal  cause 
of  challenge,  is  no  ground  for  setting 
aside  the  verdict.  Chapman  r.  "Welles, 
Kirby  (Conn.),  132;  Walton  v.  Au- 
gusta Canal  Co.,  54  Ga.  245.  But  see 
Cain  V.  Ingham,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  478. 

2  Rex  V.  Sutton,  8  Barn.  &  Cress. 
417;  s.  c.  15  Eng.  C.  L.  252;  Holliugs- 
worth  V.  Duane,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.)  353; 
State  V.  Quarrel,  2  Bay  (S.C),  150; 
Com.  V.  Thompson,  4  Phila.  (Pa.)  215; 
Brown  v.  Lacrosse  Gas  Co.,  21  Wis. 
51;  Presbury  v.  Com.,  9  Dana  (Ky.), 
203;  State  v.  Lopher,  35  La.  Ann.  975; 
Turner  V.  Hahu,  I  Colo.  23;  Jones  t. 
People,  2  Colo.  351 ;  Chase  v.  People, 
40  111.  352;  Bennett  v..  Matthews,  40 
How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  428;  Ripley  v.  Cool- 
Idge,  Minor  (Ala.),  11;  State  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 8  Ore.  113;  Kennedy ■y.  Com., 
14  Bush  (Ky.),  340;  Majors.  Pnlliam, 
3  Dana  (Ky.),  583;  Mt.  Desert  v. 
Cranberry  Isles,  46  Me.  411;  Hull  v. 
Albro,  2  Disney  (Ohio),  147;  Thomp- 
son r.  Paige,  IG  Cal.  78;  Territory  w. 
Baker  (N.  Mex.),  13  Pac.  Rep.  31. 


118 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


lecled  by  the  county  authorities ;  ^  or  non-residents,  or  not  citi- 
zens of  the  county  or  State ;  '^  or  not  possessed  of  the  statutory 
qualifications,^  as  for  instance  less  than  twenty-one  ^  or  more 
than  sixty ,^  years  of  age ;  or  related  to  the  opposite  party 
within  the  disqualifying  degrees :  ^  or  interested  in  the  event 
of  the    suit ;  ^  or  shown  to    have    expressed  disqualifijing  ojnn- 


1  Gormley  v.  Laramore,  40  Ga.  253 ; 
Edwards  v.  State,  53  Ga.  428;  Ur- 
quhart  w.  Powell,  59  Ga,  721;  Osgood 
V.  State,  G3  Ga.  701. 

2  Koseborovigh  v.  State,  43  Tex. 
570;  O'Mealy  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App. 
180;  Clarke  v.  Territory,  1  Wash, 
(Terr.)  82;  State  v.  KcuDcdy,  8  Rob, 
(La.)  590;  Costly  v.  State,  19  Ga.  614; 
Zickefoose  v.  Kuykeudall,  12  W.  Va. 
23;  Major  v.  Pulliam,  3  Dana  (Ky,), 
583;  Mt,  Desert  r.  Cranberry  Isles,  46 
Me.  411;  Hull  v.  Albro,  2  Disney,  147; 
Thompson  v.  Paige,  16  Cal.  78. 

3  Ex  parte  Phillips,  10  Exch.  731; 
s.  c.  1  Jur.  (x.  s.)  143;  24  L.  J.  Exch. 
79;  State  v.  Patrick,  3  Jones  L.  (N. 
C.)  443;  State  v.  AVhite,  68  N,  C.  158; 
Tweedy  v.  Bi-iggs,  31  Tex.  74 ;  Thomp- 
son r.  Com.,  8  Gratt.  (Va.)  637;  Gil- 
berts. Rider,  Kirby  (Conn.),  180,  184; 
Orciitt  V.  Carpenter,  1  Tyler  (Vt.), 
250;  People  v.  Jewett,  6  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  386;  Finley  v.  Haydeu,  3  A.  K. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  330;  Bratton  v.  Bryan, 
1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  212;  Rennick  ■y. 
Walthall,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  23; 
State  V.  Fisher,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.) 
261;  People  i'..  Sandford,  43  Cal.  29; 
s.  c.  1  Green  C.  L.  682;  Steele  v. 
Malony,  1  Minn.  347;  Clark  v.  Van 
Vrancken,  20  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  278;  Estep 
V.  Waterous,  45  Ind.  140;  Croy  v. 
State,  32  Ind.  384:  Pickens  v.  Ilobbs, 
42  Ind.  270;  State  r.  McLean,  21  La. 
Ann.  546;  Gillooley  r.  State,  58  Ind. 
182;  Kingen  v.  State,  46  Ind.  132; 
Whitehead  v.  Wells,  29  Ark.  99;  Watts 
V.  Ruth,  30  Ohio  St.  32;  State  v.  Biin- 
ger,  14  La.  Ann.  461;  State  v.  Parks, 


21  La.  Ann.  251;  Keurick  v.  Reppard, 
23  Ohio  St.  333;  State  v.  Madoil,  12 
Fla.  151;  Mansfield  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Clark,  23  Mich.  519;  Patterson  v. 
State,  70  Ind.  341;  Buie  v.  State,  1 
Tex.  App.  453;  Yanez  v.  State,  6  Tex. 
App.  429. 

*  Trueblood  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App. 
650;  AVassum  v.  Feeney,  121  Mass.  93; 
Brewer  v.  Jacobs,  22  Fed.  Rep.  217; 
John  V.  Hodges,  60  Md.  215;  s.  c.  45 
Am.  Rep.  722. 

5  Williams  v.  State,  37  Miss.  407; 
Monroe  v.  Brigham,  19  Pick.  (Mass.) 
368;  Davis  r.  People,  19  111.  74;  Sea- 
cord  V.  Burling,  1  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
175;  Cohron  v.  State,  20  Ga.  753. 

*>  Quinebaug  Bank  v.  Leavans,  20 
Conn.  87;  Eggleston  v.  Smiley,  17 
Johns.  (X.  Y.)  133;  Hayes  v.  Thomp- 
son, 15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (x.  s.)  220; 
McLellan  v.  Crofton,  0  Me.  307;  Tide- 
Avater  Canal  Co.  v.  Archer,  9  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  479;  Orme  v.  Pratt,  4  Cranch 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  124;  Smith  v.  Earle,  118 
Mass.  531;  Baker  v.  State,  4.  Tex. 
App;  223  Wickersham  v.  People,  2  111. 
12s. 

'  Williams  v.  Great  W.  R.  Co.,  3 
Hurl.  &  N.  869 ;  s.  c.  28  L.  J.  (Exch.) 
2;  (compare  Bailey  v,  Macaulay,  13  Q. 
B.  815)  ;  Glover  v.  Woolsey,  Dudley 
(Ga.),  85;  Josey  v.  Wilmington  &c. 
R.  Co.,  12  Ricii.  L.  134;  Boland  v. 
Greenville  &c.  R.  Co.,  12  Rich.  L. 
368;  Magness  v.  Stewart,  2  Coldw. 
309;  Pearson  v.  Wightmau,  1  Mills 
Const.  Rep.  336;  Billis  v.  State,  2  Mc- 
Cord  (S.  C.)  ,  12.  But  see  Talmadge  v. 
Northrop,  1  Root  (Couu.),  454. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.  IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


119 


ions  as  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  trial;  ^  or  otherwise  subject 
to  challenge;  2  is  not,  per  se,  a  ground  of  new  trial,  though 
it  may  be  such  in  the  discretion   of   the   court. ^      In   the   ex- 


1  Taylor  v.  Greely,  3  Me.  204; 
Briggs  V.  Byrd,  12  Ired.  L.  (X.  C.) 
377;  Byars  v.  Mt.  Veruou,  77  111.  4G7; 
Kennedy  v.  Com.,  14  Bush  (Ky.),  340; 
Romaiue  v.  State,  7  Ind.  G3;  Keener  v. 
State,  18  Ga.  194;  Alexanders.  Dunn, 
5  Ind.  122;  Fitzpatrick  v.  Harris,  KJ  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  5G1;  Tidewater  Canal  Co. 
V.  Archer,  9  Gill  &  J,  (Md.)  479;  Simp- 
sou  v.  Pittmau,  13  Ohio,  365;  Com.  v. 
Flanagan,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  415; 
Collier  v.  State,  20  Ark.  3G ;  Meyer  v. 
State,  19  Ark.  156 ;  Daniel  r.  Guy,  23 
Ark.  50;  State  v.  Howard,  17  N.  H.  171, 
198;  State  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  477; 
State  V.  Strauder,  11  AV.  Ya.  745; 
Brill  V.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  572 ;  Clough 
V.  State,  7  Neb.  324;  Stater.  Funck,  17 
Iowa,  3G5;  McKinney  v.  Simpson,  51 
Iowa,  6G2 ;  McDonald  v.  Beall,  65  Ga. 
288;  Stewart  v.  Ewbank,  3  Iowa,  191; 
Gregorys.  Wells,  Smith  (X.  H.),  239, 
n;  Porter  v.  Greenough,  Smith  (N. 
H.),  238,  u;  Caldwell  v.  Caldwell, 
Smith  (N.  H.),  239.  Unless  he  im- 
posed himself  iipon  the  jury  by  con- 
cealment or  prevarication.  Casat  v. 
State,  40  Ark.  511. 

2  States.  Davis,  SON.  C.  412;  Am- 
herst r.  Hadley,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  38: 
Wilder  v.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  555;  Ho- 
gan  V.  State,  36  Wis.  226;  Meeks  v. 
State,  57  Ga,  329 ;  Walker  v.  Green,  3 
Me.  215;  Howland  v.  Gifford,  1  Pick. 
(Mass.)  43,  note;  Fellows'  Case,  5 
Me.  383;  Cook  v.  Castner,  9  Cush. 
(Mass.)  2GG;  Bloodworth  v.  State,  6 
Baxt.  (Tenn.)  G14;  Shobe  v.  Bell,  1 
Eand.  (Va.)  39;  Hardenburgh  v.  Crary, 
15  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  307,  309;  State  v. 
Harris,  30  La.  Ann.  90;  United  States 
V.  Baker,  3  Beued.  (U.  S.)  G8;  State 
V.  Powers,  10  Ore.  145;  s.  c.  45  Am. 


Rep.  138;  Paulitsch  v.  Railroad  Co., 
50  X.  Y.  Super.  (J.  &  S.)  241;  State  v. 
Thomas,  35  La.  Ann.  24. 

2  Woodward  v.  Dean,  113  Mass. 
297,  298.  See  also  Kimiicutt  v. 
Stockwell,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  73;  Davis 
V.  Alleu,  11  Pick.  (Mass.)  4GG;  Eg- 
gleston  V.  Smiley,  17  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 
133;  Meyer  V.  State,  19  Ark.  15G;  State 
V.  McDonald,  8  Ore.  113;  Seymour  v. 
Deyo,  5  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  289;  State  i?. 
Davis,  80  N.  C.  412,  414;  State  v.  Boon, 
80  X.  C.  4G1 ;  Clough  v.  State,  7  Neb. 
351 ;  Shea  v.  Lawrence,  1  Allen 
(Mass.),  1G7;  State  r.  Madoil,  12  Fla. 
151;  State  v.  Howard,  17  N.  H.  171; 
Cain  v..  Cain,  1  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  213; 
Templet?.  Sumner,  Smith  (N.  H.),  226; 
State  V.  Pike,  20  N.  H.  344 ;  State  v. 
Lambert,  93  N.  C.  618.  On  a  motion 
in  arrest  of  judgment,  or  for  a  new 
trial,  it  is  plain  that  a  party  cannot  be 
heard  to  allege  partiality  on  the  part  of 
certain  jurors,  which,  if  existing  at  all, 
was  in  favor  of  the  party  complaining. 
Carew  v.  Howard,  1  Root  (Conn.), 
323.  In  an  early  criminal  case  in 
Massachusetts,  the  court  granted  a 
new  trial  where  it  appeared  after  ver- 
dict that  two  of  the  trial  jurors  had 
been  members  of  the  grand  jury 
which  found  the  indictment.  Com.  v. 
Hussey,  13  Mass.  221.  See  also 
Hawkins  v.  Andrews,  39  Ga.  118.  But 
in  other  cases  this  reason  has  been 
held  to  be  insufllcieut.  State  v.  Tur- 
ner, 6  La.  Ann.  309;  Beck  v.  State,  20 
Ohio  St.  228;  Franklin  v.  State,  2  Tex- 
App.  8;  State  v.  McDonald,  9  W.  Va. 
456.  It  has  been  considered  that  a 
new  trial  should  be  awarded,  where 
one  of  tlie  jurors  previous  to  the  trial 
had  made  a  trifling  loager  upon  the 


120 


IMPANELI>rG   THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


ercise  of  such  a  discretion,  an  essential  inquiry  will  be  whether 
the  objecting  party  exercised  reasonable  diligence  in  ascer- 
taining the  qualilications  of  the  obnoxious  juror. ^  Was  he 
questioned  on  the  voir  dire  as  to  the  cause  of  challenge  now  al- 
leged? If  not,  there  has  been  a  lack  of  diligence  on  the  part  of 
the  complaining  party ,"^  which  amounts  to  a  waiver  of  the  cause 


result.  Essex  v.  McPherson,  6i  111. 
31:9.  But  see  McCauslaud  v.  Mc- 
Causlaud,  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  372;  Booby 
V.  Suute,  4  Yerg.  (Tenu.)  111.  It  is 
evideut  that  an  objection  made  to  a 
juror  during  the  course  of  the  trial  is 
entitled  to  greater  consideration  than 
if  postponed  until  after  verdict.  Dil- 
worth-y.  Com.,  12  Gratt.  (Va.)  GS9; 
Henry  v.  Cuvillier,  3  Mart.  (La.)  (x. 
s.)  524. 

1  RoseboroughtJ.  State,  43  Tex.  570; 
Quinebaug  Bank  v.  Leavens,  20  Conn. 
87;  Brown  v.  Lacrosse  Gas  Co.,  21 
Wis.  51;  Steele  v.  Malony,  1  Mimi. 
341;  Mt.  Desert  v.  Cranberry  Isles,  4(5 
Me.  411;  Patterson  v.  State,  70  Iiul. 
341;  Veununi  v.  Harwood,  6  111.  (J5'J; 
Swarnes  V.  Sitton,  58  111.  lo.j;  Walker 
V.  Green,  3  Me.  215;  Glover  v.  Wool- 
sey,  Dudley  (Ga.),  85;  Fitzpatrick  v. 
Harris,  IG  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  5G1;  Frank- 
lin V.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  8 ;  McDonald 
V.  Beall,  55  Ga.  288 ;  Koenig  v.  Bauer, 
1  Brewst,  (Pa.)  304.  In  one  case  the 
court  awarded  a  new  trial,  where  a 
juror  appeared  to  have  been  strongly 
biased  against  the  defendant,  because 
the  facts  of  the  case  did  not  show 
"gross"  negligence  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant  in  not  ascertaining  this 
cause  of  objection  to  the  juror  before 
trial.  Hanks  v.  State,  21  Tex.  526. 
In  Lafayette  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  New  Al- 
bany &c.  R.  Co.,  13  Ind.  DO,  the 
motion  for  a  new  trial  was  founded 
upon  the  incapacity  of  a  juror  to  un- 
derstand the  English  language.  This 
the  court  granted,  the  juror's  ignor- 


ance being  unknown  to  the  party 
against  whom  the  verdict  was  ren- 
dered, until  after  the  trial.  "  The 
party,"  said  Perkins,  J.,  "  might  well 
presume  that  the  officer  had  called  a 
juror  competent  in  this  particular." 
But  see  Yanez  v.  State,  6  Tex,  App. 
429;  State  v.  Harris,  30  La.  Ann.  90-, 
United  States  v.  Baker,  3  Bened.  (U. 
S.)  G8. 

-  Jeffries  v.  Randall,  14  Mass.  205; 
State  V.  Patrick,  3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.) 
443;  Tweedy  v.  Briggs,  31  Tex.  74; 
State  V.  Quarrel,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  150; 
Gilbert  v.  Rider,  Kirby  (Conn.),  180, 
184;  Taylor  v.  Greely,  3  Me.  204; 
Turner  v.  Hahn,  1  Colo.  43;  Chase  v. 
People,  40  111.  352 ;  Estep  v.  Watrous, 
45  lud.  140;  Alexander  v.  Dunn,  5  Ind. 
122;  Croyv.  State,  32  Ind.  384;  Kin- 
gen  V.  State,  4G  Ind.  132;  Gillooley  r. 
State,  58  Ind.  182;  State  v.  McLean,  21 
La.  Ann.  54G;  State  v.  Parks,  21  La. 
Ann.  251;  State  v.  Kennedy,  8  Rob. 
(La.)  5'.)0;  Simpson  v.  Pitman,  13 
Ohio,  3G5;  Watts  v.  Ruth,  30  Ohio  St. 
32;  Beck  v.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  228; 
Wilder  v.  State,  25  Ohio  St.  555;  Ken- 
rick  V.  Reppard,  23  Ohio  St.  333 ;  Byars 
V.  Mt.  Vernon,  77  111.  4G7;  Keener  v. 
State,  18  Ga.  194;  Collier  v.  State,  20 
Ark.  3G;  Daniel  v.  Guy,  23  Ark.  50; 
State  V.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  477;  Buie  v. 
State,  1  Tex.  App.  453;  Yanez  v.  State, 
G  Tex.  App.  429;  Clough  v.  State,  7 
Neb.  324;  State  v.  Funck,  17  Iowa,  3G5; 
McKinney  v.  Simpson,  51  Iowa,  GG2; 
Stewart  v.  Ewbank,  3  Iowa,  191. 
Whether  the  juror  was  thus  examined 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


121 


of    challenge.     ^Moreover,  it    should    appear    by    affidavit    that 
both  the  prisoner  and  his  counsel  had  no  knowledge  of  the  dis- 


upou  tlie  voir  dire,  is  a  matter  to  be 
sliowu  by  the  record,  TheaniUavit  of 
the  party  iiioviug  for  the  uew  trial  is 
not  siitiicient  to  establish  this  fact. 
Ste'R'art  r.  Ewbauk,  3  Iowa,  I'J  L ;  State 
V.  Slielledy,  8  Iowa,  447;  Shaw  v. 
State,  27  Tex.  750.  If  the  juror  an- 
swers untruthfully,  for  the  purpose  of 
avoiding  a  challenge,  it  is  generally 
proper  for  the  court  to  grant  a  new 
trial,  upon  the  discovery  of  the  decep- 
tion after  verdict.  Sellers  v.  People, 
4  111.  412;  Howerton  v.  State,  IMeigs 
(Tenu.),2()2;  Veuuum  r.  Ilarwood,  0 
111.  659 ;  Essex  v.  McPhersou,  G4  111. 
349;  Jeffries  r.  Randall,  14  Mass. 
205;  Cody  v.  State,  3  How.  (Miss.)  27; 
Troxdale  v.  State,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
411;  Sam  v.  State,  31  Miss.  480; 
Busick  V.  State,  19  Ohio,  198;  Rice  v. 
State,  16  Ind.  298;  State  v.  Kennedy,  8 
Rob.  (La.)  590;  Smith  r.  "Ward,  2  Root 
(Conn.),  302;  Lane  v.  Scoville,  16 
Kan.  402;  State  v.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa, 
477;  Lamphier  v.  State,  70  Ind.  317; 
Watts  V.  Ruth,  30  Ohio  St.  32;  Bales 
V.  State,  63  Ala.  30;  Cannon  v.  State, 
57  Miss.  147;  McGufRer.  State,  17  Ga. 
497;  Childress  r.  Ford,  lOSmed.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  25.  Mr.  Justice  Crorapton  was 
of  opinion  that,  even  if  a  prisoner  had 
been  purposely  misled  as  to  a  cause 
of  challenge,  this  would  not  vitiate  the 
verdict  in  point  of  law,  "  though  it 
would  be  matter  for  the  consideration 
of  a  court  in  a  civil  case,  in  exercising 
their  discretion  as  to  granting  a  new 
trial  under  all  the  circiuiistances  of 
the  case,  or  for  the  advisers  of  the 
Crown  in  the  exercise  of  the  preroga- 
tive of  mercy."  Reg.  v.  Mellor,  Dears. 
&Bell  C.  C.  468,  509;  s.  c.  4  Jur.  (n. 
s.)  214;  7  Cox  C.  C.  454;  27  L.  J.  (M. 
C.)  121.     See  also  Temple  v.  Sumner, 


Smith  (N.  H.),  226;  Schmidt  v.  Rose, 
6  Mo.  App.  587,  588;  State  v.  McDon- 
ald, 9  W.  Va.  456 ;  Brenuau  v.  State, 
33  Tex.  266;  Frank  v.  State,  39  INIiss. 
705.  But  if,  at  the  time  of  the  ex- 
amination, one  of  the  parties  or  his 
counsel  is  aware  that  the  juror  has 
testified  falsely,  and  makes  no  objec- 
tion to  the  juror  until  after  verdict, 
this  circumstance  cannot  be  relied 
upon  as  ground  for  a  new  trial.  Parker 
V.  State,  55  Miss.  414.  Jurors  are  not 
required  to  know  or  to  surmise  that 
something  more  is  intended  than  is 
fairly  expressed  by  the  terms  of  the 
questions  put  to  them.  Missouri  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Munkers,  11  Kan.  223;  Moore 
V.  Cass,  10  Kan.  288;  United  States  v. 
Smith,  1  Sawyer  (U.  S.),  277,  282; 
Swarnes  v.  Sittou,  58  111.  155.  It 
seems  to  make  no  diffci'ence  whether 
the  answers  of  the  juror  are  made  to 
questions  by  the  court,  or  by  the 
party  subsequently  alleging  their 
falsity.  Hudspeth  v.  Herston,  64  Ind. 
133;  Wiggin  v.  Plummer,  31  N.  H. 
251.  It  has  been  held  that,  if  it  ap- 
pear after  verdict  that  a  juror  testi- 
Hed  falsely  upon  the  voir  dire,  he  does 
not  restore  his  competency  by  making 
an  affidavit  tliat  he  was  really  impar- 
tial in  the  case,  and  that  he  unr,;:- 
tingly  testified  to  the  contrary  of  th3 
facts.  Territory  v.  Kennedy,  3  ilont. 
520 ;  United  States  v.  Upham,  2  Mont. 
170;  Hudspeth  v.  Herston,  64  Ind.  133. 
But  the  soundness  of  this  view  may  be 
doul)ted.  The  Supreme  Court  of 
Michigan  has  taken  the  view  that  the 
conception  of  vxiiver  embodied  in  the 
above  text  is  applicable  only  in  civil 
cases,  and  has  no  application  in  cn'm- 
inal  cases,  where  every  step  against  the 
accused   is  taken  in  invitum.     Hill  v. 


122 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[L  Thorap.  Tr., 


qualifying  fact  when  the  juror  was  accepted.^  In  Enghmcl,  and  in 
many  American  jurisdictions,  a  paramount  inquiry  upon  such  an 
objection  is,  whether  it  has  resulted  in  an  unjust  verdict;  if  not, 
the  objecting  party  has  sustained  no  injury,  and  a  new  trial  will 
not  be  granted  in  order  that  public  and  private  time  may  be 
consumed,  and  the  dangers  of  other  irregularities  incurred,  when 
the  same  result  must,  on  a  just  view^of  the  evidence,  be  reached.^ 


People,    16    Mich.    351,    357;    Johr  v. 
People,    26      Mich.      427.      See    also 
Smith  V.  School  District,  40  Mich.  143. 
The  Supreme  court  of    Wisconsin,  on 
the   other    haud,    has    regarded    this 
theory  of  waiver  to  be  applicable  iu  all 
criminal  cases  not    capital.     State  v. 
Vogel,  22  Wis.    471;    Schumacker    v. 
State,  5  Wis.  324.     The  Illinois  court 
tooli  this  view  iu  two  early  cases.    See 
Nomaque   v.   People,    1  111.  109 ;  Guy- 
kowski  V.   People,  2   111.  476.     But  it 
was  later  abandoned.     See  People  v. 
Scates,  4   111.  351,   353;   Chase  v.  Peo- 
ple, 40    111.  352.      There  seems  to  be 
no    sound  view  for  such    a    distinc- 
tion  in  capital  cases,    since   here  the 
temptation  to  perjury  is  even  greater 
than  in  non-capital  felonies. '  See  for 
example.  State  v.  Hopkins,  1  Bay  (S. 
C),  372.     In  such  a  case,  a  judge  has 
"  no  right  to  be  tender  and  humane  at 
the  expense    of  the  law."     Crowder, 
J.,  in  Reg.  v.  Mellor,  Dears.  &  Bell  C. 
C.  468,  517.     Most  courts  seem  to  ap- 
ply the  principle  of  the  text  alike  in  all 
causes,  civil  and  criminal,  non-capital 
and  capital.     Ex    parte     Phillips,    10 
Exch.  731,  732;  Amherst  v.  Hadley,  1 
Pick.  (Mass.)  38,  40;  Wassum  tj.  Fee- 
ney,  121  Mass.  93;  Davis  v.  People,  19 
111.  74;  Chase  v.  The  People,  40  111. 
352;  Gillooley  v.    State,   68   lud   182; 
Kingen  v.  State,  40  Ind.  132;  Costly  v. 
State,  19  6a.  614;  Davison  v.  People, 
90  111.  221.     The  argument,  frequently 
raised,   that  the   party  cannot   waive 
what   lie    does   not  know    (Vy\-yan   v. 


Vyvyan,  30  Beav.  65,  74,  per  Lord 
Romilly,  M.  R. ;  Bristow's  case,  15 
Gratt.  (Va.)  648),  is  more  specious 
than  sound;  since  it  is  met  by  another 
I^rinciple,  which  is,  tliat  negligent  ig- 
norance operates  against  a  party  the 
same  as  actual  knowledge ;  and  there- 
fore he  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  de- 
stroy a  verdict  by  urging  a  ground  of 
challenge  which,  but  for  his  negli- 
gence, he  might  have  discovered  and 
urged  at  the  proper  time.  Note  the 
language  of  Lord  Tenterden  in  Rex  v. 
Sutton,  8  Barn.  &  Cres.  417,  419.  See 
also  \yhelan  v.  Reg.,  28  Tp.  Can.  Q.  B. 
2,  63,  177,  178;  Reg.  v.  Mellor,  Dears. 
&  Belie.  C.  468,  617,  per  Willes,  J.; 
Ibid.,  p.  523,  per  Byles,  J. 

1  Brown  r.  State,  60  Miss.  447.  The 
mere  fact,  in  a  criminal  case,  that  the 
prisoner  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
grounds  of  challenge  so  as  to  inter- 
pose it  at  the  proper  time,  counts  for 
little ;  since,  as  well  suggested  by  Cat- 
ron, J.,  how  can  tlie  court  know  this 
after  verdict  except  by  the  affidavits  of 
a  convicted  felon  —  proof  always  to  be 
had  when  necessary?  McClurei'.  State, 
1  Yerg.  (Teun.)  206,  219.  See  also 
Gillespie  I).  State,  8  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  507; 
Calhoun  v.  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
477;  Meyer  V.  State,  19  Ark.  156. 

2  Rex  V.  Huut,  4  Barn.  &  Aid.  430, 
432;  Williams  v.  Great  Western  R. 
Co.,  3  Hiirl.  &  N.  869,  870;  s.  c.  28  L. 
J.  (Exch.)  2;  Trueblood  v.  State,  1 
Tex.  App.  r,50;  O'Mealy  v.  State,  1 
Tex.  App.  180;  "Whituer  v.  Hamlin,  12 


Tit.  ]  ,  Cll.  I^^]   CHALLENGING  AND  IMPANELING. 


123 


Unless  there  is  plain  evidence  of  injustice  done  to  the  party  com- 
plainMig,  the  verdict  should  be  allowed  to  stand. ^ 

§117.  Evidence  in  Support  of  such  Objections.  —  Such 
objections,  then,  are  to  be  received  with  great  caution,  as  tend- 
ing to  perjury  and  to  the  defrauding  of  i)ublic  justice;  ^  other- 
wise, as  soon  as  a  verdict  is  rendered,  another  trial,  to  wit,  that 
of  the  jurors,  will  begin. ^  It  follows  that  the  evidence  in  sup- 
})ort  of  such  objections  will  be  closely  scrutinized,  and  if  con- 
Jiictinj,  the  decision  of  the  trial  court,  refusing  a  new  trial,  will 


Fla.  2]  •,  Fiuley  v.  Hayden,  3  A.  K. 
JMarsh.  (Ky.)  330;  Beuuett  v.  Mat- 
thews, 40  How.  Pr.  (N,  Y.)  428; 
Zickefoose  v.  Knykeudall,  12  "W.  Va. 
23;  State  v.  Madoil,  12  Fla.  IT)!;  Hull 
V.  Albro,  2  Disuey  (Ohio),  147;  Ko- 
maiue  %,  State,  7  lud.  63;  Egglestou  v. 
Smiley^  17  Johus.  (N.  Y.)  133;  Caiu  v. 
Ingham,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  478;  Hayes  v. 
Thompson,  15  Al)b.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (x.  s.) 
220;  Ftate  v.  Turuer,  6  La.  Auu.  309; 
McLe^  lau  v.  Croftou,  6  Me.  307 ;  Tide- 
water Canal  Co.  v.  Archer,  9  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.;^  479;  Com.  v.  Flanagan,  7  Watts 
&  S.  (Pa.)  415;  State  v.  Howard,  17 
N.  H  171,  198;  State  v.  Stnuider,  11 
W.  ^  A.  71:5;  Brill  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App. 
572;  Orrae  v.  Pratt,  4  Cranch  C. 
C.  (T.  S.)  121;  Maguess  v.  State,  2 
Coldw.  (Teun.)  309;  Hardeuburgh  r. 
Cravy,  15  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  307,  309; 
Bri^tow's  Case,  15  Gratt.  (Va.)  G18; 
Coin.  V.  Jones,  1  Leigh  (Va.),  598; 
Cu'-rau's  Case,  7  Gratt.  (Va.)  G19; 
Gn-euup  v.  Stoker,  8  111.202;  Seymour 
V.  Deyo,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  289;  Heath  v. 
Com.,  1  Eol).  (Va.)  735;  "Wickersham 
V.  People,  2  111,  129;  Presbury  v.  Com., 
9  Dana  (Ky.),  203. 

^  Kamadge  v.  Ryan,  9  Biug.  333; 
Davison  v.  People,  90  111.  221;  State 
V.  Hayden,  51  Vt.  296;  Mitchum  r. 
State,  11  Ga.  015;  Anderson  v.  State, 
14  Ga.  709;    Eay  r.  State,  15  Ga.  223; 


M^ercer  1),  State,  17  Ga.  146;  Curran's 
Case,  7  Gratt.  (Va.)  619;  Ash  v.  State, 
56  Ga.  683;  Moughou  v.  State,  59  Ga. 
308;  Lovettr.  State,  60  Ga.  257;  Mor- 
rison V.  McKiuuon,  12  Fla.  652;  Re 
Bowman,  7  Mo.  App.  668 ;  Schmidt  v. 
Rose,  6  Mo.  App.  587,  588;  Meyer  v. 
State,  19  Ark.  156;  Lawrence  v.  Col- 
lier, 1  Cal.  37;  People  v.  Plummer,  9 
Cal.  298;  State  v.  Shay,  30  La.  Ann. 
114;  "Wallace  v.  Columbia,  48  Me.  436; 
SteAvart  v.  State,  68  Ga.  577;  Simms  v. 
State,  8  Tex.  App.  230;  Thrall  v.  Lin- 
coln, 28  Vt.  356 ;  Parkinson  v.  Parker, 
48  Iowa,  667;  Xadenbousch  v.  Sharer, 
4  W.  Va.  203;  O'Shields  v.  State,  55 
Ga.  696;  Mitchell  v.  State,  22  Ga.  211; 
Brinkley  v.  State,  58  Ga.  296 ;  State  v. 
Dumphey,  4  Minn.  438;  Stewart  v. 
Ewbauk,  3  Iowa,  191 ;  State  v.  Pike,  20 
,N.  II.  344;  State  v.  Ayer,  23  N.  H. 
301;  Dole  v.  Erskine,  37  N.  H.  317; 
Dumas  v.  State,  63  Ga.  600.  Thus, 
where  the  juror  has  expressed  the 
opinion  that  the  defendant  killed  the 
deceased,  and  this  indisputably  ap- 
pears, but  self-defense  was  set  up  as  a 
justification,  no  injury  was  shown. 
State  V.  Wells,  28  Kan.  321. 

2  PerTilghman,  C.  J.,  in  Moore  v. 
Philadelphia  Bank,  5  Serg.  &  K.  (Pa.) 
41,  42. 

3  Per  Rogers,  J.,  in  Com,  r.  Flana- 
gan, 7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  415,  422. 


124 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


not  be  disturbed  on  appeal.^  If  such  an  objection  assails  the 
impartiality  of  a  juror,  it  is  due  to  him  and  to  justice  that  he  be 
furnished  ^ith  the  charge,  and  that  his  affidavit  be  taken,  deny- 
ing it  if  he  can  ;  ^  and  althouo-h  such  affidavit  be  not  taken,  a  new 
trial  will  not  necessarily  follow,  if  the  affidavit  in  support  of  the 
objection  conflicts  with  his  testimony  on  the  voir  dire^  since  it 
will  still  be  merely  the  case  of  oath  against  oath.^ 

§  118.  Question  how  viewed  on  Error  or  Appeal. —  Here, 
as  in  all  other  cases  where  the  rulings  of  the  trial  court  are  ques- 
tioned on  error  or  appeal,  those  rulings  are  presumed  to  be  cor- 
rect until  the  contrary  is  sliow^i ;  ^  it  will,  therefore,  be  presumed, 
until   the  contrary  appears  by  the  record,  that  the  jurors  who 


1  Miami  Valley  riirniture  Co.  v. 
Wesler,  47  lud.  (>5;  Clem  v.  State,  33 
lud.  418;  Harding  v.  Whituey,  40 
Ind.  879;  Holloway  ^7.  State,  53  lud. 
554;  Romaiue  v.  State,  7  lud.  63; 
State  t\  Bancroft,  22  Kan.  170;  Epps 
V.  State,  19  Ga.  102,  122;  Costly  v. 
State,  19  Ga.  614;  The  Auarcliists' 
Case,  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  1;  s.  c. 
12  North  East.  Rep.  867,  992,  993; 
Hughes  V.  People,  116  111.  331,  337;  s. 
c.  6  North  East.  Rep.  55;  State  v. 
Brooks  (Mo.),  5  S.  W.  Rep.  258,  271. 

2  Anderson  v.  State,  14  Ga.  709 ;  Tay- 
lor v.  Greely,  3  Me.  204;  States.  Kings- 
bury, 58  Me.  238;  Nash  v.  State,  2  Tex. 
App.  362 ;  Davison  v.  People,  90  111. 
221;  Columbus  v.  Goetchius,  7  Ga. 
139;  Re  Bowman,  7  Mo.  App.  568; 
State  V.  McDonald,  9  W.  Va.  456,  466; 
Tenney  v.  Evans,  13  N.  H.  462;  Wood- 
ward V.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  453;  Ray  v. 
State,  15  Ga.  223;  Moucrief  v.  State, 
59Ga.  470;  Brinkley  v.  State,  58  Ga. 
296;  State  ?;.  Dumphey,  4  Miun.  439; 
State  V.  Ayer,  23  N.  H.  301.  Contra, 
Vance  v.  Haslett,  4  Bibb  (Ky.),  191. 

^  Nash  V.  State,  2  Tex.  App,  362; 
State  V.  McDonald,  9  W.  Va.  456; 
Hudgins  t'.  State,  61  Ga.  is2;  AVest  t;. 
State  (Ga.),  4  S.  E.  Rep.  325;  Dumas 


V.  State,  63  Ga.  601 ;  Com.  v.  Hughes, 

11  Phila.  430.  But  see  Reddle  v.  State, 
3  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  401;  Henries.  State, 
41  Tex.  573;  Fitzgerald  v.  People,  1 
Colo.  56.  In  the  Anarchists^  Case  it  is 
said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois : 
"  It  is  a  dangerous  practice  to  allow 
verdicts  to  be  set  aside  upon  ex  jparZe 
affidavits  as  to  what  jurors  are  claimed 
to  have  said  before  they  were  sum- 
moned to  act  as  jurymen.  The  par- 
ties making  such  affidavits  submit  to 
no  cross-examination,  and  the  correct- 
ness of  their  statement  is  subject  to  no 
test  whatever."    Spies  v.  People  (111.), 

12  North  East.  Rep.  867,  992,  993;  s. 
c.  122  111.  1;  reaffirmed  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Kansas  in  State  v.  Pe- 
terson (Kan.),  16  Pac.  Rep.  263. 

4  Mansell  v.  Reg.,  8  El.   &  Bl.  54; 
s.  c.  Dears.  «&  B.  375;  Strong  v.  Kean, 

13  Irish  L.  93;  De  Bardelabenu.  State, 
50  Ala.  179;  State  v.  Monk,  3  Ala.  415,. 
417;  Chesapeake  &c.  R.  Co.  v,  Pattou, 
9  W.  Va.  648;  Campbell  v.  Strong, 
Hemp.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  265;  Dutton  v. 
Tracy,  4  Conn.  93,  94;  Clark  v.  Col- 
lins, 15  N.  J.  L.  473;  State  v.  Marshall, 
36  Mo.  400;  Potsdamcr  v.  State,  17 
Fla,  895;  Com.  v.  Stephen,  4  Leigh 
(Va.),  679;  Burfey  v.    State,    3  Tex. 


Tit.  I,  Ch.   IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


125 


tried  the  case,  were  possessed  of  the  qualifications  required  by 
l:nv,^  The  disallowance  of  a  statutory  or  principal  cause  of 
challenire  is  ground  of  a  venire  de  novo,  as  contradistiniruished 
from  a  new  trial ;  it  is  a  denial  of  a  legal  right,  and  not  the  er- 
roneous exercise  of  a  discretion ;  it  is  therefore  subject  to  re- 
view by  writ  of  error,  or  upon  a  statutory  appeal  in  the  nature 
of  a  writ  of  error  ;  ^  and  so  (under  the  old  system)  the  refusal 
to  appoint  triors,^  the  rejection  of  competent  evidence,*  the  ad- 
mission of  incompetent  evidence,^  or  a  misdirection  to  the  triors 
in  point  of  law,*'  might  be  corrected,  on  error  or  statutory  appeal, 
l)y  a  bill  of  exceptions  in  the  usual  way.  In  the  view  of  some 
courts,  where  the  trial  of  challenges  is  devolved  by  statute  upon 
the  court,  unless  the  statute  so  provides,  the  decision  of  the 
court  upon  a  challenge  ^o  the  favor  cannot  be  reviewed;^  but 
other  courts  take  the  view  that  au  appellate  court  ought  to  re- 
view the  action  of  the  trial  court  on  all  questions  touching  the 


App.  519;  Pauska  v.  Daus,  31  Tex. 
72;  State  r.  Jones,  f.I  Mo.  232;  Mont- 
gomery V.  State,  3  Kan.  2()o;  Green 
V.  State,  17Fla.  6G9,  GTU;  Haudliue  u. 
State,  6  Tex.  App.  3^7. 

1  Mansell  v.  Reg.,  supra;  Chesa- 
peake &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Pattou,  9  W.  Va. 
Gt8;  Shoemaker  v.  State,  12  Ohio,  43; 
Ishamv.  State,  1  Sueed  (Tenu.),  HI; 
Turner  v.  State,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
119;  McClurer.  State,  1  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
215,  pe?"  Catron,  J. ;  Keenau  v.  State,  8 
Wis.  132;  State  v.  Roderigas,  7  Nev. 
328.  The  bill  of  exceptions  must  con- 
tain a  statement  of  the  facts  upon 
Tvhich  the  challenge  disallowed  is 
based;  otherwise  it  cannot  be  con- 
sidered by  au  appellate  court.  State 
v..  Shaw,  5  La.  Ann.  342;  State  v. 
Bruington,  22  La.  Ann.  9;  Ripley  v. 
Coolidge,  Minor  (Ala.),  11.  This  state- 
ment must  be  ill  itself  sufficient  to 
support  a  challenge.  State  v.  Millain, 
3  Kev.  409. 

2  Rex  V.  Edmunds,  4  Barn.  &  Aid. 
i"^!,   473;  Vicars   v     Laugham,    Hob. 


235;  Knyastou  v.  Shrewsbury,  An- 
drews, 85,  89;  Hesketh  v.  Braddock, 
3  Burr.  1847;  Reg.  v.  Gray,  6  Irish  C. 
L.  259,  2(;7;  Huttonv.  Hun,  Cro.  Eliz. 
849;  Ex  parte  Yermilyea,  6  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  555;  People  V.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow. 
(X.  Y.)  108;  Mann  v.  Glover,  14  N.  J. 
L.  205;  State  v.  Shaw,  3  Ired.  L.  (N. 
C.)  532;  State  v.  Davis,  80  N.  C.  412, 
414. 

3  People  V.  Rathbun,  21  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  509;  People  v.  Bodlne,  1  Den. 
(N.  Y.)  281,  308;  Baker  t;.  Harris,  1 
Winst.  (N,  C.)  277. 

■*  Meclianics'  Bank  v.  Smith,  19 
Johns.  (N".  Y.)  115. 

^  Sanchez  v.  People,  22  N.  Y.  147, 
151. 

6  State  V.  Benton,  2  Dev.  &  Bat.  (N. 
C.)  196,  222;  People  v.  Bodine,  1 
Denio  (N".' Y.),281,  308. 

T  Solander  v.  People,  2  Colo.  48,  62; 
Jones  r.  People,  2  Colo.  351,  Licett  v. 
State,  23  Ga.  57;  Galloway  w.  State, 
25  Ga.  596 ;  Eberhart  v.  State,  47  Ga. 
598. 


126 


IMPANELING    THE    JURY. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr. 


competency  of  jurors.^  A  statute  which  grants  an  exception 
where  the  court  disallows  a  challenge,  does  not  authorize  it 
where  the  challenge  is  alloiued ;  since  the  right  of  challenge,  as 
already  seen,^  is  the  right  to  reject,  and  not  the  right  to  select, 
and  neither  party  has  the  right  to  have  a  particular  juror  sit 
on  the  trial  of  the  case.'^  As  the  question  of  the  competency  of 
a  juror  is  a  mixed  question  oflaio  and  fact, ^  and  as  the  reviewing 
court  has  not  the  opportunity  of  observing  the  demeanor  of  the 
venire-man  who  is  challenged,  or  of  the  witnesses  whose  testi- 
mony is  weighed,  it  will  defer  to  the  decision  of  the  trial  court 
and  will  exercise  its  power  of  setting  aside  that  decision  with 
caution  and  hesitancy.^  In  order  to  have  the  erroneous  disal- 
lowance of  a  challenge  reviewed  on  error  or  appeal,  the  record 
must  not  only  distinctly  set   out  the  grounds  of   the  challenge,' 


1  Winnesheik  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schiieller, 
GO  III.  -K;.");  Montague  v.  Com.,  10 
Gratt.  7i!7;  Holt  v.  People,  13  Mich. 
224;  Stevens  V.  People,  38  Mich.  739; 
State  V.  Pike,  49  N.  II.  399,  407.  The 
statute  of  Kentucky  ijrovides  that  all 
challenges  are  tried  by  the  court,  and 
that  its  decision  in  no  case  is  subject 
to  exceptions.  Bullitt's  Ky.  Cr.  Code, 
§212;  Terrell  V.  Com.,  13  Bush,  246; 
Rutherford  v.  Com.,  13  Bush  (Ky.), 
608;  Morgan  V.  Com.,  14  Bush  (Ky.), 
lOG.  A  late  statute  of  New  York  con- 
tains a  similar  provision,  but  allows 
an  exception  to  the  determination  of 
the  challenge  and  a  review  by  writ  of 
error  or  certiorari.  Laws  N.  Y.  1873, 
ch.  427;  Thomas  v.  People,  G7  N.  Y. 
218,  222,  opinion  by  Earl,  J.  See  also 
Greenfield  v.  People,  74  N.  Y.  277. 

2  Ante,  §  43. 

3  People  V.  Murphy,  45  Cal.  137, 
overruling  People  v.  Stewart,  7  Cul. 
140.  See  also  State  v.  Larkin,  11  Nev. 
314;  Peoples.  Brothertou,  43 Cal.  530; 
People  w.  Colson,  49  Cal.  G79;  People 
V.  Atherton,  51  Cal.  495. 

*  McCarthy  v.  Railway  Co.  (Mo.),  4 


S.  W.  Rep.  51 G.  See  also  State?;, 
Chatliam  Nat.  Bank,  80  Mo.  G26 ;  Mont- 
gomery V.  Railroad  Co.  (Mo.),  2  S.  W. 
Kep,  409. 

5  People  V.  Stout,  4  Parker,  Cr.  (N. 
Y.)  71,  124,  opinion  by  E.  Darwin 
Smith,  J.  See  also  Thomas  v.  People, 
67N.  Y.  218,  222,  per  Earl,  J.;  The 
State  f.  Tom,  8  Oregon,  177;  Jordan 
V.  State,  22  Ga.  545;  Bradford  v.  State, 
15  Ind.  347;  March  w.  Portsmouth  &c. 
R.  Co.,  19  N.  H.  372;  People  v.  Hen- 
derson, 28  Cal.  4GG;  Campbell  v.  Cora.,. 
84  Pa.  St.  187;  May  v.  Elam,  27  Iowa, 
3G5;  Davenport  Gas  Co.  r,  Davenport,. 
13  Iowa,  229 ;  Coryell  v.  Stone,  G2  Ind. 
307;  State  V.Saunders  (Ore.),  12  Pac. 
Rep.  441;  Reynolds  v.  United  States, 
98  U.  S.  145.  See  also  Trenor  v.  Cen- 
tral Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  222;  Swiss 
V.  Stockstill,  30  Ohio  St.  418;  Dew  ??. 
McDivitt,  31  Ohio  St.  139;  s.c.  17  Am., 
L.  Reg.  G23;  State  v.  Dodson,  IG  S.  C. 
453.  Contra,  Montague  v.  Com.,  10 
Gratt.  (Va.)  7'<w. 

6  Ripley  v.  Coolidge,  ]\Iinor  (Ala.), 
11 ;  Rash  v.  State,  01  Ala.  89 ;  Pillion  v. 
State,  5  Xeb.  351 ;  State  v.  Bullock,  63 


Tit.   I,  Ch.   IV.  1       CHALLENGING    AND    niPANELING. 


127 


but   also    the  testimony    "whicli   ^vas    adduced    for    and  against 
it.i 

§  119.  What  the  Record  must  show. — Here,  as  in  other 
cases  of  appellate  procedure,  and  especially  in  criminal  cases, 
much  attention  nmst  be  given  to  the  question,  what  errors  or 
irregularities  must  be  affirnuitively  exhibited  by  the  record,  in 
order  to  be  available  for  reversing  the  judgment.  A  general 
statement  of  principle  would  be,  that  those  steps  in  the  procedure 
which  are  matters  of  vital  or  constitutional  right  to  the  accused 
in  a  criminal  case,  must  affirmatively  appear  by  the  record, 
though  not  necessarily  in  the  form  of  specific  recitals;  and  that, 
in  respect  of  matters  of  minor  ini})ortance,  the  presumption 
spoken  of  in  the  last  section  will  su})})ort  the  judgment.  In  gen- 
real,  it  nmst  affirmatively  appear  from  the  record,  that  the  jury 
were  sicorn ;  ^  though,  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  jury  is  not 


N.  C.  570;  State  v.  Ellington,  7  Ircd. 
L.  (N.  C.)  61;  People  v.  Bodine,  1 
Den.  (N.  Y.)  281,  308;  Baker  r.  Harris, 
1  Wiust.  N.  C.  277;  State  v.  Benton,  2 
Dev.  &  Bat.  (N.  C.)  IDG,  217. 

i  State  V.  Tom,  8  Ore.  177;  Ilaydcu 
V.  Long,  8  Ore.  2U;  State  v.  Rigg,  10 
Nev.  28i. 

*  Kitter  v.  Teople,  25  111.  42;  Nels 
V.  State,  2  Tex.  280 ;  Cannon  v.  State, 
5  Tex.  App.  34;  Keunon  v.  State,  7 
Tex.  App.  326;  State  v.  Gates,  9  La. 
Ann.  94;  State  v.  Donglass,  28  La, 
Ann.  425;  State  v.  King,  28  La.  Ann. 
425;  State  v.  Phillips,  28  La.  Ann.  387; 
Botsford  V.  Yates,  25  Ark.  282;  Lacey 
V.  State,  58  Ala.  385;  Baird  v.  State, 
38  Tex.  500 ;  State  v.  Calvert,  32  La. 
Ann.  224;  State  f.  Keid,  28  La.  Ann. 
387.  It  is  doubtless  true  that  it 
seldom  happens,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
that  a  jury  is  not  sworn,  although  the 
record  omits  to  state  the  swearing. 
An  attempt  was  lately  made  in  a 
Louisiana  case  to  break  in  upon  the 
well  estal)lished  iHile  that  the  record 
must  show  the  fact  of  swearing.     Al- 


thougli  unsuccessful,  the  result  was  a 
divided  court.  Ludeling,  C.  J.,  ouo 
of  the  dissenting  judges,  held  that, 
upon  the  principle  that  courts  gener- 
ally will  not  listen  to  objections  to  the 
qualifications  of  jux'oi'S  unless  taken 
at  the  proper  time,  before  trial,  a 
prisoner  sliould  be  presumed  to  have 
waived  sucli  an  informality  if  it  actu- 
ally occurred.  But,  said  he:  "It  is 
morally  certain  that  the  jury  is  sworn 
in  all  cases.  Tliis  results  from  the 
manner  in  which  tlie  jurors  are  se- 
lected and  sworn  in  courts,  and  I  can- 
not perceive  how  it  is  possible  to  fail 
to  swear  a  jury  in  any  case."  State 
V.  Kcid,  28  La.  Ann.  387,  388.  See 
also  Ilardenburgh  v.  Crary,  15  How. 
Pr.  307,  wliere  a  verdict  rendered  hj  a 
jury,  one  of  the  twelve  being  unsworn, 
was  upheld.  Before  a  new  trial  will 
be  granted  in  such  a  case,  it  must  be 
demonstrated  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court,  that  tlie  party  com{)laiuing  and 
his  attorneys  were  ignorant  of  the  fact, 
until  after  verdict,  tliat  the  juror  was 
unswcrn.     Scott  v.  Jloore,  41  Vt.  205- 


128  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

sworn  in  each  case,  but  the  entire  panel  is  sworn  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  term  once  for  all,  this  recital  is  regarded  as  no  essen- 
tial part  of  the  history  of  the  case.^  But  it  is  sufficient  that  this 
appear  by  a  fair  interpretation  of  the  record,  although  the  fact 
be  not  expressly  stated.^  According  to  one  conception,  where 
some  of  the  jurors  affirm,  the  record  ought  to  show  that  they 
were  conscientiously  scrupulous  of  taking  an  oath;^  but  this 
conclusion  is  doubtful,^  and  by  an  English  statute,^  it  is  unneces- 
sary. 

§  120,  No  Vested  Right  in  a  Particular  Juror.  —  As  already 
pointed  out,*^  the  right  to  reject  is  not  a  right  to  select.  No  party 
can  acquire  a  vested  right  to  have  a  particular  member  of  the 
panel  sit  upon  the  trial  of  his  cause  until  he  has  been  accepted 
and  sAvorn.^  It  is  enough  that  it  appear  that  his  cause  has  been 
tried  by  an  impartial  jury.  It  is  no  ground  of  exception  that, 
against  his  objection,  a  juror  was  rejected  by  the  court  upon  in- 
sufficient grounds,  unless,  through  rejecting  qualified  persons,  the 
necessity  of  accepting  others  not  qualilied  has  been  purposely 
created.^  Thus,  in  the  process  of  impaneling,  no  party  is  en- 
titled, as  of  right,  to  have  the  Jirst  juror  sit  who  has  the  statu- 

1  Wacklell  v.  Magee,  53  Miss.  GS7  ^  State  ?;.  Putnam,  IN.  J.  L.  2G0; 
(probably  overruling  Wolfe  v.  Martin,  State  v.  Sharp,  cited  by  Kinsey,  C.  J., 
I  How.  (Miss.)  30;  Beall  «.  Campbell,  in  State  v.  RockafelloAV,  6  N.  J.  L. 
1  How.  (Miss.)  24;  Irwin  v.  Jones,  1  332,  341.  See  also  State  v.  Eox,  9  N. 
How.  (Miss.)  407)  ;  Clark  v.  Davis,  7  J.  L.  244;  State  V.Harris,  7  N.  J.  L. 
Tex.    6.36;    Drake  v.  Brauder,   8  Tex.  3(;i. 

351;  Pierce  v.  Tate,  27  Miss.  283;  Fur-  "  Clark  v.  Collins,   15  N.  J.  L.   473. 

niss  V.  Mereditli,  43  Miss.  302;  Ilewett  ^  (5  mij  7  Vict.,  chap.  85,  §  2. 

V.  Cobb,  40  Miss.  CI.     But  see  Buck  v.  e  ^„/(,^  §  43, 

Mallory,  24  Miss.  170.     See  also  Goyne  '  Mansell  v.  Keg.,  8  El.  &  Bl.  54,  79. 

V.  HoAvell,  Minor  (Ala.),  G2;  Perdue  v.  ^  Tatum  v.  Young,  1  Poi'ter  (Ala.), 

Burnett,  Minor  (Ala.),  138.  298;  Bibb   i-.  Eeid,  3  Ala.   88;   People 

2  Christ  V.  State,  21  Ala.  37.  Por  v.  Arceo,  32  Cal.  40;  Grand  Eapids 
example,  see  State  v.  Christian,  30  La,  Booming  Co.  v.  Jarvis,  30  Mich.  308; 
Ann.  3G7.  Por  cases  where  the  record  Carpenter  v.  Dame,  10  Ind.  125;  Heas- 
•was  held,  on  an  interpretation,  not  to  ton  v.  Cincinnati  &c.  R.  Co.,  16  Ind. 
show  the  fact,  see  Bass  v.  State,  6  275,  279.  Contra,  Hildreth  v.  Troy, 
Baxter  (Tenn.),  679,  58fi;  State  v.  101  N.  Y.  234;  s.  c.  54  Am.  Rep. 
Potter,  18  Conn,  16G,  175;  Richi?.  State,  68G. 

1  Tex.  App.  20G. 


Tit.   I.    Ch.  IV.]       CHALLENGING    AND    IMPANELING. 


129 


tory  qualifications  ;  ^  though  there  are  authorities  to  the  contrary, 
chiefly  based  on  exaggerated  views  of  the  rights  of  the  accused 
in  criminal  trials.^  But  this  is  on  principle  quite  untenable  ;  since, 
if  the  prisoner  has  been  tried  by  an  impartial  jury,  it  would  be 
nonsense  to  grant  a  new  trial  or  a  venire  de  novo  upon  this  ground, 
in  order  that  he  might  be  again  tried  by  another  impartial  jury.-^ 
A  consequence  of  this  rule  is,  that  when  the  name  of  a  juror  is 
drawn  and  called  in  court,  the  accused  in  a  criminal  case  cannot 
demand  that  the  juror  shall  be  called  at  the  door  of  the  court 
house,  or  that  an  attachment  shall  issue  to  bring  him  in,  or  that 
an  officer  shall  be  dispatched  for  him  ;  *  though,  if  ti  juror  ab- 
sent himself  after  he  has  been  sworn,  the  court  may  either  com- 
pel his  attendance  or  dismiss  the  jury  and  impanel  another.^ 
Finally,   it  is  a  rule  of  paramount  importance  that  errors  com- 


1  People  V.  Arceo,  32  Cal.  40,  44 ; 
State  V,  Pritchard,  15  Nev.  74;  State  v. 
Arthur,  2  Dev.  (N.  C.)  217;  State  v. 
Beutou,  2  Dt'v,  &  B.  (N.  C.)  196,  222; 
Smith  V.  ChiTtou,  2'.)  N.  ,T.  L.  357; 
Phelps  r.  Hall,  2  Tyler  (Vt.),  401; 
Johu  V.  State,  16  Fla.  554;  State  v. 
Marshall,  8  Ala.  302;  Watson  r.  State, 
C3Iiicl.548;  Hurley  v.  State,  29  Ark. 
17,  22;  State  v.  Loveusteiu,  9  La.  Aun. 
313;  State  v.  Wilson,  48  N.  H.  398; 
Foster's  Case,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  (N. 
y.)  372,  n. ;  Silvis  v.  Ely,  3  Watts  &  S. 
(Pa.)  420;  Citizens' Bank  t\  Strauss, 
26  La.  Aun.  736;  State  v.  Lewis,  28 
La.  Ann.  84;  Clifton  v.  State,  53  Ga. 
241;  Paunell  v.  State,  29  Ga.  681; 
Henry  r.  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.)  270; 
State  V.  Shelledy,  8  Iowa,  477;  O'Brien 
r.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,  7  Mo.  App. 
257. 

2  Boles  V.  State,  13  Sraed.  &  M. 
(Miss.)  3!»S;  Williams  w.  State,  32  Miss. 
390;  Smith  r.  State,  55]\Iiss.  410;  Finn 
V.  State,  5  lud.  400;  Meyers  v.  State, 
20  Ind.  511.  (But  see  Coryell  v.  Stone, 
62  Ind.  307.)  Van  Blaricura  v.  Peo- 
ple, 16  111.  364;  Greer  v.    Norvill,   3 


Hill  (S.  C),  262.  See  also  remarks  of 
Lord  Tenterden,  ante,  §  250. 

2  Henry  v.  State,  4  Humph.  (Teun.) 
270;  Grissonw.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  386, 
398;  State  v.  Raymond,  11  Nev.  98; 
Woodard  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  412. 
But,  in  the  view  of  some  courts,  this 
rule  docs  not  permit  the  trial  judge  to 
exclude  competent  jurors  arbitrarily 
and  unreasonably;  but  an  abuse  of 
discretion  in  this  regard  may  be 
ground  of  new  trial. 

*  United  States  v.  Byrne  (U.  S. 
Cir.  Ct.  S.  D.  X.  y.,  May,  1881),  7  Fed. 
Rep.  435;  AValler  v.  State,  40  Ala.  325; 
Bill  V.  State,  29  Ala.  34;  Stewart  v. 
State,  13  Ark.  721,  737;  Hall  v.  State, 
51  Ala.  9;  People  ^7.  Larned,  7  IST.  Y. 
445;  People?;.  Vermilyea,  7  Cow.  (N. 
y.)  369,  382;  Johnson  v.  State,  47  Ala. 
9  ;  State  V.  Lovensteiu,  9  La.  Aun.  313; 
Foster's  Case,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  (n. 
s.)  372,  11. ;  Boles  v.  State,  24  Miss. 
445;  State  v.  Breaux,  32  La.  Ann.  222; 
State  V.  Belcher,  13  So.  Car.  459.  But 
see  Johnson  v.  State,  47  Ala.  9;  State 
V.  Ross,  30  La.  Ann.  1154. 

5  Peuuell  V.  Percival,  13  Pa.  St.  197. 


130  IMPANELING    THE    JURY.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

mitted  in  overruling  challenges  for  cause  are  not  grounds  of  re- 
versal, unless  it  be  shown  an  objectionable  juror  was  forced  up- 
on the  challenging  party  after  he  had  exhausted  his  peremptory 
challenges ;  ^  if  his  peremptory  challenges  remained  unexhausted, 
so  that  he  might  have  excluded  the  objectionable  juror  by  that 
means,  he  has  no  ground  of  complaint.^ 

§  121.  Juror  no  Vested  Right  to  Serve.  — A  single  decision 
is  found  upholding  the  idea  that  a  citizen  has  a  vested  right  to 
serve  as  a  juror  when  drawn  ;  ^  but  the  idea  is  too  fantastic  for 
serious  discussion. 

1  The    Anarchists'   Case  (Spies  v.  ^  United    States    v.    Neverson,     1 

People)     (111.),  12  North   East.   Rep.  Mackey  (D.  C),  152. 
867,  989;  s.  c.  122  111.  1;  Holt  v.  State,  ^  Qj-ger  v.   Norvill,  3    Hill  (S.  C), 

9  Tex.  App.  571;  Laggins  v.  State,  12  262. 
Tex.  App.  65.    But  see  Wade  v.  State, 
12  Tex.  App.  358. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IM    FACIE    CURIiE.  131 


TITLE    II. 

CO:^TEOL  AXD  REGULATIO]S'  OF  THE  TKIAL. 


Chapter  V. —  Of  the  Preservation  of  Order  and  the  Pun- 
ishment OF  Contempts. 

Chapter    VI. —  Of  Compulsory  Process  against  Witnesses. 

Chapter  VII. —  Enforcing  the  Stipulations  and  Adjiissions 
of  Counsel. 

Chapter  VIII. —  Of  Other  Subjects  of  Judicial  Conduct 
AND  Control. 


CHAPTER     V. 

OF  THE  PRESERVATION  OF  ORDER  AND  THE  PUNISHMENT  OF  CON- 

TEIVIPTS. 
Section 

124.  Extent  of  the  Power  to  Punish  Contempts. 

125.  Power  of  Legishiture  to  Limit  this  Power  of  Courts. 

126.  Statutory  Affirmations  of  this  Power. 

127.  Immaterial  that  the  Offense  is  Indictable. 

128.  What  are  Superior  Courts  of  Record. 

129.  Power  of  Inferior  Courts  to  Punish  Contempts. 

130.  [Continued.]     Power  of  Referees,  Court  Commissioners,  Notaries. 

131.  [Continued.]     Power  of  .Justices  of  the  Peace. 

132.  Power  of  all  Courts  to  Protect  their  Proceedings  from  Interruption. 

133.  Of  Direct  Contempts  or  Contempts  in  Facie  Curiae. 

134r.  Matters  whicli  have  been  lield  not  Contempts  in  Facie  Curice. 
135.  What  Acts  are  Punishable  as  Constructive  Contempts. 
13G.  Contempts  by  Attorneys  of  the  Court. 

137.  [Continued.]     Punishment — Disbarment,  Suspension. 

138.  Procedui-e  in  Cases  of  Contempts  in  Facie  Curiae. 

139.  [Continued.]     Procedure  in  Cases  of  Indirect  or  Constructive  Contempts. 

140.  Remedies  of  the  Person  Committed  for  Contempt. 

141.  Remedy  by  Habeas  Corpus,  in  case  of  a  Want  of  Jurisdiction. 


132      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

Sectiox 

142.  [Continued.]  Power  of  one  Court  to  Judge  of  the  Jurisdiction  of  an- 
other Court. 

14:3.  [Continued.]  Power  to  re-judge  the  Question  of  Jurisdiction  but  not 
the  Judgment. 

144.  [Continued.]     Statutory  Expressions  in  Various  States. 

145.  [Continued.]     Extensions  of  the  Use  of  this  Writ  by  Appellate  Courts, 

146.  [Continued.]     Pernicious  Consequences  of  Such  Extensions. 

147.  Injunction,  Proliibition,  Mandamus. 

148.  Action  for  False  Imprisonment. 

149.  Executive  Pardon. 

150.  Application  to  the  Judge  who  has  Imposed  the  Punishment. 

§  124.  Extent  of  the  Power   to   Punish  Contempts.  —  It  is 

necessary  to  the  due  exercise  of  the  functions  of  a  judicial  court 
that  the  judge  should  possess  the  power  to  preserve  order  while 
conducting  judicial  proceedings,  to  enforce  obedience  tOjthe  lawful 
orders  and  process  of  the  court,  and  consequently  to  punish  disobe- 
dience of  the  same.  It  is  therefore  a  general  principle  of  the  com- 
mon-law, subject  to  statutory  limitations  in  this  country:  (1)  that 
every  superior  court  of  record  has  the  inherent  power  to  jDunish 
contempts  committed  in  its  presence  and  against  its  authority ;  (  2  ) 
that  every  such  court  is  the  exclusive  judge  of  such  contempts.^ 

1  Wilson's  Case,  7  Q.  B.  984;  s.  c.  185,  190;   Johnson  ■;;.  Commonwealth, 

9  Jur.  393,  14  L.    J.  Q.   B,  105,  201;  1  Bibb  (Ky.),  598;  Morrison  «.  McDon- 

Ex  parte  Edwards,  11   Fla.  174;  State  aid,  21  Me.  550;  Passmore  William- 

V.   Gallaway,  5  Coldw.    (Tenn.)    32(;;  son's  Case,  26  Pa.  St.  9,  18;  Ex  parte 

Re  Andrews,  4  C.  B.   226;    Ex  parte  Smith,  28  Ind.  47;  State  v.  Tipton,  1 

Hardy   (Ala.),  13   Cent.  L.  J.  50;  Re  Blackf.  (Ind.)    166;    State  v.  Doty,  32 

Cooper,  32  Vt.  253 ;   People  v.  Sturt-  N.   J.  L.   403 ;  The   Bark   Laurens,    1 

evant,  9  N.  Y.  263;   Ex  parte  Adams,  Abb.  Adm.   508,  513;  Watson?;.  AVill- 

25  Miss.  883;  Ex.  parte   Sam,  51  Ala.  iams,  36  Miss.  331;  Hollingsworth  v. 

34;     Re    Millington,     24     Kan.    214;  Duane,  Wall.  La.  (U.  S)  77;   State  v. 

Crosby's  Case,  3  Wils.  188;  Wicker  u.  Morrill,    16     Ark.     384;     Lining     v. 

Dresser,    13  How.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)   331;  Bentham,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  1,  7;  States. 

AVhitcomb's  Case,  120  Mass.  118,  120,  .Johnson,  7d,  385;    People  v.  Fancher, 

.per  Gray,  C.  J.;    Cartwright's  Case,  4  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  467;  Sanders  v. 

114  Mass.  230;    State  v.  Matthews,  37  Metcalf,  1  Tenn.  Ch.  419,  428;  People 

N.  H.   450;    Mariner  v.    Dyer,  2   Me.  ■?;.  Wilson,  64  111.  195;  Middlebrook  r. 

165,  172;  Tenney's  Case,  23  N.  H.  162;  State,  43  Conn.  257,  268;  Shattuck  v. 

Spalding  v.   People,  7   Hill    (N.  Y.),  State,   51   Miss.    50;    La    Fontaine  v 

301  (affirming  s.  c.  10  Paige  (N.  Y.),  Southern  Underwriters,  83  N.  C.  132; 

284)  ;    State  v.  AVhite,  R.   M.  Charlt.  State  v.  Harper's  Ferry  Bridge  Co.,  16 

(Ga.)  136;  Lyon  v.  Lyon,  21  Conn,  18,  W.  Va.  864,  876. 


Tit.  II,  Cll.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CURIAE.  133 

The  result  of  this  doctrine  is  that  superior  courts  of  record  are 
not  bound  to  certify  upon  their  record  the  facts  of  which  a  con- 
tempt consists,  but  that  every  other  court  or  judge,  where  the 
vahdity  of  a  commitment  for  contempt  by  such  a  court  is  drawn 
in  question,  is  bound  to  presume  that  the  facts  were  sufficient  to 
warrant  it. 

§  125.  Power  of  Legislature  to  limit  this  Power  of 
Courts. —  This- power  being  inherent  in  courts  of  justice,  and 
necessary  to  enable  them  to  preserve  their  dignity  and  enforce 
their  process,  and  so  to  attain  the  ends  of  their  creation,  the 
power  of  the  legislature  to  regulate  the  same,  except  where  such 
power  is  conferred  by  the  constitution,  may  well  be  doubted.^ 
If  the  court  is  created  by  the  constitution,  it  is  clear,  upon  prin- 
ciple, that  the  legislature  has  no  such  power,  unless  such  power 
is  conferred  upon  it  by  the  constitution;  and  it  has  been  so 
held.2 

§  126.  Statutory  Affirmations  of  this  Power.  —  Statutory 
affirmations  of  this  power  exist  in  several  States.  Where 
the  power  is  conferred  in  general  terms  by  an  affirmative 
statute  upon  a  superior  court  of  record,  it  is  regarded  as 
being  merely  declaratory  of  the  common  law,^  not  as  creating 
a  power,  but  simply  as  re-affirming  a  pre-existing  power;  and  it 
leaves  the  court  to  follow  the  principles  of  the  common  law  in 
determining  what  constitutes  a  contempt.*  Accordingly,  a  stat- 
ute conferring  this  power  upon  superior  courts  of  record,  in  gen- 
eral terms,  is  held  to  embrace  both  direct  and  constructive  con- 
tempts, because  both  of  these  were  contempts  at  common  law.^ 
Even  a  statute  requiring  a  judge  issuing  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus 

1  See  Arnold  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  300;  might  impose  reasonable  checks  upon 
s.  c.  44  Am.  Rep.  480 ;  Ex  parte  Robin-  the  mere  arbitrary  exercise  of  a  discre- 
son,  19  AVall.  (U.S.)  510;  Re  Wolley,  tion  in  this  regard.  Re  Wolley,  11 
11  Bush  (Ky.),  95,  111.  Bush  (Ky.),  95,  111. 

2  State  ?;.  Morrill,  16  Ark.  384.  The  3  Middlebroo4i  v.  State,  43  Conn. 
Kentucky  court,  while  asserting  this  257,  267. 

principle  in  general  terms,  was  dis-  ^  People  v.  W^ilson,  64  111.  195. 

posed  to  consider  that  the  legislature  ^  whittem  v.  State,  36  Ind.  196,  212. 


134  CONTEOL    AND    REGULATION   OF   TRIAL.       [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 

to  remand  a  j3risoner,  if  it  appear  that  he  is  detained  in  custody 
for  a  contempt  specially  and  plainly  charged  in  the  commitment, 
by  some  court  having  authority  to  commit  for  the  contempt 
charged,  has  been  supposed  not  to  work  a  substantial  alteration 
of  the  rule  of  the  common  law  on  the  subject.^  A  statute  which 
merely  purports  to  limit  the  power,  in  this  regard,  6f  judges  in 
vacation  and  at  chambers,  does  not,  of  course,  operate  to  curtail 
the  power  possessed  by  the  courts.'^ 

§  127.    Immaterial  that  tlie   Offense   is  Indictable.  —  The 

power  of  the  courts  in  this  regard,  being  founded  in  the  princi- 
ple of  self-preservation,  it  does  not  at  all  go  to  deprive  them  of 
it,  that  the  law  has  provided  some  other  mode  for  punishing  the 
offender;  it  is  quite  immaterial  that  the  offense  is  indictable.^ 
Courts  are  not  obliged  to  trust  the  preservation  of  their  dignity 
and  authority  to  such  weak  agencies  as  information,  indictment, 
and  trial  by  jury,  it  may  be  before  some  other  tribunal,  where 
the  success  of  the  prosecution  and  the  conviction  of  the  offender 
may  depend  upon  the  zeal  of  a  prosecuting  witness,  of  the 
State's  attorney,  or  upon  circumstances  purely  accidental.  Be- 
sides, the  exigencies  may  not  admit  of  so  tardy  a  remedy.  In 
cases  of  inferior  courts,  such  as  justices  of  the  peace,  even  the 
remedy  by  indictment  may  not  exist,  unless  the  words  are  such 
that  they  would  be  indictable  when  spoken  of  a  private  person ;  * 

^  Davison's  Case,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  an  ass  and  a  coxcomb  for  making  such 
Y.)  129,  138.  But  a  reading  of  tlie  a  warrant,  and  lie  l^nows  no  more  tlian 
Euglisli  decisions  will  show  that  this  a  slickhill,"  was  held  naught,  on  de- 
supposition  is  erroneous.  murrer,   tliough  it  was  a  breach  of 

2  Ke  Millington,  24  Kan.  214.  good     manners,     and     might     afford 

8  Rex  .V.  Lord  Ossulston,  2  Strange,  ground  for  binding  the  party  over  for 

1107  (s.  c.   sub  nom.  King  r.  Pierson,  good  behavior.     "  Et pei'  Holt,  C.  J.: 

Andrews,  310)  ;  Spauldingt'.  People,  7  '  To  say  a  justice  is  a   fool,  or  an  ass. 

Hill    (N.  Y.),  301,  302;  State  ?'.  Will-  or  a  coxcomb,  or  a  blockhead,  or  a 

iams,  3   Speers    (S.  C),   2G;     Contra,  buffle-head,  is  not  indictable.'' "     Reg. 

State  V.  Blackwell,  10  So,  Car.  35,  38.  v.  Wrightsou,  2   Salk.  698.     But  in  a 

*  Thus,  in  an  old  case,  an  indict-  rambling    report  in  the  Modern  Re- 

ment  for  saying  of  Sir  Rowland  Gwyn,  ports,  the  court  is  said  to  have  sus- 

who  was  a  justice  of  the  peace,  in  a  tained    au    indictment    for   speaking 

discourse  concerning  a  warrant  made  scandalous  words  of  Sir  J.  K.,  a  jus- 

by  him,  "  Sir  Rowland  Gwyn  is  a  fool,  tice  of  the  peace,  namely:  "  Sir  J.  K. 


Tit.   II,  Ch.   v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CURIiE.  135 

but  they  might  afford  ground  for  binding  the  party  over  to  keep 
the  peace. 1  To  this  ruling  an  exception  has  been  admitted  by 
some  courts,  in  the  case  of  proceedings  to  disbar  atlorneys  for 
professional  misconduct;  so  that,  where  a  special  proceeding 
was  provided  hy  statute  by  which  the  accused  was  allowed  the 
advantage  of  certain  formalities,  he  could  not  be  proceeded 
against  and  disbarred  b}' the  court  in  the  exercise  of  its  common- 
law  powers. 2 

§  128.  "What  arc  Superior  Courts  of  Record.  —  AVhat  are 
superior  courts  of  record,  within  the  meaning  of  this  rule,  is  an 
important  subject  of  inquiry.  It  must  be  stated  in  the  outset, 
that  it  is  not  at  all  necessary  to  the  inherent  power  of  the  court 
to  fine  and  imprison  for  contempt  that  it  should  be  what  is  termed 
a  court  of  general  jurisdiction.  In  the  largest  sense,  there  are 
no  such  courts,  because  there  are  no  courts  in  P^ngland  or  Amer- 
ica which  exercise  at  once  all  the  judicial  power  of  the  State, 
both  original  and  appellate,  legal  and  equital)le,  civil  and  crim- 
inal. The  two  houses  of  Parliament,  for  instance,  have  always 
been  regarded,  whenever  their  authority  in  this  regard  has  been 
called  in  question  in  the  judicial  courts,  as  very  high  courts. 
The  House  of  Lords,  indeed,  is  the  highest  court  of  api^ellate 
jurisdiction  in  Great  Britain,  and  it  possesses  a  certain  original 
jurisdiction,  chiefly  criminal,  in  respect  of  its  own  members,  but 
it  is  in  no  sense  a  court  of  general  jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, 
its  power,  when  sitting  as  a  legislative  body,  to  punish  contempts 
of  its  authority  is  of  so  high  a  nature  that  it  cannot 
even  be  inquired  into  by  the  judicial  courts.  The  former 
Court  of  Chancery  in  England  had  no  common-law  jurisdiction, 

is  a  buffle-headed  fellow  and  doth  not  for  which  au  hulictmeut  would  lie; 
understand  law;  he  is  not  lit  to  talk  and  of  that  opinion  was  the  whole 
law  with  me;  I  have  baffled  him,  and  court,  and  gave  judgment  accord- 
he  hath  not  done  my  client  justice."  ingly."  Rex  v.  Derby,  3  ]Mod.  lo'J. 
The  counsel  for  the  crown  urged  that  '  Richmond  v.  Dayton,  10  Johns. 
''  this  was  a  scandal  upon  the  govern-  (N.  Y.)  3'J3. 

ment;  since  it  was  as  much  as  to  say  -  State  v.    Start,  7  Iowa,  499;   Ex 

that  the  king  hath  appointed  an  ignor-  parte  Smith,  28  lud.  47. 
ant  man  to  be  a  justice  of  the  peace, 


136      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

and  hence  was  not,  properly  speaking,  a  court  of  general  juris- 
diction ;  but  its  power  to  punish  contempts  of  its  authority  was 
not  only  never  questioned,  but  in  the  earliest  times  this  was  the 
only  way  in  which  it  enforced  its  orders  and  decrees. ^  The  Court 
of  Common  Pleas  in  England  had  no  criminal  jurisdiction,  but 
its  inherent  power  in  this  regard  was  never  questioned.  So  the 
Court  of  Common  Pleas  of  Connecticut  has  no  criminal  jurisdic- 
tion,  but  its  power  in  this  regard,  Avhen  questioned,  was  dis- 
tinctly affirmed. 2  The  courts  of  the  United  States  possess  both 
common-law  and  equity  powers,  and  their  common-law  jurisdic- 
tion extends  to  cases  both  civil  and  criminal.  But  in  respect  of 
parties  to  actions,  those  courts  are  not  courts  of  general  juris- 
diction.'^ Their  jurisdiction  is  limited  by  the  citizenship  of  the 
parties,  except  in  cases  relating  to  the  federal  revenue  and  ni 
some  other  cases.  But  their  power  to  punish  contempts  of  their 
authority  is  unquestioned,  and,  when  acting  within  the  scojje  of 
their  apparent  jurisdiction,  their  judgments  in  this  regard  cannot 
be  questioned  in  other  courts.^  Passing  to  other  courts,  we  find 
that  the  English  connnon-law  judges  holding  courts  of  nisiprius,^ 
courts  of  Oyer  and  Terminer  in  England  ^  and  in  New  York  ^ 
and  the  Municipal  Court  of  Bangor,  Maine,   existing  in  1833,* 

1  3  Bl.  Com.  287.  other  State,  and  brought  before  the 

2  Middlebrook  v.    State,    43   Conn.  court  whose  authority   he   has   con- 
257   2(57.  temned,   there  to  be   dealt  with  for 

3  Ex  parte  Smith,  94  U.  S.  485.  such  contempt.  Faushawe  v.  Tracy, 
Compare  Ex  parte  Watkins,  3  Pet.  4  Biss.  (U.  S.)  490.  But  some  of  the 
(U.  S.)  193,  207;  McCormick  v.  Sul-  federal  judges  deny  this  power.  Com- 
livant,  10  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  192;  Kemp  pare  Pooley  v.  Wliethan,  15  Ch.  Div. 
V.  Kennedy,  5  Cranch  (U.  S.),  185;  435;  s.  c.  50  L.  J.  (Chan.)  236. 
Skelleru  v.  May,  6  Cranch  (U.  S.),  ^  Rex  v,  Davison,  4  Barn.  &  Aid, 
267;  Ruclvman  v.  Cowvell,  1  N.  Y.  505;  329, 

Thompsons.  Lyie,  3  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  «  Re    M'Aleece,    7    Ir.    C.    L.    146. 

166;  Reed?).  Vaughn,  10  Mo.  447;  Hays  Compare  Re  Pater,  5  Best  &  S.  299; 

V.  Ford,  55  Ind.  52.  s.  c.  10  Jur.  (x.  s.)  972;  Re  Fernandez, 

♦  Williamson's  Case,  26  Pa.  St.  9;  6  Hurl.  &  N.  717;  s.  c.  10  C.  B.  (n.  s.) 

The  Bark  Laureus,  1  Abb.  Adm.  508,  3;  30  L.  J.  (C.  P.)  321. 

513.     It  has  even  been  held  that  a  con-  ^  People  v.  Faucher,  4  Thomp.  &  a 

temnor  of  one  of  the  Circuit  Courts  of  (N.  Y.)  4(57. 

the  United  States  may  be  arrested  in  «  Morrison   v.   Macdonald,   21  MCc 

another  federal   district,  even  in  an-  651,  556. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IN    FACIE    CURI.E.  137 

were  all  ranked  as  superior  courts  of  record,  within  the  rule 
which  clothes  such  courts  with  this  power.  So,  the  Court  of 
Probate  in  Mississippi,^  and  the  Surrogates'  Court  in  New  york,^ 
possess  the  power  to  compel  defaulting  executors,  administratovs 
and  guardians  to  pay  over  inongy  or  deliver  property,  where 
payment  or  delivery  is  w'ithin  their  power. ^ 

§  129.  Power  of  Inferior  Courts  to  Punish  for  Contempt.  — 

It  maj^  be  stated  as  a  general  rule  of  the  connnon  law,  that  infe- 
rior courts  not  of  record,  inferior  legislative  bodies  such  as  those 
of  the  British  colonies  and  dependencies,  and  the  legislative 
councils  of  municipal  corporations,*  have  no  power  to  fine  and 
imprison  for  contempt,  except  in  so  far  as  such  power  has  been 
expressly  conferred  by  statute.^  Much  difference  of  opinion  has 
existed  as  to  what  tribunals  and  officers  are  to  be  deemed  inferior 
courts  not  of  record,  W'ithin  the  meaning  of  this  rule.  But  it  has 
been  held  that  judges  of  courts  performing  ex  officio  acts  out  of 
court  in  vacation,''  or  at  chambers,^  have  no  power  to  fine  or  im- 

*  Watson  w.  Wilson,  3(5  Miss.  331.  proceedings,     regarded,     in     certain 

But  not  in  Vermont .     Ee  Bingham,  32  cases,   as   superior  courts  of  record 

Vt.  329.  (Johnson  v.  Beasley,  65  Mo.  250),  yet 

2  Seaman  v.  Duryea,   11  N.  Y.  324  it  is  believed  that  it  is  not  the  uuder- 


t-ming  s.  c.  10  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  523)  ;  standing   of    the  profession    in  that 

Matter  of  Watson  v.  Nelson,  69  N.  Y.  State  that  the  above  statute  extends  to 

536.  the  courts  of  probate. 

3  In  Missouri,   there   is  a  general  *  Whitcomb's  Case,  120  Mass.  118. 

statutory  provision  to  the  effect  that  ^  j^^    Kerrigan,   33   N.   J.   L.    314; 

"when  a  judgment  requires  the  per-  Batchelder  v.  Moore,  42  Cal.  412,  414; 

formance  of  any  other  act  than  the  Reg.  v.  Lefroy,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  134;  s.  c. 

payment  of  money,  a  certified  copy  of  4   Moak,    250;    Noyes    v.   Byxbee,   45 

the  judgment  may  be  served  upon  the  Conn.    382 ;    Heard  v.  Pierce,  8  Cush. 

party  against  whom  it  is  given,  and  (Mass.)  338. 

his  obedience  thereto  required.     If  he  ^  Ex  parte  Ireland,  34  Tex.  344. 

neglect  or  refuse,  he  may  be  punished  '  People  v.   Breuuan,  44  Barb.  (N. 

by  the  court,  as  for  a  contempt,  by  Y.)  344.     The  N.  Y.  Code  Civil  Proc, 

flue  or  imprisonment,  or  both,  and,  if  §  302,  gives  to  the  judge  who  issues 

necessary,  by  sequestration  of  proper-  the  order  in  a  proceeding  supplement- 

ty."     Rev.   Stat.,   §   3728.      Although  ary  to  execution,  the  power  to  punish 

courts  of  probate  in  Missouri  are  now,  as  for  contempt,  and   such  power  is 

in  respect  of  the  presumptions  in  sup-  possessed  by  the  county  judge  in  that 

port  of  their  jurisdiction  in  collateral  State.    Rugg  v.  Spencer,  59  Barb.  (N. 


138      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

prison  for  contempt;  though  judges  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  the 
United  States,  in  cases  in  equity,  possess  power  so  to  punish  in 
vacation,  because  a  court  of  equity  has  no  terms,  but  is  deemed 
to  be  always  open.^  By  analogy  to  the  well-known  rule  that  in 
suinmojy  proceedings  contrary  to  the  course  of  the  common  law, 
nothing  is  presumed  in  favor  of  the  jurisdiction  even  of  a  supe- 
rior court  of  record,  it  his  been  laid  down  that  no  power  resides 
in  judicial  officers  when  exercising  a  summary  jurisdiction,  to 
punish  for  contempts,  unless  this  power  is  expressly  conferred 
by  statute.-  In  this  category  have  been  placed  justices  of  the 
peace,  recorders  of  municipal  corporations,  and  the  like  officers 
who  exercise  summary  jurisdiction  expressly  conferred  by  stat- 
ute for  the  trial  of  certain  petty  offenses.^  But  there  is  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion  as  to  the  powers  of  justices  of  the  peace  in 
this  regard,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see.  County  courts  possess 
varying  jurisdiction  in  different  States  ;  and  no  general  rule  can 
be  stated  with  regard  to  the  power  of  such  courts  to  punish  for 
contempts.  Undoubtedly,  they  have  such  power  in  Vermont.* 
But  it  would  seem  they  do  not  possess  it  in  Alabama;  ^  and,  un- 
questionably, they  do  not  in  Missouri,  where  the  county  court  is 
merely  an  administrative  board,  possessing,  except  in  a  few  pro- 
visional cases,  no  judicial  powers.  There  seems  to  have  been  a 
difference  of  opinion  in  New  York,  as  to  whether  surrogates 
possess  this  power;  but  it  seems  that,  by  force  of  statute,  they 
possess  it  to  a  limited  extent,  and  may  use  it  to  compel  the  pay- 
ment of  money  into  their  hands  by  defaulting  executors,  admin- 
istrators and  guardians. '^ 

Y.)  383,  398.     But  the  possessiou  of  ^  Matter  of  Kerrigan,  supra. 
this   special    statutory  power  on  the           *  lu  that  State  it  is  held  that  jus- 
part  of  the  judge,  does  not  operate  as  tices  of  the  peace  have   such  power, 
an  implied  denial  of  it  on  the  part  of  witliout  the  aid  of  any  statute.    Ee 
the  court.    Kearney's  Case,   13  Abb.  Cooper,  32  Vt.  253. 
(N.  Y.)  Pr.  459.                                                   •'5  State  v.  McDuffie,  52  Ala.  4. 

1  Vose  V.   Reed,   1  Woods  (U.  S.),  «  Seaman    v.  Duryea,  11  N.  Y.  324 

647,  652.  (affirming  s.  c.  10  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  523) ; 

-  Matter  of  Kerrigan,  33  N.  ,T.  L.  Matter  of  Watson  v.  Nelson,  69  N.  Y, 

344,  348,  350;   Stuart  r.  Allen,  45  Wis.  536. 
158,  160,  per  Orton,  J. 


Tit.    II,  Ch.   v.]        CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CUKI.E.  139 

§  130.  [Continued.]  Power  of  Referees,  Court  Commis- 
sioners, Xotaries.  —  It  is  said,  in  North  Carolina,  tliat  a  referee 
sitting  to  try  tlie  issues  of  a  cause  Mhich  has  been  referred  to 
him,  has  the  same  power  to  enforce  obedience  to  his  rulinos 
which  the  court  would  have  if  the  trial  were  before  the  court ; 
but  this  is  by  virtue  of  the  express  provisions  of  a  statute.^ 
Where  the  referee  is  not  to  try  the  issues,  but  merely  to  collect 
evidence,  in  other  words,  where  the  officer,  although  called  a 
referee,  discharges  merely  the  functions  of  an  examiner  in  chan- 
cery, he  has  no  power  to  punish  a  recusant  witness  for  contemjDt, 
but  must  refer  the  matter  to  the  court. '^  Court  commissioners 
in  "Wisconsin  have  no  such  power,  except  in  so  far  as  it  is  con- 
ferred by  statute.'^  According  to  the  usual  practice  in  chancer}^ 
an  attachment  against  a  Avitness  for  a  contempt  in  a  proceeding 
before  a  master,  requires  an  application  to  the  court. ^  A  like 
l^ractice  is  prescribed  by  act  of  Congress  in  the  case  of  commis- 
sioners to  take  depositions  to  be  used  abroad,  and  in  case  of  re<iis- 
ters  in  bankruptcy.^  Neither  have  commissioners  of  Circuit 
Courts  of  the  United  States  power  to  commit  for  contempt,  and 
the  power  of  Congress  to  clothe  them  with  this  power  has  been 
doubted.^  So,  it  has  been  well  laid  down  that  a  party  seeking  to 
justify  the  commitment  of  a  witness  by  a  notary  public,  must 
put  his  finger  upon  some  statute  directly  authorizino-  it."  "We 
shall  see  in  the  next  section,  that  justices  of  the  peace  do  not 
possess  this  power  at  common  law.  For  stronger  reasons,  then, 
it  has  been  denied  to  the  police  justices  of  municipal  corpora- 
tions.^ 

§  131.    [Continued.]      Power    of    Justices  of  the  Peace. — 

The  power  of  justices  of  the  peace  at  common  law,  to  fine  and 

1  X.  C.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  24G.  Am.  ed.)  117S,   1198;    78th  Eq.  Rule  of 

-  La  Fontaine  r.   Southern  Under-  U.  S.  Courts,  17  Peters,  Ixxiv. 
writers,  83  N.  C.  132,  137.  5  ^ev.    Stat.  U.    S.,  §§   4071,  4073, 

3  Haight    V.   Lucia,    36   Wis.   355;  4999,  5002,  5005,  5006. 
Stewart  v.  Allen,  45  Wis.  158,  160,  per  ^  Ex  parte  Doll,  7  Phila.  (Pa.)  595. 

Orton,  J.  7  Ex    parte    Mallinkrodt,    20    Mo. 

*  Gray,  C.  J..,  in  Whitcomb's  Case,  493. 
120  Mass.  118,  120.     See  Rex  r.  Almou,  s  T^iatter   of   Kerrigan,   30  X.  J.  L. 

Wiimot,  243,  2GU;  2  Dan.  Ch.  Pr.  (4th  344,  34(J-348. 


140  CONTROL    AND    KEGULATIOX    OF    TRIAL.        [1  Thoilip.   Tv.y 

imprison  for  contempt,  is 'involved  in  much  doubt.  I  have  not 
met  with  any  authoritative  adjudication  in  England  which  holds 
that  they  possess  such  power;  and  as  late  as  1822  the  power  was 
questioned  in  the  King's  Bench,  and  the  court  avoided  express- 
ing any  opinion  upon  it.  If  they  ever  possessed  this  power  at 
all,  beyond  question  it  was  limited  to  the  punishment  of  con- 
tempts committed  i)i  facie  citrice;  ^  although  a  court  of  record 
possessed  at  common  law  the  power  to  punish  constructive  con- 
tempts, that  is,  contempts  committed  out  of  court. ^  But  a  jus- 
tice of  tlie  peace  may,  for  this  kind  of  contemi:)t,  compel  the 
contemnor  to  find  sureties  to  keep  the  peace,  and  commit  him  in 
default  thereof  ;^  but  if  he  merely  imprisons  him  for  contempt,  he 
will  be  liable  to  him  for  damages  for  false  imprisonment.*  Dicta 
may  possibly  be  found  in  the  old  English  books  of  reports  which 
give  color  to  the  idea  that  justices  of  the  peace  have  power  to 
punish  direct  contempts;^  and  some  of  the  authoritative  text- 
writers  seem  to  have  supposed  that  this  is  the  law.^  But  it  has 
been  pointed  out  by  a  learned  judge  in  New  Jersey,  in  by  far  the 
ablest  discussion  of  this  branch  of  the  subject  which  has  ap- 
peared in  any  American  book  of  reports,  that  these  assumptions 
are  entirely  destitute  of  the  force  of  authority,  and  may  be  ex- 
jolained,  for  the  most  part,  by  the  indefinite  use  of  the  word 
"  commit,"  not  discriminating  between  its  use  in  the  sense  of 
committing  in  default  of  sureties  of  the  peace  or  of  bail,  to  an- 
swer before  a  criminal  tribunal  on  an  indictment,  and  the  power 
to  commit  by  way  of  punishment.^  He  pointed  out  that  origin- 
ally the  powers  of  a  justice  of  the  peace  were  ministerial  only,^ 
consisting  chiefly  in  preserving  the  peace,  receiving  complaints, 
issuing  warrants  for  the  arrest  of  accused  persons,  examining  wit- 
nesses of  the  informant,  and  binding  over  or  bailing  or  commit- 

1  Res;.  V.  Lefroy,  L.  R.  8   Q.  B.  134;  =  Rex.  v.  Laugley,  2  Salk.   (197;  s.  c. 
Richmoutl  v.    Dayton,    10   Johus.    (N.      2  Ld.  Rayin.  1029. 

y.)  393;  Fitlcrv.  Probasco,  2  Browue  e  2   Ha^vk.   P.  C,  book   2,  ch.    IC, 

(Pa.),  137.  §  3;  2  Hale  P.  C.  122. 

2  Post,  §  135.  '  Matter  of  Kerrigan,   33  N.  J.  L. 

3  Richmoud  v.  Dayton,  10  Johns.  (N.  344,  349. 

Y.)  393.  8  See,  as  to  this,  Schraedcr  v.  Eh- 

*  Fitler  v.  Probasco,  supra.  lers,  31  N.  .1.  L.  14(1. 


Tit.   11,  Ch.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IN    FACIE    CURIAE.  141 

ting  the  accused.^  Several  American  courts,  however,  have 
conceded  to  justices  of  the  peace  the  power  to  punish  contempts 
of  their  authority,  committed  in  their  immediate  presence  while 
in  the  discharge  of  their  judicial  functions,  independently  of  any 
express  grant  of  such  power  by  statute. ^  This  might  be  held  in 
New  England  consistently  Avith  sound  principles,  upon  an  excep- 
tional view  tliere  taken  of  the  character  of  courts  held  by  jus- 
tices of  the  peace,  that  such  courts  arc  courts  of  record;  ^  or  at 
least,  in  certain  cases,  judges  of  record.*  In  New  York  this 
power  is  conferred  by  statute  upon  justices  of  the  peace  in  cei- 
tain  defined  cases,  and  prohibited  in  all  others;^  so  that,  in  that 
State,  a  justice  of  the  peace  has  no  ])ower  to  adjudge  a  ])erson 
guilty  of  contempt,  and  to  })unish  him  thei'cfor,  except  in  the 
cases  prescribed.^  In  Illinois,  the  power  is  now  limited  by  stat- 
ute to  the  imposition  of  a  fine  of  $-'),  and  to  imprisonment  until 
the  same  is  paid;"  but  there  can  be  no  imprisonment  in  the  first 
instance.^ 

§  132.  Power  of  all  Courts  to  Protect  their  Proceedings 
from  Interruption. —  It  riiust  not  be  sui)))osed  from  the  foref''oin<»" 
that  the  common  law  has  been  so  jealous  of  liberty  as  to  deprive 
inferior  judicatories  and  deliberative  bodies  of  the  power  to  pre- 
serve their  deliberations  from  interruption  and  disorder,  and 
from  making  or  ordering  the  arrest  of  disturbers,  for  this  pur- 
pose. Accordingly,  under  any  view  taken  of  the  power  of  a 
justice  of  the  peace  to  fine  and  imprison  for  contempt,  he  un- 

1  See  3  Bl.  Com.  354,  note.  Mete.  (Mass.)    9.     Compare  Smith  v. 

2  Richmoud  v.   Dajtou,    10  Johns.      Morrison,  22  Piek.  (Mass.)  430. 

(N.  Y.)  303;  Lining  r.Beutliam,  2  Bay  &    Rev.    Stat.    N.  Y.  748,  §  44;    Id. 

(S.  C),  1,  8  (anno  179(;)  ;  State  v.  John-  (4th  ed.)  931,  §  51. 

son,  2  Bay  (S.  C),  385;  Hill  u.  Crau-  «  Rutlierford  t;.  Holmes,   06   N.    Y. 

dall,  52  m.   70,73;  Re  Cooper,  32  Vt.  3G8;    (aflirming    s.  c.  5  Hun    (N.  Y.), 

253,   257;     State   v.    Towle,  42  N.   H.  31);  ]\Iallory  v.  Benjamin,  9  How.  Pr. 

5*f-  (N.   Y.)    419;   People  v.  Webster,    14 

3  Holcomb  i\  Cornish,  8  Conn.  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  242;  s.  c.  3  Park.  Cr, 
375,  380.    That  this  is  not  the  view  in  (X.  Y.)  503. 

New  York,   see  Brown  v.  Genung,  I  -  111.  Act.  July  1st,  1872,  §  123. 

Wend.  (N.Y.)  115.  s  Newton  v.   Lockliu,    77   111.    103, 

"•  Thayer     v.     Commonwealth,     12      IOC 


142  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  TllOmp.   Tr., 

doubtedly  possesses  the  pov\^er,  during  the  trial  of  a  cause  before 
him,  to  order  the  removal  of  a  disorderly  by-stander  from  his 
court  room.  Such  a  power  lies  at  the  very  foundation  of  the 
administration  of  justice,  and  his  order,  in  the  exercise  of  it,  will 
justify  a  sheriff  or  constable  in  an  action  of  false  imprisonment ; 
and,  not  being  an  order  of  record,  may  be  proved  by  parol.* 
So,  one  of  the  houses  of  the  legislative  assembly  of  a  British 
colony,  while  possessing  no  power  to  imprison  for  contempt  by 
way  of  punishment,  nevertheless  possesses  the  inherent  power 
to  arrest  and  remove  a  disorderly  member.  This  power  is  nec- 
essary for  self-preservation.  It  is  warranted  by  the  legal  maxim 
quando  lex  aliquid  concedit,  concedere  videtur  et  illud,  sine  quo 
res  ipsa  e.sse  non  potest.^  In  like  manner,  a  grand  jury,  while 
possessing  no  inherent  power  to  punish  contempts  of  its  author- 
ity, is  held  to  possess,  by  necessary  implication,  the  power  to 
order  a  contumacious  witness  or  a  disturber  of  its  deliberations 
into  the  custody  of  its  officer,  for  the  purpose  of  being  brought 
before  the  court,  there  to  be  dealt  with  as  to  the  court  shall 
seem  proper.^ 

§  133.  Of  Direct  Contempts  or  Contempts  in  Facie 
Curiae.  — Having  thus  stated  by  way  of  premise  the  general 
scope  of  the  power  which  judicial  courts  possess  of  punishing 
contempts  and  protecting  their  proceedings  from  disorderly  in- 
terruption, we  shall  now  proceed  to  speak  of  those  contempts 
which  most  usually  arise  in  the  conduct  of  trials.  And  first  of 
direct  contempts,  or  contempts  in  the  face  of  the  court  itself. 
"What  will  amount  to  such  a  contempt  will,  of  course  depend 
largely  upon  the  personal  temperament  and  the  views  of  decorum 
of  the  judge  who  presides.  The  following  acts  have  been  held 
to  constitute  such  contempt:  Tearing  up  papers  of  the  oppo- 
site counsel ;  ^  for  a  person  conducting  his  own  defense  on  a 
trial  under  an  indictment  for  a  blasphemous  libel   to  say  to  the 

1  State  V.  Copp,  15  N.  II   212.  s  Heard  v.  Pierce,  S  Cush.  (Mass.) 

2  Doyle  V.  Falconer,  L.  K.,  1  P.  C.      338. 

328,310.  4  Thwiugv,  Denuie,Quiucy(Mass.), 

338. 


Tit.   II,  Ch.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACJK    CURIAE.  143 

judge;  "  My  Lord,  if  you  have  your  dungeon  read}-  I  will  give 
you  the  key."  ^  To  say  on  such  a  trial,  "  The  deist  is  infamous 
because  he  cannot  believe  that  some  traditions  handed  down 
among  the  Jews  and  Christians  are  a  divine  revelation,  and  not 
only  superior  to  the  several  and  respective  revelations  possessed 
by  the  Turks,  the  Brahmins,  the  Hindoos,  and  many  others,  but 
the  only  genuine  and  authentic  revelation  in  existence.  Now,  it 
so  happens  that  a  deist  considers  all  as  a  collection  of  ancient 
tracts,  to  contain  sentiments,  stories  and  references  totally  de- 
rogatory to  the  honor  of  a  God,  destructive  to  pure  principles  of 
morality,  and  opposed  to  the  best  interests  of  society:  "  ^  for  the 
defendant  on  such  ati'ial  to  say,  "  All  bishops  are  generally  scep- 
tics;"' ^  to  call  another  person  a  liar  in  the  presence  of  the  court 
and  in  the  hearing  of  its  officers;  ^  to  protest  against  the  judg- 
ment of  the  court  in  an  insulting  manner,  thougli  with  language 
not  necessarily  insulting;  ^  for  a  i)arty  against  whom  the  judge 
had  decided  a  cause  to  say  to  him  when  about  to  take  his  seat  on 
the  bench,  "I  do  not  si)eak  to  any  one  who  acted  so  corruptly 
and  cowardly  as  to  attack  my  character  when  I  was  absent  and 
so  entirely  defenseless;  "  ^  to  perform  militia  evolutions,  with 
music  and  firing  near  the  court. house  while  the  court  is  in  ses- 
sion ;  ^  for  a  Jew  to  refuse  to  be  sworn  on  Saturday  ;  ^  for  one 
not  a  Quaker  to  refuse  to  be  sworn  on  the  grounds  of  conscien- 
tious scruples,  the  liberty  of  affirming  being  at  the  time  confined 
to  Quakers.^ 

1  For  this  coutempt  the  defeudaut  States    (admitting  that  anywhere   the 

was  fined  £200.     Eex   v.   Davisson,  i  laws  are  in  such  a  barbarous  state  as 

Barn.  &  Aid.  329.  to  admit  of  such  a  prosecution),  with 

-  For  these  expressions  the  learned  the  slightest  prospect  of  success, 

judge  fined  the  defendant  £40.     Ibid.  *  United     States     v.     Emerson,    4 

^  This  so  horrified  the  learned  judge  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  188. 

that  he  imposed  an  additional  £40.     It  ^  Wilson's  Case,  7  Q.  B.  984. 

is  not   supposed    that  any   American  ^  Com.  v.  Dandridge,  2  Va.  Cas.  408. 

court  will  follow  this  infamous  prece-  '  State  i'.  Coulter,  Wright  (Ohio), 

dent.     The    trial   of    a    person    for  a  421;   State  r.  Goff, /rf.  78. 

blasphemous  libel,   consisting  in  the  ^  Stansbury  v.  Marks,  2  Dall.  (Pa.) 

expression  of   candid    opinions  upon  213. 

matters  of  religious  belief,  could  not  *  U.  S.  v.  Coolidge,  2  Dall.   (U.  S.) 

take    place    anywhere    in    the  United  304. 


144  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TKIAL.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

§  134.  [Continued.]  Matters  wliicli  Lave  been  held  not 
Contempts  in  Facie  Curiae. — On  the  contrary,  the  following 
cases  have  been  held  not  to  amount  to  contempts  in  the  face  of  the 
court  itself,  so  as  to  subject  the  person  or  persons  guilty  of  them 
to  immediate  fine  or  committment:  To  make  an  affray  at  a 
tavern  near  the  court  house,  where  the  judge  was  stopping,  of 
which  the  roiters  were  advised,  during  a  night  of  the  term,  the 
court  being  then  in  recess;  ^  to  serve  a  party  or  witness  attend- 
ing court,  with  a  summons,  in  violation  of  privilege;^  for  the 
clerk  of  a  court  to  send  up  an  imperfect  record  to  an  appellate 
court  —  this  not  being  a  contempt  of  the  appellate  court,  though 
jDOssibly  a  contempt  of  the  court  below ;  ^  to  read  an  aflidavit 
charging  the  judge  with  prejudice,  on  a  motion  for  a  change  of 
venue;  *  for  counsel  to  use  hasty  expressions  under  excitement, 
where  no  disrespect  w'as  intended ;  ^  for  a  justice  to  offer  a  pro- 
test to  the  county  court,  against  their  proceedings  in  making 
certain  appropriations,  and  to  complain  of  their  acting  illegally 
and  oppressively ;  *  for  an  attorney  to  post  up,  with  his  name 
signed  thereto,  at  the  ofiice  of  A.  B.,  the  judge,  a  paper  reading: 
"A.  B.  is  a  damned  base  and  corrupt  man" — the  court  not 
being  in  session,  and  it  not  appearing  that  the  language  had 
reference  to  any  ofiicial  act  of  the  judge. ^ 

§  135.  [Continued.]  What  Acts  are  Punishable  as  Con- 
structive Contempts.  —  Many  acts  intimately  connected  with 
the  conduct  of  trials,  though  not  regarded  as  direct  contempts, 
are  punishable  as  constructive  contempts.  Within  this  category 
falls  every  species  of  interference  with  the  process  or  authority 
of  the  court,  direct  or  indirect,  committed  out  of  the  presence 
of  the  court  itself,  such  as  removing  the  subject  of  the  contro- 
versy beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court ;  ^  taking  papers  from 

1  Com.  V.  Stuart,  2  Va.  Cas.  329.  '  Neel  v.  State,  9  Ark.  259. 

-  Blight  V.  Fisher,  Pet.  C.  C.  41.  *  So  held  concerning  the  removal 

•^  Moore  v.  Clerk,  6  Litt.  (Ky.)  104.  of  a  slave  pending  the  trial  of  a  suit  for 

*  Ex  parte  Curtis,  3  Minn.  274.  his  freedom.     Eichard  v.  Van  Meter, 

5  St.  Clair  V.  Piatt,  Wright  (Ohio),  3  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  214;  Thornton 

532.  V.  Davis,  4  Id.  500. 
«  Stokeley  v.  Cora.,  1  Va.    Cas.  330. 


Tit.  II,  Cb.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX   FACIE    CURI^ 


145 


the  files  of  the  court  iind  refusing  to  return  them ;  ^  for  a  juror 
to  separate  himself  from  his  associates  and  mingle  with  the  com- 
munity at  large,  or  to  hold  communications  with  persons  other 
than  ofiicers  of  the  court ;  ^  holding  improper  communications 
with  jurors;^  writing  an  insulting  letter  to  a  grand  juror;  ^ 
spiriting  away  witnesses ;  ^  procuring  an  insolvent  person  to  jus- 
tify as  bail ;  ^  becoming  surety  in  a  bail  bond  under  a  fictitious 
name;  ^  interfering  with  property  in  custodia  ler/is,  as  property 
in  the  possession  of  a  receiver,^  or  an  assignee  in  bankruptcy;  ^ 
or  property  held  under  mesne  process,^"  such  as  a  writ  of  replevin  ;" 
but  not  under  final  process,  such  as  a  writ  of  fieri  facias  .^"^ 

§  136.  Contempts  by  Attorneys  of  the  Court.  —  There  is  no 
doubt  of  the  power  at  common  law  of  those  superior  courts  of 
record  which  are  commonly  termed  convis,  oi  general  jurisdiction, 
to  disbar,  suspend,  or  otherwise  punish  attorney's  of  their  bar 
for  contempts. ^-^     This  is  nothing  more  than  a  branch  of  that  in- 


1  Baker  r.  Wilford,  Kirby  (Couii.), 
23o. 

2  State  V.  Helveustou,  R.  M.  Charlt. 
(Ga.)  48.  See  also  Milo  v.  Gardiner, 
•tl  Me.  549;  Perkins  v.  Ermil,  2  Kan. 
32.5;  Burrill  v.  Phillips,  1  Gall.  (U.  S.) 
3G0;  Alexander  v.  Dunn,  5  Ind.  122, 
125;  Graves  v.  Monet,  7  Sinedes  &  M. 
(Miss.)  45;  Oram  v.  Bishop,  7  Halst. 
(N.  J.)  L.  153. 

3  State  V.  Doty,  32  N.  J.  L.   403. 

*  Berg's  Case,  16  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
206.  The  contemner  was  excused 
under  the  circumstances  and  in  view 
of  his  official  position. 

5  Haskett  r.  State,  51  Ind.  176,  180. 
The  coutemuor  was  likewise  excused 
under  the  circumstances  in  this  case. 

«  Hall  V.  Platimer,  49  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  500;  s.  c.  5  Daly  (N.  Y.),  534. 

'  Re  Pawcett,  9  Phila.  (Pa.)  217. 

8  Secor  V.  Toledo  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  7 
Biss.  (U.  S.)  513;  King  v.  Ohio  &c.  R. 
R.  Co.,  Id.  529;  Gates  v.  People,  6 
Bradw.   (111.)  383,  386,  per  Pillsbury, 


P.  J.  Compare  Albany  City  Bank  v. 
Scliermeriiorn,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  372; 
Bowery  Savings  Bank  v.  Richards,  3 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  336;  s.  c.  6  Thomp.  &  C. 
(N.  Y.)  59;  Parker  v.  Browning,  8 
Paige  (N.  Y.),  388,  390;  Sea  Ins.  Co,  v. 
Stebbins,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  565. 

9  Gates  V.  People,  6  Bradw.  (111.) 
383. 

JO  People  r.  Church,  2  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  262. 

"  Knott  V.  People,  83  111.  583;  Peo- 
ple V.  Neill,  74  111.  68.  Compare  Horr 
V.  People,  95  111.  169,  172. 

12  Gates  V.  People,  6  Bradw.  (III.) 
383,  388. 

13  State  V.  Holding,  1  McCord  (S. 
C),  379,  where  many  precedents  are 
cited;  Ex  parte  Biggs,  64  N.  C.  202; 
Matter  of  Moree,  7cZ.  398;  Re  AVolley, 
11  Bush  (Ky.),95;  Watson  v.  Citizens' 
Bank,  5  S.  C.  159;  Stevens  v.  Hill,  10 
Mees.  &  W.  30;  Butler  v.  People,  2  Col. 
T.  295;  Winkleman  v.  People,  50  111. 
449;  Re  Ingersoll,  9  Phil.  (Pa.)  216. 

10 


146  CONTROL   AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [i  Thoilip.   Tl% 

herent  jDower  which,  as  ah'eady  seen,  superior  courts  of  record 
possess,  of  preserving  their  dignity  and  enforcing  obedience  to 
their  process  by  summary  proceedings  for  contempt.^  Thus, 
there  seems  never  to  have  been  any  question  that,  where  an  at- 
torney receives  money  for  his  client,  upon  an  employment  as  an 
attorney,  whether  any  suit  or  legal  proceedings  may  have  been 
instituted  by  him  for  his  client  or  not,  an  attachment  will  lie  to 
compel  its  payment.^  This  power  has  been  exercised  in  a  case 
where,  after  a  temporary  restraining  order  had  been  made  in  a 
suit  in  equity  to  wind  up  a  banking  corporation,  certain  attorneys 
advised  the  officers  and  stockholders  to  file  a  petition  in  bank- 
ruptcy for  the  corporation,  with  the  view  of  removing  its  prop- 
erty beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State  court;  ^  where  an 
attorney  imposed  upon  the  court  by  suing  out  an  attachment  for  a 
witness  before  a  subpoena  had  been  issued  ;  ^  or  presented  straw 
bail  to  the  court;  ^  or  charged  the  judge  with  prejudice,  in  amo- 
tion for  a  new  trial ;  ^  or  where  an  attorney  presented  to  the 
court  scandalous  matter  reflecting  on  an  opinion  of  the  court,  in 
a  petition  for  a  rehearing;  ^  or  attempted  to  suborn  a  witness;  ^ 
or  used  sneering,  insulting  and  disrespectful  language  in  a  writ- 
ten communication  to  the  judge  respecting  his  ruling  upon  a  mat- 
ter still  pending ;  ^  or  jirocured  money  for  his  client  by  practicing 
fraud  upon  the  court  ;^''  or,  being  the  editor  of  a  newspaper,  pub- 
lished therein  a  libel  upon  the  judges  of  the  court;  ^^  or  brought 

1  See  Ex  parte  Eobinson,  19  Wall.  Contra,  where  the  motion  Is  for  a 
(U.  S.)  505.  change  of  venue.     Ex  parte  Curtis,    3 

2  Wilmerdings  v.  Fowler,  14  Abb.  Minn.  274.  As  to  the  limit  of  the 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (x.  s.)  249  (N.  Y.  Ct.  of  privilege  of  an  attorney  in  criticising 
App.) ;  People  v.  Wilson,  5  Johns.  (N.  the  rulings  of  the  court,  see  Matter  of 
Y.)  3G8;  Ex  parte  Staats,  4  Cow.  (N.  Pryor,  18  Kan.  72;  Re  Wolley,  11 
Y.)    7(3;  Matter  of  Dakin,  4  Hill   (N.  Bush  (Ky.),  95. 

Y.),42;  Matter  of    Steinert,   24  Hun  '  Ee    Wolley,    11    Bush  (Ky.),  95. 

(N.  Y.),  240.  The  punishment  here  was  a  fine. 

3  Watson  V.  Citizens'  Savings  *  State  v.  Holding,  1  McCord  (S.  C), 
Bank,  5  S.  C.  159.  379. 

4  Butler  V.   People,   2   Col.  T.   295.  ^  Matter  of  Pryor,  18  Kan.  72. 

See  also  Brown  v.  Kellar,   40  111.81.  ^^  Wilmerdings   v.  Fowler,    14  Abb^. 

5  Re  Ingersoll,  9  Phil.  (Pa.)  21G.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  (n.  s.)  249. 

6  Harrison  v.   State,    35  Ark.   458.         ^i  Es  parte  Biggs,  G4  N.  C.  202. 


Tit.   II,  Ch.   v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CURI.E.  147 

an  action  in  the  name  of  another  without  his  privity  or  consent ;  ^ 
or  commenced  a  suit  against  a  lunatic  or  habitual  drunkard  with- 
out permission,  after  notice  of  the  inquisition  declaring  his 
incompetency  ;  ^  or  brought  a  fictitious  case  for  the  purpose  of  ob- 
taining the  opinion  of  the  court  on  the  matters  presented  by  it  ;^ 
or  appeared  for  a  defendant  and  confessed  judgment  without  au- 
thority.* On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  held  not  a  contempt  for 
an  attorney  to  advise  his  client,  who  was  indicted  for  assault  and 
battery,  and  bound  by  a  recognizance  to  answer  the  charge,  that 
if  he  could  not  procure  a  continuance  on  affidavit,  he  could  escape 
and  forfeit  his  recoo-nizance,  which  would  work  a  continuance, 
for  a  trifling  expense.^ 

§  137.  [Continued.]  Punishment  —  Disbarment,  Suspen- 
sion.—  The  subject  of  disciplinary  action  against  attorneys  is, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  regulated  by  statute,  and  it  has  been 
generally  held  that,  where  it  has  been  made  the  subject  of  statu- 
tory regulation,  a  court  cannot  proceed  to  disbar  or  suspend  an 
attorney  by  the  ordinary  process  of  contempt,  under  its  common- 
law  powers,  but  that  the  proceedings  must  be  in  conformity  with 
the  statute ;  ^  that  unquestionably,  unless  the  statute  contains  a 
positive  negation  of  this  power  the  court  may  proceed  summa- 
rily, in  virtue  of  its  common-law  powers,  to  fine  and  imprison  an 
attorney,  just  as  it  may  so  proceed  against  any  other  contemnor.'" 
A  fine  so  levied  upon  an  attorney  may  be  either  enforced  by  ex- 
ecution, or  by  a  capias  jjro  fine;^  or  the  attorney  may  be  sus- 
pended from  practice  until  he  purge  his  contempt  by  paying  the 
fine  which  has  been  assessed  against  him.^  Such  an  order  of  sus- 
pension imposed  by  a  court  in  virtue  of  its  common-law  powers, 
affects  only  the  status  of  the  attorney  in  that  particular  court;  it 
will  not  prevent  his  being  enrolled  as  a  counselor  in  another, 

1  Butterworth  v.    Stagg,  2   Johus.  •'  Ingle  r.  State,  8  Blackf .  (Iiid.^574. 

(N.  Y.)  Case,  291,  e  State  v.   Start,    7   Iowa  490;    Ex 

*  L'Amoureaus  v.  Crosby,  2  Paige  parte  Smith,  28  Iiul.  47. 

(N.  Y.),  422.  '  Ex  parte  Smith,  supra. 

3  Smith  V.  Brown,  3  Tex.  360.  s  j^^  Wolley,  11  Bush  (Ky.),  95. 

<  Denton  v.  Noyes,  G  Johus.  (X.  Y.)  "^  Butler  v.  People,  2   Col.  T.   295, 

296-  297, 


148  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION   OF    TRIAL.       [1  Tholllp.  Tl'., 

even  a  higher  court,  of  the   same  sovereign ;  ^  and  it  will  cease 
with  the  abolition  of  the  court  by  which  he  is  thus  disbarred. ^ 

§  138.  Procedure  in  Cases  of  Contempt  in  Facie  Curiae.  — 

Incases  of  contempt,  as  in  other  cases,  the  one  object  of  process 
is  to  bring  the  accused  person  into  court;  ^  and  the  only  object 
of  an  affidavit  in  such  a  case  is  to  inform  the  court  that  a  con- 
tempt has  been  committed.*  When,  therefore,  the  contempt  is 
committed  in  the  face  of  the  court  itself,  no  affidavit,^  order  to 
show  cause,^  attachment,^  or  interrogatories,^  are  necessary;  but 
the  court  takes  judicial  notice  of  the  contempt,^  and  proceeds  im- 
mediately, without  formality,  to  pass  sentence  upon  the  offender. ^° 
The  court  may,  however,  in  its  discretion,  require  the  contemnor 
to  answer  interrogatoi'ies ;  ^^  and,  while  the  offending  party  may 


1  Ex  parte  Tillinghast,  4  Pet.  (U. 
S.)  108,  where  an  attorney  who  had 
been  stricken  from  the  roll  of  attor- 
neys of  the  United  States  District 
Court  for  tlie  Northern  District  of  New 
York  Avas,  nevertheless,  enrolled  in 
the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  Chief  Justice  Marshall  saying: 
*'  The  court  finds  that  he  comes  Avith- 
in  the  rules  established  by  this  court. 
The  circumstances  of  his  having  been 
stricken  off  the  roll  of  counsel  of  the 
District  Court  of  the  United  States  for 
the  Northern  District  of  New  York,  by 
the  order  of  the  judge  of  the  court, 
for  contempt,  is  one  which  the  court 
do  not  mean  to  say  was  not  done  for 
suflacient  cause,  or  tliat  it  is  not  one 
of  a  serious  character ;  but  this  court 
does  not  consider  itself  authorized  to 
puuiih  him  for  a  contempt  which  may 
have  been  committed  in  that  court." 
As  to  disbarment  of  attorneys  in 
United  States  courts,  see  Ex  parte 
Garland,  4  Wall.  (U.  S.)  378;  Ex  parte 
Robinson,  19  Id.  505. 

2  Ee     Hirst,    9     Phil.     (Pa.)     21C, 
218. 


3  Com.  V.  Dandridge,  2  Va.  Cas.  408. 

4  Matter  of  Smethurst,  2  Sandf .  (N. 
Y.)  724. 

5  Matter  of  Smethurst,  supra;  Peo- 
ple V.  Kelly,  sux>ra. 

^  Matter  of  Smethurst,  supra. 

'  United  States  v.  Green,  3  Mason 
(U.  S.),482;  Commonwealth  v.  Dan- 
dridge, 2  A^a.  Cas.  408;  State  v. 
Mathews,  37  N.  H.  450,  453. 

s  Matter  of  Percy,  2  Daly  (N.  Y.), 
530.  Compare  Pitt  v.  Davidson,  37 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  97;  People  v.  Nevins,  1 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  154;  Commonwealth  v. 
Dandridge,  2  Va.  Cas.  408. 

9  People  V.  Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  75. 

10  4  Bl.  Com.  286;  1  Tidd  Pr.  479; 
2  Bac.  Abr.  (Bouv.  ed.)  G33;  Eastou 
V.  State,  39  Ala.  552;  Commonwealth 
V.  Dandridge,  2  Va.  Cas.  408 ;  State  v. 
Mathews,  37  N.  H.  450,  453;  Stater. 
Copp,  15  N.  H.  212;  Middlebrook  v. 
State,  43  Conn.  257;  People  v.  Kelley, 
24  N.  Y.  75;  Ex  parte  Wright,  G5  Ind. 
504.  Compare  Holcomb  v.  Cornish,  8 
Conn.  375. 

11  U.  S.  V.  Green,  3  Mason  (U.  S.), 
482. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IN    FACIE    CURI.E.  149 

be  ordered  into  custody  although  no  warrant  or  written  order  is 
made  out/  yet  some  record  of  the  offense  and  the  order  for  its 
punishment  shouhl  be  immediatety  made,^  and  in  this  record  the 
matter  of  the  contempt  shouki  be  stated. "^  AVhen,  therefore,  a 
witness  refused  to  answer  certain  questions  before  a  grand  jury, 
and  his  refusal  was  reported  to  the  court  in  the  presence  of  the 
witness,  who  did  not  deny,  but  justified  the  same,  and  reiterated 
his  refusal,  it  was  held  that  this  was  a  contempt  in  the  immedi- 
ate face  and  presence  of  the  court,  and  that  no  affidavit  or  fur- 
ther evidence  of  it  was  necessary  to  a  commitment.^ 

§139.  [Continued.]  Procedure  in  Cases  of  Indirect  or  Con- 
structive Contempts. — The  subject  of  procedure  in  cases  of 
indirect  or  constructive  contem}its,  that  is,  contempts  committed 
out  of  the  immediate  presence  of  the  court  while  conducting  its 
proceedings  and  not  so  near  thereto  as  to  interrupt  such  pro- 
ceedings, is  an  extensive  one,  and  would  of  itself  form  a  long 
chapter.  It  is  not  so  intimately  connected  with  the  conduct  of 
a  trial  as  to  require  treatment  here.  It  has  been  carefully 
treated  by  the  present  writer  in  an  article  in  the  Criminal 
Laio  Magazine,^  and  also  by  Mr.  Rapalje  in  his  work  on  con- 
tempts. 

§  140.   Remedies  of  the  Person  Committed  for  Contempt.  — 

The  rule  of  the  common  law,  above  stated,^  that  every  superior 
court  of  record  is  the  exclusive  judge  of  contempts  committed 
against  its  dignity  and  authority,  has  necessarily  its  counterpart 
in  another  rule  of  the  common  law,  which  is,  that  the  judgment 
of  every  superior  court  of  record  (and  this  principle  includes  the 
legislative  bodies  of  sovereign  States),  in  a  proceeding  for  con- 
tempt is  final,  and  not  subject  to  review  by  any  superior  authority 

1  State  V.  Mathews,  37  N.    H.  450,  •<  People  v.  Kelley,  24  N.  Y.  75. 
453.                                                                        5  5  crira.  L.  Mag.  483,  521. 

2  Ibid.  6  j^nte,  §  125. 
'  Ex  parte  Wright,  G5  Ind.  504, 


150 


CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [I  Thomp.   Tl'., 


by  writ  of  error, ^  appeal, ^  certiorari,^  or  otherwise  ;  nor  subject  to 
be  relieved  against  in  any  manner,  unless  such  judgment  is  abso- 
kitely  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,  in  which  case  relief  is  usually 
had  by  habeas  corpus,  as  hereafter  stated.  In  some  American  juris- 
dictions, however,  under  the  operation  of  constitutional  or  statu- 
tory provisions,  and  perhaps  in  one  or  two  cases,  of  judicial 
decisions,  contrary  to  the  general  course  of  authority,  writs  of 
error,*  lie  in  such  cases;  and  in  cases  where  the  proceeding  is  in 
the  nature  of  execution  of  judgments,  orders  or  decrees  in  civil 
cases,  such  as  orders  upon  trustees  or  executors  to  pay  over  money, 


1  Rex  V.  Dean  and  Chapter,  1  Str. 
53fi;  s.  c.  8  Mod,  27,  perFortescue,  J.; 
Groenwelt  v.  Burwell,  1  Salk,  144;  s. 
c,  1  Ld,  Raym.  454,  per  Lord  Hale,  C, 
J,;  Tyler  v.  Hammersley,  44  Conn. 
393,  409;  State  v.  Tipton,  1  Blackf, 
(Ind.)  1^6;  Lockwood  v.  State,  1  Ind. 
ir,l ;  Watson  11.  "Williams,  3G  Miss.  331; 
State  V.  Galloway,  5  Coldw.  (Tenu,) 
32(3,331;  Sliattnck  v.  State,  51  Miss, 
50;  Phillips  v.  Welch,  11  Kev,  187;  Ex 
parte  Kearney,  7  Wheat,  (U,  S.)  38; 
New  Orleans  v.  Steamship  Co.,  20 
Wall.  (U,  S.)  387;  Hayes  »,  Fischer, 
102  IT,  S.  121;  Bntler  v.  People,  2  Col. 
T,  295;  Ex  parte  Bradley,  7  Wall,  (U, 
S.)  37G;  Ex  parte  Robinson,  19  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  505;  Hagan  v.  Alston,  9  Ala, 
627;  Ex  parte  Martin,  5  Yerg,  (Tenn.) 
45G ;  Re  Cooper,  32  Vt.  253 ;  Ex  parte 
Summers,  5  Ired.  (N.  C.)  149 ;  Cossart 
V.  State,  14  Ark.  538 ;  Bunch  v.  State, 
Id.  544.  Compare  Neel  v.  State,  9 
Ark.  259, 

2  Ex  parte  Summers,  5  Ired.  (N.  C.) 
149;  State  v.  Woodfin,  Id.  199;  State 
V.  Tipton,  1  Blackf,  (Ind.)  ir.G;  Lock- 
wood  V.  State,  1  Ind.  IGl;  Watson  v. 
Williams,  36  Miss,  381;  State  v.  Gallo- 
way, 5  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  32G,  331 ;  Sliat- 
tnck V.  State,  61  Miss,  50;  Phillips  v. 
Welch,  11  Nev.  187;  Ex  parte  Kearney, 
7  Wheat.   (U,  S.)  38;  New  Orleans  v. 


Steamship  Co.,  20  Wall,  (U,  S.)  387; 
Hayes  v.  Fischer,  102  U.  S.  121;  First 
Congregational  Church  v.  Muscatine, 
2  Iowa,  69;  Ex  parte  Martin,  5  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  456;  Floyd  v.  State,  7  Tex. 
215;  Casey  V,  State,  25  Tex,  380,  385; 
Crow«.  State,  14  Tex.  12,  14;  State  v. 
Giles,  10  Wis,  101 ;  Kernodle  v.  Cason, 
25  Ind.  362 ;  Larrabee  v.  Selby,  52  Cal. 
506,  508 ;  State  v.  Mott,  4  Jones  L,  (N. 
C.)449;  State  17.  Thurmond,  37  Tex. 
340;  Vilas  v.  Burton,  27  Vt.  56;  Mc- 
Micken  v.  Perin,  20  How,  (U,  S.)  133; 
Eastou  V.  State,  39  Ala,  651 ;  Wyatt  v. 
Magee,  3  Ala.  94,  97;  Cossart  v.  State, 
14  Ark.  638;  Bunch  v.  State,  Id.  544; 
State  V.  Towle,  42  N.  H.  640,  646; 
Clark  V.  People,  Breese  (111.),  266. 

3  State  V.  Tipton,  I  Blackf,  (Ind.) 
166;  Lockwood  v.  State,  1  Ind,  161, 
The  T'rit  of  certiorari  is  used  to  bring 
up  contempt  proceedings  In  several 
States;  but  the  inquiry  extends  no 
further  than  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  below. 

*  Matter  of  Pryor,  18  Kan.  72; 
Haines  v.  People,  97  111.  161 ;  Baltimore 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Wheeling,  13  Gratt  (Va.), 
40,  57;  Stuart  V.  People,  Breese  (111.), 
395;  Stokelcy  v.  Commonwealth,  1  Va. 
Cas,  330;  Ingle  v.  State,  8  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  574  (in  case  of  an  attorney  fined 
for  contempt) . 


Tit.  II,  Cll.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IN    FACIE    CURI.E. 


151 


the  rule  is  varied  in  some  jurisdictions  by  local  statutes,  perhaps 
by  judicial  decisions,^  so  that  au  appeal  lies.^  lu  some  jur- 
isdictions the  certiorari  is  also  used  by  the  highest  appellate 
court,  in  virtue  of  a  superintending  jurisdiction,  to  bring  up  such 
judgments  for  re-examination.'^  In  most  of  these  jurisdictions 
the  -writ  of  certiorari  is  limited  to  the  office  Avhich  it  performed 
at  common  law,  that  is,  it  reaches  only  proceedings  ^vhich  are 
absolutely  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction,*  and  in  such  cases  the 
judgment  of  the  superintending  court  in  general  is  that  the  con- 
viction be  quashed.  In  others,  it  has  substantially  the  scope  of 
a  writ  of  error ;  ^  and  in  still  others  it  performs  the  office  of  an 
appeal  and  secures  a  re-examination  of  the  merits.*^ 

§  141.  Remedy  by  Habeas  Corpus  in  Case  of  a  Want  of  Ju- 
risdiction.—  An  order  committing  ii,  person  for  such  a  contempt 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  judgment.     The    person  so    committed  is 


1  See  the  subject  considered  more 
at  large  in  au  article  l)y  the  present 
writer.  5  Crim.  L.  Mag.  O-t.s,  et 
seq. 

2  Romeyn  v.  Caplis,  17  Mich.  4+;); 
McCredie  v.  Senior,  4  Paige  (X.  Y.), 
378;  Spaulding  v.  People,  10  Id.  28-1; 
.s.  c.  on  appeal,  7  Hill  (X.  Y.),  302,  and 
4  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  21 ;  People  ».  Sturt- 
evant,  9  N.  Y.  2(;3;  Ballston  Spa  Bank 
f.  IMarine  Banli,  18  AVis.  4'JO;  Shannon 
V.  State,  18  Wis.  G04;  People  v.  Healey, 
48  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  5G4;  Forbes  v.  Wil- 
lard,  37  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  193;  Ludlow 
V.  Knox,  7  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  (x.  s.)  411 
(X'.  Y.  Court  of  Appeals,  18G9)  ;  Brink- 
ley  V.  Briukley,  47  X^.  Y.  40;  Haines  v. 
Haines,  35  Mich.  138;  Matter  of  Daves, 
81  X.  C.  72;  Ke  Pierce,  44  "Wis.  411, 
422;  Watrous  v.  Kearney,  79  X".  Y. 
40(;;  Witter  r.  Lyon,  34  Wis.  5(;4; 
Huudhausen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Heisk. 
(Tenn.)  702. 

^  Pennsylvcmia:  Huminel's  Case,  9 
Watts,  416;  Com.  v.  Newton,  1  Grant 


Cas.  458.  Louisiana:  State  v.  The 
Judges,  32  La.  Ann.  549;  State  v.  The 
Judges,  32  La.  Ann.  1256.  Arkansas: 
Harrison  v.  State,  35  Ark.  458.  loica: 
Code  of  1873,  §  3499;  State  v.  Myers, 
44  Iowa,  580;  Dunham  v.  State,  6  Iowa, 
245.  California:  People  v.  Turner,  1 
Cal.  152,  15G;  Ex  parte  Field,  7d.  187. 
New  York:  People  v.  Donoliue,  59  How. 
Pr.  (X.  Y.)  417;  People  v.  Kelly,  24 
N.  Y.  74.  North  Carolina:  Ex  parte 
Biggs,  64  N.  C.  202. 

*  Louisiana:  State  v.  Judges,  32 
La.  Ann.  1256.  California:  People  u. 
Dwindle,  29  Cal.  632.  Nevada:  Max- 
well V.  Rives,  11  Nev.  213.  Utah: 
Young  V.  Cannon,  2  Utah,  560,  593. 

^  North  Carolina:  Ex  parte  Biggs, 
64  X.  C.  202.  Pennsylvania:  Com.  v. 
Newton,  1  Grant  Cas.  453.  Neio  York: 
People  V.  Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74.  Arkan- 
sas: Harrison  v.  State,  35  Ark.  458, 
4G1. 

•i  Iowa:  Code  of  1873,  §  3222;  State 
V.  Myers,  44  Iowa,  580,  584. 


152      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

committed  in  execution,^  tmd  if  the  court  have  jurisdiction  so  to 
commit  him,  and  if  the  contempt  be  plainly  charged  in  the  war- 
rant of  commitment,  he  Avill  no  more  be  relieved  on  habeas  coi- 
jms  than  he  would  be  if  he  were  committed  in  execution  of  a 
judgment  founded  upon  a  verdict  in  an  ordinary  criminal  prose- 
cution.'^ It  will  appear  from  the  general  current  of  the  decisions 
which  declare  this  rule,  that  the  inquiry  upon  habeas  corpus  is 
ordinarily  limited  to  the  question  whether  the  court  which  made 
the  order  of  commitment  had  jurisdiction  in  the  premises.^     If 


1  De  Grey  C.  J.,  in  Crosby's  Case,  3 
Wils.  188. 

2  British:  Paty  r.  The  Queen,  2  Ld. 
Raym.  1105;  Stockdale  v.  Hansard,  9 
Ad.  &E.  1;  s.  c.  4  Jur.  70;  sub  nom. 
Reg.  V.  Gossett,  3  Per.  &  D.  34:9;  suh 
nom.  Reg.  v.  Evans,  8  Dowl.  P.  C. 
451 ;  suh  nom.  Re  Sheriff  of  Middle- 
sex, 11  Ad.  &  E.  273;  Re  Wilson,  7  Q. 
B.  984;  s.  c.  9  Jur.  393;  14  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
105;  Re  Cobbett,  17  Q.  B.  187;  Re  An- 
drews, 14  C.  B.  22(j;  Betliel's  Case,  1 
Salk.  533.  United  States:  Ex  parte 
Kearney,  7  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  845.  Ala- 
bama: Gates  V.  McDaniel,  4  Stew.  & 
P.  (Ala.)  69;  Ex  parte  Sticliney,  40 
Ala.  1G7.  California:  Matter  of  Co- 
hen, 5  Cal.  494;  Ex  parte  Perkins,  18 
Cal.  GO;  IContra,  Ex  parte  Rowe,  7 
Cal.  181;  s.  c.  7  Cal.  177,  per  Buruett, 
J.]  ;  People,  ex  rel.  County  Judge,  27 
Cal.  151;  Ex  parte  MeCullough,  35 
Cal.  97;  Ex  parte  Smith,  53  Cal.  204; 
Ex  parte  Cohn,  55  Cal.  193.  Joioa: 
Robb  V.  McDonald,  22  Iowa,  330. 
Louisiana:  State,  ex  rel.,  v.  Fagin,  28 
La.  Ann.  887.  Massachusetts:  Burn- 
ham  V.  Morrissey,  14  Gray  (Mass.), 
22G,  240.  Michigan:  Matter  of  Bis- 
sell,  40  Mich.  G3.  Mississippi:  Ex 
parte  Adams,  25  Miss.  883;  Shattuck 
V.  State,  51  Miss.  50;  Ex  parte  Wim- 
berly,  57  Miss.  437.  Missouri:  Ex 
parte  Goodin,    G7   jVIo.  G37.     Nevada: 


Ex  parte  "Winston,  7  Nev.  71 ;  Phillips 
V.  Welch,  12  Nev.  171.  New  Hamp- 
shire: State  V.  Towle,  42  N.  H.  540. 
New  York:  People,  ex  rel.,  v.  Jacobs, 
66  N.  Y.  8 ;  Kearney's  Case,  13  Abb. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  459;  Davison's  Case,  13 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  129;  Kahn's  Case,  11 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  147;  s.  c.  19  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  475;  People  v.  Cassel,  5  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  1G4;  People,  ex  rel.,  v.  Sheriff, 
7  Abb.  Pr.  (X.  Y.)  96;  Matter  of 
Percy,  2  Daly  (N.  Y.),  530;  Pitt  v. 
Davidson,  37  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  97;  People 
V.  Fancher,  2  Hun  (N.  Y.),  226;  Ex 
parte  Devlin,  5  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  287; 
Matter  of  Smethurst,  2  Sandf .  (N.  Y.) 
724 ;  Myers  v.  James,  3  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  301;  Matter  of  Hackeney,  21  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  54;  s.  c.  in  Ct.  of  App.,  24 
N.  Y.  74.  Pennsylvania:  Williamson's 
Case,  26  Pa.  St.  9;  s,  c.  27  Pa.  St.  18; 
Lessee  of  Penn  v.  Messenger,  1  Yeates 
(Pa.),  2;  Expra-te  Nugent, 4  Clark  (Pa. 
L.  J.) ,  106.  Soxith  Carolina:  Re  Stokes, 
5  So.  Car.  71;  Gilliam  r.  McJuukin,  2 
So.  Car.  442;  James  v.  Smith,  2  So. 
Car.  183.  Tennessee:  State  v.  Gallo- 
way, 5  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  326.  Texas: 
Holman  v.  Mayer,  34  Tex.  668;  Jordan 
V.  State,  14  Tex.  436.  Vermont:  Vilas 
V.  Burton,  27  Vt.  Gl.  Wisconsin:  Re 
Perry,  30  Wis.  268. 

^  See  Ex  parte    Adams,  25    MisSc 
883. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.   v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CURI.E.  I53 

jurisdiction  appear,  the  rule  expressed  in  a  former  section,^  tlat 
every  superior  court  of  record  and  every  legislative  bodj^  of  a 
sovereign  State  is  the  exclusive  judge  of  contempts  committed  in 
its  presence  or  against  its  process  or  authority,  forbids  all  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  other  tribunals  hy  means  of  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus,  or  otherwise,  except  in  plain  cases  of  excess  of 
jurisdiction. 2  Great  ditEculty  attends  the  aj)plication  of  this  rule, 
and  this  difficulty  is  not  sufficiently  discussed  and  explained  in 
the  judgment  of  the  courts. 

§  142.  [Continued.]  Power  of  one  Court  to  judge  of  tlie 
Jurisdiction  of  another  Court. — The  question  concerns  the 
power  of  one  court  to  judge  of  the  jurisdiction  of  another  court. 
This  power  will  be  freely  exercised  where  the  court  which  issues 
the  habeas  corpus  is  a  court  having  a})pellate  or  superintending 
jurisdiction  over  the  court  which  made  the  commitment;  and 
this  consideration  will  explain  the  fact  that  many  such  courts, 
while  professing  to  limit  their  inquiry  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
inferior  court,  push  such  inquiry  much  further  than  one  court 
would  go  in  inquiring  concerning  the  jurisdiction  of  a  co-ordinate 
court.  Where  the  commitment  is  made  by  a  court  superior  in 
rank  or  dignity  to,  or  having  appellate  or  superintending  juris- 
isdiction  over,  the  court  which  issues  the  habeas  corpus,  it  would 
be  highly  indecent  for  the  inferior  court  to  assume  the  right  to 
judge  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  superior  court ;  and  yet  the  doc- 
trine of  many  of  the  courts,  broadly  stated  and  applied,  would 
lead  to  this  result.  Thus,  it  is  said  in  Missouri  that  the  Supreme 
Court  has  no  more  power  in  the  use  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
than  any  other  court  —  even  the  county  court,  which  has  power 
to  issue  the  writ  —  has.^ 

§  143.  [Continued.]  Power  to  Rejudgre  the  Question  of 
Jurisdiction,  but  not  tlie  Judgment.  —  Concerning  this  power 

*  Ante,  §  125;  5  Crim.  L.  Mag.  151.  vant,  9  N.   Y.  203;    Ex  parte   Adams, 

2  Ex  parte  Hardy,  13  Cent.  L.  J.   50  supra;  Ex  parte  Sam,  51  Ala.  84. 

(Supreme   Court    of    Ala.    1881);  Ke  *  See  Ex  parte  Jilz,  64  Mo.  205,  216,, 

Cooper,  32  Vt.  253;  People  v.    Sturte-  per  Henry,  J. 


154  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  Tboilip.  Tl'., 

of  one  court  to  judge  of  the  jurisdiction  of  another  court,  if  we 
take  the  English  and  American  decisions  togetlier  we  shall  be 
able  to  extract  from  them  no  uniform  rule.  The  English  courts 
of  judicature,  in  proceedings  by  habeas  corpus,  and  in  actions 
for  malicious  j^rosecutions,  have  generally  agreed,  in  respect  of 
commitments  made  by  authority  of  the  houses  of  Parliament, 
that  the  judicial  courts  have  no  power  to  judge  of  the  juris- 
diction of  Parliament;  or,  to  use  the  expression  in  which  the 
judicial  courts  couch  this  rule,  they  have  no  conusance  of 
the  lex  2>nrliamenti ,  and  no  power  to  judge  of  the  privileges  of 
either  house  of  Parliament.^  It  may  also  be  said  with  con- 
fidence that  the  English  courts,  in  dealing  by  habeas  corpus 
with  commitments  for  contempts  by  other  courts  of  co-ordi- 
nate dignity,  have  generally  refused  to  judge  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  such  other  courts.  To  this  extent  they  have  pushed  the 
doctrine  that  each  superior  court  of  record  is  the  exclusive  judge 
of  its  own  contempts.  This  limitation  upon  the  use  of  the  writ 
of  habeas  coryus  has  been  expressed  by  some  of  the  most  author- 
itative American  courts. ^  In  a  case  which  was  greatly  agitated 
in  the  State  of  New  York,  where  a  judge  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  that  State,  in  vacation,  on  habeas  corpus,  had  discharged  a 
prisoner  committed  by  the  chancellor  on  a  conviction  for  a  con- 
tempt, and  such  person  was  again  arrested  and  committed 
for  the  same  cause,  the  second  commitment  was  held  legal.  It 
was  held  that  a  person  who  had  been  regularly  committed  by  the 
chancellor  for  a  contempt,  and  who  afterwards  had  been  im- 
properly set  at  large,  might  be  recommitted  by  an  order  of  the 
court  reciting  the  original  writ  of  attachment.^     The  sound  rule 


J  5  Crim.  L.  Mag.  152,  153.  lookiDg  the  fact  that  Yates  v.  People, 

2  See  Ex  parte  Kearney,  7  Wheat.  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  337,  had  been  over- 
(U.  S.)  315;  AVilliamson's  Case,  27  Pa.  ruled,  following  the  supposed  author- 
St.  18.  ity  of  that  case,  laid  down  the  doctrine 

3  Yates  V.  Lansing,  9  Johns.  (N.  that  where  a  person,  althougli  held  in 
Y.)  395  (overruling  Yates  v.  People,  6  execution  under  the  judgment  of  a 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  337;  re-affirming  Ex  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the  sub- 
parte  Yates,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  317).  In  ject-matter  of  the  crime  for  which  he 
the  case  of  Ex  parte  Jilz,  CA  Mo.  205,  had  been  tried,  is  discharged  on /wfieas 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri,  over-  corpus  by   another   court  or  judicial 


Tit.   II,  Ch.   v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CURIAE. 


155 


was  thus  expressed  in  u  case  in  the  former  Supreme  Court  of 
Isew  York:  "  If  there  has  been  error  the  remedy  is  by  certiorari 
or  writ  of  error.  When  the  return  states  the  imprisonment  to  be 
by  virtue  of  legal  process,  the  officer  may  inquire  whether,  in 
truth,  there  be  any  process,  and  whether  it  a})pearsupon  its  face 
to  be  valid,  and  he  may  also  inquire  Avhether  any  cause  has  arisen 
since  the  execution  for  putting  an  end  to  the  imprisonment  —  as 
a  pardon,  reversal  of  the  judgment,  pa^^ment  of  the  fine,  and  the 
like.  But  he  cannot  re  judge  the  judgment  of  the  committing 
court  or  magistrate.^ 

§  144.  [Continued. J  Statutory  Expressions  in  Various 
States.  —  In  conformity  with  this  rule,  it  is  in  several  States 
provided  by  statute  that  a  prisoner  shall  not  be  discharged  on 
/tabeas  corims  where  he  is  held  in  custody  for  any  contempts 
specially  or  plainly  charged  in  the  commitment,  by  some  court 
or  body  politic  having  authority  to  commit  for  a  contempt  so 
charged.'''     In    some   of  the  States   the   statutory  expression  is 


officei"  havius  power  to  issue  the  writ, 
sucli  discliarge  conclusively  entitles 
the  prisoner  to  his  liberty,  and  he  can- 
not thereafter  be  recommitted  upon 
ti-  same  judgment,  nor  can  the  pro- 
priety of  the  discharge  on  habeas 
corpus  be  reviewed  by  another  judicial 
tribunal.  This  aljsurd  and  anarchical 
decision,  which  vested  even  in  the 
county  courts  of  Missouri  the  power 
of  opening  the  penitentiary  of  the 
State  and  discharging. therefrom  men 
who  were  held  in  execution  of  judg- 
ments which  had  been  aflirmed  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  State,  called 
forth  an  act  of  the  legislature,  pro- 
viding that  whenever,  on  habeas  corpus, 
it  should  appear  that  the  prisoner  was 
held  in  execution  under  a  sentence  for 
a  crime,  which  sentence  was  erroneous 
as  to  time  or  place  of  imprisonment, 
the  court  hearing  the  habeas  corpris 
should  correct  the  sentence.  1  Rev. 
Stat,  of  Mo.,  §  199(3.     This  act  of  tlie 


legislature  was  as  nonsensical  as  the 
decision  which  produced  it.  It  gives 
to  courts  of  any  grade  above  justices  of 
the  peace  the  power  on  habeas  corpus  io 
revise  and  correct  the  judgments  or 
sentences  of  courts  of  co-oixlinate  or 
even  superior  jurisdiction. 

1  People  V.  Cassels,  5  Hill  (X.  Y.), 
ir,4,  Kw. 

2  Comp.  L.  Kan.  1879,  §  4211;  Eev. 
Stat.  lud.  1881,  §  1119;  Comp.  L.  Mich. 
1871,  §  7014;  2  Minn.  Stat,  at  L.  1873 
p.  931,  §  3<i;  Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1879^ 
§§  2G48,  2G50;  Comp.  L.  Nev.  1873,  §  367; 
X.  Y.  Code  of  Crim.  Proc,  §  2032 
(•'Criminal  Contempt");  Batt.  Rev. 
(X.  C.)  1873,  p.  403,  §  24;  Gen.  Laws 
Ore.  1872,  §  GU;  Rev.  Stat.  Wis.  1878, 
§  3427.  This  does  not  include  an  gr- 
der  of  commitment  as  for  contempt 
iipon  proceedings  to  enforce  the  rem- 
edy of  a  party.  Comp.  L.  Kan.  1S79, 
§  4211;    Rev.    Stat.    Ind.   1881,  §  1119. 


15G  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

somewhat  different,  thus:  That  the  legality  or  justice  of  any  or- 
der, judgment,  decree  or  process  of  any  court  legally  constituted, 
or  the  justice  or  j^ropriety  of  any  commitment  for  contempt  made 
by  a  court,  officer  or  body  according  to  law,  and  charged  in  such 
commitment,  will  not  be  incjuired  into.^  In  Massachusetts  and 
Maine  it  is  also  provided  that  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  shall 
have  no  authority  to  issue  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  for  the  pur- 
pose of  taking  bail  of  any  person  committed  for  causes  men- 
tioned in  the  constitution  by  the  governor  and  council.  Senate  or 
House  of  Eepresentatives.^  In  Minnesota,  "  persons  committed 
or  detained  by  virtue  of  the  final  judgment  or  decree  of  any 
competent  tribunal  of  civil  or  criminal  jurisdiction,  or  by  virtue 
of  an  execution  issued  upon  such  judgment  or  decree,"  are  not 
entitled  to  prosecute  writs  of  habeas  corpus;  but  "  no  order  of 
commitment  for  any  alleged  contempt,  or  upon  proceedings  as 
for  contempt  to  enforce  the  rights  or  remedies  of  any  j^arty, 
shall  be  deemed  a  judgment  or  decree  within  the  meaning  of  this 
section;  nor  shall  any  attachment,  order  or  process  issued  upon 
such  order  be  deemed  an  execution  within  the  meaning  of  this 
section."^  In  Vermont,  by  statute,  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
is  made  to  extend  to  commitments  for  contempt.*  If  it  appear 
on  the  hearing  upon  such  writ  that  such  disobedience  or  contempt 
was  committed  through  ignorance,  mistake  or  misapprehension, 
or  by  acting  in  good  faith  under  the  advice  of  counsel,  and  that 
relief  may  be  granted  Avithout  impairing  the  rights  of  the  parties 
concerned,  or  the  due  administration  of  the  law,  the  Supreme 
Court  may  discharge  such  person  from  such  imprisonment  or 
confinement  upon  such  terms  as  it  thinks  fit.^  Where  a  party  in 
a  proceeding  before  a  justice  of  the  peace  assailed  the  justice's 
decision  with  sneers,  sarcasm  and  irony,  and  was  fined  for  con- 
tempt in  the  sum  of  $10,  and  committed  to  jail  for  the  non-pay- 


1  Code  of  Ala.  187(5,  §  4691;  Fla.  s  2  Minn.  Stat,  at  L.  1873,  p.  929^ 
Dig.,  1881,  p.  504,  §  8 ;  Comp.  L.  Midi.  §  22.  Compare  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proe  , 
1871,  §  7015;   Gen.  L.  Ore.  1872,  §  (513;  §  2032. 

N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  2034.  ^  Kev.  Laws  of  Vt.  1880,  §  1371, 

2  Pub.  Stat.    Mass.    1882,    p.   10(19,  s  u,,  §  1372. 
§  28;  Eev.  Stat.  Me.  1871,  p.  748,  §  33. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX   FACIE    CURI^.  15/ 

ment  of  the  fine,  the  Supreme  Court   refused  to  relieve  liim  ou 
habeas  corjms  under  this  statute.^ 

§  145.  [Contimiecl.]  Extension  of  the  Use  of  this  Writ  by 
Appellate  Courts.  —  The  general  habit  of  appelhite  courts  of 
scrutinizing  closely  the  records  of  inferior  courts  to  discover  er- 
i'ors  or  irregularities,  has  led  them  insensibly  to  pass  beyond  the 
bounds  which  have  been  set  by  sound  principle  to  the  use  of  the 
Vii'it  of  Itabeas  corpus,  and,  instead  of  limiting  their  inquir}^  to 
the  mere  question  of  general  jurisdiction,  they  have  extended  it 
so  as  to  inquire  whether  the  sentence  pronounced  was  legal. 
They  have  indeed  said  again  and  again  that  they  would  not  dis- 
charge a  prisoner  for  what  is  termed  irregularity  of  procedure. 
They  need  not  have  said  this,  because  this  is  the  correct  rule  upon 
which  courts  proceed  upon  writ  of  error.  But  they  have  said 
that  there  is  a  distinction  between  irregularity  and  illegality,  and 
that  if  the  sentence  was  illegal  — that  is,  such  a  sentence  as  the 
courtin  the  particular  case  had  no  power  to  pronounce  —  they 
would  discharge  the  prisoner  on  habeas  corpus.'^  In  other  words, 
they  have  passed  beyond  the  idea  of  the  former  school  of  jurists 
as  to  the  limits  which  are  set  by  sound  principle  to  the  iuquiiy 
into  the  jurisdiction  of  other  courts.  It  was  enough  for  the  old 
judges  to  see  that  a  court  had  what  was  termed  general  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  subject  matter  of  the  proceeding  which  resulted  in 
the  commitment,  as  well  as  jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  the 
prisoner;  ^  but  the  modern  idea  is  that  it  must  not  only  appear 
that  the  court  making  the  commitment  had  general  jurisdiction 
of  the  subject  matter — that  is,  general  power  to  commit  for 
contempt,  and  also  jurisdiction  over  the  person  of  the  prisoner  — 
but  it  must  also  appear  that  the  court  had  power  to  render  the 
particular  judgment  or  to  order  the  particular  commitment.* 
Accordingly,  they  will  inquire  Mhether  the  contempt  charged  in 

1  Re  Cooper,  32  Vt.  258.  3  Ex  parte  "Watkins,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

-  The  -nriter  refers  to  an  article  in  193,  203. 
the  Criminal  Law  Magazine  for  a  dis-  ^  See  this  subject  discussed   in  5 

cussion  of  these  distinctions.    4  Crim.  Crim.  L.  Mag.  162. 
X   Mag.  805 


ir)8  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

the  commitment  was  a  contempt  in  point  of  law ;  holding,  in  tlie 
expressive  hinguage  of  Denio,  J.,  that  "  where  the  act  is  neces- 
sarily justifiable,  it  would  be  preposterous  to  hold  it  a  cause  of 
imprisonment."  ^  It  is  very  plain  that  this  view  results  substan- 
tially in  converting  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  when  used  by  ap- 
pellate or  superintending  courts,  into  a  writ  of  error. 

§  146.  [Continued.]  — Pernicious  Consequences  of  such 
Extensions. — It  will  not  escape  the  attention  of  the  judicious 
reader  that  this  extension  of  the  original  doctrine  must  bear  per- 
nicious fruits,  because  the  appellate  courts  which  make  this  use 
of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  do  not  profess  to  use  the  writ  as  a 
means  of  exercising  appellate  jurisdiction.^  They  do  not  pro- 
fess to  exercise  a  larger  jurisdiction  in  the  use  of  the  writ  than 
any  other  court  or  judicial  officer,  even  the  lowest,  which  is 
clothed  by  law  with  power  to  issue  it,  might  exercise  ;  and  it  will 
result  from  this  that  if,  in  a  given  case,  the  Court  of  Appeals  of 
New  York  can  say  that  an  act  charged  in  a  commitment  as  a 
contempt  of  court  is  rightful  and  innocent,  and  that  the  commit- 
ment is  accordingly  preposterous,  any  justice  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  New  York,  revising  a  commitment  of  any  other  court 
for  contempt,  can  say  the  same  thing;  that  a  county  court  in 
Missouri,  composed  of  men  unlearned  in  the  law,  can  say  it;  and 
that  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  instead  of  being  a  writ  of  liberty ^ 
becomes  a  writ  of  anarchy. 

§  147.  Injunction,  Prohibition,  Mandamus.  — It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  suggest  that  the  execution  of  a  judgment  imposed 
for  a  contempt  will  not  be  enjoined  in  equity;  ^  for,  although 
courts  of  equity  constantly,  by  orders  in  personam,  exercise  the 
jurisdiction  of  restraining  the  execution  of  judgments  at  laAV,  yet 
they  do  this  on  the  ground  that,  but  for  the  existence  of  such  a 
jurisdiction  parties  would  frequently  find  themselves  remediless; 
and  this  jurisdiction  has  never,  except  in  one  or  two  rare  cases,* 

1  People  V.  Kelley,  24  N.  Y.  74,  77.  '  Sanders   v.  Metcalf,  1   Tenu.  Ch. 

2  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United      419,  428,  per  Cooper,  C. 

States  is  an  exception  to  this   state-  *  Mayor  &c.  of  Yorl<».  Pilkington,  2 

meut,    18  Fed.  Rep.  69.  Atk.  302 ;  Turner  v.  Turner,  15  Jur.  218. 


Tit.   II,  Ch.   v.]       CONTEMPTS    IX    FACIE    CURI.E.  159 

been  exercised  to  restrain  criminal  proceedings. ^  The  same  may 
be  said  of  the  writ  of  prohibition.  This  writ,  as  is  well  known, 
is  a  superintending  writ,  used  by  the  former  Court  of  King's 
Bench,  and  now  by  the  Queen's  Bench  Division  of  the  High 
Court  of  Justice  in  England,  and  by  certain  courts  in  the  United 
States,  upon  whom  the  jurisdiction  to  use  it  is  specially  con- 
ferred by  constitutional  ordinance  or  by  statute,  to  restrain  in- 
ferior courts  from  doing  injurious  acts  in  excess  of  their  juris- 
diction. Like  the  writ  of  7ncnidanms  it  is  never  issued  in  a  case 
where  the  party  has  any  other  plain  remedy.  As  the  writ  of 
habeas  corpus  in  the  cases  we  are  considering  affords  a  plain 
remedy,  the  writ  of  prohibition  Avill  not  ordinarily  issue  to  re- 
strain a  court  from  proceeding  against  a  party  for  a  contempt. - 
So  of  the  writ  of  mandamus.  While  this  writ  has  been  some- 
times awarded  to  compel  inferior  tri})unals  to  reinstate  attorneys 
who  have  been  expelled  from  the  ])ar  without  notice  or  an  op- 
portunity of  being  heard, ^  yet  it  has  been  well  laid  down  that  it 
is  not  an  a[)propriate  remedy  for  one  who  has  been  fined  or  im- 
prisoned for  contempt ;  and  o})inion  is  divided  upon  the  question 
whether  it  will  lie  to  compel  a  court  to  proceed  against  a  party 
for  contempt.* 

§  148.  Action  for  False  Imprisonment. — A  remedy  which 
has  been  frequently  resorted  to  in  cases  of  unlawful  imprison- 
ment for  contempt  is  an  action  for  false  imprisonment,  either 

^  See  an  article  ou  this  subject,  by  ceeding  is  by  certiorari  m  tlie   nature 

the   present  writer  in  tiie  American  of  a  writ  of  error.     Ex  parte  Bisgs, 

Law   Berieio  for  July-Aug.  1884.     18  G-t  X.  C.  202.     As  to  the  writ  of  ceiTi- 

Am.  L.  Rev.  599.  orari  in  the  nature  of  a  writ  of  error, 

2  See  Ex  parte  Sticl^ney,  40  Ala.  under  the  North  Carolina  practice,  see 
160'  l''*j-  Brooks   V.   Morgan,   5  Ired.   (N.   C.) 

3  Ex  parte  Bradly,  7  Wall.  (U.  S.)  481 ;  Raleigh  v.  Kane,  2  Jones  L.  (N. 
^^'^-  C.)  288.     That  mandamus  Avill  lie,  see 

*  People  V.  Turner,  1  Cal.  153,  155.  Ortnian  v.  Dixon,  9  Cal.  33;  Kimball  v. 

In  North  Carolina,   it  has  been  held  Morris,  2  Mete.  Qrass.)  573.     Contra, 

thiitmandamus  is  not  the  proper  pro-  State  ex  rel,  v.  Horner,  16  Mo.  App! 

ceeding  to  restore  an  attorney  who  has  191.     Compare  Ex  parte  Chamberlain, 

been  disbarred  by  the  superior  court  4  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  49. 
for  contempt;  that  the  proper  pro- 


160  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  TllOmp.   Tl'., 

against  the  ministerial  officer  executing  the  process  of  commit- 
ment, or  the  judicial  officer  who  awarded  the  process,  or  both. 
The  grounds  which  are  necessary  to  support  such  an  action  are 
pretty  well  understood.  An  officer  can  justify  under  legal  pro- 
cess, unless  upon  its  face  it  is  void  for  want  of  jurisdiction.^ 
Such  an  action  will  not  lie  against  the  judge  of  a  superior  court 
of  record,  although  he  may  have  acted  without  jurisdiction  and 
from  express  malice,  if  it  appear  that  the  act  was  done  colore 
officii.  He  is  under  an  absolute  privilege  in  respect  of  his  ju- 
dicial acts.  The  rule  which  clothes  him  with  this  immunity  is 
one  of  public  policy,  which  has  always  been  held  to  be  necessary 
to  preserve  the  independence  of  the  judiciary.^  The  same  im- 
munity does  not  extend  to  courts  of  inferior  jurisdiction,  such 
as  justices  of  the  peace  and  the  like.  They  are  liable  in  such 
cases  whenever  they  act  in  excess  of  their  jurisdiction ;  and  in 
their  cases  the  single  inquiry  is  whether  the  commitment  was 
within  or  without  the  jurisdiction  of  the  judicial  officer  against 
whom  the  action  is  brought.^ 

§  149.  Executive  Pardon.  —  If  these  remedies  fail,  the  party 
fined  or  imprisoned  has  still  a  right  to  resort  to  the  executive  for 
pardon.  There  is  little  doubt  that  an  order  inflicting  punish- 
ment for  a  criminal  contempt  comes  within  the  scope  of  the  par- 
doning power  of  the  executive.*  It  has  even  been  held  that 
where  the  imprisonment  is  imposed  to  compel  the  pa^^ment  of  a 
fine  assessed  for  the  violation  of  an  injunction,  and  after  a  length 
of  time  it  appears  that  payment  of  the  fine  has  become  impos- 

1  Anderson  v.  Dnnn,  6  Wheat.  (U.  388;  Ackerly  v.  Parkinson,  3  Maule  & 
S.)  204.  S.  425,  428;  Borden  v.  Fitch,  5  Jolms. 

2  Bradley  v.  Tislier,  13  Wall.  (U.  (N.  Y.)  121;  Biglow  v.  Stearnes,  19 
S.)  335;  Fray  v.  Blackburn,  3  Best  &  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  39;  Allen  v.  Gray,  11 
S.  57G.  See  Morrison  v.  Macdonald,  Conn.  95;  Clark  v.  May,  2  Gray 
21  Me.  550;  Pratt  •».  Gardner,  2  Gush.  (Mass.),  440;  Bushell  v.  Starling,  3 
(Mass.)  G8;  Cooley  on  Torts,  409.  Keb.  322. 

3  Piper  v.  Pearson,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  *  Ex  parte  Hickey,  4  Sm.  &  M. 
120;  Newton  v.  Locklin,  77  111.  103;  (Miss.)  751;  State  v.  Sauvinet,  24  La. 
Fitler  v.  Probasco,  2  Browne  (Pa.)  ,137.  Ann.  1 19 ;  4  0pp.  Atty .  -Gen.  458 :  3  Id. 
Compare  Beaurain  v.  Scott,  3  Camp.  GG2. 


Tit.  II,  Cll.  v.]       COXTEMPTS   IN   FACIE    CURI^.  IGl 

sible,  the  president  has  power  to  pardon  the  contemnor  and  re- 
lease him  from  imprisonment.^ 

§  150.  Application  to  the  Judge  who  has  Imposed  the  Piin- 
ishmeut.  — Where  the  contempt  is  merely  a  criminal  contempt, 
and  no  civil  right  is  involved  in  the  punishment  of  the  accused, 
if  all  these  remedies  fail,  there  still  remains  one  which,  though 
not  agreeable  to  the  pride  of  the  contemnor,  is  seldom  ineffective, 
and  that  is  a  submission  and  an  application  for  forgiveness  to 
the  judge  of  the  court  whose  process  has  been  disobeyed  or 
whose  authority  or  dignity  has  been  offended.  Nothing  can  be 
more  distasteful  to  a  right-minded  judge  or  hurtfid  to  his  feel- 
ings, than  the  necessity  of  being  compelled  to  impose  a  punish- 
ment upon  a  party  for  an  offense  which,  though  an  offense  against 
the  State  and  against  the  administration  of  justice,  is,  neverthe- 
less, in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  a  personal  affront  to  himself. 
Experience  shows  that  in  such  cases  judges  are  generally  eager 
to  grant  pardon  upon  the  apoh)gy  and  submission  of  the  offender, 
and  that  they  very  often  accompany  tlic  remission  of  the  line  or 
the  discharge  of  the  order  of  imprisonment  with  complimentary 
allusions  to  the  person  committed. ^ 

1  Ke  MuUee,  7  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  24.        202;  De  Witt  v.  Dennis,  30  How.  Pr. 

2  State  V.  Hunt,  4  Strobli.  (S.  C.)  (N.  Y.)  131 ;  People  v.  Murpliy,  1  Daly 
L.  322,  340;  Ex  parte  Biggs,  64  N.  C.      (N.  Y.),  462. 

11 


162      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

CHAP  TEE    VT. 

OF  COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES. 

Section 

155.  Scope  of  this  Chapter. 

156.  Power  of  Court  to  compel  Attendance  of  Witnesses. 

157.  Of  Subpoenas. 

158.  Particularity  in  this  Writ. 

159.  Eight  to  this  Process. 

160.  Of    Letters  Rogatory 

161.  Of  Attachments  for  Witnesses. 

"  162.  Whether  Attachment  a  Matter  of  Discretion. 

163.  [Continued.]     Personal  Service  of  Subpoena  necessary. 

164.  What  will  excuse  Non-Attendance. 

165.  When  Attachment  issues  in  First  Instance. 

166.  Service  and  Return  of  Attachment. 

167.  Hearing  the  Excuse  — Purging  the  Contempt. 

168.  Punishment  of  the  Recusant  Witness. 

169.  Power  to  Award  Compensation  to  Party  injured  by  Recusancy  of  Witness. 

170.  Relief  by  Habeas  Corpus. 

171.  Compelling  the  Testimony  of  Experts. 

172.  When  the  Witness  is  privileged  to  depart. 

173.  Habeas  Corpus  ad  Testificandum. 

174.  Proceedings  to  Obtain  this  Writ. 

175.  Subpoena  Duces  Tecum. 

176.  [Continued.]     May  be  used  for  obtaining  a  Discovery. 

177.  [Continued.]     Witness,  when  privileged  against  the  Writ. 

178.  Action  against  Witnesses  for  Non-Attendance. 

179.  Striking  out  the  Answer  of  a  Defendant  who  fails  to  appear. 

180.  Interfering  with  Witnesses. 

181.  Refusing  to  appear  before  Commissioners,  Examiners,  Notaries. 

182.  Refusing  to  attend  or  testify  before  Municipal  Boards,  Committees,  etc. 

183.  Refusing  to  give  Deposition  to  be  used  in  foreign  Court. 

184.  Power  to  compel  Answer  before  Grand  Jury. 

185.  Protection  of  Witness  against  Arrest  and  Service  of  Process. 

186.  Privilege  of  Member  of  Congress. 

187.  Refusing  to  be  Sworn  on  the  Ground  of  Conscientious  Scruples. 

§  155.  Scope  of  this  Chapter. — It  is  not  designed  to  dis- 
cuss in  this  chapter  the  subject  of  the  privilege  of  witnesses  ex- 
cept so  far  as  it  arises  incidentally ;  ^  but  chiefly  to  give  a  sketch 

1  Seeposf,  Ch.  XII. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       163 

of  the  mode  of  compelling  the  attendance  of  witnesses  and  the 
production  of  books  and  papers. 

§  156.  Power  of  Court  to  compel  Attendance  of  Witnesses. 

"  Every  coui't,"'  says  Dr.  Greenleaf,  "having  power  definitely 
to  hear  and  determine  any  suit,  has,  by  the  common  law,  in- 
herent power  to  call  for  all  proofs  of  the  facts  in  controversy, 
and,  to  that  end,  to  summon  and  compel  the  attendance  of  wit- 
nesses before  it."  ^ 

§  157.  Of  Subpoenas.  —  The  first  process  for  bringing  a  wit- 
ness into  court  is  a  subpceua.  This  is  a  judicial  writ,  directed 
to  the  witness,  commanding  him  to  appear  at  the  court  on  a  day 
named,  there  to  give  evidence  and  the  truth  to  say  in  a  cause 
therein  pending,  m  lierein  A.  B.  is  plaintiff  and  C.  D.  is  defend- 
ant (or  otherwise  describing  the  parties),  and  not  depart  thence 
without  leave  of  the  court,  under  a  certain  penalty  therein 
named. 

§  158.  Particularity  in  this  Writ.  — As  this  writ  is  the  foun- 
dation of  any  future  compulsory  process  against  the  witness, 
particularity  is  required  in  its  terms.  A  subpoena  issuing  in  a 
criminal  case  out  of  a  court  of  the  United  States  must  cpmmand 
the  witness  to  attend  from  day  to  day,  and  not  to  depart  with- 
out leave  of  the  court ;  otherwise  it  will  not  support  a  proceed- 
ing against  the  witness  for  contempt,  in  case  he  attends  on  the 
day  named  and  afterward  departs  without  leave. ^  "Where  sub- 
pcEuas  for  witnesses  against  whom  a  contempt  is  charged,  are 
issued  in  blank  as  to  the  names  of  the  parties  to  the  case,  such 
subpoenas  are  not  valid  process  on  which  to  predicate  a  rule  for 
contempt,  in  hiring  a  person  to  intimidate  such  witnesses. "^ 

§  159.  Right  to  this  Process. —  The  granting  of  this  process 
is  matter  of  right,  where  it  appears  that  the  attendance  of  the 

1  1    Greenl.    Ev.,     §    309.     It    Wiis  Perry   v.  Mitchell,    5   Denio  (N.    Y.), 

ruled   iu  New  York  that  a  surrogate  537. 

had  no    power    to    issue    an  attach-  ^  jjegpeticer,  4McArthur  (D.C.),433. 

ment  to  briug  in  a  witness  to  testify,  ^  Dobbs  v.  State,  55  Ga.  272. 


164  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  ThoUip.  Tr., 

witness  cannot  otherwise  be  procured,  and  the  granting  or  refus- 
ing of  it  is  not  within  the  discretion  of  the  judge  or  clerk. ^  In 
criminal  cases,  by  the  terms  of  American  constitutions,  the  ac- 
cused is  entitled  to  have  com'pulsory  process  for  obtaining  wit- 
nesses in  his  favor. ^  The  accused  may,  therefore,  demand  that 
his  witnesses  shall  be  compelled  to  enter  into  a  recognizance  for. 
their  appearance  at  the  trial, ^  and  the  court  may  compel  a  wit- 
ness in  such  a  case  to  enter  into  a  recognizance  to  appear  at  a 
future  day;  but,  according  to  one  view,  cannot  require  him  to 
find  suriLies  for  his  appearance.*  It  is  usual,  upon  preliminary 
examinations  in  criminal  cases,  where  the  accused  is  held  to  bail 
or  committed,  to  require  the  witnesses  thus  to  enter  into  a  recog- 
nizance, and,  according  to  early  conceptions,  to  commit  them 
upon  their  refusal  to  do  so.^  But  one  American  court  has  de- 
clared that  it  is  unjust,  oppressive  and  against  common  right  to 
commit  a  Avitness  to  jail  in  default  of  sureties,  without  some  proof 
of  his  intent  not  to  appear  at  the  trial.  But  where  such  inten- 
tion appears,  the  commitment  is  not  prohibited  by  the  fourteenth 
amendment  to  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,  nor  by  the 
constitution  of  the  State. ^  In  another  State,  by  statute,  the 
witness  in  a  criminal  case,  if  unable  to  procure  sureties,  may  be 
discharged  from  commitment  and  his  deposition  taken ;^  and  the 
power  to  require  undertakings  from  such  witnesses  is  limited  in 
the  same  jurisdiction  to  those  who  have  been  examined  before  a 

1  Edmonson  v.  State,  43  Tex.  230.  moned  as  such  upon  an  Indictment  for 

2  Const.  U.  S.,  6th  Amendment;  lud.  a  felony,  to  enter  into  a  recognizance 
Const.  1851,  art.  1,  §13;  Const.  Cal.  to  appear  as  a  witness  and  give  evi- 
1879,  art.  1,  §  13;  Const.  Colo.,  §  IG;  dence  upon  the  trial  of  such  indict- 
Conn.  Const.  1818, art.  1,  §9;  Const.  111.  ment,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
1870,  art.  II,  §  9;  Kans.  Const.  Bill  of  contempt,  where  there  is  no  statute 
Eights,  §  10;  Md.  Const.  Bill  of  Eights,  authorizing  the  court  to  require  such 
art.  21;  Mich.  Const.,  art.  G,  §28;  N.  security.  Bickley  v.  Com.,  2  J.  J. 
Y.  Const.  181:7,  art.  I,  §  6 ;  Ohio  Const.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  572,  574. 

art.  VIII,  §  11;  Tex.  Const.,  art.  1,  §  &  1   Greenl.  Ev.,  §  318;    Bennett  r. 

10.     See  Buchraan  v.  State,  59  Ind.  1;  Watson,  3  Maul.  &  S.  1;  Evans  ■?;.  Rees, 

Bills  V.  State,  Id.  15;  Ex  parte  Marma-  12  Ad.  &  El.  55. 

duke,  91  Mo.  228.  6  state  v.  Grace,  18  Minn.  398. 

3  State  V.  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  220.  '  People  v.  Lee,  49  Cal.  37c 

*  The  refusal  of  a   Avitnoss,  sum- 


Tit.  11,  Cll.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       165 

committing  magistrate. ^  Moreover,  the  constitution  of  that 
State  provides  that  witnesses  shall  not  be  "  unreasonably  de- 
tained;" under  which  it  is  held  that  if  a  witness  is  detained  for 
ninety  days,  after  several  continuances  not  satisfactorily  ex- 
plained, he  is  entitled  to  be- discharged  on  habeas  corpus.'^ 

§  160.  Of  Letters  Rogatory.  —  The  etymology  of  the  word 
subpoena  implies  tliat  it  is  issued  frpm  a  tribunal  having  the 
power  to  command  and  to  enforce  obedience  to  its  command  by 
the  imposition  of  a  penalty.  It,  therefore,  cannot  properly  issue 
to  a  person  who,  under  the  law,  is  privileged  from  arrest  iu  case 
of  his  refusal  to  obey  it.  In  such  a  case,  it  is  indecent  to  issue 
such  a  writ,  but  it  is  ?;ometimes  the  practice  to  issue,  instead  of 
it,  what  is  called  a  letter  rogatory.  It  seems  that  where  the  at- 
tendance of  a  member  of  a  legislative  body,,  then  in  session,  is 
desired  before  a  court  of  judicature,  the  proper  practice  is  to 
issue  a  letter  rogatory  to  the  speaker  of  the  body,  requesting  the 
attendance  of  the  member  named  aa  a  witness,  and  not  to  issue 
a.subpoena  in  the  first  instance.^     Letters  rogatory  are  also  issued 


1  Ex  parte  Shaw,  Gl  Cal.  58. 

2  Ex  parte  Dressier,  (J7  Cal.  257. 

3  Iu  a  case  iu  1800,  iu  the  Circuit 
Court  of  the  United  States  for  the 
District  of  Penusylvauia,  before  Mr. 
Justice  Chase,  of  the  Supreme  Court 
of  the  United  States,  and  Mr.  Dis- 
trict Judge  Peters,  the  defendant,  be- 
ing indicted  for  a  libel  on  the  President, 
applied  to  the  court  for  a  letter  to  be 
addressed  by  them  to  several  members 
of  Congress  (Congress  being  iu  ses- 
sion), requesting  their  attendance  as 
witnesses  on  his  behalf.  In  support 
of  the  application,  a  variety  of  similar 
cases  arising  under  the  government  of 
Pennsylvania  were  referred  to.  Mr. 
Justice  Chase,  who  appears  to  have 
been  a  person  of  liasty,  arbitrary  and 
unjudicial  temperament,  is  reported  to 
have  said :  "  The  constitution  gives  to 
every  man  charged  with  an  ofCeuse  the 


benefit  of  compulsory  process  to  se- 
cure the  attendance  of  his  witnesses. 
I  do  not  know  of  any  privilege  to  ex- 
empt members  of  Congress  from  the 
service  or  obligations  of  a  subpcena. 
In  such  cases  I  will  uot  sign  any  letter 
of  the  kind  proposed.  If,  upon  serv- 
ice of  a  subponna,  the  members  of  Con- 
gress do  not  attend,  a  different  ques- 
tion may  arise;  and  it  will  then  be 
time  enough  to  decide  whether  au  at- 
tachment ought  or  ought  not  to  issue. 
It  is  not  a  necessary  consequence  of 
non-attendance  after  the  service  of  a 
subpcena  that  an  attachment  shall  issue. 
A  satisfactory  reason  may  appear  to 
the  court  to  justify  or  excuse  it." 
Mr.  District  Judge  Peters,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  reported  to  have  said:  "I 
know  the  practice  in  Pennsylvania  to 
be  :is  it  has  been  stated ;  for  I  have  re- 
ceived such  letters  from  the  Supreme 


166  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION   OF   TRIAL.        [1  TliOmp.  Tl'., 

to  foreign  judicatories,  whose  assistance  is  desired  in  obtaining 
the  depositions  of  witnesses  residing  abroad.^ 

§  161.  Of  Attachments  for  Witnesses. — Where  a  witness 
has  been  duly  subpoenaed  and  fails  to  attend,  the  usual  course  is 
for  the  court,  on  the  application  of  the  party  whose  witness  he 
is,  to  issue  an  attachment  for  him,  under  w^hich  he  is  arrested  by 
the  court's  officer  and  brought  before  the  court  and  there  com- 
pelled to  give  his  evidence,  with  or  without  the  imposition  of 
punishment,  according  to  the  excuse  which  he  may  have  to  offer.^ 
In  ordinary  cases  the  purpose  of  the  attachment  is  satisfied  when 
the  presence  of  the  witness  is  secured ;  but  where  contumacious 
neglect  or  disobedience  of  the  court's  process  appears,  a  pecuni- 
ary fine,  generally  small,  is  also  imposed;  and  where  the  contu- 
macy is  aggravated,  as  in  the  case  of  the  witness  concealing 
himself  or  keeping  out  of  the  way  of  the  court's  officer  to  avoid 
giving  his  testimony  in  the  particular  case,  a  substantial  punish- 
ment by  fine  or  imprisonment,  within  the  limits  allowed  by  law 
may  be  inflicted. 

§  163.  Whether  Attachment  a  Matter  of  Discretion.  — Ac- 
cording to  certain  conceptions  the  refusing  of  an  attachment  for 
an  absent  witness  is  a  matter  of  discretion,  which  will  not  be 
reviewed  on  error  or  appeal,  in  the  absence  of  an  appearance  of 

Court  while   I    was   speaker    of    the  letters  rogatory.     Fronde  v.   Fronde, 

House  of  Kepreseutatives  requesting  3  Thomp.  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  79. 
that  members  might  be  permitted  to  ^  gee  Buruham    v.    Morrissey,    14 

attend  as  witnesses.    In  the  present  Gray   (Mass.),   226;    Ex  parte  Hvun- 

case  I  should  have  no  objection  to  ac-  phrey,  2  Blatehf .  (U.  S.)  228 ;  Ex  parte 

quiesce  in  the  defendant's  application,  Judsou,  3  Blatehf .  (U.  S.)  89;  United 

with  the  concurrence  of  the  presiding  States  v.  Moore,  Wall.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 

judge."     But,  in  accordance  with  the  23;  Ex  parte  Beebees,  2  Wall.  Jr.  (U. 

opinion    of  the  presiding  judge,  the  S.)  127;    Ee  Eoelker,    1  Sprague   (U. 

motion  was  refused.     United  States  v.  S.),  27G;  West  v.  State,   1  Wis.  209; 

Cooper,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.)  341.  Bleecker  v.  Carroll,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

1 1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  320,  where  the  prac-  82 ;  State  v.  Trumbull,  4  N.  J.  L.  139 ; 

tice  is  described  and  a  form  given ;  also  Stephens    v.    People,    19   N.   Y.    637, 

1  Eol.  Abr.  530,  pi.    15.     A  statutory  549. 
commission,  if  sufficient,  is  preferred  to 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]       CONTEMPTS    IN   FACIE    CUKI^.  167 

abuse. ^  But  another  and  better  view  is  that,  if  the  witness  has 
been  regularly  served  with  subpcena,  the  party  requiring  his  at- 
tendance may  claim  an  attachment  as  a  matter  of  right. ^ 

§163.  [Coutiimed.]  Personal  Service  of  Subpoena  neces- 
sary. —  In  order  to  entitle  a  party  to  an  attachment  against  a  de- 
faulting witness,  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  show  that  the  subi^oena 
was  duly  served, "^ —  it  being  a  general  rule  that  before  a  person  can 
be  brought  into  contempt  for  disobeying  an  order  of  court,  he  must 
be  personally  served  with  the  order,*  unless  he  was  present  in 
court  when  the  order  was  made,  or  knowing  that  the  order  was 
about  to  be  made,  left  the  court  in  order  to  avoid  being  present 
when  it  was  made  and  in  order  to  prevent  its  service  upon  him." 
If,  however,  the  return  of  the  sheriff  shows  that  the  witness  wil- 
fully refused  to  permit  the  sheriff  to  serve  the  ^ib})cenau[)onliim, 
this  will  be  sufficient  ground  for  the  attachment.''  It  is  said  that,  in 
order  to  punish  a  witness  for  contempt  in  not  attending  in  obedience 
to  a  subpoena,  two  things  are  necessary:  1.  That  the  process  of 
subpoena,  be  strictly  and  legally  served.  2.  That  the  disobedience 
is  of  such  a  nature  as  to  indicate  a  design  to  contemn  the  process 
and  authority  of  the  court.  Ui)on  the  first  point,  where  it  did 
not  appear  from  the  return  of  the  subpoena,  where  it  was  deliv- 
ered to  the  witness,  it  was  held  that  it  was  not  a  suflicient  basis 

1  West  t'.  State,  1  AVis.  209;  State  to  authorize  au  attachment  in  case  it 
V.  Archer,  48  Iowa,  310.  Thus,  where  is  disobeyed.  Loop  v.  Gould,  17  Hun 
an  attachment  against  an  absent  fe-  (N,  Y.),  535;  Tebo  v.  Baljer,  16  Hun 
male  witness  was  refused  on  account  (N.  Y.),  182;  s.  c.  19  Alb.  L.  J.  (N.  Y.) 
of    her  condition,   and    the  accused  398. 

failed  to  apply  for  a  continuance,  it  ^  McCaulay  v.  Palmer,  40  Hun  (N. 

was    held    that  relief    could  not  be  Y.),3S;  Sauford  v.  Sanford,  Id.  540; 

granted  on  appeal.     State  r.  Benjamin,  Bate  Ref.  Co.  ■?;.  Gilett,  24  Fed.  Rep. 

7  La.  Ann.  47.  697;  Joliuson  ?;.  San  Francisco  Supe- 

2  Green  f.  State,  17  Fla.  669.  rior  Court,  63  Cal.  578. 

3  State  V.  Trumbull,  4  N.  J.  L,  139;  «  Hearn  v.  Tennant,  14  Ves.  136. 
United  States  v.  Caldwell,  2  Dall.  (U.  «  Wilson  v.  State,  57  Ind.  71.  More- 
S.)  334.  It  has  been  held,  in  the  case  over,  all  tlie  papers  on  which  the 
of  an  order  for  the  examination  of  a  attachment  is  awarded  ought  to  be 
party  under  a  statute  (X.  Y.  Code  Civ.  filed  in  court.  United  States  v.  Cald- 
Proc,  §  873)  service  of  order  upon  the  well,  2  Dall.  (U.  S.)  334.    . 

atiorneij  of  the  party  is  not  suflicient 


168  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TKIAL.        [1  ThoiUp.   Tr., 

• 

to  punish  the  witness  for  the  contempt,  since  it  might  have  been 
delivered  to  him  at  a  place  where  he  was  not  bound  to  yield  it 
obedience.  It  might  have  been  out  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  or  out  of  the  limits  of  the  State.  Upon  the  second  head, 
it  was  said;  "  It  is  the  contempt  which  is  punishable  in  this  sum- 
mary way.  In  the  present  instance  there  is  not  the  slightest 
appearance  of  any  intention  to  disregard  the  process  or  authority. 
of  the  court.  The  defendant  had  yielded  obedience,  and  when 
he  left  the  place  it  seems  to  have  been  under  a  well-founded 
impression  that  his  presence  would  not  at  the  time  be  required. 
Besides,  he  was  in  another  State  and  attending  to  necessary 
business  of  deep  importance  to  himself.  The  court  therefore 
see  no  grounds  for  an  attachment."  ^ 

§  164.  What  will  excuse  non-attendance.  —  The  serious  ill- 
ness of  the  witness,^  or  of  his  wife,^  will  generally  be  a  sufficient 
excuse  for  his  failure  to  attend.  So,  where  there  is  a  statute 
requiring  the  party  desiring  the  attendance  of  the  witness  to 
tender  to  him  his  legal  fees^  he  cannot  be  punished  for  refusing 
to  obey  the  subpoena,  if  the 'same  are  not  tendered,  or  the  tender 
waived.*  For  the  witness  is  not  bound  to  testify  until  his  fees 
are  tendered ;  ^  and  if  he  attends  for  one  party  and  testifies  and 
then  departs,  without  notice  that  he  will  be  required  to  remain 
for  cross-examination,  the  cross-examining  party  must  tender 
his  fees  in  order  to  secure  his  return  for  that  purpose.^     By  an 


estate    V.   Trumbull,    4:  N.    J.   L.  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  319;  Gardens.  Creswell, 

139.  2  Mees.  &  W.  319. 

2  Cutler  V.  State,  42  Lid.  244.  «  Atwood  v.  Scott,  99  Mass.  177; 
Where  it  appeared  that  the  -witnesses  Bliss  v.  Brainard,  42  N.  H.  255.  Con- 
thus  brought  in  had  been  so  much  in-  tra,  in  the  federal  courts,  at  least  so 
disposed  as  to  be  incapable  of  attend-  far  as  mileage  money  is  concerned : 
ing,  they  were  discharged,  and  the  Norris  v.  Hasler,  23  Fed.  Rep.  581. 
costs  of  tlie  attachment  directed  to  ^  Richards  v.  Goddard,  L.  R.  17  Eq. 
abide  the  event  of  the  suit.  Butcher  238.  Where  a  party  is  summoned  as  a 
V.  Coats,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  340.  witness,  under  a  statute,  by  theoppo- 

3  Foster  v.   McDonald,    12    Heisk.  site  party,  it  has  been  held  that  he  is 
(Tenn.)  619.  entitled  to    witness  fees.     Penny  v. 

*  Re  Thomas,  1  Dill.  (IT.  S.)  420;  1  Brink,  75  N.  C.  68. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.   VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       J  ()9 

early  English  statute/  the  witness  was  entitled  to  his  "  reason- 
able chariies,"  "  accorclin«;  to  his  countenance  or  callino;:  "  but 
in  the  United  States,  the  fees  and  mileage  of  witnesses  are,  it  is 
believed,  universally  fixed  by  statute;^  but  there  is  so  little 
uniformity  in  the  practice  touching  this  subject  that  it  cannot 
properly  be  discussed  here.^  Nor  will  the  court  compel  the 
attendance  of  an  interpreter,  or  of  an  expert,  who  has  neglected 
to  obey  a  subpa?na,  unless  in  case  of  necessity.*  If  the  witness 
against  whom  an  attachment  is  issued,  arrives  in  court  before  it 
has  been  served  and  makes  a  reasonable  excuse,  the  court  will 
countermand  the  attachment  on  payment  of  the  costs  of  it.^ 
Moreover,  an  attachment  will  not  be  granted  where  it  appears  that 
the  testimony  of  the  witness  could  not  be  'material  to  the  issues.^ 
So,  where  a  public  officer  is  served  with  a  subpoena  duces  tecum, 
requiring  him  to  bring  certain  public  documents  which  may  be 
proved  by  copies,  an  attachment  will  not  be  granted  because  of 
his  refusal  to  obey;  ^  otherwise  if  he  refuses  to  furnish  copies.^ 
Where  the  witness  had  reasonable  grounds  to  suppose  that  he 
would  not  be  wanted  at  the  trial,''  or  was  excused  by  the  attorney 
of  the  party  who  summoned  liim,^°  attachments  were  refused. 
An  attachment  will  not  be  issued  where  it  would  be  oppressive, 
ox  dangerous  to  the  health  of  the  witness,  or  where  any  strong 
reason  relating  to  the  business  or  family  of  the  witness  exists, 
against  his  compulsory  absence  from  home ;  but  the  court  will 
either  postpone  the  cause  or  have  his  deposition  taken. ^^ 

§  165.   When  Attachment  Issues  in  First  Instance. — It  is 

not  usual  to  grant  an  attachment  against  a  witness  in  the  first 

1  Stat.  5  Eliz.,  chap.  9.  Pr.    (x.    s.)     (N.   Y.)    291.     Compare 

2  See  Holbrook  v,  Cooley,  25  Minu.      Courtney  v.  Baker,  3  Denio   (X.  Y.), 
275.  27,  30,  31,  and  cases  cited. 

*See  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  310,  and  cita-  '  Corbett  v.  Gibson,  16  Blatch.  (U. 

tions.  S.)  334. 

*  Re   Roelker,    1  Sprague  (U.   S.),  ^  Delaney  v.  Regulators,  1  Yeates 

276 ; pos?,  §  171.  (Pa.),  403. 

5  United    States    v.    Scliolfield,     1  »  Reg.  v.  Slowman,  1  Dowl.  618. 

Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  130.  lo  Farrah  v.  Keat,  6  Dowl.  470. 

fi  Dicas  V.  Lawson,  1  Cromp.  M.  &  "  Ex  parte  Beebces,  2  Wall.  Jr.  (U. 

R.  934;   Morgan  v.  Morgan     ^G  Abb.  S.)  127. 


170  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF   TRIAL.       [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

instance,  unless  some  willful  disobedience  to  the  authority  of  the 
court  is  made  to  appear.  The  usual  practice  is  to  grant  only  a 
rule  to  show  cause. ^  But  where  a  witness  is  regularly  served 
with  subpoena  and  money  tendered  him  for  his  expenses,  which 
he  does  not  object  to  for  its  insufficiency,  but  positively  refuses 
to  attend,  it  is  a  palpable  case  of  contempt,  and  the  court  will 
award  an  attachment  in  the  first  instance.  "  The  sum  of  money 
tendered  may  or  may  not  have  been  adequate ;  but  as  the  witness 
did  not  object  to  it  at  the  time,  it  is  to  be  considered  sufficient."  ^ 

§  166.  Service  and  Return  of  Attachment. — The  attach- 
ment must  be  served  by  the  proper  executive  order  of  the 
court,  —  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  by  the  marshal  of 
the  United  States,  although  the  witness  reside  in  a  distant  county 
of  the  State ;  it  being  process  regularly  issued  for  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice.^  It  has  been  held,  under  statutes,  that  it  is 
unnecessary  that  an  attachment  for  a  defaulting  witness  should 
be  issued  and  executed  at  the  same  term.  It  may  be  issued  at 
the  close  of  the  term,  returnable  to  the  succeeding  term,  and 
may  be  executed  by  the  sheriff  in  vacalion,  who  may  discharge 
him  upon  his  giving  bail  in  the  amount  required  by  statute;  and, 
after  such  an  attachment,  the  cause  may  be  continued.^ 

§  167.   Hearing    the     Excuse — Purging    the    Contempt. — 

When  the  witness  is  brought  in  by  the  officer,  in  execution  of 
the  attachment,  the  court  will,  of  course,  hear  his  excuse,  if 
any  he  have  to  offer,  and  if  it  is  a  valid  one,  will  discharge  him 
from  the  arrest  and  hear  his  testimony.  "  He  is  called  upon  to 
purge  himself  oi  the  alleged  contempt,  which,  if  he  does  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  court,  he  is  dismissed  without  more;  but  if 
he  fail  to  purge  himself,  the  court  adjudges  him  guilty  of  con- 
tempt, and  imposes  the  costs  of  the  attachment,  and  such  addi- 
tional Jine   as,  in  their  discretion,  the  case  seems    to    demand  ; 

1  Jackson w.  Mann,  2  Calues  (N.Y.),  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  109;  s.  c.  Coleman's 
Rep.  92;  Morris  v.  Creel,  1  Va.  Cas.      Cases  (N.  Y.),  119. 

.333.  »  U.  S.  V.  Montgomery,  2  Dail.  (U. 

2  Andrews   v.    Andrews,    2    Johns        S.)  335. 

*  State  V.  Archer,  43  Iowa,  310. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.        171 

and,  in  default  of   payment,  he  ma}'  be  committed  io  jail  to  com- 
pel execution  of  the  sentence."'  ^ 

§  168.  Punisliment  of  the  Recusant  Witness.  —  As  a  gen- 
eral rule,  the  refusal  of  a  witness  to  attend,  to  submit  himself 
to  an  examination,  or  to  answer  particular  questions  before  a 
subordinate  officer  of  a  court  of  record,  appointed,  or  having 
authority  to  take  the  deposition  of  the  witness,  or  to  conduct  his 
examination,  is  a  contempt  of  the  court,  and  not  of  the  officer. ^ 
In  like  manner,  the  refusal  of  a  witness  to  submit  to  an  examin- 
ation, or  to  answer  particular  questions^  before  a  grand  jury  ^  is 
a  contempt  of  the  court  by  which  the  grand  jury  is  impaneled.^ 
The  grand  jury  is  merely  an  appendage  of  the  court,  of  which 
the  judge  is  the  head  or  controlling  power .^  It  is  only  through 
the  subpoena  of  the  court  that  witnesses  can  be  brought  before 
them,  who  do  not  choose  to  attend  voluntarily  ;  and  they  must 
invoke  the  powers  of  the  court,  when  necessary,  to  compel  the 


1  Com.  V.  Newton,  1  Grant's  Cas. 
(Pa.)  453,  45G.  This  case  discusses  at 
length  the  power  of  the  courts  to  pun- 
ish contempts  under  the  Pennsylvania 
statute  of  June  IGth,  1836  (Purd.  Dig. 
158). 

2  La  Fontaine  v.  Southern  Under- 
writers, 83  N.  C.  132,  137;  Stuart  v. 
Allen,  45  Wis.  158,  KJl,  per  Ortou,  J.; 
Whitcomb's  Case,  120  Mass.  118,  121, 
per  Gray,  C.  J. ;  Rex  v.  Almon,  Wil- 
mot,  243,  2G9;  2  Dan.  Ch.  Pr.  (4th  Am. 
ed.)  1178,  1198;  78th  Eq.  Rule  of  U. 
S.  Courts,  17  Pet.  Isxiv.;  Rev.  Stat. 
U.  S.,  §§  4071,  4072,  4073,  4999,  5002, 
5005,  500(5 ;  Ex  parte  Doll,  7  Phil.  (Pa.) 
595;  Matter  of  Allen,  13  Blatchf.  (U. 
S.)  271.  Compare  Shepherd  v.  Dean, 
13  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  174;  Wicker  v. 
Dresser,  13  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  331; 
Com.  V.  Newton,  1  Grant  (Pa.)  Cas. 
453. 

3  United  States  v.  Caton,  1  Cranch 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  150.  Where  the  writ 
Issues  from  a  federal  court,  refusal  to 


obey  it  is  an  offense  against  the  United 
States.  Re  Ellerbe,  4  McCrary  (U. 
S.),  449. 

4  People  V.  Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74; 
Heard  v.  Pierce,  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  338; 
People  V.  Fancher,  4  Thomp.  &  C.  (N. 
Y.)  4G7,  470;  Commonwealth  v.  Ban- 
uon,  97  Mass.  214;  Rex  v.  Lord  Pres- 
ton, 1  Salk.  278;  Ex  parte  Maulsby,  13 
Md.  G25;  Lockwood  v.  State,  1  lud. 
IGl;  Ward t?.  State,  2  Mo.  120.  Contra, 
in  Alabama,  where  the  proceeding 
must  be  by  indictment.  State  v. 
Blocker,  14  Ala.  450. 

5  United  States  v.  Hill,  1  Brock.  (U. 
S.)  15G;  Denning  u.  State,  22  Ark.  131, 
132;  Ch-erry  v.  State,  G  Fla.  G79,  G85: 
People  V.  Naughtou,  7  Al)b.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  (N.  s.)  421,  423;  Heard  ??.  Pierce, 
8  Cush.  (Mass.)  338,  339;  Commou- 
wealth  V.  Bannon,  97  Mass.  214,  219; 
Lewis  V.  Wake  County,  74  N.  C.  194, 
198;  Commonwealth  v.  Crans,  3  Pa. 
L.  J.  449,  450;  s.  c.  2  Clarke  (Pa.  L. 
J.),  1^0. 


172      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRL4L.   [I  Thomp.  Tl'., 

attendance  of  witnesses,  and  to  protect  themselves  from  insult 
or  interference,^  Under  the  limitations  imposed  upon  the  pro- 
cess of  contempt  by  statute  in  Pennsylvania,  a  sentence  disbar- 
ring 071  attorney  for  default  as  a  witness  is  merely  void.  "  This 
legislation,"  said  Woodward,  J.,  "  would  be  a  vain  array  of 
words,  if  a  gentleman  of  the  bar  who  happened  to  be  in  techni- 
cal contempt  as  a  tardy  witness,  might,  instead  of  being  fined, 
be  stripped  of  his  profession.  As  well  might  the  occupation  of 
another  witness  be  taken  away  from  him  for  disobedience  to  a 
subpoena,  and  his  family  beggared.  Before  such  things  can  be 
done,  the  acts  of  assembly  restricting  punishments  for  con- 
tempt must  be  repealed  and  forgotten."  ^ 

§  169.  Power  to  Award  Compensation  to  Party  injured  by 
Recusancy  of  Witness. — The  power  of  courts  to  award  in- 
demnity to  an  injured  party,  in  a  summary  proceeding  as  for  a 
contempt,  is  said,  in  Wisconsin,  to  rest  entirely  upon  the  statute.-^ 
This  may  be  true,  but  it  is  beyond  question  that  it  was  the  prac- 
tice of  the  court  of  chancery  in  England,  independently  of  stat- 
ute, to  fine  contemnors  in  the  amount  which  the  opposite  party 
and  been  damaged  by  their  contempt.^  Following  this  view, 
however,  the  Wisconsin  court,  having  held  in  a  previous  case 
that  the  "loss  or  injury"  for  which  the  court  may  award 
compensation  to  the  injured  party  in  a  proceeding  for  contempt, 
under  the  statutes  of  that  State,^  is  a  pecuniary  loss  or  injury, 
for  which  the  party  injured  might  recover  damages  by  an 
action,^  —  with  this  ruling  as  the  basis  of  its  reasoning,  pro- 
ceed upon  the  consideration  that,  while  the  statute  of  that 
State '  o;ives  or  recoo;nizes  a  rio-ht  of  action  by  the  ag^ofrieved 
party  against  one  duly  subpoenaed  and  under  obligation  to  attend 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Crans,  3  Pa.  L.  ^  Com.  v.  Newton,  1   Grant's  Cas. 

J.  453;  s.  c.  2  Clarke  (Pa.  L.  J.),  184;  (Pa.)  453,  457. 

Ex  parte  Van  Hook,  3  N.  Y.  City  Hall  3  stately.  Lonsdale, 48  Wis.  348, 366. 

Eec.  64:  Ex  parte  Spooner,  5  Id.  109;  *  3  Bla.  Com.  344. 

Bergh'sCase,  IG  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)    (n.  s  r.s.    1878,  §§  3490,  3491:  R.  S. 

s.)  266.     Compare  Storey  v.  People,  79  1858,  eh.  149,  §§  21,  23. 

HI.  45;  Grand  Jury  v.  Public  Press,  4  <*  Ee  Pierce,  44  AVis.  411. 

Brewst.  (Pa.)  313.  ^  R.  S.  Wis.  1878,  §  4063. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.      173 

as  a  witness,  who  fails  to  attend  without  reasonable  excuse,  to 
recover  damages  caused  by  such  failure ;  yet  no  right  of  action 
exists  against  a  witness  for  the  mere  refusal  to  answer  proper 
questions,  at  least  without  allegation  and  proof  of  some  special 
loss  or  injury.  The  conclusion  of  the  court,  therefore,  is  that, 
in  a  proceeding  against  a  witness  for  contempt  in  refusing  to  an- 
swer proper  questions  propounded  to  him,  it  is  not  competent 
for  the  court  to  impose  a  tine  upon  him  for  an  i)idemniJication 
of  the  party  by  whom  he  was  subpoenaed.^  Speaking  for  the 
court,  Lyon,  J.,  says:  *'  Neither  the  statute  nor  any  adjudged 
case  that  has  come  to  our  notice  recoo-nizcs  such  rio^ht  of  action 
against  a  witness  for  refusing  to  answer  proper  questions.  It 
may  be,  however,  that  in  special  cases  such  an  action  can  be 
maintained  on  common-law  principles.  But  it  seems  to  us  it  can 
only  be  maintained  (if  at  all)  for  some  special  damage  resulting 
from  the  unlawful  refusal  of  the  witness  to  testify.  For  exam- 
ple, such  refusal  might  compel  a  party  to  take  a  continuance  one 
term.  The  continuance  costs  would  probably  be  the  measure  of 
damages.  If  such  an  action  can  be  maintained  in  any  case,  we 
think  the  recovery  will  be  limited  to  the  actual,  direct  tangible 
damages ;  and  that  the  mere  refusal  to  testify,  unaccompanied  by 
such  damages,  is  not  a  ground  of  action.  And  we  think  also  that 
no  recovery  can  be  bad  in  such  an  action,  based  upon  the  possi- 
bility or  probability  that,  had  the  witness  testified  fully,  the 
judgment  would  have  been  more  favorable  to  the  aggrieved  party 
than  it  was.  Such  damaofcs  are  altoo;ethcr  too  uncertain  and  con- 
jectural  to  furnish  a  ground  of  action."  '^ 

§  170.  Relief  by  Habeas  Corpus. —  If  the  commitment  of 
the  witness  is  illegal,  he  is  entitled  to  be  discharged  by  habeas 
corpus.^  At  the  same  time,  the  sentence  of  commitment  will 
not  —  at  least  at  common  law  —  be  reviewed  on  error  or  ap- 
peal.*    But,  on  well  settled  principles  touching  the  office  of  the 

»  State  V.   Lousdale,   48  Wis.  348,  C41,app.;   People  v.   Kelly,  24  N.    Y. 

367.  '  74. 

2  Ibid.  367.  4  Lockwood  v.   State,    1    Ind.    161. 

^  Ex  parte   Maulsby,    13  Md.    G25,  Otherwise  uuder  statutes.  Ante,  §  140. 


174  CONTROL   AND    REGULATION    OF   TRIAL.       [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 

writ  of  habeas  corpus,  he  cannot  be  discharged  because  of  any 
mere  error  or  irregularity  in  the  commitment,  or  in  the  steps 
which  have  led  up  to  it ;  he  can  only  be  discharged  for  what  is 
termed  illegality  —  that  is,  because  the  sentence  was  one  which 
could  not  be  legally  imposed.^  Upon  this  subject — the  differ- 
ence between  irregularity  and  illegality  in  respect  of  the  remedy 
by  habeas  corpus, — there  is  much  contrariety  of  judicial  opinion. 
It  would  appear,  on  the  whole,  that  courts  of  co-ordinate  jurisdic- 
tion will  not  assume  the  right,  on  habeas  corpus,  to  judge  of 
each  other's  jurisdiction  and  of  the  legality  of  each  other's  com- 
mitments for  contempt;  while  it  cannot  escape  attention  that 
appellate  or  superintending  courts  are  more  and  more  in  the 
habit  of  doing  so.^  It  is  apprehended  that  the  generally  pre- 
vailing view  is  that  a  person  committed  contempt  for  refusing  to 
produce  certain  papers  in  his  possession  before  a  grand  jury,  in 
compliance  with  an  order  of  the  court  in  the  nature  of  subpoena 
duces  tecum  is  in  law  committed  in  execution  of  a  criminal  judg- 
ment, and  cannot  be  enlarged  by  another  tribunal  or  judge  on 
habeas  corpus,  upon  any  view  of  errors  in  the  judgment  of  com- 
mitment, as  that  the  witness  was  privileged  by  his  position  of 
attorney  from  producing  the  documents  called  for;  they  being 
the  documents  of  his  client,  or  for  any  other  error  which  ma}'' 
have  led  to  the  judgment  of  committal,  or  for  any  excess  in  the 
fine  or  imprisonment  imposed.^  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  au- 
thority in  support  of  the  view  that  if  the  refusal  of  the  wit- 
ness to  answer  the  question  is  altogether  innocent  and  Justifiable, 
or  only  an  assertion  of  a  constitutional  right,  such  as  the  right  of 
not  giving  evidence  against  himself,  a  commitment  for  contempt 
is  illegal  in  such  a  sense  that  the  error  may  be  reached  by  certi- 
orari,  if  not  examinable  upon  the  return  to  a  habeas  corpus.^ 
Where  an  event  occurs  which  renders  it  impossible  for  the  wit- 
ness, or  other  contemnor,  to  perform  the  thing  required  of  him, 
for  refusing  to  perform  which  he  is  imprisoned,  he  will  be  en- 
titled to  be  relieved  from  imprisonment  by  habeas  corpus;  other- 

1  Ante,  §  140  et  seq.  s  Ex  parte  Maulsby,13  Md.  App.  625. 

2  Ante,  §  145.  ^  people  v.    Kelly,'  24  N.  Y.  74. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.   VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       175 

wise  he  might  be  doomed  to  perpetual  imprisonment. ^  Thus, 
where  a  witness  is  imprisoned  for  refusing  to  answer  questions 
in  a  pending  cause,  he  will  be  released  on  habeas  corpus  upon  the 
abatement  of  such  suit? 

§  171.  Compelling'  the  Testimony  of  Experts.  —  This  sub- 
ject is  also  in  much  confusion.  Statutes  exist  fixing  the  fees 
of  experts  at  larger  sums  than  those  of  ordinary  witnesses. 
Judicial  opinion  is  much  at  variance  on  the  question  whether  an 
expert  may  be  compelled  to  testify  without  the  payment  of  the 
statutory  fees,  or  even  as  to  whether  a  witness  can  be  com- 
pelled to  give  his  opinion  at  all.  According  to  one  view,  the 
witness  meets  the  requirements  of  a  subpoena  if  he  appears  in 
court  wdien  required  to  testify  and  gives  imp)romptu  answers  to 
such  questions  as  are  then  put  to  him.  He  cannot  be  required, 
by  virtue  of  the  subpoena,  to  examine  the  case,  to  use  his  skill 
and  knowledge,  to  form  an  opinion,  or  to  attend,  hear  and  con- 
sider the  testimony  given,  so  as  to  be  qualified  to  give  an  opinion 
on  a  question  of  science  arising  upon  such  testimony,  —  from 
which  the  conclusion  follows  that  a  professional  witness  called 
as  an  expert  may  properly  be  paid  for  his  time,  services  and 
expenses,  and  that  the  amount  which  is  paid  to  him  cannot,  in 
the  absence  of  anything  showing  bad  faith  on  his  part  and  on  the 
part  of  the  party  calling  him,  affect  the  regularity  of  the  trial, 
though  it  may  affect  his  credit  wnth  the  jury.  It  was  also  reas- 
oned that  it  is  not  improper  for  the  State's  attorney,  in  a  crim- 
inal case,  to  procure  the  attendance  of  skilled  witnesses  for  a 
special  compensation,  and  that  the  fact  that  an  expert  attended 
and  testified  at  his  instance,  under  an  agreement  for  compensa- 
tion, which  was  unknown  to  the  defendant  until  after  the  wit- 
ness' testimony  had  closed,  did  not  affect  the  regularity  of  the 
verdict.^  Opinion  has  so  far  varied  that  in  one  jurisdiction  it 
has  been  held  that  an  expert  may  refuse  to  give  his  opinion 
on    matters     of    science    or    skill    until  the  statutory  fees  are 

^  Ex  parte  Rowe,  7  Cal.  175.  3  People    v.   ^Aloiitsomery,  13  Abb, 

2  Had.  Pr.  (X.  s.)  (N.  Y.)  207. 


176  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF   TRIAL.       [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

paid  ;^  and  another  court  has  gone  so  far  as  to  hold  that  he  may  re- 
fuse to  give  his  opinion  at  all ;  ^  while  still  another  court  has  held  that 
such  a  refusal  is  a  contempt.^  It  has  been  reasoned  in  an  English 
case  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  a  witness  to  the  facts  and 
a  witness  selected  by  a  party  to  give  his  opinion  as  an  expert ; 
that  the  former  is  bound,  as  a  matter  of  public  duty,  to  testify 
to  facts  within  his  knowledge,  while  the  latter  is  under  no  such 
obligation  to  testify  as  to  his  opinion  on  matters  of  skill  or 
science  ;  and  accordingly  that  the  party  who  selects  him  must  pay 
for  his  time  before  he  will  be  compelled  to  testify.*  If  a  profes- 
sional man  is  called  as  an  ordinary ►  witness  to  testify  to  facts 
within  his  knowledge,  he  will  not  be  entitled  to  the  extra  com- 
pensation allowed  by  a  statute  in  the  case  of  experts ;  ^  and  it  has 
been  held  that  physicians  called  to  give  their  opinions  on  facts 
observed  by  them  while  treating  a  person  professionally,  are  not 
within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  empowering  the  court  in  its  dis- 
cretion to  give  extra  compensation  to  expert  witnesses.^ 

§  172.  When  the  Witness  is  privileged  to  depart.  —  By  the 

usual  terms  of  a  subpoena,  the  witness  is  required  to  attend  de 
die  in  diem^  and  not  to  depart  without  leave  of  the  court.  But 
it  is  usual,  and  hence  not  blameable,  for  him  to  depart  as  soon 
as  his  examination  has  been  completed  and  he  is  notified  by  the 
party  calling  him  that  his  attendance  will  not  be  further  required, 
unless  he  receives  contrary  notice  from  the  opposite  party  or 
from  the  court.  It  has  even  been  held  that  the  party  calling  the 
witness  may  allow  him  to  depart  after  cross-examination,  and 
that  the  opposite  party  cannot  demand  that  he  be  detained  to 
testify  regarding  new  matter,  or  that  he  be  required  to  produce 
documents  to  be  used  by  the  latter  in  support  of  his  case;  and 
this  for  the  reason  that  if  he  desires  him  for  this  purpose,  he 
should  subpoena  him  as  his  own  witness.^     In  another  case,  the 

1  Biicliman  v.  State,  5!)  lud.  1 ;  Dills  *  Webb  v.  Page,  1  Car.  &  K.  23. 
V.  State,  Id.  15.                                                    ^  Suyder  v.  Iowa  City,  40  la.  G4G. 

2  Ex  parte   Roelker,  1  Sprague  (U.  "  Le   Mere    v.   McHale,    30    Miun. 
S.),  027.  410. 

3  Ex  parte  Dement,  53  Ala.  389.  '  Wells  v.  Wells,  33  N.  J.  Eq,  4. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       177 

court  refused  to  allow  the  defendant  to  prove  his  case  by  cross- 
examination  of  the  plaintiffs  witness,  thus  enforcing  what  we 
shall  hereafter  find  to  be  the  general  rule  in  several  American 
jurisdictions ;  ^  whereupon  the  defendant  said  that  he  would  call 
the  witness  as  his  own  at  the  proper  time,  and  the  plaintiff  re- 
plied that  he  had  no  objection  to  the  witness  remaining.  Next 
day,  when  the  defendant  desked  to  call  the  witness,  he  could  not 
be  found.  It  appearing  that  the  defendant  had  not  subpoenaed 
him,  or  tendered  him  the  statutory  fee  for  the  second  day,  it  was 
held  that  he  could  not  have  an  attachment  for  him.^  But  there 
is  another  conception,  which  is  that,  when  a  witness  has  been 
subpoeuaed  and  called  to  testify,  he  is  presumed  to  be  present 
until  the  conclusion  of  the  trial,  and  that  if  he  has  left  the  court 
after  the  close  of  his  examination,  and  is  thereafter  wanted  by 
the  opposite  party,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  suspend  the 
trial  until  he  can  be  brought  in.^  On  a  similar  view,  it  has  been 
held  that,  after  the  announcement  of  the  counsel  on  each  side  in 
a  criminal  case  that  the  testimony  is  closed,  it  is  within  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  presiding  judge  to  issue  attachments  to  compel  the 
attendance  of  an  absent  witness.* 

§  173.  Habeas  Corpus  ad  Testificandum. — Where  the  wit- 
ness is  in  custody  or  in  the  military  or  naval  service,  it  has  been 
usual  to  compel  his  attendance  by  a  w^rit  of  habeas  corpus  ad  tes- 
tificandum, directed  to  his  prison-keeper  if  in  confinement,^  or 
to  his  superior  officer  if  in  the  military  or  naval  service.  This 
writ  is  a  very  ancient  one,  and  appears  to  have  been  granted  at  the 
discretion  of  the  courts  of  common  law.  It  is  said  to  have  been 
employed  to  bring  witnesses  before  the  court  when  in  custody 
awaitiuo;  trial,  and  also  when  under2:oino^  sentence.®     The  writ 

1  Post,  chap.  XVII.  250,   per   Sherwood,   J.     See   Adam's 

2  Beaulieu  ??.  Parsons,  2  Minn.  37.  Case,  3   Keb.  51;  Kes   v.    Burbage,  3 

3  Neil  V.  Thorn,  88  N.  Y.  270.  Burr.   1440;  Rex  v.  Layer,  Fort.  396; 
*  Stephens    v.    People,    19    N.    Y.  Geery  u.  Hopkins,  2  Ld.  Raym.  851; 

549.  Friend's  Case,    13  How.  St.  Tr.  1;  2 

5  Chapman  i\  Welles,  Kirby  (Conn.) ,  Tidd  Prac.  (9th  ed.)  809 ;  Shank's  Case, 

133,137.  15  Abb.   Pr.    (n.   s.)    (N.  Y.)  38;  Re 

«  Ex  parte  Marmaduke,  91  Mo.  228,  Mason,  8  Mich.  7 

12 


178  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1   Thoilip.  Tr., 

has  issued  in  civil  cases  from  the  federal  courts,  and  seemingly 
without  regard  to  the  question  whether  the  witness  was  in  Fed- 
eral or  in  State  custody.^  Its  use  is  recognized  by  several 
American  statutes."'^  The  Missouri  statute  empowers  the  judge 
of  any  court  of  record  to  issue  the  writ  to  bring  up  persons  de- 
tained for  any  cause,  "  except  a  sentence  for  felony."  It  was 
held,  where  the  writ  was  demanded  on  behalf  of  a  prisoner  on 
trial  for  felony,  that  this  exception  did  not  infringe  his  consti- 
tutional right  to  have  process  to  compel  the  attendance  of  wit- 
nesses in  his  behalf,  and  that  obedience  to  the  writ,  when  di- 
rected to  the  warden  of  the  penitentiary  of  the  State  to  bring  up 
a  prisoner  there  confined  under  sentence  for  a  felony,  could  not 
be  enforced  by  a  criminal  court. ^ 

§  174.  Proceeding  to  Obtain  this  Writ. —  According  to  an 
early  English  case,  in  order  to  lay  the  proper  foundation  for  the 
writ  of  habeas  corpus  ad  testificandiun,  it  is  necessary  to  show  by 
affidavit  that  the  persons  whom  it  is  desired  to  bring  up  as  wit- 
nesses have  been  served  with  subpoenas,  and  that  they  are  not 
willing  to  attend.  "  Without  such  an  affidavit,"  said  Lord  Mans- 
field, "the  writ  ought  not  to  go.  They  can  never  be  brought  up 
as  prisoners  against  their  consent."*     According  to  Dr.  Green- 

1  Ex  parte  Barnes,  1  Sprague  (U.  up  a  prisoner  who  was  confined  in 
S.),  133;  Ex  parte  Cabrera,  1  Wasli.  jail  for  the  non-payment  of  a  fine  ira- 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  2'62 ;  Ex  parte  des  Eoch-  posed  on  him  as  a  part  of  a  judg- 
ers,  1  McAIl.  (U.S.)  68;  Ex  parte  ment  of  the  court  upon  an  indictment 
Dorr,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  104;  Ex  parte  for  assault,  in  order  that  lie  might 
Bollman,  i  Cranch  (U.  S.),  75;  Elki-  give  evidence  before  an  election  corn- 
son  V.  Beliesseline,  2  Wheel.  Crim.  mittee  of  the  House  of  Commons,  on 
Cas.  5C) ;  United  States  v  Moore,  3  an  affidavit  of  service  of  a  rule  to 
Cranch  (U.  S.),  159.  show  cause  upon  the  under   sheriff, 

2  Crim.  Code  Ind.,  §§  245,  240;  2  the  solicitor  of  the  treasury,  the 
Rev.  Laws  Ohio  1880,  §  7290;  Stat.  Me.  prisoner,  and  the  person  at  whose  in- 
1883,  p.  805,  §  37;  Stat.  Mass.  1882,  p.  stance  he  was  in  execution,  and,  no 
1070,  §  29;  Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1879,  §  4031.  cause  having  been  shown.     Matter  of 

»  Ex  parte  Marmaduke,  91  Mo.  228  Price,  4  East,  587.     See   also   Rex  v. 

(Sherwood,  J.,  dissenting).  Burbage,  3  Burr.    1440;    Thelusson  v. 

*  Rex  V.  Roddam,  Cowp.  672.     The  Coppiuger,  3Esp.  283;  Noble  v.  Smith, 

King's  Bench,  in   1804   granted  a  ha-  5  Johns.  357.     It  was   at  one  time  a 

beas  corpus   ad  testificandum  to  bring  doubtful  point  whether  a  habeas  cor- 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.  1  coMPUi.soRY  process  against  witnesses.     179 

leaf,  "  the  application  in  civil  cases,  is  made  upon  affidavit,  stat_ 
ing  the  nature  of  the  suit,  and  the  materiality  of  the  testimony, 
as  the  party  is  advised  and  verily  believes,  together  with  the 
fact  and  general  circumstances  of  restraint,  which  call  for  the 
issuing  of  the  writ ;  and,  if  he  is  not  actually  a  prisoner,  it 
should  state  his  willingness  to  attend.  In  criminal  cases,  no 
affidavit  is  deemed  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  prosecuting  at- 
torney. The  writ  is  left  with  the  sheriff,  if  the  witness  is  in 
custody;  but  if  he  is  in  the  military  or  naval  service,  it  is  left 
with  the  officer  in  immediate  command,  to  be  served,  obeyed  and 
returned  like  any  other  writ  of  habeas  corpus.^  This  writ  will 
not  be  issued  in  any  case  to  bring  out  of  the  penitentiary  a  wit- 
ness who,  by  reason  of  his  conviction  for  a  felony  is  incompetent 
to  testify.^  Nor  will  it  be  issued  in  such  a  case  where  the  com- 
petency of  the  witness  is  substantially  in  doubt ;  ^  nor  will  its 
execution  be  enforced  when  impi'ovideutli/  granted.^ 


pus  ad  testificandum  could  be  granted 
in  the  Common  Pleas,  to  bring  up  a 
prisoner  charged  in  execution  in  the 
Fleet,  in  order  that  he  might  testify 
in  a  pending  cause.  The  doubt  turned 
upon  whether  the  writ  of  habeas  cor- 
pus would  be  a  good  defense  to  an  ac- 
tion for  an  escape  against  the  warden  of 
the  Fleet.  Burdus  v.  Shorter,  Barnes' 
Notes,  222.  The  court  refused  the  writ 
in  Francia  v.  De  Mattos,  Id.  223.  The 
court  declared  it  to  be  a  very  doubtful 
point  and  did  not  grant  the  writ ;  but 
the  deposition  of  the  prisoner  taken 
in  chancery  was  read  by  consent. 

1  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  312.  See  Evans 
V.  Rees,  12  Ad.  &  El.  55;  Hammond  v. 
Stewart,  1  Strange,  510. 

-  Ex  parte  Marmaduke,  91  Mo.  228, 
23(J. 

^  United  States  v.  Barefield,  23  Fed. 
Rep.  136. 

*  Accordingly,  where,  in  a  trial  of 
an  issue  m  a  divorce  case,  the  re- 
spondent, the  father,  had  been  served 
With  a  habeas  corpus  ad  tesUficandum, 


directing  him  to  produce  the  two 
daughters  of  the  parties  who  were  at 
school  in  Boston,  and  he  made  re- 
turn that  the  children  had  been  sent 
to  the  school  more  than  six  months  be- 
fore, and  that  the  libellant.  the  mother, 
had  visited  them  there  and  had  free 
access  to  them, —  it  was  held  that,  as 
the  libellant  knew  of  the  whereabouts 
of  the  children  and  could  have  taken 
their  depositions  under  a  commission, 
she  had  been  guilty  of  laches  in  not 
doing  so,  and  could  not  obtain  a  con- 
tinuance of  the  cause  because  of  their 
absence;  that  the  writ  of  habeas  cor- 
pus ad  testificandum  had  been  improvi- 
dently  issued,  and  could  not,  there- 
fore, be  enforced ;  that  the  witnesses, 
not  having  been  sent  away  by  the  fa- 
ther to  avoid  service  of  the  subpoena, 
and  being  at  the  time  of  the  applica- 
tion, and  for  several  months  before, 
in  another  State,  could  not  be  brought 
in  under  this  writ  without  their  con- 
sent. Koecker  v.  Koecker,  7  Phila. 
364,  before  Paxson,  J. 


180  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION   OF   TRIAL.        [1  Tliomp.  Tl'., 

§  175.  Subpoena  Duces  Tecum, — The  ordinary  process  for 
compelling  the  production  of  books  and  papers  which  are  neces- 
sary to  be  used  in  evidence  upon  a  trial  or  other  judicial  examin- 
ation, is  a  subpoena  duces  tecum.  This  is  usually  the  ordinary 
subpoena  with  an  additional  clause  to  the  following  effect:  "  And 
also,  that  you  diligently  and  carefully  search  for,  examine,  and 
inquire  after,  and  bring  with  you  and  produce  at  the  time,  and 
place  aforesaid,  a  bill  of  exchange,  dated,"  etc.  [here  describing 
with  precision  the  papers  and  documents  to  be  produced],  "  to- 
gether with  all  copies,  drafts  and  vouchers,  relating  to  said  doc- 
uments, and  all  other  documents,  letters,  and  papers,  writings 
whatsoever,  that  can  or  may  afford  any  information  or  evidence 
in  said  cause ;  then  and  there  to  testify  and  show  all  and  singu- 
larly those  things  which  you  (or  either  of  you)  know  or  the  said 
documents,  letters  or  instruments  in  writing  do  import,  of  and 
concerning  the  said  cause  now  depending.  And  this  you  (or  any 
of  you)  shall  in  no  wise  omit,"  etc.^  It  has  been  held  that  unless 
the  subpoena  contain  the  words  "  to  testify,"  it  will  not  support 
further  compulsory  process  against  the  witness ;  since  the  power 
of  the  court  to  compel  the  witness  to  attend  at  all,  is  based  upon 
the  assumption  that  his  testimony  is  material  to  a  case  in  court. ^ 
Particularity  is  required  in  describing  the  documents  which  the 
witness  is  required  to  produce.  Thus,  a  subpoena  to  produce  all 
the  dispatches  received  at  a  certain  telegraph  office  between  the 
6th  and  20th  days  of  the  month,  is  too  general.'^  So,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  subpoena  requiring  a  solicitor  to  produce  all  his  books, 
papers,  etc.,  relating  to  all  dealings  between  him  and  a  party  to 
the  suit  during  a  term  of  thirty-three  years,  is  too  vague.*  But 
''  the  papers  are  required  to  be  stated  or  specified  only  with 
that  degree  of  certainty  which  is  practicable,  considering  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  so  that  the  witness  may  know  what  is 
wanted  of  him,  and  may  have  the  papers  at  the  trial  so  that  they 
can  be  used,   if  the  court  shall  then  determine  them  to  be  com- 

»  Araey  v.  Long,  9  East,  473;  3  Chit.  ^  United  States  v.  Hunter,    15  Fed. 

Geu.,  Prac.   830,  note;    1  Greeul.    Ev.,  Rep.  712. 
§  309.  4  Lee  v.  Angas,  L.  R.  2  Eq.  59. 

^  Murray  v.  Elstou,  2i5  X.  J.  Kq.  212. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       181 

petent  and  relevant  evidence."  ^  There  is,  of  course,  some  limit 
to  the  tiling  which  the  witness  can  be  compelled  under  such  a 
writ  to  produce.  It  has  been  held  in  a  patent  case  that  he  could 
not  be  thus  compelled  to  bring  before  the  court  the  patterns  of  a 
stove?  It  was  held  in  an  early  case  in  Pennsjdvania  that  a 
subpoena  duces  tecum  would  not  lie  to  compel  a  party,  residing  at 
a  great  distance  from  court,  to  produce  in  court  certain  news- 
papers containing  advertisements  of  the  sale  of  unseated  lands 
for  taxes ;  the  court  reasoning  that  if  the  party  applying  for  the 
process  desired  the  benefit  of  the  newspapers,  it  behooved  him  to 
produce  them  or  get  them  the  best  way  he  could. ^  Moreover,  if 
books  or  papers  are  brought  into  court  under  a  subpoena  duces  te- 
cum, a  party  who  withdraios  them  from  the  court  and  restores 
them  to  their  original  custody,  is  guilty  of  a  contempt  of  court 
and  may  be  punished  for  so  doing.*  A  witness  will  not  be  pun- 
ished for  contempt  for  failing  to  produce  books  and  papers  in  a 
case  pending  before  a  referee,  where  it  appears  from  his  afiidavit 
that  he  has  not  had  reasonable  time  within  which  to  procure  and 
produce  them.^  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  a  pub- 
lic ofiicer, —  the  surveyor-general  of  the  State,  —  is  guilty  of 
contempt  if  he  refuses  to  furnish  copies  of  official  records  in  obe- 
dience to  a  subpoena  duces  tecum,  though  applied  to  for  this  pur- 
pose after  office  hours.^ 

§  176.  [Continued.]  May  be  used  for  obtaining  a  Dis- 
covery. —  The  use  of  the  subpxjena  duces  tecum  is  regulated  to 
such  an  extent  by  local  statutes  that  it  would  be  unsafe  to  at- 
tempt any  extended  exposition  of  the  practice  under  it  in  this 
country,  without  a  very  minute  examination.  One  idea  concern- 
ing it  seems  to  be  that  it  is  not  to  be  used  as  a  means  of  obtain- 
ing a  discovery  of   evidence    in  the  possession  of  the   opposite 

1  United  States  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  *  Com.  v.  Brayuard,  Thach.  Cr. 
(U.  S.)  5G6,  568,  per  Dillon,  J.  Cas.  146,  155. 

2  Re  Shepherd,  18  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  ^  Heerdt  v.  Wetmore,  2  Rob.  (N.  Y.) 
225.  697. 

'  Shippen's     Lesee      v.     Wells,   2  ^  Delaney  v.   Regulators,  1  Yeates 

Yeates  (Pa.),  2G0.  (Pa.),  403. 


182 


CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF   TRIAL.       [1  Thomp.  Tr., 


party  .^  But  this  cannot  be  stated  with  much  confidence,  especially 
in  view  of  recent  statutes  rendering  parties  competent  as  wit- 
nesses ;  for  we  find  that  it  has  been  ruled  that  a  subpoena  duces 
tecum  must  in  all  cases  be  issued  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
profert  of  books  and  papers;  and  that,  upon  taking  conditionally 
the  testimony  of  a  witness,  whether  a  party  to  the  action  or  not, 
he  may  be  required,  by  such  a  subpoena,  to  produce  any  books  or 
papers  specified  in  the  writ,  and,  for  disobedience,  is  guilty  of 
contempt  and  also  liable  in  damages  to  any  party  aggrieved 
thereby.^  It  is  held  that  it  may  issue  to  compel  the  president 
and  secretary  of  a  corporation  to  produce  books  and  papers  of 
the  corporation  in  a  suit  in  equity  to  which  the  corporation  is 
not  a  party.^ 


1  Smith  V.  McDonald,  50  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  519;  Campbell  v.  Johnsou,  3 
Del.  Ch.  94. 

2  Central  Nat.  Bank  v.  Arthur,  2 
Sweeny  (N.  Y.),  194;  Trotter  v.  Lat- 
son,  7  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  261.  Mott  v. 
Consumers  Ice  Co.,  52  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  244;  Murray  v.  Elston,  23  N. 
J.  Eq.  212.  As  to  the  proper  proceed- 
ing where  the  witness  appears  but 
neglects  to  produce  the  books  or  pa- 
pers, see  O'Toole's  Estate,  1  Tuck. 
(N.  Y.)  (Surr.)  39.  Where,  in  an  ac- 
tion for  ejectment  against  a  gi'antee, 
his  loarrantor,  though  not  nominally 
a  party,  employed  counsel  to  defend 
the  case,  and  placed  in  his  hands  a 
deed  to  be  used  in  the  litigation,  it 
was  held  that  the  paper  was  legally  in 
the  custody  of  the  warrantor  and  must 
be  produced  under  such  a  subpoena. 
Steed  V.  Cruise,  70  Ga.  168.  It  is  no 
answer  to  such  a  writ  that  the  books 
and  {)apers  are  private  property  of  the 
witness,  nor  is  it  necessary  that  the 
subpoena  should  declare  them  material 
to  the  investigation.  Re  Dunn,  9  Mo. 
App.  255. 

3  Wertheim  v.  Continental  &c.  Co., 
21  Blatchf.  ^U.  S.)  246.    Contra,  Boor- 


man  V.  Atlantic  &c.  R.  Co.,  17  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  555;  Central  Nat.  Bank  v. 
AVhite,  37  N.  Y.  Super.  297.  In  the 
view  of  other  courts,  the  statute  af- 
fords ample  means  of  compelling  a 
corporation  to  produce  its  books 
under  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  in  like 
manner  as  in  the  case  of  a  natural 
person.  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  § 
8G8;  Central  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Twenty- 
third  Street  R.  Co.,  53  How.  Pr.  45. 
On  the]  contrary,  it  has  been  laid 
down  in  New  York  that,  even  in  case 
of  an  action  in  which  a  corporation  is 
a  party,  the  production  of  its  books 
cannot  be  enforced  by  subpoena  duces 
tecum,  served  on  its  officers;  it  can 
only  be  effected  by  way  of  discovery  un- 
der the  provisions  of  the  statutes.  (2 
Rev.  Stats.  New  York,  199;  Wait's 
New  York  Code  of  Procedure,  1871, 
§388  Throop's  Code,  1877,  §803;  La 
Farge  v.  La  Farge  Ins.  Co.,  14  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  26;Opdyke  v.  Marble,  44  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  64) ;  and  the  exercise  of  this 
power  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the 
court.  As  to  the  books  of  a  corpora- 
tion, not  a  party  to  the  action,  no  such 
power  of  enforcing  an  examination  or 
production  of  them  on  a  trial  between 


Tit.  II,  Cb,  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.       183 

§  177.  [Continued.]  Witness  wlien  privileged  against  the 
Writ.  —  The  command  of  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  is  sometimes 
met  by  the  claim  of  absolute  privilege;  and  where  the  chiim  is 
well  founded,  the  person  to  whom  the  subpoena  is  directed  will 
be  justified  in  disobeying  it,  and  if  he  is  thereafter  committed 
for  the  supposed  contempt,  he  will  be  entitled  to  be  discharged 
by  habeas  coipus.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  an  attachment 
will  not  be  awarded  against  an  attorney  for  refusing  to  obey  a 
subpoena  duces  tecum,  to  appear  before  a  grand  jur}^  with  vouch- 
ers which  have  been  intrusted  to  him  b}^  his  client  in  confidence, 
which  vouchers  contain  evidence  of  a  forgery  committed  by  his 
client.^  In  such  circumstances,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  attorney, 
immediatel}''  on  receiving  the  subpoena,  to  deliver  up  the  papers 
to  his  client. 2  This  subject  is  merely  suggested  here,  and  is  dis- 
cussed hereafter.^ 

§  178.  Actions  against   Witnesses    for   Non-attendance.  — 

Statutes  exist  imposing  penalties  upon  witnesses  for  non-attend- 
ance, to  be  recovered  by  the  parties  on  whose  behalf  they  have 
been  subpoenaed.  It  has  been  held  that,  in  order  to  recover  the 
penalty  denounced  by  such  a  statute,  it  must  be  shown  that  the 
witness  was  a  material  witness,  and  tiiat  damages  resulted  from 
his  non-attendance.*  Under  some  systems,  the  party  summon- 
ing the  witness  also  ma}'  have  an  action  for  damages  against  the 

other  parties  is  afforded ;  nor  can  its  tlie  defendant  had  left  an  infant  with 

agents  or  officers,  in  their  individual  such  hospital,  the   result  of  an  illicit 

capacity,  be  compelled  to  discover  or  sexual   intercourse  with  a  third  per- 

produce  the   books  of  a  corporation  son,  was  denied.     Morgan  v.  Morgan, 

over  which  they  have  not  an  absolute  siqyra.     Whether  these  decisions  are 

control   and  right  of    disposition   at  law  in  that  State   at  the  pi'esent  time, 

their  own  will  and  discretion.     Mor-  the     writer    does    not    undertake    to 

gan    V.   Morgan,  16  Abb.   Pr.    (x.  s.)  say. 

'291,  295.     See   Opdyke  v.  Marble,  su-  ^  Rex  v.  Dixon,  3  Burr.  1G87. 

pra.     Accordingly,  a  motion  for  an  at-  ^  Ibid. 

tachment  against  the  chief  officers  of  ^  Post,  Ch.  XII. 

a.  foundling   hospital,  to  compel  them  *  Carrington  v.   Hutson,    28    Hun 

to  produce  upon  the  hearing,  before  a  (N.  Y.),  371.     See    also    Courtney  v. 

referee,  of  an  action   for   divorce,  the  Baker,  3  Denio    (N.  Y.),  27.     This   is 

books  of  the  hospital,  for  the  purpose  required  by  the  Texas   statute.     Mc- 

of  disclosing  the   supposed  fact  that  Gehee  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  94. 


184  CONTROL    AND   REGULATION    OF   TRIAL.       [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 

witness ;  ^  but  here  it  must  likewise  appear  that  his  testimony 
was  material  and  necessary  to  prove  the  case  of  the  party  re- 
quiring his  attendance.^  But  in  order  to  sustain  such  an  action, 
it  is  necessary  to  prove  that  the  fees  of  the  witnesss  for  travel 
and  attendance  were  duly  paid  or  tendered  according  to  the  re- 
quirements of  the  statute ;  it  is  not  sufficient  to  prove  a  loaiver 
on  the  part  of  the  witness  of  his  right  to  such  fees.-^  Under 
some  systems  the  penalty  does  not  go  to  the  injured  party,  but 
is  in  the  nature  of  a  fine  imposed  on  the  witness  by  way  of  pun- 
ishment.* Under  the  Tennessee  statute,  the  penalty  can  only  be 
recovered  in  the  name,  and  to  the  use  of  the  State,^  In  order 
to  recover  such  a  penalty  there  must  have  been  a  substantial 
compliance  with  the  statute  in  the  matter  of  summoning  the 
witness.^  Such  a  statute  has  been  regarded  as  penal  and  to  be 
strictly  pursued,  for  which  reason  a  judgment  nisi  for  any  sum,  — - 
even  a  less  sum,  —  than  therein  prescribed,  has  been  held  a  nul- 
lity.^ Under  some  systems,  defaulting  witnesses  are  liable  to 
summary  proceedings  for  punishment.^ 

§  179.    Striking  out  the  Answer  of  a  Defendant  who  fails 
to  appear.  —  Under  some  statutes,  if  the  defendant,  duly  sum- 

1  McCall  V.  Butterworth,  8  la.  329;  *  Maclin  v.  Wilson,  21  Ala.  670, 
Hurd  V.  Swan,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.),  75.  ^  Nelson  v.  Ewell,  2  Swan  (Tenn.), 

2  It  Is  an  answer,  as  well  to  a  com-  271.    As    to  forfeitures  against   wit- 
mon-law  action  against  a  witness,  as  nesses  who  have  been  put  under   re- 
to  a  proceeding  to  punish  him  for  con-  cognizance,   see   State  v.  Herudon,  1 
tempt    for    neglecting    to    attend    in  Murph.  (N.  C.)  2G9.     See,  as  to  stat- 
obedience   to  a  subpoena  served  upon  ute     forfeitures    against    witnesses, 
him,  that  he  knows  nothing  material  State  v.  Thomas,  11  Lea  (Tenn.),  113 
to  the  issue;  or,  if  it  were  a  suhpcena  Duke  v.  Given,  4  Yerg.  (Tenn.)    478 
duces  tecum,  that  he  has  not  any  docu-  State  v.   Butler,  8    Yerg.  (Tenn.)  83 
ment  such  as  he  is  called  upon  to  pro-  State  v.  Dill,   2  Sneed    (Tenn.),   414 
duce,  material  and  necessary  as  evi-  Kincaid   v.  Rogers,  3   Sneed    (Tenn  ) 
dence  tending  to  prove  the  case  of  the  1 ;  Mattocks  v.  "Wheatou,  10  Vt.  493 
party  requiring  his  attendance.     Mor-  Kiuzey  v.  King,  G  Ired.  (N.  C.)  70. 
gan  V.  Morgan,  k;  Abb.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  (N.  «  Durden  v.  State,  32  Ala.  579.     See 
Y.)  291.     Compare  Courtney  v.  Baker,  also  Mattocks  v.  Wheaton,  10  Vt.  493. 
3  Denio  (N.  Y.),  27,  30,  31,  and   cases  '  State  v.   Dill,  2   Sneed    (Tenn.), 
cited.  414. 

3  McKeon  t?.  Lane,  1  Hall  (N.  Y.),  «  bobbins    v.   Gorham,    25    N.    Y. 
319.  588. 


Tit.   II,  Ch.   VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  "VVIT^ESSEt.v.       185 

moned  as  a  witness,  fails  to  appear  and    testify,  the  court    may 
strike  out  his  answer  and  give  judgment  for  the  plaintiff.^ 

§  ISO.  Interfering  witli  Witnesses. — Tampering  with  wit- 
nesses, attempting  to  bribe  them,  or  to  dissuade  them  from  at- 
tending and  testifying,  is  not  only  a  contempt  of  court,  but  a 
misdemeanor  at  common  law  and  punishable  by   indictment. ^ 

§  181.  Refusing  to  Appear  before  Commissioners,  Exam- 
iners, Notaries.  — The  process  for  compelling  the  attendance  of 
witnesses  and  their  answers  to  questions,  before  examiners, 
notaries,  commissioners  or  other  officers,  is  too  wide  a  question 
for  general  discussion  in  a  work  of  this  kind.  Nothing  can  be 
done  beyond  suggesting  certain  lines  of  inquiry.  In  the  first 
place,  it  should  be  observed  that  the  subject  is  very  much  con- 
trolled by  local  statutes.  For  instance,  we  find  that  it  has  been 
laid  down  in  Pennsylvania  that  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  wit- 
ness to  appear  before  an  examiner  in  obedience  to  a  subpoena  is 
not  a  contempt  of  the  court  in  which  the  proceeding  is  pending, 
in  which  his  testimony  was  to  be  used,  but  a  contempt  of  the 
process  of  the  law,  for  which  the  examiner  is  entrusted  by  the 
law  with  power  to  punish  liim.^  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  in 
Wisconsin,  as  a  rule  under  the  statute  of  that  State,*  as  well  as 
at  common  law,  that  the  circuit  court  of  any  county  may  punish 
as  for  a  criminal  contempt  a  person  who,  subpoenaed  to  testify 
in  an  action  pending  in  such  court,  before  a  court  commissioner 
in  another  county,  disobeys  the  summons  or  refuse  to  be  sworn 
or  to  answer.^  It  has  been  laid  down  that  the  same  rules  must 
be  applied  in  determining  the  propriety  of  compelling  a  witness 
to  answer  a  particular  question,  on  his  examination  de  bene  esse 
before  a  commissioner  of  the  Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States, 
under  section  thirty  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789,  which  govern 
the  court  in  the  examination  of  a  witness   on  a  trial  before  a 


1  Snyder  V.  Raab,  40  Mo.  166;  Hew-  ^  Corn.  v.  Newton,  1    Grant's   Cas. 

lett  V.  Brown,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  655.  (Pa.)  453. 

'  Com.      V.     Reynolds,     14      Gray  ^  R.  S.  Wis.,  §  3477. 

(Mass.) ,  87.  5  state  v.  Lonsdale,  48  Wis.  348,  365 


186  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

court;  and  accordingly,  that  an  attachment  will  not  be  granted 
against  a  witness  for  contempt  in  refusing  to  answer  questions 
before  such  a  commissioner  on  the  taking  of  a  deposition  de  bene 
esse,  unless  the  materiality  of  the  evidence  sought  to  be  elicited 
is  shown.  In  so  holding  Mr.  District  Judge  Betts  said :  "  I  see  no 
reason  why  any  more  stringent  obligation  should  be  imposed  upon  a 
witness  in  these  outside  examinations  than  is  enforced  in  court. 
Before  the  court  w^ill  adjudge  a  witness  to  be  in  contempt,  or  com- 
mit him  therefor,  it  will  require  more  than  proof  of  the  fact  that 
he  declines  to  respond  to  a  question.  It  will  inquire  whether  the 
question  is  relevant  and  material  to  the  case  on  hearing,^  and  also 
whether  the  witness  is  exempt  from  answering  it.  No  contu- 
macy can  be  imputed  to  him  until  these  points  are  determined."  ^ 

§  183.  Refusing  to  attend  or  testify  before  Municipal 
Boards,  Committees,  etc.  —  A  statute  of  A^-^isconsin,^  empowers 
courts  of  record  to  punish  for  conteinjjt  witnesses  who  refuse  to 
attend  and  give  evidence  before  municipal  boards,  committees, 
etc.^  A  similar  statute  formerly  existed  in  New  York  City,^  un- 
der which  it  has  been  held  that  an  attachment  ^\'\\\  not  be  granted 
against  a  witness  subpcenaed  to  attend  and  testify  before  a  com- 
mittee of  the  New  York  Common  Council,  unless  it  satisfacto- 
rily appears  to  the  judge  to  whom  the  application  is  made:  (1) 
That  the  w^itness  refused  to  obey  a  subpoena  issued  by  the  clerk; 
or  (2)  that,  on  appearing,  he  refused  to  be  sworn  as  a  witness; 
or  (3)  that, after  being  sworn,  he  refused  to  answer  some  question 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  judge,  was  a  question  proper  to  be 
put.  Therefore,  wdiere  the  witness  attended  pursuant  to  the 
subpoena  and  submitted  to  be  sworn,  and  then  stated  that  he  de- 
clined generally  to  answer  any  questions,  and  none  were  put  to 
him  by  the  committee,  an  attachment  was  refused.® 

1  Citing  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  319.  N.  Y.  1855,  p.  24,  chap.  20  (local  to  the 

2  Ke  Judson,  3  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  148.  city  of  New    York)  ;  repealed  by  the 

3  R.  S.  Wis.  §  4066.  N.  Y.  Laws  of  1860,  chap.  39;   IE.  S. 
*  See   State  v.   Lonsdale,   48  Wis.  N.  Y.  1882,  p.  921. 

348,  363;  and  compare  Stuart  v.  Allen,  «  Biggs  v.  Matsell,  2  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 

45AVis.  158.  Y.)  156. 

5  N.  Y.  Act  of  Feb.  8th,  1855;  Laws 


Tit.  TI,  Ch.  VI.]  COMPULSORY  process  against  witnesses.     187 

§  183.  Refusing  to  give  Deposition  to  be  used  in  Foreign 
Court.  —  Construing  a  statute,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin 
say;  "The  law  which  compels  the  citizens  of  this  State  to 
give  testimony  in  such  cases  is  founded  in  comity^  and  such  tes- 
timony is,  so  to  speak,  extra-judicial  as  to  our  courts.  A  wit- 
ness who  unhiwfully  refuses  to  testify  in  a  foreign  cause, 
although  he  violates  a  penal  law  and  is  liable  to  be  punished 
therefor,  commits  no  contempt  of  any  court  of  this  State."  ^ 

§  184.   Power  to  Compel  answer  before  Grand.  Jury. — As 

already  suggested,^  courts  of  criminal  jurisdiction,  which  have 
power  to  impanel  grand  juries,  have  inherent  power  to  com- 
pel witnesses  summoned  to  appear  before  such  grand  juries, 
to  answer  proper  questions  propounded  to  them  by  such  bodies.^ 
A  grand  jury  falls  within  the  designation  of  ''  persons  appointed 
under  the  authority  of  the  court,  to  take  depositions  or  testi- 
mony," within  the  meaning  of  a  statute  empowering  courts  to 
compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses  in  such  cases.*  \^'here  a 
witness  is  committed  for  contempt  in  refusing  to  produce  cer- 
tain papers  before  a  grand  jury,  in  obedience  to  an  order  of  the 
court  in  the  nature  of  a  subpoena  duces  tecum ^  the  commitment 
reciting  that  he  shall  remain  in  custody  till  "  purged  of  contempt 
by  appearing  before  the  grand  jury  and  furnishing  to  them  the 
paper  or  papers  required  by  them,"  —  he  is  entitled  to  his  dis- 
charge upon  habeas  corpus,  from  such  commitment,  upon  the 
discharge  of  the  grand  jury  ;  for  this  circumstance  renders  obe- 
dience to  the  subpoena  duces  tecum  impossible ;  and  if  he  were 
not  entitled  to  his  discharge  upon  the  happening  of  this  event, 
he  would  be  doomed  to  perpetual  imprisonment.^ 

1  State  V.  Lonsdale,  48  Wis.  348,  grand  jury  to  cowceaZAiiwse//,  in  order 
365.  to  prevent  the  service  of  the  process, 

2  Ante,  §  1G8.  has  been  held,  under  a  statute,  not  a 
^  People  V.  Fancher,  4  Thomp.  &  C.      contempt  such  as  could  be  punished 

(N.  Y.)  467,470;  People  v.  Kelly,  24  in  a  summary  manner.     Com.  v.  Des- 

N.  Y.   74;    Heard  v.  Pierce,   8  Cush.  kins,   4  Leigh   (Va.),   685.     But  this 

(Mass.)  338.     So  by  statute  in  Mis-  would  seem  to  be  a  contempt  of  court 

soui'i:  Ward  v.  State,  2  Mo.  120.  upon  common-law  principles. 

MYard?;.  State,  swpm.     For  a  vrit-  ^  e^  parte  Maulsby,    13  Md.   625, 

ness  summoned    to  attend   before    a  641,  App. 


188 


CONTROL   AND    REGULATION    OF  TRIAL.       [1  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  185.  Protection  of  Witnesses  against  Arrest  and  Service  of 
Process.  —  Moreover,  it  is  to  be  observed  tliat  the  court  has  pow- 
er, at  common  law,  to  protect  witnesses  and  parties  from  arrest  on 
civil  process  during  their  attendance,  and  for  a  reasonable  time 
ingoing  and  returning,  —  eundo^  morando,  et  redeundo;^  and 
this  whether  they  attend  under  the  compulsion  of  a  subpcena  or 
voluntarily,  or  whether  or  not  they  have  obtained  a  writ  of  pro- 
tection.^  According  to  early  conceptions,  the  privilege  extended 
only  to  exemption  from  arrest,  but  not  to  the  mere  service  of  a 
summons,  —  a  distinction  not  of  much  importance  at  a  time 
when  civil  actions  were  ordinarily  commenced  by  the  issuing  of  a 
capias;^  but  later  views  incline  to  extend  it  to  immunity  from 
the  service  of  all  process.* 

§  186.  Privilege  of  Member  of  Congress.  —  The  constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  declares  that  ' '  the  senators  and  repre- 


1  1  Greenl.    Ev.,    §  316;    Palmer  v. 
Rowan    (Neb.),   32    N.  W.    Rep.   210 
(where  numerous  authorities  are  col- 
lected by  Maxwell,  C.  J.)  ;  Thompson's 
Case,  122  Mass.  428.     See  also  Lar- 
ned     V.   Griffin,    12   Fed.    Rep.     590 
Ex    parte    Levy,   28   Eed.    Rep.    651 
Atchison  v.  Morris,  11  Fed.  Rep.  582 
Plimpton  V.  Wiuslow,  9  Fed.  Rep.  365 
Bridges  v.  Sheldon,  7  Fed.  Rep.  19 
Brooks  V.   FarTvell,  4  Fed.  Rep.  166 
Parker  v.  Hotchkiss,  1  Wall.  Jr.  269. 

2  Walpole  V.  Alexander,  3  Doug. 
45;  Meekius  v.  Smith,  1  H.  B.  L.  686; 
Arding  v.  Flower,  8  Term  R.  534; 
Spence  v.  Stuart,  3  East,  89;  Ex  parte 
Byne,  1  Ves.  &  B.  316;  Persse  v. 
Persse,  5  H.  L.  Gas.  671;  McNeil's 
Case,  6  Mass.  245;  Wood  v.  Neale,  5 
Gray  (Mass.),  538;  May  v.  Shumway, 
16  Gray  (Mass.),  86;  Gray,  J.,  in 
Thompson's  Case,  supra. 

3  Blight  V.  Fisher,  Pet.  C.  C.  41; 
Hunter  v.  Cleveland,  1  Brev.  167;  Taft 
V.  Hoppin,  Anth.  N.  P.  255;  Booraem 
V.Wheeler,  12  Vt.  311. 

*  Mitchell  V.  Huron  Circuit  .Tudge, 
53  Mich.  541 ;  s.  c.  sub  nom.  Mitchell  v. 


Wixon,  19  N.  W.  Rep.  176;  Compton  v. 
Wilder,  40  Ohio  St.  130.  See,  as  to 
the  nature  and  extent  of  the  immunity 
and  the  reasons  which  support  it. 
Morris  v.  Beach,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  294; 
Sanford  v.  Chase,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  381; 
Hopkins  V.  Coburn,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
292;  Seaver  v.  Robinson,  3  Duer  (N. 
Y.),  622;  Merrill  v.  George,  23  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  331;  Matthews  v.  Tufts, 
87  N.  Y.  568,  570;  Huddeson  v.  Prizer, 
9  Phila.  (Pa.)  65;  Dungan  v.  Miller, 
37  N.  J.  Law,  182 ;  Vincent  v.  Watson, 
1  Rich.  194;  Saddler  v.  Ray,  5  Rich.  L, 
(S.  C.)  523;  Martin  v.  Ramsey,  7 
Humph.  (Tenu.)  260;  Dickenson's 
Case,  3  Har.  (Del.)  517;  Hanegar  v. 
Spangler,  29  Ga.  217;  May  v.  Shum- 
way,  16  Gray  (Mass.),  86 ;  Thompson's 
Case,  122  Mass.  428 ;  Ballinger  v.  El- 
liott, 72  N.  C.  596 ;  Parker  v.  Hotch- 
kiss, 1  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)  269 ;  Juneau 
Bank  v.  McSpedou,  5Biss.  64;  Arding 
V.  Flower,  8  Term  R.  534;  Newton  v. 
Askew,  6  Hare,  310;  Persse  v.  Persse, 
5  H.  L.  Cas.  671.  See  also  In  re  Can- 
non, 47  Mich.  481,  11  N.  W.  Rep.  280. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VI.]    COMPULSORY  PROCESS  AGAINST  WITNESSES.      189 

sentatives  shall,  in  all  cases  except  treason,  felony  and  breach  of 
the  peace,  be  privileged  from  arrest  during  their  attendance  at 
the  sessions  of  their  respective  houses,  and  in  going  to  or  return- 
ing from  the  same."  ^  It  has  been  said:  "  There  is  no  ambiguity  in 
these  expressions;  they  convey  precise  and  definite  ideas.  The 
privilege  secured  to  the  members  of  both  houses  is  freedom  from 
arrest.  It  cannot  be  asserted  that  the  service  of  a  subpcena  is  an 
arrest.  It  is  a  mere  notice  to  the  party  to  appear  and  give  testi- 
mony. But  it  is  certain  that,  unless  a  court  can  constitutionally 
enforce  the  attendance  of  a  witness  under  a  subpoena,  it  will  be 
of  little  avail  to  issue  that  process  to  a  reluctant  witness.  And 
this  necessarily  leads  to  the  inquiry  whether  an  attachment  can 
issue  against  a  senator  or  representative  in  Congress,  neglecting 
or  refusing  to  attend  in  consequence  of  a  subpoena  properly 
served?  On  the  most  mature  reflection,  I  am  of  opinion  that 
the  court  may  either  grant  or  refuse  such  compulsory  process, 
according  to  existing  circumstances.  That  the  service  of  an  at- 
tachment for  a  contempt  includes  an  arrest  there  can  be  little 
doubt ;  and  it  cannot  be  said  that  such  contempt  is  either  treason, 
felony  or  breach  of  the  peace.  But  the  })rivilege  is  confined  to 
the  periods  of  the  members'  attendance  at  the  sessions  of  their 
respective  houses,  going  to  or  returning  from  the  same.  If  a 
member  should  neglect  his  duty  by  not  attending  the  session  of 
Congress,  or  should  desert  it  without  leave,  he  is  no  more  en- 
titled to  the  privilege  in  such  circumstances  from  arrest  than  a 
mere  private  citizen.  The  court,  however,  will  not  presume  a 
dereliction  of  duty  unless  it  is  established  by  satisfactory  proof ; 
they  will  construe  the  privilege  liberally,  and  by  no  means  weigh 
the  absence  of  the  member  in  scales  too  nice.  Should  it  appear 
to  them  that  he  is  on  his  return  to  Congress,  they  will  at  once 
refuse  the  attachment."  ^ 

§   187.   Refusing  to  be  sworn  on  the  Ground  of  Conscien- 
tious Scruples.  — A  Jew  refusmg  to  be  sworn  on  Saturday,  was 

1  Const.  U.  S.,  art.  1,  §  6.  pare  U.  S.  v.  Cooper,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.) 

2  Respublica    v.  Duaue,    4    Yeates      341. 
(Pa.),  347,  348,  per  Yeates,  J.     Com- 


190      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp,  Tr., 

fined  ten  pounds  for  contempt,  but,  the  defendant  afterwards 
waiving  the  benefit  of  his  testimony,  he  was  discharged  from  the 
fine.^  One  who,  not  being  a  Quaker,  was  called  as  a  witness  and 
refused  to  be  sworn,  on  the  ground  of  conscientious  scruples,  but 
offered  to  a-fflrm,  was  committed  for  contempt,  —  the  liberty  to 
afiirm  being  strictly  confined  to  Quakers  by  the  laws  and  practice 
of  Massachusetts  then  existing.^ 

1  Stansbury  v.  Marks,  2  Dall.  (Pa.)  2  u.  S.  v.  Coolidge,  2  Gall.  (U.  S.) 

313.  364,  before  Mr.  Justice  Story. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VII.]    STIPULATIONS    AND    ADMISSIONS.  191 


CHAPTER     VII. 

ENFORCING  THE  STIPULATIONS  AND  ADMISSIONS  OF  COUNSEL. 

Section 

190.  Extent  of  Authority  of  Attorney  in  Management  of  Cause. 

191.  [Continued.]     What  he  may  do. 

192.  [Continued.]     What  he  may  not  do. 

193.  Binding  Nature  of  his  Stipulations. 

191.  Setting  aside  and  relieving  against  such  Stipulations. 

195.  [Illustration.]     Agreement  that  several  Causes  shall  abide  the  Event  of 

One. 

196.  [Further  Illustrations.]     That  the  opposite  Party  may  take  Judgment. 

197.  [Further  Illustrations.]     Admissions  in  the  Pleadings. 

198.  Admissions  and  Agreements  of  State's  Attorney. 

199.  Stipulation  cannot  confer  Jurisdiction. 

200.  Verbal  Stipulations,  how  far  Binding. 

201.  Solemnity  and  Formality  required  in  Admissions  of  Counsel. 
•  202.  Interpretation  of  Various  Stipulations  and  Agreements. 

§  190.  Extent  of  Authority  of  Attorney  in  Management  of 
Cause. — "While  a  geueral  retainer  to  collect  a  debt  or  to  conduct 
a  cause  does  not,  except  under  extraordinary  circumstances,  en- 
able the  attorney  to  bind  his  client  by  a  compromise  entered  in- 
to with  the  opposite  party, ^  yet  he  has  general  power  to  make 

1  Jones  V.  Inness,  32  Kan.  177;  Kel-  Rep,  2G1 ;  Levy  v.  Brown,  5G  Miss.  83; 
\y  V.  Wright,  65  Wis.  236;  Roberts?;.  Picket  v.  Merchants'  Nat.  Bank,  32 
Nelson,  22  Mo.  App.  28;  Walden  v.  Ark.  346;  Maudeville  v.  Reynolds,  68 
Boulten,  55  Mo.  405;  Spears  v.  Leder-  N,  Y,  528;  Wadhams^J,  Gay,  73111,  415; 
gerber,  56  Mo.  465;  Ambrose  v.  Mc-  People  d.  Quick,  92  111,  580;  Holker  v. 
Donald,  53  Cal,  28;  Preston  17,  Hill,  Parker,  7  Cranch  (U,  S.),  436,  The 
50  Cal,  43;  Township  v.  Keller,  100  Pa,  English  courts,  after  some  vacillation, 
St.  105;  s.  c.  43  Am.  Rep.  42;  Hus-  seem  to  have  settled  upon  the  view 
ton  v.  Mitchell,  14  Serg.  «&  R.  (Pa.)  307;  that  the  attorney  has  power,  by  virtue 
Stackhouse  v.  O'Hara,  14  Pa.  St.  88;  of  his  retainer,  to  compromise  the  ac- 
Stokely  v.  Robinson,  34  Pa.  St.  315;  tiou  in  which  he  is  retained,  provided 
Mackey  v.  Adair,  99  Pa.  St.  143;  Ham-  he  acts  bonafida  and  reasonably,  and 
rich  V.  Combs,  14  Neb.  381;  Robinson  does  not  violate  the  positive  instruc- 
ts. Murphy,  69  Ala,  543;  Herriman  v.  tious  of  his  client,  and  that  the  com- 
Shomau,  24    Kan,    387;  s,    c,  36  Am.  promise  will  bind  the  client  even  if  he 


192 


CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  TllOmp.  Tr.. 


such  engagements  and  stipulation  in  or  out  of  court  as  lie  may 
deem  proper  in  the  conduct  of  the  litigation/  and  where  they  are 
entered  into  without  fraud  or  collusion,  they  will  bind  his  client.'' 
In  short,  according  to  Dr.  Greenleaf,  "  the  effect  of  a  retainer 
to  prosecute  or  defend  a  suit,  is  to  confer  upon  the  attorney 
all  the  powers  exercised  by  the  forms  and  usages  of  the  court 
in  which  the  suit  is  pending."  ^ 

§  191.    [Continued.]     What  lie  may  do.  —  He  may  agree  to 
submit  the  matter  in  controversy  to  arbitration ;  ^  or  not  to  take 


does  violate  instructions,  unless  the 
violation  is  known  to  the  adverse  par- 
ty, —  the  reason  being  that  the  attor- 
ney, within  tlie  scope  of  his  retainer, 
is  the  general  agent  of  his  client. 
Swinfen  v.  Swinfen,  18  C.  B.  485; 
Swinfen  v.  Chelmsford,  5  Hurl.  &  N. 
890;  Chambers  v.  Mason,  5  C.  B.  (n. 
s.)  59;  Chown  v.  Parrott,  14  C.  B.  (n. 
s.)  74 ;  Prestwitch  v.  Poley,  18  C.  B. 
(N.  s.)  80G;  Fray  v.  Voules,  1  El.  &  El. 
839;  Butler  v.  Knight,  L.  E.  2  Exch. 
109.  A  few  American  courts  have  fol- 
lowed the  same  rule.  Wieland  v. 
White,  109  Mass.  392;  Potter  v.  Par- 
sons, 14  Iowa,  286;  Holmes  v.  Kogers, 
13  Cal.  191  (overruled  it  seems,  by 
Preston  v.  Hill,  50  Cal.  43  and  Am- 
brose V.  McDonald,  53  Cal.  28). 
And  American  courts  generally  show 
a  leaning  in  favor  of  such  com- 
promises, when  fairly  made,  and  up- 
hold them  if  they  seem  advantageous 
to  the  party  complaining.  Holker  v. 
Parker,  7  Crauch  (U.  S.),  436,  452; 
Whipple  V.  Whitman,  13  R.  I.  512. 
See  also  Rollers.  Wooldridge,  46  Tex. 
485;  Potter  v.  Parsons,  14  la.  286; 
Bank  of  Georgetown  v.  Geary,  5  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  99;  Black  v.  Rogers,  75  Mo. 
441;  Williams  v.  Nolan,  58  Tex.  708; 
Bonny  v.  Morrill,  57  Me.  374 ;  Jones  v. 
Williamson,  5  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  371; 
Union     Mutual    Life     Ins.     Co.     v. 


Buchanan,  100  Ind.  63;  Albee  v.  Hay- 
den,  25  Minn.  267.  Nor  has  he  gener- 
ally authority  to  release  a  sux'ety. 
Stowe  V.  Sheldon,  13  Neb.  207. 

1  Greenlee  v.  McDowell,  4  Ired.  Eg. 
(N.  C.)  485;  Branch  v.  Walker,  92  N. 
C.  89;  Moulton  v.  Bowker,  115  Mass. 
36;  Williamson-Stewart  Paper  Co.  v. 
Bosbyshell,  14  Mo.  App.  534,  538; 
Levy  V.  Brown,  56  Miss.  83;  Annelly  v, 
Saussure,  12  S.  C.  488;  Read  v. 
French,  28  N.  Y.  293;  Nightingale  v. 
Oregon  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Sawy.  (U.  S.) 
338.  See  also  Schoregge  v.  Gordon, 
29  Minn.  367;  Clark  v.  Randall,  9  Wis. 
135;  Nelson  v.  Cook,  19  111.  440;  Gor- 
ham  V.  Gale,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  739 ;  Union 
Bank  v.  Geary,  5  Pet.  (U.  S.)  99; 
Newberry  v.  Lee,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  526; 
Oestrich  v.  Gilbert,  9  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
242;  Jennie  v.  Delesdernier,  20  Me. 
183;  Week's  Att.,  §218;  Whart.  Ag., 
§  585  et  seq.  He  cannot  stipulate  that 
a  sheriff  shall  conduct  a  business  on 
which  he  has  levied.  Alexander  v. 
Denaveaux,  53  Cal.  663;  s.  c.  59  CaL 
476. 

2  Beck  V.  Bellamy,  93  N.  C.  129. 

3  2  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  141;  Smith  v. 
Bossard,  2  McCord  Ch.  (S.  C.)  409. 

4  Sargeant  v.  Clark,  108  Pa.  St.  688; 
Bingham  v.  Guthrie,  19  Pa.  St.  418; 
Tilton  V.  United  States  Life  Ins.  Co., 
8  Daly  (N.  Y.),  84;   Somers  v.  Bala- 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VII.]  STIPULATIONS    AND    ADMISSIONS.  193 

an  appeal  or  ivrit  of  error;  ^  or  may  agree  that  the  opposite  party 
may  take  judgment,^  and  this,  too,  although  he  may  know  that 
his  client  has  a  good  defense  to  the  action.^  So,  where  he  rep- 
resents the  plaintiff,  he  may,  without  the  consent  of  his  client, 
dismiss  the  action,*  or  restore  it  after  a  dismissal  or  nolle  pros., ^ 
or  bring  a  new  action;^  and  he  may  take  an  appeal,  and,  ac- 
cording to  one  opinion,  bind  his  client  by  a  recognizance  in  the 
name  of  the  latter  for  the  prosecution  of  it.^  So,  he  may  have 
printed,  at  the  charge  of  his  client,  such  briefs  or  arguments  as 
he  may  judge  advisable  for  the  more  convenient  presentation  of 
the  cause  in  an  appellate  court. ^  In  all  these  cases  if,  in  the 
absence  of  collusion  with  the  opposite  party,  he  acts  contrary  to 
the  express  directions  of  his  client,  or  to  his  injury,  the  client 
must  look  to  the  attorney,  and  not  to  the  opposite  party,  for  re- 
dress. 

§192.  [Continued]  AVhat  he  may  not  do. —  But  there  is 
even  here  a  line  which  he  cannot  overstep.  He  cannot,  by  virtue 
of  his  general  authority,  accept  service  for  his  client  of  the  orig- 
inal process  by  which  the  action  is  begun;  ^  nor,  under  the  old 
law  excluding  interested  witnesses,  could  he  release  a  claim  of  his 
client  against  a  witness,  in  order  to  render  the  latter  competent 

brega,  1  Dall.    (U.  S.)  IGl;  Holker  v.  attorney  has  taken  place  in  the  mean- 
Parker,  7  Crauch  (U.  S.),  436;  Buck-  time.     Barlow   v.    Steel,    65   Mo.  611, 
land  V.  Conway,  16  Mass.  396.     Com-  618. 
pare  Conuett  v.  Chicago,  114  111.  233.  *  McLeran   v.   McNamara,    55  Cal. 

1  Shisler  v.  Keavy,  75  Pa.  St.  79.  508;  Gaillard  v.  Smart,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 

2  Hudson   V.    Allison,   54  lud.  215.  385. 

Compare   Pike   v.   Emerson,    5  N.  H.  ^  Reinhold  v.  Alberti,  1  Binu.  (Pa.) 

393;  Talbott  v.  McGee,  4  T.  B.  Mon.  469. 

(Ky.)   377;  Union    Bank  v.  Geary,    5  6  Scott  r.  Elraendorf,  12  Johns.  (N. 

Pet.  (U.  S.)  99.  Y.)  31.-). 

3  Thompson  •;;.  Pershing,  86  Ind.  '  Adams  v.  Robinson,  1  Pick. 
304,  310.     So,  an  attorney  has  author-  (Mass.)  462. 

ity,  in  virtue  of  his  general  retainer,  ^  Williamson-Stewart  Paper  Co.  v. 

to  bind  his  client  by  a  stipulation  to  Bosbyshell,  14  Mo.  App.  534;  Weisse 

take  a  judgment  on  a  verdict  ah'cady  v.  City,  IC  La.  Ann.  46. 

rendered,  and  such  a  stipulation  does  ^  Bayley  v.   Buckland,  1   Esch.    1 ; 

not  lose  its  force  by  the  lapse  of  over  Mastei'son  v.  Le  Claire,  4  Minn.   163; 

ten  years  before  judgment  is  entered,  Anderson  v.  Hall,  87  N.  C.  381. 

if  no  revocation  of  the  authority  of  the 

13 


194  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

to  testify;^  nor  release  siireties;  ^  nor  execute  a  replevin  bond  for 
his  client;  '^  nor  enter  a  retraxit ;  *  nor,  according  to  one  doubtful 
opinion,  stipulate  loJiat  laio  shall  govern  the  case, —  as  that  a 
particular  statute  was  or  was  not  duly  enacted ;  ^  nor  assign  the 
judgment  when  recovered ;  ^  nor  release  or  postpone  the  lien 
thereof ;  ^  nor  act  for  the  legal  representatives  of  his  deceased 
client.^ 


§  193.  Binding  Nature  of  his  Stipulations.  —  Such  being 
the  extensive  nature  of  his  powers  in  the  conduct  of  the  litiga- 
tion, it  follows  that  his  stipulations,  made  in  open  court  with  the 
opposite  counsel,  have  in  general  the  force  of  contracts,  the  per- 
formance of  which  the  court  will  enforce.^  Some  decisions  add, 
as  a  condition  of  the  binding  character  of  a  stipulation,  that  it  be 
also  entered  of  record.^^  But,  on  principle,  it  would  seem  suffi- 
cient, to  give  the  stipulation  or  promise,  made  in  facie  curiae,  the 
binding  nature  of  a  contract,  that  the  other  party  has  acted  upon 
it.  This  conclusion  is  supported  upon  the  familiar  principle  of 
an  estoppel  in  pais,  which  is  that  when  a  party,  by  his  declaration 
or  conduct,  has  induced  another  to  act  in  a  particular  manner 


1  Shores  v.  Casswell,  13  Mete. 
(Mass.)  413.  See  also  Marshall  v. 
Nagel,  1  Bail.  (S.  C.)  308. 

2  Giveus  V.  Briscoe,  3  J.  J.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  532. 

3  Proprietors  v.  Wentworth,  3G  Me. 
339.  But  aliter  as  to  an  indemnifying 
bond  to  a  sheriff,  in  the  name  of  his 
principal.  Ford  i-.  Williams,  13  N.  Y. 
577. 

^  Lambert  v.  Sanford,  2  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  137. 

5  Graves  v.  Alsap,  1  Ariz.  Ter.  274. 

6  Wilson   V.  Wadleigh,  36  Me.  496. 

7  Wilson  V.  Jennings,  3  Oh.  St.  528. 
See  also  Doub  v.  Barnes,  1  Md.  Ch. 
27. 

8  Campbell  v.  Kincaid,  3  T.  B- 
Mon.  (Kj'.)  560;  Wood  v.  Hopkins,  3 
N.  J.  507. 

9  Banks  v.  American  Tract  Society, 
4   Sandf.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  438;    Staples   v. 


Parker,  41  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  648.  It  is 
said  to  have  always  been  the  practice 
in  New  York  "to  hold  the  parties 
strictly  to  their  engagements  made 
during  the  trial  and  in  the  face  of  the 
court,  relating  to  the  conduct  of  the 
suit,  and  its  proceedings."  Staples  v. 
Parker,  supra. 

io  Caldwell  v.  Mc Williams,  65  Ga. 
99.  Under  the  statute  of  Minnesota, 
whicli  declares  that  the  authority  of 
an  attorney  to  bind  his  client  shall  ex- 
tend to  "  any  of  the  proceedings  in  an 
action  or  special  proceeding,  duly 
made,  or  entered  upon  the  minutes  of 
the  court,"  it  has  been  held  that  a 
stipulation  touching  the  conduct  of  a 
cause,  so  made  and  entered,  is  in  the 
nature  of  a  contract,  which  the  court 
cannot  set  aside  at  the  instance  of  one 
of  the  parties.  Bingham  v.  Super- 
visors, 6  Minn.  13" 


Tit.   II,  Ch.   VII.]  STIPULATIONS    AND    ADMISSIONS.  195 

which  he  would  not  otherwise  have  done,  such  party  will  not 
afterwards  be  permitted  to  set  up  a  claim  inconsistent  with  such 
declaration  and  conduct,  if  such  claim  will  work  an  injury  to  the 
other  party  or  to  those  claiming  under  him.^  Sometimes  the 
qualification  is  added  that  the  agreement  he  fair  and  reasonable. 
Thus,  it  is  said  in  Tennessee  by  the  court,  speaking  through 
Reese,  J. :  "  The  power  of  the  court,  as  well  as  the  duty,  to  en- 
force fair  and  reasonable  agreements  relatino-  to  the  conduct  and 
dispatch  of  business  before  it,  is  necessarily  incident  to  the 
nature  of  its  position  and  required  to  insure  the  orderly  and 
faithful  determination  of  causes.  It  is  a  power  which  this  court 
has  repeatedly  exercised  upon  deliberation  and  examination  of 
authorities,  and  very  recently  in  a  highly  important  case."  "^ 

§  194.  Setting  aside  and  relieving  against  such  Stipula- 
tions.—  Such  being  the  nature  of  the  stipulations  of  counsel 
made  in  court  touching  the  cause  of  the  trial,  it  follows  that  they 
will  not  be  set  aside  upon  any  lower  grounds  than  those  which 
would  warrant  the  rescission  of  a  contract,  ■ — namely,  fraud,  collu- 
sion, accident,  surprise,  or  some  ground  of  the  same  nature.^ 
The  court  will  not  relieve  parties  from  the  effects  of  a  stipulation 
made  under  a  full  understandino;  of  the  facts  existing  at  the  time.* 
The  mere  fact  that  a  party,  by  such  a  stipulation,  has  waived  de- 
fenses which  he  might  otherwise  urge,  is  no  sufficient  ground  for 
setting  it  aside. ^  But,  by  analogy  to  the  relief  of  parties  from 
contracts  entered  into  under  a  mutual  mistake  of  fact  ^  it  is  clear 
that  a  court  will  relieve  a  party  against  a  stipulation  made  under 
such  a  mistake.^  It  has  been  held  that  an  order  settins:  aside  a 
stipulation  of  counsel  touching  the  conduct  of  a  case,  is  appeal- 
able.''    But  this,  under  most  systems,  would  obviously  depend 

1  Banks  v.  American  Tract  Society,  ^  Bingham  v.  Supervisors,  supra. 

4  Saudf.  Ch.  (X.  Y.)  438,  4(;7.  6  W'ells  v.  American   Express   Co., 

2  Jones  V.  Kimbro,  6  Humph.  49  Wis.  224.  In  this  case  the  mistake 
(Tenu.)  319.  does  not  appear  to  have  been  mutual 

3  Bingham  v.  Supervisors,  6  Minn.  and  yet  the  stipulation  was  set  aside. 
136;  Keogh  v.  Main,  52  N.  Y.  Super.  '  Bingham  v.  Supervisors,  6  Miim. 
100.  13(3. 

*  Conner  v.  Belden,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.), 
257. 


196      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

upon  the  nature  of  the  order ;  it  would  not  be  appealable  unless 
it  were  in  the  nature  of  a  final  judgment  dispositive  of  a  sub- 
stantial right. 

§  195.  [Illustration.]  Agreement  that  Several  Causes  shall 
ABIDE  the  Event  of  one.  — Where  several  cases  are  pending  in  court, 
depending  upon  the  same  facts  or  questions  of  law,  it  is  compe- 
tent for  the  attorneys,  in  virtue  of  their  general  retainers,  to  stipulate 
that  only  one  shall  be  tried  and  that  the  others  shall  abide  the  result  of 
that  one.i  Such  a  stipulation  is  not  merely  an  independent  executory 
agreement,  but  it  operates  presently  to  affect  the  status  of  the  case  itself, 
and  invests  the  plaintiff  with  rights  in  respect  to  its  conduct,  which  he 
otherwise  would  not  have  had,  and  of  which  neither  the  opposite  party 
nor  the  court  can  lawfully  divest  him.  When,  therefore,  one  suit  was 
selected  from  among  a  number  which  were  founded  upon  the  same 
cause  of  action,  and  a  stipulation  made  that  all  the  causes  then  pending 
on  appeal  from  a  justice  should  abide  the  final  determination  of  this 
case, — the  defendant  thereafter  had  no  right  to  dismiss  his  appeal  in 
the  case  in  which  the  stipulation  was  entered  of  record. ^ 

§  19G.  [Further  Illustrations.]  That  the  Opposite  Partt 
MAY  take  Judgment.  — The  foregoing  principle  no  doubt  extends  so 
as  to  give  binding  force  to  a  stipulation  that  one  of  the  parties  to  the 
suit  may  take  judgment,  since  it  is  competent  for  counsel  to  make  such 
an  agreement."^  Under  a  statute  providing  that  parties  may  agree  to  a 
judgment  by  loriting  filed  in  open  court,  it  is  held  that  an  agreement  be- 
tween the  parties  to  an  action,  stipulating  the  terms  upon  which  a  de- 
cree shall  be  entered,  when  filed  in  open  court,  becomes  a  part  of  the 
record,  and  is  in  effect  an  answer  or  pleading,  and,  unless  for  good  cause 
shown,  should  be  so  regarded  by  the  court,  and  cannot  hence  be  stricken 
from  the  files  or  withdrawn  upon  the  motion  of  the  parties  ;  and  accord- 

1  North     Missouri    R.    Co.  v.   Ste-  377 ;  Union  Bank  v.  Geary,  5  Pet.  (U. 

phens,  36  Mo.  150.     As  to  the  effect  of  8.)    99;    2   Greeul.  Ev.    §14:1.     It  has 

a  stipulation  tliat    one    cause    shall  been  lield  that  a  party  who  obtains  a 

abide  the  result  of  another,  see  Gil-  juiipnent  in  violation  of  his  written 

more  v.  American  Central  Ins.  Co.,  07  stipulation  on  file,  dismissing  the  ac- 

Cal.  366.  tion,  —  may  be  restrained  or  enjoined 

^  McKinley    v.     "Wilmington     Star  from  enforcing  it  by  the  court  in  which 

Mining  Co.,  7  Bradw.  (111.)  386.  it  was  obtained.    McLeran  v.  McNa- 

3  Pike  ri.    Emerson,    5   N.   H.   393;  mara,  55  Cal.  508. 
Talbott  V.  McGee,  i  T.  B.  Mou.  (Ky.) 


Tit.  II,  Ch.   VII.]  STIPULATIONS    AND    ADMISSIONS.  197 

ingly,  that  a  subsequent  pleading,  filed  by  one  of  the  parties,  inconsist- 
ent therewith,  should  be  stricken  from  the  files. ^ 

§  197.  [Further  Illustrations.]  Admissions  in  the  Pleadings. — 
The  pleadings  are  drawn  by  the  attornej's  of  the  parties,  except  in 
those  few  cases  where  parties  are  foolish  enough  to  endeavor  to  act  as 
their  own  attorneys ;  and  no  better  illustration  of  the  principle  under 
discussion  could  be  furnished  than  is  found  in  the  binding  nature  of 
the  admissions  in  the  pleadings.  Such  admissions  are  evidentiary  in 
their  character,  are  an  absolute  estoppel  upon  the  party  making  them, 
unless  he  seasonably  withdraws  them  by  amendment,  and  obviates  the 
necessity  of  the  other  part3'  proving  the  facts  thus  admitted.  Much 
could  be  written  upon  this  subject.  There  are  implied  admissions  as 
well  as  express  admissions.  It  has  been  held  that,  where  an  answer 
sets  up  several  distinct  defenses,. a  denial  in  one  is  qualified  by  an  ad- 
mission in  another,  —  which  is  merely  an  apj^lication  of  the  rule  that  a 
party's  pleading,  like  any  other  written  instrument,  is  to  be  construed 
as  a  whole,  and  in  case  of  any  incongruities  or  contradictions,  is  to  be 
taken  most  strongly  against  the  pleader.  If,  therefore,  a  party  in  one 
count  of  an  answer  denies  a  fact  alleged  in  the  petition  or  complaint, 
and  in  another  count  admits  it,  the  admission,  and  not  the  denial,  will 
be  taken  to  be  true.  It  will  estop  him,  and  the  plaintiff  will  not  be 
bound  to  prove  the  fact  thus  admitted.  For  instance,  where  the  action 
was  replevin  for  unlawfully  taking  the  plaintiff 's  goods,  and  the 
answer  contained  two  defenses:  (1)  a  general  denial  of  the  allegations 
of  the  complaint,  and  (2)  a  justification  of  the  taking  under  a  levy 
upon  execution,  —  it  was  held  that  the  answer  admitted  the  taking  for 
the  purposes  of  the  trial,  and  that  to  that  extent  the  second  defense 
vacated  the  first. ^  In  another  case,  the  same  court,  applying  the  same 
principle,  held  that  a  general  denial  in  one  count  of  the  answer  was  in- 
consistent with  special  matter  alleged  in  another  count,  and  was  to  be 
construed  as  modified  b}^  the  latter.^  This  principle  has  been  applied 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  a  case  originating  in  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  District  of  Minnesota,  —  the 
court  holding  that  the  admission  of  the  plaintiff  's  title  contained  in  an 
equitable  defense  set  up  in  the  third  count  of  the  answer,  overrode  and 
controlled  a  denial  of  the  plaintiff's  title  in  the  first  count,  and  was 
conclusive  upon  the  question  of  title. ^ 

1  Vail  V.  Stone,  13  Iowa,  2S4.  *  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Paine, 

2  Derby  v.  Gallup,  5  Minn.  119.  7  Sup.  Ct.  Kep.  323,  325. 

3  Scott  V.  Kiug,  7  Miuu.  494.     See 
aisoZiraraermau  v.  Lamb,  7  Minn.  421. 


198      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  198.  Admissions  and  Agreements  of  State's  Attorney. — 

Admissions  made  by  the  State's  attorney  of  facts  for  the  pur- 
pose of  the  trial  are  to  be  considered,  for  all  the  purposes  to 
which  they  are  relevant,  in  precisely  the  same  light  as  if  they  had 
been  proved  by  testimony  instead  of  admitted. ^  Where  the 
State's  attorney  is  not  in  a  condition  to  go  to  trial  or  to  demand 
the  forfeiture  of  a  recognizance,  he  may  lawfully  agree  in  con- 
sideration of  a  consent  to  th.e  forfeiture ,  that  it  shall  be  set  aside 
on  the  appearance  of  the  defendant  at  the  next  term.^ 

§  199.  Stipulation  cannot  confer  Jurisdiction. — An  ex- 
ception to  the  rule  touching  the  binding  force  of  stipulations  of 
counsel  as  to  the  conduct  of  a  cause  is  founded  in  the  principle 
that  consent  cannot  confer  jurisdiction  over  the  subject  matter  of 
a  litigation:  a  stipulation  giving  the  court  jurisdiction  which  it 
does  not  possess  is  invalid.^ 

§  200.  Verbal  Stipulations,  How  far  Binding". —  Subject  to 
the  statute  of  frauds,  verbal  promises,  whether  made  in  or  out 
of  court,  if  acted  upon  by  the  other  party,  are  binding  as  con- 
tracts, at  least  by  way  of  estoppel,  on  a  principle  already  sug- 
gested.* Acting  upon  this  principle,  one  court  has  ruled  that 
although  there  may  be  a  rule  of  court  intended  to  prevent  dis- 
putes and  uncertainties,  requiring  stipulations  of  counsel  touching 
the  conduct  of  causes  to  be  put  in  writing,  yet  where  such  an 
agreement  has  been  orally  made  between  counsel,  and  the  sub- 
stance of  it  is  admitted,  the  court  will  not  allow  one  of  the  coun- 
sel to  disregard  it,  after  it  has  been  acted  upon  by  the  other. 
*«  We  think  it  well  established  by  the  authorities,"  said  Paine,  J., 
"  that,  although  the  rule  requires  stipulations  to  be  in  writing  in 
order  to  be  binding,  yet  it  was  not  designed  to  allow  a  party  who 
had  entered  into  a  verbal  stipulation,  upon  which  his  adversary 
had  relied  and  acted,  to  obtain  an  unjust  advantage,  and  destroy 


1  People  V.  Tyler,  3*5  Cal.    522,  531.  ^  Bingham  v.  Supervisors,  6   Minn. 

2  Esmond?;.  People,  ISBradw.  (111.)       13G,  U7. 

114.  ■»  Ante,  §  193. 


Tit.   II,  Cb.   VII.]  STIPULATIONS    AND    ADMISSIONS.  199 

the  other's  rights  by  disregarding  it  himself.^  Another  court 
has  ruled,  proceeding  upon  the  necessity  of  avoiding  disputes 
between  counsel,  that  verbal  stipulations  with  reference  to  pro- 
ceedings pending  an  action  cannot  be  regarded,  except  so  far  as 
they  are  admitted  by  the  parties  against  whom  they  are  sought 
to  be  enforced. 2  For  stronger  reasons,  a  verbal  stipulation  not 
entered  of  record  will  not  be  enforced  after  a  Ions:  and  un- 
explained  delay,  as  for  instance,  a  stipulation  that  a  default  may 
be  set  aside  wiiere  a  delay  of  seven  years  has  intervened  before 
making  the  application  to  the  court  to  enforce  the  same.^  Stat- 
utes exist  in  some  States  like  the  following:  "  An  attorney  and 
counsellor  has  authority  to  bind  his  client  in  any  of  the  steps  of 
an  action  or  proceeding,  by  his  agreement  filed  with  the  clerk  or 
entered  upon  the  minutes  of  the  court,  and  not  otherwise."* 
Such  statutes  are  regarded  as  in  the  nature  of  a  statute  of  frauds.^ 
Under  them  an  attorney  cannot  bind  his  client,  by  a  verbal  stip- 
ulation, made  during  the  progress  of  a  trial  and  not  entered  on 
the  minutes,  to  waive  the  rights  of  his  client  under  an  issue  made 
by  the  pleadings, —  as,  for  instance,  that  the  judgment  of  the 
plaintiff,  if  he  recover,  shall  be  for  payment  in  gold  coin;  ^  or 
even  extending  the  time  for  filing  a  bill  of  exceptions.^ 

§  201.  Solemnity  and  Formality  Required  in  Admissions  of 
Counsel.  —  In  order  that  admissions  of  counsel  of  facts  may  take 
the  place  of  evidence  in  a  civil  trial,  such  admissions  "  must  be 
distinct  and  formal,  or  such  as  are  termed  solemn  admissions, 
made  for  the  express  purpose  of  alleviating  the  stringency  of 
some  rule  of  practice,  or  of  dispensing  with  the  formal  proof  of 

1  Buruham  v.  Smith,  11  "Wis.  258.  ^  Borkheim  v.  Insurance  Co.,  38 
Tlie  court  cite  Gaillard  v.  Stuart,  <!  Cow.      Cal.  (J23,  (_;28. 

(N.  y.)3S5;  Ex  parte  Lassell,  8  Cow.  ^  Merritt   v.  Wilcox,    52   Cal.    238. 

(N.   Y.)   119;  Montgomery  u.   Ellis,  6  Under  a  substantially   similar  statute 

How.     Pr.     (N.    Y.)    32(J;    Wager  v.  the    same    rule    exists     in    Indiana. 

Stickle,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  407;  Turner  Louisville   &c.   R.  Co.    v.   Boland,  70 

17.  Burrows,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  627.  Ind.  595. 

2  Patterson  v.  Ely,  19  Cal.  35;  '  Goben  v.  Goldsb^rry,  72  Ind.  44 
Reese  v.  Mahony,  21  Cal.  305,  308.  (distinguishing  Ridgway  v.  Morrison, 

'  Reese  v.  Muhony,  supra.  28  Ind.  201). 

<  Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  283. 


200      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tl*., 

some  fact  at  the  trial."  ^  The  remark's  of  counsel  during  the 
progress  of  a  trial  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  adirissions  by  which 
the  rights  of  the  client  are  to  be  determined. ^  It  has  even  been 
held  that  counsel  who,  when  evidence  is  offered,  make  declara- 
tions that  it  is  offered  iov  delimited jnirpose  only,  are  not  estopped, 
after  it  is  received,  from  drawing  from  it  deductions  other  than 
those  contained  in  the  offer,  unless  injustice  will  be  done  to  the 
opposite  party  by  permitting  such  new  deductions.  Coun- 
sel, it  is  reasoned,  have  no  power  to  limit  the  effect  of  evidence, 
but  its  effect  is  regulated  by  the  court  in  its  charge  to  the  jury. 
The  statement  by  counsel  of  the  purpose  for  which  evidence  is 
offered  is  only  a  reason  given  wdiy  the  evidence  should  be  re- 
ceived.^ But  i\\Q  failure  to  object  to  evidence  in  the  course  of  the 
trial  will,  in  many  cases,  have  the  effect  of  an  admission  of  cer- 
tain facts  which  flow  as  a  natural  consequence  from  acts  done  or 
evidence  admitted.  Thus,  in  a  suit  upon  notes  where  certain 
notes  are  offered  in  evidence  without  objection,  this,  it  has  been 
held,  is  equivalent  to  a  tacit  admission  that  they  were  the  notes 
in  suit.  "If  they  were  not,"  said  the  court,  "  by  timely  ob- 
jection, by  pointing  out  any  substantial  difference  between  the 
notes  sued  on  and  those  offered,  he  (defendant)  could  very 
easily  have  prevented  their  introduction  in  evidence."  * 

§  202.  Interpretation  of  Various  Stipulations  and  Agree- 
ments.—  A  stipulation  which  on  its  face  purports  to  be  '•'•^statement 
of  the  facts  in  this  action  "  does  not,  unless  its  terms  so  import,  pre- 
clude the  parties  from  introducing  other  evidence  on  the  trial. ^ 

An  agreement  to  supply  lost  papers  or  dismiss  cause  at  the  next  term, 
is  construed   to  mean  at   that  period  of  the  term  when  the  cause  is 

reached  for  trial  on  the  docket  in  regnlar  course  of  business.^ 

An  agreement  to  submit  a  case  on  briefs  to  be  decided  in  vacation,  the 
order  and   decree  to  be  entered  as  of  that  or  the  next  term,  is  con- 

1  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §   180;   Ferson  v.  ^  Sill  v.  Reese,  47  Cal.  294. 
Wilcox,  19  Miun.  449,  451.     See  also  ^  Fitzgerald  ??.  Barker,  85  Mo.  13,  20. 
Geu.  Stat.  Minu.,  chap.  88,  §  8.  s  Dillou  v.  Cockcroft,  90  N.  Y.  049. 

2  McKeeu  v.  Gammon,  33  Me.  187.  ^  Jones  v.  Kimbrough,  3  Humph, 
See  for  illustration,  Stewart  v.  Shaw,  (Tenu.)  319. 

55  Mich.  G13. 


Tit.   II,  Ch.  VII.]       STIPULATIONS    AND    ADMISSIONS.  201 

strued  as  a  submission  of  the  whole  controversy,  and  not  as  merely 

the  submission   of    a  motion  to  disallow  an  injunction.^ Where 

the  parties,  upon  the  evidence  as  it  stands  at  a  given  stage  of  the  trial, 
stipulate  that  the  jury  may  he  discharged  and  the  cause  submitted  to 
the  court  alone,  if  one  of  them  is  thereafter,  against  the  objection  of 
the  other,  permitted  to  introduce  further  evidence,  and  if  the  cause  is 
decided  by  the  court  with  reference  to  such  further  evidence,  without 
any  waiver  by  the  other  party  of  his  right  to  a  jury  trial  thereupon, 
it  will  be  error.- Where  the  defendant  moved  for  a  continu- 
ance to  enable  him  to  discredit  the  testimony  of  the  plaintiff,  in  case 
she  should  be  called  as  a  witness  in  her  own  behalf ;  and  thereupon  her 
counsel,  in  order  to  avoid  a  continuance,  announced  that  she  should 
not  be  called,  whereupon  the  court  said  that,  upon  that  agreement,  the 
continuance  would  be  refused,  —  it  was  held  that  this  circumstance 
did  not  preclude  the  counsel  of  the  defendant  from  commenting  in  his 

argument  upon  the  failure  to  call  her  as  a  witness.^ A  stipulation 

that  a  stenographer's  notes  of  testimony  taken  on  a  trial  of  another 
cause  may  be  used  as  evidence,  subject  to  objections  for  immateriality, 
irrelevancy,  or  other  matter  of  substance,  is  a  waiver  of  the  right  to 
object  that  the  witnesses  were  incompetent,  or  that  the  parties  or  is- 
sues were   different  than  on    the    former  trial. ^ An   agreement 

to  amend  the  issue  and  try  the  case  on  the  merits  has  the  effect 
merely  of  waiving  exceptions  to  the  matter  of  form,  and  does  not,  in 
any  other  respect,  affect  the  legal  rights  of  the  parties.^ A  stipu- 
lation that  the  jury,  if  the  court  be  not  in  session  when  they  agree  upon 
their  verdict,  may  sign,  seal  and  deliver  it  to  the  otficer  in  charge  and 
disperse,  is  equivalent  to  an  agreement  that  the  court  may  open  the 
sealed  verdict  in  their  absence,  and,  if  necessary,  reduce  it  to  proper 
form.  It  is  also  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  poll  the  jury  if  they  should 
be  in  court. ^ 

1  Auderson  v.  White,  27  111.  57.  '=  Banghart  v.  Flummerfelt,  43  N.  J. 

2  Hewitt  V.  Week,  51  Wis.  368.  L.  28. 

3  Hurd  V.  Marple,  10  Bradw.   (HI.)  ^  Koon  v.  Insurance  Co.,  104  U.  S. 
418.  100.     Whether  a  suit  at  law  and  one 

*  Weldon  Hotel  Co.  v.  Seymour,  54      in  chancery  are  to  be  tried  as  one  suit. 
Vt.  582  King  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  98  111.  376 


202  CONTROL   AND    REGULATION   OF   TRIAL.       [1  ThOQip.  Tl'., 


CHAP  TEE     A^IL 

OF  OTHER  SUBJECTS  OF  JUDICIAL  CONDUCT  AND  CONTROL. 

Section 

205.  Establishing  Rules  of  Practice. 

20(;.  Coutrolling  tlie  Intercourse  between  tlie  Court  and  the  Bar. 

207.  Protracting  a  Trial  during  a  whole  Night. 

208.  Allowing  Members  of  the  Family  of  the  Prosecutrix  to  sit  in  court  and 

weep. 

209.  Allowing  one  not  an  Attorney  to  appear. 

210.  Consolidating  several  Actions  for  Purposes  of  Trial. 

211.  Calling  an  Attorney  to  Preside. 

212.  Retiring  from  the  Bench  without  Suspension  of  Trial. 

213.  Change  of  Judges  during  the  Trial. 

214.  Who  to  sign  Bill  of  Exceptions  in  such  a  Case. 

215.  Objection  that  the  Judge  presided  on  a  previous  Trial  of  the  same  Action. 
216=  Exclusion  of  Spectators  when  not  a  Violation  of  Right  of  Public  Trial. 

217.  When  Improper  to  grant  Leave  of  Absence  to  Counsel. 

218.  Prejudicing  the  Minds  of  the  Jurors. 

219.  [Continued.]     Remarks  ludicatiug  Opinion  as  to  Facts. 

220.  Asking  Pertinent  Question  of  Counsel. 

221.  Conversing  privately  with  Witnesses. 

§  205.  Establishing  Rules  of  Practice.  — While  it  is  the  un- 
doubted province  of  judicial  courts  to  establish  reasonable  rules 
of  practice,  yet  a  rule  of  court  which  operates  to  deprive  a  party 
of  a  legal  right  is  void.^  So  held  of  a  rule  which  empowered  the 
court  to  disregard  a  motion  to  have  the  jury  polled. 


2 


§  206.  Controlling  the  Intercourse  between  the  Court  ana 
the  Bar. —  It  seems  that  the  whole  subject  of  the  intercourse  be- 
tween the  trial  court  and  the  bar  is  a  matter  committed  to  the 
discretionary  control  of  the  trial  court  and  the  sense  of  propriety 
of  the  members  of  the  bar.  "  We  presume  not,"  said  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Georgia,  "  to  prescribe  the  manner  of  inter- 
course between  the  court  and  the  bar.     We    leave  that  to  the 

1  Crotty  V.   Wyatt,  3  Bradw.  (III.)  2  ji^^i^ 

388. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VIII.]  VAEIOUS   INSTANCES.  203 

good  sense  and  high  breeding  which  so  generally  characterize 
both,  except  where  we  tind  that  it  affects  the  rights  of  parties; 
then  it  is  within  our  corrective  jurisdiction."  ^ 

§' 207.  Protractiug"  a  Trial  During  a  whole  Night.  —  In 
Kansas,  where  new  trials  are  granted  in  cases  appealed  from 
justices  of  the  peace,  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  an  unusual  and  un- 
just proceeding  and  a  great  abuse  of  discretion  for  a  justice  of 
the  peace,  without  special  circumstances  existing  therefor,  to 
proceed  with  the  trial  of  an  action  during  the  whole  night, 
against  the  objection  and  protest  of  one  of  the  parties  litigant. 
The  court  said:  "  Special  circumstances  might  justify  a  court  in 
proceeding  with  a  trial  until  after  midnight;  but  the  mere  fact 
that  a  criminal  charge  was  pending  against  the  defendant  below, 
to  which  he  was  required  to  answer  on  November  12th,  1881,  be- 
fore a  justice  in  another  township,  was  not  a  sufficient  excuse 
for  keeping  open  the  court  all  night,  as  the  case  might  have  been 
adjourned,  if  it  were  deemed  necessary,  until  after  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  hearing  of  the  criminal  charge.^ 

§  208.  Allowing  Members  of  the  Family  of  the  Prosecutrix 
to  sit  in  Court  and  weep.  — During  the  trial  of  an  indictment 
for  rape,  certain  members  of  the  family  of  the  prosecutrix  sat 
within  the  bar  of  the  court  and  occasionally  wept  during  the 
argument  of  the  prosecuting  counsel,  and  withdrew  when  the 
prisoner's  counsel  began  to  address  the  jury.  It  was  held  that 
the  failure  of  the  judge  to  restrain  such  conduct  was  no  ground 
for  new  trial. ^ 

§  209.  Allowing    one  not  an  Attorney  to  Appear. — It  haj 

been  ruled  that,  where  the  judge  allows  a  person  not  a  licensed 
attorney  and  counsellor,  to  appear  for  and  conduct  the  trial  on 
the  part  of  one  of  the  parties,  notwithstanding  the  objection  of 
the  other  party,  the  judgment  will  be  reversed  on  appeal;  ^  but 
this  is  a  very  doubtful  holding. 

• 

1  Long  V.  State,  12  Ga.  295,  330.  *  Newburger  v.   Campbell,  9    Daly 

2  McGoTreu  v.  Campbell,  28  Kau.  (N.  Y.),  102;  s.  c.  58  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
25,  30.  313. 

3  State  V.  Laxtou,  78  N,  C.  564,  570. 


204  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl"., 

§  210.  Consolidatingseveral  Actions  for  Purposes  of  Trial. — 

It  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  presiding  judge  to  order  several 
actions  founded  on  the  same  subject  matter,  brought  by  the  same 
party  against  several  defendants,  to  be  brought  together,  al- 
though the  defendants  employ  different  counsel  and  the  evidence 
in  the  several  causes  is  different.^  So,  it  is  clearly  within  the 
discretion  of  the  presiding  judge  to  hold  })arties  to  an  agreement 
to  try  together  several  petitions  against  different  owners  of  land 
taken  for  the  public  use  under  a  statute ;  and  it  seems  that  the 
court  might  so  order  without  an  agreement. ^ 

§  211.  Calling  an  Attorney  to  preside. —  It  has  been  held 
manifest  error  for  the  trial  judge,  in  a  civil  case,  to  call  an  at- 
torney of  the  court  to  occupy  the  bench  while  the  trial  was  pro- 
ceeding. "Judicial  functions,"  says  Walker,  J.,  speaking  for 
the  court,  "  cannot  be  delegated  to  or  exercised  by  an  agent  or 
deputy.  They  must  be  performed  by  the  persons  who  have 
been  designated  by  law  for  the  purpose.  The  attorney  occupy- 
ing the  bench  was  not  connected  with  or  a  part  of  the  judicial 
department  of  the  State,  named  in  the  third  article  of  our  con- 
stitution; and  persons  not  of  that  department  are  prohibited 
from  the  exercise  of  such  powers.  The  putting  of  the  verdict  in 
form  and  discharging  the  jury  for  the  term  were  both  judicial 
acts,  and  the  first  related  to  and  affected  the  rights  of  appellants. 
Even  if  a  person  not  a-  judge  may,  by  consent  of  parties,  act  as 
such,  still  it  is  clear  that  the  presiding  judge,  of  his  own  motion, 
cannot  substitute  another  to  act  for  the  court :  and  if  it  can  be 
done,  it  must  be  by  consent  of  the  parties  appearing  on  the  rec- 
ord ;  and  such  consent  does  not  appear,  and  will  not  be  implied. 
It  has  been  supposed  by  some  that  it  would  be  error  if  the  rec- 
ord showed  that  any  one  but  the  judge  acted  even  with  consent; 
but  we  refrain  from  deciding  that  question  until  it  shall  be  pre- 
sented." ^ 

1  Springfield  v.  Sleeper,  115  Mass.  v.  James,  99  Mass.  438;  Com.  v.  Pow- 

587.     See  also  Witherlee  v.  Ocean  In-  ers,  109  Mass.  353. 
snrance    Co.,   24    Pick.    (Mass.)    67;  2  Burt  i;.  WlggleSTVorth,  117  Mass. 

Kimball    v.  Thompson,  4   Cush.  441;  302. 
Com.  V.  Robinson,  1  Gray  555;  Com.  ^  Davis  v.  Wilson,  05  111.  527,  530. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.  VIII.]    CONDUCT  OF  THE  JUDGE.  205 

§  212.  Retiring  from  the  Bench  Without  Suspending  the 
Trial.  —  In  a  capital  case  in  Georgia  it  was  said  by  tlie  Supreme 
Court,  speaking  through  Bleckle}',  J. :  "  When,  during  the  trial 
of  a  case,  the  judge  leaves  the  bench  and  withdraws  from  the 
bar,  he  should  order  a  suspension  of  business  until  his  return. 
His  immediate  presence  tends  to  preserve  the  legal  solemnity  and 
security  of  the  trial,  and  u}>holds  the  majesty  of  the  law.  Es- 
pecially, while  a  witness  for  the  State  is  under  examination, 
should  the  judge  not  retire  beyond  the  bar,  without  directing  the 
examination  to  cease  during  his  temporary  absence,  however 
necessary  or  however  brief  his  absence  may  be.  The  guilty  and 
the  innocent  are  alike  entitled  to  be  tried  according  to  law,  in 
the  immediate  presence  of  one  of  the  State's  judges."  ^ 

§  213.  Change  of  Judges  duringthe  Trial. — Where  the  judge 
who  i^resides  at  the  trial  becomes  sick,  or  is  otherwise  unable  to 
proceed,  after  the  evidence  is  all  in  and  the  instructions  have 
been  given  to  the  jury,  the  trial,  it  has  been  held,  should  pro- 
ceed under  a  special  judge ^  before  the  same  jury  and  without  re- 
hearing the  testimony.  Upon  this  question  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Wisconsin,  speaking  through  Mr.  Justice  Eakin,  say:  *'  It  is 
submitted  as  matter  for  arrest  that  the  jury  were  not  discharired 
upon  the  election  of  the  special  judge,  and  a  new  jury  selected. 
The  jury  had  heard  the  evidence  and  instructions,  and  had  dis- 
persed to  await  the  argument  of  counsel.  There  is  no  reason 
why  this  should  not  be  made  under  the  presiding  control  of  the 
special  judge.  The  instructions  had  not  been  excepted  to,  and  if 
it  had  been  important  to  determine  precisely  what  the  evidence 
had  been,  the  special  judge  might  in  several  ways  sufBciently 
have  advised  himself  of  it,  to  have  enabled  him  to  regulate  the 
discussion.  Upon  a  difference  among  the  attorneys  as  to  testi- 
mony during  an  argument,  it  is  no  uncommon  practice  to  call  a 
witness,  not  for  re-examination,  but  to  state  what  he  had  testi- 
fied. After  the  evidence  has  been  admitted  and  the  law  settled, 
the  presidency  of  the  judge  is  more  for  the  purpose  of  preserv- 
ing the  order  in  the  discussion,  and  in  the  future  conduct  of  the 

1  Hayes  v.  State,  58  Ga.  35,  49. 


206      CONTROL  AND  REGULATION  OF  TRIAL.   [1  Thomp.  Tr.y 

i 

jury,  than  for  anything  else.  It  would  be  an  unnecessary  delay, 
expense  and  vexation  to  clients  in  such  cases,  to  impanel  a  new 
jury  and  to  recall  witnesses.  It  is  not  demanded  by  the  ordi- 
nary requirements  of  justice."  ^ 

§  214.  Who  to  sign  Bill  of  Exceptions  in  such  a  Case.  — A 

controversy  having  arisen  as  to  which  judge  should  sign  a  bill  of 
exceptions  in  such  a  case,  the  court  also  said:  "  All  matters  of 
exception  occurring  whilst  the  regular  judge  was  presiding  should 
have  been  shown  by  the  bill  of  exceptions,  certified  to  be  true  un- 
der his  signature.  As  to  those  matters,  the  special  judge  had  no 
authority  to  sign  a  bill.  If,  however,  the  exceptions  regarded 
any  matter  which  occurred  before  the  special  judge,  or  was  first 
brought  to  his  notice,  such  as  misconduct  of  the  jury,  newly  dis- 
covered evidence,  etc.,  he  should  have  signed  the  bill  himself,  al- 
though he  had  vacated  the  bench.  The  object  of  the  signature 
is  to  give  verity  to  the  statement  of  occurrences  complained  of 
as  erroneous.  As  it  is  the  duty  of  the  presiding  judge  to  con- 
sider them,  he  can  most  properly  certify  them.  In  doing  so,  he 
performs  no  judicial  act,  requiring  him  to  have  the  present  char- 
acter and  authority  of  a  judge.  He  thereby  orders  nothing  and 
determines  nothing,  not  already  ruled.  The  certificate  has  refer- 
ence to  past  transactions.  The  honorable  special  judge  was  mis- 
taken in  basing  his  opinion,  as  to  his  incompetency  to  sign  the 
bill  of  exceptions,  upon  the  ground  that  he  had  vacated  the 
bench.  He  might  sign  it  as  to  all  matters  occurring  before 
himself  .2  As  to  matters  arising  before  the  regular  judge,  he  was 
the  only  person  competent  to  certify  them,  except  in  certain  con- 
tingencies, when  bystanders  might  do  so."  ^  Where  there  was 
thus  a  change  of  judges  during  the  trial,  after  the  evidence  had 
been  heard  and  the  instructions  given,  the  Supreme  Court  held 
that  it  could  not  regard  any  proceedings  as  before  it  for  review 
which  were  not  regularly  certified  in  a  bill  of  exceptions,  signed  by 
the  regular  judge  who  presided  when  the  proceedings  were  had.* 

1  Bullock  tJ.  Neal,  42  Ark.  278.  *  Bulloch  v.    Neal,   42    Ark.  supra. 

2  Citiug  Watkius  v.  State,   37   Ark.  Compare  Cowall  v.  Altchul,   40  Ark,. 
370.  172. 

3  Bulloch  V.  Neal,  42  Ark.  278. 


Tit     II,  Ch.  VIII.]  CONDUCT    OF    THE    JUDGE.  207 

§  215.  Objection  that  the  Judge  presided  on  a  previous 
Trial  of  the  same  Action. — Generally  speaking,  it  is  no  objec- 
tion to  the  qualification  of  a  judge  that  he  presided  upon  a  pre- 
vious trial  of  the  same  cause,  though  of  course  a  plain 
manifestation  of  prejudice  against  either  party  on  the  previous 
trial  might,  under  statutory  rules  existing  in  various  jurisdictions, 
afford  ground  of  a  change  of  venue.  In  a  cause  of  some  celeb- 
rity in  New  York,  an  action  for  libel  against  James  Gordon  Ben- 
nett, the  publisher  of  the  New'  York  Herald,  Chief  Justice 
Oakley,  of  the  New  York  Superior  Court,  before  whom  the 
cause  had  been  previously  tried,  after  consulting  with  his 
brethren,  when  the  cause  had  been  reached  in  its  order  on  the 
calendar,  declined  to  yield  to  the  request  of  the  plaintiff  to  have 
it  tried  before  another  judge  of  the  same  court.  It  was  held 
that  this  was  no  ground  of  exception.  Bosworth,  J.,  in  giving 
the  opinion  of  the  same  court,  said :  "We  know  of  no  recog- 
nized principle  which  will  justify  a  judge  in  holding  a  circuit 
court,  to  direct  a  cause  on  the  calendar,  when  reached  and  ready 
to  be  tried,  to  be  postponed  and  await  its  oi)portunity  to  betried 
before  another  judge,  merely  because  it  had  been  previously 
tried  before  himself.  The  considerations  of  inconvenience  and 
delay  resulting  from  such  a  practice  in  the  circuit  courts,  as 
they  are  generally  constituted,  would  not,  it  is  true,  exist  to  the 
same  extent  with  reference  to  a  court  organized  as  this  court  is. 
But  that  view  cannot  affect  the  legal  rights  of  the  parties,  nor  the 
legal  duty  of  the  presiding  judge.  The  objection  by  either  party 
to  retrying  a  cause  before  a  judge  before  whom  it  has  been  once 
tried  would  apply  with  nearly,  if  not  quite  as  much  force,  to  trj^- 
ing  it  before  either  of  the  judges  who  sat  at  General  Term  and 
heard  the  argument  which  resulted  in  granting  a  new  trial.  For 
it  is  to  be  presumed  that  they  severally  examined  the  evidence, 
and  formed  opinions  of  the  merits  according  to  such  evidence, 
especially  in  a  case  where,  as  in  this  one,  a  new  trial  was  sought 
as  well  on  the  ground  of  excessive  damages  as  of  erroneous  de- 
cisions of  questions  of  law.  Even  if  such  a  presumption  should 
not  entirely  and  in  all  respects  accord  with  the  fact,  yet  it  would 
be  true  that  the  judae  Avho  examined  and    scrutinized  the  evi- 


208  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 

dence  most  closely,  and  made  himself  most  familiar  with  its  de- 
tails, would  be  mos,t  obnoxious  to  such  an  objection;  because 
the  inference  would  be  just  that  he  had  more  decided  views  with 
respect  to  the  whole  merits,  as  developed  by  the  evidence  given 
on  the  first  trial,  than  one  who  had  given  less  attention  to  the 
evidence  in  all  its  particulars.  It  is  no  part  of  the  province  of 
a  judge  to  find  the  facts,  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that, 
on  a  second  trial,  he  will  not  apply  any  rules  of  law  determined 
by  the  court  which  granted  a  new  trial,  with  as  much  firmness 
and  accuracy  as  if  he  were  a  stranger  to  the  cause.  Any  judge 
would  willingly  be  relieved  from  trying  a  cause  which  he  knew 
either  party  was  averse  to  trying  before  him.  But  although  he 
might  be  disposed  to  gratify  any  such  prejudice  of  either  party, 
he  is  not  at  liberty  to  refuse  to  try  a  cause,  wdien  reached  and 
ready  to  be  tried,  for  any  reason  which  the  law  does  not  recog- 
nize as  sufficient.  The  ground  of  objection  assigned  will  not 
warrant  us  in  granting  a  new  trial,  either  because  it  was  erro- 
neous to  overrule  it,  or  because,  in  the  proper  exercise  of  judicial 
discretion,  it  should  have  been  sustained."  ^ 

§  216.  Exclusion  of  Spectators  when  not  a  Violation  of 
Right  of  Public  Trial.  — During  the  progress  of  a  trial  for  an 
assault  with  intent  to  commit  murder,  the  court  made  an  order 
directing  that  the  lobby  outside  of  the  court-room  should  be 
cleared  of  spectators,  and  that  no  person  except  officers  of  the 
court,  reporters  of  the  public  press,  friends  of  the  defendant, 
and  persons  necessary  for  her  to  have  on  said  trial,  should  be 
allowed  to  remain ;  but  no  order  was  made  requiring  the  doors 
to  be  closed,  and  the  friends  of  defendant  and  reporters  were 
permitted  to  come  and  go  at  will.  The  order  of  the  court  was 
made  on  behalf  of  the  defendant,  as  well  as  to  preserve  order, 
because  the  attendance  and  conduct  of  a  large  crowd  in  the  court 
room  tended  to  excite  the  defendant.  It  was  held  that  the  de- 
fendant's right  to  a  public  trial  was  not  violated. ^ 

1  Fry  t».  Bennett,  3  Bosw.  (N.Y.)  200,      N.   Y.   324,   329.     Compare    Pierce  v. 
The   point  was  af!irined  on  appeal  and      Delameter,  1  N.  Y.  17. 
the    above    reasouiug    approved.     28  2  f>eople  v.  Kerrigan  (Cal,),  H  Pac. 

Rep.  849. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.   VIII.]  CONDUCT   OF   THE   JUDGE.  209 

§  217.  Wlieii  improper  to  grant  Leave  of  Absence  to 
Counsel.  —  In  Georijia  it  seems  there  is  a  statute  regulation 
requiring  counsel,  under  what  circumstances  the  writer  does  not 
know,  to  obtain  leave  of  absence  from  the  court.  It  has  been  laid 
down  in  a  case  in  that  State  that  the  grantino;  of  leave  of  absence 
by  court  to  counsel,  unless  for  providential  cause,  is  of  doubtful 
propriety  when  it  affects  the  rights  and  interests  of  other  parties, 
and  should  be  exercised  at  all  times  with  caution  and  circum- 
spection by  the  court.  But  where  the  court  had  granted  the 
claimant's  counsel  leave  of  absence,  though  the  docket  did  not 
show  him  to  be  of  counsel  (such,  however,  otherwise  appearing 
to  be  the  fact),  the  Supreme  Court  would  not  control  the  discre- 
tion of  the  trial  court  in  continuing  the  case  because  of  such 
absence. i 

§  218.  Prejudicing- the  Minds  of  the  Jurors. — Undoubt- 
edly, any  remarks  of  the  presiding  judge  made  in  the  presence  of 
the  jury,  which  have  a  tendency  to  prejudice  their  minds  against 
the  unsuccessful  party,  will  afford  ground  for  a  reversal  of  the 
judgment.  But  it  has  been  held  that  a  mere  complaint  made  by 
the  presiding  judge,  of  the  consumption  of  time  by  counsel,  does 
not  fall  within  this  category.  Accordingly,  it  was  no  ground 
for  a  new  trial  that  counsel  for  the  defendant  requested,  before 
the  concluding  argument  to  the  jury  on  their  part  was  begun, 
and  whilst  the  argument  for  the  State  was  in  progress,  that  the}^ 
be  furnished  with  the  authorities  relied  upon  by  the  State,  and 
the  court  replied:  "You  shall  be  furnished  with  them  before 
your  concluding  counsel  commences  his  argument,  and  they  shall 
be  read  too,  if  you  desire  to  consume  another  hour  of  the  time 
of  the  court."  ■^ 

§  219.  [Continued.]  Remarks  Indicating  Opinion  as  to 
Facts. — During  the  progress  of  a  criminal  trial,  the  clerk  of 
the  justice  of  the  peace  who  had  taken  down  the  testimony  on 
the  preliminary  examination,  testifying  as  a  witness,  was  asked 
by  the  court:  "  Don't  you  ever  make  mistakes  in  taking  down 

1  Ross  V.  Head,  51  Ga.  005.  2  Long  v.  State,  12  G*.  295,  330. 

1* 


210  CONTROL    AND    REGULATION    OF    TRIAL.        [1   Thoilip.  Tl'., 

testimony  in  the  justice's  court?  ' '  To  which  the  witness  replied  : 
"  It  may  be  possible,  your  honor,  but  we  try  not  to."  "Where- 
upon the  judge  made  the  remark  in  the  presence  of  the  jury: 
"  Well,  if  you  don't,  you  are  the  first  justice  of  the  peace  I  ever 
heard  of  who  does  not  make  a  mistake  occasionally."  It  was 
held  that  these  remarks  were  in  substance  and  effect  an  instruc- 
tion to  the  jury  upon  questions  of  fact,  and  were  in  violation  of 
the  constitutional  rights  of  the  accused. ^  It  is  immaterial  that  a 
prejudicial  remark  of  this  kind  is  not  embodied  in  the  forma 
instructions,  since  it  would  have  substantially  the  same  effect 
upon  the  jury  as  if  it  were  so  given. ^  The  same  court  in  another 
case,  said:  "Under  our  practice  the  judge  should  intimate  no 
opinion  upon  the  facts.  If  he  cannot  do  so  directly,  he  cannot 
indirectly ;  if  not  explicitly,  he  cannot  by  innuendo ;  and  the  effect 
of  such  an  opinion  cannot  be  obviated  by  announcing  in  distinct 
terms  the  jury's  independency  of  hini  in  all  matters  of  fact."  ^ 
The  same  court,  straining  this  rule,  reversed  a  judgment  in  a 
criminal  trial,  because  the  trial  court,  in  overruling  an  objection 
to  certain  testimony,  remarked  in  the  presence  of  the  jury, 
"  that  there  was  as  much  testimony  that  defendant  had  kicked 
the  deceased  upon  the  chest  as  upon  the  face ;  ' '  although  the 
court  subsequently  cautioned  the  jury  that  he  did  not  wish  to  be 
understood  as  saying  how  much  or  how  little  testimony  there  was 
on  any  particular  point,  that  the  whole  matter  was  for  them  to 
pass  upon,  and  that  they  would  observe  for  themselves  what  the 
testimony  was,  —  without,  however,  in  terms  retracting  this 
opinion  formerly  expressed.*  Carrying  out  the  same  idea,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  California,  where  the  judge  had  expressed  his 
opinion  as  to  the  respectability  of  a  witness  under  examination, 
said:  "  We  should  not  hesitate  to  reverse  the  judgment  because 
of  it,  if  the  same  depended  in  any  material  degree  upon  the  testi- 
mony of  the  witness  whose  character  and  standing  were  thus 
indorsed."  ^ 


1  state  V.  Tickel,  13  Nev.  502,  508.  *  State  v.  Harkin,  7  Nev.  381. 

2  People  V.  Bonds,  1  Nev.  33,  3(j.  ^  McMinn  v.  Wheelan,  27  Cal.  300, 

3  State  V.  Ah  Tong,  7  Nev.  U8,  152.      319. 


Tit.  II,  Ch.   VIII.]  CONDUCT    OF    THE    JUDGE.  211 

§  220.  Asking  pertinent  Question  of  Counsel. — The  judge 
may  ask  counsel  a  pertinent  question  during  the  examination  of 
an  expert,  even  though  the  effect  be  to  put  the  witness  on  his 
guard  by  disclosing  to  him  a  fact  which  the  counsel  wished  him 
not  to  know.^ 

§  221.  Conversing  privately  with  Witnesses. —  The  judge 
should  not  converse  privately,  either  in  or  out  of  court,  with  a 
witness,  to  ascertain  whether  he  has  or  has  not  knowledge  of 
particular  facts;  nor  should  he  suggest  to  the  witness,  after  his 
examination,  that  there  are  facts  other  than  those  to  which  he 
has  testified,  within  his  knowledge.^  But  it  is  not  ground  for  a 
new  trial  that  the  judge  conversed  with  a  witness  upon  the  stand, 
after  his  examination  was  through,  in  an  undertone.^ 

i  City  Bank  v.  Kent,  57  Ga.  285.  »  City  Bank  v.  Kent,  57  Ga.  285. 

2  Sparks  v.  State,  59  Ala.  82,  87. 


212  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr. 


TITLE    III. 

OPEISrmG  THE  CASE  AND  PKESENTING  THE 

EVIDENCE. 


Chapter  IX.  —  Of  the  Right  to  Open  and  Close. 

Chapter  X. — Of  the  Opening  Statement. 

Chapter  XI.  —  Excluding  Witnesses  from  the  Court  Room. 

Chapter  XII.  —  Of  the  Privilege  of  Witnesses. 

Chapter  XIII.  —  Preliminary  Questions  of  fact  for  the 
Judge. 

Chapter  XIV. — Control  of  the  Court  over  the  Examin- 
ation OF  Witnesses. 

Chapter  XV. — Incidents  of  the   Direct  Examination. 

Chapter  XVI. — Of  the  Use  by  Witnesses  of  Memoranda 
TO  Refresh  Recollection. 

Chapter  XVII.  —  Of  the  Cross-examination. 

Chapter  XVIII.  —  Of  the  Re-examination. 

Chapter  XIX.  —  Of  Indirect  Impeachment. 

Chapter  XX.  —  Of  Direct  Impeachment. 

Chapter  XXI. — Sustaining  and  Corroborating  Witnesses. 

Chapter  XXII.  —  Of  the  Examination  of  Experts. 

Chapter  XXIII.  —  Of  the  Accused  as  Witnesses. 

Chapter  XXIV.  —  Of  the  Unsworn  Statement  op  the  Ac- 
cused. 

Chapter  XXV.  —  Objections  to  Evidence  and  Exceptions 
TO  THE  Rulings  thereon. 

Chapter  XXVI.  —  Of  the  Production  and  Use  of  Books 
AND  Papers. 

Chapter  XXVII.  —  Of  Natural  Evidence. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  I,]       RIGHT   TO   OPEN   AND    CLOSE.  213 


CHAPTER     IX. 

CTF  THE  RIGHT  TO  OPEN  AND  CLOSE. 


Article    I. — In  Ordixary  Actions. 
Article  II.  — In  Special  Proceedings. 
Article  III. — Certain  Special  Rules. 


Article  I.  — In  Ordinary  Actions. 

Section 

225.  Preliminary. 

226.  Importance  of  the  Right. 

227.  Confusing  Ideas  upon  the  Subject. 

228.  The  Plaintiff  l)egins  where  he  has  anything  to  Prove. 

229.  What  this  Rule  Decides. 

230.  In  Actions  for  Unliquidated  Damages. 

231.  In  Actions  on  Contracts  which  Liquidate  the  Damages. 

232.  In  Actions  on  Contracts  which  do  not  Liquidate  the  D  inages. 

233.  Doctrine  of  this  Article  Restated. 

§  225.  Preliminary.  —  The  right  to  open  aud  close  is  strictly 
a  branch  of  the  discussion  concernino;  forensic  aro-ument,  and 
hence  belongs  in  the  next  succeeding  article ;  but  as  this  right 
must  be  settled  at  the  outset,  before  the  opening  statement  is 
made  or  before  any  evidence  is  introduced,  it  is  perhaps  best  to 
consider  it  here. 


§  226.  Importance  of  the  Right. — The  right  to  open  and 
close  the  argument  in  a  civil  case  has  been  deemed  of  such  im- 
portance that  it  has  been  the  subject  of  a  distinct  treatise  by  a 
distinguished  law  writer  and  judge. ^     It  is  the  settled  law  in 

'^  Best  on  the  Right  to  Begin. 


214 


OPENING   THE    CASE.  [1  Tliomp.   Tr.» 


England/  and  in  most,^  though  not  all,^  American  jurisdictions, 
that  a  deprivation  of  this  right  is  substantial  error,  whiph,  if 
saved  and  properly  presented  by  a  bill  of  exceptions,  will 
operate  to  reverse  a  judgment ;  while  in  still  others  there  is  a 
middle  rule  to  the  effect  that  it  is  a  matter  within  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  trial  court,  which  discretion  will  not  be 
revised  except  in  cases  of  manifest  abuse.*     A  statute  prescrib- 


1  Huckman  v.  Fernie,  3  Mees.  &  W. 
605;  Mercer  V.  Whall,  5  Ad.  &  El.  (n. 
8.)  447;  Geach  v.  Ingall,  14  Mees.  & 
W.  95;  Ashby  v.  Bates,  15  Mees.  &  W. 
589. 

2  David  V.  Mason,  4  Pick.  (Mass.) 
156;   Robinson  v.  Hitchcock,   8  Met. 
(Mass.)  64;  Merriam  v.  Cuuuingham, 
11  Gush.   (Mass.)  40,  44;    Beuham  v. 
Eowe,   2  Cal.    387,  408;    Singleton  v. 
Millett,    1  Nott   &  McC.    (S.  C.)  355; 
Johnson  v.  Wideman,  Dudley  (S.  C.), 
70;    Huntington  v.  Conkey,   33  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  218;  Ayrault  v.  Ghamberlain, 
33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  229 ;  Hill  v.  Perry,  82 
Ind.  28;  Johnson  v.  Josephs,  75  Me. 
544;  Ney  v.  Rothe,  61  Tex.  374;  Millerd 
V.  Thorn,  56  N.  Y.  402;  Glaflin  v.  Baere, 
28  Hun  (N.  Y.),  204;  Johnson  v.  Max- 
well,  87  N.  C.  18,  22;   Peuhryn  Slate 
Go.  V.  Meyer,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.),  61;  Mil- 
lerd V.  Thorn,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  376; 
s.  c.  56  N.  Y.  402;  Lindsley  v.  European 
Petroleum  Go.,  3  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  176; 
Elwell  V.  Ghamberlain,  31  N.  Y.  611, 
614;    Ghurchwell  v.   Rogers,    Hai'din 
(Ky.),  182;  Goldsberry  v.  Stuteville,  3 
Bibb  (Ky.),  345;  Blackledge  v.  Pine, 
28   Ind.   466;    Young  v.   Highland,    9 
Gratt.    (Va.)    16;   Haines  v.  Kent,  11 
Ind.  126. 

3  Montgomery  v.  Swindler,  32  Oh. 
St.  224,  226;  Gomstock  v.  Hadlyme 
Ecc.  Soc,  8  Gonn.  254;  Scott  v.  Hull, 
8  Gonn.  296;  Lexington  &c.  Ins.  Go.  v. 
^  Paver,  16  Oh.  324,  330;  State  v.  Wat- 
ham,  48  Mo.  55;  Wade  v.  Scott,  7  Mo. 
509,  514;   Sodousky  v.  McGee,  4  J.  J. 


Marsh.  (Ky.)  267,275;  Day  v.  Wood- 
worth,  13  How.  (U.  S.)  363;  Hall  v. 
Weare,  92  U.  S.  728;  Lancaster  v. 
Gollins,  115  U.  S.  222. 

*  In  Texas,   a  deprivation  of  this 
right  is  error  for  which  the  judgment 
will  be  reversed,  unless  it  appear  that 
the  party   complaining   has  not  been 
injured  thereby  (Ney  v.  Rothe,  61  Tex. 
374,  376),  and  in  Iowa  (what  is  sub- 
stantially the  same  thing),  "while  the 
right  to  review  such  a  question  is  not 
absolutely  denied,  yet  there  must  be  a 
clear  case  of  prejudice   in  order  to 
justify  a  reversal  upon  this  ground." 
Preston  v.  Walker,  26  Iowa,  205,  207; 
Eouutain  v.  West,  23  Iowa,  9, 14 ;  Good- 
pastor  V.  Voris,  8  Iowa,  335;  Smith  v. 
Goopers,  9  Iowa,  379;   Woodward  v. 
Laverty,   14  Iowa,  381;  Viele  v.  Ger- 
raania  Ins.   Go.,   26  Iowa,  9,  45.     In 
Wisconsin,  this  is  a  matter  resting  in 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge, 
which  discretion  is  subject  to  review 
only  in  cases  of  outrage  or    abuse. 
Marshall  v.  American  Express  Go.,  7 
Wis.  1,  19.    A  similar  doctrine  was 
suggested  in  a  case  in  New  York  (Fry 
V.  Bennett,  28  N.  Y.  324,  331)  ;  but,  as 
seen  by  cases  cited  in  the  preceding 
note,  the  rule  in  that  State  is  now  the 
same  as  in  England.     This  doctrine 
also  prevails  in  Arkansas  (Pogue  v. 
Joyner,  7  Ark.  462)  and  in  Missouri. 
Reichard  v.  Manhattan  Life  Ins.  Co., 
31  Mo.  518;  Farrell  v.  Brennan,  32  Mo. 
328;  McCliutockv.  Curd,  32  Mo.  411; 
Wade  V.  Scott,  7  Mo.  509;  Tibeau  v. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  IX.]   RIGHT  TO  OPEN  A^D  CLOSE. 


215 


ing  which    party    shall   have  this  right  has    been  held  manda- 
tory.^ 

§  227.  Confusing  Ideas  upon  the  Subject. —  Prior  to  the 
time  when  the  ques.tion  became  settled  in  England,  as  will 
be  hereafter  stated,  the  English  books  were  full  of  confusing 
ideas  upon  this  subject.  These  ideas  were  propagated  in  this 
country,  and  they  still  disfigure  our  jurisprudence  to  a  consider- 
able extent.  One  of  them  was  an  attempt  to  formulate  the  rule 
in  the  proposition  that  the  party  sustaining  the  burden  of  proof  ,2 
or,  as  it  is  sometimes  stated,  the  burden  of  the  issue, ^  or  of  the 
issues,*  or  the  affirmative  of  the  issue  or   issues,*    possesses  the 


Tibeau,  22  Mo.  77.     This  was  at  oue 
time  tlie  rule  iu  England.     Goodtitle  v. 
Brahara,    4   T.   R.    497;    Branford    v 
Freeman,    1   Eug.   Law  and  Eq.  444 
Geach  v.  Ingall,    14  Mees.   &  W.  97 
Booth  V.  Millus,   15  Mees.  &W.  669, 
Doe  V.  Brayue,  5   Com.   Bench,   655; 
Edwards  v.  Matthews,  16  L.  J.  Exch. 
291.     Iu  New  Hampshire,  as  late  as 
1850,  it  was  regarded  as  an  open  ques- 
tion whether  it  was  a  matter  of  right 
or  discretion' merely  (Belknap  v.  Wen- 
dell, 21  N.  H.  175,  182) ;  but,  as  above 
seen,  it  is  now  regarded  in  that  State 
as  a  matter  of  right. 

1  Heffron  v.  State,  8  Ela,  73. 

2  Ransone  v.  Chi-istian,  56  Ga.  351; 
Baker  i'.  Lyman,  53  Ga.  339;  Com.  v. 
Haskell,  2  Brewst.  (Pa.)  491;  Hudson 
V.  Wetheriugton,  79  N.  C.  3;  Bradley 
V.  Clark,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  293;  Patton 
V.  Hamilton,  12  lud.  256;  Shank  v. 
Fleming,  9  Lid.  189;  Mason  v.  Croom, 
24  Ga.  211;  Higdon  v.  Higdon,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  48;  Bertody  v.  Isou,  69 
Ga.  317;  .Judah  v.  Trustees,  23  Lid. 
272;  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McWhin- 
uey,  36  Ind.  436;  Hyatt  v.  Clements, 
65  Ind.  12 ;  Hill  v.  Perry,  82  Ind.  28,  31 ; 
Wright  u.  Abbott,  85  Ind.  154;  Good- 
win V.  Smith,  72  Ind.  113;  Johnson  v. 
Josephs,  75  Me.  544  i  Tobiuv.  Jenkins, 


29  Ark  .151,  153;  Y  iugling  v.  Hesson, 
16  Md.  112,  121;  Waller  v.  Morgan, 
18  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  137,  144;  1  Greenl. 
Ev.,  §  74  and  note. 

3  McLees  v.  Felt,  11  Ind.  218. 

*  Rev.  Stat.  Ind.  (1881),  §  536; 
Iowa  Rev.  Stat.  (1886),  §  2780;  Judah 
V.  Trustees,  23  Ind.  274,  283;  dis- 
tinguishing Howards.  Kisling,  15  Ind. 
83,  and  Aurora  v.  Cobb,  21  Ind.  492. 
Compare  McLees  v.  Felt,  11  lud.  218; 
Ashing  V.  Miles,  16  Ind.  329. 

*  Goss  V.  Turner,  21  Vt.  440;  Dun- 
lop  V.  Peter,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  403;  Beale 
V.  Newton,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  405;  Yau 
Cleave  w.  Beam,  2  Dana  (Ky.),  155; 
(compare  Higdon  v.  Higdon,  6  J.  J. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  50)  ;  Randolph  Bank  v. 
Armstrong,  11  Iowa,  515;  Daviess  v. 
Arbuckle,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  525;  Golds- 
berry  u.  Stuteville,  3  Bibb  (Ky.),  346; 
Latham  V.  Selkirk,  11  Tex.  314,  322; 
Auld  V.  Hepburn,  1  Cranch  C.  C.  122. 
Compare  Sutton  v.  Mandeville,  1 
Cranch  C.  C.  187;  Buzzell  v.  Snell,  25 
N.  H.  474,  478;  Chesley  v.  Chesley,  37 
N.  H.  229 ;  Den  d.  Hopper  v.  Demar- 
est,  21  N.  J.  L.  526,  530;  Denney  v. 
Booker,  2  Bibb  (Ky.),  427;  Page  v. 
Carter,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  192;  Mar- 
shall V.  Am.  Express  Co.,  7  Wis.  1, 
18;  Reichard  v.  Manhattan  Life  Ins. 


216  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

right  to  open  and  close  the  argument.  In  cases  where  the  ques- 
tion was  free  from  difficulty,  these  propositions  generally,  though 
not  always,  conducted  the  courts  to  the  right  results;  but  the 
application  of  them  has  been  attended  with  the  difficulty  which 
always  attends  in  practice  the  application  of  general  rules :  by 
reason  of  their  generality  they  have  failed  to  supply  a  uniform 
test  by  which  to  decide  every  question  of  this  kind  whenever  it 
arises  —  a  thing  which  is  extremely  desirable  when  possible. 
The  rule  that  the  right  rests  with  the  party  sustaining  the  bur- 
den of  proof  is  not  adequate,  because  in  many  cases  the  plaintiff 
sustains  the  burden  as  to  some  slight  or  almost  formal  matter, 
after  which  the  burden  shifts  upon  the  defendant,  and  either  re- 
mains with  him  throughout  the  case,  or  else,  as  sometimes  hap- 
pens, shifts  back  again  upon  the  plaintiff.  In  these  cases,  how 
is  the  rule  to  l)e  applied?  The  plaintiff  sustains  the  burden  at 
the  threshold ;  he  must  go  forward  and  produce  some  evidence, 
albeit  slight  or  formal,  such  as  the  introduction  of  a  written  in- 
strument, or  the  proof  of  a  signature,  while  the  substantial  con- 
test in  the  case  grows  out  of  defensive  matter  pleaded  by  his 
antagonist.  The  same  may  be  said  substantially  as  to  the  rule 
that  the  right  rests  with  the  party  having  the  burden  of  the  issue, 
which  means  the  same  thing  as  the  burden  of  proof.  Nor  has 
the  statutory  rule  in  Indiana  and  Iowa,  that  the  right  rests  with 
the  party  having  the  burden  of  the  issues,  supplied  an  unvarying 
rule  for  the  decision  of  the  question ;  since  in  many  cases  the 
plaintiff  will  have  the  burden  of  a  single  issue,  and  the  defend- 
ant will  have  the  burden  of  many  others.  The  same  may  be 
said  concerning  the  rule  that  the  right  rests  witli  the  i^arty  having 
the  affirmative  of  the  issues.  Although  it  is  conceded  that  the 
question  must  be  determined  by  the  trial  judge  on  an  inspection 

Co.,  31  Mo.  518;  Banning  v.  Banning,  402;  Claflin  v.  Baera,  28  Ilun  (N.  Y.), 

12  011.  St.  437;  Ross  v.  Gonld,  5   Me.  204;  Colwell    v.  Brower,    75   111.    517, 

210;    Belknap  v.  Wendell,  21    N.    H.  523.     It  has    been  said  that  the  right 
175;  Curtis  v.  Wheeler,  1  Mood.  &  M.  '   is  governed   by  the  same  rule  as  that 

493;  Montgomery  V.  Swindler,  32  Oh.  which  governs  the  production  oi  testi- 

St.  224;  Jackson  v.  Heskete,  2  Stark.  mony.     Perkins   v.  Ermel,  2  Kan.  325, 

N.  P.  518;  Millerd  v.  Thorn,  56  N.  Y.  330. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEX    AND    CLOSE.  217 

of  the  pleadings/  yet  is  the  question  to  be  determined  by  the 
form  of  the  issues,  as  held  in  Texas, ^  or  hj  iho.  substance  of  them 
as  held  in  New  Hampshire, "^  Kentucky,^  and  New  York?^  Again, 
suppose  that  the  defendant  in  his  plea  or  answer  admits  every- 
thing which  the  plaintiff  alleges  as  the  ground  of  his  right  of 
action,  except  the  amount  of  his  damages,  these  being  unliqui- 
dated, —  as  in  actions  for  libel,  where  the  fact  of  the  publication 
is  admitted,  —  is  the  burden  of  proof,  or  the  burden  of  the  issue 
or  issues,  or  the  affirmative  of  the  issue  or  issues,  to  be  held  to 
be  on  the  plaintiff  or  on  the  defendant?  The  general  terms  in 
which  the  rule  has  been  variously  formulated,  as  above  given,  do 
not  furnish  a  uniform  test  by  which  to  determine  these  questions. 

§  228.  The  Plaintiff  Begins  where  he  has  Anything  to 
Prove.  —  The  English  decisions  upon  this  subject  being  in  a 
state  of  confusion,^  a  decision  was  rendered  in  the  Queen's 
Bench  in  the  year  1845,  which  settled  previous  conflicts  and  es- 
tablished a  rule  which  furnishes  an  absolute  test  for  the  decision 
of  the  question  in  all  ordinary  actions  between  plaintiff  and  de- 
fendant. That  rule  is  this:  That  where  the  plaintiff  has  any- 
thing to  prove,  in  order  to  got  a  verdict,  whether  in  an  action 
ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto,  and  whether  to  establish  his  rio-ht  of 
action  or  to  fix  the  amount  of  his  damages,  the  right  to  begin 

1  Dahlmau  v.  Hammel,  45  "Wis.  &  Rob.  281;  s.  c.  G  Carr.  &  P.  CA; 
466;  Richards  r.  Xixon,  20  Pa.  St.  19,  Staunton  v.  Paton,  1  Carr.  &  Kir.  148; 
23.  Rowland  v.  Borues,  1  Carr.  &  Kir.  46; 

2  Latham  v.  Selkirk,  11  Tex.  314,  Bird  v.  Higginson,  2  Ad.  &  El.  160; 
322.  Huckman  v.  Fernie,  3  Mees.  &  W.  505; 

»  Chesley  «.  Chesley,  37  N.  H.  229,  Mills  v.  Barber,  1  Mees.  &  W.   425; 

237.     See  also  Bills  v.  Vose,  27  N.  H.  s.  c.  Tyr.  &  G.  835;  LeAvis  v.  Parker,  4 

215;  Tlmrstou  v.    Kennett,   22  X.   H.  Ad.  &  El.  838;  Bedell  ».  Russell,  Ry.  & 

151.  M.  293;  Bonfleld  v.  Smith,  2  Mood.  & 

*  Daviess  v.  Arbukle,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  Rob.  519;  Pearson  v.  Coles,  1  Mood.  & 

525.  Rob.   206 ;    Pole  v.  Rogers,  2  Mood.  & 

5  Huntington  v.  Coukey,  33    Barb.  Rob.  287;  Reeve  t.  Underhill,  1  Mood. 

(N.  Y.)  218,  228.  &    Rob.   440;    Wootton   v.    Barton,    1 

"  Curtis  V.  Wheeler,  Mood.   &   M.  Mood.  &  Rob.  518;  Jackson  v.  Hesketh, 

493;  Hoggett  v.  Oxley,     Mood.  &  Rob.  2  Stark.  N.  P.  518;  Goodtitlp  d.  Revett 

251;    Burrell  v.  Nicholson,  1  Mood.  &  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  497. 
Rob.    304 ;    Carter  v.  .Jones,  1    Mood. 


218 


OPENING   THE    CASE. 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


and  reply  belongs  to  him.^  This  rule  has  been  generally  adopted 
in  this  country,  as  the  decisions  hereafter  cited  will  show.  The 
unvarying  test  furnished  by  this  rule  is  to  consider  which  party 
would,  in  the  state  of  the  pleadings  and  of  the  record  admissions, 
get  a  verdict  for  substantial  damages,  if  the  cause  were  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  without  any  evidence  being  offered  by  either. 
If  the  plaintiff  would  succeed,  then  there  is  nothing  for  him  to 
prove  at  the  outset,  and  the  defendant  begins  and  replies ;  if  the 
defendant  would  succeed,  then  there  is  something  for  the  plaint- 
iff to  prove  at  the  outset,  and  the  plaintiff  begins  and  replies. ^ 

§  229.  What  this  Rule  Decides.  —  The  advantage  of  this 
rule  is  that  it  defines  the  general  propositions  stated  in  the 
preceding  paragraph  and  tells  us  the  precise  meaning  of 
them.  It  tells  us  that  the  party  sustaining  the  burden 
of  proof,  or  the  burden  of  the  issue  or  issues,  or  the  af- 
tirmative  of  the  issue  or  issues,  is  in  every  case  the  plaintiff, 
where  he  has  anything,  however  slight,  to  prove,  in  order  to  get 
a  verdict  for  other  than  nominal  damages;  and  that  in  every 
other  case  it  is  the  defendant. "^     It  tells    us  that,  although  the 


1  Mercer  v.  Whall,  5  Ad.  &  El.  (n. 
s.)  447;  overruliug  Cooper  u.  Wakley, 
Mood.  &  Malk.  248. 

2  Huckman   v.   Fernie,  2   Jur.  444; 
Veiths  V.  Hagge,  8   la.  163 ;  Robinson 
V.   Hitchcock,    8  Mete.     (Mass.)    64 
Perkins   v.   Errael,  2   Kan.    325,   330 
Amos    V.  Hughes,   1    Mood.  &  R.  464 
Ridgway  v.   Ewbauk,  3   Mood.   &  R 
217;    McConnell  v.  Kitchens,  20  S.  C 
430;    Boyce   v.  Lake,    17    S.    C.    481 
Kennedy    v.    Moore,    17    S.    C.    4(i4 
Burklialter   v.  Coward,    16  >S.  C.  435 
Brown  v.   Kirkpatrick,   5   S.  C.   267 
Pierce  v.  Lyman,   28  Ark.    550;    Ber- 
trand   v.  Taylor,   32  Id.  470;  Camp   v. 
Brown,  48  Ind.  575  (with  -which  com- 
pare Heilman  v.  Shanklin,  (;01nd.  424; 
Johnson?;.  Josephs,  75   Me.  544;  Rolf 
v.Polland,  16  Nehr.  21 ;  s.  c.  11)  N.  W. 
Rep.  615;  Fry  r.  Bennett,  28  N.  Y.  324; 


s.  c.  affl'd  3  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  200:  Little- 
john  V.  Greeley,  13  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
41,45;  Huntington  t).  Coukey,  33  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  218;  Hecker  v.  Hopkins,  16 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  301,  n.;  Opdyke  v. 
Weed,  18  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  223,  n.; 
Love  V.  Dickerson,  85  N.  C.  5;  Dille 
?;.  Lovell,  37  Oh.  St.  415;  Young  w. 
Highland,  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  16. 

3  Johnson  v.  Josephs,  75  Me.  544; 
iSpaulding  v.  Hood,  8  Cush.  (Mass.) 
602;  Thurston  v.  Kennett,  22  N.  H. 
151;  Belknap  v.  Wendell,  21  N.  H. 
175;  Lunt  v.  Wormell,  19  Me.  100; 
Sawyer  v.  Hopkins,  22  Me.  276 ;  Wash- 
ington Ice  Co.  V.  Webster,  68  Me.  449; 
Page  V.  Osgood,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  260; 
Dorr  V.  Tremont  National  Bank,  128 
Mass.  359 ;  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme  Ecc. 
Soc,  8  Conn.  254,  261;  Bills  v.  Vose, 
27  N.   H.  215;  Chesley  v.  Chesley,  37 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE. 


219 


burden  of  proof  may  shift  during  the  trial,  yet  the  right  to  open 
and  close  the  argument  does  not  shift  with  it,  but  that  the  right 
remains  with  the  party  on  whom  it  primarily  rested. ^  It  decides 
that  where  there  are  several  issues,  and  the  plaintiff  has  anything 
to  prove  under  any  one  of  them  in  the  first  instance,  in  order  to 
a  recovery,  the  right  to  open  and  close  is  with  him.^  It  tells  us 
that  in  every  case  where  the  general  issice,  or  a  general  or  special 
denial  is  pleaded,  the  right  to  open  and  close  is  with  the  plaintiff, 
no  matter  what  may  be  the  nature  of  the  controversy,  or  what 
special  defenses  or  counter-claims  may  be  set  up."^ 


N.  H.  229;  Seavy  v.  Dearborn,  19  N. 
H.  351 ;  Fetters  v.  Mimcie  National 
Bank,  34  lud.  251;  Baltimore  &c.  R. 
Co.  ^^  Mc^yhinney,  30  Intl.  436,444; 
Hamlyn  v.  Xesbit,  37  lud.  284 ;  Thomp- 
son ■?;.  Mills,  39  lud.  528;  Williams??. 
Allen,  40  Ind.  295;  Camp  v.  Brown,  48 
Ind.  575;  Aurora  v.  Cobb,  21  Ind.  493, 
509;  Shaw  v.  Barnhart,  17  lud.  183; 
Buzzell  V.  Snell,  25  N.  H.  474,  478 ; 
Hoxie  V.  Greene,  37  How.  Pr.  (X.  Y.) 
97;  Carter  ?;.  Jones,  G  Carr.  &  P.  G4; 
s.  c.  1  Mood  &  Rob.  281;  Amos  v. 
Hughes,  1  Mood.  &  Rol).  404 ;  Rogers 
V.  Diamond,  13  Ark.  474.  Compare 
Pope  V.  Latham,  1  Ark.  66;  Piuley  v. 
Woodruff,  8  Ark.  328. 

1  Brooks  V.  Barrett,  7  Pick.  (Mass.) 
94,  100;  Belknap  v.  Wendell,  21  N.  H. 
175;  Judge  of  Probate  v.  Stone,  44  N. 
H.  593,  602;  Ross  v.  Gould,  5  Me.  204. 
Compare  Crerar  v.  Sodo,  Mood.  &  M. 
85;  Weidman  v.  Kohr,  13  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  17,  24;  Cothrau  v.  Forsyth,  68 
Ga.  560. 

2  Cent.  Bank  v.  St.  John.  17  Wis. 
157;  Davidson  v.  Henop,  1  Crauch  C. 
C.  280;  Churchill  v.  Lee,  77  N.  C.  341; 
Jackson  v,  Pittsford,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
194;  Jackson  v.  Hesketh,  2  Stark.  N. 
P.  518;  Ridgway  v  Ewbank,  2  Mood. 
&  Rob.  217;  Burckhalter  v.  Coward, 
16  S.  C,  435,  442;  Jolmson  v.  Maxwell, 
87   N.    C.   18;    Bertrand   v   Taylor,  32 


Ark.  470;  Zehner  v.  Kepler,  16  Ind 
290;  Bowen  v.  Spears,  20  Ind.  146; 
Viele  V.  Germania  Ins.  Co.,  26  la.  10, 
45;  Veiths  v.  Ilagge,  8  la.  163,  192; 
Sillivant  v.  Reardon,  5  Ark.  141,  157; 
Montgomery  v.  Swiudler,  32  Oh.  St. 
224;  Slauson  v.  Englehart,  34  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  198;  Buzzell  v.  Snell,  25  N. 
H.  474.  Compare  Sodousky  v.  Mc- 
Gee,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  267,  274. 
where  the  subject  is  reasoned  forcibly 
and  at  length  by  Robertson,  C.  J., 
taking  some  positions  which  are  not 
in  conformity  with  the  above  rule. 
As  to  the  right  of  the  court  to  sever 
the  issues,  and  give  the  opening  and 
closing  to  each  party,  see  Central 
Bank  u.  St.  John,  17  Wis,  157;  Vuy- 
ton  V.  Brenell,  1  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 
4G7. 

3  Ayer  v  Austin,  6  Pick.  (Mass.) 
225;  Toppan  v.  Jeuuess,  21  N.  H.  232; 
Jackson  v.  Pittsford,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
194;  Burroughs?;.  Hunt,  13  Ind.  178; 
Cox  V.  Tickers,  35  lud.  27;  Robinson 
r.  Hitchcock,  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  64,  66; 
Perkins  v.  Ermel,  2  Kan.  325,  330; 
Judge  of  Probate  v.  Stone,  44  N.  H. 
593,  602;  Belknap  v.  Wendell,  21  N. 
H.  175;  Thurston  v.  Keunett,  22  N.  H. 
151;  Buzzell  v.  Snell,  25  N.  H.  478; 
Brooks  V.  Barrett,  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  94, 
100;  Chesley??.  Cliesley,  37  N.  II  227, 
237r     So,  where  matter  is  affirmatively 


220 


OPENING    THE    CASE. 


[I  Thomp.  Tr., 


§  230.  In  Actions  for  Unliquidated  Damages. — It  decides 
that,  in  all  actions  for  unliquidated  damages,  except  where  the 
defendant,  by  his  plea  or  answer,  admits  not  only  the  cause  of 
action,  but  also  the  amount  of  damages  claimed,  the  right  is 
with  the  plaintiff;  since  he  must  introduce  evidence  showing  the 
extent  of  his  injury,  ^  —  as  where,  in  any  action  sounding  in  dam- 
ages, the  cause  of  action  is  admitted,  and  a  plea  of  confession  and 
avoidance  is  filed,  leaving  the  amount  of  damages  claimed  sub- 
ject to  affirmative  proof .^  Thus,  in  actions  for  libel  or  slander, 
where  the  defendant  admits  the  writing  or  speaking  and  pleads 
justification,  or  claims  privilege  and  denies  mahce,  the  right,  ac- 
cording to  the  modern  doctrine,  is  with  the  plaintiff.  The  rea- 
son is  that  the  question  of  malice  and  of  the  extent  of  the 
damages  are  both  in  issue,  and  that  the  plaintiff  has  therefore 
something  to  prove  in  order  to  make  out  his  case.^  For  the 
same  reasons,  in  an  action  for  assault  and  battery,  where  the  plea 
is  son  assault  demense,  followed  by  a  replication  de  injuria,  or. 


pleaded  which  amounts  merely  to  the 
general  issue.  Denny  v.  Booker,  2 
Bibb  (Ky.),  427.  Compare,  contra, 
the  text,  Bangs  v.  Snow,  1   Mass.  181. 

1  Mercer  v.  Whall,  5  Ad.  &  El.  (n. 
s.)  447,  4G1;  Aurora  v.  Cobb,  21  Ind. 
493,  509;  Haines  v.  Kent,  11  Ind.  126; 
Young  V.  Highland,  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  16; 
Steptoe  V.  Harvey,  7  Leigh  (Va.),  501, 
544;  Cunningham  u.  Gallagher,  61  Wis. 
170;  Opdyke  v.  Weed,  18  Abb,  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  223,  n.;  Hecker  v.  Hopkins,  16 
Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  301,  n. 

-  Cunningham  v.  Gallagher,  supra. 

3  Vifquain  v.  Finch,  15  Neb.  505; 
Burckhalter  v.  Coward,  16  S.  C.  435, 
443;  Fry  V.  Bennett,  3  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
200,  232;  s.  c.  affirmed,  28  N.  Y.  324. 
The  decision  of  Lord  Tenterden,  in 
Cooper  V.  Wakley,  Mood.  &  M.  248, 
has  been  overruled  in  England,  and 
has  not  been  the  law  in  that  country 
since  the  decision  of  Mercer  v.  Whall, 
5  Ad.  &  El.  (x.  s.)  447,  463,  in  which' 
last  case  Lord  Deumau  said  :  "  K  ever 


a  decision  was  overruled  on  great  de- 
liberation, and  by  an  undeviating 
practice  afterwards,  it  was  that  in 
Cooper  V.  Wakley."  The  English 
judges,  soon  after  the  accession  of 
Lord  Denman  to  the  office  of  chief  jus- 
tice of  the  Queen's  Bench,  met  and 
discussed  this  troublesome  question, 
and  adopted  the  following  rule :  "In 
actions  for  libel,  slander  and  injuries 
to  the  person,  the  plaintiff  shall  be- 
gin, although  the  affirmative  is  on  the 
defendant."  A  sketch  of  this  rule  is 
given  by  Lord  Denman  in  his  opinion 
in  Mercer  v.  Whall,  svpra.  Two 
American  decisions  (Moses  v.  Gate- 
wood,  5  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  234,  and  Ran- 
sone  V.  Christian,  56  Ga.  351)  hold 
that,  in  actions  for  libel  or  slander, 
where  the  defendant  pleads  justifica- 
tion, he  assumes  the  affirmative,  and 
the  right  to  begin  and  reply  is  with 
him;  but  these  decisions  are  contrary 
to  iiriuciple  and  entirely  out  of  cur- 
rent with  modern  authority. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEN   AND    CLOSE. 


221 


as  we  would  say  in  modern  procedure,  where  the  answer  is  a 
justification^  the  plaintiff  begins  and  replies;  since  he  must  first 
go  forward  with  his  evidence. ^  So,  in  trespass  de  bonis  asjior- 
talis,  where  the  defendant  pleads  the  general  issue  and  files  "  a 
brief  statement "  justifying  under  his  authority  as  an  officer,  the 
right  is  with  the  plaintiflf.- 

§  231.  In  Actions  on  Contracts  which  Liquidate  the  Dam- 
ages. —  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  action  is  upon  a  contract 
which,  by  its  terms,  liquidates  the  damages  —  as  upon  a  promis- 
sory note,"^  bill  of  exchange,*  bank  check, ^  bill  single,"  policy  of 


1  Young  V.  Highland,  9  Gratt.  (Va.) 
16;  Johnson  v.  Josephs,  75  Me.  544. 
Contra,  and  out  of  line  with  modern 
authority,  are  tlie  following  old  cases ; 
M'Keuzie  v.  Milligau,  1  Bay  (S.  C), 
248;  Goldsberry  v.  Stuteville,  3  Bibb 
(Ky.),  345;  Downey  v.  Day,  4  Ind. 
531.  Compare  Van  Zant  v.  Jones,  3 
Dana  (Ky.),  465,  where,  in  such  a 
state  of  pleading,  the  defendant  of- 
fered no  substantial  evidence  of  justi- 
fication, and  it  was  held  that  the  court 
might,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  dis- 
cretion, withhold  from  him  the  advan- 
tage, which  the  court  supposed  the 
form  of  the  pleadings  gave  him,  by 
giving  the  right  to  open  and  close  to 
the  plaintiff. 

2  Luut  V.  Wormell,  19  Me.  100; 
Ayer  v.  Austin,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  225, 
overruling  Bangs  v.  Snow,  1  Mass.  181. 
It  has  been  held  in  old  cases,  con- 
trary to  the  general  principle  stated  in 
the  text,  that,  in  such  an  action,  where 
justification  only  is  pleaded,  the  de- 
fendant is  entitled  to  open  and  close. 
Kimble  v.  Adair,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  320; 
Downey  v.  Day,  4  Ind.  531.  So,  it  has 
been  held  that,  in  an  action  of  trespass 
quare  clausum,  where  the  defendant 
pleads  freehold  only,  the  right  to  be- 
gin and  reply  is  with  him.  Singleton 
V.  Millet,   Nott  &  McC.    (S.  C.)   355; 


Davis  V.  Mason,  4  Pick,  (Mass.)  156. 
And  one  English  case  holds  that  this  is 
so,  although  the  declaration  alleges 
special  damage.  Fish  v.  Travers,  3 
Carr.  &  P.  578.  But  these  two  classes 
of  decisions  seem  to  be  opposed  to  the 
modern  rule  stated  in  the  text;  since 
in  either  case,  the  damages  being  un- 
liquidated and  not  admitted  in  the 
state  of  the  pleadings,  the  plaintiff  has 
something  to  prove  in  order  to  get  a 
verdict.  See  Haines  v.  Kent,  11  Ind. 
126. 

3  Kimble  v.  Adair,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
320;  Bowen  v.  Spears,  20  Ind.  146; 
Harvey  v.  Ellithorpe,  26  111.  418;  Tip-, 
ton  r.  Triplett,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  570;  Ay- 
rault  V.  Chamberlain,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
229;  Huntington  v.  Conkey,  33  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  218;  Hoxie  v.  Greene,  37  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  97;  McShane  v.  Braender, 
66  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  294;  Hudson  v. 
Weatherington,  79  N.  C.  3;  Blackledge 
V.  Piue,  28  Ind.  466;  Judah  v.  Trustees, 
23  Ind.  272 ;  Shank  v.  Fleming,  9  lud. 
189. 

*  Warner  v.  Haines,  6  Carr.  &  P. 
666;  List  v.  Kortepeter,  26  Ind.  27. 

5  Elwell  V.  Chamberlin,  31  N.  Y.  611. 

6  Richards  v.  Nixon,  20  Pa.  St.  19, 
23;  Scott  V.  Hull,  8  Conn.  296.  Com- 
pare Robinson  v.  Hitchcock,  8  Mete. 
(Mass.)  64. 


222 


OPENING    THE    CASE, 


[1  Thomp.  Tr., 


life  ^  or  fire  insurance,-  or  any  other  written  instrument  which 
by  its  terms  fixes  the  amount  of  the  recovery,^  —  and  the  de- 
fendant admits  the  execution  of  the  instrument,  but  sets  up  an 
aflSrmative  defense/  such  as  duress/  fraud/  want  of  jurisdiction/ 
usury/  a  discharge  under  an  insolvent  debtor's  act  ^  or  in  bank- 
ruptcy/^ want  of  title  in  the  plaintiff/^  tender  /^  or  other  affirmative 
matter  of  defense/^  or  pleads  a  set-off  or  counter-claim/*  —  in  all 
such  cases  the  plaintiff  has  nothing  to  prove  in  order  to  recover; 
upon  a  default  an  inquiry  of  damages  would  be  unnecessary; 
and  therefore  the  right  to  begin  and  reply  is  with  the  de- 
fendant. 

§  232.  In  Actions  on  Contracts  whicli  do  not  Liquidate  the 
Damages.  —  Outside  of  these  lie  a  mass  of  cases,  founded  upon 
contracts,  express  or  implied,  where  the  contract  itself  does  not 
liquidate  the  damages,  and  where,  although  the  existence  of  the 
contract  is  admitted  in  the  pleadings,  the  damages  claimed  are 
not  admitted;  or  where  defensive  matter  is  set  up,  apparently  in 


1  Breunan  v.  Security  Life  Ins.  Co., 
4:  Daly  (N.  Y.),  296.  Compare,  contra, 
Ashby  V.  Bates,  15  Mees.  &  W.  589. 

2  Viele  V.  Germauia  Ins.  Co.,  2 
Iowa,  10,  44. 

3  Aurora  v.  Cobb,  21  lud.  492,  509. 
*  Auld  V.  Hepburn,  1  Crauch  C.  C. 

(U.  S.)  122. 

^  Hoxie  V.  Greene,  37  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  97. 

«  Elwell  V.  Chamberlin,  31  N.  Y. 
Gil;  Brennan  v.  Security  Life  Ins.  Co., 
Daly  (N.  Y.),  29(5. 

'  Tipton  V.  Triplett,  1  IMetc.  (Ky.) 
570;  Hoxie  v.  Greene,  37  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  97;  McShaue  v.  Braeuder,  6G  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  294 ;  List  v.  Kortepeter,  26 
Ind.  27. 

8  Harvey  v.  Ellithorpe,  20  111.  418; 
Ayrault  v.  Chamberlain,  33  Bai-b.  (N. 
Y.)  229;  Huntintiton  v.  Conkey,  33 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  218;  Elwell  v.  Chamber- 
lin, 31  N.  Y.  Gil. 


Warner  v.    Haines,  6  Carr.  &  P. 


GGG. 

'0  Kichard  v.  Nixon,  20  Pa.  St.  19, 
23. 

"  Hoxie  V.  Greene,  37  How.  Pr.  (N. 
Y.)  97.  Compare  Hudson  v.  Weather- 
ington,  79  N.  C.  3,  where  it  was  held 
that,  upon  an  issue  upon  a  want  of 
title  in  the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  must 
go  forward  with  the  evidence,  and 
consequently  has  the  right  to  begin 
and  reply. 

12  Auld  V.  Hepl)urn,  1  Cranch  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  122.  Compare  Buzzell  v.  Snell, 
25  N.  H.  474. 

"  Biackledge  v.  Pine,  28  Ind.  4G6; 
Judah  V.  Trustee,  23  Ind.  272;  Shank 
V.  Fleming,  9  Ind.  189. 

"  Bowen  v.  Spears,  20  Ind.  146; 
Brown  v.  Kirkpatrick,  5  S.  C.  2G7. 
Compare  Penhryn  Slate  Co.  v.  Meyer, 
8  Daly  (N.  Y.),G1;  Graham  v.  Gautier, 
21  Tex.  112. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE.  223 

avoidance,  but  which  really  amounts  to  a  denial  of  the  grounds 
on  which  the  right  of  recovery  is  predicated, —  in  all  which  cases 
the  right  to  begin  and  reply  is  with  the  plaintiff.  Among  these 
may  be  mentioned  actions  of  debt  on  penal  bonds  where  the  plea 
is  nil  debit,  performance,  set-off,  etc.,  —  these  pleas  not  dispens- 
ing with  the  necessity  of  proving  the  breaches  and  the  damages ;  i 
actions  for  goods  sold,  answer  admitting  sale  and  delivery,  but 
alleging  that  the  goods  were  not  equal  to  the  quality  agreed 
upon,  and  claiming  a  recoupment;  '^  actions  for  the  value  of  a 
physician's  services  and  a  plea  in  reconvention,  admitting  the 
services,  but  alleging  damages  by  reason  of  want  of  skill,  etc. ;  ^ 
actions  on  promissory  notes  providing  for  reasonable  attorney's 
fees,  defense  of  payment,  set-off,  etc.,  and  an  admission  that  a 
certain  sum  would  be  a  reasonable  attorney's  fee  if  the  plaintiff 
should  recover  the  amount  of  the  note, —  the  admission  not 
agreeing  what  would  be  a  reasonable  fee  in  case  he  should  re- 
cover  a  2:)art  only  of  the  note  ;  *  actions  upon  promises  and  pleas 
or  answers  alleging  that  the  promise  was  a  different  promise 
from  that  sued  on,  since  this  leaves  the  burden  upon  the  plaint- 
iff of  proving  the  promise  which  he  has  alleged;  ^  covenant  for 
dismissing  a  servant,  justification  and  replication  cZe  injuria, — 
since  the  damages  are  unliquidated  and  must  be  proved  by  the 
plaintiff;^  covenant  broken,  general  issue,  with  notice  (under 
Massachusetts  statute)  of  special  defense  of  discharge  under  in- 
solvent law,  replication  admitting  discharge  but  denying  its 
validity;^  action  upon  a  policy  of  life  insurance — plea, 
misrepresentation  by  the  assured,  replication  de  injuria, —  the 
plea  being  in  substance  a  mere  denial  of  the  averment  in  the 
declaration  of  the  truth  of  the  statement  by  which  the  assured 


1  Sillivaut  V.  Reardon,  5  Ark.   141,  s.)   447   (leading  English  case).     The 
157.  following  decisions  are  referred  to  as 

2  Penhryu  Slate  Co.  ».  Meyer,  8  Daly  contrary  to  the  principle  of  this  case, 
(N.  Y.),  61.  and  as  having  been  wrongly  decided. 

*  Graham  v,  Gautier,  21  Tex.  112.  Page  v.  Carter,  8  B.  Mou.   (Ky.)  192-, 
^  Camp  V.  Brown,  48  Ind.  575.  Sutton  v.  Mandeville,  1  Cranch  C-  C. 

*  Davies  v.  Evans,  6  Carr.  &  P.  619;  (U.  S.)  187. 

McCouuell  V.  Kitchens,  20  S.  C.  430.  *  '  Robinson  v.   Hitchcock,  8   Mete. 

6  Mercer  v.  Whall,  5  Ad.  &  El.  (n.  (Mass.)  64. 


224  orENiNQ  THE  CASE.  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

had  obtained  the  policy;  ^  actions  to  foreclose  mortgages,  since 
the  plaintiff  must  prove  the  mortgage  debt  and  all  other  facts 
preliminary  to  his  right  of  foreclosure ;  ^  an  action  on  bills  of 
exchange  with  a  count  on  an  account  stated,  plea  of  payment  as 
to  the  bills  and  non-assumpsit  as  to  the  account  stated, —  since 
the  plaintiff  must  give  some  evidence  in  order  to  a  recovery  upon 
the  account  stated ;  ^  assumpsit  for  the  unworkman-like  execu- 
tion of  a  contract,  plea  that  the  work  was  properly  done;* 
action  on  an  account,  cause  of  action  not  admitted,  defense  of 
payment ;  ^  action  upon  a  guaranty  of  payment  of  certain  prom- 
issory notes,  answer  denying  any  indebtedness  and  setting  up 
false  and  fraudulent  representations,  etc.,  —  the  reason  being 
that  it  is  incumbent  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  the  original  indebt- 
edness evidenced  by  the  notes;  ^  action  for  goods  sold,  general 
issue  except  as  to  a  part  of  the  sum  demanded,  as  to  a  plea  of 
tender;  ^  and  many  other  similar  cases  which  might  be  stated. 

§  233,  Doctrine  of  this  Article  Restated.  —  The  doctrine  of 
this  article  cannot  better  be  restated  than  in  the  language  of 
Judge  E.  Darwin  Smith  at  the  conclusion  of  a  learned  opinion  in 
the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York:  "1.  The  plaintiff ,  in  all  cases 
where  the  damages  are  unliquidated,  has  the  right  to  open  the 
case  to  the  jury  and  of  the  reply.  2.  Whenever  the  plaintiff  has 
anything  to  prove,  on  the  question  of  damages  or  otherwise,  he 
has  the  right  to  begin.  3.  In  other  cases  where  the  damages  are 
liquidated  or  depend  on  mere  calculation  —  as  the  casting  of  in- 
terest—  the  party  holding  the  affirmative  of  the  issue  has  the 
rifht  to  beffin.  4.  The  affirmative  of  the  issue  in  such  cases 
means  the  affirmative  in  substance,  and  not  inform,  and  upon  the 
whole  record.     5.  The  denial  of  the  right  to  begin,  to  the  party 

1  Ashby  V.  Bates,  15  Mees.  &  W.  *  Amos  t?.  Hughes,  1  Mood.  &  R.  464. 
589.  Compare  Viele  v.  Germauia  lus.  ^  Wright  v.  Abbott,  85  Ind.  154. 
Co.,  26  Iowa,  10,  44;  Breunan  v.  Se-  See  also  Ashlug  v.  Miles,  16  lud.  329 
curity  Life  lus.  Co.,  4  Daly  (N.  Y.),  (action  for  use  and  occupation). 

296.  ^  Uahlman  v.  Hammel,  45  Wis.  466, 

2  Mason  v.  Croora,  24  Ga  211.  citing  Second  Ward  Savings  Bauli  v. 

3  Smart    v.  Rayuer,   6   Carr.  &  T.      Shakman,  30  Wis.  333. 

721.  '  Biuzell  V.  Snell,  25  N,  H.  474,  4"9. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE.  225 

entitled  to  it  and  claiming  it  at  the  proper  time,  is  error,  for 
which  a  new  trial  will  be  granted,  unless  the  court  can  see  clearly 
that  no  injury  or  injustice  resulted  from  the  erroneous  decision."  ^ 
The  foundation  of  this  doctrine  is,  as  before  stated,  the  leading 
case  of  Mercer  v.  WhaU,"^  to  which  most,  though  not  all,  Ameri- 
can courts  have  conformed.  While,  as  already  stated,  the  rule 
of  that  case  is  sufficient  for  the  decision  of  the  question  in  every 
ordinary  case,  yet  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  it  furnishes  the 
key  to  a  decision  of  the  question  in  every  case.  In  a  variety  of 
special  proceedings  the  question  which  the  juror  asked  of  the 
judge  at  the  conclusion  of  his  charge,  "  What  does  your  honor 
mean  by  the  words  plaintiff  and  defendant?  "  is  constantly  re- 
curring. To  this  question,  as  well  as  to  several  other  topics  con- 
nected with  the  subject,  the  next  article  will  be  devoted. 


Article.  II  —  In  Special  Proceedings. 

Section 

236.  Purpose  of  this  Article. 

237.  Tlie  Govei-ning  Priuciple  Stated. 

238.  On  au  Issue  of  Sauity. 

239.  On  Issues  of  Devisavit  vel  non. 

(1.)  Wliat  Rule  upon  Principle. 

(2.)  Cases  which  Concede  the  Right  to  the  Proponents. 

240.  In  Actions  of  Replevin. 

241.  In  Cases  of  Replevin  of  Cattle  Distrained  for  Rent  with  Avowry  of  Rent 

in  Arrear. 

242.  In  Cases  of  Interpleader. 

243.  In  Ci'iminal  Cases. 

244.  In  Cases  of  Fraud. 

245.  [Continued.]     Opposing  Views. 

246.  In  Proceedings  on  Reports  of  Commissioners,  Auditors,  Referees. 

247.  In  Proceedings  to  Condemn  Land  and  Assess  Damages-. 

248.  Petitioner,  Claimant,  Administrator. 

249.  Miscellaneous  Cases  where  the  Right  was  held  to  be  with  the  Plaintiff. 

250.  Miscellaneous  Cases  where  the  Right  is  with  the  Defendant. 

§  236.  Purpose  of  this  Article. — From  the  former  article 
on  this  subject  it  would  appear  that  there  is  no  difficulty  in  de- 
termining, on  principle  and  authority,  with  which  party  the  right 

1  Huntington  v.  Conkey,  33  Barb.  2  5  Ad.  &  El.  (n.  s.)  447. 

(N.  Y.)  218,  228. 

15 


226  OPENING  THE   CASE.  [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

to  open  and  close  the  argument  rests,  in  ordinary  actions  between 
plaintiff  and  defendant.  But,  as  was  there  suggested,  in  many 
special  proceedings  the  situation  of  the  parties  is  such  that  it  is 
difficult  to  determine  which  is  to  be  deemed  to  stand  in  the  posi- 
tion  of  plaintiff  and  which  in  that  of  defendant.  In  these  cases 
the  courts  have  not  been  able  to  lay  hold  of  and  adhere  to  any 
governing  principle,  and  the  result  is  a  great  confusion  and  con- 
trariety of  holding;  so  that  on  perhaps  no  point  can  a  un-iform 
rule  of  procedure,  applicable  in  all  American  jurisdictions,  be 
said  to  exist. 

§  237.  The  Governing  Principle  Stated.  —  Recollecting  the 
general  principle,  developed  in  the  former  article,  that  the  right 
to  open  and  close  is  generally  coincident  with  the  initiatory  bur- 
den of  proof,  that  is  that  it  belongs  to  the  one  who,  in  order  to 
succeed  in  his  action  or  defense,  must  go  forward  and  prove 
sometJiing  in  the  event  of  no  proof  being  offered  by  the  oppos- 
ing party, —  we  arrive  at  a  governing  principle,  which  should 
furnish  an  adequate  rule  in  every  special  proceedmg,  namely,  that 
the  right  to  open  and  close  belongs  to  the  party  who  seeks  to  alter 
the  existing  state  of  things. 

§  238.  On  an  Issue  of  Sanity. — A  simple  illustration  of 
the  ai)plication  of  this  principle  is  found  in  cases  where  the  issue 
is  whether  a  certain  person  is,  or  was  at  a  certain  time,  sane  or 
insane.  The  general  presumption  is  in  favor  of  sanity;  because, 
according  to  human  experience,  men  and  women  are  commonly 
sane.  The  party  asserting  the  sanity  of  the  person  whose  san- 
ity is  in  question  has  therefore  at  the  outset  nothing  to  prove; 
but  the  burden,  and  with  it  the  right  to  open  and  close  the  con- 
test, rests  upon  the  person  asserting  the  contrary.  He  is  the  one 
who  seeks  to  overthrow  the  general  presumption,  or  to  aher  the 
commonly  existing  state  of  things.  Thus,  on  the  hearing  of  a 
commission  of  lunacy  in  Pennsylvania,  the  burden  of  proof,  and 
with  it  the  right  to  open  and  close  the  argument,  is  with  the 
commonwealth.^     So,  on  an  issue  from  an  orphan's  court,  or 

»  Com.  V.  II;iskL-ll,  '_>  Brcwst.  (Pa.)  491. 


Tit.    ill,  Ch.   IX.]        RIGHT    TO    OPEX    AND    CLOSE.  227 

court  of  probate,  to  ascertain  the  sanity  of  a  testator,  the  party 
objecting  to  the  probate  of  the  will  on  the  ground  of  the  testa- 
tor's insanity  is  the  moving  party,  and  the  right  is  with  him.^ 

§  239.  On  Issues  of  Devisavit  vel  nou.  —  (1.)  What  rule 
upon  principle.  —  The  principle  already  suggested  ^  would,  if 
kept  in  view,  furnish  a  uniform  rule  for  determining  with  which 
party  the  right  lies,  in  cases  of  contested  wills.  That  rule  would 
be  that,  when  a  will  is  first  brought  into  court  and  exhibited  for 
probate,  the  right  is  with  the  proponent  or  party  affirming  the 
will;  and  that,  after  the  will  has  been  admitted  to  probate  in 
common  form,  in  any  future  proceeding  to  contest  its  validity, 
whether  in  the  same  or  in  another  tribunal,  the  right  is  with  tho 
contestant,  called  variously  the  plaintiff,  the  petitioner,  the  cave- 
ator, or  the  objector.  The  reason  is  that  the  executor,  or  other 
party  who  first  presents  the  will  in  the  probate  court  and  seeks 
to  prove  it  and  have  it  admitted  to  record,  is  the  acting  party; 
he  seeks  to  move  the  court ;  he  must  bring  forward  some  evi- 
dence, or  the  court  will  not  grant  his  motion.  He  must  at  least 
produce  a  paper,  testamentary  in  its  character,  and  prove  in  a 
formal  way  that  it  was  executed  by  the  person  whose  last  Avill 
and  testament  it  purports  to  be.  If,  at  this  stage  of  the  pro- 
ceeding, he  meets  in  court  an  objecting  party,  as  he  must  pro- 
duce some  evidence  in  order  to  get  what  he  seeks,  he  comes 
within  the  rule  above  stated  and  more  fully  developed  in  the 
former  article,  which  gives  the  right  to  open  and  close  to  him.^ 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  will  is  admitted  to  probate  on  his  mo- 
tion, and  the  objecting  party  persists  in  his  contest,  either  by  an 
appeal  to  a  higher  tribunal,**  by  an  issue  of  devisavit  vel  non  tria- 
ble by  a  jury  in  a  court  of  law,  by  a  bill  in  chancery,^  or  by 

1  Dunlop   V.  Peter,  1    Cranch  C.  C.  Edelen  v.  Edelen,  6   Md.  288  (follow  ■ 

(U.  S.)  403.  ing    Brooke     v.    Townsheud,   7   Gill 

^  Ante,  ^237.  (Md.),    10.     Distiugiiishiug   Stockton 

3  McClintock     v.     Curd,     32     Mo,  v.  Frey,  4  Gill    (Md),  407.     Compare 

411.  Kearuey  v.  Gough,  5  Gill  &  J.   (Md.) 

*  Rogers  v.  Diamond,  13  Ark.  475,  457). 
480;  McDaniel  u  Crosby,  19  Ark.  538;  ^  Contrary   to  the   doctrine  of  the 

Tobiu  V    Jenkins,   29  Ark.    151,    153;  text,  it  was   early   held  in   Kentucky 


228  OPENING    THE    CASE.  [1  ThoiUp.   Tl .  , 

some  other  mode  of  procedure,  generally  prescribed  by  statute, 
he  will  become  the  moving  party,  the  party  who  seeks  to  alter 
the  existing  state  of  things.  A  presumption  obtains  that  the  de- 
cision of  the  court  of  probate  was  right ;  he  must  overthrow  that 
presumption  by  evidence ;  and  consequently  the  office  of  taking 
the  initiative  in  the  production  of  evidence,  and  with  it  the  right 
to  open  and  close  the  argument,  rests  with  him.  But,  in  the 
various  conclusions  at  which  the  courts  have  arrived,  neither  the 
principle  of  the  text,  nor  any  other  uniform  principle,  has  been 
adhered  to. 

(2.)  Cases  loliich  Concede  the  Right  to  tJie  Proponents. — 
We  gather  from  different  jurisdictions  a  group  of  cases  which, 
without  reference  to  the  stage  or  form  of  the  proceeding,  con- 
cede the  right  to  the  caveators,  objectors  or  assailants  of  the  will, 
sometimes  called  petitioners,  and  even  plaintiffs.  Thus,  it  is 
held  in  several  of  the  New  England  States  that,  on  an  appeal 
from  a  decree  of  the  probate  court  establishing  a  will  (the 
ground  of  the  contest  in  most  cases  relating  to  the  sanity  of  the 
testator),  the  burden  of  proof,  and  with  it  the  right  to  open  and 
close,  belongs  to  the  executor,  or  to  the  party  affirming  the  will.^ 
These  courts  apply  this  rule  without  reference  to  the  question 
which  party  is  the  appellant,  and  without  regard  to  ih.Q  form  of 
the  issues  as  made  up;  reasoning  that,  according  to  the  sub- 
stance of  the  issues,  the  party  assailing  the  will  takes  the  affirm- 
ative. Whethef  this  is  true,  where  the  sole  ground  of  the  contest 
is  the  alleged  insanity  of  the  testator,  would  seem  to  depend 
upon  the  view  which  is  taken  of  the  nature  of  the  proceed- 
ing.    If  it  is  viewed  as  an  original  proceeding,  instituted  to  set 

that,  in  a   statutory  proceeding  by  a  are  also  opposed  to  the   conclusion  of 

bill  to  contest  a  will  which  has  been  the  text. 

admitted    to    probate    in  the   county  '  Comstock  v.  Hadlyme  Ecc.  Soc, 

court,  the  burden  of  proof,  and  with  8  Conn  254;  Buckrainster  v.   Terry,  4 

it  the  right  to  open  and  close,  belongs  Mass.  593;  Phelps  v.  Hartwell,  1  Mass. 

to  the  proponents  of  the  will,  defend-  71;  Brooks  v.  Barrett,  7  Pick.  (Mass.) 

ants  in  the  proceeding.     Vancleave  v.  94;  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  42,  53;  Per- 

Beam,  2   Dana    (Ky.),  155;   Higdon  v,  kins   v.    Perkins,    39  N.    H.    163,    l(i7; 

Higdon,  «  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  48.     The  Boardman  v.  Woodman^  47  N.  H.  120, 

New  England  cases   cited  further  on  132;  Goss  v.  Turner,  21  Vt.  437,  440. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   IX.]       KIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE.     •  229 

aside  the  judgment  of  another  tribunal,  then  the  rule  is  contrary 
to  principle,  for  presumptively  the  judgment  of  the  probate  court 
is  right.  But  if  it  is  viewed  as  a  new  trial  in  the  same  proceed- 
ing, then  the  conclusion  would  be  different.  An  appeal  in  cases 
of  this  kind  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  writ  of  error ;  its  purpose 
is  not  to  correct  errors  of  law  committed  hy  the  original  court 
of  probate ;  but  it  merely  secures  to  the  appellant  a  new  trial  of 
the  same  controversy  in  a  higher  tribunal,  upon  the  same  or 
such  other  evidence  as  the  parties  may  be  able  to  produce.  This 
being  the  nature  of  the  case,  the  proceedings  in  the  original  court 
of  probate  may  be  disregarded ;  they  may  be  treated  as  having 
been  entirely  vacated  by  the  ai)peal ;  they  may  stand  as  though 
they  had  never  taken  place,  —  just  as,  in  the  case  of  appeals  from 
justices  of  the  peace  to  courts  of  record,  in  most  American  juris- 
dictions, in  which  cases  the  issues  stand  for  trial  exactly  as  they 
stood  in  the  court  below  ;  and  the  party  having  the  burden  of  proof, 
and  with  it  the  right  to  open  and  close  in  that  court,  has  it  in  the 
appellate  court.  On  this  principle  the  New  England  rule  may 
be  vindicated;  for,  as  already  pointed  out,  in  every  case  where 
a  will  is  offered  for  probate  in  the  tirst  instance,  the  proponent 
assumes  the  initiatory  burden  of  proof.  Viewing  the  trial  of 
such  a  contest,  when  appealed  from  the  probate  court,  as  merely 
a  new  trial  of  the  same  case  before  a  different  tribunal ,  the  New 
England  rule  also  conforms  to  another  principle  pointed  out  in  a 
preceding  article,  namely,  that  the  right  to  open  and  close  the 
argument  does  not  shift  with  the  shifting  of  the  burden  of 
proof.  So  that,  although  in  the  appellate  court  the  objectors 
may  be  required  to  go  forward  with  the  production  of  evidence, 
the  right  to  open  and  close  the  argument  will  remain  with  the 
proponents.^  In  Ohio,  the  contestants  are  at  liberty  to  proceed 
either  according  to  the  forms  of  a  suit  in  chancery  or  by  peti- 
tion under  the  code  of  civil  procedure ;  but  in  either  case  it  is 
laid  down  that  an  issue  must  in  some  form  be  made  up,  "  whether 
the  writing  produced  be  the  last  will  of  the  alleged  testator  or 
not;"  and  in  cither  case,  on  the  trial  of  such  issue,  the  party  or 

'  Brooks  V.  Barrett.  7  Pick.  (Mass.)  94. 


230  OPENING    THE    CASE.  [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

parties  setting  up  tlie  will  liold  the  affirmative,  and  are  entitled 
to  open  and  close ;  ^  and  this  although  the  will,  admitted  to 
probate  and  recorded,  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  its  validity, 
due  execution  and  contents,  so  as  to  cast  the  burden  of  proof  up- 
on the  contestant.^  The  rule  is  the  same  in  Kentucky,  where 
the  proceeding  is  by  a  bill  in  chancery  to  set  aside  a  will  on  the 
ground  of  the  insanity  of  the  testator  after  it  has  been  admitted 
to  probate  in  the  county  court. ^ 

§  240.  Ill  Actions  of  Replevin.  — Lord  Tenterden  said  that, 
in  respect  of  this  question,  he  could  make  no  distinction  between 
replevin  and  other  forms  of  action;  the  principles  applicable  to 
all  were  the  same.  The  consequence  was  that  the  plaintiff  was 
entitled  to  begin,  as  there  was  an  affirmative  issue  upon  him.* 
The  Supreme  Court  of  New  Hampshire,  following  this  principle, 
held  that,  in  replevin,  where  the  plaintiffs  alleged  that  the  articles 
replevied  were  their  property,  upon  which  issue  was  Joined,  and 
also  that  the  articles  were  mortgaged  to  them,  which  allegation 
was  denied  by  the  defendants,  upon  which  denial  issue  was 
joined,  —  the  affirmative  of  both  issues  was  with  the  plaintiffs, 
and  that  they  had  the  right  to  open  and  close. ^  But  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Indiana  has  held  that,  where  the  answer  sets  up,  in 
avoidance,  that  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  a  lien  upon  the 
goods  for  freight,  wherefore  the  plaintiffs  are  not  entitled  to 
the  possession  of  them,  and  the  reply  is  a  denial  of  such  new 
matter,  —  the  burden  of  the  issue  is  upon  the  defendant,  and  he 
is  entitled  to  open  and  close. ^  The  court,  in  so  holding,  recog- 
nize as  correct  doctrine  the  dictum  of  Professor  Greenleaf,  that 
whenever  the  plaintiff  is  obliged  to  produce  any  proof  in  order 
to  establish  his  right  to  recover,  he  is  generally  required  to  go 
into  his  whole   case  and  is  entitled  to    reply."     In  Kentucky, 

1  Brown  W.Griffiths,  11  Ohio  St.  329.  ^  Curtis  v.  Wlieeler,  1  Mood.  &  M. 

2  Banning  v.   Banning,   12  Ohio   St.      493. 

437.     See  also  Randebaugh  v.  Shelley,  *  Belknap  v.  Wendell,  21  N.  II.  175, 

6  Ohio  St.  307.  182. 

3  Van  Cleave  v.  Bean,  2  Dana  (Ky.),  ^  McLees  v.  Felt,  11  Ind.  218. 
155;  Iligdou  V.  Higdon,  t)  J.  J.  Marsh.  '  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  74. 

(Ky.)  48. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   IX.]       EIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE-  231 

where  the  answer  admits  that  the  possession  of  the  cliattel  is  in 
the  pkiintiff,  but  denies  that  the  chattel  was  taken  from  plaintiff's 
possession  as  alleged  in  the  petition,  and  then  sets  up  that  the  de- 
fendant is  the  owner  of  the  chattel, —  it  has  been  held  that  the 
right  to  open  and  close  the  argument  to  the  jury  is  with  the  de- 
fendant. The  ruling  is  based  upon  the  provision  of  the  Ken- 
tucky Code  of  Practice,  §  347,  that  the  party  having  the  burden 
of  proof  has  the  right  to  conclude  the  argument.  "It  is  evi- 
dent," said  Simpson,  C.  J.,  "  that,  on  this  state  of  pleading,  if 
no  evidence  had  been  adduced  by  either  party,  the  plaintiffs 
would  have  been  entitled  to  a  judgment  for  the  slave.  Their 
possession  was  prima  facie  evidence  of  title;  and  that  being  ad- 
mitted by  the  defendant,  it  then  devolved  upon  him  to  introduce 
evidence  to  repel  that  presumption,  and  if  he  failed  to  do  it,  a 
judgment  should  have  been  rendered  against  him.  Consequently 
the  burden  of  proof  was  upon  him,  and  he  had  a  right  to  the 
conclusion  of  the  argument  with  the  jury."  ^  In  Illinois  it  has 
been  ruled  that,  in  replevin  for  goods  levied  upon  by  an  officer, 
under  an  execution,  as  belonging  to  the  defendant  in  the  execu- 
tion, where  the  defendant  pleads  facts  to  estop  the  plaintiff  in 
replevin  from  claiming  the  property  or  denying  that  it  belongs 
to  the  defendant  in  execution,  which  facts  are  denied  by  the 
plaintiff,  the  defendant  has  the  right  to  open  and  close. '^ 
These  last  decisions  overlook  the  fact  that  the  object  of  the 
statutory  action  of  replevin  is  not  merely  the  recovery  of  the 
possession  of  the  chattel.  The  plaintiif  seeks,  in  the  event  the 
chattel  is  not  restored  to  him  prior  to  the  trial  under  his  delivery 
order,  or  subsequently  under  execution  issuing  to  enforce  his 
judgment,  an  alternative  judgment  for  its  value;  and  in  either 
event  he  also  seeks  a  judgment  for  the  damages  which  he  has 
sustained  in  consequence  of  its  detention  by  the  defendant. 
Unless,  therefore,  the  chattel  has  been  restored  to  him  prior  to 
the  trial,  and  unless  he  also  waives  his  right  to  a  recovery  of 
damages  for  its  detention,  he  must,  if  his  action  is  brouirht  in 
the  usual  form,  prove  something  in  order  to  the  full  relief  which 

^  Yauce  r.  Vauce,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  581.  2  Colwell  v.  Brower,  75  111.  517. 


232  OPENING  THE   CASE.  [1  Tlioinp.  Tr., 

he  seeks,  notwithstanding  the  defendant  may  in  his  answer  have 
made  the  admissions  above  stated.  In  conformity  with  Lord 
Tenterden's  view,  and  with  the  settled  rule  as  shown  m  the  pre- 
ceding article,  the  right  to  open  and  close  would  rest  with  him, 
and  not  with  the  defendant. 

§  241.  In  Cases  of  Replevin  of  Cattle  Distrained  for  Rent 
with  Avowry  of  Rent  in  Arrear.  —  Unless  repealed  by  recent 
statutory  enactments,  an  unjust  rule  of  the  common  law  still  de- 
faces the  jurisprudence  of  two  or  three  of  the  older  American 
States,  by  which  a  landlord,  wliose  tenant  is  in  arrear  for  rent, 
may  go  upon  the  land  occupied  by  the  tenant  and  drive  awa}' 
and  impound  any  cattle  which  he  may  find  there,  whether  be- 
longing to  the  tenant  or  to  any  innocent  third  person,  and  hokl 
them  until  the  rent  is  paid,  —  thus  making  himself  not  only  a 
judge  in  his  own  cause,  but,  in  a  controversy  between  himself 
and  his  tenant,  rendering  judgment  in  his  own  favor  without  no- 
tice to  the  tenant,  without  the  formality  of  a  trial,  and  execut- 
ing his  judgment  at  the  same  instant,  and  equally  without  notice. 
The  remedy  of  the  tenant,  if  the  cattle  were  his,  and  if  no  rent 
were  arrear,  or  if  the  cattle  were  not  on  the  freehold  of  the  land- 
lord at  the  time  of  the  distress,  was  an  action  of  replevin.  In 
this  action  the  landlord  filed  a  plea  called  an  avowry,  in  which 
he  admitted  the  possession  of  the  plaintiff,  but  set  up  that  the 
cattle  were  distrained  when  upon  his  (defendant's)  freehold, 
whereof  the  plaintiff  was  tenant,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  in 
arrear  for  the  rent.  To  this  the  plaintiff  Avould  ordinarily  re- 
ply, either  denying  that  he  was  in  arrear  for  the  rent,  or  alleg- 
mg  that  the  cattle,  when  distrained,  were  not  upon  the  freehold 
of  the  defendant,  but  on  the  freehold  of  some  other  person,  nam- 
ing him.^  There  seems  to  be  nothing  to  distinguish  such  a  case 
from  any  other  action  of  replevin,  in  respect  of  the  right  to  be- 
gin and  reply.  The  plaintiff  would  have  something  to  prove,  in 
order  to  establish  the  value  of  the  chattels,  or  the  amount  of 
damage  sustained  by  reason  of  their  caption  and  detention,  unless 

1  See  the  uature  of  the  actiou  aud  the  form  of  the  plea  as  stated  in  Chitty 
PI.  G18. 


Tit.   HI,  Ch.  IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEX    AND    CLOSE.  233 

these  allegations  of  his  declaration,  as  well  as  that  asserting  his 
original  right  of  possession,  wore  admitted  by  the  defendant's 
plea,  —  which  would  vest  the  right  to  begin  and  reply  in  him.; 
and  it  has  been  so  held.^  Thus,  in  replevin  for  cattle  alleged  to 
have  been  illegally  taken  and  impounded  by  the  defendant,  the 
defendant  avowed  the  taking  of  the  cattle  upon  a  certain  lot  of 
ground,  alleging  that  the  same  was  his  soil  and  freehold.  The 
plaintiff  replied  that  -the  soil  and  freehold  Avere  in  one  T.,  and 
tendered  an  issue  thereon,  which  the  defendant  joined.  It  was 
held  that  the  plaintiff  had  the  right  to  open  and  close. ^ 

§  242.  lu  Cases  of  Interpleader. —  In  the  case  of  a  bill  of 
interpleader  in  equity,  or  of  the  corresponding  proceeding  under 
codes  of  procedure,  where  a  party  has  possession  of  a  fund  be- 
longing to  one  or  more  of  several  parties  who  contend  against 
each  other  for  the  possession  of  it,  and,  to  exonerate  himself, 
presents  a  bill  or  petition  in  court,  praying  that  these  rival 
claimants  may  be  required  to  interplea;d  for  the  fund  and  that  he 
may  pay  it  into  court  and  be  exonerated, —  it  is  difficult  to  say 
with  which  one  of  the  rival  claimants  the  right  to  beo-in  and  re- 
ply rests,  since  all  are  equally  plaintiffs  and  defendants;  each  is 
an  actor  and  each  defends  against  the  contention  of  the  others. 
It  is  supposed  that  such  a  case  must  yield  to  the  sound  discretion 
of  the  court,  and  that  this  discretion  would  be  best  exercised  by 
giving  each  claimant  a  stated  period  in  which  to  argue  in  support 
of  his  own  claim  and  against  the  evidence  adduced  in  support  of 
the  claim  of  his  opponents.  As  all  would  be  equally  entitled  to 
a  reply  and  as  all  could  not  have  a  reply  without  giving  the  last 
word  to  some  one  of  them,  it  would  seem  that  none  should  be  al- 
lowed to  make  a  second  argument.  A  case  which  presented  less 
difficulty  was  a  proceeding  by  garnishment,  in  which,  under  the 
issue  as  made  up,  it  was  held  that  the  interpleading  claimants 
had  the  affirmative  and  consequently  the  right  to  begin  and  reply. =^ 

1  Kearney  v.    Gough,   5  Gill   &    J.  2  Thurston   v.   Kennett,   29  M".    H. 

(Md.)     457;     Huugerford   v.    Burr,   4  151,   158  (following   Belknap  i'.  Wen- 

Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)   349.      See    also  dell.  21  X.  H.  175). 
Greer  v.   Nourse,  4   Cranch  C.    C.  (U.  •''  Randolph  Bank  v,  Armstrong,  11 

S.)  527  la.  515, 


234  orExiNG  THE  CASE.  [ITliomp.  Tl'., 

§  243.  Ill  Criminal  Cases,  —  In  criminal  cases  the  defendant 
is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until  he  is  proved  to  be  guilty.  The 
burden  rests  upon  the  State  to  prove,  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt, 
every  fact  essential  to  a  conviction.  From  this  it  necessarily 
follows  that,  in  all  cases,  the  right  to  open  and  close  is  with  the 
prosecution,  unless  a  different  rule  is  declared  by  statute.  This 
is  so,  although  the  accused  offers  no  evidence ;  ^  nor  does  the  fact 
that  the  accused  sets  up  the  defense  of  insanity  shift  the  right  to 
him.  Where  counsel  are  employed  by  private  parties  to  assist 
the  prosecuting  officer  of  the  State  in  a  criminal  trial,  it  is  within 
the  discretion  of  the  court  to  allow  such  counsel  to  make  the  con- 
cluding argument  to  the  jury  in  the  place  of  the  prosecuting  at- 
torney, although  the  prosecution  is  for  a  felony^  which  is  capital.-^ 
But  a  statute  which  changes  this  rule  and  gives  the  right  of  con- 
cluding the  argument  in  a  particular  event  to  the  defendant,  is 
not  directory  but  mandatory ;  it  clothes  him  with  a  substantial 
right,  which  the  court  is  not  at  liberty  to  disregard  or  abridge, 
the  denial  of  which  will  work  a  reversal  of  a  conviction.  It  has 
been  so  held  in  respect  of  a  statute  giving  the  defendant  this  right 
in  cases  wherein  he  introduces  no  testimony.* 

§  244.  Ill  Cases  of  Fraud.  —  A  general  presumption  of  right- 
acting  attends  human  conduct;  and  therefore  fraud  is  never  pre- 
sumed, but  must  be  affirmatively  })roved  as  a  fact ;  and  of  course 
the  burden  of  proving  it  lies  upon  the  party  alleging  it.  It  does 
not  follow  from  this  that,  where  fraud  is  set  up  as  a  defense  to 
an  action  on  a  contract,  this  necessarily  shifts  the  burden  of 
proof,  and  with  it  the  right  to  open  and  close,  to  the  defendant. 
If  the  fraud  which  is  thus  pleaded  is  what  the  civilians  call 
dolus  dans  locum  contradui,  that  is  a  fraud  giving  occasion  to  the 
contract  itself,  the  pleading  of  it  may  be  regarded  as  no  more 
than  a  special  denial  of  the  facts  on  which  the  plaintiff  predicates 
his   right  of  action;   since  it  is  not  very  material  in  principle 

1  Doss  V.  Com.,  1  Gratt.  (Va.)  Jarnagiu  v.  State,  10  Yerg.  (Tenu.) 
557;   State    v.    Millicau,  15   La.    Aim.       529. 

557.  3  State  v.    Hamilton,    55    Mo.    520. 

2  State   V.  Waltham,   48    Mo.     55;  *  Heffrou  ?;.  State,  8  Fla.  73. 


Tit.  Ill,   Ch.   IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPKN    AND    CLOSE.  235- 

whether  the  defendant  merely  denies  the  existence  of  the  con- 
tract, or  affirmatively  states  certain  specific  facts  which,  if  true, 
show  that  the  contract,  though  formally  made,  was  void.  There 
is  room,  however,  for  the  view  that  an  answer  setting  up  such  a 
defense  should  be  regarded  as  setting  up  an  extrinsic  defense  ; 
since  fraudulent  representations  or  concealments,  whereby  a 
party  has  been  induced  to  enter  into  a  contract,  do  not  make  the 
contract  void  ah  initio,  that  is  to  say,  non-existent  from  its  in- 
ception, but  merely  give  to  the  party  thus  induced  to  enter 
into  it  the  rijjht  to  disaffirm  it  within  a  reasonable  time  after 
discovering  the  fraud.  He  may  affirm  or  disaffirm,  but  he  can- 
not do  both ;  he  cannot  keep  the  benefits  which  he  nuiy  have 
received  under  the  contract  from  the  other  contracting  party, 
and  at  the  same  time  disaffirm  it  so  far  as  it  imposes  duties  or 
obligations  upon  him.  His  right,  therefore,  when  sued  upon 
the  contract,  is  at  most  a  right  of  rescission,  —  that  is,  either  a 
right  to  have  it  then  rescinded  for  the  fraud,  or  a  right  to  plead 
and  prove  that,  because  of  the  fraud,  he  had,  Avithin  a  reasonable 
time  after  discovering  the  fraud,  elected  to  rescind  it.  In  this 
view  the  defense  of  fraud,  set  up  in  an  action  upon  the  contract, 
may  w'ell  be  regarded  as  an  extrinsic  defense ;  since  it  amounts 
to  something  more  than  a  mere  denial  or  traverse  of  the  allega- 
tion of  the  existence  of  the  contract.  AVe  find  that  courts  have 
taken  both  views  of  this  question,  some  treating  such  an  answer 
as  a  special  denial,  and  others  treating  it  as  the  pleading  of  an 
affirmative  defense.  Whichever  view  is  taken,  the  opening  and 
closing  is,  on  principle  and  authority,^  to  be  given  to  the  defend- 
ant in  every  case  where  the  contract  liquidates  the  damages.  In 
other  cases,  if  the  allegation  of  fraud  is  to  be  regarded  as  a 
special  denial,  the  right  remains  with  the  plaintiff;  but  if  it  is 
to  be  regarded  as  the  pleading  of  an  extrinsic  defense,  the  right 
plainly  rests  with  the    defendant. 

§  245.    [Continued.]      Opposing  A^iews. —  When,  therefore, 
the  plaintiff  sues  to  recover  specific  chattels  and  his  right  to  re- 

1  Elwell    V.  Chamberliu,  31   N.  Y.      Co.,  4  Daly    (N.    Y.),   290.     Compare 
611;    Breuuan    v.  Security    Life  lus.      Patton  v.  Hamiltou,  12  Iiid.  25ij. 


236  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

cover  is  predicated  on  his  establishing  a  bona  fide  ownership  of  the 
property,  he  cannot,  it  has  been  held,  be  deprived  of  his  right  to 
open  and  close,  by  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  defendant  alleges 
that  his  title  is  fraudulent  and  void,  —  the  court  regardinof  this 
as  in  the  nature  of  a  special  denial. ^  In  like  manner,  it  has  been 
held  that,  in  an  action  for  the  recovery  of  damages  for  the 
wrongful  seizure  and  conversion  of  goods  to  which  the  plaintiff 
claims  title,  if  the  defendant  answers,  simply  alleging  fraud  in 
the  assignment  under  which  the  plaintiff  chums,  the  plaintiff,  on 
the  trial,  is  entitled  to  0})en  and  close;  because  the  effect  of  the 
answer  is  not  to  admit  that  the  plaintiff  ever  had  title  to  the 
goods,  but  it  is  in  effect  only  a  special  denial  of  the  title  alleged 
in  the  petition.  The  court  say:  "  Before  the  plaintiff  would  be 
entitled  to  recover  at  all,  he  would  have  to  show  a  title  in  him- 
self; but  the  answer  admits  nothing  but  a  fraudulent  assignment, 
which  is  not  an  admission  of  any  title.  This  state  of  the  plead- 
ings, under  the  third  clause  of  section  26(3  of  the  [Ohioj  code, 
gave  the  affirmative  of  the  issue  to  the  plaintiff."  ^  On  the  con- 
trary, and  apparently  on  the  view  that  the  defense  of  fraud  is 
an  affirmative  defense,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  to  recover 
the  value  of  goods  attached  by  a  sheriff,  where  the  defendant, 
before  the  trial,  filed  a  pleading  in  which  he  admitted  the  plaint- 
iff 's  possession  and  that  he  had  the  right  of  possession  at  the 
time  of  the  seizure,  but  alleged  that  his  title  w:is  obtained  by  a 
transfer  from  the  attachment  debtor  in  fraud  of  his  creditors,  — 
that  the  burden,  and  with  it  the  right  to  open  and  close,  was  with 
the  defendant. "^  So,  in  Georgia,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  an 
insolvent  debtor,  arrested  and  held  in  execution  under  a  ca.  sa., 
institutes  a  proceeding  in  the  inferior  court  to  obtain  the  benefit 
of  the  statute  for  the  relief  of  insolvent  debtors,  and  credi- 
tors aj)pear  and  object  on  the  ground  of  fraud,  the  burden  of  the 
issue  which  is  made  up  is  on  the  objecting  creditors,  and  the  cor- 
responding right  to  open  and  close  rests  with  them.     The  reason 

1  Churchill   v.   Lee,    77   N.  C.    341.  =  Beatty  v.  Hatcher,  13  Oh.  St.  115, 

See  also  McRae  v.  Lawrence,  75  N.  C.      119. 

2S9;  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  74,  3  Bixby  v.  Carskaddoa  (la.),  29  N. 

W.  Rep.  (J26, 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  IX.  ]      RIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE. 


237 


for  this  liolding  is  that  the  debtor  has  no  proof  to  make  —  noth- 
ing to  do  but  to  take  the  oath  and  be  discharged,  for  which 
reason  the  creditor  alleging  the  fraud  assumes  the  substantial 
burden  of  proof,  and  is  the  movant  within  the  meaning  of  the 
rule  of  court  which  governs  the  question.^ 

§  246.  In  Proceedings  on  Reports  of  Commissioners, 
Auditors,  Referees.  —  In  Indiana,  on  appeal  from  proceedings 
before  a  board  of  commissioners  in  reference  to  the  location  of 
a  highway,  Avhere  the  remonstrance  is  lor  damages  only,  the  re- 
monstrant has  the  burden  of  proof,  and  is  therefore  entitled  to 
open  and  close.  The  reason  seems  to  be  that  if  there  is  no  re- 
monstrance, no  proof  will  be  required  from  the  petitioners,  but 
the  report  of  the  viewers  will  be  final. ^  Under  the  code  of 
Georgia,  the  report  of  an  auditor  is  prima  facie  evidence,  and 
the  burden  is  on  the  exceptor  to  show  error  in  it  and  to  make 
good  his  exceptions.  "When  an  order  is  made  that  the  report  be 
filed  and  granting  leave  and  time  to  except  thereto,  the  report 
becomes  such  evidence.  The  burden  thus  being  on  the  excep- 
tor, he  is  entitled  to  open  and  conclude,  unless  the  other  party 
introduces  no  testimony,  in  which  case  the  right  of  conclusion 
shifts  to  the  other  party.  To  cross-examine  a  witness  of  the  ob- 
jector and  to  continue  the  cross-examination  after  a  temporary 
susj^ension  of  it  by  the  court,  is  not  an  introduction  of  testimony 
by  the  party  so  cross-examining,  in  such  a  sense  as  to  give  him 
the  right  to  the  conclusion.^  In  Massachusetts,  where  the  re- 
port of  an  auditor  is  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  and  the  defendant 
files  exceptions  to  it,  the  right  to  open  and  close,  in  the  contest 
raised  by  the  exceptions,  remains  with  the  plaintiff,  although  the 
report  makes  a  prima  facie  case  in  his  favor, —  on  the  j^rinciple 
alluded  to  in  the  former  article,  that  where  the  rio;ht  once  at- 
taches  to  a  party,  it  does  not  shift  with  the  shifting  of  the  bur- 
den of  proof.*     The  same  conclusion  has  been  reached  in  New 


^  Johuson  V.   Martin,   25  Ga.   269,  3  Arthur  v.  Commissiouers,  67  Ga, 

271.  221,  224. 

2  Peed     y.    Brenneman,  89     lud.  *  Suow    v.   Batclielder,     8     Cush. 

252.  (Mass.)  513. 


238  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr.y 

Hampshire,  in  a  case  which  was  referred  to  co'mmissioners  under 
a  statute,  who  had  reported  in  favor  of  the  phiintiff,  the  defend- 
ant electing  to  h  ive  the  case'  afterwards  tried  by  a  jury,  and 
filing,  under  the  terms  of  the  statute,  a  statement  of  the  particu- 
lars in  which  he  expected  to  change  the  result  of  the  report.  The 
court,  on  a  consideration  of  the  state  of  the  case  and  the  terms 
of  the  statute,  being  of  opinion  that  the  issue  was  in  substance 
the  general  issue,  in  which  case  the  opening  and  closing  is  al- 
ways with  the  plaintiff,  gave  the  right  to  him.^ 

§  247.  In  Proceedings  to  Condemn  Land  and  Assess  Dam- 
ages. —  In  a  proceeding  to  condemn  land  for  public  uses  and  for 
the  assessment  of  the  compensation  to  be  made  to  the  land- 
owner, the  petitioner  holds  the  affirmative  of  the  issue,  and  con- 
sequently has  the  right  to  begin  and  reply,  both  in  the  introduction 
of  evidence  and  in  the  argument  to  the  jury.^  The  reason  is 
that  the  petitioner,  the  party  seeking  to  condemn  the  land,  is  the 
moving  party.  Under  the  constitution  the  land  cannot  be  taken 
without  just  compensation  being  made  to  the  owner.  The  pro- 
ceeding of  the  petitioner  is  therefore  a  proceeding  to  ascertain 
what  is  just  compensation,  and,  should  no  proof  be  offered  under 
this  head,  he  would  be  defeated.^ 

§  248.  Petitioner,  Claimant,  Administrator. —  The  right  is 
with  the  applicant  for  a  license  to  sell  intoxicating  liquors,  under 
a  statute  of  Indiana,  in  a  proceeding  to  try  his  right  to  such  a 
license  ;^  with  the  claimant  or  creditor  in  case  of  a  claim  preferred 

^  Chesley    v.    Chesley,    10     N.    H.  the  damage  is  the  object  of  the  inquiry, 

327.  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  him. 

-  South     Park     Commissioners    v.  Springfield  &c.  E.  Co.  v.  Rhea,  44  Arli. 

Trustees,  107  111.  489;  McReynokls  v.  258,  2(54  (citing  Mansfield's   Arkansas 

Burlington  &c.  II.  Co.,  10(3  111.  152 ;  Neff  Dig.,  §  5131 ;  Pierce  on  Railroads,  187 ; 

V.  Cincinnati,  32  Oh.  St.  215.  Mills  on  Eminent  Domain,  §  92).     On 

3  McReynokls  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  principle  the    burden  in  these  cases 

Co.,  lOGIU.  152.     The  contrary  is  held  -vyould,  however,  seem  to  be  upon  the 

in  Arkansas,  the  court  reasoning  that  petitioner,  since  the  petitioner  cannot 

the  land-owner  is  the  real  actor.  No  succeed  without  introducing  evidence, 
matter  which  party  initiates  the  pro-  *  Hill  v.  Perry,  82  Ind.  28;  Good— 

ceeding,  the  court  say,  the  extent  of  win  v.  Smith,  72  Ind.  I13o" 


Tit.   HI,  Ch.   IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEX    AND    CLOSE.  239 

against  a  decedent's  estate  which  is  contested;^  with  the  adminis-. 
trator  on  the  trial  of  exceptions  filed  to  his  linal  settlement."' 

§  249.  Miscellaneous  Cases  where  the  Right  was  held  to 
be  with  the  Plaintiff.  —  Passing  from  these  we  come  to  a  num- 
ber of  miscellaneous  cases,  some  of  which  appear  to  have  been 
decided  according  to  principle  and  others  not,  which,  within  the 
limits  of  this  article,  can  only  be  referred  to  without  explanation 
or  discussion.  The  right  rests  with  the  plaintiff  in  a  proceeding 
called  "  claim  "  under  a  statute  of  Georgia  where  land  has  been 
levied  upon  r^  but  in  cases  of  "  illegality,"  under  another  statute 
of  the  same  State,  it  is  with  the  defendant.*  It  is  with  the  plaint- 
iff a  proceeding  under  a  statute  of  Texas  to  try  the  right  of  prop- 
erty levied  upon  by  execution,^  and  in  an  action  against  an 
administrator  who  pleads  payment  and  plene  administravit.^ 

§  250.  Miscellaneous  Cases  where  the  Right  is  with  the  De- 
fendant.—  In  like  manner  the  right  has  been  held  with  the  de- 
fendant on  a  plea  in  abatement  to  an  action  on  bills  of  exchano-e, 
which  sets  up  the  non-joinder  of  a  joint  maker  or  promissor;  ^  in 
Alabama,  where  the  defendant  in  a  judgment  applies  for  a.  super- 
sedeas under  a  statute,  the  proceeding  being  a  substitute  for  the 
common-law  writ  of  audita  querela;  ^  in  Delaware,  on  the  trial  of 
a  caveat  filed  against  proceedings  to  locate  vacant  lands  under  a 
private  act  of  assembly;  ^  and,  as  stated  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph, on  the  trial  of  an  affidavit  of  "  illeoralitv  "  in  Georgia. ^^ 


121. 


'   Yingling   v.  Essou,  1(5   Md.    112,  though  decided  before  the  rule  became 

settled  iu  Eughiud,  is    in  conformity 

2  Taylor  v.  Burk.  91  Ind.  252;  Hau-  with  correct  principle. 

lyn  V.  Nesbit,  37  Ind.  284:  Brownlee  v.  ^  Persall  v.  McCartney,  28  Ala.  110 

Hare,  G-l  Ind.  311.  125.     Compare  Worshara   v.   Goar,   4 

3  Baker  i;.  Lyman,  53  Ga.  339.  Port.  (Ala.)  441 ;  Shearer  v.  Boyd,  10 
*  Bertodi  v.  Ison,  (39  Ga.  317.  Ala.  279;  Grady  v.  Hammond,  21  Ala. 
5  Latliam  v.  Selkirk,  11  Tex.  314.  428;  Edwards  v.  Lewis,  16  Ahi..  813; 
*=  Clay     V.    Kobinson,    7     W.     Va.  Bruce  v.  Barnes,  20  Ala.  219. 

^°'^-  ^  Eecords     v.     Melsou,    1    Houst. 

'  Fowler  V.  Coster,  Mood.  &M.  241,  (Del.)  139. 

per  Lord  Tenterdeu,  C.  J.     This  case,  "  Bertodi  v.  Ison,  C9  Ga.  317. 


240  OPENING   THE    CASE.  [1  Tlioiiip.  Tf., 

Article  III.  —  Certain  Special  Rules. 

Section 

253.  Express  Waiver  of  General  Denial. 

254.  Failure  of  the  Defendant  to  Offer  Evidence. 

255.  Effect  of  Admitting  Plaintiff's  Cause  of  Action. 

256.  Admission  of  a  Part  of  the  Plaintiff's  Cause  of  Action. 

257.  Eight  to  Begin  Carries  with  It  Right  to  Keply. 

258.  Refusal  of  Right  to  Open  not  Cured  by  Granting  Right  to  Conclude. 

259.  The  Right  to  Reply  how  Affected  by  Waiving  the  Right  to  Begin. 

§  253.  Express  Waiver  of  General  Denial. —  As  seen  in  the 
former  article,  in  a  suit  on  a  contract  which  liquidates  the  dam- 
ao-es,  if  the  defendant  files  no  denial  but  sets  up  an  affirmative 
defense,  the  right  to  begin  and  reply  is  with  him.  It  has  been 
held  that  this  rule  is  capable  of  application  in  an  action  upon 
such  an  instrument  before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  where  no 
formal  defensive  pleading  is  required,  but  where,  by  the  terms 
of  the  statute,  the  case  stands  as  though  the  defendant  had 
pleaded  the  general  denial;  in  which  case  he  may,  by  filing  of 
record  an  express  waiver  of  the  general  denial,  confine  himself  to 
an  affirmative  defense  and  acquire  the  right  to  open  and  to  close. ^ 

§   254.    Failure  of  the  Defendant  to  Offer  Evidence. — It 

is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the  failure  of  the  defendant  to 
offer  evidence  does  not  oust  the  plaintiff  of  his  right  to  open  and 
close  the  argument,  if  he  otherwise  has  it  under  the  rules  already 
stated.^  And  where  the  defendant  files  a  plea  setting  up  an 
affirmative  defense  which  would  give  him  the  right  to  begin  and 
reply  if  evidence  were  offered  under  it,  he  does  not  have  the 
rioht  if  he  offers  no  evidence  under  it;  for  otherwise,  by  filing 
a  sham  plea,  a  defendant  might  acquire  a  right  which  the  law 
does  not  intend  to  give  him.^ 

§   255.    Effect  of  Admitting  Plaintiff's  Cause  of  Action.  — 

But  in  Massachusetts,  where  the  courts  have  been  driven  for  the 

1  Cross  V.  Pearson,  17  Ind.  612.  (Kj-))  525;  approving  Sodousky  v.  Mc- 

2  Worsham  v.  Goar,  4  Port.  (Ala.)  Gee,   i  J.   J.    Marsh.    (Ky.)  275,  and 
441.  qualifying  Goldsberry  v.  Stuteville,  3 

3  Daviess     v,    Arbuckle,     1     Dana  Bibb  (Ky.),  346. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  IX.]       RIGHT    TO   OPEN   AND    CLOSE.  241 

sake  of  convenience  to  adopt  a  uniform  rule/  giving  the  plaint- 
iff the  right  to  open  and  close  in  all  cases,  the  fact  that  the  de- 
fendant admits  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  that  the  only 
issue  for  the  jury  is  on  the  defendant's  declaration  in  set-off, 
does  not  shift  the  right  to  the  defendant. ^  In  New  Hampshire, 
it  is  held,  on  somewhat  doubtful  grounds,  that,  although  the  de- 
fendant admits  the  plaintiff  s  claim,  which  he  has  formally  de- 
nied in  his  answer,  yet  as  the  admission  is  only  in  the  nature  of 
evidence,  it  does  not  change  the  burden  of  proof,  and  does  not 
entitle  the  defendant  to  begin  and  reply.  "  The  right,"  says 
Bell,  J.,  "  depends  on  the  form  of  the  pleadings,  and  is  deter- 
mined by  the  fact  that  the  affirmative  of  one  of  the  issues  is 
upon  the  plaintiff ;  and  this  is  in  no  way  affected  by  the  cir- 
cumstance that  the  plaintiff  has  greater  or  less  facilities  for 
making  the  retjuired  jn-oof .  An}^  material  fact  may  be  proved 
by  the  admissions  of  the  adverse  party ;  and  it  does  not  change 
the  burden  of  proof  upon  the  pleadings,  that  the  defendant  has 
admitted  the  claim  wdiich  he  formally  denies  by  his  plea.  Nor 
is  it  in  any  way  material  in  what  form  the  admission  is  made, 
so  long  as  he  chooses  to  deny  it  upon  the  record,  and  join  issue 
upon  it."  ^  In  Texas,  where  the-defendant  files  a  written  admis- 
sion, in  accordance  Avith  a  rule  of  court  numbered  31,  that  the 
plaintiff  has  a  good  cause  of  action  as  set  forth  in  his  petition, 
except  so  far  as  it  may  be  defeated,  in  whole  or  in  part,  by  the 
facts  constituting  the  defense  which  may  be  established  on  the 
trial,  he  is  entitled  to  open  and  close,  both  in  adducing  evidence 
and  in  arguing  the  [case.*  Under  a  rule  of  court,  numbered  59, 
which  has,  been  in  force  for  many  years  in  South  Carolina,  the 
defendant  is  likewise  entitled  to  begin  and    reply,  when  he  ad- 

1  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  603,  note.  which   were   decided  under  a  rule  of 

2  Page  V.  Osgood,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  the  Court  of  Corainou  Pleas  of  that 
260.  Compare  Bradley  v.  Clark,  1  State  prior  to  the  adoption  of  this  uni- 
Cush.  (Mass.)  293;    Wigglesworth  v.  form  rule. 

Atkins,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  212;  Spauld-  ^  Buzzell  v.    Snell,   25  N.  H.   474, 

ing  V.Hood,  8  Cush.   602;   Merrimau      479. 

V.  Cunningham,    11    Cush.    40,  44,—  *  Ney  v,  Koth,  61  Tex.  374. 

16 


242  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

mitsiipon  the  record  the  phiintiff  s  cause  of  action  and  takes  up- 
on himself  the  burden  of  proof  .^ 

§  256.  Admission  of  a  Part  of  the  Plaintiff 's  Cause  of 
Action.  — It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the  admission  by 
the  defendant  of  a  part  only  of  the  plaintiff  's  case,  or  of  a  part 
only  of  the  evidentiary  facts  upon  which  the  plaintiff  relies  for 
a  recovery,  will  not  give  the  right  to  begin  and  reply  to  the  de- 
fendant. Thus,  in  ejectment  where  each  party  claimed  as  heir 
at  law,  and  the  real  question  was  as  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  de- 
fendant, who  was  clearly  heir  if  legitimate,  he  proposed  to  ad- 
mit that,  unless  he  was  legitimate,  the  lessor  of  the  plaintiff  was 
the  heir  at  law.  It  was  held  that  the  admission  did  not  give  him 
the  right  to  begin. ^  So,  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  the  lessor  of 
the  plaintiff  claimed  as  devisee  under  the  will  of  J.  S.  At  the 
trial  the  defendant  admitted  the  seizin  of  J.  S.,  and  the  due  ex- 
ecution of  that  will,  and  that  the  plaintiff  was  pm?2a  y^cie  en- 
titled under  it,  and  proposed  to  set  up  a  subsequent  will,  revok- 
ing the  first  will.  It  was  held,  reversing  the  trial  court,  that  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  begin.  The  reasoning  of  the  learned 
judges  was,  that  the  lessor  of  the  plaintiff  claimed  as  devisee  un- 
der the  will,  that  is,  under  the  will  that  was  a  good  and  valid 
will  at  the  time  of  the  testator's  death  ;  therefore  the  defendants 
proposed  to  admit  a  part  only  of  the  plaintiff's  case,  and  in 
fact  did  set  up  a  case  which  denied  that  the  plaintiff  was  such 
devisee.^ 


1  Burckhalter  v.  Cowerd,  16  S.  C.  386.  The  court  also  distinguish  Doe 
435,  441.  d.    Corbett  v.   Corbett,  3   Camp.  368. 

2  Doe  d.  Warren  v.  Bray,  Mood.  &  On  the  right  of  the  devisee  to  begin. 
M.  166.  See  also  Goodlittle  d.  Revett  v.  Bra- 

3  Doe  d.  Bather  v.  Brayne,  5  Com.  ham,  4  T.  R.  498;  Doe  d.  Tucker  t?. 
Bench,  655,  670.  The  case  was  dis-  Tucker,  Mood  &  M.  536.  Several 
tinguished  from  cases  where  the  other  early  cases  were  cited  in  the  ar- 
plaintiff  claims  as  heir  at  law,  and  gument:  Doe  d.  Warren  v.  Bray, 
where  tlie  defendant  admits  the  whole  Mood.  &  M.  166;  Doe  d.  Pill  v.  Wil- 
title  of  the  plaintiff,  that  is,  tliat  the  son,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  323;  Doe  d. 
ancestor  died  seized  and  that  the  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  1  Carr.  &  K.  122.  But, 
plaintiff  is  his  heir  at  law.  Doe  d.  as  several  of  these  were  nisi  prius 
Wollaston  v.  Barnes,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  cases,  decided  at  a  period  ])efore  the 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   IX.]       RIGHT    TO    OPEN    AND    CLOSE.  243 

§  257.   Right  to  Begin  Carries  with  It  Right  to   Reply. — 

The  right  to  begin,  based  iipou  this  so-called  primary  burden  of 
proof,  carries  with  it  the  right  to  reply. ^ 

§  258.  Refusal  of  Right  to  Open  not  Cured  by  Granting 
Right  to  Conclude.  — The  refusal  to  the  party  having  the  bur- 
den of  proof,  of  the  right  to  open  his  case  to  the  jury,  is  an  error 
which  is  not  cured  by  according  to  him  the  right  to  have  the 
concluding  argument.  In  the  opinion  of  the  court  so  holding, 
Daly,  C.  J.,  said:  "  The  opening  of  the  case  to  the  jury  by  the 
plaintiffs,  and  the  laying  before  them  of  their  evidence  in  the 
first  instance,  and  confining  the  defendant  to  evidence  in  the  way 
of  reply,  are  a  part  of  their  legal  right,  of  which  they  are  de- 
prived under  exception ;  and  I  fail  to  see  how  the  error  is  cured  by 
allowing  them  afterwards  what  was  their  further  rig-ht,  the  final 
address  to  the  jurv.  Depriving  a  party  of  one  part  of  his  legal 
rights  is  certainly  not  cured  by  allowing  another  part."  And  the 
judgment  was  reversed  for  this  error  alone,  although  the  case 
had  been  already  tried  three  times. ^ 

§  259.  The  Right  to  Reply  how  Affected  by  Waiving  the 
Right  to  Begin.  —  Where  the  plaintiff  waives  the  opening  argu- 
ment to  the  jury,  it  has  been  thought  that,  on  strict  grounds,  this 
might  give  the  defendant  the  right  to  close;  but  it  was  said: 
"  If  such  a  waiver  should  still  leave  the  closino;  argument  to  the 
plaintiff,  it  certainly  confined  it  to  a  strict  reply  to  the  defend- 
ant's argument,  excluding  general  discussion  of  the  case.  The 
sole  object  of  all  argument  is  the  elucidation  of  the  truth,  greatly 
a.ided,  in  matter  of  fact,  as  well  as  in  matters  of  law,  by  full  and 
fair  forensic  discussion.  And  this  is  always  imperiled  when 
either  party  is  able  to  present  his  views  of  the  case  to  the  jury 
without  opportunity  of  the  other  to  comment  on  them.     And  if 

rule  had  become  settled  in  England  in  (Mass.)  64;  Judge  of  Probate  v.  Stone, 
the  leading  case  of  Mercer  v.  AVhall  ii  N.  H.  593,  <JOG;  Elwell  v.  Chamber- 
Co  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  s.)  447),  it  is  thought  lin,  31  N.  Y.  611,  612. 
unnecessary  to  examine  them  in  detail.  2  Penhryn  Slate  Co  v.  Meyer,  8  Daly 
1  Robinson   v.  Hitchcocli,  8   Mete.  (N.  Y.),  61. 


244  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

the  party  entitled  to  the  opening  argument,  relying  on  the 
strength  of  his  case  without  discussion,  waive  the  right  to  open, 
he  waives  the  right  to  discuss  the  case  generally,  and  should  not 
be  permitted  to  do  so  out  of  his  order,  and  after  the  mouth 
of  the  other  party  is  closed.  His  close,  if  permitted  to  close 
the  argument,  would  be  limited  to  comment  on  the  argument  of 
the  other  side.  This  is  essential  to  the  fairness  and  usefulness 
of  juridical  discussion  at  the  bar."  ^  In  a  civil  case,  where  the 
court,  after  the  close  of  the  evidence,  directed  counsel  for  the 
plaintiff  to  go  on  and  state  his  points  relied  on  for  a  recovery, 
which  counsel  did,  and  the  defendant's  counsel  then  asked  the 
court  to  charge  the  jury,  but  the  plaintiff's  counsel  insisted  upon 
his  right  to  argue  the  case  to  the  jury,  which  was  denied  him  by 
the  court,  —  it  was  held  that  the  ruling  was  erroneous.  This 
holding  was  predicated  upon  the  view  that  the  court,  in  directing 
the  plaintiff's  counsel  to  state  his  points,  meant  to  restrict  him 
in  his  opening  to  a  naked  statement  of  his  points,  to  the  exclusion 
of  argument  in  sujDport  of  them.  The  reviewing  court  did  not 
hold  that,  where  the  plaintiff  has  the  privilege  of  argument  and 
declines  it,  he  is  entitled  to  make  the  closing  argument,  although 
the  defendant  declines  argument.^  In  a  civil  case,  after  the  tes- 
timony is  closed  and  the  case  is  opened  by  the  plaintiff's  counsel, 
if  the  defendant's  counsel  submits  the  cause  to  the  jury  without 
argument  on  his  part,  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  make  any 
further  argument  to  the  jury.^ 

1  Brown  v.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  282,  2  Cartright  v.  Clopton,  25  Ga.  85. 

290,  opinion  by  Ryan,  C.  J.  '  Tyre  v.  Morris,  5  Harr.  (Del.)  3. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  X.]       THE    OPENING    STATE3IENT.  245 


CHAPTER     X. 

OF  THE  OPENING  STATEMENT. 

Section 

260.  Reading  the  Pleadings. 

261.  The  Opening  Statement. 

262.  AVhether  Anticipate  Defense  of  Opposing  Party. 

263.  No  Right  to  rehearse  Facts  which  cannot  be  Proved. 

264.  Nor  Irrelevant  and  Prejudicial  Matters. 

265.  Instructing  the  Jury  to  Disregard  such  Statements. 

266.  Abuse  of  Discretion  in  this  Regard  Revisable  on  Appeal. 

267.  Rehearsal  of  Testimony  not  Allowed. 

268.  Exhibiting  Diagrams. 

269.  Dismissing  the  Cause  on  the  Plaintiff's  Opening  Statement. 

270.  Defendant's  Opening  Statement. 

§  260.  Reading  the  Pleadings.  —  The  case  is  ordinarily 
opened  by  reading  the  pleadings.  This  is  usually  done  thus :  The 
counsel  (or,  if  there  be  more  than  one,  the  junior  counsel) 
of  either  party,  beginning  with  the  party  who  sustains  the  bur- 
den of  proof,  reads  his  own  pleading  to  the  jury.  This  for- 
mality may  be  dispensed  with  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.  On 
this  subject  it  has  been  observed:  "It  was  purely  a  matter  of 
discretion  with  the  judge  whether  he  would  allow  the  pleadings 
to  be  read.  He  might  call  upon  the  counsel  to  read  them,  or  to 
state  their  substance,  if  it  was  necessary  to  enable  the  court  to 
understand  the  issues  which  were  raised  and  were  to  be  tried. 
The  pleadings,  which  are  presumed  to  be  statements  in  leo-al  form 
of  those  facts  which  constitute  the  charge  or  defense  of  the 
parties,  are  for  the  consideration  of  the  court.  When  evidence 
for  the  consideration  of  the  jury  is  offered  or  given  to  sustain 
or  establish  those  facts,  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  court  to 
understand  what  issues  are  raised,  and  which  are  properly  tria- 
ble in  the  case.  The  facts  stated  in  the  pleadings,  except  so  far 
as  admitted,  could  not   be  considered  by  the  jury  until  proved 


246  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

by  competent  testimony."  ^  It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that 
matters  concerning  the  pleadings  are  ordinarily  addressed  to  the 
judge,  whose  duty  it  is  to  slate  the  issues  to  the  jury  when  he 
comes  to  deliver  to  them  his  instructions;  and  that  comments 
on  the  pleadings  to  the  jury  are  in  general  out  of  place,  and 
sometimes  unprofessional. 

§  261.  The  Opening  Statement. —  The  counsel  for  the  party 
sustaining  the  burden  of  proof  next  makes  a  short  address  to  the 
jury,  in  which  he  states  the  nature  of  the  issues  to  be  tried  and 
what  he  expects  to  prove,  in  order  to  sustain  the  action  (or  de- 
fense, as  the  case  may  be.)  According  to  an  approved  writer, 
"  the  opening  address  usually  states  first,  the  full  extent  of  the 
plaintiff's  claims,  and  the  circumstances  under  which  they  are 
made,  to  show  that  they  are  just  and  reasonable;  secondly,  at 
least  an  outline  of  the  evidence  by  which  those  claims  are  to  be 
established ;  thirdly,  the  legal  grounds  and  authorities  in  favor 
of  the  claim  or  of  the  proposed  evidence."  -^ 

§   262.  Whether  anticipate  Defense  of  Opposing  Party.  — 

As  to  the  foregoing  there  is  no  difference  of  opinion;  but  the 
writer  last  quoted  from  adds:  "  Fourthly,  an  anticipation  of  the 
expected  defense,  and  a  statement  of  the  grounds  on  which  it  is 
futile,  either  in  law  or  justice,  and  reasons  why  it  ought  to 
fail."  3  That  such  is  the  English  practice  is  shown  by  other 
authorities.^  In  some  American  jurisdictions  this  rule  is  denied, 
and  it  is  laid  down  that  each  party  should  be  confined  to  a  legiti- 
mate and  proper  opening  of  his  own  case,  —  the  plaintiff 's  coun- 
sel to  a  statement  of  his  cause  of  action,  and  the  defendant's 
counsel  to  a  statement  of  his  answer  to  the  plaintiff's  case  and 
the  evidence  he  proposes  to  give  to  sustain  it;  and  that  it 
is  imiiroper  for  the  counsel  of  the  plaintiff  in  his  opening  to 

1  Willis  V.  Forrest,  2  Duer  (N.  Y.),  *  Meagoe   v.  Simmons,  3  Car.  &  P. 
310,317.  75;  Brown  v.  Murray,  Ry.  &   M.  254. 

2  3  Chit.  Pr.  880.  See  also  Lacon  v.  Higgius,  3  Stark. 

3  3  Chit.  Prac.  880.  178;  s.  c.  D.  &  R.  178. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  X.]       THE    OPENING    STATEMENT.  247 

state  the  case  as  made  by  the  defendant  in  his  answer,  or  the 
evidence  he  expects  to  give  in  reply  to  the  defense  set  up  in  the 
answer.^ 

§  263.  No  Right  to  Rehearse  Facts  which  caniiot  be 
Proved. —  Counsel  has  no  right  in  his  opening  statement,  to  re- 
hearse before  the  jury  facts  which  he  is  not  in  a  condition  to 
prove.''  It  is  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  see  that  this  rule  is  not 
overstepped,  and  therefore  he  has  a  right  to  ask  the  counsel  if  he 
means  to  prove  what  he  has  stated.^  As  was  well  said  by  Mr, 
Justice  Graves :  "  The  decisions  unite  in  substantially  denying 
the  right  to  get  before  the  jury  a  detail  of  the  testimony  ex- 
pected to  be  offered,  and  especially  any  not  positively  entitled  to 
be  introduced,  and  deny  the  right  to  use  it  as  a  cover  for  any 
topics  not  fairly  pertinent."  ^ 

§   264.    Nor  Irrelevant    and    Prejudicial    Matters. —   It    is 

equally  the  duty  of  the  trial  court  to  restrain  every  effort  on  the 
part  of  counsel,  in  their  statements  to  the  jury,  to  introduce 
matters  which  are  foreign  to  ihe  issues, 'and  especiall}'  matters 
which  have  a  tendency  to  excite  the  prejudice  of  the  jury.  It 
was  so  held  where  it  was  charged,  though  not    established,  that 

^  Ayrault  r.  Chamberlain,  33  Barb,  and    not    the    case    of    the    accused. 

(N.  Y.)  229,  234 ;  Elwell  v.  Chamber-  Held,  that  this   ruling   was  sufficient 

lin,   31   N.  Y.    611,    614.      Ayrault  v.  protection  to  the  accused  from  being 

Chamberlain  was  affirmed  by  the  Court  prejudiced  by  anything  thus   stated. 

of  Appeals,  as  stated  in  the  opinion  in  Baker  v.  State  (Wis.),  33  N.  W.  Hep. 

Elwell  r.  Chamberliu,  supra,  but    the  52;  s.  c.  69  Wis.  32. 
derision    affirming  does  not  seem  to  ^  Stevens  v.  Webb,  7  Carr.  &  P.  60; 

have  been  reported-.     In    a  bastardy  Duncombe  v.  Daniell,  8   Carr.     &  P. 

proceeding  the  counsel  for  the  prose-  222;  Scripps  v.  Reilly,  35  Mich.    371. 

cution,  in  opening  the  case  to  the  jury,  He  cbuld  not,  therefore,  under  the  old 

stated,    in    effect,    that    the    accused  lav^',  give   his  client's  account  of  the 

would  introduce  testimony  as  to  the  transaction,  where  his  client  was  not 

character  of  the  complainant,  and  as  permitted    to    testify.     Duncombe   v. 

to  what  he    tried    to    prove    on  the  Daniell,  supra. 

former    trial.       Upon      objection     to  ^  Darby  v.  Ouseley,  36  Eng.  Law.  & 

these  remarks,    the    court    promptly  Eq.  518,  525,  per  Pollock,  C.  B. 
ruled  that  he  must  confine  himself  to  *  Scripps  v.   Eeilly,   35  Mich.  371, 

stating  the   case  of  the  prosecution,  388. 


248  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

the  plaintiff's  counsel,  in  his  openino;  speech  to  the  jury,  had 
stated  that,  on  a  former  trial  of  the  cause,  the  defendants  had 
suborned  their  little  son,  then  a  child  of  four  years,  to  commit 
perjury,  and  that  one  of  the  defendants  had  committed  perjury 
in  his  affidavit  for  a  change  of  venue. ^  So,  in  an  action  for 
libel  it  is  held  error  to  permit  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  in  opening 
his  case  to  the  jury,  to  read  at  length,  against  objection,  otJier 
publications  by  the  defendant  which  are  not  relevant  or  admissi- 
ble as  evidence,  and  which,  afterward  on  the  trial  are  not  offered 
as  evidence.^ 

§  265.  Instructing  the  Jury  to  disregard  such  Statements. — 

Where  counsel  have  overstepped  the  bounds  of  the  preceding 
rule,  it  is  the  plain  duty  of  the  judge,  as  was  done  by  Lord  Den- 
man,  C.  J.,  in  one  case,^  to  reprove  the  practice  in  the  hearing 
of  the  jury,  and  afterwards,  in  instructing  the  jury,  to  admonish 
them  to  dismiss  from  their  minds  the  statements  thus  made;  4 
though  where  the  privilege  of  advocacy  in  opening  the  case  has 
been  greatly  abused  in  this  regard,  such  an  instruction  may  not 

1  Hennies  ??.  Vogel,  87  111.  242.  disprove  them,  and  in  Tvhich  the  jury 

2  Scripps  V.  Reilly,  35  Mich.  371.  were  addressed  as  to  facts   tending  to 
^  Duucombe  v.  Daniell,8  Carr.  &  P.      establish  the  innocence  of  the  plaint- 

222.  Counsel  in  this  case  having  re-  iff,  without  some  proof  being  given  of 
ferred  in  his  opening  to  a  document  those  facts  by  the  counsel  stating 
which  he  did  not  expect  to  prove,  Lord  them;  yet  that  has  been  done  on  the 
Denman,  by  way  of  punishment,  al-  present  occasion.  I  do  not  believe 
lowed  secondary  evidence  to  be  given  that  the  statement  here  will  make  any 
of  its  contents.  difference  in  your  opinion;  for  you 
*  In  such  a  case  Lord  Denman,  C.  will  no  doubt  regard  (as  you  ought) 
J.,  in  his  charge  to  the  jury,  rebuked  the  evidence  only  as  to  facts,  and  listen 
the  conduct  of  Mr.  Attorney-General  to  counsel  only  for  their  observation 
Campbell  (Lord  Denman's  successor  on  the  facts.  Still,  I  think  that  the 
asLordChief  Justice),  in  his  summing  practice  which  has  been  adopted  on 
up,  by  saying:  "  With  respect  to  the  this  occasion  is  not  one  encouraged, 
manner  in  which  the  plaintiff's  case  and  that  counsel  ought  not  to  be  in- 
has  been  conducted,  I  must  say  that  1  structed  to  go  into  a  particular  detail 
do  not  recollect  any  case  in  which  a  of  circumstances,  unless  they  aj-e  pre- 
statement  was  made  of  independent  pared  to  give  some  evidence  of  the 
facts  not  drawn  from  the  libelous  truth  of  those  circumstances."  Dun- 
matters    themselves,  but  tending    to  combe  v.  Daniell,  8  Carr.  &  P.  222,  227. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  X.]       THE    OPENING    STATEMENT.  249 

be  siiiEcient  to  cure    the  irregularity,  but    it  will  be  ground  of 
new  trial. ^ 

§  266.  Abuse  of  Discretion  in  tliis  Regard  revisable  on  Ap- 
peal.—  No  doubt,  the  limits  of  privilege  allowed  to  counsel  in 
this  regard  are  very  much  within  the  diacretionot  the  trial  court, 
but  subject,  as  in  other  cases  of  the  exercise  of  judicial  discre- 
tion, to  be  revised  on  appeal  in  case  of  manifest  abuse. ^  In  such 
a  case  the  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan,  speaking  through  Graves, 
J.,  said:  "  There  is  no  doubt  of  the  right  of  this  court  to  revise 
in  such  a  case  as  this.  If  the  trial  court  may  pursue  any  course 
it  pleases  in  relation  to  the  opening  statement,  if  it  may  act  in- 
dependently of  all  control,  then  the  idea  of  a  rule  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  this  court,  under  the  constitution  and  legislative 
enactment,  for  its  guidance  and  government,  is  preposterous  and 
absurd.  But  the  point  is  too  plain  for  argument.  This  court 
will  not  revise  such  matters  unless  there  is  plain  evidence  of  ac- 
tion amounting  to  what  is  called  an  abuse  of  discretion,  and  cal- 
culated to  injuriously  affect  the  legal  rights  of  a  party;  and 
where  such  is  the  case,  whether  the  result  of  accident,  or  inad- 
vertence, or  misconception,  it  will  take  cognizance.  The  error 
in  this  case  was  not  cured,  and  is  one  subject  to  review,  and  is 
sufficient  to  require  a  reversal.^ 

^  Where  counsel  for  the  plaintiff,  be  brought  into  the   same  impartial 

in  his  opening    statement  in  a   libel  attitude   by   tlie   court's   admonition, 

case,  grossly  abused  the  privilege  of  ■which  they  would  have  held  if  counsel 

advocacy,  by  reading  many  irrelevant  for  tlie  defendant  in  error  had  been 

matters  to  the    jury,  prejudicial    in  properly  confined  in  his  opening  state- 

their  nature,  which  were  not  even  of-  ment.     The  course  of  fair  and  settled 

fered  in  evidence,  the  court  held  that  practice  was  violated  to  the  prejudice 

error  had  been  committed  by  the  trial  of  plaintiff  in  error,  and  it  is  not  a  sat- 

court  in  allowing   him  to  pursue  this  isfactory  answer  to  say  that  the  court 

course;  and,  although  the  court  had  went  as  far  as  "practicable  afterwards  to 

not   instructed   tlie  jury  to   disregard  cure  the  miscliief,  so  long  as  an  infer- 

such  matters,  the  reviewing  court  held  ence  remained  that  the  remedy  applied 

that  such  an    instruction,   if    made,  by  tlie    court    was    not    adequate." 

would  not  have  cured  tlie  error.  "  Be-  Scripps  v.  Reilly,  35  Mich.  371,  391. 
cause,"  said  Graves,  J.,   ''it  is  quite  ^  Ayrault  v.  Chamberlain,  33  Barb, 

impossible  to  conclude  that  the  jury  (X.  Y.)  229,  235. 

had  not  been  influenced  too  far  by  the  ^  Scripps  v.   Reilly,   35  Mich.  37X, 

erroneous  rulings  and  proceedings,  to  392. 


250  OPENING  THE  CASE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  267.  Detailed  Rehearsal  of   Testimony   not   allowed.  — 

In  the  case  last  cited,  where  this  subject  was  much  considered, 
it  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Graves:  "A  brief  summary  or 
outline  of  the  substance  of  the  evidence  intended  to  be  offered, 
with  requisite  clear  and  concise  explanations,  are  considered 
proper.  But  a  relation  of  expected  oral  testimony  at  length,  or 
a  reading  of  expected  documentary  proofs  at  large,  or  any  other 
course  fitted  to  mislead  the  triers,  should  not  be  tolerated.  Of 
course,  there  may  be  cases  and  instances  where  the  statement  of 
the  evidence  itself,  or  a  reading  of  a  paper,  may  be  convenient 
and  harmless.  Such,  however,  must  be  exceptional,  and  not 
within  the  spirit  of  the  general  requirement."  ^  From  this  it 
would  necessarily  follow  that  counsel  is  not  confined,  in  the  in- 
troduction of  evidence,  to  the  statement  which  he  makes  in  the 
opening  of  his  case;  ^  since  this  would  oblige  him,  at  his  peril, 
to  announce  to  the  jury  each  item  of  evidence  which  he  intended 
to  introduce,  —  a  practice  which  would  be  a  reversal  of  the  rule 
above  declared.^ 

§  268.  Exhibiting-  Diagrams.  — In  an  action  for  damages  for 
a  negligent  injury,  w^here  the  exact  location  of  the  injury  is 
material,  it  is  the  right  of  the  counsel  for  either  party  to  exhibit 
to  the  jury,  in  his  opening  statement,  a  diagram  showing  the 
place  of  the  injury,  the  same  being  correctly  drawn  and  admis- 
sible in  evidence,  and  in  fact  afterwards  admitted;  and  a  denial 
of  this  right  to  counsel  is  error.* 


1  Scripps   V,  Keilly,  35  Mich,    371,  evidence.     Darby  v.  Oiiseley,  36  Eng. 
388.  L.  &   Eq.  518,   525.     Before   tlie  pas- 

2  Kelly  V.    Troy    lus.    Co.,  3   Wis.  sage  of  this  act,  as  stated  by  Pollock, 
254.  C.  B.,  "you  never  could  compel  a  de- 

^  It  has   been  held,  tn  view  of  the  feudant's  counsel   to   say  whether  he 

provision  of  the  Englisli  Common  Law  would  call  witnesses  or  not,  until  he 

Procedure   Act,  which  has  been  more  had    concluded    his    address    to    the 

or     less     adopted     in    this     country  jxiry.     That    makes     the    defendant's 

(Stat.  17  &  18  Vict.,  c.  125,  sec.  18),  counsel  bind   himself  on  the  subject 

that,   where    counsel   announce   their  before    the     plaintiff     concludes    his 

intention  not  to  adduce  evidence,  they  case."     Ibid. 

cannot  alter  their  purpose  at  a  subse-  *  Battisliill  v.  Humphrey  (Mich.), 

■quent  stage  of  the  trial  and  introduce  31  N.  W.  Rep.  894. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  X.]       THE    OPENING    STATEMENT.  251 

§  269,  Dismissing-  the  Cause  on  the  Plaintiff's  Opening 
Statement.  —  In  jurisdictions  where  tlie  court  has  power  to  order 
a  nonsuit,  it  is  the  frequent  practice  of  the  judge,  where  the 
plaintiff  's  opening  statement  discloses  no  cause  of  action,  without 
waiting  for  the  introduction  of  evidence,  to  direct  a  nonsuit  at 
once.  The  principles  on  w^hich  he  should  proceed  in  so  doing 
are  analogous  to  those  relating  to  a  demurrer  to  the  evidence,  or 
to  a  motion  for  a  nonsuit  or  for  a  peremptory  instruction  in  behalf 
of  the  defendant,  at  the  close  of  the  plaintiff  's  case.  All  the 
facts  referred  to  in  his  opening,  or  offers  of  proof,  should  be 
considered,  including  facts  not  stated  in  the  complaint,  as  well  as 
those  stated,  unless  objection  to  proof  of  such  additional  facts  is 
made  on  the  specific  ground  that  it  is  not  admissible  under  the 
pleadings.^ 

§270.  Defendant's  Opening  Statement. — Eegularly,  the 
defendant's  opening  statement  is  not  made  until  the  evidence  for 
the  plaintiff  has  been  hea/d  and  the  plaintiff  has  rested.  He 
then  introduces  his  case  by  an  opening  statement;  and,  in  a 
criminal  case,  where  a  statute  prescribes  that  the  defendant  shall 
be  allowed  to  make  his  opening  statement  at  this  time,  it  is  error 
to  require  him  to  make  it  immediately  after  that  of  the  prose- 
cuting attorney,  or  not  at  all.^ 

1  Clews  V.  Bauk  (N.  Y.),  11  N.East.  dence  in  support  of  the  prosecution. 
Rep.  814;  s.  c.  105  N.  Y.  398.  2.  The  defeudaut  or  his  couusel  may 

2  Willey  V.  State,  52  lud.  421.  This  then  state  his  defense  and  offer  evi- 
was  held  under  a  statute  which  pro-  deuce  in  support  thereof."  lud.  Acts 
vided:  "  1.  The  prosecuting  attorney  1873,  chap.  74,  page  183;  Buskirk  Ind. 
must  state  the  case,  and  offer  the  evi-  Prac.  403. 


252  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 


CHAPTEK     XI. 

EXCLUDING  WITNESSES  FROM  THE  COURT  ROOM. 

Section 

275.  The  Practice  Stated. 

276.  Discretionary  witli  Trial  Court. 

277.  Doctrine  that  it  is  a  Matter  of  Right. 

278.  What  Witnesses  Exempt  Irom  the  Rule. 

279.  Parties  in  Interest  cannot  be  so  Excluded. 

280.  Nor  the  Agent  of  a  Party,  when. 

281.  Consequences  of  Violating  the  Rule 

282.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

§  275.  The  Practice  stated.  — "In  the  trial  of  causes,  both, 
civil  and  criminal,  it  is  a  rule  of  practice,  devised  for  the  discov- 
ery of  truth  and  the  detection  and  exposure  of  falsehood,  and 
well  adapted  to  the  ends  designed,  for  the  presiding  judge,  on  the 
motion  of  either  party,  to  direct  that  the  witnesses  shall  be  exam- 
ined out  of  the  hearing  of  each  other.  Such  an  order,  upon  the 
motion  or  suggestion  of  either  party,  it  is  said,  is  rarely  with- 
held. But,  by  the  weight  of  authority,  the  party  does  not  seem 
entitled  to  it  as  a  matter  of  right. ^  To  effect  this  object,  gen- 
erally the  respective  parties  are  required  to  disclose  the  names 
of  the  witnesses  intended  to  be  examined,  and  then  the  wit- 
nesses are  simply  ordered  to  withdraw  froni  the  court  room  and 
directed  not  to  return  until  called;  or,  as  is  sometimes  the  case, 
they  are  placed  under  charge  of  an  ofBcer  of  the  court,  to  be 
kept  by  him  out  of  hearing,  in  the  jury  room  or  some  other  con- 
venient place,  and  brought  into  court  when  and  as  they  may  be 
severally  needed  for  examination.  If  a  witness,  or  the  officer  in 
charge,  willfully  disobeys  or  violates  such  order,  he  is  liable  to 
be  punished  for  his  contempt;  and  at  one  time,  according  to  the 
English  practice,  it  was  considered  that  the  judge,  m  the  exercise 
of  his  discretion,  might  even  exclude  the  testimony  of  such  a 

1  Citing  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  432. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XI.]       EXCLUDING  WITNESSES.  253 

witness.  But  now,  it  seems  to  be  the  practice  to  allow  the  wit- 
ness to  be  examined,  subject  to  observation  as  to  his  conduct  in 
disobeying  the  order."  ^ 

§  276.  Discretionary  with  the  Trial  Court. — According  to 
a  much  prevailing  view,  whether  the  court  will  thus  sequester 
the  witnesses,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  "put  them  under  the 
rule,"  is  a  matter  of  sound  judicial  discretion,  which  discretion  will 
not  be  revised  on  error  or  appeal  in  the  absence  of  an  appear- 
ance of  abuse. 2  Upon  this  question  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Alabama,  speaking  through  Somerville,  J.,  said:  "  The  exam- 
ination of  witnesses  in  cases,  civil  or  criminal,  is  in  a  great 
measure,  necessarily  under  the  control  of  the  presiding  judge,  and 
subject  to  a  just,  wise  and  sound  judicial  discretion.  If  he  deem 
it  necessary,  in  order  to  elicit  the  truth  and  promote  justice,  he 
may,  jDroprio  mohi,  or  on  the  application  of  either  party  to 
the  suit  or  proceeding,  order  all  the  witnesses,  except  the  one 
under  examination,  to  leave  the  court.  This  practice  is  thought 
to  be  coeval  with  judicature,  having  long  been  administered  in  the 
British  Parliament,  and  the  courts  of  both  England  and  Scot- 
land. When  requested  by  counsel  or  parties,  though  not  a  mat- 
ter of  right,  the  order  is  rarely  withheld."^  Accordingly,  it 
has  been  held  not  error,  in  the  absence  of  a  plain  appearance  of 
abuse  of  discretion  and  prejudice,  to  admit,  against  the  objection 
of  the  defendant,  the  testimony  of  a  witness  for  the  State  in  a 
criminal  case,  who  had  not  been  put  under  the  rule.*  In  Georgia  it 
has  been  ruled  that,  where  there  is  an  order  for  the  separation 

*  Hey  V.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  (Va.)  94G,  Tex.  App.    150;    Ham  v.  State,  4  Tex. 

948,  opinion  by  Burks,  J.  App,      645;    Estep    v.    State,   9  Tex. 

2  EiTissman  v.   Errissman,   25  111.  App.  360;    Jolmson  tj.  State,   10  Tex. 

136;    McLean  v.  State,    16   Ala.    672;  App.   671;    People   v.     O'Lougliliu,  3 

Johnson  V.  State,  2  Ind.  652;  Benaway  Utah,    133.     Compare  Tex.   Code  Cr. 

V.  Couyne,3  Chand.  (Wis.)   214;  Nel-  Proc.,  art.  666;  Brown  v.  State,  3  Tex. 

son  V.  State,   2   Swan    (Tenn.),   237.  App.  295. 

Powell  V.    State,    13  Tex.   244,   252;  3  Ryan  u.  Couch,  66  Ala.  244,   248; 

Walling    V.  State,    7    Tex.  App.  625;  citing  2  Best  Ev.,  §  636;  1  Greenl.  Ev., 

People  V.  Sam  Lung  (Cal.),  11   Pac.  §  432. 

■Rep.   673;     Avery  v.    State,   10  Tex.  <  ^very  r.  State,  10  Tex.  App.   192, 

App.     199,    213;    Jones    v.    State,    3  213. 


25-4  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tl'., 

of  the  witnesses,  exceptions  therefrom  as  to  witnesses  not  parties 
to  the  suit,  are  discretionary  with  the  court,  and  in  the  particu- 
lar case  the  discretion  was  not  abused  in  refusing  to  make  the  ex- 
ception requested.^ 

§  277.  Doctrine  that  it  is  a  Matter  of  Right.  —  In  an  English 
nisi  prius  case  Mr.  Baron  Alderson  said  that  it  was  "  the  right  of 
either  party  at  any  moment  to  require  that  the  unexamined  wit- 
nesses shall  leave  the  court."  ^  But  this  was  very  different  from 
holding  that  a  judgment  would  be  reversed  because  the  trial 
court  had  refused  to  grant  such  an  application.  In  1881  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Texas,  in  a  heated  decision  delivered  by  the 
Commission  of  Appeals,  a  body  organized  to  assist  the  Supreme 
Court  in  clearing  its  docket,  held  that  it  is  error  in  a  civil  case, 
for  which  a  judgment  will  be  reversed,  to  refuse  the  application 
of  a  party  thus  to  exclude  witnesses  from  the  court  room.  The 
reasoning  of  the  learned  commissioner  appealed  to  general  prin- 
ciples of  law,  but  he  failed  to  cite  any  common-law  authorities 
which  sustain  the  court  in  its  conclusion.  On  the  contrary,  the 
text  writers  cited  by  him  do  not  sustain  the  conclusion  of  the 
court. ^  The  opinion  is  capable  of  being  sustained  on  the  ground 
that,  in  the  particular  case,  a  suit  to  establish  a  nuncupative  will 
it  was  an  abuse  of  discretion  not  to  grant  such  rule,  and  upon  no' 
other.  In  Tennessee  the  rule  is  favored  as  a  mode  of  eliciting 
the  truth,  and  may  be  demanded  as  a  matter  of  right  in  all  cases, 
upon  affidavit  of  facts  showing  its  necessity.*  In  Georgia  it  has 
been  ruled  that  the  defendant  may  demand  the  separation  of  the 
witnesses.^  In  New  Jersey  it  is  a  strict  rule  of  practice  that  the 
prisoner's  witnesses  shall  not  be  in  the  court  room  while  the 
State's  witnesses  are  being  examined.^ 

§   278.   What    Witnesses    exempt  from  the  Rule.- — It  has 

been  said  that  ordinarily  witnesses  who  are  summoned  as  experts, 

1  City  Bank  v.  Kent,  57  Ga.  285.  (Tenn.)  363;  Nelson  v.  State,  2  Swan 

2  Southey  v.   Nash,   7   Carr.    &  P.       (Tenn.),  237;    Smith  v.  State,  4  Lea 
632.  (Tenn.),  428,  430. 

8  Watts  V.  Holland,  50  Tex.  54.  ^  Johnson  v.   State^  14  Ga.  55. 

*  Kainwater    v.  Elmore,    I    Heisk.  6  State  v.  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  220' 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XI.]       EXCLUDING    WITNESSES.  255 

as  well  as  attorneys  in  the  case,  and  witnesses  called  to  testify  to 
the  character  of  another  witness,  are  excepted  from  the  rule  and 
permitted  to  remain  in  the  court  room  while  the  rest  of  the  wit- 
nesses are  sent  out.^  Accordingly,  where  the  court  exempted 
from  the  rule  an  attorney  of  the  court,  who  was  one  of  the  pros- 
ecuting counsel  in  the  case,  it  was  held  that  there  was  nothing 
which  could  be  assigned  for  error. ^  When  medical  experts  are 
called  solely  as  such,  the  better  practice  is  said  to  be  to  allow 
them  to  remain  in  the  court  room  and  hear  the  testimony  of  all 
the  other  witnesses,  in  order  that,  from  the  whole  testimony, 
they  may  be  able  to  determine,  from  the  evidence  itself,  the  mat- 
ter upon  which  their  opinion  is  desired.^  It  is  submitted  by  the 
writer,  however,  that  this  is  not  a  sound  reason  for  allowing  ex- 
pert witnesses  to  be  exempt  from  the  rule;  since,  as  elsewhere 
seen,'*  the  weight  of  opinion  is  that  such  witnesses  do  not  deliver 
their  testimony  from  their  own  conclusions  as  to  the  evidence  given 
by  the  other  witnesses,  but  upon  questions  propounded  to  them 
by  counsel,  presenting  hypothetical  states  of  fact,  which  the  jury 
are  or  are  not  to  find  true,  accordingly  as  they  may  view  the  evi- 
dence. It  is  laid  down  in  Texas  that  where  expert  witnesses  have 
been  put  under  the  rule,  and  have  not  been  permitted  to  hear 
the  evidence  of  the  other  witnesses,  a  hypothetical  case  embrac- 
ing the  facts  in  evidence  may,  in  all  cases,  be  submitted  to  them 
for  their  opinions.^  And  finally,  it  is  laid  down  that  the  court 
does  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  the  slightest  by  subjecting  medi- 
cal experts  to  the  operation  of  the  rule.^  The  w^riter  expresses 
the  view,  with  confidence,  that  it  is  the  better  exercise  of  discre- 
tion to  put  such  witnesses  under  the  rule ;  since,  where  they  are 
permitted  to  remain  in  court  during  the  trial,  they  are  apt  to 
form  theories  from  the  evidence  toward  which  their  testimony 
will  be  directed,  instead  of  its  being  directed  in  a  colorless  manner 

1  Brown    v.     State,    3    Tex.     App.  *  Post,  ch.  XXII. 

295.  5  Webb   v.  State,  9  Tex.   App.  4P0j 

2  PoTvell  V.  State,  13  Tex.  244.  Hunt  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  156. 

3  .Johnson  v.    State,   10  Tex.   App.  6  Johnson  v.   State,    10  Tex.  App. 
571,  577.  571,  577. 


256  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

to  the  hypothetical  states  of  fact  which  may  be  submitted  to  them 
by  counsel  on  either  side. 

§  279.  Parties  in  Interest  cannot  be  so  excluded. — An  order 
excluding  witnesses  from  the  court  room  ought  not  to  be  extended 
to  parties  in  interest;  since,  although  they  are  competent  to  tes- 
tify as  witnesses,  it  is  their  right  to  be  present  and  to  aid  in  or 
observe  the  progress  of  the  trial. ^  "  It  is  obvious,"  said  Somer- 
ville,  J.,  "  that  this  rule  of  exclusion  ought  never  to  be  applied 
so  as  to  debar  a  party  to  a  suit  from  being  present  during  the 
progress  of  his  cause.  He  has  a  right  to  be  present,  for  the 
purpose  of  aiding  and  instructing  his  counsel  in  prosecuting  or 
defendino-  his  suit.  To  order  him  from  the  court  room  while  his 
case  is  in  process  of  judicial  investigation  would  be  violative  of 
the  spirit,  if  not  of  the  very  letter  of  the  Declaration  of  Rights, 
which  declares  that  '  no  person  shall  be  debarred  from  prose- 
cuting or  defending,  before  any  tribunal  in  this  State,  by  himself 
or  counsel,  any  civil  cause  to  which  he  is  a  party.'  "  ^ 

§  280.  Nor  the  Agent  of  a  Party,  when.  —  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Alabama,  while  conceding  that  the  exercise  of  this  dis- 
cretion is  not  revisable  on  error  or  appeal,  nevertheless,  in  view 
of  the  practical  importance  of  the  question,  have  deemed  it 
proper  to  indicate  the  correct  rule  of  practice  in  cases  of  this 
character,  as  follows :  "  Where  a  judge  is  satisfied,  from  the  state- 
ment of  counsel  in  open  court,  or  otherwise,  that  a  witness  in  a 
cause  has  acquired  such  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  facts,  by 
reason  of  having  acted  as  the  authorized  agent  of  either  of  the 
parties,  that  his  services  are  required  by  counsel  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  trial,  he  ought  not,  especially  in  the  necessary  ab- 
sence of  his  principal,  to  be  placed  under  the  rule.  *  *  * 
To  exclude  such  a  one  from  the  valuable  privilege  of  consultation 
with  the  attorney  of  his  principal  during  the  progress  of  the  trial, 
is  not  required  by  the  reason  of  this  rule  of  evidence.  The 
sounder  and  better  practice  is  to  permit  him  to  remain  in  the 
<30urt  room."  ^ 

1  Chester  v.  Bower,  55  Cal.  46.  ^  Ryan     v.     Couch,    66    Ala.     244^ 

2  Ryan  v.  Couch,  6G  Ala.  244,  248.         248. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XL]  EXCLUDING    WITNESSES. 


257 


§'281.  Consequences  of  Violating-  the  Rule.  —  The  better 
opinion  now  is  that  the  violation  of  the  rule  by  a  witness, 
although  it  will  subject  him  to  punishment  for  contempt  of  court, 
will  not  deprive  the  party,  whose  witness  he  is,  of  the  benefit  of 
his  testimony,  where  the  party  himself  is  without  fault,  and  that 
the  court  cannot  lawfully  refuse  to  permit  the  examination  of 
the  witness ;  ^  although  it  will  be  a  matter  for  observation  to  the 
jury  upon  his  evidence. ^  After  such  an  order  has  been  made,  it 
is  no  cause  for  a  new  trial  that  a  witness,  who  had  not  gone  out, 
but  had  remained  and  heard  the  other  witnesses,  was  afterwards 
allowed  to  be  examined ;  ^  but  it  will  be  a  matter  of  discretion 
with  the  trial  court  whether  a  new  trial  will  be  granted  for  such 
a  reason,  and  this  discretion  is  not  reviewable.*  In  Illinois  it  is 
laid  down  that  where  a  witness,  after  being  put  under  the  rule, 
converses  with  other  witnesses,  after  they  have  testified,  and  with 
counsel  calling  him,  in  violation  of  the  court's  order,  it  is  a  mat- 


1  2  Tayl.  Ev.  (5th  Am.  ed.)  744;  1 
Bish.  Crim.  Proc,  §§  1191,  1192;  Cob- 
bett  V.  Hudson,  1  El.  &  Bl.  11;  Cook  v. 
Xethercote,  6  Carr.  &  P.  741;  Res  v. 
Coliey,  1  Mood.  &  M.  329;  Thomas  v. 
David,  7  Carr.  &  P.  350;  Chaudler  v. 
Horue,  2  Mood.  &  Rob.  423;  Nelson  v. 
State,  2  Swan  (Teun.),  237;  Hey 
V.  Com  ,  32  Gratt.  (Va  )  94^1;  Burk  v. 
Audis,  98  Ind.  79;  Davis  v.  Byrd,  94 
Ind.  525  (overruling  Jackson  v.  State, 
14  Ind.  327) ;  Davenport  v.  Ogg,  15 
Kan.  363;  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark. 
€24;  State  v.  Salge,  2  Nev.  321;  Grimes 
V.  Martin,  10  la.  347;  Bell  v.  State,  44 
Ala.  393;  Keith  v.  Wilson,  6  Mo.  435; 
People  V.  Boscovitch,  20  Cal.  436; 
Gregg  V.  State,  3  W.  Va.  705;  Smith  v. 
State,  4  Lea  (Tenn.),  42.s;  Keith  v. 
Wilson,  6  Mo.  435;  Lassiter  v.  State, 
67  Ga.  739;  Rooks  v.  State,  (55  Ga.  330 
(citing  Ga.  Code,  §  38(i3) ;  Thomas  v. 
State,  27  Ga.  288;  Hubbard  v.  Hub- 
bard, 7  Ore.  42,  47.  It  was  formerly 
held  in  Indiana  to  be  a  matter  of  dis- 
cretion for  the  court  trying  tlie  cause, 


whether  the  testimony  of  a  witness 
who  liad  willfully  disobeyed  the  order 
of  the  court  to  remain  out  of  the  court 
room  until  called,  should  be  rejected 
for  that  reason,  and  that  this  discre- 
tion would  not  be  reviewed  on  appeal 
unless  it  appeared  tliat  it  had  been 
abused.  Porter  v.  State,  2  Ind.  435; 
Jackson  v.  State,  14  Ind.  327.  But  in 
later  cases  the  same  court  have 
adopted  this  as  the  true  rule :  "  Where 
a  party  is  without  fault,  and  the  wit- 
ness disobeys  an  order  directing  a 
separation  of  witnesses,  the  party 
shall  not  be  denied  the  right  of  hav- 
ing the  witness  testify,  but  the  con- 
duct of  tlie  witness  may  go  to  the 
jury  upon  the  question  of  his  credi- 
bility." Davis  V.  Byrd^  94  Ind.  525; 
Burk  V.  Andis,  98  Ind.  59,  64. 

2  Chandler    v.   Home,   2   Mood.   & 
Rob.  423. 

3  State  V.  Sparrow,  3  Murph.(X.  C.) 
487. 

^  Purnell  v.  Purnell,  89  N.  C.  42;   1 
Greeul.  Ev.,  §§  431,  432,  and  notes. 


1' 


258  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

ter  of  discretion  with  the  court  whether  to  allow  him  to  testify 
as  a  witness,  and  hence  not  error  to  permit  him  to  testify. 
Scholfield,  J.,  said:  "  If  witnesses,  after  an  order  of  separation, 
upon  being  spoken  to  by  third  parties  in  violation  of  the  order 
of  court,  would  become  thereby  disqualified  to  testify,  a  wide 
door  would  be  open  to  unscrupulous  friends  of  those  charged 
with  crime  to  disqualify  material  prosecuting  witnesses.  There 
might  probably  be  such  an  interference  with  witnesses,  in  disre- 
gard of  the  order  of  court,  as  would  justify  the  court  in  setting 
aside  a  verdict  based  upon  their  evidence,  the  defendant  being 
free  of  fault,  and  the  facts  beino;  brought  to  his  attention  for 
the  first  time  after  the  examination  of  all  the  witnesses  had  con- 
cluded." ' 

§282.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. — In  Tennessee,  where, 
as  already  seen,  the  rule  is  a  matter  of  right  when  the  demand 
for  it  is  supported  by  afiidavit,  if  it  has  been  asked  for  by  both 
parties,  and  a  witness  is  discovered  who  knows  an  important 
fact,  who  has  been  in  court  and  heard  the  testimony  of  other 
witnesses,  it  will  not  be  ground  of  refusing  to  allow  him  to  tes- 
tify that  he  was  not  under  the  rule  with  the  other  witnesses.'^  In 
Georgia,  although  at  the  request  of  the  defendant's  counsel  in  a 
criminal  case,  the  witnesses  had  been  sworn  and  put  under  the 
rule,  yet  it  was  no  ground  for  a  new  trial  that  a  witness  who  re- 
mained in  the  court  room  was  allowed  to  testify  merely  as  to  the 
correctness  of  a  diagrcnn  which  he  had  made  of  the  scene  of  the 
homicide.^  In  the  same  State  it  is  held  that,  where  objection  is 
made  to  the  witness  on  this  ground,  if  the  witness  testifies  that 
he  heard  none  of  the  testimony  nor  the  prisoner's  statement,  the 
court  may  admit  him  to  testify.'*  It  is  further  held  in  the  same 
State  that  the  fact  that  a  witness  for  the  State,  after  being  put 
under  the  rule,  and,  after  having  testified,  may  have  heard  thi 


1  Bullmeru.  People,  95  111.394,399.  18  Oh.    99;  State  v.   Fitzsimmous,  30 

To  the   same   doctrine   see   State    v.  Mo.  236. 

Brookshire,  2    Ala.   203;    Sidgreaves  2  gmith  w.  State,  4Lea  (Tenu.),  428. 

V.  Myatt,  22  Ala.   617;   Sartorious   v.  ^  Betts  v.  State,  G6  Ga.  508. 

State,  24  Miss.  602;  Laughlin  v.  State,  *  Lyman  v.  State,  (;9  Ga.  405. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XL]         EXCLUDING    WITNESSES.  259 

prisoner's  statement,  would  not  disqualify  him  from  being  re- 
introduced as  a  witness.^  The  same  court  has  alt^o  held  that 
the  fact  that  the  bailiff  in  charge  of  the  jury  is  a  witness  in  a 
criminal  trial  and  is  put  under  the  rule,  but  nevertheless  retires 
with  the  jury  (upon  a  call  of  nature)  is  no  ground  for  a  new 
trial. ^  In  Louisiana,  it  was  held  that  the  accused  in  a  criminal 
trial  could  not  be  deprived  of  the  testimony  of  some  of  his  wit- 
nesses, who  were  not  in  court  when  the  order  was  made,  and 
who  only  presented  themselves  the  day  after.  The  court  had 
no  hesitation  in  saying  that,  when  the  witnesses  made  state- 
ments under  oath  that  they  had  held  no  communication  with  the 
accused  on  the  subject  of  the  trial,  they  should  have  been  per- 
mitted to  testify.^  In  general,  it  may  be  stated  that,  where  a 
witness,  who  has  been  thus  excluded,  has  inadvertently  come  in- 
to court  in  vioUition  of  the  order,  the  court  should  have  no  hes- 
itancy in  receiving  his  testimony.* 

1  Lyman  v.  State,  69  Ga.  405.  *  People  v.  O'Loughlin,  3Utha,  133; 

2  Wade  V.  State,  65  Ga.  756.  Dyer  v.  Morris,  4  Mo.   214.     See  fur- 

3  State  V.  Gregory,  33  La.  Ann.  737,  the  r,  Anon.,.  1  Hill  (S.  C),  251 ;  State 
742.  V.  McElmurray,  3  Strobh.  (S.  C.)    33. 


260  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Tllomp.  Tl', 


CHAPTEK     XII. 

OF  THE  TRIVILEGE  OF  WITNESSES. 

Section 

285.  Preliminary. 

286.  Privilege  against  Self-Crimination. 

287.  Against  Questions  Tending  to  Degrade. 

288.  Against  Questions  Exposing  to  Penalty  or  Forfeiture. 

289.  Against  Questions  Forming   Links  in  a  Chain  of  Criminating  Evidence. 

290.  Disclosing  the  Names  of  Accomplices. 

■  291.  [Continued.]     Application  of  this  Rule. 

292.  Compelling  Witness  to  Exhibit  his  Body. 

293.  Effect  of  Statutes  preventing  Answer  from  being  Used  against  Witness. 

294.  Illustration  under  Massachusetts  Statute. 

295.  Effects  of  Promise  not  to  Prosecute. 

296.  Privileged  Communications  between  Attorney  and  Client 

297.  [Continued.]     History  of  this  Privilege. 

298.  [Continued.]     Rule  Limited  where  Question  of  Crime  not  Involved. 

299.  [Continued.]     Confidential  Communications. 

300.  [Continued.]     Witness  not  Exclusive  .Tudge  of  Privilege. 

301.  [Continued.]     These  Principles,  how  far  changed  by  Statutes  Compelling 

Parties  to  Testify. 

302.  Attorney  has  no  greater  Privilege  than  Client. 

303.  Trade  Secrets  Privileged. 

304.  Refusing  to  Expose  Defense. 

305.  Testimony  of  the  Judge  as  to  Former  Trials. 

306.  Privilege  must  be  Claimed  by  the  Witness  himself. 

307.  Privilege  may  be  Waived, 

308.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

309.  Question  Decided  by  Court,  not  by  Witness. 

310.  Compulsory  Answer  not  Evidence  against  Witness. 

311.  Whether  Refusal  to  Answer  is  P^videuce  against  Witness. 

312.  Whether  Court  Bound  to  Instruct  Witness. 

§  385.  Preliminary.  —  It  is  supposed  in  this  chapter  that  the 
witness  is  on  the  stand  and  undergoing  examination,  and  that  a 
question  is  put  to  him  in  respect  of  which  he  interposes  a  claim 
of  privilege.  It  is  not  the  design  of  this  chapter  to  consider 
the  subject  of  privilege  in  its  relation  to  the  compulsory  attend- 
ance of  witnesses,   the  service  of  subpoenas  upon  them  under 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XIL]       THE    PRIVILEGK    OF    WITNESSES.  261 

circumstances  which  clothe  them  with  a  privilege;^  or  (except 
incidental!}' )  their  privilege  in  respect  of  the  production  of  books 
and  papers ;  ^  or  the  right  of  an  accused  person,  testifying  as  a  wit- 
ness for  himself,  to  refrain  from  answering  certain  questions  on 
cross-edzambiation.^  These  questions  are  elsewhere  considered. 
The  privilege  which  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  discuss 
relates  to  the  claim  which  the  witness  may  interpose  against  being 
compelled  to  answer  particular  questions. 

286.  Privilege  Against  Self-Crimination. — It  is  a  funda- 
mental principle  of  Anglo-American  jurisprudence,  that  a  person, 
summoned  as  a  witness  before  any  inquisitorial  body,  judicial  or 
legislative,  is  absolutely  privileged  from  answering  a  question 
put  to  him,  if  he  will  state  upon  his  oath,  in  answer  to  such 
question,  that  he  refuses  to  answer  the  same,  for  the  reason  that 
his  answer  thereto,  if  given,  would  subject  him  to  an  indictment 
for  a  crime ;  and  that,  if  such  an  answer  be  not  deemed  sufficient 
by  the  inquisitorial  body,  and  the  witness  be  imprisoned  for  con- 
tempt for  refusing  further  to  answer,  he  will  be  entitled  to  his 
discharge  on  habeas  corpus.^  The  rule,  as  stated  by  Chief  Justice 
Marshall  in  Burr's  Trial,^  is  this:  "It  is  the  province  of  the 
court  to  judge  whether  any  direct  answer  to  the  questions  that 
may  be  proposed  will  furnish  evidence  against  the  witness.  If 
such   answer  may  disclose  a   fact  which  forms  a  necessary  and 

^  Ante,ch.Yl.  128;    Chamberlin  v.   Wilson,    12  Vt. 

2  Post,  ch.  XXVI.  491;  Robinson  v.  Neal,  2  T.  B.    Men. 

3  Pust,  ell.  XXIII.  (Ky.)    212;    Neale  v.  Cunuiugliara,    1 
*  Emory's    Case,  107  Mass.    172.      Crauch  C.    C.    (U.    S.)  7G;    Hayes  v. 

It  Tvas  so  held  in  this  case,  where  the  Caldwell,  10  111.  333;  United  States  v. 
committing  body  was  a  legislative  Moses,  1  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  170; 
body,  —  the  Senate  of  the  State  of  United  States  v.  Lynn,  2 /fZ.  309;  San- 
Massachusetts.  See  also  People  v.  derson's  Case,  3  Id.  638;  Ex  parte 
O'Brien,  66  Cal.  602;  Taylor  v.  Mclr-  Lindo,  1  Id.  445;  United  States  v. 
win,  94  111.488;  Re  Graham,  8  Ben.  Strother,  3  Id.  432;  Short  t;.  State,  4 
(U.  S.)  419;  Lister  u.  Boker,  6  Blackf.  Harr.  (Del.)  568;  State  v.  Marshall, 
(Ind.)  439;  Coburn  v.  Odell,  30  N.  H.  36  Mo.  400;  Fries  v.  Brugler,  12  N.  J. 
540;  Janrin  u.  Scammon,29  N.  H.  280;  L.  79;  Southard  v.  Rexford,  6  Cow. 
People  V.  Mather,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  229 ;  (N.  Y.)  254. 
People  V.  Rector,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  ^  i  jjyrr  Trial,  245. 
569;  Poole  v.  Perrett,  1  Spears  (S.  C), 


262  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

essential  link  in  the  chain  of  testimony,  which  would  be  sufficient 
to  convict  him  of  any  crime,  he  is  not  bound  to  answer  it  so  as 
to  furnish  matter  for  that  conviction.  In  such  case,  the  witness 
must  himself  judge  what  his  answer  will  be ;  and  if  he  say  on 
his  oath  that  he  cannot  answer  without  accusing  himself,  he  will 
not  be  compelled  to  answer."  ^  Some  of  the  constitutional  pro- 
visions extending  this  immunity  to  witnesses  are  construed  to 
apply  only  in  cases  where  the  person  himself  is  prosecuted,  and 
not  merely  where  he  is  called  upon  to  testify  in  a  criminal  pro- 
ceeding against  another.  This  construction  has  been  placed  upon 
the  provision  of  the  fifth  amendment  to  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States,  that  "  no  person  shall  be  compelled  in  any  crim- 
inal action  to  be  a  witness  against  himself."  ^ 

.    §  287.  Against  Questions    whicb  tend  to    Degrade. — The 

rule  is  that  a  witness  is  not  bound  to  answer  a  question  the  an- 
swer to  which  will  subject  him  to  disgrace,  unless  the  evidence 
is  material  to  the  issue  on  trial, ^  or  unless  it  tends  to  impeach  his 
credibility,  under  principles  hereafter  stated.^  In  England  the 
rule  is  said  to  be  that  the  asking  of  questions  which  tend  to  de- 
grade the  witness  is  regulated  by  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court 
in  each  particular  case.^  It  has  been  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Cooley  : 
*'  When  discreditable  facts  are  aside  from  the  issue,  a  witness 

1  This  rule  was  declared  by  the  Su-  testify  to  facts  tending  to  prove  the 

preme  Court  of  Missouri  in  1829  to  be  guilt  of    the   club,  in  a  prosecution 

the  true  rule  of  law.     Ward  v.  State,  against  it  by  indictment  for  the  illegal 

2  Mo.  120,  123.     See  also   South  Bend  sale  of  intoxicating  liquors.     Chesa- 

V.  Hardy,  98  Ind.  577,  583.  peake  Club  v.  State,  63  Md.  446. 

2  United     States    v.   McCarthy,    18  ^  Lohman  v.  People,  1  Comst.  (N. 

Fed.  Eep.  87;  s.  c.  21  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  Y.)  379;  Great  Western  Turnpike  Co. 

4G9.      Under    a  statute  of    Maryland  v.   Loomis,    32    N.  Y.    127;    State    v. 

(Md.  Acts  of  1882,  chap.  112),  provid-  Staples,    47    N.  H.    113.      The   court 

ing  that,  in  case  of  the  illegal  sale  of  may,  in  its  discretion,  permit  disparag- 

liquor  by  any  company  or  corporation,  ing  questions  to  be  asked,  but  it  is  not 

"each  or  any  member  of  such   com-  error  to  exclude  them  even  when  they 

pany,     corporation,     or     association,  are  irrelevant.       Conway  v.  Clinton, 

shall  be  liable,  and  shall  suffer  impris-  Utah  T.  215,  220. 
onmeut  as  prescribed  by  this  act," —  4  post,  ch.  XVII,  Art.  III. 

it  is  lu'ld  that  a  member  of  an  incor-  ^  Rex  v.  Pitcher,  1  Carr.  «&  P.  85. 

porated  club  cannot  be   compelled   to 


Tit.  Ill,   Ch.    XII.]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  2G3 

may  sometimes  refuse  to  impair  his  evidence  by  a  disclosure  ; 
but  when  they  are  relevant,  it  is  no  excuse  for  his  refusal  to  tes- 
tify concerning  them  that  they  may  exhibit  him  in  a  light  that 
is  not  creditable.  His  dishonesty  or  fraud,  when  not  criminal, 
may  as  properly  be  proved  by  him  as  by  any  other  person."^ 
"  If  the  answer,"  says  Mr.  Commissioner  Blaclv,  "  would  tend 
merely  to  degrade  the  character  of  the  witness,  and  if  it  be  rele- 
vant and  material  to  the  issue,  w^hether  it  will  go  to  his  credibility 
or  not,  he  may  not  decline  to  answer,  and  the  party  cannot  ob- 
ject. If,  however,  the  answer  to  a  question  on  cross-examination 
would  be  collateral  and  irrelevant,  and  would  merely  disgrace 
the  witness,  but  would  not  affect  his  credibility,  the  witness  may 
decline  to  answer;  the  court  should  in  all  cases  sustain  any  ob- 
jection made  by  counsel,  and  the  court  may,  without  objection 
made,  interpose  to  protect  the  witness  from  the  impertinence. ^ 
If  the  cross-examination  tends  merely  to  disgrace  the  witness, 
but  relates  to  a  collateral  and  independent  fact,  and  goes  clearly 
to  the  credibility  of  the  witness,  whether  in  such  case  he  has  the 
privilege  to  decline  or  not,  the  matter  so  far  rests  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  trial  court  that,  in  the  absence  of  a  claim  of  privilege, 
if  the  question  relate  to  a  matter  of  recent  date  and  would  mate- 
rially assist  the  jury  or  court  in  forming  an  opinion  as  to  his 
credibilit}',  the  court  will  usually  require  an  answer,  over  the 
objection  of  counsel,  but  may  sustain  an  objection.  When  the 
answer  would  tend  to  criminate  the  witness,  but  would  be  collat- 
eral and  irrelevant  to  the  issue,  and  yet  would  affect  his  credibility, 
if  he  do  not  claim  his  privilege,  no  distinction,  so  far  as  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court  and  the  right  of  the  party  to  call  for  its 
exercise  by  an  objection  are  concerned,  can  be  perceived  between 
such  a  case  and  one  differing  from  it  only  in  that  the  answer 
would  merely  disgiace  the  witness.  In  short,  where  the  question 
relates  to  a  particular  act  which  is  collateral  and  irrelevant  to  the 
issue,  it  is  proper  for  the  party  to  object,  and  it  is  within  the 
srund  discretion  of  the  court,  where  the  witness  does  not  exercise 
a  privilege  to  decline,  to  permit  an  answer,  if,  by  affecting  the 

'  Jenuiugs  v.  Prentice,  39  Mich.  421.  -  Citing  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  458. 


264 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I   Thomp.   Tl'., 


credibility  of  the  witness,  it  will  subserve  justice,  or  to  sustain 
the  objection  if  such  purpose  will  not  be  promoted  by  the  answer ; 
and  if  the  answer  would  not  affect  the  credibility  of  the  witness, 
the  court  should  sustain  the  objection,  and  has  no  discretion  to 
admit  the  evidence/'  ^  This  immunity  is  not  founded  in  consti- 
tutions, hwtYesis  on  principles  of  the  common  law;  therefore 
it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  pass  an  act  under  which 
a  witness  may  be  compelled  to  answer  questions  which  will  in- 
volve him  in  shame  and  reproach.^  Where  the  witness  claims 
his  privilege  on  this  ground,  he  should  not  be  obliged  to  disclose 
why  he  declines  to  answer  the  question ;  because  so  to  do  would 
of  itself  defeat  his  claim  of  privilege/^ 

§  288.  Against  Questions  Exposing  to  Penalty  or  Forfeit- 
ure.—  By  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  of  Kew  York,"*  a  wit- 
ness shall  not  be  required  to  give  an  answer  which  will  tend  to 


»  South  Bend  v.  Harclie,  98  lud. 
577,  583,  584.  For  cases  illustrating 
the  rule,  see  Great  Western  Turnpike 
Co.  V.  Loomis,  32  N.  Y.  127;  Shepherd 
V.  Parker,  36  N.  Y.  517;  Vaughn  v. 
Paine,  3  N.  J.  L.  728;  Sodusky  v.  Mc- 
Gee,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  621;  Camp- 
bell V.  State,  23  Ala.  44;  United  States 
V.  Dickinson,  2  McLean  (U.  S.),  325; 
People  V.  Heneck,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
82 ;  Grannis  v.  Brandon,  5  Day  (Conn.), 
2C0;  State  v.  Bailey,  2  N.  J.  L.  415; 
United  States  v.  Craig,  4  Wash.  C.  C. 
(U.S.)  729;  Galbreath  v.  Eichelber- 
ger,  3  Yeates  (Pa.),  515. 

2  Kellar  v.  Roberts,  Bright.  (Pa.) 
109.  A  wit  ness  cannot  be  compelled 
to  testify  as  to  his  opinions  on  matters 
of  religious  faith.  Dedric  v.  Hopsou, 
62  la.  562;  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  370;  Com. 
V.  Smith,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  516;  Odell 
B.  Coppee,  5  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  88;  Arnd 
V.  Amling,  53  Md.  192;  The  Queen's 
Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  284.  And  al- 
though he  may  have  testified  as  to 
his   belief  in  God,  he  does  not  there- 


by xoaive  his  right  to  refuse  to  testify 
as  to  his  belief  in  a  future  life. 
Dedric  v.  Hopson,  supra.  Where  there 
is  a  statute  providing  that  no  witness 
who  shall  give  evidence  in  a  prosecu- 
tion touching  any  unlawful  gaming, 
"  shall  be  ever  proceeded  against  for 
any  offense  of  unlawful  gaming  com- 
mitted ])y  him  at  the  time  and  place 
indicated  in  such  prosecution," — a 
witness  cannot  refuse  to  answer  ques- 
tions touching  the  unlawful  gaming, 
on  the  ground  that  his  testimony 
"  might  tend  to  disgrace  him."  Kend- 
rick  V.  Com.,  78  Va.  490.  Against 
objection,  the  court  permitted  a  wit- 
ness to  be  asked  if  he  had  ever 
been  confined  in  jail;  and  then  in- 
structed him  that  he  need  not  answer, 
and  he  did  not  answer.  It  was  held 
that  this  ruling  presented  no  prejudi- 
cial error.  Smith  v.  State,  64  Md.  25;. 
s.  c.  54  Am.  Rep.  752. 

3  Mcrluzzi  V.  Gleeson,  59  Md.  214, 

4  §  S37. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XII.]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES. 


265 


expose  him  to  a  penalty  or  forfeiture .  ^  An  action  brought  against 
a  party  to  recover  a  debt  due  by  a  manufacturing  corporation,  of 
which  the  defendant  was  a  ti-us(ee  or  director,  seeking  to  make 
him  liable  on  the  ground  that  he  failed  to  make  the  annual  re- 
port required  of  him  by  the  statute,  is  not  one  for  a  penalty 
within  the  meaning  of  this  statutory  privilege. ^  Aside  from 
statutory  provisions  the  rule  is  that  the  constitutional  immunity 
does  not  extend  to  the  mere  protection  of  property,  but  to 
immunity  from  criminal  prosecutions.^  Therefore,  a  liability 
to  a  civil  aclion  or  to  a  pecuniary  loss  is  no  ground  of  privi- 
lege.* 

§  289.  Against  Questions  forming  Links  in  a  Chain  of 
criminating  Evidence.  —  The  better  opinion  is  that  it  is  not 
necessary,  in  order  to  bring  the  witness  within  thejirivilege,  that 
the  answer  to  the  question  might  directly  criminate  him,  but 
that  it  is  sufficient  if  the  court  can  see  that  it  would  probably 
form  a  link  in  a  chain  of  criminatins;  evidence  against  him.^ 


1  See  Merchants'  Bauk  v.  Bliss,  35 
N.  Y.  412;  Veeder  v.  Baker,  83  N.  Y. 
156;  Stokes  v.  Stickney,  96  N.  Y.  326; 
Re  Dickinson,  58  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
260.  And  he  Is  not  reqiiired  to  verify 
a  pleading  where  he  Avould  be  pi'iv- 
ileged  from  testifying  as  a  witness  on 
this  ground.  Gadsden  v.  Woodward 
(X.  Y.  Ct.  of  App.),  8  N.  East.  Rep. 
653. 

"  Gadsden  v.  Woodward,  supra. 
Compare  Wiles  v.  Suydam,  64  N.  Y- 
173;  Veeder  v.  Baker,  83  N.  Y.  156, 
160. 

3  Devoll  V.  Brownell,  5  Pick. 
(Mass.)  448;  Keith  v.  Woombell,  8  Id. 
217. 

*  Bull  V.  Loveland,  10  Pick.  (Mass.) 
9;  Baird  v.  Cochran, 4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
397;  AVardv.  Shaw,  15  Vt.  115;  Har- 
per V.  Burrow,  6  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  30; 
Matter  of  Kip,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.),  601; 
Lowney  v.  Perham,  20  Me.  235;  Hays 


V.  Richardson,  1  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  36G; 
Cora.  V.  Thurston,  7  J.  J.  Marsh. 
(Ky.)  62;  Tancey  v.  Kemp,  4  Harr.  & 
J.  (Md.)  348;  Naylor  v.  Semmes,  4 
Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  273;  Copp  v.  Upham, 
3  N.  H.  159;  Alexander  v.  Knox,  7  Ala. 
503;  Judge  of  Probate  v.  Green,  1 
How.  (Miss.)  146;  Zollicoffer  v.  Tur- 
ney,  6  Yerg.  (Teuu.)  297;  Gorham  v. 
Carroll,  3  Litt.  (Ky.)  221;  Black  v. 
Coorgh,  Id.  226.  In  an  action  under 
a  statute  relating  to  copyright  (Rev. 
Stat.  U.  S.,  §  4965)  to  recover  penal- 
ties and  for  a  forfeiture  of  certain 
photographic  plates,  the  defendant 
cannot  be  compelled,  under  a  subpoena 
duces  tecum,  to  produce  his  books  of 
account  and  plates  to  be  used  in  evi- 
dence for  the  plaintiff.  Johnson  v. 
Donaldson,  18  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  287. 

5  1  Burr  Trial,  245;  Priutz  v. 
Cheeuey,  11  Iowa,  469;  Lea  v.  Hen- 
derson,   1  Coldw.    (Tenn.)   146. 


266  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  ?90.  Disclosing'  the  names  of  Accomplices.  —  But  a  wit- 
ness is  not  protected  from  giving  evidence,  from  the  mere  fact 
that  the  evidence  which  he  will  be  obliged  to  give  in  answer  to 
the  questions  propounded,  may  disclose  the  names  of  other  wit- 
nesses Avhose  testimony  may  convict  him  of  a  pending  criminal 
charge,  or  may  furnish  the  means  of  procuring  other  evidence 
to  convict  him  of  such  charge.^  Thus,  a  person  may  be  com- 
pelled to  disclose  to  a  grand  jury  the  names  of  persons  whom  he 
has  seen  betting  at  an  unlawful  game,  although  by  so  doing  he 
may  disclose  the  names  of  witnesses  who  may  be  called  to  testif}' 
that  he  himself  also  bet  at  the  same  game. ^  But  it  has  been  held 
that  a  statute  ^  which  provides  that  any  person  concerned  in  a 
trespass  may  be  compelled  to  testify  against  any  other  person 
therein  concerned,  is  in  direct  contravention  of  the  provision  in 
the  constitution  of  that  State  that  "  no  person  in  any  criminal 
prosecution,  shall  be  compelled  to   testify  against  himself."  ^ 

§  291.  [Continued.]  Application  of  this  Rule. — A  grand  jury 
caused  a  subpcena  to  be  issued  for  one  Ward  to  appear  before  them  and 
testify  generally,  without  specifying  the  particular  matter  or  cause  about 
which  he  was  to  testify.  Ward  appeared  and  was  sworn  to  give  evidence 
before  the  grand  jur^^  He  went  before  the  grand  jury  to  testify.  The 
first  question  asked  by  the  foreman  of  the  grand  jury  was  this:  "Do 
you  know  of  any  person  or  persons  having  bet  at  a  faro  table  in  this 
county  within  the  last  twelve  months?"  To  which  the  witness  an- 
swered, "  I  do."  The  foreman  then  desired  the  witness  to  tell  what 
person  or  persons  had  so  bet,  other  than  himself,  and  not  naming  him- 
self. The  witness  declined  to  answer,  sa^'ing  that  he  could  not  answer 
without  im[)hcating  himself.  He  was  then  directed  by  the  court  to  an- 
swer, luit  not  to  name  himself  as' a  better.  This  he  refused  to  do, 
alleging  that  to  answer  would  impHcate  himself;  whereupon  the  court 
committed  him  to  prison  until  he  should  consent  to  give  the  evidence 

^  LaFontahie    v.    Sontheru  Under-  McGirk,  J. :  followed  and  its  reasouhig 

writers,  83 N.C.  132, 141; W'ardv.  State,  approved    in   La  Fontaine  v.  Southern 

2  Mo.  120;    Kiernan  v.  Abbott,  1  Hun  Uudei" writers,  8S  N.  C.  132,141. 
(N.  y.),  109;  .s.  6.   3  Thomp.  &  C.    (N.  »  2  Rev.  Stat.   Ind.  1876,  chap.  403, 

Y.)  7.-5.  §  14. 

-  Ward  V.  State,  supra,  where   the  ^  State  v.  Enoch,  69  Ind.  314. 

question  was   reasoui'd   at   length   by 


Tit.   Ill,   Ch.  XII.]        THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  267 

required,  and  until  the  furtlier  order  of  the  court.  He  sued  out  a  writ 
of  error  ;  and  on  an  application  to  the  Supreme  Court  for  a  supersedeas, 
this  relief  was  refused.  The  court,  applying  the  foregoing  rule,  held 
that  the  answer  to  the  question  would  not  necessarily  criminate  the  wit- 
ness, and  that  the  witness  could  not  refuse  to  answer  a  question  on  the 
ground  that  it  might  excite  the  vengeance  of  other  malefactors  against 

him.i In  an  action  to  enjoin  the  defendant  from  surreptitiously 

obtaining  and  communicating  to  another  certain  foreign  news  dis- 
patches, sent  by  the  Atlantic  cable  exclusively  to  the  plaintiff  the  de- 
fendant, after  testifying  that  the  foreign  news  which  he  so  furnished 
was  obtained  by  him  several  times  each  day  directly  by  cable  from 
London,  and  that  the  dispatches  came  to  a  baniiing  house  in  New  York, 
from  whom  he  received  them,  was  asked,  "  What  banking  house  was 
that?  "  It  was  held  that  this  question  was  proper  and  pertinent,  since 
the  plaintiff  had  a  right  to  contradict  the  statement  and  to  test  its  accu- 
racy in  any  legal  manner ;  and  accordingly  that  the  defendant  was  in 
contempt  for  refusing  to  answer  it.'- 

§292.    Compelling    AVitness    to    Exhibit    liis    Body. — The 

privilege  of  not  giving  solf-criminating  evidence  extends  so  far 
that  a  witness  oq  trial  for  a  crime  will  not  be  compelled  to  ex- 
hibit to  the  JLuy  a  portion  of  his  body,  where  this  might  disclose 
a  fact  prejudicial  to  him.  Accordingly,  on  the  trial  of  an  indict- 
ment for  murder  where  it  became  material  to  disclose  the  extent 
of  an  amputation  of  one  of  the  prisoner's  legs,  it  was  held  error 
to  compel  him  to  exhibit  his  leg  to  the  jury.^  Contrary  to  this, 
it  was  held  on  a  criminal  trial,  where  the  identity  of  the  accused 
was  in  question,  that  no  error  was  committed  in  compelling  him 
to  exhibit  his  arm  to  the  jury,  which  disclosed  certain  tattoo  marks 
tending  to  identify  him  as  the  person  who  committed  the  crime.* 

§  293.  Effect  of  Statutes  Preventing-  Answer  from  being 
used  against  Witness. — As  a  general  rule,  a  witness  will 
not  be  protected  in  refusing  to  give  testimony  on  the  ground 
that     the     testimony,   if     given,   ^vould    furnish    evidence    on 

1  Ward  V.  State,  2  Mo.  120.  *  State   v.   Ah   Chuey,    U   Ncv.    79 

2  Kieman  u.  Abbott,  3  Thomp.  «Sb  C.  (Leonard,  J.,  dissenting).  Sue  jiost, 
fX.  Y.)  755;  s.  c.  1  Huu  (N.  Y.),  109.        chap.  XXVII. 

■'  Bluckwell  V.  State,  G7  Ga.  76;  s.  c. 
44  Am.  Kep.  717 


2(58  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

which  he  might  be  convicted  in  a  crmiinal  prosecution,  where 
there  is  a  statute  which  expressly  provides  that  the  testi- 
mony so  given  shall  not  be  used  as  evidence  against  the 
witness  in  a  criminal  proceeding;  ^  but  there  are  holdings  to  the 
contrary.^  But  in  order  to  have  this  effect,  the  protection  of  the 
statute  must  be  complete.  A  statute  providing  that  testimony 
which  a  witness  may  give  upon  an  investigation  shall  not  be 
used  against  him,  is  ineffectual  to  deprive  the  witness  of  his  con- 
stitutional privilege  of  exemption  from  being  compelled  to 
accuse  himself,  or  to  furnish  evidence  against  himself,  unless  it 
is  so  broad  that  it  secures  him  from  future  liability  and  from 
exposure  to  prejudice,  in  any  criminal  proceeding  against  him, 
as  fully  and  extensively  as  would  be  secured  by  availing  himself 
of  the  constitutional  privilege.-^  So,  if  a  prosecution  for  the 
offense  is  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations^  the  witness  must 
answer.* 

§  294.  [Continued.]  Illustration  under  Massachusetts  Statute. — 
A  statute  of  Massachusetts  enacted  as  follows:  "No  person  who  is 
called  as  a  witness  before  the  Joint  Special  Committee  on  the  State 
Police  shall  be  excused  from  answering  any  question,  or  from  the  pro- 

1  La  Fontaine  v.  Southern  Under-  person  is  summoned  before  tlie  grand 

writers,  83  N.  C.  132;  United  States  v.  jury,  and  is  aslsed  if  lie  knows  of  any 

McCartliy,  18  Fed.Rep.  87;  21Blatciif.  persons  playing  cards    for    a    wager 

(U.  S.)  4(19;  Keudrick  v.  Com.,  78  Va.  within  the  last  six  montlis,  within  the 

490;   Kain  v.   State,  16  Tex.  App  282;  county,  and  no   objection  is  taken  to 

State  V.  Warner,  13  Lea  (Teun.),  52;  the   form  of  the  question,  and  he  re- 

Wilkins  v.  Maloue,  14  Ind.  153.     Com-  fuses  to  answer,  upon  the  ground  that 

pare  Temple    v.    Com.,   75  Va.    892;  if  he  make  any  disclosures  upon  the 

Kneelaud  v.  State,  (i2  Ga.  395.  subject,  he  will  be  obliged,  in  crimi- 

-  State    V.   Nowell,  58  N.  H.    314.  uatiug  others  also  to  criminate  him- 

Thus,  the  statutes  of  Tennessee,  ex-  self,  —  he   may    be     required    by  the 

isting  from    an    early  day,   give    the  court    to   answer,  upon    pain  of  im- 

grand  juries  in  cases  of  gambling,  in-  prisonmeut  for  contempt.     Hirsch  ?;. 

quisitorial   powers.      Those    statutes  State,  8  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  89. 

also  coutain  a  provision  which  forbids  ^  Emery's  Case,  107  Mass.  172. 

the  indictment  or  prosecution  of  any  ^  Floyd  v.    State,  7  Tex.  215;  Wel- 

witness  for  any  offense  as  to  which  he  don  v.  Burch,  12  111.  374;  Moloney  v. 

has  testified  before  the    grand  jury.  Dows,  2   Hilt.    (N.   Y.)  247;  Wolfe  ». 

Code  of  Tenn.,  §   5089.     In  view  of  Goulard,  15  Abb.  Fr.  (N.  Y.)  336. 
this  provision,  it  is  held  tliac,  where  a 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.    XII.]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  269 

duction  of  any  paper  relating  to  any  corrupt  practice  or  improper 
conduct  of  the  State  police,  forming  the  subject  of  inquiry  by  such 
committee,  on  the  ground  that  the  answer  to  such  a  question,  or  the 
production  of  such  paper,  may  tend  to  criminate  himself,  or  to  disgrace 
him,  or  otherwise  render  him  infamous,  or  on  the  ground  of  privilege; 
but  the  testimony  of  any  witness  examined  before  said  committee,  upon 
the  subject  aforesaid,  or  any  statement  made,  or  paper  produced  by 
him  upon  such  examination,  shall  not  be  used  as  evidence  against  such 
witness,  in  anj'  civil  or  criminal  proceeding  in  any  court  of  justice- 
provided  hoxoever,  that  no  official  paper  or  record  produced  by  such 
witness  on  such  examination  shall  be  held  or  taken  to  be  included  with- 
in the  privilege  of  said  evidence,  so  to  protect  such  witness  in  any  civil 
or  criminal  proceeding  as  aforesaid,  and  that  nothing  in  this  act  shall 
be  construed  to  exempt  an\'  witness  from  prosecution  and  punishment 
for  perjury  committed  by  him  in  testifying  as  aforesaid."  i  With  this 
statute  in  force,  a  person  was  summoned  to  appear  as  a  witness  before 
a  joint  special  committee  of  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  General  Court  of  Massachusetts  appointed  "to  inquire  if  the 
State  police  is  guilty  of  bribery  and  corruption,"  and,  in  obedience  to 
the  summons,  appeared  before  the  commiteee  at  the  State  house  when 
interrogatories  were  propounded  to  him  which  he  declined  to  answer. 
These  facts  being  reported  to  the  Senate,  that  body  ordered  tlie  sergeant- 
at-arms  to  arrest  the  witness  and  bring  him  before  the  Senate  to  answer 
for  contempt  in  refusing  to  answer  the  interrogatories.  The  sergeant- 
at-arms  arrested  him  and  brought  him  to  the  bar  of  the  Senate,  where- 
upon the  Senate  passed  the  following  order:  "That  the  President  pro- 
pound to  Henry  Emery,  now  arraigned  at  the  bar  of  the  Senate,  the 
following  questions:  '  Are  you  ready  and  willing  to  answer  before  the 
joint  special  committee  appointed  by  this  Senate  and  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives of  Massachusetts  to  '  inquire  if  the  State  police  is  guilty 
of  bribery  and  corruption,*  the  following  questions  namely:  First, 
whether,  since  the  appointment  of  the  State  constabulary  force,  you 
have  ever  been  prosecuted  for  the  sale  or  keeping  for  sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors?  Second,  have  3'ou  ever  paid  any  money  to  any  Slate 
constable  and  do  you  know  of  any  corrupt  practices  or  improper  con- 
duct of  the  State  police?  If  so,  state  fully  what  sums  and  to  whom 
you  have  thus  paid  money,  and  also  what  you  know  of  such  cor- 
rupt practices  and  improper  conduct.' "  The  President  of  the  Senate 
then  and  there    propounded  the  questions  ordered  by  the  Senate  to  the 

1  Mass.  Stat,  of  1871,  chap.  91. 


270  EXAMINATIOX   OF  M'ITXESSE8.       [1  Thom[).  Tr., 

petitioner,  and  he  answered  in  writing  as  follows :  "  Intending  no  dis- 
respect to«tlie  honorable  Senate,  I  answer,  under  the  advice  of  counsel, 
that  I  am  ready  and  willing  to  answer  the  first  question  ;  but  I  decline 
to  answer  the  second  question,  upon  the  ground,  first,  that  the  answer 
thereto  will  accuse  rae  of  an  indictable  offense  ;  second,  that  the  answer 
thereto  will  furnish  evirlence  agaiiist  me  by  which  I  can  l)e  convicted  of 
such  an  offense."  The  Senate  thereupon  passed  an  order  that,  whereas 
the  witness,  "  in  contempt  of  the  authority  of  this  Senate,  did  give  an 
unsatisfactory  answer  to  the  second  question,"  he  "  be  committed  to 
the  custody  of  the  sergeant-at-arms,  to  be  by  him  confined  in  the  jail  of 
the  county  of  Suffolk  for  the  space  of  twenty-five  days,  or  until  the 
further  order  of  the  Senate,  unless  he  shall  sooner  signify  his  willingness 
to  appear  and  purge  himself  of  his  contempt,  and  testify  before  the  joint 
special  committee  and  this  Senate,  and  satisfactorily  answer  the  ques- 
tions propounded  to  him  by  the  joint  special  committee  and  this  Senate, 
and  the  President  of  the  Senate  is  hereby  authorized  to  issue  his  warrant 
to  commit  said  Henry  Emery  to  the  custody  of  the  sergeant-at-arms,  to 
be  imprisoned  in  the  common  jail  of  the  county  of  Suffolk;"  and 
"  whenever  the  said  Henry  Emery,  under  the  foregoing  order,  shall  in- 
form the  sergeant-at-arms  that  he  is  willing  to  testify  before  the  said 
joint  special  committee  and  this  Senate,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
sergeant-at-arnis  immediately  to  take  the  said  Emery  before  the  Senate 
and  hold  him  subject  to  its  order."  In  conformity  with  this  order,  the 
President  of  the  Senate  issued  his  warrant  for  the  arrest  of  the  witness  ; 
whereupon  the  witness  sued  out  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  in  the  Supreme 
Judicial  Court.  The  sergeant-at-arms  returned  the  warrant  of  com- 
mitment as  his  justification  for  holding  the  petitioner  restrained 
of  his  liberty.  The  Supreme  Judicial  Court,  after  able  argument 
and  full  consideration,  announced  its  decision  which  bore  "the  ap- 
proval and  unanimous  concurrence  of  all  the  memliers  of  the  court," 
discharging  the  prisoner  from  custody.  The  court  held  that  the 
statute  did  not  furnish  the  prisoner  with  an  exemption  from 
criminal  prosecution  in  case  he  should  answer  the  question 
propounded  to  him,  as  broad  and  effectual  as  the  constitutional 
provision  that  "  no  one  shall  be  *  *  *  compelled  to  accuse  or 
furnish  evidence  against  himself,"  furnished  him  in  the  event  of  his 
refusal  to  answer  it.  In  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court  upon  this  point. 
Wells,  J.,  after  discussing  at  length  the  constitutional  provision,  said: 
"  It  follows  from  the  considerations  already  named  that,  so  far  as  this 
statute  requires  a  witness  who  may  be  called,  to  answer  questions  and 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XII.]        THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    AVITXESSES.  271 

produce  papers  which  may  tend  to  criminate  himself,  and  attempts  to 
take  from  him  the  constitutional  privilege  in  respect  theret©,  it  must 
be  entirely  ineffectual  for  that  purpose,  unless  it  also  relieves  him  from 
liabilities,  for  protection  against  which  the  privilege  is  secured  to 
him  by  the  constitution.  The  statute  does  undertake  to  secure 
him  against  certain  of  those  liabilities,  to  wit,  the  use  of  any  dis- 
closures he  may  make  as  admissions  of  direct  evidence  against  him  in 
any  civil  or  criminal  proceeding.  In  the  case  already  referred  to,i  it  was 
held  that  such  a  provision  by  statute  removed  all  the  liability  against 
which  the  witness  was  secured  by  the  constitutional  exemption,  and 
that,  being  thus  otherwise  furnished  with  all  the  protection  to  which 
the  constitution  entitled  him,  he  had  no  further  occasion  and  therefore 
no  riglit  to  set  up  the  claim  of  privilege  as  a  protection  against  that  to 
which  he  was  not  exposed.  But  this  decision  was  made  upon  the 
ground  that  the  terms  of  the  provision  relied  on  in  the  con- 
stitution of  New  York  protected  the  witness  only  from  being 
compelled     'to     be     a     witness     against     himself,'     and     did     not 

•  protect  him  from  the  indirect  and  incidental  consequences 
of  a  disclosure  which  he  might  be  called  upon  to  make.  The 
terms  of  the  provision  in  the  constitution  of  Massachusetts  require 
a  much  broader  interpretation,  as  has  already  been  indicated  ;  and  no 
one  can  be  required  to  forego  an  appeal  to  its  protection,  unless  first 
secured  from  future  liability  and  exposure  to  be  prejudiced  in  any 
criminal  proceeding  against  him,  as  fuU}^  and  extensively  as  he  would 
be  secured  by  availing  himself  of  the  privilege  accorded  by  the  consti- 
tution. Under  the  interpretation  already  given,  this  cannot  be  accom- 
plished so  long  as  he  remains  ]ial)le  to  prosecution  criminally  for  any 
matters  or  causes  in  respect  of  which  he  shall  be  examined,  or  to  which 
his  testimony  shall  relate.  It  is  not  done,  in  direct  terras,  by  tlie  stat- 
ute in  question  ;  it  is  not  contended  that  the  statute  is  capable  of  an 
interpi-etation  which  will  give  it  that  effect ;  and  it  is  clear  that  it  can  not 
and  was  not  intended  so  to  operate.  Failing,  then,  to  furnish  to  the 
persons  to  be  examined  an  exemption  equivalent  to  that  contained  in 
the  constitution,   or  to   remove    the  whole  lialjility  against  which   its 

^  privileges  were  intended  to  protect  them,  it  fails  to  deprive  them  of 
the  right  to  appeal  to  the  privilege  therein  secured  to  them.  The  re- 
sult is,  that,  in  appealing  to  his  privilege  as  an  exemption  from  lieing 
exposed  to  answering  inquiries  put  to  him,  the  petitioner  was  in  the 
exercise  of  his  constitutional  right ;  and  his  refusal  to  answer  upon  that 

1  People  V.  Kelk-y,  24  N.  Y.  74. 


272  EXAMINATION    OF    "WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

ground  was  not  and  could  not  be  considered  as  disorderly  conduct,  or 
a  contempt  of  the  authority  of  tlfe  body  before  which  he  was  called  to 
answer.  There  being  no  legal  grounds  to  authorize  the  commitment 
upon  which  he  is  held,  he  must  be  discharged  therefrom.  He  is  dis- 
charged accordingly."  ^ 

§  295.  Effect  of  Promise  not  to  Prosecvite. — The  priv- 
ilege "which  a  "witness  may  have  to  refrain  from  answering  a 
particular  question  on  the  ground  of  self-crimination,  is  not  re- 
moved by  the  promise  of  the  State's  attorney  not  to  prefer  an 
indictment  against  him.'^ 

§  296.  Privileged  Commvinications  between  Attorney  and 
Client.  —  Professional  communications  between  attorney  and 
client  are  regarded  as  confidential,  and  are  protected  on  grounds 
of  public  policy.^  But  this  is  a  privilege  of  the  client;  it  maybe 
"waived  by  him;  if  the  client  sees  fit  to  be  a  witness,  he  makes 
himself  liable  to  full  cross-examination  in  respect  of  communi- 
cations made  by  himself  to  his  counsel.^  Moreover,  the  rule 
extends  merely  to  communications  which  the  attorney  and 
client  have  themselves  seen  fit  to  entrust  only  to  each  other ;  if 
they  make  the  communication  in  the  presence  of  a  tJiird  "person 
the  privilege  is  waived,  and  he  may  disclose  it  on  the  witness 
stand. ^  Obviously,  the  rule  does  not  extend  to  statements  made 
by  the  client  to  oilier  persons,  or  to  statements  made  by  other 
persons  to  the  client,  in  the  presence  of  the  attorney.®     It  is  said 

1  Emery's  Case,  107  Mass.  172,  185-  CO  Mich.  277;  s.  c.  27  N.  W.  Eep.  539; 
18(i.  Mobile  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Yeates,  G7  Ala. 

2  Muller  V.  State,  11  Lea  (Tenn.),  18.       1(J4.     See  also  Martiu  v.  Anderson,  21 
"5  Mobile   &c.  11.  Co.  v.  Yeates,  G7      Ga.   301;   Brown  v.  Payson,   6   N.   H. 

Ala.  1(;+;  Jackson  v.  French,  3  Wend.  443.     See  also  Doe  v.  Jauncey,  8  Carr. 

(N.  Y.)  337.  &  P.  99;    Barnes   v.  Harris,   7   Cush. 

*  "VVoburn  v.   Henshaw,   101  Mass.  (Mass.)  57(!. 
193;    Laudsberger  v.  Gorham,  5  Cal.  »>  Gallagher  v.  Williamson,  23  Cal. 

450.  331,  334.     See  also  Coveney  v.  Tanne- 

-^  Jackson   v.   French,  3  "Wend.  (N.  hill,    1   Hill    (N.   Y.),   33;    Rochester 

Y.)    337;    Hoy    v.    Morris,    13     Gray  City  Bank  u.  Snydani,  5  How.  Pr.  254; 

(Mass  ),  519;  Hatton  v.  Robinson,  14  Bramwell   v.   Lncas,  2   Barn.  &  Cres. 

Pick.  (Mass.)  41(;;   People  v.   Barker,  745. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIL]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  273 

in  Connecticut,  by  Sanford,  J. :  "  No  reason  of  necessity  requires 
that  anjMvitness  (save  an  interyretei')  should  ever  be  present  at  a 
consultation  between  a  client  and  his  attorney ;  and  if  the  client 
procures  or  submits  to  the  presence  of  such  a  witness,  he  volun- 
tarily confides  his  secrets,  not  to  his  attorney  onl}  ,  but. also  to  the 
witness,  in  whose  custody  the  law  cannot  protect  them  when  the 
interests  of  justice  require  that  they  should  be  disclosed."  ^  In  like 
manner  it  is  said  by  Merrick,  J.,  in  a  Massachusetts  case:  "  The 
privilege  of  exemption  from  testifying  to  facts  actually  known 
is  extended  only  to  an  attorney  or  legal  adviser  Avho  derives  ,his 
knowledge  from  a  communication  by  the  client  who  applies  and 
makes  disclosures  to  him  in  his  professional  character,  and  to 
those  other  persons  whose  intervention  is  strictly  necessary  to 
enable  the  parties  to  communicate  with  each  other."  ^  The  rule 
is  therefore  carried  to  the  extent  of  holding  that  a  statement  to 
an  attorney  in  the  presence  and  at  the  instance  of  his  client,  by 
a  third  party,  is  not  privileged.^  Nor  does  the  privilege  extend 
to  any  facts  within  the  attorney's  knowledge  or  to  any  informa- 
tion acquired  by  him  in  any  other  way  than  through  the  channel 
of  a  confidential  communication  from  his  client.*  Paper's  in- 
trusted to  an  attorney  in  professional  confidence  are  not  neces- 
sarily to  be  deemed  confidential  communications;  and  if  he 
asserts  that  he  is  ignorant  of  their  contents,  he  may  be  ordered 
to  produce  them  for  the  inspection  of  the  court,  and  if  he 
refuse  to  do  so,  he  will  be  guilty  of  a  contempt.^ 

§  297.  [Continued.]  History  of  this  Privilege. — In  a  very  well 
considered  case  before  Daly,  F.  J.,  in  the  New  York  Court  of  Common 
Pleas,  the  following  sketch  was  given  of  the  history  of  the  privilege  of 
an  attorney,  in  respect  of  producing  documents  belonging  to  his  client, 

1  Gocldard  v.  Gardner,  28  Conn.  M.  310;  Shore  v.  Bedford,  5  Man.  &  G. 
172,  175.  See  also  Gainsford  v.  Gram-  271;  Griffith  v.  Davies,  5  Barn.  &  Ad. 
mar,  2  Campb.  9;  2  Stark.  Ev.,  §  239;       502. 

1  Phil.  Ev.  162.  *  Hunter   v.  Watson,    12   Cal.    363, 

2  Hoy  V.  Morris,  13   Gray  (Mass.),      377. 

519,  521.  5  Mitcliell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr,  (N. 

'^  Perkins  v.  Guy,  55  Miss.  153,  167.      Y.)  249. 
See  also   Ripon  v.  Davies,  2  Nev.  & 

18 


274  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

or  making  disclosures  of  matters  communicaled  by  his  client  to  him  in 
professional  confidence  :  "  Before  the  important  change  in  the  law  re- 
quiring a  party  to  an  action  to  be  examined  as  a  witness  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  adverse  party,  the  general  principle  was  recognized  that 
no  one  in  a  court  of  law  could  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against 
himself.  1  This  principle  had  its  most  extensive  application  where  the 
question  put  to  the  witness  would  or  might  have  a  tendency  to  expose 
him  to  a  criminal  charge  or  penal  liability,  or  to  any  kind  of  punish- 
ment ;  and  so  far  as  protecting  a  party  from  an  inquiry  that  may  have 
such  a  tendency,  this  broad  principle  of  the  common  law  remains 
untouched.  In  such  a  case,  as  the  witness  knows  what  the  court  does 
not  know,  and  which  he  could  not  communicate  without  becoming  his 
own  accuser,  he  is  permitted  to  judge  for  himself  what  the  effect  of 
his  answering  the  inquiry  would  be ;  the  power  of  the  court  being  lim- 
ited simply  to  determining  whether  the  question  is  one  that  might  admit 
of  an  answer  having  such  a  tendency. ^  The  shelter  of  the  principle 
extends  also  to  everything  confidentially  communicated  by  the  party  to 
his  attorney ;  and  it  is  for  the  attorney,  as  it  would  be  for  the  party,  to 
judge  what  would  be  the  effect  of  the  inquiry.  Thus  in  Rex  v.  Dixon,^ 
it  was  held  that  an  attorney  was  justified  in  disobeying  a  subpoena  duces 
tecum,  directing  him  to  bring  before  a  grand  jury  certain  papers  which 
had  been  placed  in  his  hands  confidentially  by  his  client,  where  the  ob- 
ject in  requiring  him  to  do  so  was  to  found  a  prosecution  against  his 
client  for  forgery."  ^ 

§  298.  [Continued.]  Rule  Limited  where  Question  op  Crime 
NOT  Involved.  —  "But  the  principle  that  a  party  could  not  be  com- 
pelled to  give  evidence  against  himself,  was  far  more  limited  in  its  ap- 
plication when  no  question  of  crime  was  involved,  both  in  relation  to 
the  obligations  of  the  witness  and  the  power  of  the  court  in  determin- 
ing whether  he  should  be  absolved  from  answering  or  not.  The 
principle  of  exemption  was  applied,  in  its  broadest  extent,  to  parties  to 
actions  at  law,  who  could  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence ;  and  in 
respect  to  the  production  of  documentary  testimony,  as  a  party  to 
an  action  was  not  bound  to  give  evidence,  he  could  not  be  required  to 

1  Citing     Cook    v.    Corn,    1    Tenn.      tlieir  principal.     Shotwell  v.  Maurice, 
(Overt.)    340.     See    also    Owings    v.      1  N.  J.  L.  (Coxe),  224. 
Low,  5  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  134;  Maiirau  v.  2  Citiug  1  Burr  Trial,  245. 

Lanab,   7  Cow.   (N.  Y.)  174.     So  bail  s  3  Burr.  1G87. 

were  not  compellable  to  testify  agaiust  ^Mitchell's  Case,    12   Abb.  Pr.  (N. 

Y.)  240,  257. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XII.]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  275 

produce  papers  to  be  used  against  him  as  evidence  ;  and  if  a  paper  had 
been  deposited  by  him  with  his  attorney,  the  attorney's  possession  was 
deemed  the  possession  of  the  party,  and  the  attorney  could  not  be  re- 
quired to  produce  it,  nor  even  any  other  person  having  the  temporary 
possession  of  it  in  right  of  the  party. ^  If  a  document  was  in  the 
possession  of  a  party  to  an  action  at  law,  or  in  the  possession  of  his 
attorney,  all  that  could  be  done  was  to  give  him  notice  to  produce  it ; 
and  if  he  failed  to  do  so,  the  other  party  was  at  liberty  to  give  sec- 
ondary evidence  of  its  contents  ;  or  if  the  production  of  the  document 
itself  was  essential,  and  he  would  not  produce  it,  the  court  would,  if 
he  was  a  defendant,  strike  out  his  answer,  or,  if  a  plaintiff,  non-suit 
him  2 — a  practice  introduced  into  courts  of  law  from  the  court  of 
chancery.  But  the  attorney  might  be  called  and  was  bound  to  answer 
whether  or  not  he  had  the  paper  in  his  possession,  that  the  other  party 
might  be  enabled  to  give  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents,  which  he 
could  not  do  until  he  had  first  shown  that  he  was  unable  to  produce  it ; 
and  though  the  attorney  could  not  be  required  to  disclose  the  contents 
of  the  paper,  his  examination  might  be  carried  at  least  so  far  as  to 
show,  with  reasonable  certainty,  that  the  document  introduced  was  the 
one  respecting  which  the  other  party  proposed  to  give  evidence.^  The 
protection  of  this  rule  was  also  applied,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  favor  of 
witnesses  called  on  behalf  of  third  persons.  Neither  they  nor  their 
attorneys,  if  called  as  witnesses,  could  be  required  to  produce  docu- 
ments to  be  used  in  evidence,  if  the  production  of  the  paper  might 
materially  affect  the  rights  or  prejudice  the  interests  of  the  persons  to 
whom  it  belonged,  which  was  a  question  which  the  court  would  deter- 
mine upon  tlie  inspection  of  the  document."  * 

§299.  [Continued.]  Confidential  Communications.  —  "The  rule 
was  also  well  established,  that  neither  a  party  nor  his  legal  adviser 

1  Citing  Bank  of  Utica  v.  Hillard,  5  241,  245;  Cow.  &  Hill's  notes  (SrdecL), 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  419.  Part  2,  note  lo2. 

2  Citing  3  Eev.  Stat.  N.  Y.  (5th  ed.)  *  Mitchell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N. 
293,294;  4  Cow.  &  Hill's  notes  (3rd  Y.)  249,  259.  Citiug  Copeland  v. 
ed.)  648.  Watts,  1  Stark.  95;  Bull  v.  Loveland, 

3  Citiug  Bevan  v.  Waters,  1  Mood.  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  9;  Araey  v.  Long,  9 
&  M.  235;  Eicke  v.  Nokcs,  7(^.  303;  East,  473;  Bateman  v.  Phillips,  4 
Rhoades  u.  Selin,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  Taunt.  157;  Field  v.  Beaumout,  1 
S.)  715,718;  Coveney  i7.  Tanuahill,  1  Snanst.  209;  Cowan  &  Hill's  Notes 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  33;  Jackson  v.  McVey,  (3rd  ed.),  Part  2,  uote  316;  1  Greeul. 
18  Johns.    (N.   Y.)     330;     Braudt  v.  Ev.,  §  246;  Dunlap  Pr.  607. 

Kleiu,  17  Id.   335;    1    Greenl.    Ev.,  §§ 


276  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

would  be  compelled  in  a  court  of  justice  to  disclose  the  confidential 
communication  which  had  passed  between  them  in  respect  of  the  mat- 
ter upon  which  the  party  had  sought  professional  advice.  The  prin- 
ciple, which  appears  to  have  been  recognized  as  far  back  as  the  days  of 
Elizabeth,!  was  not  confined  to  courts  of  law  but  was  equally  acted  upon 
by  the  court  of  chancery,  where  the  aid  of  the  court  was  sought  to 
compel  a  discovery  of  evidence.  On  an  application  for  a  discovery,  a 
court  of  equity  would  neither  compel  nor  permit  a  solicitor  to  disclose 
what  his  client  had  communicated  to  him  in  professional  confidence, 
nor  compel  the  production  of  letters  which  had  passed  between  them, 
or  through  intermediate  agents  on  the  business,  containing  or  asking 
legal  advice  or  opinions,  nor  cases  prepared  at  the  instance  of  the  client 
for  the  opinion  of  counsel.^  Both  courts  of  law  and  of  equity  recog- 
nized the  necessity  of  a  free  and  unrestricted  intercourse  between  the 
client  and  his  professional  adviser,  which  would  not  exist  if  what  was 
imparted  to  the  former  in  professional  confidence  could  be  afterwards 
used  against  him.  Everything  of  this  nature  was  regarded,  therefore, 
as  inviolate,  and  neither  the  client  to  a  certain  extent,  nor  his  profes- 
sional adviser,  would  be  required,  either  at  law  or  in  equity,  to  disclose 
it.  As  this  was  a  rule,  however,  susceptible  of  great  abuse,  it  was 
always  kept  within  just  and  rational  limits.  As  it  has,  in  the  language 
of  Chief  Justice  Shaw, -^  '  a  tendency  to  prevent  the  full  disclosure  of 
the  truth,  it  is  to  be  construed  .strictly ;  '  to  which  may  be  added  the 
very  pertinent  observation  of  Lord  Langdale,  M.  R.,!  upon  what  he 
deemed  a  too  extensive  application  of  it :  '  It  seems  strange  to  say  that 
justice  can  be  promoted  by  concealing  the  truth,  by  suppressing  the 
knowledge  of  any  fact  or  any  statement  of  the  parties  which  bears  upon 
the  question  to  be  decided.  It  is  often  easier  to  exclude  evidence  than 
to  determine  what  weight  ought  justly  to  be  attributed  to  it  when  re- 
ceived. A  bad  cause  may  suffer,  and  the  evasion  of  justice  may  be 
prevented  by  compelling  a  party  to  disclose  a  material  fact ;  but  the 
object  is  not  to  save  the  trouble  or  lessen  the  responsibilities  of  the 
judge  to  protect  a  bad  cause,  or  to  facilitate  the  evasion  of  justice, 

1  Citiug  Gary,  127,  88,  89.  2  Beavau,  173;   Greenough  v.  Gaskell, 

2  Citiug  Lord  Walsiugham  v.  Good-  1  Myl.  &  K.  98;  Holmes  v.  Baddeley,  I 
ricke,  3  Hare,  122;  Mayor  of  Durt-  Phil.  Ch.  47G;  Walker  v.  Wiklmau,  G 
month  V.  Holdsworth,  10  Sim.  476;  Madd.  37,  48;  Bank  of  Utica  v.  Mer- 
Bolton  V.  Coi-poratiou  of  Liverpool,  3  serau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  528;  March 
Id.  4(J7;  Hughes  v.  Biddulph,  4  Euss.  v.  Ludliun,  3  Saudf.  Ch.  (N  Y.)  35. 
190;  Kias  ■??.  Northern  &  Eastern  R.  3  In  Foster  t7.  Hall,  12  Tick.  89. 
Co.,  2  Keeu,  7fl;  Bunbury  v.  Bunbury,  *  In  Nias  v.  Railway  Co.,  supra. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XII.]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  277 

but,  if  possible,  to  do  justice,  and  for  that  purpose  to  get  at  the  whole 
truth ;  and  I  confess  I  have  yet  to  learn  how  tlie  concealment  of  the 
truth  or  hiding  from  the  court  that  which  is  known  to  any  of  the  par- 
ties, and  relates  to  the  matter  in  question,  can  in  any  way  promote 
justice.'  "  ^ 

§  300.  [CoNTiNDED.l  Witness  NOT  Exclusive  Judge  OF  Privilege. — 
"  Whenever,  in  the  practical  application  of  these  rules,  the  question  of 
privilege  arose,  it  was  not  *  *  *  the  right  of  the  witness  to 
judge,  except  where  the  matter  might  criminate  him,  whether  the 
matter  inquired  of  was  privileged  or  not.  That  was  the  province  of  the 
court.  If  the  production  of  a  document  was  called  for,  and  the  witness 
declined  to  produce  it,  upon  the  ground  that  the  reading  of  it  in  ev- 
idence would  be  prejudicial  to  his  interests,  or  to  the  interests  of  the 
party  for  whom  the  witness  acted  as  attorney,  the  witness  was  re- 
quired to  submit  the  document  to  the  inspection  of  the  court,  and  if  the 
judge,  after  perusing  it,  differed  from  the  witness,  he  would  direct  it  to 
be  read ;  ^  or  if  a  witness  swore  that  a  question  put  to  him  could 
not  be  answered  without  a  disclosure  of  secrets  communicated  to  him 
by  his  client,  it  was  for  the  court  to  determine,  from  the  nature  of  the 
inquiry,  whether  the  principle  of  protection  extended  to  it  or  not ;  ^  and 
if  the  court  decided  that  it  did  not,  the  witness,  should  he  refuse  to 
answer,  would  be  guilty  of  a  contempt,  nor  would  the  court  even  hear 
counsel  upon  the  plea  of  the  witness'  objection.^ 

§  301.  [Continued.]  These  Principles  how  far  Changed  by  Stat- 
utes Compelling  Parties  to  Testify.  —  "  Such  was  the  state  of  the  law 
before  the  enactment  of  the  provision  compelling  parties  to  actions  to  be 
examined  as  witnesses  at  the  instance  of  an  adverse  party.  That  pro- 
vision has  brought  about  a  very  material  change.  *  *  *  The  pro- 
vision in  question  declares  that  a  '  party  to  an  action  may  be 
examined  as  a  witness,  at  the  instance  of  the  adverse  party,  and  for 
that    purpose    may    be    compelled     to     testify    in    the    same    man- 

1  Mitchell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  249,  57;  Parkhurst  v.  Lawton,  3  Id.  121; 
259,  2(i0.  Beer  v.   Ward,   Jacob,   77;     Com.   v. 

2  Copeland  v.  Watts,  1  Stark.  95;  Brayuard,  Thach.Cr.  Cas.  (Mass.)  146. 
Bradshaw  v.  Bradshaw,  1  Russ.  &  Myl.  *  Mitchell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
358;  Walsh  v.  Trevanion,  15  Sim.  249,  2(J0  (citing  to  the  last  proposition 
578.  Doe  v.  Earl  of  Egremout,  2  Moody  & 

"'  Citing  Morgan  v.  Shaw,  4  ]Madd.      Eob.  38G). 


278  EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

ner  and  subject  to  the  same  rules  of  examination  as  any  other 
witness.'  This  sweeps  away  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  that  parties 
to  actions  could  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  themselves ; 
and  every  privilege,  either  of  the  party  or  of  his  attorney,  that  was 
founded  upon  it,  is  gone.  I  suppose  that  the  protection  that  was  ex- 
tended to  the  confidential  communications  between  attorney  and  client 
remains  unaffected,  as  the  reason  upon  which  that  rule  was  founded  is 
as  applicable  now  as  it  was  before ;  but,  with  this  exception,  a  party  to 
an  action  or  his  attorney  is  no  longer  privileged  to  withhold  testi- 
mony. A  party  to  an  action  may  now  be  compelled  by  a  subpoena 
duces  tecmn,  to  produce  papers  and  documents  upon  the  trial,  to  be  read 
in  evidence.^  The  contrary  was  held  by  Justice  Rosevelt  in  a  previous 
case ;  ^  but  the  construction  he  put  upon  the  statute  was  repudiated, 
after  a  careful  examination,  by  Justice  "Wells  ;  and  I  entertain  no  doubt 
but  that  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  latter  was  the  correct  one.  If 
a  party,  then,  may  be  compelled  to  produce  documents,  the  attorney, 
whose  privilege  can  be  no  greater  than  his  client,  must  be  equally 
bound.  Li  Doe  dem.  Courtail  v.  Thomas,"^  which  was  an  action  at  law, 
an  attorney  was  called  upon  to  produce  a  lease,  who  declared  that  he 
had  received  it  from  his  client  in  the  character  of  his  attorney,  and  that 
he  held  it  in  that  character ;  but,  it  appearing  that  the  client  had 
been  ordered,  by  the  court  of  chancery,  to  deposit  the  lease  for  the  in- 
spection of  the  plaintiff,  in  a  suit  brought  by  the  plaintiff  against  the 
client  in  the  court  of  chancery,  the  court  ordered  the  attorney  to  pro- 
duce the  lease  ;  and,  when  the  case  came  up  for  review,  Lord  Tenterden 
held  that  the  client  might  have  been  subpojnaed  upon  the  trial  and  com- 
pelled to  produce  the  lease,  and  that  if  he  could  be  compelled  to  pro- 
duce it,  then  the  attorney,  who  stood  in  the  same  situation  as  his  client, 
was  equally  bound  to  do  so.  If  this  were  not  so,  all  that  a  party 
would  have  to  do,  to  evade  the  production  of  papers,  would  be  to  put 
them  into  the  custod}^  of  his  attorney.  'The  production  of 
written,  as  well  as  oral  testimony,'  said  Lord  Ellenborough,*  'is 
essential  to  the  ver}'  existence  and  constitution  of  a  court  of 
common  law,  which  receives  and  acts  upon  both  descriptions  of 
evidence,  and  could  not  possibly  proceed  with  due  effect  with- 
out them ;'  holding  that  the  writ  of  subpama  duces  tecum  was  as 
essential  and  of  as  compulsory  obligation  as  the  ordinary  writ  by  which 

1  Citing  Bonesteel  v.  Lyude,  8  How.  »  9  Barn.  &  Cress.  288. 

Pr.  (N.  Y.)  22G.  *  In  Amey  v.  Long,  1)  East,  47 

2  Trotter  v.  Latsou,  7  Id.  2(;i. 


Tit.   Ill,   Ch.  XII.]        THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  279 

a  witness  is  commanded  to  appear  and  testify.  Tlie  object  sought  in 
the  examination  of  a  witness  is  to  obtain  from  him,  not  only  the  evi- 
dence wliich  he  may  give  orally,  but  the  written  evidence  which  may 
be  in  his  possession  or  under  his  control.  One  is  as  much  a  part  of 
what  he  is  called  upon  to  furnish,  and  in  respect  to  which  he  may  be 
examined,  as  the  other.  When  the  code,  therefore,  declares  that  a 
party  to  an  action  may  be  compelled  to  testify  in  the  same  manner  and 
subject  to  the  same  rules  of  examination  as  other  witnesses,  it  is  ob- 
vious that  the  meaning  is  that  whatever  may  be  required  of  other  wit- 
nesses may  be  required  of  him.  If  they  must  produce  books  and 
papers,  so  must  he  ;  and  if  he  has  placed  them  in  the  possession  of  his 
attorne}',  agent,  or  any  other  person,  the  one  who  has  them  in  actual 
custody  may  be  compelled  to  bring  them  before  the  court,  to  be  used 
as  evidence.  In  courts  of  equit}^  the  principle  of  protection  was  never 
extended  to  all  papers  belonging  to  the  client  which  he  may  have  put 
into  the  hands  of  his  solicitor.  But  the  general  rule  was,  tliat  what- 
ever the  client  was  bound  to  produce  for  the  benefit  of  a  third  person, 
his  solicitor,  if  the  document  or  paper  was  in  his  possession,  was  also 
bound  to  produce ;  ^  and  if  tlie  solicitor  was  not  a  party  to  tlie 
suit,  he  might  be  compelled,  by  a  subpcpua  duces  tecum  to  produce 
it.'^  Indeed,  the  principle  of  protection,  recognized  in  courts  of  equity, 
does  not  appear  to  have  extended,  so  far  as  the  adjudged  cases  show, 
beyond  letters  or  other  communications  passing  between  a  client  and  his 
solicitor  or  their  intermediate  agents, or  papers  or  documents  prepared  by 
the  sohcitor  at  the  client's  request,  and  in  certain  cases  to  the  title  deeds 
of  the  client  in  the  hands  of  his  solicitor, ^  or  to  a  general  application 
*upon  a  solicitor  to  produce  his  client's  papers.^  The  general  rule  of 
courts  of  equity,  that  whenever  the  client  may  be  called  upon  to  pro- 
duce jDapers,  the  attorney,  if  they  are  in  his  possession,  may  be  required 
to  produce  them,  is  the  proper  rule,  now  that  parties  to  communications 
are  made  witnesses.  There  may  possibly  be  cases  in  which  the  deposit 
of  a  document  with  an  attorney,  for  advice  and  counsel,  may  bring  it 
within  the  rule  of  protection ;  though  I  can  conceive  of  none,  if  the 
client  would  himself  be  bound,  if  he  had  it  in  his  possession,  to  produce 
it  as  a  witness."  ^ 

1  Citing  Furlong  v.  Howard,  2  Sch.      &  B.  KU;   jNIcCann  v,  Beere,  1  Hogan, 
&  Lef.  115;  Fenwick  v.  Reed,  1  Meriv.       129. 

114.  *  Citing   Wright   v.  Mayer,  C,  Ves. 

2  Citing  Burk  v.   Lewis,   G  Madd.      280. 

29.  _  s  Mitclieirs  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  249, 

3  Citing  Stratford  v.  Hogan,  2  Ball      2(34. 


280  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

§  302.  [Continued.]  Attorney  has  no  Greater  Privilege  than 
Client  has.  —  "  The  exemption  of  an  attorney  was  never  regarded  as 
his  personal  privilege,  but  as  existing  purely  for  the  protection  of  his 
client ;  ^  and,  even  though  willing  or  desirous  to  do  so,  he  would  not  be 
allowed,  unless  by  his  client's  consent,  to  reveal  anything  entrusted  to 
him  in  professional  confidence. ^  He  was,  in  this  respect,  in  the  lan- 
guage of  Chief  Baron  Gilbert  '  considered  as  one  and  the  same  person 
with  his  client ; '  ^  and  if,  by  a  change  of  the  law,  a  party  to  an  action 
has  no  longer  any  privilege,  it  follows  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  his 
attorney  would  have  none."  ^ 

§  303.  Trade  Secrets  Privileged.  —  Although  the  rule  does 
not  extend  to  the  protection  of  property,^  yet  in  an  action  to  re- 
strain the  use  of  the  plaintiff's  trade-mark ^  the  plaintiff  will 
not  be  compelled  to  disclose  the  ingredients  of  which  his  goods 
are  made,  merely  because  the  defendant  in  his  answer  alleges 
that  they  contain  injurious  materials.^ 

§  304.  Refusing  to  Expose  Defense. — A  person  who  has  been 
indicted,  and  also  made  a  defendant  in  a  civil  action  in  respect 
of  the  same  matter,  and  who  is  brought  out  of  jail  on  an  or- 
der of  court  to  testify  as  a  witness  in  the  civil  case,  is  not  privi- 
leged to  refuse  answering  relevant  questions  which  are  put  to 
him,  on  the  ground  that  his  answers  thereto  will  expose  his  de- 
fense in  the  criminal  case,  and  put  him  "  in  the  hands  of  his  ene- 
mies," —that  is,  in  the  hands  of  the  complainant  in  the  civil 
case  and  of  the  prosecuting  attorney  in  the  criminal  case.  He 
can  only  escape  answering  the  questions,  by  putting  himself 
upon  his  privilege,  and  claiming  that  the  answers  which  he 
would  be  bound  to  give  would  furnish  evidence  on  which  he 
might  be   convicted  of  a  crime.     In  so  holding,  the  court  said: 

'  Bnller  N.  P.  284.  (Pa.)    170.     Compare  Burnett  v.  Pha- 

2  Petrie's   Case,  cited,  4  T.  R.  756.  Ion,  21  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  100,  — where 

3  Gilbert  Ev.  138.  a  similar  question  was  allowed,  but 

4  Mitcliell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  only  on  the  ground  tliat  the  plaintiff 
Y.)  249,  2()2,  opinion  by  Daly,  F.  .J.  in  his  examination  in  chief  had  opened 

^  Ante,  §  288.  the   question,  and  thus   had  made   it 

^  Tetlow    V.    Savouruin,    15    Phil,      relevant  on  cross-examination. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XII.]       THE    PKIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  281 

"It  is  true,  that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  criminal  proceedings, 
the  defendant  is  enabled  to  conceal  the  grounds  of  his  defense 
until  the  prosecution  has  made  a  prima  facie  case  before  the 
jury ;  but  this  is  merely  incident  to  the  course  of  those  pro- 
ceedings, and  not  in  any  true  sense  a  privilege.  As  a  defendant 
in  the  criminal  action,  he  can  stand  upon  the  presumption  of  his 
innocence,  and  is  not  bound  to  offer  any  defense  until  a  case  has 
been  proved  against  him ;  but,  as  a  party  to  a  civil  action,  his 
privilege  is  just  the  same,  whether  he  has  been  indicted  or  not; 
he  can  only  refuse  to  answer  when  his  answers  would  tend  to 
criminate  or  degrade  him,  and  he  must  himself  invoke  his  privi- 
lege.^ This  is  the  plain  rule  of  the  statute,  and  there  is  no  pub- 
lic policy  superior  to  the  rule.  To  conceal  his  defense  until  the 
day  of  trial,  is,  no  doubt,  a  valuable  privilege  to  the  criminal ; 
for  it  will  often  deprive  the  State  of  all  opportunity  of  exposing 
its  falsity ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  it  is  to  benefit  an  inno- 
cent defendant,  who  relies  upon  the  truth  for  his  vindication, 
unless  it  is  assumed  that  the  State  will  suborn  false  witnesses  for 
the  purpose  of  destroying  him."  ^  There  is  a  statute  in  New 
Hampshire  providing  that  a  party  testifying  as  a  witness  shall 
not  be  compelled  to  disclose  his  witnesses  nor  the  manner  of 
proving  his  case.^  This  does  not  excuse  him  from  testifying  as 
to  all  he  knows  upon  the  issue. ^ 

§  305.   Testimony  of  the   Judge  as  to  Former  Trials.  —  On 

grounds  of  public  policy,  the  judge  of  a  court  is  excused  from 
testifying  as  to  what  witnesses  have  testified  to  on  former  trials 
before  him ;  but  it  has  been  held  that  he  may  waive  the  privi- 
lege and  testify  without    furnishing  just  ground  of  exccDtion.® 

§  306.  Privilege  must   be    claimed  by  Witness  himself.  — 

The  privilege  in  respect  of  self  crimination  or  disgrace  is  per- 
sonal to  the   ivitness,  and  cannot  be  claimed  by  the  party  whose 

1  Corap.  Laws  Nev.,  §  1455.  ■*  Penniman    v.    Jones,    5!)    N.    II. 

2  Maxwell   v.    Eives,    11    Nev.  213,       119. 

220.  5  Welcome   v.  Batchelder,    23   Me. 

3  Geu.  Laws  N.  H.,  chap.  228,  §  1-t.      85. 


282  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

witness  he  is.^  "  AY  here  the  answer  would  thus  tend  to  ex- 
l^ose  the  witness  to  a  criminal  charge,  if  it  be  material  and 
relevant  to  the  issue,  the  privilege  belongs  to  the  witness  alone, 
and  must  be  claimed  by  him  ;  the  objection  cannot  be  inter- 
i:)osed  by  a  party,  but  the  witness,  advised  of  his  privilege, 
will  be  permitted  to  answer  if  he  choose  to  do  so."  ^  The  general 
rule  is  that,  where  a  question  is  put  tending  to  criminate  or 
degrade  the  witness,  the  claim  of  privilege  from  answering  it 
must  be  made  by  the  witness  himself,  and  is  not  available  when 
made  merely  by  the  party  whose  witness  the  witness  is.  It  is 
merely  a  question  between  the  witness  and  the  court,  with  which 
the  party  has  nothing  to  do,  and  with  Avhieh  the  counsel  for  a 
party  has  no  right  to  interfere.^  Thus,  on  a  trial  for  murder, 
the  accused,  testifying  for  himself,  was  asked  on  cross-examina- 
tion, whether  he  had  not  been  arrested  for  an  assault  with  intent 
to  kill.  The  question  was  objected  to,  the  objection  was  over- 
ruled, and  the  accused  answered  without  claiming  his  privilege. 
It  was  held  that  the  ruling  was  not  erroneous.^  Where,  upon 
cross-examination,  a  witness  refuses  to  answer  a  question  which, 
although  upon  collateral  matter,  is  not  otherwise  objectionable, 
but  the  answer  to  which  may  tend  to  criminate  or  degrade  him, 
the  cross-examining  party  may  further  ask  him  his  reason  for 
refusing  to  answer,  and  thus  conti^el  liira  to  claim  his  privilege,  if 
his  refusal  is  based  upon  that  ground.^ 

§  307.  Privilege  may  be  Waived.  —  The  refusal  to  answer 
a  question  on  the  ground  that  the  answer  might  subject  the 
witness  to  a  criminal  prosecution  is  a  privilege  which  the  wit- 
ness is  at  libertv  to  waive.     It  therefore  follows  that  a  question 


1  Ingalls     V.    State,   48    Wis.   G47;  s  Cloves  v.  Thayer,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.), 

Clark    V.    Reese,   35   Cal.  89;    Com.  v.  564;  Southard  r.  Ke-xford,  6  Cow.  (N. 

Shaw,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  594;  Soiulusky  Y.)   2,54;    Teople  r.  Brown,   72   N.  Y. 

V.  McGee,  5  J.   J.  Marsh.   (Ky.)  621;  571,573. 

State  v.  Bilansky,  3  Minn,  246;   New-  *  Hauoff  v.   State,  37   Oh.  St.   178; 

comb  V.  State,  37  Miss.  383;    State  v.  s.  c.  41  Am.  Rep.  496. 
Patterson,  2  Ired.  (N.  C.)  346.  &  Kew  v.  Fisher,  II  Daly   (N.  Y.), 

-  South  Bend  v.  Hardie,  98  Ind.  577,  309. 
583. 


Tit.   Ill,   Ch.  XII.]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  283 

can  never  be  objected  to  upon  this  ground,  if  it  is  otherwise 
proper.  The  extent  of  the  rule  is  that  a  witness  can  never  be  com- 
pelled by  compulsory  process  to  answer  such  a  question.^  Where 
a  co-defendant  in  a  criminal  case  "  turns  State's  evidence'^  and 
attempts  to  convict  others  by  i^roof  which  would  also  convict  him- 
self, he  has  no  right  to  claim  any  privilege  concerning  any  of  the 
facts  bearing  upon  the  issue.  He  has  waived  all  privilege  which 
would  permit  him  to  hold  anything.'^  Such  a  waiver  covers 
confidential  commiDiications  made  to  attorneys;  since  there  is  no 
more  reason  for  saving  these  than  for  saving  the  privilege  of  a 
witness  from  criminating  himself.  Each  may  be  waived,  and 
each  is,  by  such  criminating  disclosures,  conclusively  waived. 
Both  client  and  attorney  may  be  •  compelled  to  disclose  the 
client's  statements  which  are  pertinent  to  the  issue. ^  If  a  wit- 
ness discloses  a  part  of  a  criminal  transaction,  without  claiming 
his  privilege,  he  must  disclose  the  whole.  He  cannot,  after  vol- 
untarily testifying  in  chief,  decline  cross-examination  on  the 
ground  that  his  answer  may  criminate  or  disgrace  him.*  So,  if  he 
voluntarily  states  that  he  knows  a  fact,  he  may  be  compelled  to 
state  how  he  knows  it.^  0\iq^\\\o  volunteers  his  testi^nony  in  be- 
half of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case,  cannot  refuse  to  submit 
to  a  cross-examination  on  the  ground  that  his  answers  will  expose 
him  to  a  criminal  charge  growing  out  of  the  transaction  concern- 
ing whichhe  has  volunteered  to  testify.^  And  it  seems  that  a  wit- 
ness, by  voluntarily  answering  as  to  a  transaction,  where  his 
answers  tends  to  criminate  him,  waives  the  privilege  of  refusing 
to  answer  which  he  misfht  have  had  at  the  outset  if  he  had  seen 


1  People  V.  Arnold,  40  Mich.  710.  r.  Gaylord,  28  Couu.  309;  State  v.  Fos- 

2  Hamiltoa  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173,  ter,  23  N.  H.  348;  Coburn  v.  Odell,  30 
184;  Foster  V.  People,  18  Mich.  2(]G;  N.  H.  540;  People  v.  Carroll,  3  Park. 
Lockett  V.  State,  G3  Ala.  5;  Alderman  Cr.  (X.  Y.)  73;  Chamberlin  v.  Wilson, 
t\  People,  4  Mich.  414;  Com.  v.  Price,  12  Yt.  491;  East  v.  Chapman,  Mood. 
10  Gray  (Mass.),  472.  &  M.  47;  s.  c.  2  Car.  &  P.  570;  Dixon 

3  Aderman  v.  People,  4  Mich.  414;  v.  Yale,  1  Car.  &  P.  278. 
Hamilton  v.  People,  supra.  ^  State  v.  K ,  4  N.  H.  562. 

■*  People  V.  Freshauer,  55  Cal.  575;  *^  State  v.  Hall,  20  Mo.  App.  397,  per 

Com.  V.  Pratt,  126 Mass.  462;  Fosters.  Hall,  J.;  See  Whart.  Crim.  Ev.,  §  470 

Pierce,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  437;  Norfolk  and  cases  cited. 


284  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

fit  to  claim  it/  But  the  fact  that  the  witness  testified  before  tlie 
grand  jury,  and  that  it  was  on  his  testimony  that  the  indictment 
was  found,  docs  not  deprive  him  of  his  privilege  of  declining  to 
testify  on  the  trial? 

§  308.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. — Thus,  a  witness  in  a  bastardy 
case  testified  for  the  defendant  that  a  person  other  than  the  defendant 
had  had  sexual  intercourse  with  the  prosecutrix.  He  was  required  by 
the  court,  on  cross-examination,  to  state  who  that  person  was,  and 
thereupon  he  said  that  it  was  himself.  It  was  held  that  this  was  no 
error ;  since,  by  appearing  for  the  defendant  to  testify  to  such  a  fact,  he 

waived  his  privilege  of  not  criminating  himself.^ In  a  proceeding 

to  revoke  letters  of  administration  granted  upon  an  estate  on  the  ground 
that  the  supposed  decedent  was  alive,  a  witness  swore  that  he  himself 
was  the  supposed  decedent ;  that  he  left  the  place  in  1875  and  did  not 
return  until  1880 ;  but  he  declined  to  disclose  his  whereabouts  in  the 
meantime,  on  the  ground  of  self-crimination,  —  adding  that  he  had 
neither  been  in  prison  nor  under  arrest.  It  was  held,  (1)  that  he  had 
not  waived  his  privilege;  but,  (2)  that  he  did  not  disclose  a  suflflcient 
basis  to  enable  him  to  claim  it."* A  physician  testified  without  ob- 
jection as  to  the  condition  of  his  patient,  and  then  refused  to  give  his 
opinion  as  to  the  cause  of  the  symptoms  discovered,  unless  he  should 
receive  an  expert's  fee.     It  was  held  that  he  must  answer. ^ 

§   309.   Question    decided  by  Court,  not  by  Witness. —  The 

question  of  privilege  must  be  decided  by  the  judge,  and  not  by 
the  witness.*^  Tlie  rule  under  this  head  was  tlius  stated  in  a  case 
in  Wisconsin  by  Dixon,  C.  J.:  "  Although  the  witness  is  the 
judge  of  the  effect  of  his  answer,  and  is  not  bound  to  disclose  any 
facts  or  circumstances  to  show  how  the  answer  would  affect  him, 
as  that  would  defeat  the  rule  and  destroy  the  protection  afforded 

1  Youngs  V.  Youugs,  5  Reclf.  (N.  Y.  245;  Uuited  States  v.  Miller,  2  Crauch 
Surr.)  505^  C.  C.    (U.    S.)    247;  United   States  v. 

2  Temple -y.  Com.,  75  Va.  892,  Devauglin,   2     Id.   501;     Sanderson's 

3  State  t7.  Nichols,  29  Minn.  357.  Case,  3    Id.    638;    State  v.   Duffy,   15  ' 

4  Youngs  V.  Youngs,  5  Redf.  (N.  Y.  Iowa,  425;  Eichman  v.  State,  2  G. 
Surr.)  505.  Greene    (Iowa),    532;  Com.   v.  Bray- 

5  Wright  u.  Teople,  112  111.  540.  nard,  Thach.  Cr.   (Mass.)    146;  Floyd 

6  United  States  v.  Burr,  1  Burr  Tr.  v.  State,  7  Tex.  215. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIL]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  285 

by  the  law,  yet  the  court  is  to  determine,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  whether  such  is  the  tendency  of  the  question 
put  to  him,  and  whether  he  shall  be  required  to  answer;  as  other- 
wise it  would  be  in  the  power  of  every  witness  to  deprive  parties 
of  the  benefit  of  his  testimony,  by  the  merely  colorable  pretense 
that  his  answers  to  questions  would  have  a  tendency  to  implicate 
him  in  some  crime  or  misdemeanor,  or  would  expose  him  to  a  pen- 
alty or  forfeiture  when  it  is  clear  *  *  *  tlijit  the  questions 
have  no  such  tendency."  ^  This  was  decided  by  Chief  Justice 
Marshall  in  Burr's  trial,  as  shown  by  the  quotation  in  a  preced- 
ing section ;  and  there  is  a  general  concurrence  of  autliority  to  the 
same  effect.  "  The  court  must,"  said  Smith,  C. «!.,  "  in  the  first 
instance,  determine  whether  the  question  is  such  that  it  may  be 
reasonably  inferred  that  the  answer  made  is  criminating ;  and  the 
nature  of  the  answer,  as  it  is  known  to  the  witness  alone,  he  alone 
nuist  decide.  If  the  information  sought  may  be  self-accusing, 
and  the  witness  says  it  is,  he  need  not  answer."  ^  In  like  man- 
ner Prof .  Greenleaf  says:  "  Whether  it  [the  answer]  nuiy  tend 
to  criminate  or  expose  the  witness,  is  a  point  which  the  court 
will  determine  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case."  ^  It  is 
accordingly  said  by  Marcy,  J.,  in  a  case  in  New  York:  "  My 
conclusion  is  that  where  the  witness  claims  to  be  excused  from 
answering  a  question  because  the  answer  may  disgrace  him  or 
render  him  infamous,  the  court  must  see  that  the  answer  way, 
without  the  intervention  of  other  facts,  fix  on  him  moral  turpi- 
tude. Where  he  claims  to  be  excused  from  answering  because 
his  answer  will  have  a  tendency  to  implicate  him  in  a  crime  or 
misdemeanor,  or  will  expose  him  to  a  i)enalty  or  forfeiture,  then 
the  court  are  to  determine  whether  the  answer  he  may  give  to  the 
question  can  criminate  him  directh^  or  indirectly,  by  furnishing 
direct  evidence  of  his  guilt,  or  by  establishing  one  of  many  facts 
which,  together,  may  constitute  a  chain  of  testimony  sufficient 
to  warrant  his  conviction,  but  which  one  fact,  of  itself,  could 

1  Kirschnerv.  State,  9  Wis.  140  (re-  2  LaFontaiue    v.  Southcru   Uuder- 

affirmed  iu  State  v.  Lousdale,  48  Wis.      writers,  83  N.  C.  132,  138. 
348,  368,  3  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  451. 


286  '  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoinp.  Tl'., 

not  produce  such  result."^  Considering  these  authorities,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  North  Carolina  hold  the  rule  to  be:  "That 
to  entitle  a  party  called  as  a  witness  to  the  privilege  of  silence, 
the  court  must  see  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the 
nature  of  the  evidence  which  the  witness  is  called  to  give,  that 
there  is  no  reasonable  ground  to  apprehend  danger  to  the  wit- 
ness from  his  being  compelled  to  answer,"^  So,  it  has  been 
said  in  Iowa:  "It  is  not  left  alone  to  the  witness  to  determine 
whether  the  answer  would  tend  to  criminate  him.  He  is  not 
required  to  explain  how  he  would  be  criminated  ;  for  this  would 
or  might  annihilate  the  protection  secured  by  the  rule.  But  it 
is  for  the  court  to  determine  whether  the  answer  can  criminate 
him,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  furnishing  direct  evidence  of  his 
guilt,  or  by  establishing  one  of  m.any  facts  which,  together,  may 
constitute  a  chain  of  testimony  sufficient  to  warrant  his  conviction, 
but  one  part  of  which,  by  itself,  could  not  produce  such  result."  ^ 
li  the  production  of  a  docur)ienthQ  called  for,  and  the  witness  de- 
cline to  produce  it,  upon  the  ground  that  the  reading  of  it  in  evi- 
dence would  be  prejudicial  to  his  interests,  or  to  the  interests  of  a 
person  toward  whom  he  stands  in  a  confidential  relation  respect- 
ing the  instrument,  the  witness  may  be  required  to  submit  the 
document  to  the  inspection  of  the  court.  In  so  holding  Daly,  F. 
J.,  said:  "  It  was  a  contempt  wilfully  to  deprive  the  court  of  the 
means  of  determining  whether  the  principle  of  protection  extended 
to  the  papers  in  his  possession  or  not ;  and  it  would  not  be  the  less 
a  case  of  contempt,  even  assuming  that,  by  what  was  stated  to  the 
court,  a  case  of  privilege  was  shown;  for  though  the  judge 
should  decide  erroneously  upon  the  question  of  privilege,  the 
order  he  makes  is  nevertheless  to  be  obeyed.  If  it  were  other- 
wise, it  will  always  be  in  the  power  of  a  witness  to  withhold  evi- 
"  dence  wherever  he  thought  fit  to  consider  himself  privileged."* 

1  People  V.  Mather,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  ^  LaFontaine  v.    Southern    Under- 

254.     See   also  Ward  v.  State,  2  Mo.      -writers,  83  N.  C.  132,  141. 
123;    1   Whart,  Crim.    L.,    §807.     See  ^  gt^te   v.  Duffy,    15   la.    425,    427, 

Osborne  v.  London  Dock  Co.,  10  Exch.      per  Wright,  J. 

(H.  &G.)701.  4  Mitchell's     Case,     12     Abb.     Tr. 

(N.Y.)   249. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIL]       THE    PRIVILEGE    OF    WITNESSES.  287 

§  310.  Compulsory  answer  not  Evidence  against  Wit- 
ness. —  This  question  was  considered  in  England  by  the  judges, 
when  a  majority  were  of  opinion  that,  if  a  witness  claims  the 
protection  of  the  court  on  the  ground  that  his  answer  W'Ould 
tend  to  criminate  himself,  and  there  appears  to  be  ground  for  be- 
lieving that  it  would  do  so,  he  is  not  compellable  to  answer ;  and, 
if  obliged  to  answer  notwithstanding,  what  he  says  must  be  con- 
sidered to  have  been  obtained  by  compulsion,  and  cannot  after- 
wards be  given  in  evidence  against  him.  The  judges  also  held 
that  it  made  no  difference  in  the  right  of  the  witness  to  protec- 
tion, that  he  had  before  answered  in  part;  on  the  contrary,  they 
were  of  opinion  that  he  was  entitled  to  claim  the  privilege  at  any 
stage  of  the  inquiry,  and  that  no  answer  forced  from  him  by  the 
presiding  judge  after  he  had  claimed  such  privilege  could  after- 
wards be  given  in  evidence  against  him.^ 

§  311.  Whether  Refusal  to  Answer  is  Evidence  against 
Witness.  — It  has  been  held  that  the  refusal  of  a  party  to  a  civil 
suit,  when  testifying  as  a  witness,  to  answer  a  material  question 
on  the  ground  of  self-crimination,  is  a  circumstance  which  may 
be  considered  against  him  in  such  civil  suit.'^  The  rule  is  other- 
wise wdiere  the  witness  is  not  a  party .-^  But  in  a  criminal  case 
where  the  accused,  testifying  as  a  witness,  claims  his  privilege  on 
the  ground  of  self-crimination,  this  cannot  be  shown  as  a  circum- 
stance against  him  on  a  subsequent  trial  for  the  same  offense.* 

§  312.  Whether   Court  bound  to    Instruct    the  Witness.  — 

It  has  been  held  that  the  court  is  bound  to  instruct  the  witness 
whether,  as  matter  of  law,  his  answer  would  tend  to  criminate  him.^ 
But,  while  this  is  proper,  it  would  seem  to  be  rather  a  matter  of 
discretion.  It  is  not  error  to  refuse  to  instruct  a  Avitness  that,  if 
he  would  avail  himself  of  his  privilege,  he  must  make  the  ob- 
jection before  answering  anything  upon  the  subject.^ 

^  Reg.  V.  Garbett,  2  Car.  &  Ker.  474.  (Tenn.)  146.     Compare  Eutherford  v. 

-  Andrews  v.  Frye,  104  Mass.  234.  Com.,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)   387;  Pointdexter 

3  Rose  V.  Blakemore,  Ry.  &  M.  383.  v.  Davis,  6  Gratt.  (Va.)  481. 
^  State  V.  Bailey,  54  la.  414.  «  Com.  v.  Howe,  13  Gray    (Mass.), 

^  Lea     V.     Henderson,     1     Coldw.  2G. 


288  EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.       [1  TilOmp.  Tr., 


CHAPTER      XIII. 

PRELIMINARY  QUESTIONS  OF  FACT  FOR  THE  JUDGE. 

Sectiox 

318.  Judge  must  Decide  all  Questions  of  Fact  Preliminary  to  tlie  Admission 

or  Exclusion  of  Evidence. 

319.  What  if  tlie  Decision  of  the  Preliminary  Question  would  Decide  the 

Main  Issue. 

320.  [Illustration.]     Admissibility  of  Copy  of  Instrument  Sued  on,  Existence 

of  Original  in  Dispute. 

321.  Error  to  Suljmit  these  Preliminary  Questions  of  Fact  to  the  Jury. 

322.  Judge  must  be  Satistied  by  Competent  Proof. 

323.  [Illustration.]     Competency  of  Witnesses. 

324.  Competency  of  Documentary  Evidence. 

325.  Witness'  Inability  to  Attend  so  as  to  Admit  his  Deposition. 

326.  Privilege. 

327.  Dying  Declarations. 

328.  Threats  or  Promises  which  will  Exclude  Confessions. 

329.  Evidence  of  Similar  Acts. 

330.  Admissibility  of  Evidence  of  Other  Criminal  Acts. 

331.  [Continued.]     Instances  under  this  View  of  the  Law. 

332.  [Continued.]     Such    Evidence   Admissible    to    Show   Guilty  Purpose, 

Plan,  System,  etc. 

333.  [Continued.]     Instances  in  the  Cases  of   Forgery  and  Uttering  Forged 

Paper. 

334.  [Coutiuued.]     Instances  in  the  Case  of  Sexual  Crimes. 

335.  [Continued.]     Other    Instances    where   such   Evidence   has   been    Ad- 

mitted. 

336.  Usage  of  Trade  or  Business. 

337.  Leading  Questions. 

338.  Further  Illustrations. 

§  318.  Judge  must  decide  all  Questions  of  Fact  preliminary 
to  the  Admission  or  Exclvision  of  Evidence.  —  "  Whether  there 
be  any  evidence  or  not,  is  a  question  for  the  judge ;  whether  it 
is  sufficient  evidence,  is  a  question  for  the  jury."  ^     It  is  the  ex- 

1  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.  §49;  Buller,  J.,  v.  Von  Roeder,  24  How.  (U.  S.) 
in  Cbmpanyof  Carpenters?;.  Hay  ward,  227;  Witkowsky  v.  Wassou,  71  N.  C 
Dougl.  360;  Campbell,  J.,  in  Chandler      451. 


Tit.   Ill,  Cll.   XIII.]    QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    FOR    THE    JUDGE.       289 

elusive  province  and  duty  of  the  court  to  decide  upon  the  admis- 
sibility of  evidence,  and  it  is  none  the  less  so  where,  in  order  to 
make  such  determination,  the  court  is  obliged  to  examine  and 
pass  upon  que-tions  of  fact.^  In  all  cases,  whether  civil  or  crim- 
inal, where  objection  is  made  to  the  competency  of  evidence 
offered,  and  the  question  depends  upon  facts  which  may  be  proved 
or  disproved,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  hear  all  proper  evi- 
dence offered  on  either  side  touching  the  question  of  competency, 
before  letting  the  challenged  evidence  go  to  the  jury;  and  it  is 
error  to  do  other  wise. ^ 

§  319.  What  if  the  Decision  of  the  Preliminary  Question 
would  decide  the  Main  Issue. —  An  exception,  sometimes  ad- 
mitted to  this  rule  is,  that  th§  judge  is  not  bound  to  decide  the 
preliminary  question  of  fact  where  the  state  of  the  case  is  such 
that,  for  the  judge  to  decide  this  question  would  be  equivalent  to 
deciding  the  main  issue. ^  Embarrassments  surround  the  situa- 
tion of  the  judge  where  the  question  is  thus  presented,  as  will  be 
seen  by  the  observations  of  Lord  Penzance  in  a  case  where  he 
took  the  course  of  admitting  the  evidence  upon  a  prima  facie 
showing,  although  his  conclusion  did  decide  the  main  issue, —  at 
the  same  time  cautioning  the  jury  that  his  ruling  was  a  prelimin- 
ary ruling  upon  imperfect  evidence,  and  was  not  in  the  least  de- 
gree to  influence  their  verdict.  The  question  at  issue  was 
whether  Murhall  Daniels,  through  whom  the  defendants  claimed, 
was  legitimate.  The  defendants,  after  producing  'prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  legitimacy  of  Murhall  Daniels,  tendered  his  de- 
clarations in  evidence.     The  plaintiffs  objected  to  the  admissi- 

1  Robinsou  v.  Ferry,  11  Conu.  4G0;  uot  that  of  the  jury,  to  determiue  as 

Carter  f.  Bennett,  6Fla.  214;  Scott  i?.  to    the    admissibility    of    testimony. 

Coxe,  20  Ala.  294;  Gorton  v.  Hadsell,  Merrill  r.  Berkshire,  11  Pick.  (Mass.) 

9  Cush.   (Mass.)  508;   Claytor  v.  An-  2G9. 

thony,  6  Rand.  (Va.)  285;  Carrico  v.  -  Bartlett  r.  Smith,  11   Mees.  &  W. 

McGee,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  6.     So,  in  Mas-  483.     See  also  Reg.  v.  Garner,  2  Carr. 

sachusetts,  where  a  jury  is  impaneled  &  K.  920,  and  note, 

by  an  officer,  in  pursuance  of  statutes  ^  Stowe  v.   Queruer,  L.  R.   5  Exch. 

respecting  the  laying  out  of  ahigliway,  155;  s.  c.  39  L.  J.  (Exch.)  GO. 
it  is  tlie  province  of  the  officer,  and 

19 


290  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES,  .   ThoQip.  Tl'., 

bility  of  these  declarations,  and  tendered  evidence  on  the  voir 
dire^  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  declarant  was  not  a 
member  of  the  family.  Lord  Penzance,  being  of  opinion  that 
the  defendants  had  made  out  a  prima  facie  case  of  the  declar- 
ant's legitimacy,  admitted  the  evidence  of  the  declarations,  and 
rejected  the  evidence  on  the  voii'  dire  tendered  by  the  plaintiffs. 
His  lordship  gave  an  interesting  opinion,  pointing  out  the  incon- 
venience of  hearing  the  whole  of  the  evidence  on  both  sides, 
touching  the  question  of  legitimacy,  before  admitting  the  decla- 
rations; and  added,  evidently  with  the  view  of  admonishing  the 
jury,  that  his  decision,  based  upon  imperfect  evidence,  would  not 
have  the  slightest  effect  upon  their  verdict.^  In  an  action  of 
ejectment,  where  this  question  was  reserved  for  the  judgment  of 
the  Court  of  Queen's  Bench,  it  was  similarly  decided.  The  ulti- 
mate question  for  the  decision  of  the  jury  was  whether  Elizabeth 
Stephens  was  legitimate.  A  certificate  of  the  marriage  of  her 
alleged  father,  J.  D.,  to  her  mother  was  produced  by  a  witness, 
who  said  he  received  it  from  the  said  Elizabeth.  The  question 
was  then  put,  whether  Elizabeth  made  at  that  time  any  statement 
respecting  her  mother's  marriage.  The  admissibility  of  this  state- 
ment, if  any,  depended,  as  in  the  previous  case,  upon  the  question 
whether  she  was  a  member  of  the  family, —  that  is  the  question 
called  for  a  declaration  concerning  pedigree.  It  was  held,  on  the 
authority  of  a  leading  case  already  cited, ^  that  this  question  was 
for  the  judge,  and  that  it  made  no  difference  that  the  fact  which 
the  judge  was  thus  called  upon  to  decide  was  identical  with  the  issue 
on  which  the  opinion  of  the  jury  would  be  ultimately  taken. 
Lord  Denman,  C.  J.,  who  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  court  after 
an  advisement,  said:  "  It  was  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  decide 
whether  it  was  proved  to  Jiim,  and  he  decided  that  it  was.  There 
are  conditions  precedent  which  are  required  to  be  fulfilled  before 
evidence  is  admissible  for  the  jury.  Thus,  an  oath,  or  its  equiva- 
lent, and  competency,  are  conditions  precedent  to  admitting  viva 
voce  evidence;   an  apprehension  of  immediate  death,  to  admitting 

1  Hitchins  v.  Eardley,  L.  R.  2  Prob.  «  Bartlett  v.  Smith,  11  Mees.  &  W. 

&  Div.  2-18 ;  s.  c.  40  L.  J.  (Prob.  &  Mat.)      483. 
70. 


Tit.   Ill,  Cb.   XIJI.]     QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    FOR    THE    JUDGE.       291 

evidence  of  dying  declarations  ;  a  search,  to  secondary  evidence  of 
lost  writings ;  a  stamp,  to  certain  written  instruments:  and  so  is 
consanguinity  or  affinity  in  the  declarant,  to  declarations  of 
deceased  relatives.  The  judge  alone  has  to  decide  whether  the 
condition  has  been  fullilled.  If  the  proof  is  by  witnesses,  he 
must  decide  on  their  credibility.  If  counter  evidence  is  offered, 
he  must  receive  it  before  he  decides;  and  he  has  no  right  to  ask 
the  opinion  of  a  jury  on  the  fact  as  a  condition  precedent."  ^ 

§  320.  [Illustration.]  Admissibility  of  Copy  of  Instru- 
ment sued  on.  Existence  of  Original  in  Dispute.  —  This  ex- 
ception to  the  rule  is  well  illustrated  by  a  case  in  the  English  Ex- 
chequer, W'here  the  action  was  upon  a  policy  of  insurance  and  the 
defendant  had  pleaded  (inter  alia)  that  the  defendant  did  not 
become  an  insurer  as  alleged,  which,  it  is  perceived,  was  equiva- 
lent to  a  plea  of  non  est  factum  in  respect  of  the  policy  sued  on. 
The  plaintiffs,  pursuant  to  notice  to  produce,  called  on  the  de- 
fendant to  produce  the  original  policy.  He  declined,  and  they, 
thereupon,  with  the  view  of  proving  that  it  had  been  duly  exe- 
cuted, offered  in  evidence  a  document  which  purported  to  be  a 
copy  of  the  policy  which  they  had  received  from  the  defendant's 
broker.  To  this  the  defendant  objected,  and  requested  the 
judge  to  hear  evidence  to  show  that  no  original  policy  was,  or 
ever  had  been,  in  existence.  The  objection  was  overruled,  and 
the  alleged  copy  was  admitted.  Later  in  the  trial,  the  defend- 
ant gave  evidence  tending  to  prove  that  in  fact  there  had  never 
been  any  duly  stamped  policy,  or  indeed  any  policy  at  all  exe- 
cuted; and  the  judge  left  it  to  the  jury  to  say  whether  there  had 
or  had  not  been  executed  a  duly  stamped  policy  by  the  defend- 
ant. The  jury  having  found  in  the  affirmative,  it  Avas  held  that 
the  question  was  rightly  left  to  them,  inasmuch  as  if  the  judge 
had  himself  decided  it,  he  would  in  fact  have  decided  the  main 
issue  between  the  parties.  Baron  Bramwell,  in  the  course  of  his 
opinion,  said:  "  If  the  objection  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  had 
been  that  there  was  a  policy,  but  that  it  was  not  stamped,  it  would, 

1  Jenkius  v.  Davies,   10  Ad.   &  El.  (x.  s.)  314,  323. 


292  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [i  TllOinp.  Tl'., 

perhaps,  have  been  well  founded.  But  here  it  was  objected 
that  there  was  no  policy  executed  at  all,  an  objection  which  goes 
to  the  entire  ground  of  action,  and  one  which,  if  it  had  prevailed, 
might  have  left  the  jury  nothing  to  decide.  For,  suppose  the 
judge  had  ruled  that  the  copy  was  inadmissible  on  the  ground  that 
there  was  no  original  ever  in  existence,  the  plaintiffs  would  in  fact 
have  had  no  case  left,  and  the  judge  would  himself  have  decided 
the  whole  of  it.  *  *  *  Put  an  illustration  analogous  to  the 
present.  Suppose  an  action  to  be  brought  for  libel,  and  a  copy 
of  a  letter  which  is  destroyed,  but  which  contained  the  libel  com- 
plained of,  is  produced  and  tendered  in  evidence.  Could  the  de- 
fendant say  '  stop ;  I  will  show  that  no  letter  was  in  point  of 
fact  ever  written,  and  I  call  upon  you,  the  judge,  to  hear  evidence 
upon  this  point,  and  if  I  satisfy  you  that  no  such  letter  ever  ex- 
isted, you  ought  not  to  admit  the  copy?'  Surely  not;  for  that 
would  be  getting  the  judge  to  decide  what  is  peculiarly  within  the 
province  of  the  jury.  The  distinction  is  really  this:  Where  the 
objection  to  the  reading  of  a  copy  concedes  that  there  was  pri- 
mary evidence  of  some  sort  in  existence,  but  defective  in  some 
collateral  matter,  as,  for  instance,  where  the  objection  is  a  pure 
stamp  objection,  the  judge  must,  before  he  admits  the  copy,  hear 
and  determine  whether  the  objection  is  well  founded.  But  where 
the  objection  goes  to  show  that  the  very  substratum  and  founda- 
tion of  the  cause  of  action  is  wanting,  the  judge  must  not  decide 
upon  the  matter,  but  receive  the  copy,  and  leave  the  main  ques- 
tion to  the  jury."^    Barons  Martin,  Pigott  and  Cleasby  concurred. 

§  321.  Error  to  submit  these  Preliniiuary  Qviestions  of  Fact 
to  the  Jury. — Although  Prof.  Greenleaf  states  that  the  judge 
may,  if  he  chooses,  take  the  opinion  of  the  jury  upon  these 
preliminary  questions  of  fact,^  and  although  this  doctrine  has 
been  admitted  in  a  few  cases, "^  yet  the  general  conclusion  is  that 

1  Stowe  V.  Queruor,  L.  R.  5  Exch.  294.  lu  Bai-tlett  v.  Hoyt,  the  prelira- 
155,  158;  s.  c.  39  L.  J.  (Esch.)  GO.  iuary  questiou  whether  a  statement  of 

2  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  49.  a  party  offered  in  evidence  was  in- 

3  Egan  V.  Larkiu,  Arm.  M.  &  O.  tended  as  an  admission  of  a  fact,  or 
(Irish  Exch.)  403;  Bartlett  v.  Hoyt,  33  merely  as  an  offer  to  compromise,  was 
N.    H.  151,  1G5;  Scott  ^'.  Coxe,  20  Ala.  regarded  as  one  which  the  court  miglit, 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIII.]  QUESTJoxs  of  fact  fok  the  judge.     293 

it  is  error  to  .submit  such  questions  to  the  jury.^  If,  upon  such 
examination  of  facts,  the  judge  decides  to  admit  the  evidence,  it 
is  for  the  jury  to  weigh  and  apply  it ;  but  if  the  judge  rejects  it, 
the  jury  has  no  right  even  to  know  that  it  was  offered.''^ 

§  322.  Judge  must  be  satisfied   by  Competent  Proof . — In 

determining  any  preliminary  fact  essential  to  the  admissibility 
of  evidence,  the  rule  is  the  same  as  to  the  weight  of  the  testi- 
mony, as  in  the  case' of  issues  tried  by  juries:  it  is  not  sufficient 
that  there  may  be  evidence  tending  to  establish  the  particular 
fact,  but  the  judge  must  be  satisfied  of  it  by  competent  proof  .^ 
But  it  was  early  hekl  in  Pennsylvania  that  if,  when  a  witness  is 
offered,  it  \s  j)erfectly  clear  from  the  testimony  given  in  relation 
to  him,  that  he  is  interested,  the  court  may  reject  him  as  incom- 
petent ;  but  if  his  interest  be  in  the  least  degree  doubtful,  the 
court  should  permit  him  to  be  sworn,  instructing  the  jury,  that 
if,  in  their  opinion,  he  is  interested,  they  are  to  pay  no  regard 
whatever  to  his  testimony.*  But  this  view  seems  to  have  been 
grounded  upon  the  disfavor  with  which  the  court,  even  at  that 
early  day,  viewed  the  rule  of  law  which  excluded  witnesses  on  the 
ground  of  interest,  rather  than  upon  a  general  principle  applica- 
ble to  all  cases. 

§323.  [Illustration.]  Competency  of  Witnesses. — Whether 
a  witness  is  qualified  to  be  sworn  as  such  is  always  a  question 
for  the  court;  but  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  they 
will  believe  his  evidence.^     Thus,  whether  a  witness  is  incompe- 

in  its  discretion,  submit  to  the  jiu-y,  —  liff  v.  Huntly,  5  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  545; 

the  view  being  that  there  is  a  distiuc-  Thoraasou  v.   Odnra,  31  Ala.  108;  De- 

tion  between  such  a  question  and  that  graffeureid  v.  Thomas,  14  Ala.  (181. 
of  the  interest  of  a  witness  and  other  2  Scovell  v.   Kingsley,  7  Conn.  284. 

questions  which    illustrate    the    rule  3  Degraffenreid  v.  Thomas,  14  Ala. 

we    are    considering;   but    the    vieAV  681,  fi87. 

which  the  court  there  took  is  plainly  4  i^art  v.   Heilner,  3  Rawle    (Pa.), 

untenable.  407,  411. 

1  Bartlett  v.  Smith,  11  Mees.  &  W.  ^  Com.   v.  Lynes    (Mass.),    3  New 

483;    Hart  v.    Heilner,  3  Rawle  (Pa.),  Eng.  Rep.  89,  91 ;  s.  c.  North    E.  Rep. 

107,  411;  Stowe  V.   Querner,  L.  R.  5  408;  s.  c.  142  Mass.  577;  Reg.  v.  Hill, 

Exch.    155;    s.  c.   39  L.  J.  (Exch.)  60;  5   Cox  C.  C.  259;    Kendall  ?;.  May,    10 

i:o':iy.sou  v.  Ferry,  11  Conn.  460;  Rat-  Allen  (:Mass.),  64. 


294  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoiUp.  Tl., 

tent  (where  the  old  rule  prevails)  by  reason  of  interest,'^  or  by 
reason  of  a  want  of  religious  belief;  -  or  whether  or  not  a  witness 
is  an  expert  so  as  to  render  him  competent  to  express  an  opinion 
upon  the  question  in  issue,  ^  —  are  questions  for  the  judge. 

§  324  Competency  of  Docunieiitary  Evidence. — In  like 
manner,  the  judge  must  determine  all  questions  of  fact  which 
are  necessary  to  the  decision  of  the  question  whether  writings 
which  are  offered  in  evidence  are  admissible.  Thus,  in  an  action 
of  ejectment,  the  court  must  decide  upon  the  competency  of 
title  pa j)ers,  and  the  right  to  use  them ;  and,  as  an  incident  to 
this,  under  what  title  the  party  entered.*  So,  it  is  for  the  judge 
to  decide,  where  a  document  is  offered  in  evidence  and  objected 
to  on  the  ground  that  it  has  not  come  from  the  proper  custody^ 
whether  it  has  come  from  the  proper  custody  or  not;  and  an 
appellate  court  will  not  interfere  with  his  decision,  unless  it  ap- 
pears to  be  clearly  wrong. ^  Upon  like  grounds,  evidence  of  the 
loss  or  destruction  of  an  instrument  upon  which  suit  is  brought, 
is  not  to  go  to  the  jury,  but  is  addressed  to  the  court,  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  the  right  of  the  party  to  introduce  sec- 
ondary evidence  of  the  contents  of  the  lost  instrument,  and  it  is 
error  to  refer  such  a  question  to  the  jury.^     So,  where  a  hill  of 

1  Cook  V.  Mix,  11  Couu.  432,  Jacobs  v.  Phillips,  8   Ad.  &  El.  (n.  s.) 

-  Wakefield,    v.     Eoss,    5    Mason  158.     See  the  opinion  of  the  judges  to 

(U.  S.),  16,  18;  People  v.  Mattesou,  2  the  Lords,  given  by  Tindal,  C.  J.,  in 

Cow.    (N.  Y.)  433,    572;    Jackson  v.  the  case  of  the  Bishop  of  Meath  v. 

Gridley,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  99.  Marquis   of    Winchester,  3  Bing.   N. 

3  State  u.  Cole,  94  N.  C.  959;  Flynt  C.  183,  196,  198.  Compare  Reg.  v. 
V.  Bodeuhamer,  80  N.  C.  205.  Com-  Kenilworth,  7  Ad.  &  El.  (x.  s.)  642. 
pare  State  v.  Sanders,  84  N.  C.  728;  "  Locwe  v.  Ilolsmaun,  8  Bradw. 
State  V.  Efler,  85  N.  C.  585;  State  v.  (111.)  525;  Dormandy  v.  State  Bank,  3 
Burgwyn,  87  N.  C.  572;  Fairbanks  t'.  Id.  236;  Tayloe  v.  Riggs,  1  Pet. 
Hughson,  58  Cal.  314;  Joues  v.  (U.  S.}  591 ;  Ratliff  t7.  Hinitly,  5Ired.  L. 
Tucker,  41  N.  H.  546;  Ives  v.  Leon-  (N.  C.)  545;  Graff  v.  Pittsburgh  &c.  R. 
ard,  50  Mich.  183.  Co.,  31  Pa.  St.  489;  Witter  v.  Latham, 

4  Carrico  v.  McGee,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  12  Conn.  392;  Donelson  v.  Taylor,  8 
6;  Hamilton  v.  Taylor,  Littell's  Sel.  Pick,  (Mass.)  390.  Contra,  Coleman 
Gas.  (Ky.)  444.  v.  Wolcott,  4  Day  (Conn.),  388.     And 

^  Slirewsbury  v.  Keeling,  11  Ad.  &  this  question  is  not  afterwards  to  be 
El.  (n.  s.)  884,  889;  Reese  r.  "Walters,  considered  by  tlie  jury.  Witter  v 
3  Mees.  &  W.  527,  531,  per  Parke,  II.  \       Latliam,  supra. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XIII.]    QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    FOR    THE    JUDGE.       295 

exchange,  purporting  to  be  a  foreign  bill  and  stamped  accord- 
ingly, was  offered  in  evidence,  and  objected  to,  on  the  ground 
that,  although  it  purported  to  have  been  drawn  abroad,  it  was  in 
fact  an  inland  bill,  drawn  in  London,  and  therefore  required  a 
higher  stani]),  it  was  held  that  the  judge  ought  to  have  received 
the  evidence  in  that  stage  of  the  case,  and  ought  to  have  decided 
upon  the  admissibility  of  the  instrument,  instead  of  receiving 
the  evidence  afterwards,  as  a  part  of  the  defendant's  case,  and 
submitting  it  to  the  jury ;  and  for  this  error  a  new  trial  was 
ordered.^  Applying  the  same  principle,  it  has  been  ruled  that, 
where  the  question  is  whether  a  check  was  post-dated,  and  this 
question  arises  upon  an  objection  to  its  admissibility  in  evidence, 
it  is  for  the  judge  to  try  and  determine  the  question  as  a  collat- 
eral issue,  and  not  for  the  jury.^ 

§  325.  Witness'  Inability  to  Attend  so  as  to  Admit  his  Depo- 
sition, —  Where  the  deposition  of  a  witness  is  made  by  a  statute,^ 
inadmissible  in  evidence,  unless  it  shall  appear  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  judge  that  the  deponent  is  unable,  from  permanent  sickness 
or  other  permanent  infirmity,  to  attend  the  trial,  —  it  is  for  the 
judge  to  satisfy  himself  of  the  deponent's  inability  to  attend,  by 
such  evidence  as  he  shall  think  fit;  and  although  his  decision  is 
subject  to  review,  yet  it  will  not  be  disturbed  by  a  reviewing 
court,  unless  it  be  shown  that  he  has  been  misled  by  false  evi- 
dence, or  that  injustice  has  resulted  from  the  course  pursued  at 
the  trial. ■* 

§  326.  Privileg-e. — Where  the  question  is  whether  the  evi- 
dence of  a  witness  is  to  be  excluded  on  the  ground  of  privileo-e, 
as  where  the  witness  is  an  attorney  and  the  evidence  called  for 

is  a  confidential  communication  of  his   client, this,   on  like 

grounds,  is  a  question  for  the  court,  and  not  for  the  jury.^     So, 

1  Bartlett  v.  Smith,  11  Mees.  &  W.  ■•  Duke  of  Beaufort  v.  Crawshay,  L. 
'*^-^-                                                                          1^-  1  C.   P.  C99;  s.    c.    35  L.    J.    cV  P. 

2  Dumsford  v.  Curlewis,  1  Post.  &      342. 

^'"-  '^2.  5  Hull  V.  Lyou,  27  Mo.  570,  576. 

3  In  this  case,  the  Stat.  1  "\Vm.  IV., 
c.  22,  §  10 


29G  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOtlip.  Tl"., 

whether  an  instrument  of  w^'iting,  offered  in  evidence,  is  protected 
on  the  ground  of  its  being  a  privileged  communication  ,is  a  pre- 
liminary question  of  fact  to  be  decided  by  the  judge, ^  though  his 
decision  is  subject  to  review  in  a  court  of  error. ^ 

§  327.  Dying  Declarations. —  So,  upon  the  question  whether 
a  declaration  by  a  deceased  person  is  competent  as  a  dying 
declaration  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  murder,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  court  to  hear  evidence  tendered  by  both  parties  as  to 
the  circumstances  under  which  the  declaration  was  made,  and 
thereupon  to  determine  whether  evidence  of  it  is  admissible  or 
not.^ 

§  328.  Threats  or  Promises  which  will  Exclude  Confes- 
sions.—  What  amounts  to  such  threats  or  promises  as  will  ex- 
clude evidencQ  of  the  confessions  of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal 
case,  is  a  question  of  law,  which  may  be  reviewed  on  exceptions 
by  an  appellate  court. ^  But,  whether  the  evidence,  if  true, 
proves  these  facts,  and  whether  the  witnesses  giving  the  testi- 
mony in  regard  to  the  facts  are  credible  or  not,  and,  in  a  case 
presenting  a  conflict  of  testimony,  which  witnesses  shall  be  be- 
lieved by  the  court,  are  all  questions  of  fact  to  be  decided  by 
the  trial  court,  the  decision  of  which  cannot  be  reviewed  on 
appeal.^  Where  objection  is  made  to  the  competency  of  evi- 
dence offered  to  prove  confessions  made  by  the  defendant  in  a 
criminal  case,  upon  the  ground  that  such  confessions  were  made 
under  the  influence  of  fear  produced  by  threats,  and  evidence  is 
offered  to  prove  such  threats,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  hear 

1  Cleave  v.  -Jones,  7  Esch.  421.  not  for    the    jury.     Rex.    v.    Hucks, 

2  Wri.<:;htv.  T:itham,7  Ad.  &E1.  313.  1    Stark,  N.  P.  523.     In  this  view  of 

3  State  y.  Elliott,  45  la.  48G;  s.  c.  the  law  the  ruling  of  Lord  Eyre,  C.  B., 
2  Am.  Crim.  Rep.  322;  State  v.  Mo-  in  Rex  v.  Woodcock  (2  Leach  Cr.  C. 
lisse,  36  La.  Ann.  920.     *'  This  point,"  5G3) ,  was  plainly  erroneous. 

said  Lord  Ellenborough   "was   con-  ■*  State  u.  Andrew,  Phil.  L.  (N.  C.) 

sidered  by  the  judgeshere,  ona  ques-  205;  States.   Burgwyn,  87  N.  C.  572. 

tion  proposed  to  them  by  the  judges  ^  State  v.  Burgwyn,  supra.    To  the 

in  Ireland,   who  entertained    doubts  same  effect  are   State  v.    Vann,  82  N. 

upon  the  subject,  and  tliis  was  their  C.    631 ;  and  State  v.  Efler,   85  N.  C. 

unanimous   opinion,"  —  that  is,   that  585.                                ' 
it  was  a  fiuestion  for  the  judge,    and 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIII.]    QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    FOR    THE    JUDGE.        297 

such  evidence,  to  determine  therefrom  the  competency  of  the 
evidence  offered  to  prove  the  confession,  and  not  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  jury.^ 

§  329.  Evidence  of  Similar  Acts.  —  "  Where  evidence  is  of- 
fered of  acts  done  in  phices  other  than  the  phice  in  dispute,  it 
is  for  the  judge  to  decide,  in  the  iirst  instance,  whether  there 
is  such  a  unity  of  character  in  the  different  parts,  as  to  render 
evidence  affecting  a  part  not  in  dispute,  admissible  with  ref- 
erence to  the  part  in  dispute,  and  whether  the  acts  relied  on 
amount  to  evidence  of  ownership."  Accordingly,  where  the 
question  was,  whether  a  slip  of  land  between  some  old  enclosures 
and  the  highway,  vested  in  the  lord  of  the  manor  or  in  the  owner 
of  the  adjoining  freehold,  —  it  was  held  that  evidence  might  be 
received  of  acts  of  ownership  by  the  lord  of  the  manor  on  sim- 
ilar slips  of  land  not  adjoining  his  own  freehold,  in  various  parts 
of  the  manor. ^ 

§  330.  [Continued.]  Admissibility  of  Evidence  op  other  Crim- 
inal Acts.  — The  general  rule  is  that  it  is  not  competent,  on  a  criminal 
trial,  to  give  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  defendant  has  been 
guilty  of  other  acts  of  a  criminal  nature. ^  Upon  the  same  view  it  has 
been  held  that  it  is  not  competent  to  show  that  the  defendant  had  a 
tendency  to  commit  the  offense  with  which  he  was  charged.'*  A  better 
statement  of  the  rule  is  that  evidence  of  other  criminal  acts  of  the 
prisoner  cannot  be  given  by  the  prosecution,  unless  such  acts  are  so 
connected  by  circumstances  with  the  particular  crime  in  issue,  that 
proof  of  one  act,  with  its  attending  circumstances,  has  a  tendency  to 
make  it  probable  that  the  accused  committed  the  crime  with  which  he 
stands  charged.-''  It  has  been  reasoned  that  such  evidence  should  have 
a  peculiar  and  intimate,  if  not  also  an  inseparable  connection  with  and 
tendency  to  explain  and  characterize  the  act  in  issue  against  the  pris- 
oner, and  that  it  is  only  admissible  on  the  question  of  intent. ^  The  ob- 
jection to  such  evidence  was  thus  forcibly  stated  by  Allen,  J. :   "  The 

1  Brown  v.  State,  71  lad.  470;  Com.  ^  State  v.  Reutou,  15  N.  H.  174. 
V.  Culver,  12(3  Mass.  4(3  4.                                     s  state  v.  Lepasre,  57  N.  H.  245. 

2  Barrett  y.  Kemp,  7  Biug.  332,  33(3,  "  Co,ji_  u.  Tuckerroan,  10  Gray 
per  Bosanquet,  J.  (Mass.),    198;    State    v.    Lepage,    67 

3  Com.     V.      Campbell,      7      Alleu  N.  II.  245, 302,  304, 
(Mass.),  542. 


298  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoiUp.   Tl'., 

general  rule  is  against  receiving  evidence  of  another  offense,  A  per- 
son cannot  be  convicted  of  one  offense  upon  proof  that  he  committed 
another,  however  persuasive  in  a  moral  point  of  view  such  evidence 
may  be.  It  would  be  easier  to  believe  a  person  guilty  of  one  crime, 
if  it  was  known  that  he  had  committed  another  of  a  similar  character, 
or  indeed,  of  any  character;  but  the  injustice  of  such  a  rule  in  courts 
of  justice  is  apparent.  It  would  lead  to  convictions  upon  the  particu- 
lar charge  made,  by  proof  of  other  acts  in  no  way  connected  with  it, 
and  to  uniting  evidence  of  several  offenses  to  produce  conviction  for 
a  single  one."  ^  So,  in  a  leading  case  in  New  Hampshire  it  was  said 
by  Smith,  J. :  "  It  is  always  competent  for  the  government  to  intro- 
duce evidence  of  any  facts  tending  directly  to  show  an  evil  intent,  or 
from  which  such  evil  intent  may  be  justly  and  reasonably  inferred  ;  but 
all  proof  in  relation  to  transactions  not  intimately  and  directly  con- 
nected with  the  particular  case  against  the  defendant,  or  with  the  evi- 
dence, or  in  necessary  explanation  of  the  evidence  introduced  in 
support  of  the  charge  contained  in  the  indictment,  is  irrelevant  and 
inadmissible."  ^ 

§  331.  [Continued.]  Instances  under  this  View  of  the  Law.  — 
Thus,  where  the  action  was  against  the  owner  of  a  dog  for  damages  in 
consequence  of  the  killing  of  plaintiff 's  sheep  by  the  dog,  it  was  said  in 
the  Supreme  Court  of  New  Hampshire,  by  Perley,  C.  J. :  "  We  are  not 
acquainted  with  any  rule  of  evidence  which  will  allow  the  character  of 
the  dog,  or  the  fact  that  he  had  killed  or  worried  sheep  before,  to  be 
admitted  as  evidence  that  he  did  the  damage  complained  of  in  this  suit. 
To  she iv  that  he  did  this  mischief,  it  is  not  competent  to  prove  that 
he  had  done  similar  mischief  before,  more  than  it  would  be  to  prove 
that  the  defendant,  sued  for  an  assault  and  batter}^  had  beaten  other 
men  before,  or  the  same  man."  ^  So,  where  the  indictment  was  for 
keeping  a  gaming  house,  and  the  allegation  in  the  second  count  was 
confined  to  a  single  day,  it  was  held  that  the  government  could  not,  for 
the  purpose  of  charging  the  defendant  on  that  count,  prove  that  the 
crime  Avas  committed  on  more  than  one  day,  although  evidence  cover- 
ing a  longer  time  would  be  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what 
character  the  house  had  on  the  particular  day  when  it  was  sought  to 
prove  that  the  offense  was  committed.'*     On  the  other  hand,  on  the  trial 

1  Coleman  v.  People,  55  X.  Y.  81,  90.  '  East  Kingston  v.  Towle,  48  N.  H. 

2  State   V.    Lepage,  57   X.    H.    245        57,  (!5. 

302.  <  State  v.  Prescott,  33  N.  H.  212 


Tit.   Ill,   Ch.  XIII.]     QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    FOR    THE    JUDGE.       299 

of  an  indictment  for  murder,  proof  of  other  crimes  than  tlmt  alleged  in 
the  indictment,  but  connected  with  it  by  unity  of  plot  and  design  ana 
influenced  by  a  similar  motive,  has  been  held  admissible. ^  So,  evi- 
'dence  of  the  commission  of  a  previous  crime  is  admissible  where  it  will 
furnish  a  motive  for  the  commission  of  the  crime  charged.  As  where 
A.  is  indicted  for  the  murder  of  B.,  and  evidence  is  admitted  to  show 
an  adulterous  intercourse  between  A.  and  the  wife  of  B.^ 

§  332.  [Continued.]  Such  Evidence  Admissible  to  show  Guilty 
PuKPOSE,  Plan,  System,  etc.  —  Where  evidence  is  admissible  as  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  of  intent,  it  is  not  rendered  inadmissible  by  the 
fact  that  it  tends  to  prove  the  commission  of  another  distinct  and  sep- 
arate offense.^  "  The  principle  is,  that  all  the  evidence  admitted  must 
be  pertinent  to  the  point  in  issue  ;  but  if  it  be  pertinent  to  this  point, 
and  tends  to  prove  the  crime  charged,  it  is  not  to  be  rejected,  though 
it  also  tends  to  prove  the  commission  of  other  crimes,  or  to  establish 
collateral  facts."*  This  rule  applies  where  intent,  system,  or  scienter 
may  be  involved,  as  illustrated  in  successive  cheats  or  forgeries,  or 
passing  counterfeit  monej'  to  different  persons,  and  the  like.^  "  An- 
other act  of  fraud  is  admissible  to  prove  the  fraud  charged,  whenever 
there  is  evidence  that  the  two  are  parts  of  one  scheme  or  plan  of  fraud, 
committed  in  pursuance  of  a  common  purpose."  ^ 

§  333.  [Continued.]  Instances  in  the  Case  of  Forgery  and  Ut- 
tering Forged  Paper.  —  Numerous  instances  of  the  application  of  this 
principle  could  be  cited  where  the  trial  was  for  forgery  or  the  uttering 
of  forged  paper.  Proof  of  the  commission  of  other  forgeries,  or  the 
having  in  possession  other  forged  paper,  is  generally  admissible  in  such 
cases,  as  bearing  upon  the  question  of   intent.^     Thus,  where  the  in- 

1  People  V.  Wood,  3  Park.  Cr.  (X.  Crim.  Ev.  (8th  ed.),  §  31  et  seq.;  1 
Y.)  081.  Greenl.  Ev.  (13th  ed.),  §§  53,  451,  454; 

2  Com.  V.  Ferrigan,  44  Pa.  St.  38(3.  Whart.  Crhn.  Law    (8th  ed.),  §    1733; 

3  Reg.  V.  Weeks,  Leigh  &  Cave  C.  Bish,  Stat.  Crime,  §  082;  2  Bish.  Mar. 
C.  18,  21;   Kirkwood's  Case,  1   Lewiu  &  Div.  (C.th  ed.),  §  025. 

C.  C.  103;  Com.  v.  Steams,  10  Mete.  **  Jordan  v.  Osgood,  109  Mass.  457, 

257;  Mason  v.  Stale,  42  Ala.  532.  461;  approved  and  applied  in  Berkey 

^  Com.  V.  Choate,    105   Mass.   451^  v.  Judd,  22  Minu.  287,  298. 
458.  '  Reg.  V.    Foster,   Dearsley   C.    C. 

5  See  State  v.  Bridgmau,49  Vt.  202;  456;  Reg.  v.  Nisbett,  6  Cox  C.  C.  320: 

Thayer    v.   Thayer,     101    Mass.    Ill;  Reg,  v.  Salt,  3  Fost.  &  F.  834;  Com. 

Com.  ■?;.  Nichols,  114  Mass.  285;  Whart.  r.  Price,  10  Gray,  473. 


300  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

dictmentwas  for  forging  and  uttering  a  note  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland, 
on  September  1st,  1835,  evidence  was  received  to  show  that  the  defend- 
ant, on  August  24th,  1835,  agreed  to  forge  a  thousand  Austrian  notes, 
and  that  in  September,  1834,  he  had  in  his  possession  plates  for  printing 
Polish  notes  different  from  that  which  was  the  subject  of  the  indictment, 
and  had  caused  500  notes  to  be  printed  from  those  plates. ^  So,  where 
the  charge  was  that  the  defendant  had  in  his  possession  a  counterfeit  bank 
bill  with  intent  to  pass  it,  it  was  held  tliat  evidence  was  admissible  to 
show  that  he  had  passed  a  different  kind  of  counterfeit  money  at  vari- 
ous times  and  places,  and  that  he  had  made  statements  to  a  witness 
which  were  tantamount  to  an  admission  that  he  was  a  dealer  in  counter- 
feit money. 2  So,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  forging  and  deliver- 
ing bank  notes,  after  proof  of  the  fact  of  forging  a  large  quantity  and 
the  delivery  of  one  note  had  been  given,  it  was  held  that  parol  evidence 
of  the  contents  of  a  letter  from  the  defendant  to  an  accomplice  on  the 
subject  of  counterfeit  notes,  for  which  the  accomplice  could  tiot  account 
and  had  not  searched,  but  which  he  believed  to  be  lost,  might  be  ad- 
mitted.^ 

§  334.  [Continued.  ]  Instances  in  the  Case  of  Sexual  Crimes.  — 
Upon  the  same  principle,  on  an  indictment  for  adultery,  evidence  of 
previous  improper  familiarities  is  competent."*  But  it  is  said  that  the 
reception  of  such  evidence  is  to  be  controlled  largely  by  the  judge  who 
tries  the  cause,  and  that  it  is  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury  with  proper 
explanation  of  its  purpose  and  effect.^  So,  on  an  indictment  for  seduc- 
tion, it  is  competent  for  the  defendant  to  give  evidence  of  previous 
acts  of  carnal  intercourse  between  the  prosecutrix  and  himself,  not  for 
the  purpose  of  impeaching  her  character  for  chastity,  but  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  the  criminal  act  charged  was  not  committed  under 
a  promise  of  marriage.^  So,  on  an  indictment  for  rape,  evidence  that 
the  defendant  had  made  previous  attempts  to  have  sexual  intercourse 
with  the  prosecutrix  has  been  held  admissible.^  But  where  the  defend- 

1  Rex  V.  Balls,  1  Moody  C.  C.  470;  v.  Thayer,  101  Mass.  Ill;  (overrulins 
s.  c.  7  Carr.  &  P.  429.  Com.  v.  Hortou,2  Gray  (Mass.),  354, 

2  Cora.  V.  Edgerly,  10  Allen  (Mas.s.) ,  aud  Com.  v.  Thrasher,ll  Gray  (Mass.), 
184,  186,  187.  450). 

3  United  States  v.  Doebler,  1  ^  State  v.  Withara,  72  Me.  531,  535. 
Baldw.  (U.  S.)  519.                                             «  Bowers  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  542. 

4  State  V.  Wallace,  9  N.  H.  515;  ^  Williams  v.  State,  8  Humph. 
State  V.  Marvin,  35 N.  H-  22;  Com.  v.  (Tenn.)  585;  State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  II. 
Merriam,  14  Pick.  (Mass.)  518;  Tliayer  148,  15(],  157. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIII.]    QUESTIONS    OF    FACT   FOR   THE   JUDGE.       301 

ant  was  charged  in  the  indictment  with  the  murder  of  a  woman,  pei'pe- 
trated  in  attempting  to  commit  rape  upon  her,  and  the  evidence  of 
another  woman  was  admitted,  detailing  the  fact  that,  four  years  before, 
the  defendant  had  committed  a  rape  upon  the  witness  in  Canada,  giving 
in  full  tlie  circumstances  of  the  outrage, —  it  was  held  that,  for  the  ad- 
mission of  this  evidence,  a  neu-  trial  must  be  had.i 

§  335.  [Continued.]  Other  Instances  where  such  Evidence  has 
BEEN  AD-AHTTED.  —  lu  the  leading  case  on  this  subject  in  New  Hamp- 
shire,- the  court  had  the  advantage  of  an  exhaustive  printed  argument 
by  the  attorney-general,  Lewis  W.  Clark  (with  whom  were  W.  W. 
Flanders,  solicitor,  and  C.  P.  Sanborn).  In  this  argument  the  follow- 
ing instances  were  given  of  cases  where  evidence  of  other  criminal  acts 
has  been  admitted.  They  have  been  re-examined  and  verified  by  the 
present  writer:  — On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  shooting  with  intent 
to  kill,  evidence  that  the  defendant  shot  at  the  same  person  at  another 
time  was  held  by  all  the  judges  admissible,  for  the  purpose  of  showing 

that  the  shooting  charged  was  not  accidental. ^ Where  the  charge 

was  against  a  wife  for  murdering  her  husband  by  poison,  evidence  that 
three  of  her  sons  had  been  subsequently  poisoned  was  received,  as  tend- 
ing to  show  that  the  husband  had  died  of  poison,  and  that  his  death 

was  not  accidental.^ Where  the  charge  was  against  a  mother  for 

murdering  her  child  by  poison,  evidence  was  held  admissible  that  two 
other  children  of  tlie  mother  and  a  lodger  in  the  house  had  previously 
died  of  the  same  poison.^ Where  the  charge  was  that  the  de- 
fendant had  murdered  his  mother  by  poison,  and  the  defendant's  wife 
had  lived  in  his  family  as  a  servant  when  his  former  wife  died,  evidence 
was  received  to  show  that  his  first  wife  had  died  of  poison,  and  also  to 

show  the  circumstances  of   her   death.  ^ Where  the  charge  was 

against  a  mother  for  murdering  her  infant  by  suffocating  it  in  bed,  evi- 
dence was   received   to  show  the   previous  deaths    of  her   other  chil- 

^  State    V.    Lepage,  57   N.    H.  245.  the  prosecutrix  with   other  persons, 

The  Ohio  statute  with  reference  .to  but  he  must  attack  her  character,  if 

seduction   (Oh.   Act  of  April  4th,  1859,  at  all,  by    proof    of    her    reputation. 

S.  &  C.  452)    extends  its  protection  to  Bowers  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  542. 

all  females  under  the   age  of  18  years  ^  state  v.  Lepage,  57  N.  H.  245. 

who  are  "  of  good  repute  for  chas-  ^  pex  v.  Voke,  Russ.  &  Ey.  531. 

tity ;"  and  therefore  on  the  trial  of  an  ^  Reg.  v.  Geering,    IS  L.  J.  (Mag. 

iudictmeut  under  the  statute,  it  is  not  Cas.)  215. 

competent  for  the  defendant  to  prove  ^  Reg.  v.  Cotton,  12  Cox  C.  C.  400. 

specific  acts   of  carnal  intercourse  by  ^  Reg.  v.  Garner,  3  F.  &  F.  G81. 


302  EXAMINATIOX    OF    WITNESSES.        [IThotlip.  Tr., 

dren  at  early  ages.^ Where  the  indictment  was  for  the  murder  of 

H.,  evidence  was  received   to  show  that  H.  had  been  employed  by  the 

defendant  to  murder  P."^ Where  the  charge  was  that  the  defendant 

had  murdered  his  wife,  evidence  was  received  to  show  that  he  had 
lived  in  adulterous  intercourse  with  another  woman  for  some  months 
prior  to  his  wife's  death. ^  -  -  _  _  So,  on  a  trial  for  murder, 
evidence  was  received  to  show  an  adulterous  intercourse  between  the 
defendant  and  the  wife  of  the  deceased.^  _  -  -  _  On  the  charge 
of  administering  sulphuric  acid  to  eight  horses  with  intent  to  kill 
them,  evidence  that  the  defendant  had  administered  the  same  chemical 

at  different  times,  was  received  to  show  his  intent. ^ On  a  charge 

of  setting  fire  to  a  rick  by  firing  a  gun  close  to  it,  on  the  29th  of 
March,  evidence  that  the  rick  was  also  on  fire  on  the  28th  of  March, 
and  that  the  prisoner  was  then  close  to  it,  having  a  gun  in  his  hand,  was 

received  to  show  that  the  fire  of  the  29th  was  not  accidental.^ On  the 

charge  of  setting  fire  to  the  defendant's  house  with  intent  to  defraud  an 
insurance  company,  evidence  that  the  defendant  had  insured  in  other 
offices  two  other  houses  in  which  he  had  lived,  which  other  houses  were 
burned  and  that  he  received  the  insurance  money  from  the  other  com- 
panies, has  been  held  relevant  as  tending  to  show  that  the  fire  in  ques- 
tion was  intentional  and  not  accidental.''' On  an  Indictment  for  arson, 

evidence  of  two  previous  unsuccessful  attempts  to  set  fire  to  the  same 
premises  was  admitted  to  show  that  the  last  fire  was  not  accidental, 
although  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  two  former  attempts  were  made 
by  the  defendant.^ .Where  the  charge  was  embezzlement  by  the  de- 
fendant, as  a  clerk,  who  had  made  false  entries  in  his  book  of  the 
amounts  by  him  received,  it  was  held  that  the  book  was  evidence,  and 
that  generally  not  only  the  false  entries  bearing  directly  upon  the  issue, 

but  also  other  similar  false  entries  might  be  shown  thereby.^ Where 

the  charge  was  that  of  embezzlement  against  a   clerk  who  made  out 

weekly  accounts  of  his  payments,  it  was  shown  that  on  three  occasions 

within  six  months  he  had  entered  the  payments  correctly,  but  that  in 

.  adding  them  up  he  had  made  the  totals   £2  greater  than  they  were, 

1  Rog.  V.  Roder,  12   Cox  C.  C.  630.  «  Rex  v.  Mogg,  4  Carr.  &  P.  364. 

-  Rex  V.  Clewes,  4  Carr.  &  P.  221.  ^  Reg.   v.  Dossett,   2    Carr.   &    K. 

3  State  V.   Watkins,    9    Conn.   47;      306. 

Johnson   v.   State,  17  Ala.  618;  Hall  '  Reg.  v.  Gray,  4  Post.  &  F.  1102. 

V.  State,  40  Ala.  698;  People  v.  Stout,  »  jjeg.  v.  Bailey,  2  Cox  C.  C.  311. 

4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  71.  »  Reg.  v.  Proud,  Leigh  &  Cave  C.  C- 

4  Com..?;.  Ferrigan,  44  Pa.  St,  386.  97,  101. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIII.]    QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    FOR    THE    JUDGE.        303 

and  had  taken  credit  for  the  larger  amounts.  These  were  the  cases 
on  which  the  indictments  were  founded.  Evidence  was  admitted  that, 
on  several  occasions  befoi'e  and  afterwards,  precisely  similar  errors  had 
been  made  and  similar  advantage  talcen  of  them  by  him,  as  tending  to 
show  that  the  errors  which  were  the  foundation  of  the  indictment  were  in- 
tentional and  fraudulent,  and  not  accidental.^ In  another  case,  where 

the  charge  was  embezzlement,  evidence  of  another  act  of  embezzlement 
by  the  defendant  during  the  same  week  was  held  competent  on  the  ques- 
tion of  intent.^ Where  the  defendants  were  indicted  for  obtaining 

goods  of  certain  persons  by  false  pretenses,  evidence  of  the  purchase  of 
other  goods  from  other  persons  by  similar  pretenses  was  held  competent 

on  the  question  of  criminal  intent.-' So,  where  the  indictment  was 

for  obtaining  money  by  false  pretense,  and  the  pretense  charged  was 
that  a  chain  which  the  defendant  pledged  to  a  pawn  broker  was  silver, 
evidence  that  the  defendant,  a  few  days  afterwards ,  offered  a  similar 

chain  to  another  pawn  broker,  was  held  admissible.* Where,  on 

an  indictment  for  robbery,  evidence  was  adduced  to  the  effect  that  the 
prosecutor  was  induced,  by  defendant's  advice,  to  give  money  to  a  mob 
who  had  come  to  his  house  for  the  purpose  of  getting  rid  of  them  and 
preventing  mischief,  it  was  competent  to  show  that  the  same  mob  had 
demanded  money  at  other  houses  when  some  of  the  defendants  were 
present,  — for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  advice  was  fraudulent 

and  a  mere  mode  of  effecting  the  robber3\^ Where  the  defendant 

was  indicted  for  robbery  and  found  guilty  of  larceny  of  the  prose- 
cutor's watch,  upon  evidence  that  he  had  oUtained  it  under  the  pre- 
tense of  a  bet,  evidence  was  held  competent  to  show  that  the  defendant 
had  attempted  to  practice  the  same  artifice  on  other  persons  and  on 

other  occasions.^ Where  the  question  at  issue  was  whether  the 

purchase  of  property  from  one  person  was  fraudulent,  evidence  was 
held  admissible  to  show  that  the  purchasers  had  fraudulently  bought 
other  property  of  other  persons.''' Where  the  charge  was  the  steal- 
ing of  coal,  it  was  held  competent  to  prove  that  the  defendant  was  the 

i  Reg.  V.  Richardsou,  2  Fost.  &  F.  ^  Rex   v.  Wiukworth,  -4   Carr.    &  P. 

343.  444. 

2  Com.     V.      Shepherd,      1     Allen  «  Defrese  v.  State,  3  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
(Mass.),  575,  581.  53,  62. 

3  Cora.  V.  Eastman,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  ^  Bradley   v.   Obear,  10  N.  H.  477, 
189,  216.  480;    Hovey   •;.    Grant,   52  N.   H.   569. 

•*  Reg.  V.  Roebuck,  Dearsly  &  B.  C.      See  also   State   v.  Johnson,  33  N.  H. 
C.  24.  441,  456,  457. 


304  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

lessee  of  a  coal  mine,  and  that  he  had  from  the  shaft  of  the  leased  mine 
wrongfully  cut  into  adjoining  premises  and  taken  coal,  during  a  period 
of  more  than  four  j-ears,  from  the  coal  fields  of  thirty  or  forty  different 
owners,  —  the  evidence  bearing  upon  the  question  of  felonious  in- 
tent.^   So,  on  an  indictment  for  burglary,  it  is  competent  to  show 

that  the  defendant  entered  the  building  with    a  felonious  intent,  by 

proof  of  a  felony  committed  by  him  in  the  adjoining  building.^ 

So,  it  was  held  competent  on  an  indictment  of  two  persons  for  bur- 
glary, to   show   that   they   had   committed   other    burglaries,   for  the 

purpose  of  showing  privity  and  community  of  design,^ So,  on  an 

indictment  for  kidnaping  a  negro  boy,  evidence  that  the  defendants 
made  a  similar  attempt  to  kidnap  another  boy  on  the  day  previous,  was 

held  competent  as  bearing  upon  the  question  of  intent.* So,  on  a 

charge  of  keeping  liquor  for  sale  contrary  to  law,  evidence  that  the  de- 
fendant had  previousl3'^  sold  other  liquor,  or  kept  other  liquor  for  sale, 
or  was  a  liquor-dealer,  has  been  held  admissible  on  tlie  question  of  in- 
tent.-''   So,  where  the  prisoner  was  indicted  for  placing  obstruc- 
tions upon  a  railroad  track,  it  was  held  competent  to  prove  that  he  had 
placed  other  obstructions  than  those  for  which  the  indictment  was 
found,  upon  the  same  railroad  track,  the  court  reasoning  that  the  acts 
were  so  connected  that  they  might  be  regarded  as  being  the  continua- 
tion of  the  same  transaction.^ 

§  336.  Usage  of  Trade  or  Business.  —  So,  where  the  question 
at  issue  is  the  practice  or  usage  with  reference  to  a  particular 
trade  or  business,  it  is  for  the  judge  to  decide,  as  a  preliminary 
question,  whether  tlie  evidence  tendered  upon  the  question  is 
evidence  of  the  fact  of  a  general  usage  or  practice  prevailing  in 
the  particular  trade  or  business,  or  merely  the  judgment  or  opin- 
ion of  the  witness.  If  the  latter,  he  must  reject  it,  as  that 
furnishes  no  safe  guide  for  interpretation.^ 

1  Reg.-y.Bleasdale,  2  Carr.  &  K.7fi5.  ^  State    v.   Plunkett,    64    Me.   534; 

2  Osborne  u.  People,  2  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Com.  v.  Stoehr,  109  Mass.  3G5;  Com. 
Y.)  583;   Phillips  v.  People,  57  Barb.      v.  Dearborn,  109  Mass.  368. 

(N.  Y.)  356.  «  State  v.  Wentworth,  37  N.  II.  197. 

3  Mason  v.  State,  42  Ala.  532,  539.  ^  Lewis  v.  Marshall,  7  Man.  &  G. 

4  Com.  V.  Turner,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  729,  743. 
19,  24,  25. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIII.]    QUESTIONS    OF   FACT   FOR   THE    JUDGE.       305 

§  337.  Leading-  Questions.  — On  the  same  principle  the  judge 
must  determine  the  facts  which  form  the  necessary  premises  for 
a  conchisiou  whether  or  not  leading  questions  ought  to  be  allowed 
to  be  put  to  a  witness.^ 

§  338.  Further  Illustrations.  —  On  the  same  principle  it  is 
for  the  judge,  and  not  for  the  jury,  to  decide  whether  one  person 
sustains  such  a  relation  to  another,  that  the  declarations  of  the 
former  are  admissible  in  evidence  against  the  latter;  ^  whether 
evidence  shall  be  heard  to  show  that  a  debt,  absolute  on  its  face, 
was  merely  intended  by  the  parties  as  a  mortgage ;  ^  and  whether 
a  combination  has  been  established  such  as  renders  competent 
unsworn  declarations  of  a  person,  dumfervet  opus,  in  furtherance 
of  the  common  design.* 


1  Bundy  v.  Hyde,  50  N.  H.  116,  120;  3  ^e  France  v.  De  France,  34  Pa. 

post,  §  357,  et  seq.  St.  385. 

-  Cliquot's  Champagne,  3  Wall.  (U.  ■*  Claytor  v.  Anthony,  6  Rand.  (Va.) 

S.)    114,    140;    Claytor  v.   Anthony,  6      285. 
Rand.  (Va.)  285. 

20 


306  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr 


CHAPTER     XIV. 

CONTROL  OF  THE  COURT  OVER  THE  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES. 

Section 

343.  Extent  of  the  Discretion  of  the  Court. 

344.  Order  of  Proof. 

345.  Anticipating  the  Defense. 

346.  Allowing  the  Plaintiff  to  Introduce  Evidence  not  in  Rebuttal  after  the 

Defendant  has  Rested. 

347.  Defendant's  Right  of  Reply  or  Sur-rehuttal. 

348.  Reopening  the  Case  to  admit  Additional  Evidence. 

349.  Recalling  Witnesses  for  further  Examination. 

350.  Allowing  Witnesses  to  Correct  their  Testimony. 

351.  Admitting  Irrelevant  Testimony  upon  a  Promise  of  subsequently  Show- 

ing Relevancy. 

352.  Limiting  Time  — Stopping  Repetitions  and  Irrelevant  Examinations. 

353.  Limiting  the  Number  of  Witnesses. 

354.  Control  as  to  the  Mode  of  Examination. 

355.  Right  of  Judge  to  put  Questions. 

356.  Indecent  Questions. 

357.  Leading  Questions. 

358.  [Continued.]     What  Questions  are  Leading  and  what  not. 

359.  [Continued.]     Where  the  Witness  is  manifestly  Hostile. 

360.  [Continued.]     Other  Circumstances  where  Allowed. 
3G1.  Effect  of  Admissions  upon  offers  of  Evidence. 

§  343.  Extent  of  the  Discretion  of  the  Court.  — It  is  best 
to  consider  at  the  outset  the  extent  of  the  discretionary  power 
which  is  possessed  by  the  trial  judge  in  the  matter  of  the  exam- 
ination of  the  witnesses  and  the  deraignment  of  the  evidence. 
As  it  may  be  necessary  to  appeal  to  this  discretion  to  help  the 
party  out  of  the  consequences  of  omissions  or  mistakes,  it  is 
necessary  for  counsel  to  have  as  clear  a  view  as  possible 
of  the  extent  to  which  the  law  requires  them  to  proceed  ac- 
cording to  strict  rules,  and  the  extent  to  which  they  may  secure 
a  possible  relaxation  of  such  rules  through  an  exercise  of  the 
discretion  of  the  court. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIV.]     .CONTROL    OVER    EXAMINATION.  307 

§  344.  Order  of  Proof.  —  Where  the  plaintiff  sustains  the 
burden  of  proof,  "  the  rule  of  practice  in  the  introduction  of  tes- 
timony is,  that  the  plaintiff  shall  first  bring  forward  all  the  testi- 
mony that  goes  to  establish  his  claim ;  the  defendant  shall  then 
introduce  his  proof  upon  matters  of  defense  and  his  testimony 
rebuttin(]j  the  proof  adduced  by  the  plaintiff;  then  the  plaintiff  by 
his  proof  rebutting  that  of  the  defendant.  And  after  the  plaint- 
iff has  introduced  his  proof  establishing  his  case,  and  the  testi- 
mony of  the  defendant  has  been  heard,  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled, 
as  a  matter  of  right,  to  introduce  additional  proof  in  chief."  ^  In 
strict  practice  the  party  holding  the  affirmative  of  the  issue,  is 
bound  to  give  all  his  evidence  in  support  of  the  issue,  in  the  first 
instance;  he  can  only  give  such  evidence  in  reply,  as  tends  to  an- 
swer the  new  matter  introduced  by  the  adversary.^  But  the  or- 
der in  which  testimony,  competent  and  relevant  to  the  issues,  is 
admitted,  is  largely  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  and 
the  exercise  of  this  discretion  is  not  assignable  for  error  except  in 
cases  of  manifest  abuse.'^  The  reason  and  policy  of  this  rule 
were  thus  well  stated  by  Poland,  J. :  "  Although  there  are  cer- 
tain established  rules,  which  have  obtained  in  the  process  of  try- 

1  Walker  v.  Walker,  li  Ga.  2^2,  don  v.  Goulman,  1  Monr.  (Ky.)  115; 
260.  See  also  Macullar  v.  Wall,  6  State  v.  Alford,  31  Coun.  40;  State  u. 
Gray  (Mass.),  507;  Hathaway  v.  Hem-  Fox,  25  N.  J.  L.  566;  Dane  v.  Treat,  35 
ingway,  20  Conn.  195;  Gilpins  v.  Me.  198;  Pierce u.  Wood,  23  N.  H.  519. 
Consequa,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  184;  Especially  where  the  case  is  tried  before 
s.  c.  Pet.  C.  C.  85;  Pettibone  v.  Der-  the  court,  without  a  jury.  Goodman 
ringer,  4  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  215;  v.  Kennedy,  10 Neb.  271,  274.  Walker 
Braydon  v.  Goulman,  1  Monr.  (Ky.)  v.  Walker,  supra.  It  is  said  that: 
115;  Abb.  Tr.  Brief,  42.  <'  Only  in  an  extreme  case  will  it  be 

2  Graham  v.  Davis,  4  Oh.  St.  held  that  the  manner  or  order  of  pre- 
362,  senting  competent  testimony  violates 

3  Graham  V.  Davis,  supra;  Blake  v.  a  substantial  right  of  either  party." 
Powell,  26  Kan.  320,  327;  Rheinhart  V.  Blake  v.  Powell,  SM/)ra,  opinion  by 
State,  14  Kan.  322.  Bourreseau  v.  Brewer,  J.  The  remedy  for  an  abuse 
Detroit  Evening  Journal  Co.  (Mich.),  6  of  such  h,  discretion  is  a,  motion  for  a 
West.  Eep.  151;  Buttertield  v.  Gil-  new  trial;  and  if  reviewable  at  all  on 
Christ  (Mich.),  5  West.  Rep.  744;  error,  it  is  only  when,  taken  in  connec- 
Hastings  v.  Palmer,  20  Wend.  ("S".  Y.)  tion  with  all  the  evidence  in  the  case, 
225;  Ford  v.  Niles,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  300;  it  is  shown  to  have  prevented  the  party 
Marshall  u.  Davies,  78  N.  Y.  414,  420;  from  having  a  fair  trial.  Webb  v. 
Agate  V.  Morrison,  84  N.  Y.  672;  Bray-  State,  29  Oh.  St.  351. 


308  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 

ing  causes  before  a  jury,  and  in  the  order  of  introducing  the  evi- 
dence of  witnesses,  yet  these  rules,  for  the  most  part,  are  but 
rules  of  practice,  and  are  considered  as  under  the  control  of  the 
court,  and  subject  to  be  varied,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  judi- 
cial discretion ;  so  that  a  departure  from  the  ordinary  rules,  in 
the  course  of  a  trial,  or  a  refusal  to  grant  such  indulgence  to  a 
party  on  request,  cannot  properly  be  made  a  ground  of  error. 
Of  this  class  are  the  rules  as  to  the  order  of  introducing  the  evi- 
dence, and  also  as  to  the  mode  of  examining  witnesses.  In- 
deed, the  constantly  varying  circumstances  under  which  cases 
arise,  and  the  haste  and  confusion  which  must  frequently  be 
expected  in  jury  trials  (without  permitting  the  exercise  of  the 
discretion  of  the  court),  would  often  lead  to  most  unjust  results 
and  disastrous  consequences."  ^ 

§  345.  Anticipating  the  Defense.  —  Thus,  while  the  plaintiff 
is  not  bound  to  anticipate  the  defense  of  his  opponent,  and  to 
introduce  evidence  in  rebuttal  of  it,^  yet,  where  the  materiality 
of  evidence  in  rebuttal  is  foreshadowed  by  the  line  of  defense,  it 
is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to  admit  it  in  advance  of 
the  evidence  which  it  is  intended  to  rebut. ^  .  It  has  been  laid  down 
that  it  is  not  an  objectionable  practice  to  allow  the  plaintiff,  after 
submitting  sufficient  evidence  to  make  a  prima  facie  case  within 
his  complaint,  to  rest  and  see  what  the  defendant  will  make  out  by 
way  of  affirmative  proof,  reserving  the  balance  of  his  evidence  for 
purposes  of  rebuttal,  — thereby  not  exhausting  all  his  ammunition 
at  the  first  fire.* 

1  Gossv.  Turner,  21  Vt.  437,  439.  Williams  v.  DeWitt,  12  lad.  309; 
The  learned  judge  cited  Clayes  v.  Duun  v.  People,  29  N.  Y.  523;  Bancroft 
Ferris,  10  Vt.  112;  Hopkiuson  v.  Steel,      v.  Sheehan,  21  Hun  (N.  Y.),  550. 

12  Vt.  582.     See  also  Pingry  v.  Wash-  ^  Dean  v.  Corbett,  51  N.  Y.  Super, 

burn,  1   Aik.  (Vt.)  204;  s.   c.    15  Am.  (19  J.  &  S.)  103.     And  see  Bedell  v. 

Dec.    676.     See   under  Tex.    Statute,  Carll,  33N.  Y.  581.    But  if  the  plaintiff 

Bostick  V.  State,   11  Tex.  App.    126;  takes  this  course,  he  is  not.  In  strict 

Cohea  v.  State,  Id.  153.  right,    entitled    to    give    in    rebuttal 

2  Dodge  V.  Dunham,  41  Ind.  187,  further  evidence  on  the  same  point. 
192;  Bancroft  v.  Sheehan,  21  Hun  (N.  Holbrook  v.  McBride,  4  Gray  (Mass.), 
Y.),  550.  215;    York   v.   Pease,  2  Id.  282;  Gil- 

3  Dimick  v.  Downs,  82  111.  570;  pins  v.  Cousequa,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  (Uc 
York  V.   Pease,  2   Gray  (Mass.),  282;  S.)  184. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIV.]    CONTROL    OVEK   EXAMINATION.  309 

§  346.  Allowing  Plaintiff  to  introduce  Evidence  not  in 
Rebuttal  after  Defendant  has  rested.  — The  admission  or  ex- 
clusion of  evidence  not  strictly  in  rebuttal  is  a  matter  resting  in 
the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  the  exercise  of  which  discretion 
is  not  subject  to  review  except  in  cases  of  gross  abuse. ^  The 
proper  rule  for  the  exercise  of  this  discretion  is,  that  material 
testimony  should  not  be  excluded  because  offered  by  the  plaint- 
iff after  the  defendant  has  rested,  although  not  in  rebuttal,  unless 
it  has  been  kept  back  by  a  trick,  and  for  the  purpose  of  deceiving 
the  defendant  and  affecting  his  case  injuriously.^  On  this  subject, 
the  following  observation  has  been  made:  "  It  is  a  settled  rule 
of  practice  that,  whilst  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  rest,  on  making 
out  a  prima  facie  case,  and  afterwards  to  adduce  additional  as 
well  as  rebutting  testimony,  the  defendant  is  in  general  required 
to  go  through  his  proofs  before  resting.  In  ordinary  cases,  a 
departure  from  this  course  is  matter  of  indulgence  and  discretion 
with  the  court,  and  a  refusal  to  permit  it  is,  therefore,  no  ground 
of  error.  The  rule  supposes,  however,  that  the  case  as  first  made 
by  the  plaintiff  shall  be  calculated  to  apprize  the  defendant  of 
the  ground  on  which  the  right  of  recovery  is  finally  to  be  sup- 
ported. If  a  new  case  is  made  in  the  close,  without  any  pre- 
vious notice  to  the  defendant,  he  should  be  allowed  to  go  into 
evidence  in  answer  to  it."^  But  the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to 
this  grace.  The  strict  rule  is  that  he  must  try  his  case  out  when 
he  commences.*  He  cannot  in  strictness  (though  he  can  in  dis- 
cretion) be  allowed  to  prove  again  the  facts  which  he  proved,  in 
making  out  his  prima  facie  case.^     The  better  view,  however,  is 

1  Farmers'   Mutual  Fire  Insurance  (S.  C.)  36;  Finlayv.  Stewart,  56  Pa.  St. 

Co.  t'.  Bair,  87  Fa.  St.  121;  Vaudike  u.  183;    Dailey  u.    Grimes,   27  Md.    440; 

Towuseud,  6  Week.  Notes  Cas.  (Pa.)  McCoy  v.  Phillips,  4  Kich.  (S.  C.)  463. 
55;    Marshall  v.  Davies,  78  N.  Y,  414;  ^  Richardson  v.  Lessee  &c.,  4  Binn. 

s.c.  58  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  231;  reversing  (Pa.)    198;  Pucker  ?;.  Eddiugs,  7  Mo. 

s.  c.  16  Hua  (N.  Y.),  606;    Huntsman  115,  118;  Dozier   v.   Jerman,   30  Mo. 

V.  Nichols,  116  Mass.  521;  Dozier  v.  216,220. 

Jerman,  30  Mo,   216,  220;  Walker  v.  ^  Clayes  w.  Ferris,  10  Vt.  112. 

Walker,  14  Ga.  242;  Gaines  u.  Com.,  50  *  Rowe  v.  Breuton,  3  Man.  &  Ry. 

Pa.  St.  319;  Morse  v.  Potter,  4  Gray  133,  139. 

(Mass.),   292;  Day   v.   Moore,  13  Id.  ^  xjuion  Water  Co.  u.  Crary,  25  Cal. 

522;   Ciiutou  v.   McKeuzie,  5  Strobh.  504;  Kohler  u.  Wells,  60  Cal.  €06. 


310  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

that  where  the  plsdntifl ' s.jjrima  facie  case  is  vigorously  assailed, 
he  should  be  allowed  to  introduce  in  rebuttal  additional  corrobo- 
rating evidenced  This  discretion  cannot  be  exercised  so  as  to 
abridge  the  plaintiff  's  7'ight  of  rebuttal,  — which  is,  his  right  to 
introduce  evidence  which  tends  to  meet  and  overthrow  the  af- 
firmative case  set  up  by  the  defendant  in  his  testimony.^  It  is 
no  ground  of  exception  to  such  evidence  that,  in  addition  to  re- 
butting the  defendant's  new  matter,  it  also  tends  to  corroborate 
the  case  made  by  the  plaintiff  in  chief;  ^  nor  that  it  may  neces- 
sitate allowing  the  defendant  to  give  evidence  in  sur-rebuttal> 

§  347.    Defendant's    Right    of   Reply    or    Sur-rebuttal. — 

Moreover,  this  discretion  cannot  properly  be  exercised  so  as  to 
cut  off  the  defendant's  right  of  reply  to  any  new  matter  which 
the  plaintiff  may  thus  be  allowed  to  introduce  in  rebuttal,  pro- 
vided the  defendant  has  not  had  the  opportunity  of  introducing 
the  same  evidence  in  his  case  in  chief  ,^ — -  and  this,  in  the  view  of 
one  court,  though  his  evidence  in  reply  is  merely  cumulative.® 

§  348.  Reopening  the  Case  to  Admit  Additional  Evi- 
dence. —  So,  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  both 
in  civil  and  criminal  trials,  to  reopen  the  case  at  the  request  of  a 
party,  for  the  purpose  of  allowing  him  to  introduce  additional 
evidence.^     The  court  may  allow  a  party  to  introduce  further  evi- 

1  Bryan u.  Walton,  20  Ga.  480;  Dav-  enkerap,  13  B.  Mon,  (Ky.)  219;  Lar- 
idson  u.  Overhulser,  3  la.  196.  man  v.  Huey,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  43(3; 

2  Bancroft  v.  Sheehau,  21  Hun  (N.  McDowell  v.  Crawford,  11  Gratt.  (Va.) 
Y.),550.  377,408;    Eggspieller  v.  Knockles,  58 

8  Chadbourn    v.    Franklin,  5   Gray  Iowa,    G49;     McKinney  v.   Jones,   55 

(Mass.),  312.  Wis.   39;    State    v.   Coleman,  27  La. 

*  Abb.  Tr.  Brief,  43;  citing    Scott  Ann.  691;    Johnston  v.  Mason,  27  Mo, 

V.Woodward,  2  McCord  (S.  C),  161.  511;  States.  Porter,  26  Mo.  201,  209; 

5  Asay  V.  Hay,  89  Fa.  St.  77;  Kent  Couch  v.  Charlotte  &c.  R.  Co.,  22  S.C. 
V.Lincoln,  32  Vt.  591;  (compare  as  to  557;  States.  Rose,  33  La.  Ann,  932; 
Vermont  rule  Thayer  v.  Davis,  38  Vt.  Darlend  v.  Roseucrans,  56  Iowa,  122; 
163).  Williams  v.  Hayes,  20  N.  Y.  58;  Cald- 

6  Walker  v.  Fields,  28  Ga.  237.  well  v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  47 

7  Cora.  V.  Ricketson,  5  Mete.  N.  Y.  282,  295;  People  v.  Rector,  19 
Mass.)  412,  428;   Taylor  v.  Shemwell,  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  569. 

4  B.  Mon.   (Ky.)   575;    Fleet  v.   Hoel- 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIY.J    CONTROL  over  examination.  311 

dence  after  the  testimony  has  closed  on  both  sides, ^  after  a  de- 
murrer to  the  evidence  has  been  made,^  after  the  argument  has 
commenced,^  and  even  after  the  argument  has  closed.^  The 
court  may  allow  the  prosecution  in  a  criminal  trial,  to  reopen  its 
case  and  introduce  further  evidence  in  chief,  even  after  the  ex- 
amination of  witnesses  for  the  defense  has  commenced,*  and 
after  the  State  has  closed  and  the  defendant  has  announced  that 
he  will  introduce  no  evidence ;  ®  though  it  has  been  elsewhere 
said  tl;iat  this  discretion  should  be  exercised  with  the  utmost  cau- 
tion.' This  discretion  will  not  be  exercised  where  it  would 
work  a  fraud  on  the  opposite  party,  or  where  the  withholding  of 
the  evidence  was  a  manifest  trick;  ^  and  if  the  introduction  of 
such  additional  evidence  takes  the  adverse  party  by  surprise,  he 
should  be  allowed  time  and  opportunity,  if  desired,  to  meet  it 
with  further  evidence  on  his  side.^  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to 
add  that  it  is  not  an  abuse  of  discretion  for  the  trial  court  to 
refuse  to  open  a  case  to  admit  further  defenses  after  the  trial, 
where  the  defendant,  knoiving  of  the  existence  of  the  defenses, 
neglected  to  assert  them  in  his  pleading  in  the  first  instance,  and 
gives    no    satisfactory    reason    for    the    neglect. ^°     But    where 

1  Taylor  v.  Shemwell,  4  B.  Mon.  lo  Kirschbon  r.  Bousel  (Wis.),  29  N. 
(Ky.)  577;  Hess  v.  Wilcox,  58  Iowa,  W.  Rep.  907;  s.  c.  67  Wis.  178.  And 
380.  see  Foster  v.  Newbrous;fh,  66  Barb.  (N. 

2  Tierney  v.  Spiva,  76  Mo.  279.  Y.)  645,  where  it  was  held  that  it  was 

3  Buggies  V.  Coffin,  70  Me.  468 ;  proper  to  refuse  to  allow  the  defendant, 
George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  299,  after  the  plaintiff  had  closed  in  rebut- 
310.  tal,  to  offer  witnesses  to  sustain  his 

*  Breedlove  v.  Bundy,  96  Ind.  319.  testimony  on  the  defense  and  to  con- 

5  State  V.  Clyburn,  16  S.  C.  375.  tradict  the  plaintiff's  evidence  in  re- 

6  State  V.  Rose,  33  La.  Ann.  932.  buttal.     In  a  case  in  Georgia  it  was 
^  CloBgh  V.  State,  7  Neb.  323,  341,  said  by  Lumpkin,  J.:  "I  must  say  that 

342.      See    also    Kalle    v.   People,    4  so  much  averse  am  I  to  withholding 

Park.  Cr.  R.   (N.  Y.)  591.     This  must  testimony,  that  I  can  hardly  conceive 

be  allowed  under  Tex.    Code  Crim.,  of  a  case  so  gross  and  palpable  that 

art.  661  (which  is  mandatory) ,  at  any  I  should  feel   constrained  to   control 

time  before  the  conclusion  of  the  ar-  the  discretion  of    the    circuit  judge 

guments.     Donahoe  v.  State,  12  Tex.  from  receiving  at  any  time  additional 

App.  297.  affirmatory,  cumulative  and   corrobo- 

8  Breedlove  v.  Bundy,  96  Ind.  319.  rative  evidence    of    facts    previously 

8  George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  proved,   or  which  tends  to  strengthen 

299,  310.  and  add  force  or  probability  to  such 


312  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

the  plaintiff  lias  inadvertently  omitted  to  introduce  a  formal 
though  necessary  document,  until  after  the  close  of  his  evidence, 
it  will  be  an  abuse  of  discretion,  for  which  the  judgment  will  be 
reversed,  to  refuse  his  application  to  be  allowed  to  introduce  it 
then.^  So,  where  a  material  witness  failed  to  arrive  in  time 
through  no  fault  of  his  own,  it  was  held  error  to  refuse  to  allow 
him  to  testify,  after  the  argument  had  commenced,  but  before  the 
case  had  been  finally  submitted  to  the  jury.'-^  If,  after  the  de- 
fense is  closed,  the  plaintiff  introduces  new  evidence,  the  defend- 
ant will  have  the  right  to  explain.^  Thus,  where,  after  the 
plaintiff  had  rested,  the  defendants  moved  for  a  non-suit,  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  already  on  the  records  of  the  court  a  judg- 
ment against  them,  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held,  must  be  allowed  to 
introduce  a  docket  entry  showing  that  it  has  been  set  aside.*  If 
the  court  exercises  this  discretion  unsoundly  ^^  —  as  by  refusing 
to  let  in  evidence  which  has  been  omitted  in  its  regular  order  by 
an  oversight,  the  judgment  will  be  reversed.^ 

§  349.  Recalling  Witnesses    for    Further  Examination.  — 

So,  it  is   within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to  grant  ^  or  to 

evidence.  Walkers.  Walker,  14  Ga.  8  Mo.  26;  Gavan  w.  Elsworth,  45  Ga. 
242,250.  It  has  even  been  held  no  283;  Cothran  u.  Forsyth,  (JS  Ga.  560; 
error,  in  a  suit  on  a  promissory  note,  De  Lome  v.  Pease,  19  Ga.  220;  Jesse 
to  admit  evidence  of  a  reasonable  at-  v.  State,  20  Ga.  156,  164;  Jones  v. 
toruey's  fee  (allowed  by  statute),  after  Smith,  64  N.  Y.  180.  See  also  Cur- 
motions  for  new  trial  and  in  arrest  ran  v.  Conuery,  5  Binn.  (Pa.)  488. 
have  been  overi'uled.  Maynard  v.  By  statute  in  Texas,  "  the  court  shall 
Shorb,  85  Ind.  501.  allow  testimony  to  be   introduced  at 

1  Meacham  v.  Moore,  59  Miss.  561.  any  time  before  argument  of  a  cause 

2  Smith  V.  State  Ins.  Co.,  58  la.  478.  is  concluded,  if  it  appear  that  it  is 
•^  Asay  ■;;.  Hay,  89  Pa.  St.  77.  necessary  to  a  due  administi-ation  of 
^  Gillette  v.  Morrison,  7  Neb.  395.  justice."  Pasc.  Dig.  Tex.  Stat.,  art. 
fi  Meyer  v.   Cullen,  54  N.   Y.  392;  3046  ;  see  Sherwood  v.  State,  42  Tex. 

Meacham  v.  Moore,  59  Miss.  561.  498.  The  construction  of  this  statute 
«  Owen  V.  O'Reilly,  20  Mo.  603.  is  that  the  discretion  thus  confided  to 
'  State  V.  Coleman,  27  La.  Ann.  691;  the  court  is  not  subject  to  revision, 
Johnston  v.  Mason,  27  Mo.  511.  except  in  cases  where  it  has  been  so 
State  V.  Porter,  2G  Mo.  201,  209;  abused  as  to  defeat  the  ends  of  jus- 
Samuels  V.  Gritfith,  13  la.  103;  Morn-  tice  (Kemp  v.  State,  38  Tex.  Ill; 
ingstar  v.  State,  59  Ala.  30;  Rucker  ?;.  Roach  v.  State,  41  Tex.  262;  Tread- 
Eddings,  7  Mo.  115;  Brown  v.  Burrus,  way  v.  State,   1  Tex.  App.  668);  and 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIV.]      CONTROL    OVER    EXAMINATION. 


313 


refuse^  an  application  to  recall  a  witness,  who  has  been  examined 
and  dismissed  from  the  stand,  for  further  examination.  A  wit- 
ness may  be  thus  recalled  after  cross-examination,  for  further 
examination  in  chief ,"^  or  for  further  cross-examination.^  But 
when  permitted  to  be  recalled,  the  court  is  entitled  to  exercise  a 
larffe  discretion  as  to  the  manner  in  which,  and  the  extent  to 
which  the  favor  granted  shall  be  made  use  of  .^ 

'  §  350.  Allowing  Witness  to  correct  bis  Testiniouy.  —  The 
trial  court  will  always  allow  a  witness  to  explain  an  error,  mis- 
take or  oversight  in  his  testimony,  when  he  requests  the  privilege 
of  doing  so  before  leaving  the  stand. ^  But  whether  it  will  al- 
low a  witness  to  be  recalled  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  his 
testimony  after  he  has  left  the  stand,  is  a  matter  which  rests  in 
the  discretion  of  the  court."  This  will  alwaj^s  be  allowed  unless 
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  witness  desires  to  substitute  an 
untruthful  statement  for  a  truthful  one, — especially  in  view  of 


that  it  would  be  difficult  to  conceive 
of  such  a  case,  where  the  discretion 
has  been  exercised  by  perraittiug  the 
re-examination.  Treadway  v.  State, 
1  Tex.  App.  668.  See  also  Harris  v. 
State,  44  Tex.  146 ;  Meredith  v.  State,  40 
Tex.  483.  A  witness  thus  recalled  does 
not  necessarily  become  the  witness  of 
the  party  recalling  him.  Treadway  v. 
State,  1  Tex.  App.  6(;8,  670.  Recalling 
to  lay  foundation  for  impeachment: 
Ibid.  Recalling  to  restate  testimony, 
under  Texas  statute  (Pasch.  Dig.  Tex. 
Stat.,  art.  3080;  Tex.  Code.  Cr.  Proc, 
art.  615)  where  jury  disagree  as  to 
the  statements  of  the  witnesses :  Ed- 
mondson  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  116; 
Campbell  v.  State,  42  Tex.  591;  Tar- 
ver  V.  State,  43  Tex.  564. 

1  People  V.  Mather,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
229,249;  Beaulieu  v.  Parsons,  2  Minn. 
37;  Treadwell  v.  Goodwin,  6  Bosw  (N. 
Y.)  180.  It  has  been  held  that  the  fact 
that,  in  a  criminal  trial  after  the  prose- 


cuting witness  has  left  the  stand,  an- 
other witness  for  the  prosecution  gives 
a  different  account  of  the  occurrence 
from  that  given  by  the  prosecutor,  does 
not  give  the  defendant  a  right  further  to 
cross-examine  the  prosecutor.  People 
V.  Parton,  49  Cal.  632.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  say  that  a  witness  cannot 
thus  be  recalled  without  special  leave  of 
the  court,  whether  in  a  case  at  law  or 
inequity.  Girault  w.  Adams,  61  Md. 
1,  9;  Heise's  Case,  44  Md.  453. 

2  Brown  v.    Burrus,  8  Mo.   26,  30. 

3  Cummiugs  v.  Taylor,  24  Minn. 
429. 

^  Ibid.  Rule  of  court  restricting 
this  discretion  not  valid:  De  Lome  v. 
Pease,  19  Ga.  220,  227. 

'=>  Oberf elder  v.  Kavanaugh  (Neb.), 
32  N.  W.  Rep.  296;  s.  c.  21  Neb. 
483. 

^  Miller  v.  Hartford  Ins.  Co. 
(Iowa),  29  N.  W.  Rep.  411;  s.  c.  70 
la.  704. 


314  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

the  fact  that  the  witness  has  delivered  his  testimony  under  the 
risk  of  an  indictment  for  perjury,  and  if  he  has  testified  errone- 
ously he  is  under  a  moral,  if  not  a  legal  obligation,  of  tendering 
the  proper  correction.^  But  amended  swearing  is  a  thing  which 
justice  suspects  and  abhors  ;  and  where  a  witness  has  demeaned 
himself  unfavorably  on  the  stand,  has  been  manifestly  prejudiced 
or  uucandid,  it  will  be  no  abuse  of  discretion  to  deny  him  the 
privilege  of  returning  to  the  stand  for  the  alleged  purpose  of 
correcting  a  statement,  if  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  cor-, 
rection  will  not  be  in  furtherance  of  truth  and  justice. ^  It  is 
not  error  for  the  court  to  allow  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  taken 
down  in  writing,  to  be  read  over  to  them  in  the  presence  of  the 
jury,  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  errors  which  may  have  been 
committed  in  writing  it  down.  It  is  impossible  that  a  party  can 
be  injured  by  having  the  testimony  twice  impressed  on  the  minds 
of  the  jury,  if  it  is  taken  down  correctly;  and  it  can  do  him 
no  injustice  to  have  errors,  if  any,  corrected.^ 

§  351.  Admitting-  Irrelevant  Testimony  upon  a  promise  of 
subsequently  showing  Relevancy. —  It  is  laid  down  by  Professor 
Greenleaf  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  relevancy  of  testimony 
"  should  appear  at  the  time  when  it  is  offered,  it  being  the  usual 
course  to  receive,  at  any  proper  and  convenient  stage  of  the  trial, 
in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  any  evidence  which  the  counsel 
shows  will  be  rendered  material  by  other  evidence  which  he  un- 
dertakes to  produce.     If  it  is  not  subsequently  thus  connected 

1  Upon  this  point  it  was  said   by  him  the  permission  to  make  a  correc- 

Lumpkin,   J.:    "A    witness,    tlirougli  tion  would  be  to  transfer  the  guilt  from 

forgetfulness    or    inadvertence,  mis-  his    conscience    to  theirs."     Walker 

states  a  fact:   upon  reflection  he  dis-  v.  Walker,  14  Ga.  242,  251. 
covers  the  mistake  and  i^eks  to  rec-  ^  ^  witness  who  had  just    sworn 

tify  it.      Would  it  not 'be  monstrous  that  certain  property  was  worth  $2,- 

to  deny  him  the  privilege?     Is   it  not  000,   was  not   allowed  to  be  recalled 

due  to  him,  apart  from  any  other  con-  for  the  purpose  of  proving  that,  at  the 

sideration?       Should  he  fail  to  make  same  time  referred  to   in  his  testi- 

the  explanation  so  soon  as  he  detects  mony,   the   property    was  worth  but 

the  error,   he  would    be    guilty  un-  $300.     State  v.  Nauert,  6  Mo.  App.  596. 
doubtedly  of  moral,   if  not  of  legal  ^  Cobb  v.  State,  27  Ga.   648.     See 

perjury.     And  for  the  court  to  refuse  also  Crawford  v.  State,  12  Ga.  145. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIV.]      CONTROL    OVER    EXAMINATION.  315 

with  the  issue,  it  is  laid  out  of  the  case.^  This  is  regarded  by 
many  courts  as  merely  a  branch  of  the  general  rule  already 
treated  of  ,^  that  the  order  of  proof  is  a  matter  within  the  discre- 
tion of  the  trial  court.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  a  judgment 
will  not  be  reversed  because  the  court  admitted  declarations  of  a 
cons/jifra^or  against  his  co-conspirator,  before  proof  of  the  con- 
nection of  the  latter  with  the  conspiracy  had  been  made,  pro- 
vided the  proof  was  afterwards  made.  If  the  proof  is  not  after- 
wards made,  the  rule  is  to  withdraw  the  testimony  from  the 
jury.^  It  is  conceded,  however,  that  the  better  rule  is  not  to  ad- 
mit evidence  of  the  declarations  of  a  co-conspirator  or  accom- 
plice, until  A  2)rima  fade  case  has  been  made,  establishing  the  fact 
of  the  conspiracy.^  And,  in  general,  it  is  an  objectionable  prac- 
tice, to  admit  evidence  which  may  be  prejudicial,  with  the 
understanding  that  it  may  be  excluded  from  the  jury  by  an  in- 
struction, unless  the  party  tendering  it  produces  other  evidence 
which  makes  it  competent,^  for  which  in  some  cases  judgments 
have  been  reversed.^  In  a  criminal  case  where  this  was  done  it 
was  said:  "It  must  be  apparent  that  such  testimony,  having 
once  gone  to  the  jury,  its  impression  would  necessarily,  to  some 
extent,  remain  in  their  minds,  though  they  were  ordered  to 
discard  it ;  and  in  a  case  of  circumstantial  evidence,  it  is  next 
to  impossible  to  say  how  far  that  impression  exercised  its  in- 
fluence in  supplying  any  defect  which  might  have  arisen,  or  in 
solving  any  doubt  in  their  minds  on  the  general  state  of  the  evi- 
dence. A  prosecuting  officer  in  behalf  of  the  State,  in  his  zeal 
for  a  conviction,  should  never  overlook  the  fact  that  the  interests 

1  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  51  a.  Compare  ^  insurance  Co.  v.  Rubin,  79111.  402; 
Follausbee  V.  Johnson,  28  Minn.  311;  Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  RosinCj  87  111. 
People  V.  Bragle,  10  Abb,  New   Cas.      105.     Post,  §§  723,  2415. 

(N.  Y.)  300;  s.  c.  26  Hun  (N.  Y.),  378.  «  State  v.  Mis,  15  Mo.  153;  State  v. 

2  Ante,  §  344.  Wolff,  15  Mo.  KJS;  State  v.   Schneider, 
'Miller  v.  Barber,    (N.  Y.   Ct.    of      35  Mo.  536;  State  i).  Marshall,  36  Mo. 

App.)    4  Cent.  Law.  Journ.  177.     See  400;   State  v.   Danhart,   42   Mo.  242; 

Page  V.  Parker,  40  N.  H.  62;  Sweat  v.  Gulf  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Levy,  59  Tex.  542; 

Rogers,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  118;  Page  v.  s.  c.  46  Am.  Rep.    269;  Cobb?;.  Grif- 

Parker,  43  N.  H.  363.  fith  &c.  Co.,  12   Mo.  App.  130;   Ruil- 

^  Sweat  V.  Rogers,  supra;  Pearson  road  Co.   v.   Wiuslow,   66    111.     219. 

V.  South,  61  Iowa,  232.  Compare  Tucker  v.  Hamlin,60  Tex.  171. 


316  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

of  society  and  the  vindication  of  the  law  require  at  his  hands  as 
much  the  protection  of  the  innocent  as  the  conviction  of  the 
guilty.  Evidence  of  this  character,  in  cases  involving  life,  should 
never  be  proposed  by  him,  unless  he  is  morally  certain  that  he 
can  make  good  his  promise  of  connecting  the  defendant  with  the 
matter;  there  should  be  no  room  for  doubt,  where,  as  in  this  case, 
he  could  have  ascertained  in  advance  the  existence  or  non-exist- 
ence of  defendant's  connection  with  the  proposed  evidence."  ^  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  considerable  authority  to  the  effect  that 
the  admission  of  improper  evidence,  which  is  subsequently  with- 
drawn from  the  jury,  presents  no  available  error. ^  In  any  view, 
counsel  cannot  claim  the  privilege  of  thus  putting  evidence  before 
laying  the  foundation,  without  stating  in  advance  wJuit  he  ex- 
pects to  prove,  and  in  such  a  case  it  will  be  no  error  to  refuse  it.^ 

§  352.  liimitiiig  Time,  Stopping  Repetitions  and  Irrelevant 
Examinations.  —  In  like  manner,  the  discvetion  of  the  trial 
court  extends  to  the  stopping  of  repetitions,  to  the  placing  of  a 
reasonable  limit  upon  the  time  which  shall  be  allowed  for  the 
examination  or  cross-examination  of  a  witness,  and  to  prevent- 
ing the  consuming  of  the  public  time  by  an  examination  into 
irrelevant  matters.  It  is  discretionary  with  the  trial  court  to 
allow  a  subject  to  be  gone  into  again,  in  examining  a  witness, 
after  he  has  been  fully  examined  upon  it.^     So,  it  has  been  laid 

1  Marshal  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  273,  Bnreu  v.  Wells,  19  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  202; 

291.  Abbey  v.  Kiugsland,  10  Ala.  355;  s.  c. 

-  Blizzard  V.  Applegate,  77  lud.  516;  44  Am.  Dec.  491;  Carries  v.  Pratt,  15 

Hopt  V.  People,  7  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  Abb.    Pr.   (n.  s.)  337;   s.  c.  36  N.  Y. 

614;  Specht  v.  Howard,  16  Wall.  564;  Super.  361;    s.   c.   affirmed,  59  N.  Y. 

Davis  V.  Peveler,  65  Mo.  189;   State  v.  405. 

May,  4  Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  330;  Goodnow  ■*  Joslin  v.  Grand  Rapids  Ice  &  Coal 

V.  Hill,  125  Mass.  589;  Smith  v.  Whit-  Co.,  53  Mich.  323;  Crow  v.  Marshall, 

mau,  G  Allen  (Mass.),  562;  Hawes  v.  15   Mo.    499.     Where   a    witness   has 

Gustiu,  2    Allen  (Mass.),  125;   Dillin  already  testified  that  he  cannot  swear 

V.  People,  8  Mich.  369.  to  a  certain    fact,  e.g.,  that    certain 

3  Abb.  Tr.  Brief,  52;  citing  Mech-  persons  wei'e  at  a  certain  time  in- 
elke  V.  Bremar,  59  Wis.  57;  s.  c.  17  toxicated,  —  no  error  is  committed  in 
N.  W.  Rep.  682;  Piper  v.  White,  56  Pa.  allowing  the  same  question  to  be  re- 
st. 90;  Hall  v.  Patterson,  51  Id.  289;  peated  in  substance  to  the  witness. 
Bilberry  v.  Mobley,  21  Ala.  277;  Van  Aurora  v.  Hillman,  90  111.  62. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XIV.]      CONTROL    OVER    EXAMINATION.  317 

down,  generally,  that  where,  in  the  progress  of  a  trial,  it  appears 
obvious  that  a  party,  either  in  the  examination  of  his  witnesses 
or  in  his  argument,  is  consuming  time  unnecessarily,  the  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  arrest  the  examination;  and  the  exercise 
of  this  discretion  will  not  be  reviewed  unless  its  abuse  mani- 
festly appears.^  So,  it  is  the  obvious  duty  of  the  judge  to 
interpose  of  his  own  motion,  when  a  useless  and  irrelevant  exam- 
ination of  the  witness  is  going  on,  and  prevent  a  waste  of  time  and 
the  distraction  of  the  attention  of  the  jury  from  the  real  issues. ^ 

§  353.  Limiting  Xumber  of  Witnesses. — So,  a  reasonable 
limitation  of  the  number  of  witnesses  who  shall  testify  to  a  par- 
ticular fact  is  Avithin  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court;  and  it  has 
been  held  that  the  limitation  of  the  number  to  seven  is  not  an 
abuse  of  discretion  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for  a  nuisance, 
where  the  court  gives  notice  in  advance  of  the  limitation.-^  So, 
the  court  may  limit  the  number  of  expert  witnesses  to  be  called 
at  the  trial. ^  So,  the  court  may  make  and  enforce  a  rule  limit- 
ing the  number  of  witnesses  who  shall  be  allowed  to  testify  upon 
the  question  of  the  credibility  of  the  plaintiff  .^  So,  the  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  notify  the  parties  that  not  more  than 
eleven  witnesses  on  each  side  will  be  heard  upon  the  question  of 
the  value  of  the  property  in  controversy,  and  may  enforce  the 
order.^  So,  in  an  action  against  a  railway  comi)any  to  recover 
damages  for  taking  the  plaintiff's  land  for  the  defendant's  use, 
it  has  been  held  no  abuse  of  discretion  for  the  court  to  limit  the 
number  of  witnesses  who  should  be  allowed  to  testify  as  to  the 
value  of  the  land,  to  Jive  J 

1  It  was  so  held  where,  in  a  civil  2  state  v.  McGee,  36   La.  Auu.  20G, 

action  to  recover  a  quantity  of  goods,  209. 

the  plaintiff,   after  having  examined  ^  Mergentheira  u.  State  (lud.),  8  N. 

sixteen  witnesses  in  rebuttal,  was  or-  East.  Rep.  0G8;  s.  c.  107  Ind.  567. 

dered  by  the  court  to  stop;  and  the  •«  Hilliard  v.  Beattie,  59  N.  H.  462. 

defendant  declining  to  argue,  the  court  ^  B^ys  v.  Huut,  60  Iowa,  251. 

restricted    tlie    plaintiff's  counsel  to  ^  Union  &c.    K.    Co.  v.   Moore     80 

ninety  minutes.     Eosser  v.  McColly,  Ind.  458. 

9  Ind.  5S7.     See  also  Priddy  V.  Dodd,  '  Everett  v.  Union  Pacific  R.   Co., 

4  Ind.   84;    Lynch   v.    State,   9    Ind.  59  Iowa,  243  (Beck  and  Adams,  JJ., 

^^^-  dissenting). 


318  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§   334.    Control  as    to  the    Mode    of    Examination.  —  The 

manner  of  examining  a  witness  is  largely  within  the  discretion  of 
the  court  before  whom  the  witness  is  produced,  and  that  discre- 
tion must  be  governed,  in  a  great  measure,  by  a  knowledge  of 
the  character  of  the  witness,  and  from  his  demeanor  during 
his  examination.^  While  the  regular  practice  is  to  allow  the 
examination  to  proceed  by  questions  and  answers,  so  that  the 
opposing  counsel  shall  have  fair  opportunity  for  interposing 
seasonable  objections  —  yet  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial 
court  to  allow  a  witness  to  give  his  testimony  without  being 
questioned  at  all;  and  it  is  said  that  cases  undoubtedly  occur 
which  justify  such  an  indulgence. ^  So,  it  is  discretionary  and 
proper  for  the  court  to  act  as  a  moderator  over  the  course  of  the 
examination,  and  to  interpose,  when  necessary,  to  prevent  the 
unreasonable  interruption  of  a  witness,  or  to  allow  the  witness  to 
complete  a  statement  or  to  give  his  version  of  a  fact  or  circum- 
stance.^ It  is  the  obvious  duty  of  the  trial  judge  to  see  that  all  wit- 
nesses are  treated  with  respect,  and  that  ar/ed  and  feeble  witnesses 
are  treated  with  indulgence,  especially  when  testifying  under  cir- 
cumstances which  necessarily  call  forth  great  emotion.*  It  has 
been  held  that  a  witness  cannot  be  required  to  put  a  question  to  a 
person  in  court,  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting  information  con- 
cerning which  the  witness  is  interrogated,  —  as  for  instance,  the 
full  name  of  a  person  of  which  the  witness  professes  to  be  ig- 

1  Brown   V.  Biirrus,  8  Mo.  2G,    30,      enough  to  be  heard,  at   the  same  time 
per  Scott,  J.  remarking  to  counsel  that,  "  some  al- 

2  Clark    V.    Field,    42  Mich.     342,      lowauce  must  be  made  for  the  woman, 
344.  as  she  is ovei'come  with  emotion."    It 

^  State  V.  Scott,  80  N.  C.  365.  was  held  that  the  prisoner  could  not 

4  Thus,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  claim  a  new  trial   on  the  ground  that 

for  rape,  tlie  mother  of  the  prosecu-  this  remark  miglit  liave  had  an  unfair 

trix,  while  testifying  before  the  jury,  influence  with  the  jury,  nor  was  it  ob- 

held  down  her  head  seemingly  much  jectionable  in  view  of  the  statute  (N. 

affected,   and   spoke  in  a  low  voice.  C.  C.  C.  P.,  §  237;    same  code   1883, 

The  prisoner's  counsel  thereupon  re-  §413),  which  forbids  the  judge  in  giv- 

quested  the  court   to  instruct  her  to  ing  a  charge  to  tlie  jury  '^  to   give  an 

hold  up  laer  head  and  speak  louder.  opinion  whether  a  fact  is  fully  or  sut- 

The  court  declined  to  compel  the  wit-  flciently  proved,  such  matter  being  the 

ness  to  hold  up  her  head,  but  said  that  true  oflice  and  province  of  the  jury.'* 

she  would  be  required  to  speak  loud  State  v.  Lastoa,  78  N.  C.  5G4. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIV.]      CONTROL    OVER    EXAMINATION.  319 

norant.^  Where  a  witness  states  that  he  is  not  able  to  ansiver 
a  question,  the  discretion  of  the  court  is  not  abused  in  exclud- 
ing it.^ 

§  355.   Right  of  a  Judge  to  put  Questions  to  a  Witness. — 

A  judge  presiding  upon  the  trial  of  a  cause  is  more  than  a  mere 
moderator  between  contending  parties ;  he  is  charged  Avith  the 
grave  duty  of  maintaining  truth  and  preventing  wrong,  and,  to 
this  end,  has  a  large  discretion,  which,  if  exercised  without 
abuse,  will  not  be  error.  He  may  in  the  exercise  of  this  discre- 
tion propound  questions  to  witnesses  with  a  view  to  elicit  the 
facts;  ^  and  if  they  be  leading  questions,  it  is  not  available 
error.  *  It  is  said  to  be  the  duty  of  the  judge,  both  in  civil  and 
criminal  cases,  to  give  strict  attention  to  the  evidence,  and  to 
propound  to  the  witness  sucli  questions  as  he  may  deem  neces- 
sary to  elicit  any  relevant  or  material  evidence,  without  regard 
to  its  effect  upon  the  interests  of  either  party. ^  But  it  is  also 
said  that  the  questions  which  a  judge  or  a  juror  may  properly 
put  to  a  witness  should  be  such  as  are  suggested  by  the  evidence 
given  on  the  trial. ^  To  this  end  the  judge  may  propound  to  un- 
willing witnesses  all  such  proper  questions  as  may  throw  light 
upon  their  statements,  and  especially  upon  the  motives  which 
actuate  them.^ 

§  3.56.  Indecent  Questions.  —  The  fact  that  evidence  is  in- 
decent is  no  objection  to  its  being  received,  where  it  is  necessary 
to  justice.^     But  it  is  proper  for  the  trial  court  to  refuse  to  per- 

1  Wehrkamp  v.  Willet,  4  Abb.  App.  In  this  case  the  judge  was  upheld  in 
Dec.  (X.  Y.)  548.  propouucling  to  the   prosecutrix  in  an 

2  Teese  v.  Ilutingdon,  23  How.  hadictmeut  for  rape,  who  had  been 
(U.  S.)  2.  brought  in  by  attachment,  questions 

3  Ferguson  v.  Hirsch,  54  Ind.  337;  whicli  elicited  answers  showing  that 
Blizzard  v.  Applegate,  77  Ind.  516;  the  mother  of  the  defendant  had  given 
Lefever  v.  Johnson,  79  Ind.  554.  her  a  sura  of  money  to  induce  her  not 

^Huffman  v.  Cauble,   8G   Ind.  591,  to  appear  against  the  defendant.     But 

596.  see  the  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  B.  284. 
^  Sparks  v.  State,  59  Ala.  82.  s  jy^  Costa    v.   Jones,    Cowp.    729. 

•5  Ibid.  87.  Compare  Anon.  v.  Anon.,  23  Beav.  273; 

»  Lockhart  v.   State,   92  Ind.   452.  s.  c.  22  Beav.  481. 


320 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I  Thomp.  Tr, 


mit  indecent  questions  to  be  put  to  children  on  the  witness  stand ;  ^ 
nor  will  the  court  commit  error  in  refusing  to  compel  a  female 
witness^  testifying  upon  an  indelicate  subject,  to  couch  her  answers 
in  indecent  language,  although,  if  so  expressed,  her  answers  would 
be  more  direct,  though  not  necessarily  more  intelligible.^ 


1  People  V.  White,  53  Mich.  537,  540. 

2  Thus,  on  tlie  trial  of  au  iudict- 
meut  for  rape,  the  prosecutrix,  while 
iestifyiug  as  to  the  circuuistauces  of 
the  crime,  hesitated  aud  wept,  where- 
upon the  court  directed  her  to  pro- 
ceed, saying:  "  I  will  not  require  you 
to  use  language  that  will  shock  your 
modesty."  The  witness  then  said: 
"He  had  his  will  with  me."  It  was 
held  that  there  was  no  error  in  this ; 
but  the  report  showed  that  no  objec- 
tion was  made  by  the  prisoner's  coun- 
sel at  the  time.  State  v.  Laxtou,  78 
N.  C.  5(54.  A  recent  case  in  Indi- 
ana strikingly  illustrates  the  extent  to 
which  the  discretionary  power  of  the 
court  in  this  regard  extends  in  the  ab- 
sence of  an  appearance  of  prejudice  in 
the  record.  On  the  trial  of  an  indict- 
ment for  an  assault  upon  a  deaf-mute, 
with  intent  to  commit  rape,  a  question 
was  propounded  through  an  interpre- 
ter to  the  prosecuting  witness  which 
shocked  her  modesty  to  such  an  ex- 
tent that  she  fled  precipitately  into  an 
adjoining  room.  She  Avas  there  fol- 
lowed by  another  deaf  aud  dumb 
woman,  whom  the  court  had  ap- 
pointed as  an  interpreter,  witlioutauy 
objection  fi-om  the  court  or  on  the 
part  of  the  prisoner.  In  the  seclusion 
of  that  room,  the  interpreting  witness 
succeeded  in  pacifying  her  aud  in  get- 
ting her  lo  answer  tlie  question.  In 
about  a  minute  they  returned  together 
into  the  court,  and  there,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  court,  the  jury,  the  witness 
and  defendant,  the  interpreting  wit- 
ness,   without    having    repeated    the 


question  to  the  witness,  communi- 
cated the  witness'  answer  thereto  to 
another  interpreter,  who  was  not  deaf 
aud  dumb,  wlio  gave  such  answer 
orally  to  the  court  aud  jury.  This  pro- 
ceeding was  vigorously  assailed  on 
appeal  by  the  prisoner's  counsel,  as 
beiug  intolerable  in  a  court  of  justice 
aud  a  palpable  violation  of  his  consti- 
tutioual  right  to  be  brought  face  to 
face  with  a  witness  testifying  against 
him.  The  Supreme  Court  nevertheless 
held  that  the  proceeding  was  not  fairly 
open  to  any  of  the  criticisms  or  objur- 
gations of  the  prisoner's  counsel. 
Howk,  C.  J.,  said:  "  In  some  particu- 
lars the  case  is  an  anomalous  one ;  for, 
to  the  credit  of  human  nature,  it  is  not 
often  that  a  man  is  cliarged  with  an 
attempt  even  to  gratify  his  passions 
upon  the  person  of  an  unfortunate 
woman,  forcibly  and  against  her  will, 
who  is  deprived  of  the  sense  of  hear- 
ing and  the  power  of  speech.  When 
the  case  occnrs,  however,  as  it  must 
be  sustained,  in  the  nature  of  things, 
by  tlie  woman's  evidence  in  relation  to 
the  offense  charged,  the  proceedings  to 
obtain  her  evidence  will  also  be  anom- 
alous to  some  extent.  If  it  be  conceded 
that  the  proceedings  of  which  appellant 
complains  were  irregular  or  even  er- 
roneous, there  is  nothing  in  the  record 
to  show  that  the  appellant  was  in  any 
manner  injured  thereby.  The  record 
fails  to  show  what  the  question  was 
which  shocked  the  modesty  of  the 
prosecuting  witness,  or  Avhat  was  her 
answer  thereto,  which  she  communi- 
cated to  Miss  Coons,  the  interpreting 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIV.]      COXTROL    OVER    EXAMIXATION. 


321 


§  357.  Leading-  Questions.  —  As  a  general  rule,  a  party  will 
not  be  allowed  to  put  leading  questions  to  his  own  witnesses,^ 
though  he  will  be  allowed  to  put  such  questions  to  the  witnesses 
of  his  adversary  on  cross-examination?  But  this  rule  is  one 
which  yields  to  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court, "^  which 
discretion  will  not  be  reviewed  on  error  or  appeal  except  in  cases 
of  manifest  abuse.*  In  some  jurisdictions  it  is  held  that  this 
discretion  is  unlimited,  and  that  the  exercise  of  it  is  not  subject 
to  revision,  even  upon  a  case  reserved.^  In  others,  e.g.^  in  New 
Hampshire,  the  propriety  of  admitting  or  excluding  a  leading 
question  is  deemed  a  matter  most  conveniently  and  satisfactorily 
determined  at  the  trial,  upon  personal  examination  of  the  wit- 
ness, and  in  view  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case.     At  the 


deaf-mute,  out  of  the  presence  of  the 
court  aud  jury.  lu  this  state  of  the 
record,  we  caunot  say  that  the  error 
uuder  consideration  was  raateiially,  or 
in  any  wise,  injurious  to  the  appel- 
hxut."  Skaggs  v.  State  (Ind.),  « 
West.  Rep.  261 ;  s.  c.  108  lud.  53. 

»  Klock  V.  State,  60  Wis.  574,  576. 
It  is  said  in  Pennsylvania  by  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Paxou:  '*  Wiiile  there  are  in- 
stances in  the  books  where  judgments 
have  been  reversed  for  the  refusal  to 
allow  leading  questions  where  the  par- 
ty was  entitled  to  them,  I  know  of  no 
reversal  in  Pennsylvania  for  allowing 
a  leading  question."  Farmers'  Mu- 
tual Fire  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Bair,  87  Pa.  St. 
12i,  128.  In  Texas,  the  rule  seems  to 
be  that  the  action  of  the  trial  court  in 
a  criminal  case,  in  permitting  a  leading 
question  to  be  put  by  the  State's  at- 
torney, may  be  assigned  for  error,  aud 
is  ground  of  reversing  a  conviction. 
Rangel  v.  State  (Te.x.),  3  S.  W.  Rep. 
788;  s.  c.  22  Tex.  App.  642;  Mathis  v. 
Buford,  17  Tex.  152;  Tinsley  v.  Carey, 
2G  Tex.  350;  Kennedy  v.  State,  19  Tex. 
App.  620.  Thus,  on  the  trial  of  an  in- 
dictment for  theft,  uuder  the  Texas 
statute,  while  a  witness  was  testifying. 


the  district  attorney  handed  him  a 
paper  purporting  to  be  a  certificate  of 
the  brand  of  the  company  whose  steer 
the  defendant  was  charged  with  steal- 
ing, a  representation  of  the  brand  be- 
ing therein  contained.  After  the  wit- 
ness had  examined  it,  the  district 
attorney,  for  the  purpose  of  ideutifying 
this  braud  with  the  one  on  the  stolen 
animal,  asked  the  witness,  '•  Is  this 
the  brand  that  was  on  the  animal 
killed?  '■  It  was  held  that  the  court 
erred  in  overruling  an  objection  to  this 
question  on  the  ground  that  it  was 
leading.  Rangel  v.  State  (Tex.),  3  S. 
W.  Rep.  788;  s.  c.  22  Tex.  App.  642. 

2  Phares  v.  Barber,  61  111.  272. 
Post,  §443  etseq. 

3  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  435. 

•»  Cade  V.  Hatcher,  72  Ga.  359; 
Farmers'  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bair, 
87  Pa.  St.  124;  Hopkinson  v.  Steel,  12 
Vt.  582;  Dounell  v.  Jones,  13  Ala.  490; 
Walker  v.  Duuspaugh,  20  N.  Y.  170; 
Addison  v.  State,  48  Ala.  478;  Lawson 
V.  Glass,  6  Colo.  134;  1  Greeul.  Ev., 
§435. 

5  State  V.  Lull,  37  Me.  246;  Parsous 
V.  Huff,  38  Me.  137;  Moody  v.  Rowell, 
17  Pick.  (Mass.)  498. 


21 


322 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr.» 


same  time  it  is  held  to  be  quite  proper  at  anytime,  and  certainly 
expedient  in  cases  of  doubt  and  difficulty,  for  the  presiding  judge 
to  reserve  the  question  of  discretion  for  the  revision  of  the  whole 
court;  but  when  it  is  not  reserved,  it  will  always  be  presumed 
that  the  discretion  has  been  properly  exercised.^ 


§  358.  [Coiitiiiiied.]  What  Questions  are  Leading  and 
wliat  not.  — A  leading  question  is  one  which  may  be  answered 
by  Yes  or  No,  or  which  suggests  the  desired  answer. ^  It  is  a 
question  which  puts  the  answer  into  the  mouth  of  the  witness.^ 
All  questions  put  to  a  witness,  which  assume  the  existence  of 
facts  material  to  the  issue  which  have  not  been  proved,  are  said 
to  fall  within  the  definition  of  leading  questions.*  But  a  ques- 
tion which  merely  directs  the  attention  of  the  witness  to  the  fact 
in   controversy,    about  which    his   testimony  is  desired,   is  not 


leading." 


1  Bundy  v.  Hyde,  50  N.  H.  116,  120; 
Severance  v.  Can;  43  N.  H.  65;  Steer 
V.  Little,  44  N.  H.  613;  Kendall  v. 
Browusou,  47  N.  H.  186. 

2  1  Whart.  Ev.  (2d  ed.),  §  499; 
Raugel  V.  State  (Tex.),  3  S.  W.  Eep. 
788:  s,  c.  22  Tex.  App.  642.  Accord- 
ingly, it  is  not  proper,  on  the  direct 
examination  of  a  witness  who  does 
not  need  the  aid  of  a  memorandum  to 
refresh  his  memory,  to  read  to  him  par- 
agraphs from  an  affidavit  made  by  him 
on  a  previous  occasion,  and  to  ask 
him  if  tho.^e  statements  are  true. 
This  is  in  effect  putting  in  evidence 
the  affidavit  of  the  witness  and  his 
declarations  made  previous  to  the 
trial,  in  place  of  his  direct  oral  state- 
ments to  the  ijury  on  his  present 
recollection  of  the  facts.  Hubbell  v. 
Bowe,  17  Jones  &  Sp.  (40  N.  Y.  Super.) 
131. 

3  Harvey  v.  Osboru,  55  Ind.  535, 
547. 

4  Klock  V.  state,  60  Wis.  574,  576; 
1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  434;   1  Stark.  Ev.  (9th 


ed.)  197;  Tiirney  v.  State,  8  Smed.  & 
M.  (Miss.)  104. 

^  Thus,  the  following  question  has 
been  held  not  leading :  "  Do  you  know 
anything  of  the  money  transactions 
between  the  same  parties?  If  so, 
state  their  nature  and  the  time,  as 
near  as  you  may  remember."  Harvey 
V.  Osboru,  55  Ind.  535,  547.  So,  the 
following  question  has  been  held  not 
leading:  "  State  what  you  may  know, 
if  anything,  of  the  purchase  of  land, 
by  your  brother  William,  from  Harvey 
or  Harvey's  wife,  shares  or  shares  of 
the  estate,  when  it  was,  and  what  land 
it  was,  and  what,  if  anything,  did 
Harvey  ever  say  to  you  on  the  sub- 
ject." Ibid.  So,  the  following  ques- 
tion lias  been  held  not  leading:  "  State 
what  you  may  know,  if  anything, 
about  any  indebtedness  by  Squire 
Harvey,  one  of  the  defendants  In  the 
case,  to  William  Osboru,  the  otlier  de- 
fendant." Ibid.  548.  So,  of  the  fol- 
lowing question:  '^' In  speaking  of  a 
balance  of  his  wiff  in  the  homestead. 


Tit,  III,  Cb.  XIV.]      CONTKOL    OVER    EXAMINATION.  323 

§  339.  [Continued.]  Whei-e  the  Witness  is  manifestly 
Hostile  to  the  Party  calling  him.  — The  discretion  of  the  trial 
court  is  well  exercised  in  allowing  leading  questions  to  be  put, 
where  it  appears,  from  the  previous  answers  or  conduct  of  the 
witness,  that  he  is  an  unwilling  ivitness,^  or  manifestly  hostile  to 
the  party  calling  him.-' 

§  360.  [Continued.]  Other  Circumstances  where  al- 
lowed. —  An  exception  to  the  rule  which  disallows  leading  ques- 
tions to  one's  own  witness,  is  that  such  questions  may  be  put 
for  the  purpose  of  introducing  matter  or  leading  or  directing  the 
attention  of  the  witness  to  the  subject  upon  which  his  testimony 
is  desired.^  So,  a  party  may  put  leading  questions  to  his  own 
witness  where  an  omission  in  the  testimony  of  the  witness  is  evi- 
dently caused  by  a  failure  of  recollection,  which  a  suggestion  may 
assist.'*  So,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  witness  is  called 
to  contradict  a  former  witness,  who  has  stated  that  certain  ex- 
pressions were  used,  the  proper  practice  is  to  ask  whether  such 
expressions  were  used,  without  putting  the  question  in  the  gen- 
eral form  of  inquiring  what  was  said.^  In  general,  it  is  not 
within  the  inhibition  of  the  rule  against  leading  questions,  to  ask 
a  witness  questions  calling  for  an  affirmative  or  negative  answer, 
which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  could  not  well  be  put  in  any 
other  way.  "  Some  discretion,"  says  Campbell,  C.  J.,  "  must 
be  used  on  the  subject,  and  every  nicety  is  not  conducive  to  either 
convenience  or  justice."^     According  to  a  learned  and  accurate 

was  reference   had  to  a   share  pur-  -  Williams  v.     Jarrot,    (]  111.    120; 

chased  by  William  Osborn  of  the  wife  McBride  v.  Wallace  (Mich.),  2'J  N.  AV. 

of  Harvey,  as  child  aud  heir  at  law  of  Rep.  75;   Klock  v.  State,  60  Wis.  574, 

James  D.   Osboru,   or  was    it  some  576. 

other    and    different    claim?  "     This  ^  Williams  v.  Jarrot,  6  111.  120. 

question    naturally   arose    from    the  ^  Shultz  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  390; 

Avituess'  answer.to  a  preceding  ques-  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §§  434,  435. 
:ion,and  was  therefore  held  not  lead-  ^  Farmers'  IMutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 

mg.     Ibid.  Bair,  87  Pa.  St.   124;  explaining  Sus- 

1  Hopiiinson  u.    Steel,  12  Vt.    582;  quehanna  Coal  Co.  ?;.  Quick,  61  Pa.  St. 

Bradshaw    v.   Combs,    102    111.    429;  328. 

Baker?;.  State  (Wis.),  33  N.  W.  Rep.  ^  jjcKeown   v.    Harvey,    40    Mich. 

52 ;    s.  c.  69  Wis.  32.  226. 


324 


EXA.MINATION    OF    WITXESSES.        [1   TllOIlip.  Tr., 


writer,  "  the  judge  may,  ia  his  discretion,  allow  leading  ques- 
tions to  be  put,  on  direct  or  re-direct  examination,  where  the 
witness  is  hostile  or  reluctant,  or  is  in  the  interest  of  the  other 
party,  or  so  youthful,  ignorant,  or  intirm  as  to  require  the  atten- 
tion to  be  led  ;  or  where  his  memory  has  been  exhausted  without 
stating  some  particular,  such  as  a  name,  which  cannot  be  signifi- 
cantly pointed  out  by  a  general  inquiry."  ^ 

§  361.   Effect    of  Admissions  upon  Offers  of  Evidence.  — 

On  principles  already  stated,^  stipulations  made  between  counsel 
in  court,^  dispensing  with  witnesses  or  with  evidence,  will  be  en- 
forced by  the  court,  at  least  when  in  writing,^  or  when  acted  on 
by  one  of  the  parties,^  or  even  where,  though  not  in  writing,^  it 
would  work  a  fraud  to  allow  them  to  be  disregarded.^  Nor  will 
such  stipulations  be  set  aside  on  the  ground  of  mistake,  where 
the  evidence  touching  the  mistake  is  conflicting  and  doubtful;  ** 


1  Abb.  Tr.  Brief,  9(3 ;  citing  14  Abb. 
N,  C.  (N.  Y.)  470,  note;  Moody  v. 
RoTvell,  17  Pick.  490,  498;  Metropoli- 
tan Bank  v.  Hale,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.),  341 ; 
Cheney  v.  Arnold,  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
434  (witness  old  and  blind) ;  Strat- 
ford V.  Sandford,  9  Conn.  274,  284; 
Snyder  v.  Snyder,  50  lud.  492. 

2  Ante,  §  193. 

3  Not  enforced  when  made  out  of 
and  not  entered  of  record,  though 
made  pending  the  trial.  Commercial 
Bank   v.  Clark,  28   Vt.    325. 

4  See,  as  to  the  necessity  of  stipu- 
lations being  in  writing,  ante,  §  200; 
also  Huff  V.  State,  29  Ga.  424. 

5  Johnson  v.  Wright,  19  Ga.  509. 

6  Henderson  v.  Merritt,  38  Ga. 
232. 

'  Heilner  v.  Battin,  27  Pa.  St.  517. 
See  as  to  various  stipulations  touch- 
ing evidence, — their  validity  and  in- 
terpretation,—  Sidener  v.  Essex,  22 
Ind.  201;  Shields  v.  Guffey,  9  Iowa, 
322;  Curl  v.  Watson,  25  Iowa,  35; 
Bryan  v.  Coursey,  3  Md.  (31 ;  Booth  v. 
Hall,     6     Md.     1     (interpretation     of 


an  agreement  waiving  errors  in 
pleading) ;  Farmers'  Bank  v,  Sprigg, 
11  Md.  389  (effect  of  agreement 
that  judgment  shall  be  entered  for 
the  plaintiff,  as  evidence  on  a  fu- 
ture trial)  ;  State  v.  Norwood,  12  Md. 
177  (waiving  formality  of  pleading)  ; 
Boardniau  v.  Kibbe,  10  Cush.  (Mass.) 
545  (waiving  proof  of  execution  of 
papers) ;  White  v.  Harlow,  5  Gray 
(Mass.),  563;  Leonard  v.  White,  5 
Allen  (Mass.),  177  (agreement  to  de- 
feud  on  a  particular  ground  only) ; 
Bingham  v.  Supervisors,  8  Minn.  441 
(restricting  the  evidence  to  a  particu- 
lar question) ;  Seawell  v.  Cohn,  2  Nev. 
308  (to  enter  judgment  and  stay  of 
execution)  ;  Neil  v.  Tarin,  9  Tex.  256 
(tiual  determination  of  controversy)  ; 
Uuis  V.  Cliarlton,  12  Graft.  (Va.)  484 
(evidence  taken  in  one  of  several  cases 
to  be  read  in  all)  ;  Douglass  v.  Rogers, 
4  Wis.  304  (that  certain  depositions  be 
admitted,  reserving  objections  to  mat- 
ters of  substance  only) . 

8  Charles  v.  Miller,  36  Ala.  141  (affi- 
davit against  affidavit). 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XI v.]      CONTROL    OVER    EXAMINATION.  325 

or  where  entered  into  by  one  party  under  a  mistaken  belief  touch- 
ing a  fact  which  did  not  change  the  legal  rights  of  the  parties;  ^ 
or  because  of  newly  discovered  evidence?  Agreements  touching 
instruments  of  evidence,  when  not  otherwise  confined  in  their 
meaning,  are  applicable  to  any  future  trial  of  the  cause. ^  A 
frequent  stipulation,  entered  into  to  avoid  a  continuance,  relates 
to  what  an  absent  witness  would  testify  to,  if  present,  .  On  plain 
grounds,  this  does  not  preclude  objections  to  the  reading  of  any 
portion  of  the  admission,  founded  on  reasons  which  would  have 
been  good  against  the  like  testimony  of  the  witness,  if  person- 
ally present ;  *  nor  prevent  the  State  from  showing  that  the 
absent  witness  has  made  contradictory  statements.^  There  are 
statutes  which  enable  the  State's  attorney  to  avoid  a  continu- 
ance by  admitting  that  an  absent  witness  of  the  accused  would, 
if  present,  swear  to  the  facts  which  the  accused,  in  his  affidavit 
for  a  continuance,  states  that  he  expects  to  prove  by  him ;  in 
which  case  the  affidavit  and  the  admission  are  read  to  the  jury 
in  the  place  of  the  testimony  of  the  absent  witness.  It  is  ob- 
vious that  the  statements  thus  read  to  them  will  not  have  the 
same  realistic  effect  on  their  minds  as  would  the  testimony  of  the 
witness  delivered  in  their  presence ;  and  on  this  ground  doubts  have 
been  felt  as  to  whether  such  a  statute  does  not  violate  the  consti- 
tutional rights  of  the  accused.^  On  a  similar  view,  it  has  been 
reasoned  in  civil  cases,  that  the  admission  of  a  fact  by  the  oppos- 
ing counsel  will  not  necessarily  preclude  the  party  from  proving 
it ;  ^  since  "  it  would  be  absurd  to  hold  that  any  party  by  his  bald 
admissions  on  a  trial,  could  shut  out  legal  evidence.^  But  this 
reasoning  seems  to  go  too  far.  Carried  to  its  logical  extent,  it 
would  destroy  the    conclusive    effect  of  the  admissions   in   the 

J  Chapman  v.  Coates,  2r,  Iowa,  288.  v.  Hatfield,  72  Mo.  518;  State  v.  Jen- 

2  Fraukliu   v.  National  Ins.  Co.,  4M  nings,  81  Mo.  585;  State  v.  Heuson,  81 
Mo.  401.  Mo.  384. 

3  Central  &c.  Coi'p.  v.  Lowell,    15  ''  State  v.  Underwood,    75  Mo.  230, 
Gray  (Mass.),  IOC;  Carroll  v.  Panl,  19  234. 

Mo.  102.  '  Hancock   ^Mnt.    Life    Ins.    Co.  v. 

•*  Scaggs  V.  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.,  10  Moore,  34  Mich.  41, 
Md.  268.  8  Kimball  &c.  Man,  Co.  v.  Vroraan, 

5  State  V.  Miller,  fi7  Mo.  G04;  State  35  Mich.  310. 


326  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOUip.  Tr., 

pleadings.  The  better  view  is  that  a  formal  admission  of  a  fact 
precludes,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  the  offer  of  any  further 
evidence  of  such  fact,^  unless  the  admission  is  not  co-extensive 
with  the  offer  ;  ^  though  it  will  not  be  error  to  admit  it.^ 

1  Dorr  V.  Tremont  Bank,  128  Mass,      Groton,  103  Mass.  540;  Brown  v.  Per- 
349;   Ainsworth  v.  Hutchius,   62  Vt.      kins,  1  Alleu  (Mass.),  89,  96. 

554;  Butterworth  v.  Pecare,   8   Bosw.  ^  Hancock  Mut.    Life  Ins.   Co,   v. 

(N.  Y.)  671.  Moore,  34  Midi.  41;  Bannister  v.  Al- 

2  Abb.  Tr.  Brief,  45;  citing  Priest  u.      derman,  111  Mass.  261. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cli.  XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF   DIRECT   EXAMINATION.  327 


CHAPTER     XV. 

INCIDENTS  OF  THE  DIRECT  EXAMINATION. 

Section 

364.  Examinatiou  ou  the  voir  dire. 

365.  Of  the  Oath  or  Affirmatiou. 

366.  Of  Sworn  luterpreters. 

367.  Examination  of  Deaf  and  Dumb  Witnesses. 

368.  Introductory  Statements. 

369.  Assuming  Material  Facts  in  Issue. 

370.  Detailing  Collateral  Facts  to  assist  Recollection. 

371.  [Illustration.]     Marking  the  Boundaries  of  Parishes  in  Loudon. 

372.  Evidence  of  Undisputed  Date  to  fix  Disputed  Date. 

373.  Reason  for  Remembering. 

374.  Questions  as -to  Contemporaneous  Circumstances. 

375.  Eight  to  Contradict  a  Fact  from  which  a  Witness  infers  another  Fact. 

376.  Strength  of  Recollection  —  "  Impressions  "  of  the  Witness. 

377.  Witness  must  state  Facts,  not  Conclusions. 

378.  [Continued.]     Further  Illustrations. 

379.  Appearances. 

380.  Opinions  as  to  Value. 

381.  Opinion  of  the  Plaintiff  as  to  his  own  Damages. 

382.  Questions  Depending  on  the  Experience  of  Witnesses. 

383.  Testimony  as  to  Intent,  Belief  or  Motive. 

384.  Rule  where  the  Concuri-ence  of  Intent  of  two  Parties  is  Material. 

385.  Fullness  of  Witness'  Statements. 

386.  Sufficient  that  the  Evidence  tends  to  Prove. 

387.  Substance  of  Conversation  or  Admission. 

388.  Rule  where  the  Wituess  remembers  a  Part  only  of  the  Convei'sation. 

389.  Source  of  Information  or  Belief  must  be  given. 

390.  Compound  Questions  when  not  Admissible. 

391.  Negative  Testimony  when  too  remote. 

392.  Putting  the  Testimouy  of  two  Witnesses  together. 

393.  Rule  as  to  the  Declarations  of  Conspirators. 

§  364.  Examination  on  the  Voir  Dire.  —  "Where  the  witness 
is  objected  to  on  the  ground  of  incompetency,  what  is  called  his 
examination  on  the  voir  dire  precedes,  in  strict  j^ractice,  his  ex- 
amination as  a  witness.^     But  this  strictness  does  not  obtain  in 

^  Dewdney  v.  Palmer,  4  Mees.  &  W.  664. 


328  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

modern  practice;  and,  where  the  objection  is  grounded  on  inter- 
est, it  is  now  entirely  a  matter  of  discretion  with  the  court 
whether  the  preliminary  oath  as  to  interest,  or  the  oath  in 
chief  shall  be  admhiistered;  and  it  has  been  said  that  the  bet- 
ter practice  is  to  swear  the  witness  in  chief,  and  to  bring  out  the 
facts  showing  his  interest,  either  by  direct  or  by  cross-exam- 
ination.^ Under  the  former  practice,  the  examination  on  the 
voir  dire  related  only  to  the  question  of  the  interest  of  the  wit- 
ness in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit;  ^  but  the  term  is  now  gen- 
erally employed  to  designate  the  preliminary  examination  of  the 
witness  touching  any  other  ground  of  qualification  as  to  which  he 
may  be  interrogated. "^  He  is  first  sworn  to  make  true  answers 
to  such  questions  as  shall  be  put  to  him  touching  his  competency 
as  a  witness.  He  is  then  examined  in  chief  by  the  objecting 
party,  after  which  the  party  calling  him  has  the  right  of  cross- 
examination.^  The  question  of  his  competency  is  decided  by 
the  court,  and  not  by  the  jury.^  Where,  under  the  old  system, 
the  witness  was  objected  to  on  the  ground  of  interest,  two 
methods  of  proving  him  incompetent  were  open  to  the  ob- 
jecting party:  1.  By  examining  him  on  his  voir  dire.  2, 
By  the  introduction  of  independent  evidence.  The  resort  to 
one  method  was  in  general  a  waiver  of  the  other.®  The  rule 
that  the  contents  of  a  written  instrument  cannot  be  proved  by 
parol  where  the  instrument  itself  can  be  produced,  does  not  ap- 

1  Seeley  u.  Engel,  17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  Morningstar,    18    Oh.    St    579;    City 
530.  Council  v.  Haywood,  2  Nott  &  McC. 

2  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  424.  (S.  C.)  308. 

3  Rapalje  on  Witnesses,  §  232.  <>  Butler  v.  Butler,  3  Day   (Conn.), 

4  Beach   v.    Covillaud,   2   Cal.  237;  214;  The  Watchman,  1  Ware  (U.  S.), 
Succession  of  AVeigel,  18  La.  Aun.  49.  232;    AVaughop  v.  Weeks,  22  III.  350; 

^  Ante,  §  323,  ct   seq.;  Reynolds  v.  Diversy  v.  Will,  28  111.  216;  "Walker  v. 

Lounsbury,  6  Hill  (N.  Y.),  534;  Chou-  Collier,  37  111.  3G2;  Weldea  v.   Buck, 

teau   V.    Searcy,   8   Mo.    733;    Cook  t).  Anthon.  (N.  Y.)  15;  Mifflinv.  Bingham, 

Mix,  11  Coun.  432;  Amory  v.  Fellows,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.)  294;  Mallet  v.  Mallet,  1 

5  Mass.  219,  229;  Tucker  v.  Welsh,  17  Root  (Conu.),  501;  McAllister  v.  W^ill- 

Id.   ICO;    Dole  v.   Thurlow,   12  Mete,  iams,     1     Teun.     (Overt.)     107,    119; 

(Mass.)     157;     Commercial    Bank    v.  Bridge  v.   Wellington,    1   Mass.   219; 

Hughes,  17  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  94;  Stall  v.  Chance  v.  Hine,  G  Conu,  231. 
Catskill  Bank,  18  Id.  iCC;    Rohrer  u. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  329 

ply  to  the  examination  of  a  witness  on  a  voir  dire;  since  the 
examining  party  cannot  be  supposed  to  know  beforehand  what 
the  witness  Avill  state,  or  what  papers  affecting  his  competency 
are  in  existence.^ 

§  365.  Of  the  Oath  or  AiHrniation. —  It  is  the  duty  of  the  par- 
ty caHing  the  witness  to  see  that  he  is  sworn ;  '^  though  if  the 
oath  is  inadvertently  omitted,  the  objection  will  not  be  good  after 
verdict.^  The  objection  must  be  made  as  soon  as  it  is  discovered, 
or  it  will  be  deemed  waived.*  The  oath,  as  we  have  inherited  it 
from  England,  is  generally  administered  by  handing  to  the  wit- 
ness a  copy  of  the  New  Testament^  on  the  external  cover  of  which 
is  imprinted  a  cross.  The  clerk  of  the  court,  at  the  same  time  re- 
taining hold  of  the  book,  recites  an  oath  like  the  followins; :  "You 
do  solemnly  swear,  on  the  holy  Evangelists  of  Almighty  God, 
that  the  evidence  you  shall  give  in  the  cause  now  in  hearing, 
wherein  A.  B.  is  plaintiff  and  C.  D.  is  defendant  (or  otherwise 
describing  the  parties,  or  omitting  the  description  altogether), 
shall  be  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth  :  so 
help  you  God."  The  witness  nods  assent  and  kisses  the  book. 
In  many  American  jurisdictions  this  form  of  administering  the 
oath  is  changed,  and  in  its  place  is  substituted  an  oath  adminis- 
tered by  the  upJifted  ImndJ'  The  clerk  of  the  court  rises  and 
holds  up  his  right  hand,  and  so  does  the  witness.  The  clerk  then 
recites  an  oath  like  the  following:  "You  solemnly  swear  that 
the  evidence  you  shall  give  in  the  cause  now  in  hearing  shall  be 
the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth ;  so  help  you 
God."  The  witness  bows,  or  adds  the  words  "  I  do."  In  the 
case  of  nou-christiaus,  the  judge  will  substitute  an  oath  which 
conforms  to  the  custom  of  the  witness'  country  or  to  his  religious 

1  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §95;  Hernclon  v.  (Mass.)  236;  Sells  ?;.  Hoare,  7  J.  B. 
Giveus,  16  Ala.  261.  Moore,  36:  s.  c.  3  Brod.  &  Bing.  232. 

2  Rap.  Wit.,  §  235;  Davis  v.  Melviu,  *  Slauter  v.  Whitelock,  12  lud.  338. 
1  lud.  130;  White  Water  Valley  Canal  5  xhat  such  au  oath  is  good  see 
Co.  w.  Dow,  Id.Ul;  Hawlis  V.  Baker,  Gill  v.  Cakhvell,  1  111.  (Breese)  28; 
6  Me.  72.  Doss  v.  Birks,  11  Huiiiph.  (Teun.)  431; 

8  Nesbit    V.   Dallam,    7    Gill   &  J.      McKiuuey  v.  People,  7  111.  540. 
(Md.)  494;  Cady  v.  Norton,  14  Pick. 


330  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  TllOmp.  Tl"., 

belief  or  scruples ;  ^  or  where  he  is  conscientiously  opposed  to  tak- 
insr  an  oath,  he  will  allow  the  clerk  to  administer  to  him  an  affir- 
mation,^  which  may  run  thus:  "  You  do  solemnly,  sincerely,  and 
truly  declare  and  affirm,"  etc."^  Thus,  Jews  may  be  sworn  on  the 
Pentateuch  with  covered  head,*  Gentoos,  by  touching  the  feet  of 
a  Brahmin;^  Chinese,  by  the  ceremony  of  killing  a  cock,  or 
breaking  a  saucer;  ®a  member  of  the  Scottish  Kirk,  by  holding  up 
the  hand  without  kissing  the  book ;  ^  a  Methodist  on  the 
Old  Testament,  if  he  prefers;  ^  Quakers  and  others  of  like 
scruples,  by  taking  a  solemn  asseveration  that  their  testimony 
shall  be  true;  ^  and  in  whatever  way  the  oath  is  administered,  if 
the  witness  knowingly  testifies  falsely,  he  will  be  guilty  of  per- 
jury.^°  The  fact  that  the  oath  is  more  comprehensive  than  the 
statute  requires  does  not,  of  course,  affect  its  validity. ^^  The 
meaning  of  the  clause  in  the  oath,  "  to  tell  the  whole  truth,"  is 
that  the  witness  obligates  himself  to  tell  so  much  of  the  truth  as 
may  be  competent  evidence  and  as  may  not  criminate  himself. ^"^ 
An  oath  administered  to  the  witness  suffices  for  the  whole  trial. ^^ 
Although  the  witness  is  sworn  before  arraignment  in  a  criminal 
case,  but  after  the  prisoner  has  announced  his  readiness  to  pro- 

^  By  the  principles  of  tlie  commou  ^  Ibid. 

law,   no    particular  form   of   oath  is  *>  Ibid. 

necessary,  so  that  it   binds   his  con-  '  Miklrone's    Case,    1  Leach  C.  C. 

science.    Atcheson  v.  Everitt,  Cowp.  459. 

389;  Rex  v.  Gilham,  1  Esp.  285;  s.  c.  «  Edmonds    v.    Rowe,   Ryl.    &    M. 

6  T.  R.  265 ;  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  77. 

&  B.  284.  ^  United  States  v.  Coolidge,  2  Gal. 

2  See  United  States  v.  Coolidge,  (U.  S.)  3(;4;  Stat.  9  Geo.  4,  ch.  32;  3& 
2  Gall.  (U.  S.)  364;  ante,  §  188.  If  tlie  4  Will.  4,  ch.  49;  Id.,  ch.  82;  Reg.  v. 
witness  does  not  object  to  be  sworn  he  Doran,  Lewin  C.  C.  27;  Stat.  1  &  2 
cannot  be  allowed  to  affirm.  Will-  Vict.,  ch.  77;  and  many  American 
iamson  v.  Carroll,  16  N.  Y.  217.  statutes. 

3  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  847.  Or,  »  Sells  v.  Iloare,  3  Brod.  &  B.  232. 
"  I  solemnly  promise  and  declare  that  See  further  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  371;  Rap. 
the  evidence  given  by  me  to  the  court  Wit.,  §  235,  and  cases  cited. 

shall  be  tlie  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  "  Ballance  v.  Underhill,  4  111.  453. 

nothing  but  the  truth."     Stat.  32  &  33  '^  ijap.  Wit.,  §  235,  citing   Com.  v. 

Vict.  ch.  68,  §  4.     For  an  earlier  form,  Reld,  1  Leg.  Gaz.  Rep.  (Pa.)  182. 
see  Stat.  17  &  18  Vict.,  cii.  125,  §  20.  ^^  Bullock  «.  Coon,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 

4  Ormychund  «.   Barker,    1  Atk.  21,  30. 
40,  42;s.  c.  Wides,  543. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION. 


331 


ceed  with  the  trial,  it  is  unnecessary  to  reswear  him.^  AYhere 
the  witness  is  competent  in  chief  he  must  be  sworn  generally,  al- 
though his  examination  is  confined  to  a  particular  fact."^ 

§  366.  Of  Sworn  Interpreters.  —  Where  the  witness  does 
not  understand  the  English  language,  the  court  may  swear  an  in- 
terpreter to  translate  his  answers.'^  This  is  generally  provided 
for  by  statute;  but  where  there  is  no  statute,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed on  appeal,  in  the  absence  of  a  contrary  showing  in  the 
record,  that  the  parties  agreed  upon  the  appointment  of  an  in- 
terpreter.* "  The  interpreter,"  says  Mr.  Rapalje,  "  is  sioorn 
truly  to  interpret  between  the  court,  the  jury  and  the  witness; 
the  oath  is  then  administered  to  the  witness  in  English,  and  in- 
terpreted to  him  by  the  sworn  interpreter,  as  it  is  pronounced 
by  the  clerk."  ^  He  should  be  instructed  to  interpret  and  report 
every  statement  made  by  the  witness. ^  He  may,  it  has  been 
ruled,  take  advantao;e  of  the  suo-crestions  of  others  who  are  not 
sworn,  with  regard  to  the  proper  interpretation  of  the  testimony, 
stating  the  result  to  the  court  as  his  own  interpretation.^  Of 
course,  a  party  is  not  bound  by  the  interpretation,  but  may  show 
that  the  interpreter  has  given  an  erroneous  translation  of  a  word 
or  phrase.^ 

1  State  V.  Weber,  22  Mo.  3*1.  ^  Leetchr.  Atlantic  Mutual  lus.  Co., 

2  Jackson   v.  Parkhurst,   4   Wend.      4  Daly  (N.  Y.),  518. 

(N.  Y.)  3(i9.     A  civil  action  for  dam-  ^  Rap.  Wit.,  §  230;  Norberg'sCase, 

ages  will  not  lie  against  a  witness  who  4  Mass.  81. 

swears    falsely.      Amey    v.    Long,    9  ''  People  u.  Wong  Ah  Bang  (Cal.),  3 

East.   473;  s.   c.    6   Esp.    UG;  s.    c.   1  West.  Coast  Kep.  58. 

Camp.  16;  Collins  v.  Cave,  9  Jur.  (n.  '  United  States  v.  Gibert,  2  Sumn. 

s.)  297;  s.  c.  4   Hurl.  &  N.  225;  28  L.  (U.  S.)    19.     Mr.  Rapalje  regards  this 

J.  (Exch.)  204.  as  a  dangerous  doctrine.     Rap.  Wit., 

3  See  Norberg's  Case,  4  Mass.  81;  §  23G. 

Amory  u.  Fellows,  5   Mass.  219,  22G;  *  Schuier  v.    People,  23  111.17.     A 

Rap.  Wit.,  §  23G.     Where  the  witness  witness    may    translate    to    the  jury 

is  at  the  moment  physically  incapable  documents  written  by  himself  in  a  for- 

of  speaking  aloud,  his  testimony  may  eign  language,  without  being   sworn 

be  reported  by  some  suitable  person  as  an  interpreter.     Kuhlman  v.  Med- 

appoiuted  by  the     court.     Conner    v.  liuka,  29  Tex.  385. 
State,  25  Ga.  515. 


332 


EXAMINATIOX    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tl'. 


§  367.  Examination  of  Deaf  and  Dumb  Witnesses.  —  A  deaf 
and  dumb  witness  is  examined  by  a  sworn  interpreter,  upon  prin- 
ciples similar  to  those  which  govern  the  examination  of  witnesses 
who  cannot  understand  and  speak  the  language  in  which  the  trial 
is  conducted.  It  has  been  held  that  such  an  interpreter  need  not 
be  an  adept  in  the  sign  language  used  by  deaf  and  dumb  persons, 
but  that  it  is  sufficient  if  he  understands  the  lansuajje  so  as  to  be 
able  to  interpret,  as  well  the  questions  that  might  be  propounded 
to  the  deaf  and  dumb  witness  as  the  answers  thereto.^  It  should 
be  added  that  in  this,  as  in  other  cases,  where  an  interpreter  is 
employed,  the  accuracy  of  the  interpretation  may  be  impeached 
and  is  ultimately  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.^  If  he  can  write 
sufficiently  well,  he  may  be  required  to  give  his  testimony  in  that 
way ;  ^  but  he  may  be  allowed  to  communicate  by  signs,  although 
he  can  write  imperfectly.^ 

§  368.  Introductory  Statements.— It  is  usual  at  the  outset 
to  ask  a  witness  such  questions   concerning  himself  as  are  suffi- 


1  Skaggs  V.  State  (lud.),  (i  West 
Rep.  2(31;  s.  c.  108  Iiid,  53. 

2  Ibid.  As  to  this  general  principle 
see  Wliart.  Crim.  Ev.,  §449;  United 
States  V.  Gibert,  2  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  19; 
Schnier  v.  People,  23  111.  17.  As  to 
the  competency  of  such  witnesses,  see 
Rap.  Wit.,  §  6;  Ruston's  Case,  1  Leach 
C.  C.  458;  Snyder  v.  Nations,  5  Blaclif. 
(Ind.)  295. 

^  Morrison  v.  Lennard,  3  Car.  &  P. 
127. 

•4  State  V.  De  Wolf,  8  Conn.  93; 
Com.  V.  Hill,  14  Mass.  207;  Snyder  v. 
Nations,  supra.  In  a  trial  in  Indiana 
for  assaulting  a  deaf  and  dumb  woman 
with  intent  to  ravish  her,  an  interpre- 
ter was  appointed  to  put  the  questions 
to  and  interpret  the  answers  of  the 
prosecuting  witness.  The  court  ap- 
pointed another  deaf  and  dumb  woman 
to  assist  in  the  interpretation.  It  was 
held  that  there  was  no  error  in  so  do- 
ing.    Howk,  C.  J.,  said:  "The  object 


of  the  examination  of  the  prosecuting 
witness  was  to  get  the  facts  of  the 
case  within  her  personal  knowledge, 
before  the  court  and  jury;  and  the 
court  had  the  power  undoubtedly  to 
appoint  as  many  interpreters  as  to  it 
seemed 'necessary  to  the  accomplish- 
ment of  that  object.  The  manner  in 
which  such  an  examination  could  be 
coudncted  was  a  matter  to  ])e  regulated 
and  controlled  by  the  trial  court,  in  its 
discretion,  and  will  not  be  reviewed  by 
this  court,  in  the  absence  of  a  showing 
that  appellant  was  in  some  way  in- 
jured thereby."  Skaggs  v.  State 
(Ind.),  6  West.  Rep.  261;  s.  c.  108 
Ind.  53.  As  to  the  admissibility  of 
declarations,  communicated  by  signs, 
of  a  deaf  and  dumb  female,  alleged  to 
have  been  ravished,  see  People  v.  Mc- 
Gee,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  19,  24;  Reg.  v. 
Guttridge,  9  Car.  &  P.  471;  Reg.  v. 
Megson,  Id.  420. 


Tit.   Ill,   Ch.   XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  333 

cient  to  inform  the  jury  who  he  is ;  and  the  examination  usually 
begins  by  asking  him  his  name.  But  this  question  may  be  put 
to  him  by  the  clerk  of  the  court  at  the  time  when  he  is  called 
and  sworn,  in  which  case  it  will  not  be  a  good  assignment  of 
error  that  the  name  of  the  witness  was  not  proved.^  So,  a  wit- 
ness may  be  permitted  to  state  that  he  is  a  public  officer  without 
producing  his  commission.''^  A  witness  may  be  permitted  to  tell 
in  his  oivn  language  what  may  be  necessary  to  tell  by  way  of 
introduction.,  to  make  his  narrative  intelligible,  provided  his 
statements  are  propi^-rly  restricted,  or  he  reaches  the  material 
facts  of  his  testimony, —  that  is,  those  portions  that  bear  upon 
the  issues  involved  in  the  case  about  which  he  is  called  to 
testify. 3 

§  369.  Assuming  3Iaterial  Facts  in  Issue. —  It  is  said  by  an 
able  judge:  "  The  rules  of  law  which  govern  in  the  examination 
of  witnesses  as  effectually  prohibit  counsel  from  assuming,  in 
their  questions,  any  facts  which  are  material  to  the  point  of  the  in- 
quiry, but  which  are  to  be  ultimately  found  by  the  jury,  as  other 
rules  of  law  forbid  the  presiding  judge  from  assuming  such  facts 
in  his  instructions  to  the  jury.  In  the  former  case,  the  reason 
of  such  rules  does  not  rest  merely  upon  the  consideration  that 
such  assumption  of  facts  might  mislead  the  witnesses,  but  upon 
tke  liability  of  such  assumption  or  assertion  of  facts  by  counsel 
becoming  a  substitute  in  the  minds  of  the  jurors  for  evidence, 
and  thus  calculated  to  mislead  them.  In  the  latter  case  the 
reason  is  the  same,  with  the  further  reason  that  the  assumption 
by  the  court,  in  its  instructions  to  the  jury,  of  material  facts  to  be 
found  by  them,  is  regarded  as  an  invasion  by  the  court  of  the 
peculiar  province  of  the  ]\\vy.  The  rules  in  the  former  case  are 
so  rigidly  maintained  that  they  will  not  permit  counsel,  even 
upon  cross-examination  and  when  leading  questions  may  be  put, 
to  assume  any  material  facts  in  issue  and  wdiich  are  to  be  found 
by  the   jury,  or   to  assume  that   particular  answers  have  been 

1  People  V.  Winters,  49  Cal.  383.  ^  Shultz  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  390, 

2  Moody  V.  Keener,  7  Port.    (Ala.)      392. 

•-'18. 


334  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr. 

given  contrary  to  the  fact."  ^  Such  a  practice  has  also  been  re- 
garded as  subject  to  the  objection  that  it  tends  to  lead  the  wit- 
ness; and  where  it  was  resorted  to  by  the  State's  counsel  in  a 
criminal  case,  against  the  objection  of  the  defendant,  it  was  held 
that  the  ruling  might  be  assigned  for  error. ^  Accordingly,  coun- 
sel have  no  right  to  put  a  question  to  a  witness  which  assumes 
that  the  witness  has  said  something  which  he  denies  having  said.^ 
But  it  is  no  objection  to  a  question  that  it  assumes  facts  which  are 
not  disputed;  *  nor  as  hereafter  seen,  that  the  question  is  hypothet- 
ically  framed,  when  designed  to  elicit  the  opinion  of  an  expert 
witness.^  Nor  is  it  always  available  error  that  introductory  ques- 
tions, designed  to  draw  the  mind  of  the  witness  to  the  scene  or 
fact  of  the  controversy,  are  put  in  such  a  manner  as  to  assume 
the  existence  of  a  fact.  Thus,  in  a  criminal  trial  it  was  held  that 
a  witness  might  bo  asked  whether  "he  had  examined  the  place 
designated  by  H.  as  the  place  where  he  was  shot," — the  object 
being  merely  to  introduce  further  questions.^ 

§   370.   Detailing  Collateral  Facts  to  Assist  Recollection. — 

The  rule  under  this  head  is  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  wit- 
ness should  have  a  positive  or  full  recollection  of  the  facts  to 
which  he  testifies,  or  that  he  should  speak  with  such  certainty  as 
to  exclude  all  doubt  in  his  mind.^  "  He  may,"  says  Willie,  C. 
J.,  "  detail  circumstances  which  satisfy  his  mind  of  the  existence 
of  the  fact,  and  they  should  go  to  the  jury,  so  that  they  may 
draw  from  them  such  conclusion  as  they  may  deem  just  and  rea- 
sonable. If  the  deduction  drawn  by  the  witness  from  these 
circumstances  is  unwarrantable,  then  the  evidence  may  be  ex- 
cluded;  but  if  they  may  or  may  not,  under   the   facts,  warrant 

'  Haish    V.    Mimday,     12     Bradw.  court  cite  Tuniey    v.  State,  8  Smed. 

(111.)  539,  545,  opinion  by  McAllister,  &  M.  (Miss.)  104, 120;  Guuter  v.  Wat- 

J. ;  citing  People  v.    Mather,  4  Wend.  sou,  4  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  455. 
(N.  Y.)229,   249;  People  V.    Graham,  3  gauderlin  ?;.  Sanderlin,  24  Ga.  583. 

21  Cal.  261;  Carpenters.   Ambrosau,  *  Willey  w.   Portsmouth,   35  N.  H. 

20  111.  170;  Baltimore  &c.  R.   Co.  v.  303. 
Thompson,  10  Md.  70;   1  Greenl.  Ev.,  ■'  Ibid.,  post,  ch.  22. 

§  434.  "  Magee  v.  State,  32  Ala.  5 

2  Klocku.  State    GO  Wis.  574.     The  '    1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  440. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  335 

the  conclusion  derived  from  them  by  the  witness,  we  think  that 
they  should  be  allowed  to  go  to  the  jury.  "When  resort  is  had  to 
circumstantial  proof,  '  any  fact  may  be  submitted  to  the  jury, 
provided  it  can  be  established  by  competent  means,  which 
affords  any  fair  presumption  or  inference  as  to  the  question  in 
dispute.'  ^  The  particular  fact  connected  with  an  old  transac- 
tion as  to  which  a  witness'  testimony  is  sought,  may  have  faded 
from  his  memory,  but  other  and  surrounding  or  collateral  facts, 
which  are  remembered,  may  be  so  intimately  associated  with  the 
fact  inquired  about,  as  to  satisfy  the  witness  that  it  did  exist. 
In  such  cases  it  is  entirely  proper  that  all  these  facts  should 
be  laid  before  the  jury,  together  with  the  deduction  drawn 
from  them  by  the  witness,  and  let  them  determine  as  to  the  suiE- 
ciency  of  the  circumstances  to  establish  the  main  fact.  It  is 
more  a  matter  of  the  sufficiency  than  of  the  competency  of  the 
evidence."  ^ 

§  371.  [Illustration.]  Marking  the  Boundaries  op  the  Parishes 
IN  LoNT)ON.  —  A  good  illustration  of  the  value  of  the  principle  above 
stated,  that  the  witness  may  be  allowed  to  appeal  to  collateral  facts  in 
order  to  assist  his  memory,  is  found  in  a  custom  which  still  prevails  in 
London,  of  perpetuating  the  memory  of  the  corners  of  the  different 
parishes  of  the  city.  As  stated  to  the  writer  by  an  English  barrister, 
the  beadle  of  each  parish  goes  around  at  stated  periods  with  a  number 
of  boys  with  hazel  switches  and  marks  the  corners  of  the  parish  by 
calling  the  attention  of  the  lads  to  it ;  and  it  was  stated  to  the  writer 
by  a  gentleman  who  had  long  lived  in  London,  that  in  one  known  in- 
stance the  point  where  several  parishes  "  cornered  "  was  immediately 
under  the  seat  of  one  of  the  judges  of  one  of  the  judicial  courts,  and 
that  when  the  beadle  and  the  boys  came  around  to  perform  this  cere- 
mony, the  judge  would  vacate  his  seat  for  the  purpose.  The  custom 
originated  in  the  practice  of  taking  one  or  more  boys  to  the  parish 
corner  and  there  flogging  them  soundly  with  hazel  switches,  which  cir- 
cumstance would  ever  afterwards  fix  the  particular  spot  in  their  recollec- 
tions, and  in  that  way  a  perpetual  memorial  of  the  place  was  preserved 
in  the  memories  of  living  witnesses. 

1   Citing  Wells  v.  Fairbanks,  5  Tex.  2  Davie  v.  Terrill,  63  Tex.  105. 

585. 


336  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

§  372.  Evidence  of  Undisputed  Date  to  fix  a  Disputed 
Date.  — It  has  been  held  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to 
admit  evidence  of  a  transaction  having  an  undisputed  date,  for  the 
purpose  of  fixing  in  the  mind  of  the  witness  a  date  whicja  was  in 
dispute.  Loomis,  J,,  said:  "  If  the  dates  to  be  shown  were  ma- 
terial and  in  dispute,  they  could  be  shown  by  the  date  of  some 
other  date  not  in  dispute,  upon  the  same  principle  that  '  the 
qualities  of  an  object  in  dis})ute  may  be  shown  by  comparison 
with  the  known  qualities  of  some  object  not  in  dispute.'  "  ^ 

§  373.  Reason  for  Remembering-. —  "  A  witness,"  says  Mr. 
Abbott,  "  may  be  asked  why  he  is  confident  he  is  correct ;  for  a 
reason  for  the  positiveness  of  relevant  knowledge  is  relevant."  ^ 
Evidence  which  will  assist  in  showing  which  party  speaks  the 
truth  is  relevant;^  therefore -a  party  may  aid  the  memory  of 
his  own  witness  by  directing  his  mind  to  any  circumstance  which 
will  help  him  to  recollect  more  clearly  the  fact  sought  to  be 
proved.*  The  rule  that  a  witness  may  state  collateral  facts  which 
tixed  the  subject  about  which  he  is  being  interrogated  in  his  rec- 
ollection has  been  applied  so  as  to  allow  a  witness,  testifying  to 
a  material  fact  in  the  case,  to  state  as  a  reason  for  his  accurate 
recollection  that  he  had  ^conversation  about  it  with  a  third  person 
at  a  stated  time;  but  the  details  of  the  conversation  are  not  rele- 
vant or  admissible.  Soinerville,  J.,  speaking  for  the  court,  said: 
"  Itis  always  competent  for  a  witness  to  state  that  he  had  a  con- 
versation with  a  third  i)erson  on  a  certain  subject  germane  to  the 
issue  in  dispute,  and  at  a  time  specified,  as  a  reason  for  his  ac- 
curate recollection  of  the  fact  to  which  he  has  testified.  The 
rules  of  evidence  are  those  of  connnon  sense  and  human  ex- 
perience; and  both  of  these  teach  us  that  the  retentiveness  of  a 
witness'  memory,^  as  to  a  particular  fact  or  incident,  is  greatly  im- 


1  Harris    v.   Rosenberg,   43  Conn.  Rosenburg,  12  Mich.  241,  256. 

227,   231 ;    citing   Isbell   v.  New  York  »   Platner  v.  I'latner,  78  N.  Y.  90. 

&c.  R.  Co.,  25  Conn.  550.  *  O'llagan  v.  Dillon,    7(1  X.  Y.  170. 

2  Abb.  Pr.  Brief,  99;    citing  Blacl<-  Compare  Sawyer  r.  Urr,  140  Mass.  234. 
well  V.  Hamilton,  47  Ala.  472;  Angell  v. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  337 

proved  where,  after  seeing  or  hearing  of  it,  he  subsequently  con- 
verses about  it.' 

§  374.   Questions  as  to  Contemporaneous  Circumstances. — 

It  has  been  held  that  a  party  ought  to  be  allowed  to  put  a  ques- 
tion to  his  own  witness  relating  to  a  contemporaneous  circum- 
stance, for  the  purpose  of  bringing  to  his  recollection  the  fact 
desired  to  be  brought  out.  It  is  said  by  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals:  "While  a  party  cannot  cross-examine  his  own  wit- 
nesses, and  is  in  general  bound  by  the  answers  made,  it  is  not 
objectionable,  after  the  witness  has  given  an  ambiguous  answer, 
to  inquire  as  to  any  circumstance  or  fact  tending  to  enable  him 
to  recollect  the  fact  sought  to  be  proved  more  clearly  or  cer- 
tainly." 2 

§  375.  Right  to  Contradict  a  Fact  from  which  a  Witness 
infers  Another  Fact. — In  a  recent  case  in  Massachusetts  it  is 
ruled  that,  wdiere  a  witness  swears  to  a  fact  only  as  an  inference 
from  the  existence  of  another  fact,  the  question  whether  the  fact 
from  which  the  main  fact  is  inferred  is  true,  becomes  material, 
and  may  be  contradicted  by  the  witnesses  of  the  opposite  party. 
Thus,  in  an  action  against  a  railway  company  for  a  negligent  in- 
jury received  by  the  plaintiff,  a  passenger,  in  alighting  at  the  de- 
fendant's station  in  the  night  time,  it  became  a  material  inquiry 
whether  the  premises  were  lighted  at  the  time.  The  defendant's 
witnesses  swore  to  the  fact  that  they  were  lighted,  but  based 
their  statement  solely  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  the  uniform 
practice  to  light  it.  It  was  held  competent  for  the  plaintiff  to 
show  in  rebuttal  that  there  was  no  such  uniform  practice.** 

§  376.  Strength  of  Recollection  —  "Impressions'*  of  the 
Witness.  —  In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  impressions 
of  a  witness  are  not  evidence,  unless  it  be  made  to  a})pear 
that  what  are  called  impressions  are  derived  from  recollection, 

1  Adams  v.  Robiusou,  65  Ala.  587,  ^  Wentworth  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  3 
591.  New  Eug.  Rep.    355;  s.   c.   143  Mass. 

2  O'Hagau  v.  Dillon,  76   N.  Y.  170,  2i8- 
173. 


338  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Tliomp.  Tl'., 

and  not  from  the  information  of  others  ;^  and  not  then  when  the 
so-culled  impressions  are  in  substance  the  conclusions  of  the  wit- 
ness, under  the  rule  hereafter  stated.^  Thus,  on  the  trial  of  an 
issue  of  devisavit  vel  non,  several  witnesses  were  asked:  "  From 
the  acts  and  declarations  of  S.  (the  deceased)  by  you  related 
and  testified,  and  as  you  observed,  what  impressions  did  it  make 
on  your  mind  as  to  his  mental  condition  ?  "  It  was  held  that  the 
question  called  for  nw  opinion  which  the  witnesses  were  not  com- 
petent to  give.^  So,  a  witness  called  to  authenticate  a  paper 
cannot  be  asked  whether,  to  the  best  of  his  impression,  it  is  in 
the  handwriting  of  the  party. ^ 

§  377.  Witness  must  state   Facts,  not  Conclusions. — It  is 

for  the  Jury,  and  not  for  the  witnesses,  to  draw  inferences  from 
facts ;  and  therefore  it  is  a  general  rule  that  witnesses  who  are 
not  testifying  as  experts  are  not  permitted  to  state  their  opin- 
ions, conclusions  or  deductions  from  facts,  but  they  must  be  con- 
fined to  the  communication  of  facts,  simply.^  Again,  it  is  for  the 
court,  and  not  for  the  witnesses,  to  draw  conclusions  of  law,  and 

1  Clark   V.   Bigelow,    16    Me.    24(5;  be  Dave  Long  at  the  time.     I   could 

Boyd  V.  Bank,  25  Iowa,  255.     Follow-  not  say  for  certain  who  it  was  now; 

ing  this  principle,  it  has  been  held  in  the  man  was  running  fast,"  etc.     It 

one  of  the  appellate  courts  of  Illinois,  was   held   after  a  conviction  and  on 

that  it  is  not  competent  to  allow  a  appeal,  that  it  was    not    an  available 

wiiness  to  answer,  "  My  impression  is  error  for  the  court  to  put  the  ques- 

that  they  did;  I  could  not  swear  pos-  tion  in  a  leading  form,  and  that,  for 

itively."     Rounds  v.   McCormick,    11  the  purpose  of  testing  the  witness  and 

Bradw.  (111.)  220.     But  in  another  ju-  getting  at  the  truth,  the  court  had  the 

risdiction,  on   the   trial   of   a  felony,  right  to  ask  her  what  her  impressions 

which     consisted    of     shooting    and  were  at  the  time.     Long  y.   State,  95 

wounding,  after  the  witness  had  tes-  Ind.  481,  487.     See  3  Abb.  N.  C.  235. 

tified  that  she  was  at  her  mother's  ^  Real  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  270. 

gate  near  the  scene  of  the  injury,  and  ^  Sisson   v.    Conger,    1    Thomp.    & 

saw  a  pei'son  run  west  just  after  the  C.  (N.  Y.)  5G4. 

shooting,  l)ut  that  she  could  not  say  ^  Carter  v.  Connell,  1  Whart.  (Pa.) 

who  it  Avas,  the  court   put  to  her  this  392. 

question:   "  At  the  time  you  saw  that  ^  jviorchouse   v.    Mathews,   2  N.  Y. 

person  running,  and   not  from  what  514;Teall  v.  Barton,  40  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

you  heard,  did  you  think  it  was  Dave  137;   National  Bank  v,   Isham,  48  Vt. 

Long    (the   defendant)?"     To  which  590. 
the  witness  answered :  "  I   took  it  to 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XY.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  339 

it  is  therefore  a  general  rule  that  witnesses  must  not  be  per- 
mitted to  state  such  conehisions.^  The  dividing  line  between 
matter  which  involves  the  opinion,  deduction,  or  conclusion  of  the 
witness,  and  the  recital  of  a  state  of  the  facts,  will  often  be 
difficult  to  be  drawn;  but  several  illustrations  may  be  given 
of  the  rule.  Where  a  witness  ended  his  answer  to  a  question  by 
saying  that  he  considered  that  certain  property  belonged  to  the 
plaintiff,  it  was  held  that  this  part  of  his  answer  should  be  ex- 
cluded, it  being  the  statement  of  a  conclusion  of  law.^  A  ques- 
tion which  embraces  the  whole  merits  of  the  controversy  is  or- 
dinarily subject  to  the  objection  that  it  calls  for  a  conclusion 
on  the  part  of  the  witness,  although  it  may  not  be  so  in  particu- 
lar cases. ^  Where,  on  a  criminal  trial,  a  witness  persisted  in 
stating,  against  the  objection  of  the  defendent's  counsel,  his 
suspicions  and  conclusions  as  to  the  defendant's  guilt,  and  the 
court  failed  to  confine  his  examination  to  statements  of  fact,  a 
conviction  was  reversed.*  So,  a  witness,  in  an  action  against  a 
guarantor  of  a  promissory  note,  in  proving  the  defendant's  in- 
dorsements, of  which  there  are  two,  —  one  above  and  one  be- 
low a  written  guaranty,  —  should  not  be  allowed  to  testify  that 
"  the  second  signature  was  put  on  to  guarantee  the  payment  of 
the  paper."  *  So,  in  a  summary  proceeding  by  motion  against 
a  tax  collector  and  his  sureties  for  failing  to  pay  over  public 
moneys,  it  has  been  held  error  to  allow  the  chairman  of  the  coun- 
ty court,  as  a  witness,  to  state  orally  the  result  of  his  statement 
of  the  collector's  account,  without  producing  the  papers  on  which 
it  is  based.'' 

§  378.  [Continued.]  Further  Illustrations. — Applying  this  rule, 
it  has  been  held  inadmissible,  in  an  action  by  a  bank  on  a  promissory 
note,  the  entire  consideration  of  which  had  failed,  to  ask  the  president 

*  Toralin  v.  Hilyard,  43  111.  300.  *  Harrison    v.   State,  16   Tex.  App, 

-  Ro.seuthal  v.  Mitkllebrook,  (J3Tex.  325,  329. 
334.  5  Johnson   v.  Glover,   10   North  E. 

3  Caspar  v.  O'Brien,  15  Abb.  Pr.  (x.  Rep.  (111.)  214;  s.  c.  121  111.  283. 
8.)  (N.  Y.)  402;  Conner  u.  Stanley,  67  ^  Shepherd  v.    Hamilton  Couuty,  8 

Cal.   315.     Compare  Orr  v.  State,   15  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  380. 
Ark.  540. 


340  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

of  the  bank  whether  the  bank  discounted  and  received  the  note  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  business  and  in  good  faith.^  So,  the  following  ques- 
tion has  been  held  improper,  as  eaUing  for  a  conclusion  of  law :  "  Was 
the  judgment  obtained  for  the  purchase-money  of  the  land  in  contro- 
versy? "  '^  So,  it  is  improper  to  ask  a  witness  what  it  would  cost  to  do 
certain  work  "  according  to  the  contract  testified  to  by  the  plaintiff," 
because  it  is  for  the  court,  and  not  for  the  witness  to  construe  the  con- 
tract.^ So,  it  is  improper  to  ask  the  witness  what  the  defendant  meant 
by  an  expression  which,  according  to  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses,  the 
defendant  had  used,'*  —  the  interpretation  of  verbal  speech  being  for 
the  jury.^  So  the  question  "  was  a  certain  deed  delivered  to  take 
effect?" — is  inadmissible,  as  calling  for  a  legal  conclusion.'^  So,  in 
an  action  for  damages  for  flowing  land,  a  witness  cannot  be  asked 
whether  the  flowage  injured  the  plaintiff.^  In  like  manner,  it  is  not 
competent  for  a  witness  to  testify  as  to  the  knowledge  of  a  person  other 
than  himself.  He  may  state  declarations,  acts  or  circumstances  tend- 
ing to  show  such  knowledge,  but  beyond  that  his  statement  is  merely 
that  of  a  conclusion,  which  is  inadmissible.  The  following  question 
was,  under  this  rule,  properly  rejected:  "  Did  the  plaintiff  know  you 
had  nothhig  to  do  with  the  labor  on  the  building  after  October  last?  "  ^ 
For  a  somewhat  different  reason,  it  is  not  competent  to  ask  a  witness 
whether  or  not  a  certain  instrument  is  a  ivarranty  deed.  The  reason  is 
that  tlie  contents  of  a  writing  cannot  be  proved  by  parol,  unless  the  ab- 
sence of  the  writing  has  been  sufficiently  accounted  for.  Where  the 
contents  are  shown,  it  is  a  question  of  law,  for  the  court  to  decide,  upon 
which  the  opinion  of  a  witness  is  incompetent.^  So,  in  an  action  on  a 
building  contract,  it  has  been  held  proper  not  to  allow  the  architect, 
testifying  as  a  witness,  to  state  whether  certain  extra  work,  which  had 
been  ordered,  was  of  such  a  character  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  the 
plaintiff  to  complete  the  building  by  the  date  named. ^°  What  the  wit- 
ness understands  or  thinks  falls  within  the  rule  which  prohibits  witnesses 
from  stating  their  conclusions.  Accordingly,  the  following  testimony 
was  properly  excluded  from  the  jury:   "  Mj'  understanding  was,  at  the 


1  National  Bank  v.   Isham,  48   Vt.  "  Braman  v.  Bingham,  26  N.  Y.  483. 
590.     See  also  Clougli  v.  Patricia,   37  '  Keagan  v.  Grim,  13  Pa.  St.  508. 
Vt.  421.  8  Major  v.  Spies,  6G  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

2  Tomlin  v.  Ililyard,  43  111.  300.  577. 

3  McCUay  v.  lli'dgu,  IS  Iowa,  G6.  ^  Jackson  v.  Benson,  54  la.  G54. 

4  Whitman?;.  Freese,  23  Me.  185.  ^^  c.uupijL'll  v.   Kussell,   139    Mass. 
5  Post,   §   1115.  278. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  341 

time,  and  still  is,  that  the  mortgage  was  given  to  release  the  securities 
and  secure  the  payment  of  the  note.  I  think  Barber  (the  payee)  un- 
derstood it  in  that  way  also."  ^  But  a  witness  may  be  asked  whether 
a  person,  e.g.,  the  cashier  of  a  bank,  had  authority  to  do  a  particular 
act.2  And  in  an  action  for  damages  and  for  an  injunction  against 
miners,  who  had  cut  away  the  dam  above  the  plaintiff's  mill,  it  has 
bee-n  held  proper  to  ask  a  witness  what  effect  did  the  running  of  the 
slum,  etc.,  by  defendants  and  other  miners  above,  have  upon  the  plaint- 
iff's race. 3 

§  379.  Appearances,  — An  exception  to  the  foregoing  rule  is 
that  a  witness  may  frequently  state  a  conclusion  of  fact  from 
appearances.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  not  error,  in  a  trial  for 
murder,  to  allow  witnesses  for  the  State  to  testify  that  the  pris- 
oner "  appeared  to  be  drinking,''  *  or  was  intoxicated  at  the  time 
of  the  alleged  offense.^  So,  witnesses  other  than  experts  may 
give  their  opinions  as  to  sanity  or  insanity,  provided  such  opinions 
be  accompanied  with  statements  of  facts  upon  which  they  are 
founded.^  So,  it  has  been  held  proi)er  to  ask,  "  What  did  per- 
sons in  the  crowd  say,  tending  to  show  a  common  design  and 
feeling  among  several  persons,  to  resist  an  officer  in  the  execution 
of  his  duty  ?  "  ^  So,  on  a  trial  for  murder  occurring  in  an  affray, 
a  witness,  who  was  present,  may  be  asked  whether,  when  de- 
ceased rushed  upon  defendant,  there  was  time  enough  for  the  latter 
to  escape  and  get  out  of  the  way.^  But  where  the  issue  is 
whether  the  deceased  person  was  possessed  of  testamentary  capa- 
city, it  will  not  be  competent  to  ask  a  witness,  "  From  what  you 
saw,  what  was  his  mental  capacity?  "  — since  this  would  devolve 
upon  him  the  office  of  court  and  jury,  and  require  him  to  decide 
the  whole  case.^ 

§  380.  Opinions  as  to  Value.  —  An  exception  to  the  rule 
which  excludes  the  conclusions  of  witnesses  is  found  in  another 
rule  which  admits  their  opinions  as  to  value,  provided  y^founda- 

1  Phares  v.  Barber,  61  111.272.  6  Choice  v.  State,  31  Ga.  424. 

2  KoI)inson  v.  Bealle,  20  Ga.  275.  '  Maiu  v.  McCarty,  15  111.  441. 

3  Bell  V.  Shutz,  18  Cal.  449.  s  Stewart  v.  State,  19  Oh.  312. 

4  Choice  V.  State,  31  Ga.  424.  »  White  v.  Bailey,  10  Mich.  155. 
^■^  People  V.  Eastwood,  14  N.  Y.  562. 


342  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  Thomp.  Tu., 

Hon  is  first  laid  by  showing  that  the  witness  is  acquainted  with 
the  value  of  the  thing,  the  vahie  of  which  is  in  dispute,  and  is 
therefore  competent  to  give  an  opinion  upon  that  subject.^ 
This  rule  is  subject  to  the  qualification  that  the  opinions  of  wit- 
nesses as  to  value  are  not  binding  upon  the  jury,  but  persuasive 
merely.  If  they  are  of  a  different  opinion,  they  may'  find  ac- 
cording to  their  own  opinion ;  though  a  wide  discrepancy  between 
their  verdict  and  the  opinions  of  the  witnesses  might  be  ground 
of  setting:  the  verdict  aside. ^  Thus,  where  land  is  taken  for  the 
building  of  a  railroad,  a  witness  acquainted  with  the  land  and  its 
value  may  state  his  opinion  as  to  its  value,  immediately  before 
the  taking  and  immediately  after,  and  the  amount  of  damage 
done  to  the  land  by  such  taking.^  So,  a  witness  acquainted  with 
the  land  and  its  value  may  state  his  opinion  as  to  the  amount  of 
damage  done  by  hauling  logs  over  it,  in  an  action  of  trespass 
quare  clasum  f regit .^  These  decisions  proceed  upon  the  ground 
that  opinions  of  witnesses  derived  from  observation  are  gener- 
ally admissible  in  evidence  when,  from  the  nature  of  the  subject 
under  investigation,  no  better  evidence  can  be  obtained.^  So,  in 
an  action  on  a  policy  for  fi7'e  insurance ,  where  it  was  necessary 
to  show  the  value  of  articles  destroyed  by  the  fire,  it  was  held 
that  a  daughter  of  the  plaintiff  who  had  bought  many  of  the  ar- 
ticles insured,  and  who  was  present  when  others  were  bought,  was 
a  competent  witness  to  testify  concerning  their  value.^  It  is 
competent  for  a  witness  to  testify  as  to  the  actual  cost  of  property 
at  a  particular  place,  such  evidence  being  relevant  on  the  question 
of  value. ^  So,  a  witness  may  testify  to  a  knowledge  of  the  market 
price  of  cattle  at  a  particular  time  and  place  derived  from  the 
newspapers.^  Obviously,  a  witness  cannot  be  asked  a  question 
which  calls  upon  him,  not  to  give  his  own  opinion  as  to  value,  but 
which  requires  him,  from  what  he  knows  and  from  the  testimony 

1  Clark  V.  Field,  42  Mich.  342.  5  Hardy  v.  Merrill,  m  N.  H.  227, 241. 

2  Winkler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  21  Mo.  ^  Coiitiuoutal  liiburauceCo.  v.Hov- 
App.  109.  ton,  28  Mich.  173. 

3  Curtis  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  20  Mimi.  28;  '  AVhipple  v.  Walpole,  10  N.  H.  130. 
Sherwood  V.  R.  R.  Co.,  21  Miuu.  127.  ^  Cleveland  &c.  R.  Co.  i?.  Perkins, 

•*  Carter  v.  Thurston,  58  N.  H.  105,      17  Mich.  2yG. 
108. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  Xy.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  343 

of  the  witnesses  which  he  has  heard,  to  give  his  opinion  as 
to  the  amount  of  damages  which  ought  to  be  awarded,  — 
since  this  devolves  upon  him  the  functions  of  th^  jury.^ 

§  381.   Opinion  of  the  Plaintiff  as  to  his  own  Damages. — 

The  rule  of  the  preceding  section  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to 
allow  a  plaintiff  in  an  action,  where  the  quantum  of  damages  is 
not  determined  by  the  value  of  real  or  personal  property,  to  give 
an  opinion  on  the  witness  stand,  as  to  the  extent  to  which  he 
has  been  damaged.'^  Such  evidence  falls  within  the  rule  of  a  pre- 
ceding section, 3  which  excludes  statements  of  witnesses  which 
involve  conclusions  merely,  and  especially  conclusions  which  go 
to  the  entire  merits  of  the  controversy.^  Thus,  in  an  action  for 
maliciously  suing  out  an  attachment^  where  injury  to  the  plaint- 
iff's credit  is  assigned  as  an  element  of  damages,  he  will  not  be 
permitted  to  testify  what  his  credit  was  worth  to  him  prior  to 
the  doino;  of  the  wrong. ^ 

§  382.  Questions  depending  on  the  Experience  of  Wit- 
nesses. —  Witnesses  may  properly  testify  in  regard  to  matters 
derived  partly  from  their  own  experience  in  a  particular  business, 
althouo;li  their  information  comes  through  others  in  the  course  of 
such  business,  — as,  for  instance,  where  the  question  concerns  the 
course  of  such  business  in  a  particular  trade. ^  So,  it  has  been 
held  competent  to  ask  a  witness  who  professes  to  know  the  num- 
ber of  slaves,  mules,  etc.,  employed  on  a  plantation,  how  much 
corn  per  month  it  would  require  to  supply  the  wants  of  the 
plantation.^  This  opens  up  the  question  of  expert  testimony, 
which  is  too  extensive  a  subject  for  full  treatment  here.^ 

1  "Shepherd  v.   Willis,   19   Oh.  142.  The  court  cite  Clarcli  v.  Calicoat,  24 

Compare   White  v.   Bailey,    10  Mich.  Tex.  170,  173;  Gabel  v.  Weiseusee,  49 

155.  Tex.  131,  142;  Turner  v.  Strange,  56 

^  Kennedy  V.  Holladay,  25  Mo.  App.  Tex.   142;  I  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  440.     The 

503,514;  Smith  v.  Young,  2G  Mo.  App.  same  ruling  was   made   at  the  same 

575,  578.  time  in  Herusheim  v.  Babcock  (Tex.) 

^  Antp,  §  377.  2  S.  W.  Rep.  880. 

4  White  V.  Stoner,  18  Mo.  App.  540,  c  Kj^g  j,   Woodbridge,  34  Vt.  565. 
547;  Belch  v.  Railroad  Co.,  Id.  80.  "  Rembert  v.  Brown,  14  Ala.  36. 

5  Kauffraan  v.   Babcock,    2   S.    W.  «  As  to  the   manner  of  examining, 
Rep.    (Tex.)    878;    s.  c.    Wi  Tex.   241.  expert  witnesses,  see  posf,  chap.  XXII. 


344 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 


§   383.   Testimony  as  to  Intent,  Belief  or  Motive. — It  is  a 

general  rule  that  the  intent  or  purpose  with  which  an  act  is  done 
is  not  material  in  civil  cases,  when  the  doing  of  the  act  is  called 
in  question  ;  since  parties  are  held  to  the  natural  and  legal  conse- 
quences of  their  acts,  and  the  law  cannot  investigate  their  psy- 
chological conditions  with  accuracy.^  But  where  the  intention 
of  a  party  becomes  material,  it  may,  of  course  be  shown  in  evi- 
dence. Before  parties  were  made  competent  by  statute  to  tes- 
tify as  witnesses,  the  intent  of  a  party  to  a  litigation,  when 
material,  necessarily  had  to  be  proved  by  his  acts  or  declarations, 
or  by  surrounding  circumstances.  But  since  the  passage  of  stat- 
utes rendering  parties  competent  to  testify  as  witnesses,  it  is 
settled  by  a  preponderance  of  authority,  that  it  is  competent  for  a 
party,  testifying  in  his  own  behalf ,  to  state  his  intent  with  regard 
to  the  transaction  in  question,  where  such  intent  is  material.^ 
Thus,  in  a  civil  action  for  wantonly  and  maliciously  destroying 
property,  the  defendant  may  testify  as  to  his  motive,  for  the 
purpose   of  disproving   malice.^     So,   it  has  been  held,  on  the 


1  Hale  V.  Taylor,  45  N.  H.  405; 
Gale  V.  Belknap  lus.  Co.,  41  N.  H. 
170;  Wadleigh  v.  Jauvriu,  41  N.  H. 
512;  Snedeker  v.  Warring,  12  N.  Y_ 
170;  Farmers  &c.  Bank  v.  Cliamplaiu 
Co.,  23  Vt.  186;  Hayward  v.  Bath,  38 
N.  H.  182.  See  also  as  bearing  on  this 
subject.  Gates  v.  Lounsbury,  20  Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  427;  Lawrence  v.  Ocean  Co., 
11  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  241;  N.  Y.  Fire- 
men's Co.  V.  Lawrence,  14  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  4G;  Palmer  v.  Piukham,  33  Me. 
35. 

2  Shockey  v.  Mills,  71  Ind.  288; 
Thurston  v.  Cornell,  38  N.  Y.  281; 
Miner  v.  Phillips,  42  111.  123;  Bloch  v. 
Price,  24  Mo.  App.  14;  Fish  w.  Chester, 
8  Gray  (Mass.),  50(;;  Hulett  v.  Huiett, 
37  Vt.  581,  58(1;  Graves  u.  Graves,  45 
N.  H,  323;  Homans  v.  Cornnig,  GO  N.  H. 
418;  Sweet  v.  Tuttle,  14  N.  Y.  4(55; 
Hale  V.  Taylor,45  N.  H.  405 ;  Gale  v.  Bel- 
knap Ins.  Co.,  4  IN.  H.  170,  175;  Norris 


U.Morrill,  40  N.  H.  395;  Edwards  ». 
Currier,  43  Me.  474;  Wlieelden  v. 
Wilson,  44  Me.  11;  Coriuna  v.  Exeter, 
13  Me.  328 ;  French  v.  Marstin,  24  N.  H. 
440,  450;  Conway  v.  Clinton,  1  Utah 
T.  215,  221;  McKown  v.  Hunter,  30 
N.  Y.  625;  White  v.  Tucker,  16  Oh.  St. 
468;  Berkey  v.  Judd,  22  Minn.  287, 
297  (overruling  dicaim  in  Hathaway  u. 
Brown,  18  Minn.  414;  distinguishing 
People  V.  Saxton,  22  N.  Y.  309) ;  Wat- 
kin  V.  Wallace,  19  Mich.  57;  Seymour 
V.  Wilson,  14  N.  Y.  567;  Forbes  v. 
Waller,  25  N.  Y.  430;  Cortland 
County  V.  Herkimer  County,  44  N.  Y. 
22.  See  also  as  bearing  on  the  ques- 
tion, Jones  V.  Howland,  8  Mete. 
(Mass.)  377;  Blodgett  v.  Farmer,  41 
N.  H,  403;  Fiedler  v.  Darin,  50  N.  Y. 
437 ;  Lawyer  v.  Loomis,  1  Thoinp.  &  C. 
(N.  Y.)  393. 

3  Conway  v.  Clinton,  1  Utah  T.  215, 
221. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  345 

trial  of  an  indictment  for  an  assault  and  battery  with  intent  to 
commit  a  rape,  that  the  accused  might  testify  as  to  what  his 
intention  was  in  the  commission  of  the  assault  and  battery.^ 
So,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  larceny,  it  is  competent 
for  the  defendant  to  testify  as  to  what  his  intention  was  at  the 
time  the  goods  came  into  his  possession.^  So,  where  the  ques- 
tion concerns  the  intent  with  which  an  assignment  of  property 
has  been  made,  it  is  competent  for  the  assignor  to  testify  what 
his  intentions  were.'^  So,  where  the  validity  of  a  cZeecZ,*  or  of 
an  official  act,^  is  in  question,  it  is  competent  for  the  grantor 
to  testify  that  he  executed  it  in  good  faith.  And  in  general, 
it  may  be  stated  that,  where  the  intent  is  an  essential  element 
in  the  charge  of  crime,  the  prisoner  has  the  right  to  testify  as  to 
intent  in  doing  the  act.^  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  the  operation 
of  the  rule  that  the  witness  should  be  a  party  to  the  action. 
More  broadly,  the  rule  is,  that  where  the  motive  of  the  witness, 
in  performing  a  particular  act  or  making  a  particular  declara- 
tion, becomes  a  material  issue  in  the  case,  or  reflects  import- 
ant light  upon  such  issue,  he  may  himself  be  sworn  in  regard 
io  it,  notwithstanding  the  difficulty  of  furnishing  contradictory 
evidence,  and  notwithstanding  the  diminished  credit  to  which  his 
testimony  may  be  entitled  as  coming  from  the  mouth  of  an  in- 
terested party .^  Some  courts,  however,  hold  that,  where  a 
party  takes  the  stand  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  in  civil  and 
criminal  cases,  it  is  incompetent  for  him  to  testify  as  to  an  un- 
communicated  opinion,  belief  or  motive  on  which  he  acted.**  It 
is  clear  that  "  a  party  cannot  be  allowed  to  testify  to  his  undis- 

1  Greer  17.  State,  53  Ind.  420.  Corning,  60  N.    H.  418;    McKown  v. 

2  White  V.  State,  53  Ind.  595.  Hunter,  30  N.  ¥.025;   Starin  v.  Kelly, 

3  Watkins  v.  Wallace,  19  Micli.  57,  88  N.  Y.    318;    Griffin  v.  Marquardt, 
76.  21  N.    Y.  121;    Forbes   v.  AValler,  25 

*  Tliacher    v.    Pliiuuey,      7      Allen      N.  Y.  430;    also.  City  of  Columbus  t;. 
(Mass.),  146.  ,  Dalin,  36  Ind.    330,    where   some   au- 

*  CortlaudtCo.  v.  Herkimer  Co.,  44      thorities   on  this  point  were   quoted, 
N.Y.  22.  but  the  point  left  undecided. 

6  Kerrains  v.  People,  60  N.   Y.  221;  s  Whizenant  v.  State,    71  Ala.  383; 

People  V.  Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340.  Ford  v.  State,  Id.  385;  McCormick  v. 

■f  Seymour  v.  Wilson,  14  N.  Y.  567;  Joseph,  77  Ala.  236;  Stewart  v.  State,  78 

Kerrains  v.  People,  supra;   Homans  v  Ala.  436;  Ball  v.  Farley,  1  South.  Rep. 


346  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

dosed  intent,  in  order  to  alter  the  effect  of  that  which  was  matter 
of  contract,  representation,  or  estoppel,  on  which  the  other  party 
had  a  right  to  rely."  ^ 

§  384.  Rule  where  the  Coucurreiiee  of  Intent  of  two  Parties 
is  Material. — It  is  said  that,  where  it  is  material  to  show  the 
concurrence  of  two  parties  in  the  same  intent,  evidence  of  the 
intent  of  one  party  alone  cannot  prevail.^  But  this  will  not  nec- 
essarily render  it  improper  to  prove  the  intent  of  each  party. ^ 
Thus,  upon  the  question  of  the  delivery  and  acceptance  of  chat- 
tels under  a  contract  of  sale,  the  intent  characterizes  the  act,  and 
the  intention  with  which  the  act  is  done  becomes  material ;  *  and 
therefore,  under  the  above  rule,  each  party  may  testify  to  his 
intention  in  doino-  what  was  done.^  This  rule  is  not  inconsistent 
with  another  rule,  which  conclusively  ascribes  a  certain  intent  to 
a  given  act,  which  the  law  does  in  many  cases,  in  which  case  the 
party  will  be  precluded  from  asserting,  at  least  in  civil  cases,  an 
intent  contrary  to  the  act  which  he  did."  Where  the  concurring 
intent  of  two  parties  must  be  shown,  —  as  in  an  illegal  agree- 
ment,—  the  intent  of  each  may  be  shown  by  independent  evi- 
dence, and  evidence  which  shows  the  intent  of  one  is  not  incorn- 
petent  because  it  does  not  also  show  the  intent  of  the  other. ^ 

§  385.  Fullness  of  Witness'  Statement.  —  Either    party  is 
entitled,  if  he  insists  upon  it,  to  have  the  witnesses  state  fully  all 

(Ala.)  253,  259;  s.  c.  81  Ala.  288;  Bal-  (N.  Y.),  158;  Waiigh  v.  Fielding,  48  N. 

lard  V.  Lockwood,  I  Daly  (N.  Y.),  158;  Y.  (i81. 

Oxford  Iron  Co.  v.  Spradley,  51  Ala.  2  Hale   v.   Taylor,   45  N.    H.    405; 

172;  Baker   v.   Trotter,   73   Ala.   277,  Murray  v.  Betliuue,   1  Weud.   (N.   Y.) 

281;    Sledge    v.   Scott,    5(;    Ala.    202.  191;    compare    Rich    v.   Jackway,    18 

lu   Georgia  the  doctrine  obtains  that,  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  357. 

although  the  intention  with  which  an  ^  Hale  v.  Taylor,    supra;    Blake  v. 

actwas  doueora  contract  made  may  be  White,  13  N.  11.  272. 

a  material  subject  of  inquiry,  it  is  not  •*  Kelsea  v.   Haines,  41  N.   H.  246, 

competent  for  a  witness  to  testify  as  253. 

to  what  the  iuteutiou  was.     Green  v.  ^  Hale  v.  Taylor,  45  N.  II.  405. 

Akers,  55  Ga.  159.  •'  1  Smith  L.  C.  531.     Compare  Hib- 

1  Abb.  Tr.  Brief,   93;  citing  Dillon  bard  v.  llussell,  16  N.  H.  410,  417. 
V.  Anderson,  43  N.  Y.  231;  Craighead  '  Abb.  Tr.  Ev.  739  n.  5;    Yerkes  v, 

V.  Peterson,  72  N.  Y.  279;  s.  c.  28  Am.  Salomau,  11  liuu  (N.  Y.),  47' 
Hep.  150;  Ballard  v-.  Lockwood    1  Daly 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XY.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  347 

the  details  in  respect  of  which  he  is  interrogated.  The  court 
cannot  properly  limit  the  direct  examination  to  a  general  state- 
ment,—  such  as,  whether  the  witness  has  heard  the  testimony  of 
a  preceding  witness  and  concurs  therein. ^  But  the  party  calling 
the  witness  is  not  obliged  to  enter  into  the  details.  He  may  ask 
his  witness  a  general  question  and  elicit  a  general  answer  thereto, 
and  then  leave  his  opponent  to  supply  the  details,  if  he  shall  de- 
sire, by  a  cross-examination.-  So,  in  a  criminal  trial,  if  there  is 
no  objection,  it  is  not  an  abuse  of  discretion  for  the  judge  to 
allow  a  Avitness  to  answer  the  general  question,  whether  the  wit- 
ness has  seen  the  defendant  play  at  a  game  charged  in  the  indict- 
ment at  any  time  within  twelve  months,  etc.^  It  has  been  held 
that  a  witness  cannot  be  asked  whether  the  facts  stated  in  a  par- 
ticular paper  are  true:  he  should  be  interrogated  as  to  those  facts 
particularly.* 

§   386.   Sufficient  that  the  Evidence  tends  to  Prove.  — It  is 

sufficient,  in  order  to  make  a  question  relevant,  that  the  answer 
which  it  seeks  to  elicit  will  tend  in  some  sensible  degree  to  prove 
or  disprove  the  fact  in  issue.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the 
answer,  if  believed,  should  in  itself  afford  complete  proof.  It 
may  be  corroborative  testimony  merely,  or  a  single  link  in  a  chain 
of  circumstances,  or  a  single  fad  in  a  collection  of  facts,  neither 
of  which  is  sufficient  in  itself,  but  all  of  which,  when  taken  col- 
lectively, may  be  of  sufficient  probative  force  to  carry  conviction, 
to  the  minds  of  the  jurors.  If,  therefore,  the  answer  to  a  ques- 
tion may  tend  to  prove,  or  may  form  iiart  of  the  proof  of  the 
matters  alleged,  though  not  wholly  sufficient  to  prove  them, 
the  question  may  be  asked. ^  In  technical  strictness  the  word 
^^  issue,"  when  used  with  reference  to  pleadings,  signifies  the 
disputed  point  or  question.^  It  is  said  that  by  the  term  "  rele- 
vancy," we  do  not  mean   that  the  evidence  shall  be  addressed 

1  Eames  v.  Eames,  41  N.  H.  177.  ^  Eichardsou  v.    Golden,   3   Wash 

2  Ayrault  v.  Chamberlaiu,  33  Barb.       (U.  S.)  100. 

(N.  Y.)  229.  5  SchiR'hardt    v.    Aliens,    1     Wall. 

*  Orr  V.  State,  15  Ark.  540.  (U.  S.)  359. 

<5  Steph.  PI.  25. 


348  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoiUp.  Tl"., 

with,  positive  directness  to  the  disputed  point,  but  we  mean  evi- 
dence which,  according  to  the  common  course  of  events,  "  either 
taken  by  itself  or  in  connection  with  tlie  testimony,  proves,  or 
renders  probable  the  past,  present  or  future  existence  or  non- 
existence of  the  other. 1  "It  is  not  necessary,"  continue  the 
Indiana  court,  "that  the  fact  offered  in  evidence  should  bear 
immediately  and  directly  on  the  main  issue;  for,  again  to  quote 
from  Stephen,  'facts  which,  though  not  in  issue  are  so  connected 
with  a  fact  in  issue  as  to  form  part  of  the  same  transaction  or 
subject  matter,  are  relevant  to  the  fact  with  which  they  are  so 
connected.'  "^  Dr.  Wharton  defines  relevancy  as  being  that 
which  conduces  to  the  proof  of  a  pertinent  hypothesis.  ^ 

§  387.  Substance  of  Conversation  or  Admission.  — While  a 
witness  testifying  to  declarations,  conversations  or  admissions, 
should  give,  if  possible,  the  exact  words  used,  yet  a  general  answer 
embodying  the  substance  or  purport  of  the  declarations,  conver- 
sations or  admissions,  is  not  objectionable  where  that  is  all  that 
the  witness  can  remember.*  But  it  has  been  held  that  the  rule  is 
not  satisfied  with  a  statement  of  anything  else  thtui  the  substance 
of  the  language  which  was  employed,  and  does  not  permit  the 
witness  to  state  merely  his  conclusion  from  the  testimony. 
Thus,  where,  eight  years  after  an  alleged  conversation,  a  witness 
in  a  case  in  chancery  testified  concerning  the  party,  "that  he 
fully  admitted  his  liability  on  the  note,"  — it  was  held  that  this 
was  a  mere  conclusion,  and  hence  inadmissible.^  On  the  other 
hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  witness  is  unable  to  state 
what  a  conversation  was,  it  is  improper  to  refuse  to  allow  him 
to  state  the  impression  which  the  conversation  made  on  his 
mind.^ 

1  Steph.  Ev.,  art.  1;  Bent.  Ev.  ^  Helm  v.  Cautroll,  59  111.  525,  531. 
257,  n;  Seller  v.  Jenkins,  97  Ind.  430,  ^  AVilder  v.  Peabody,  21  Huu 
488.  (N.   Y.)    37(;;    ante,   §   37(i.     But  see 

2  Seller  v.  Jenkins,  97  Ind.  430,  438;  Miles  v.  Eoberts,  34  N.  H.  245,  which 
citing  Stephen's  Ev.,  art.  3.  supports  the  view  that  a  witness  may 

3  1  Whart.  Ev.,  §  20.  state  what  he  understood  to  be  the  <?/- 

4  Chambers  v.  Hill,  34  Mich.  523;  /eci  of  a  conversation. 
Kittredge  v.  Russell,  114  Mass.  (!7. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  349 

§  388.  Rule  where  a  Witness  Remembers  a  Part  only  of 
the  Conversation.  —  The  fact  that  the  witness  remembers  only 
a  part  of  the  conversation  does  not  render  the  rest  incompetent. 
Although  it  is  a  rule  of  evidence  that,  where  testimony  of  a  con- 
fession of  the  accused  person  is  given  the  whole  of  what  he  said 
must  be  detailed,  and  the  State  will  not  be  allowed  to  extract  a 
part  of  it  and  detail  that  to  the  jury  only ;  ^  yet  where  there  is 
no  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  State  to  violate  this  rule,  the  fact 
that  the  State's  witness  is  not  able  to  remember  all  the  conversa- 
tion between  himself  and  the  prisoner,  but  details  it  so  far  as  he 
can  remember  it,  does  not  aiford  ground  for  striking  out  and  ex- 
cluding what  he  does  remember  and  detail. ^ 

§  389.   Source  of  Information  or  Belief  must  be  given. — 

Where  a  question  calls  for  the  knowledge  of  the  witness  with 
reference  to  a  particular  fact  or  transaction,  and  the-  witness, 
instead  of  answering  the  question  directly,  details  that  he  found 
out  certain  facts,  his  answer  is  correctly  excluded,  unless  he  gives 
the  source  of  his  information.^ 

§  390.  Compound  Qviestions  when  not  Admissible. —  Where 
a  compound  question  is  propounded  to  a  witness,  part  of  which 
is/admissible  and  part  inadmissible,  it  is  rightfully  excluded  as  a 
whole.* 

§  391.  Negative  Testimony  when  too  Remote.  —  A  witness 
cannot,  on  principle,  be  allowed  to  testify  that  he  was  not  cog- 
nizant of  a  fact,  unless  he  lays  n,  foundation  for  so  testifying,  by 
saying  that  he  was  in  a  position  in  which  he  would  have  been 
cognizant  of  the  fact  if  it  had  taken  place.  Thus,  a  witness  hav- 
ing testified  to  a  material  conversation  in  the  family  of  a  deceased 
person,  it  was  held  not  competent,  for  the  pur})ose  of  contradict- 
ing him,  to  call  a  neighbor  to  testify  merely  that  he  had  never 

1  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  218 ;  Coon  v.  State,  s  Rosenthal  v.  Mickllebrook,  63  Tex. 
13     Smed.    &    M.   (Miss.)     240,    250;       334,  336. 

Brown's  Case,  9  Leigh  (Va.),  6;U.  •*  -Wy^an    v.   Gould,    47    Me.    159; 

2  Wright  V.  State,  35  Ark.  640,  George  v.  Norris,  23  Ark.  121;  White- 
654.  ford  v.  Burckraeyer,  1  Gill  (Md.),  127. 


350  EX>AMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOlUp.   Tr., 

heard  such  a  conversatioii  in  the  family.  Such  negative  testi- 
mony has  no  legal  value. ^ 

§  392.  Putting   the  Testimony  of  two  Witnesses  together. — 

There  is  authorit}^  for  the  conclusion  that  a  fact  may  be  proved 
by  putting  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  together.  Thus,  if 
one  witness  knew  the  fact  at  the  time  and  told  it  to  the  other, 
and  then  forgot  it,  but  the  other  remembers  it  as  the  former 
told  it,  and  the  former  is  able  to  testify  that  he  told  it  correctly, 
the  latter  may  detail  it  to  the  jury  as  the  former  told  it  to  him.^ 
In  like  manner,  where  the  plaintiff  testified  that  he  made  entries 
in  accordance  with  statements  made  to  him  by  other  witnesses, 
the  latter  testified  that  such  statements  were  true, —  the  evi- 
dence was  held  to  be  admissible.^ 

§  393.   Rule  as  to  the  Declarations  of    Conspirators.  —  It  is 

a  well  established  rule  that,  where  several  persons  are  proved  to 
have  combined  together  for  the  same  illegal  or  fraudulent  pur- 
pose, any  act  done  by  one  of  the  party  in  pursuance  of  the  orig- 
inal concerted  plan,  and  with  reference  to  the  common  object,  is, 
in  contemplation  of  law,  the  act  of  the  whole  party.  It  follows 
as  a  corollary  from  this  rule,  that  any  acts  or  verbal  expressions, 
being  acts  in  themselves,  or  accompanying  and  explaining  other 
acts,  in  furtherance  of  the  common  design,  and  for  this  reason 
part  of  the  res  gestoe,  which  are  brought  home  to  one  conspira- 
tor, are  evidence  against  the  other  conspirators,  provided  it  suffi- 
ciently appear  that  they  were  made  and  used  in  furtherance  of 
the  common  purposes  of  the  conspiracy.  But,  on  obvious 
grounds,  before  one  party  can  be  bound  by  the  declarations  of 

1  Chambers  v.  Hill,  34  Mich.  523.  the  plaintiff.     The  i)laintiff   was  then 

2  Thus,  oil  the  trial  of  au  action  for  called  and  allowed,  against  objectiou, 
breach  of  a  contract  in  reference  to  to  state  that  the  number  of  loads 
gathering  hay,  the  question  in  issue  given  him  by  the  previous  witness  was 
was  the  uuml)er  of  loads  of  hay  which  fourteen.  It  was  held  that  the  evi- 
had  been  delivered  at  a  particular  deuce  was  adnussible.  Shear  v.  Van 
time.     A  witness  stated  that  he  could  Dyke,  10  llun  (N.  Y.),  528. 

not  remember  the  number,  but  that  he  ^  Payne  v.  llodge,  7  Hun    (N.  Y.), 

knew  it  at  the  time  and  then  told  it  to      612. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XV.]    INCIDENTS    OF    DIRECT    EXAMINATION.  351 

another  party  on  the  ground  that  the  two  are  co-conspirators,  the 
fact  of  the  conspiracy  must  be  shown,  and  then  the  declarations 
must  appear  to  have  been  made  in  furtherance  of  the  common 
design.  Reguhxrl}^  proof  of  the  plot  or  combination  must  j9re- 
cede  the  proof  of  the  declarations :  but  this  is  a  matter  which 
yields  to  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court.  In  ordier  to 
make  such  evidence  admissible,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  con- 
spiracy or  combination  was  entered  into  before  the  declaration 
was  made,  though  the  conduct,  acts  and  declarations  of  the  sep- 
arate individuals,  in  the  planning  or  the  execution  of  the  joint 
scheme,  may  be  shown  as  evidence  of  the  common  design.  If 
admissible,  the  acts  and  declarations  must  be  those  only  which 
were  done  and  made  during  the  pendency  of  the  wrongful  enter- 
prise, shown  to  have  been  undertaken  jointly  and  in  furtherance 
of  its  objects.^  The  preliminary  question  of  the  existence  of 
such  a  common  purpose  must  be  passed  on  by  the  court,  for  the 
purpose  of  deciding  on  the  admissibility  of  the  evidence  of  such 
acts  and  declarations.  The  question  of  the  probative  value  of  the 
acts  and  declarations  is  ultimately  to  be  decided  by  the  jury.^ 

1  Page -y.  Parker,  40  N.  H.  47,62.    See  have  been  laid  by   evidence  sufficient 

also  People  v.  Parish,  4  Denio  (X.  Y.),  to  establish  the  fact  of  the  conspiracy 

153;    Williamson  v.   Com.,   4     Graft.  to   the  satisfaction  of  the  court,  or  at 

(Va.)  547;  State  u.   Simons,  4  Strobh.  least  by  evidence  reasonably  tending 

L.  (S.  C.)  206;   Reg.  v.  Mears,  l.Eng.  to   establish  it,   before  such   declara- 

L.  &  Eq.  581 ;    State  v.  Ripley,   31  Me.  tion's   can  be  admitted.     Sometimes, 

386;  Glory  v.  State,  13  Ark.  236;  Ap-  however,  the  court  may,  in  its  discre- 

thorp  u.   Comstock,  2  Paige  (N.  Y.),  tion, -an^er  peculiar  undi  urgent  circum- 

482,488;  Craige  i?.  Sprague,  12  Wend.  stances,   let  such  declarations  go    to 

(N.  Y.)41;  Willes  V.   Farley,  3  Carr.  the    jury    before    sufficient  proof    is 

&  P.  395;  Patten  v.  Gurney,  17  Mass.  given  of  the  conspiracy,  the  State  un- 

182;  Lovell  v.  Briggs,  2   N.    H.    218;  dertaking  to  supply  such  proof  after- 

Sheple  ■y.Page,  12  Vt.  519;  Talbot  v.  wards.     Lawson  v.  State,  32  Ark.  220; 

Cains,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  520;  Brannock  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  111. 
.  Bouldin,  5  Ir^d.  L.  (N.  C.)  61.    But,  -  Cora.  v.  Brown,  14   Gray  (Mass.), 

as  a  general  rule,  a  foundation   must  419,432. 


352  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 


CHAPTER    XVI. 

OF  THE  USE  BY  WITNESSES  OF  MEMORANDA  TO  REFRESH  RECOL- 
LECTION. 

Section 

398.  Statement  of  the  General  Rule  by  Prof.  Greenleaf . 

399.  By  Whom  Made. 

400.  Time  when  Made. 

401.  How  Made  —  May  Consist  of  what. 

(1.)  Stenographic  Writings. 

(2.)  Copies. 

(3.)  Previous  Testimony,  Deposition  or  Affidavit  of  the  same  Witness. 

(4.)  Books  of  Account,  Bills  of  Particulars,  etc. 

(5.)  Newspaper  Report  made  by  Witness. 

402.  How  Used  at  the  Trial. 

(1.)  Not  Necessary  that  the  Witness  Should  have  an  Independent 

Recollection  of  the  Fact.       ♦ 
(2.)  Right  of  the  Other  Party  to  Inspect  the  Document. 
(3.)  Manner  in  which  Memorandum  Used  by  Witness. 
(4.)  Whether  Memorandum  can  be  Put  in  Evidence. 

§  398.  Statement  of  tlie  General  Rule  by  Prof.  Green- 
leaf.  —  Prof.  Greenleaf  s  statement  of  the  general  rule  has  been 
so  often  quoted  with  approval  by  the  judicial  courts,  that  the 
writer  takes  the  liberty  of  reproducing  it  here:  "  Though  a  wit- 
ness can  testify  only  to  such  facts  as  are  within  his  own  knowl- 
edge and  recollection,  yet  he  is  permitted  to  refresh  and  assist 
his  memory,  by  the  use  of  a  written  instrument,  memorandum, 
or  entry  in  a  book,  and  maybe  compelled  to  do  so,  if  the  writing 
is  present  in  court.  It  does  not  seem  to  be  necessary  that  the 
writing  should  have  been  made  by  the  witness  himself,  nor  that 
it  should  be  an  original  writing,  provided,  after  inspecting  it,  he 
can  speak  to  the  facts  from  his  own  recollection.  So  also  where 
the  witness  recollects  that  he  saw  the  paper  while  the  facts  were 
fresh  in  his  memory,  and  remembers  that  he  then  knew  that  the 
particulars  therein  mentioned  were  correctly  stated.  And  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  writing  thus  used  to  refresh  the  memory 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVI.]       U«E    OF    MEMORANDA.  353 

should  itself  be  admissible  in  evidence  ;  for  if  inadmissible  in 
itself,  as  for  want  of  a  stamp,  it  may  still  be  referred  to  by 
the  witness.  But  where  the  witness  neither  recollects  the  fact, 
nor  remembers  to  have  recognized  the  written  statement  as  true, 
and  the  writing  was  not  made  by  him,  his  testimony,  so  far  as  it 
is  founded  upon  the  written  paper,  is  but  hearsay;  and  a  witness 
can  no  more  be  permitted  to  give  evidence  of  his  inference  from 
Avhat  a  third  person  has  written,  than  from  what  a  third  person 
has  said."  ^  The  rule  is  applicable  to  criminal  as  well  as  to 
civil  cases.  A  witness  called  by  the  prosecution  in  a  criminal 
case  to  prove  statements  made  by  the  defendant,  may,  while  on 
the  stand,  refresh  his  recollection  by  referring  to  a  written  mem- 
orandum made  by  him  at  the  time  of  making  such  statements  or 
soon  after. 2 

§  399.  Bj' Whom  Made.  —  In  conformity  with  the  above 
text  of  Greenleaf ,  the  prevailing,  though  not  universal  ^  view  now 
is,  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  memorandum  which  a  witness 
may  use  to  refresh  his  recollection,  should  have  been  made  by 
the  witness  himself,  i)rovided  that,  after  reading  it  he  can  speak 
to  the  facts  from  his  recollection,*  or  can  swear  positively  to 
them  from  the  memorandum,'  and  provided  also  it  is  used  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  refreshing  his  recollection,  and  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  acquiring  original  information.'^     It  is,  therefore,  scarce- 

»  1  Greenl  Ev.,§  43G.     The  follow-  •*  Berry   v.  Jourclau,  11  Eich.  L.  (S- 

ing,  among  other  authorities,  are  in  C.)    67;  Davis  v.  Field,   56  Vt.   42(;, 

.substantial  support  of  the  text.     Fol-  428;  Com.  v.  Ford,  130  Mass.  64;  Huff 

som  t>.  Apple  River  Log  Driving  Co.,  v.  Benuett,  6  N.  Y.  337;  Henry  v.  Lee, 

47  "Wis.  (;02  (where  the  text  is  quoted  18  Eng.  C.  L.  273  (2  Chit.  Rep.  124)  ;  1 

with  approval);    Huff   v.   Benuett,    6  Whart.    Ev.,  §516;    State  v.    Lull,  37 

X.  Y.  337;  Howlaud  v.  Sheriff,  5Saudf.  Me.  246. 

(X.  Y.)21!);  Harrison  r.  Middletou,  11  »  Martin  v.  Good,  14  Md.  398;  Cof- 

Gratt.  (Va.)  527;  Talbot  t\  Cusack,  17  fin  v.  Vincent,   12  Ciish.    (Mass.)  98; 

Ir.  L.  (x.s.)  216;  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Hill  w.   State,    17  Wis.  675.     Compare 

Adler,  56  HI.  344;  Mead  v.  McGraw,  19  McCormicku.  Mulvihill,  1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.) 

Oh.  St.  55.  131. 

2  Peoples.  Cotta,  49  Cal.  166.  e  j^rie  Preserving  Co.  v.  Miller,  52 

s  See,  for  instance,  Stater.  Rhodes,  Conn.  444;  Jaques  r.  Horton,    76   Ala. 

I  Houst.  (^Del.)  Crim.  Cas.  476,  480.  239,  243. 

23 


354  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

\y  necessary  to  say  that,  where  a  witness  swears  that  he  has  a 
complete  recollection  of  the  facts,  it  makes  no  difference  that 
the  memoranda  which  he  uses  to  refresh  his  memory  are  not  his 
own  notes. ^  Thus,  a  sur2:;eon  may  use  for  this  purpose  the  7-ec- 
ord  of  a  hospital,  although  not  made  by  him,  provided  he  speaks 
from  his  own  recollection.^ 

§  400.  Time  When  Made. — Professor  Greenleaf  says:  "It 
is  most  frequently  said  that  the  writing  must  have  been  made  at 
the  time  of  the  fact  in  question,  or  recently  afterwards.  At  the 
farthest  it  ought  to  have  been  made  before  such  a  period  of  time 
has  elapsed  as  to  render  it  probable  that  the  memory  of  the  wit- 
ness might  have  become  deficient.  But  the  practice  in  this  respect 
is  governed  very  much  by  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case."  ^  The  memorandum  must  have  been  reduced  to  writing  at, 
or  shortly  after,  the  transaction,  and  while  the  transaction  must 
have  been  fresh  in  the  memory  of  the  witness.  It  must  have  been 
"  presently  committed  to  writing,"  *  "  while  the  occurrences  men- 
tioned in  it  were  recent  and  fresh  in  his  recollection;"  ^  "  written 
contemporaneously, with  the  transaction,"®  "or  contemporaneous- 
ly or  nearly  so,  with  the  facts  deposed  to."  ^  Where  the  witness 
uses  a  copy  of  his  memorandum  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his 
memory,  it  is  immaterial  when  the  copy  was  made,  if  it  suiEc- 

1  Camerou  v.  Blackman,  39  Mich.  Chapiu,  97  Mass.  72,  77;  Spriug  Gar- 
108.  den  lus.    Co.    v.   Evans,    15  Md.    54; 

2  State  V.  Collins,  15  S.  C.  373;  s.  c.  Nicholls  v.  Webb,  8  Wlieat.  (U.  S.) 
40  Am.Kep.  697.  326,  337;    Ins.    Co.   v.  Weide,  9  Wall. 

3  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  438.  667  and  14  Wall.  375;  Chaffee  v.  U.  S., 

4  Lord  Holt  in  Sandwell  v.  Sand-  18  Wall.  516.  Instances:  Two  xveeks, 
well,  Comb.  445;  s.  c.  Holt,  295.  too  long.  O'Neale  v.  Walton,  1  Rich.  L. 

s  Lord   Ellenborongh   in  Burrough  (S.  C.)  234.     So,  under  circumstances, 

V.  Martin,  2  Camp.  112.  the     next    day.     Ballard    v.    Ballard, 

6  Tindal,   C.    J.,    in    Steinkeller  v.  5  Rich.  L.  495.     So,  of  sixteen  months. 

Newton,  9  Carr.  &  P.  313.  Swartz  v.  Chickering,  58  Md.  291,  298. 

^  Wilde,  C.  J.,  in  Whitfield  «.  Aland,  So,  of  a  memorandum  made  five  moJiths 

2  Carr.  &  K.  1015.     To  the  same  effect  after  the  transaction  at  the  request  of 

see  Burton  v.  Plummer,  2  Ad.  &  El.  a  party.    Spriug  &c.,  Ins.  Co.  v.  Evans, 

341;  s.   c.  4  Nev.  &  Man.  315;  Wood  v.  75  Md.  54. 
Cooper,  1  Carr.  &  K.  645;  Morrison  v. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVI.]       USE    OF   MEMORANDA.  355 

iently  appear  that  it  is  a  correct  copy.^  It  is  said  that  in  re- 
spect of  the  time  wheu  a  memorandum  was  made,  much  must  be 
left  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  who  sees  the  witness  and 
hears  him  testify.  Accordingly,  where  the  witness  said  that  he 
made  the  memorandum  within  a  month  or  so,  but  that  he  re- 
membered it  until  he  wrote  it  down,  it  was  held  that  there  was 
no  error  in  allowing  him  to  use  it  to  refresh  his  recollection. 
The  court  said:  "  The  witness  having  testified  that  he  remem- 
bered the  items  of  labor  when  he  wrote  them  down,  the  lapse  of 
time  was  not  such,  considering  the  nature  of  the  account,  as  to 
forbid  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  allowing  the 
witness  to  use  the  account  to  refresh  his  memory."  ^  "The 
reasons,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  "  for  limiting  the  time  within 
which  the  memorandum  must  have  been  made  are,  to  say  the 
least,  quite  as  strong  when  the  witness,  after  reading  it,  has  no 
recollection  of  the  facts  stated  in  it,  but  testifies  to  the  truth  of 
those  facts  only  because  of  his  confidence  that  he  must  have 
known  them  to  be  true  when  he  signed  the  memorandum."  ^ 

§  401.  How  Made  —  May  Consist  of  What.  —  (  1 . )  8teno- 
grapliic  Writings.  —  It  seems  to  be  no  objection  that  the  memo- 
randum used  by  a  witness  to  refresh  his  memory,  if  written  by 
himself,  is  in  characters  which  he  alone  can  read.  This  o})inion 
was  held  in  a  case  where  the  memorandum  was  written  in  pho- 
nographic characters  peculiar  to  the  witness.* 

(2.)  Copies.  —  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  writing  used  for 
this  purpose  should  be  an  original  writing,  but  a  copy  taken  by 
the  witness  may  be  used,  provided  that,  after  inspecting  the 
copy  the  witness  can  speak  to  the  facts  from  his  recollection.^ 
"  The  rule  is  subject  to  the  limitation,  that  the  witness  must  be 

1  Lawson  v.  Glass,  C  Colo.  134.  McC.    (S.  C.)  331;  O'Neale  v.  Walton, 

2  Ibid.  1  Rich.  L'.  (S.  C.)  234. 

*  Maxwell  v.   Wilkinson,  113  U.  S.  *  gtate  v.  Cardoza,  11  S.  C.  195,238. 

6ofi,  658;  citing  Halsey  u.  Sinsebaugh,  ^  Lawson    v.   Glass,   6   Colo.    134; 

15  N.    Y.  485;    Marcly  v.   Shults,   29  Jaques   v.    Horton,   76  Ala.   238,244; 

N.Y.  346,355;  State  ».  Rawls,  2Nott  &  Berry  v.  Jourdan,  11  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  67. 


356  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [I  Tliomp.  Tr., 

able  to  testify  that  the  original  entry,  when  made,  was  a  true 
statement  of  the  facts,  and  the  copy  must  be  verified."^  A 
clerk  may  also  use  for  this  purpose  copies  of  papers  on  file  in  his 
office,  which  relate  to  the  business  which  passes  under  his  super- 
vision.^ 

(3.)  Previous  Testimony^  Deposition  or  Affidavit  of  the  Same 
Witness.  —  There  is  a  difference  of  o})inion  whether  the  previous 
deposition,  testimony,  or  affidavit  of  a  witness  can  be  used  by  him 
for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his  memory.  In  one  jurisdiction 
the  deposition  of  a  witness,  previously  made  by  him,  may  be  so 
used,*^  and  it  is  not  error  to  allow  a  witness,  on  a  criminal  trial, 
to  refresh  his  memory  by  reference  to  the  minutes  of  his  testi- 
mony given  before  the  grand  jury,  although  the  minutes  are  not 
in  his  handwriting.*  In  another  jurisdiction,  it  is  ruled  that  a 
witness  in  a  criminal  trial  may,  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his 
memory  as  to  certain  dates,  be  permitted  to  read  over  the  min- 
utes of  his  testimony  as  given  on  the  preliminary  examination  be- 
fore a  mao'istrate,  where,  after  so  refreshing  his  memory,  he  tes- 
tifies from  memory  to  the  facts.^  These  rulings  conform  to  the 
view  above  stated,^  that  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  memorandum 
should  have  been  made  by  the  witness  himself.  But,  if  they  are 
sound  in  principle,  what  becomes  of  the  rule  that  the  memoran- 
dum should  be  made  at,  or  near  the  time  of  the  transaction  to 
which  the  testimony  relates?  It  is  believed  that  they  are  un- 
sound in  principle,  and  that  the  true  view  is  that  taken  in  Penn- 
sylvania, that  a  party  cannot  refresh  the  memory  of  his  own 
witness  by  reading  to  him  notes  of  testimony  given  by  him  in 


1  Calloway  v.  Varner,  cited  in  ney  v.  Ball,  24:Ga.  505;  Beaubien  v. 
Jaques  v.  Ilorton,  76  Ala.  244.  Cicotte,  12  Mich.  459,  469. 

2  Erie  Preserving  Co.  v.  Miller,  52  ^  State  v.  Miller,  53  la.  1.54.  Corn- 
Conn.  444,  446;  s.  c.  52  Am.  Kep.  G07.  pare  Com.  w.  Phelps,  11  Gray  (Mass.), 
Use  of  copy  of  defaced  copy  of  defaced  73. 

original  permitted:  Folsom  v.  Apple  ^  White   v.    State,  18  Tex.  App.  57, 

Rivei  &c.  Co.,  41  Wis.  602,  606.  62.     See  also.  Hubby  v.  State,  8  Tex 

3  Hull    V.  Alexander,    26   la.    569.  App.  597. 

See  Atkin  v.  State,  16  Ark.  568;  Bur-  ^  Ante,  §  399. 


Til.    ill,  Ch.  XVI.]       USE    OF   MEMORANDA.  '  357 

a  former  proceeding,  touching  the  same  subject-matter;^  though 
in  that  State  the  rule  seems  to  be  otherwise  in  a  case  of  a  witness, 
who,  since  the  former  trial,  has  lost  his  health  and  memory.'' 
But  the  mere  fact  that  a  witness  fails  to  recollect  what  he  had 
previously  sworn  to,  where  he  has  not,  by  reason  of  old  age  or 
otherwise,  lost  his  memory,  will  not  be  sufficient  to  admit  the 
notes  of  a  former  trial.  The  court  said :  "  He  probably  failed  to 
recollect  what  he  had  previously  sworn  to,  but  if  this  were  enough 
to  admit  the  notes  of  the  former  trial,  we  might  as  well  abandon 
original  testimony  altogether,  and  supply  it  with  previous  notes 
and  depositions.  It  would  certainly  be  an  excellent  way  to 
avoid  the  contradiction  of  a  doubtful  witness,  for  he  could  al- 
ways be  thus  led  to  the  exact  words  of  his  former  evidence.  As 
we  are  not  yet  prepared  for  an  advance  of  this  kind,  we  must 
accept  the  ruling  of  the  court  below  as  correct."  "^  On  the  same 
view  it  has  been  held  that  an  affidavit,  made  by  the  witness 
some  three  years  after  the  occurrence  of  the  transaction  in  ques- 
tion, and  shortly  before  the  trial,  at  the  request  of  the  defend- 
ant's counsel,  could  not  be  so  used  by  the  witness,  since  it 
"  would  be  calculated  to  stimulate  his  courage  rather  than  his 
veracity."  The  court  said:  "  We  think  the  practice  of  procur- 
ing such  papers,  and  then  using  them,  ostensibly  for  the  purpose 
of  refreshing  the  recollection  of  a  witness  who  appears  to  be  ad- 
verse, but  reallj^  to  intimidate  him,  ought  not  to  be  encouraged 
or  sanctioned.  The  proper  course  is  to  examine  the  witness  in 
the  usual  way,  and,  if  his  testimony  be  in  contradiction  of  writ- 
ten statements  previously  made  by  him,  to  interrogate  him  re- 
specting the  latter,  for  the  purpose  of  probing  his  recollection, 
and  of  obtaining  an  explanation  of  his  inconsistency."  *  But 
where  a  witness  is  cross-examined  as  to  his  testimony  in  a  previ- 
ous deposition,  there  is  no  good  reason  wdiy  he  should  not  be  al- 
lowed to  refresh  his  memory  by  looking  at  the  deposition.^ 

1  Velott  V.  Lewis,  102  Pa.  St,  326.  *  Honstiue    v.   O'Donnell,   5   Hun, 

See  also  Brown  I'.  State,  28  Ga.  199.  472;      citiiii:;    Bullard    v.  Tearsall,   .53 

2Rotlirock  I'.    Gallaher,  91  Pa.  108.  N.Y.  230.     Compare  Harvey  i'.  State,  40 

8  Velott  V.   Lewis,  102  Pa.  St.  326,  lud.  516. 
333,  opiuion  by  Gordon,  J.  ^  George  v.  .Joy,  19  N.  H.  544. 


358  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

(4.)  Books  of  Account^  Bills  of  Particulars,  etc. — This 
question  must  be  kept  distinct  from  the  question  under  what  cir- 
cumstances books  of  account,  shown  to  have  been  correctly  kept, 
are  admissible  as  original  evidence.  On  grounds  already  sug- 
gested, books  of  account  kept  by  the  witness,  or  known  by  him 
to  be  correct,  may  be  used  by  him  as  memoranda  for  the  purpose 
of  refreshing  his  recollection. ^  Thus,  an  invoice  book,  known  by 
the  witness  to  be  in  the  plaintiff  's  handwriting,  the  witness  hav- 
ing been  present  when  it  was  made,  and  it  being  correct  so  far 
as  the  witness  knows,  has  been  held  such  a  memorandum  as  the 
witness  might  look  to,  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his  memory 
as  to  the  character  of  the  goods  mentioned  therein  and  their 
value. 2  So,  where  the  question  relates  to  the  nature  and  value 
of  property  sold  at  an  administrator's  sale,  it  is  competent  for  a 
witness  to  refresh  his  memory  from  an  account  of  the  sales  kept 
by  himself,  and  also  to  read  the  terms  of  the  sale  as  they  were 
read  just  before  the  sale  commenced.^  So,  where  the  question 
was  w^hether  or  not  the  defendant  had  deposited  $1,000  with  the 
plaintiff  's  bank  on  a  given  date  and  an  offer  was  made  to  show 
that  he  had  deposited  the  amount  in  another  bank  on  that  date, 
and  that  the  entry  had  been  made  by  the  teller  of  such  other  bank 
in  the  wrong  pass-book,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  pass-book  which 
contained  the  entries  of  the  plaintiff  's  bank,  and  the  book-keeper 
of  such  other  bank  was  prepared  to  testify  from  an  inspection  of 
his  daily  figuring  book,  made  in  course  of  business  at  the  time,  — 
it  was  held  that  the  testimony  should  have  been  received,  whether 
the  books  were  admissible  or  not.*  So,  in  a  criminal  trial  the 
prisoner  was  time-keeper,  and  the  witness  was  pay-clerk,  of  a 
colliery.     The  prisoner  gave  a  time-list  to  a  clerk,  who  entered 

MVhite  V.   Tucker,   9    Iowa,   100;  42(1;  Reed  i'.  Jones,  15  Wis.  40;   Schet- 

Flower  V.   Downs,   6   La.   Ann.  539;  tier  ?;.  Jones  20  Wis.  412. 
Davidson  v.  Lallaude,  12  La.  Ann.  820 ;  2  Miller  v.  Jannett,  63  Tex.  82.     So 

Sacliett  V.  Spencer,   29  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  as  to  the  invoices  themselves,  received 

180;  Columbia  tJ.  Harrison,  2  Treadw.  with  the  goods  by  a /actor.     Bartlett 

(S.  C.)  213;  Treadwell  V.  Wells,  4  Cal.  v.  Hoyt,  33  N.  H.  151. 
260;  Chiapella  v.  Brown,  14  La.  Ann.  ^  Cowles  v.  Hayes,  71  N.  C.  230. 

189;    Mussey  v.  Hackett,   12  Id.   54;  ^  Lawrence     v.    Stiles,    16   Bradw. 

Jones  V.  Johns,  2  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S)  (111.)  489. 


A 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVI.]       USE    OF    MEMORAJfDA.  359 

it  in  the  time-book,  and  on  pay-day  the  prisoner  read  from  the 
time-book  the  number  of  days  each  man  had  worked  to  the  wit- 
ness, who  paid  accordingly  and  who  saw  the  entries  of  that  time. 
It  was  held  that,  for  the  purpose  of  proving  these  payments,  the 
witness  might  refresh  his  recollection  by  referring  to  the  time- 
book.^  For  this  pur})ose  a  witness  may  use  a  book  kept  by  an- 
other clerk,  if,  from  his  connection  with  the  business,  he  knows 
that  the  entries  are  correct,  and  testities  therefrom  according  to 
his  own  recollection.-  So,  a  plaintiff  testifying  in  his  own  be- 
half, may  refresh  his  recollection,  where  he  kuDws  the  facts,  by 
reading  from  his  bill  of  particulars,  when  that  is  a  duplicate  of 
the  account  rendered  on  which  he  sues,  even  though  it  was  kept 
by  his  clerk  from  entries  in  his  book,  as  to  which  the  witness 
cannot  say,  wdthout  seeing  them,  wdiether  or  not  he  made  them 
himself  ."^  So,  in  a  suit  to  recover  the  pay  for  boarding  a  lot  of 
workmen,  the  plaintiff  in  his  testimony  referred  to  the  bill  of 
particulars  made  out  by  another  person  under  his  direction,  and 
testified  that  he  knew  it  to  be  correct.  He  testified  from  recol- 
lection to  the  number  of  men  boarded,  the  rate  per  week  at  which 
they  w'ere  boarded,  and  the  aggregate  amount  due  therefor.  It 
was  held  that  it  was  proper  to  allow  him  to  refer  to  this  account, 
although  he  could  not  give  the  name  of  each  man  who  boarded 
with  him.*  And  where  a  bill  of  particulars  contains  many  items, 
so  that  no  person  could  be  expected  to  remember  them  or  to  state 
them  in  detail  without  the  aid  of  some  memorandum  made  by 
himself  or  under  his  direction,  it  is  discretionary  to  allow  the 
witness  to  take  the  bill  of  particulars  for  the  purpose  of  answer- 
ing the  question  whether  or  not  it  contains  a  correct  list.^  It  is 
sometimes  admissible  to  permit  a  witness  to  refresh  his  memory 
by  his  books  of  account,  although  such  books  do  not  contain  the 
original  entries.  The  fact,  however,  that  books  of  original  en- 
tries have  been  lost  or  destroyed  is  ordinarily  a  suspicious  cir- 
cumstance proper  to  be  considered  by  the    jury.^     Where  the 

1  Reg.  r.  Laiigton,  2  Q.  B.  Div.  206.  *  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Liddell,  69 

2  Interuatioual  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Blan-      111.  639. 

ton,  63  Tex.  109.  ^  Cool  v.  Suover,  38  Mich.  562. 

3  Iluduutt  V.   Comstocli,    50   Mich.  ^  Murray  v.  Cuuuiugham,   10  Neb. 
596,601.                                                               167. 


360  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

question  was  whether  a  party  was  a  resident  of  the  State  at  a 
partieuhir  date,  and  a  witness  was  testifying,  who  made  the  tax- 
list,  and  who  had  signed  and  sworn  to  it,  it  was  held  that  he 
might  use  it  as  a  memorandum  to  refresh  his  recollection.^ 
Whether  the  writing  be  used  merely  as  an  instrument  for  restor- 
ing the  recollection  of  a  fact,  or  be  offered  to  be  read  as  contain- 
ing a  true  account  of  transactions  entirely  forgotten,  it  must,  in 
conformity  with  the  general  principles  of  evidence,  be  the  best 
evidence  for  the  purpose  that  the  case  admits  of.^  When, 
therefore,  the  subject  of  the  testimony  is  what  took  place  at  an 
interview  between  a  person  and  the  reporter  of  a  newspaper,  the 
reporter's  notes  of  the  interview,  if  in  existence,  would  be  the  ' 
proper  memoranda  to  be  used  by  the  witness  in  refreshing  his 
recollection.  But  where  the  reporter  testified  that  his  notes  of 
such  an  interview  had  been  destroyed,  and  that  he  had  read  the 
published  account  of  the  interview  printed  from  his  minutes,  had 
compared  it  mentally  with  his  minutes  and  had  found  it  to  be 
correct,  it  was  held  that  the  printed  article  was  the  best  evidence 
that  the  case  admitted  of,  and  that  it  might  be  used  by  the  re-  . 
porter,  testifying  as  a  witness,  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his 
memory  as  to  what  took  place  at  the  interview.^  But  where  it  is 
sought  to  introduce  the  newspaper  article  itself  as  evidence,  and 
not  to  allow  a  witness  to  use  it  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his 
memory,  the  rule  is  said  to  be  that  it  would  be  material  to  show, 
as  a  foundation  for  the  introduction  of  the  article,  that  the  orig- 
inal manuscript  from  which  it  had  been  printed  had  been  lost.* 

(5.)  JSTewspaper  Report  made  by  Witness. —  A  newspaper  re- 
porter, testifying  as  a  witness,  may  be  permitted,  for  this  pur- 
pose, to  look  at  a  newspaper  report  of  the  transaction  made  by 
him  at  the   time,  although  the    absence   of   his    written  report, 

1  Davis  «.  Field,  56  Vt,  426.  Railroad   Co.  v.    Addler,  56  111.   344; 

2  1  Stark  Ev.  178.  Strader  v.  Snyder,  67  111.  404;  Adams 

3  Clifford  V.Drake,  14  Bradw.  (111.)  v.  Kelly,  Ry.  &  M.  157;  Burton  v. 
75;  s.  c.  affirmed,   110  111.    135.     See  Plummer,  2  Ad.  &  EL  341. 

also  Toiiliara  v.  McGregor,  1  Carr,  &  *  Clifford  v.  Drake,  14  Bradw.  (III.) 

K.  320;  Com.  v.  Ford,  130  Mass.  64;      75. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVI.]       USE    OF    MEMORANDA.  361 

from  which  the  newspaper  report  was  printed,  is  not  accounted 
for.i 

§  402.  How  Used  at  the  Trial. — (1.)  Not  Necessary  that  the 
Witness  Should  have  an  Independent  Recollection  of  the  Fact. — 
The  old  idea  seems  to  have  been  that  the  use  of  the  memoran- 
dum by  the  witness  was  permitted  strictly  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
freshing his  previous  recollection  of  the  fact —  revivifying  it,  so 
to  speak,  —  and  that  it  was  for  the  witness  then  to  testify,  from 
his  recollection,  so  refreshed,  what  the  fact  was.^  But  this  idea 
seems  to  be  pretty  much  exploded.  At  least,  in  several  modern 
jurisdictions,  it  is  held  that  all  that  is  required  is  that  the  witness 
be  able  to  swear  that  the  memorandum  is  correct,  although  he 
may  have  forgotten  the  facts  themselvo*?.^  "There  seems," 
said  Howell,  J.,  "  to  be  two  classes  of  cases  on  this  subject:  1. 
Where  the  witness,  by  referring  to  the  memorandum,  has  his 
memory  quickened  and  refreshed  thereby,  so  that  he  is  enabled 
to  swear  to  an  actual  recollection.  2.  "Where  the  witness,  after 
referring  to  the  memorandum,  undertakes  to  swear  to  the  fact, 
yet,  not  because  he  remembers  it,  but  because  of  his  confidence 
in  the  correctness  of  the  memorandum.  In  both  cases  the  oath 
of  the  witness  is  the  primary,  substantive  evidence  relied  upon. 
In  the  former,  the  oath  being  grounded  upon  actual  recollection, 
and  in  the  latter  on  the  faith  imposed  in  the  verity  of  the  memo- 
randum, in  wdiich  case,  in  order  to  judge  of  the  credibility  of 
the  oath  and  the  reliance  to  be  placed  upon  the  testimony  of  the 

1  Com.  V.  Ford,  130  Mass.  G4;  s.  c.  3  Davis  v.  Field,  5G  Vt.  426,  428; 
39  Am.  Rep.  42<J.  Downer  v.  Rowell,  24  Vt.  343;  Halsey 

2  Redden  v.  Spriiance,  4  Harr.  v.  Siuesbaiigli,  15  N.  Y.  485;  Russell 
(Del.)  217;  Key  u.  Lynn,  4  Litt.  (Ky.)  v.  Hudson  &c.,  R.  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  134: 
338;  Harrison  v.  Middletou,  11  Gratt.  State  v.  Colwell,  3  R.  I.  132;  O'Neale 
(Va.)  527;  Holmes  v.  Gayle,  1  Ala.  v.  Walton,  1  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  234; 
517;  Vastbinder  v.  Metcalf,  3  Ala.  Mattocks  ».  Lyman,  16  Vt.  113;  Eby  w. 
100;  Bank  v.  Brown,  Dudley  (Ga.),  69;  Eby,  5  Pa.  St.  435;  State  v.  Rawls,  2 
Huckins  v.  People's  &c.,  Ins.  Co.,  31  Nott  &  McCord  (S.  C),  331.  Well 
N.  H.  238;  Clark  v.  State,  4  Ind.  156;  illustrated,  in  the  case  of  an  old  and 
Calvert  v.  Fitzgerald,  Litt.  Sel.  Cas.  feeble  witness,  by  Cooper  v.  State,  59 
(Ky.)  388;    Lawrence     v.    Barker,    5  Miss.  267,  272. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)  301;  Owings  v.  Shan- 
non, 1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  188.  ' 


362  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tf., 

witness,  the  memorandum  must  be  original,  and  contemporary, 
and  produced  in  court."  ^  The  idea  upon  whicli  many  modern 
decisions  unite  is  that  it  is  sufficient  if  the  witness  is  able  to 
swear  that  he  knows,  from  the  memorandum,  that  certain  facts 
are  true,  although,  independently  of  the  memorandum,  he  may 
have  no  present  recollection  of  them.^  The  same  idea  is  some- 
times expressed  by  saying  that  the  witness  may,  from  his  memo- 
randum, testify  to  his  supposition  and  belief  of  the  fact  which  is 
stated  in  the  memorandum.  Thus,  a  witness  has  been  allowed 
to  testify  to  his  supposition  and  belief  as  to  the  time  when  a 
transaction  took  place,  although  he  had  no  recollection  as  to 
the  time  independently  of  the  entry  in  his  cash  book.^  So,  a 
notary's  belief  that  protest  and  notice  were  given,  based  on  his 
entry  in  his  books,  his  habit  being  to  make  such  entries  on  the 
happening  of  the  event,  is  evidence,  though  he  has  no  recollec- 
tion of  the  fact  independently  of  his  books.*  The  same  rule  is 
applied  when  a  surveyor  uses  his  field  book  to  refresh  his  memory.^ 
So,  where  a  witness  was  shown  a  receipt  given  for  the  payment 
of  money  signed  by  himself,  he  was  permitted  to  say  that  he  had 
no  doubt  that  he  received  the  money,  although  he  had  no  recol- 
lection of  it,  and  this  was  held  sufiicient  parol  evidence  of  the 
payment.^  So,  in  regard  to  an  attesting  witness,  it  is  not  gen- 
erally necessary  that  he  should  be  able  to  recollect  the  circum- 
stances attending  his  attestation,  or  the  fact  that  he  saw  the 
maker  of  the  instrument  sign  it.  It  is  enough,  lyrima  facie,  if 
he  answers  to  his  signature,  and  testifies  that  it  would  not  have 
been  affixed  to  the  instrument  but  for  the  purpose  of  attesta- 
tion.^    But  where  a  witness,  testifying  to  transactions    relating 

1  Davis  V.  Field,  56  Vt.  42ii,  42!).  375;  Reynolds  Steph.  Ev.,art.    130;  I 

2  State   V.    Ravvls,  2   Nott   &  McC.       Greenl.  Ev.,  §  437. 

(S.    C.)    331;  Dugau   v.   Mahoney,   11  3  Mattocks  v.  Lymau,  16  Vt.  113. 

Alk'ii    (,Mass.),    572;  Cowles  v.  State,  ^  Davis  v.  Field,  56  Vt.  426,  428,  per 

50  Ala.  454;  Wright  v.  Bolliug,  27  Ala.  Rovvell,  J. 

259;  Stephens  v.    People,  19  N.  Y.  549.  ^  i  Whart.  Ev.,    §  518. 

See  also    Rex  v.    Ramsdeu,  2  Carr.  &  ^  Maugham  v.   Hubbard,  8  Baru.  & 

P.  603;  Guy   v.    Meail,    22   N.  Y.  462;  Cres.  14. 

Ins.  Co.  V.  Wcide,  9  Wall.  (U.  S.)  677;  '  Alvord  v.  Collins,   20  Pick.    418; 

Ins.   Co.  V.  Weules,  14  Wall.   (U.   S.)  Burling  v.  Patterson,  9  Carr.  &  P.  570; 

1  Whart.  Ev.,  §739. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cb.  XVI.]       USE    OF    MEMORANDA.  363 

to  the  sale  and  delivery  of  goods  which  were  the  subject  of  a 
book  account,  said,  "  I  have  no  present  recollection  of  the  trans- 
action, and  can  only  speak  now  of  the  amount  by  what  I  swore  on 
a  former  trial  of  this  action,"  —  it  was  held  that  his  testimony  was 
properly  rejected ;  ^  the  court  reasoning,  according  to  the  old 
idea,  that  the  witness  must  testify  from  his  recollection  as  thus 
refreshed.  If  a  document,  made  by  the  witness  and  containing 
an  account  of  the  transaction  about  which  he  is  called  upon  to 
testify,  is  handed  to  him  to  refresh  his  memory,  and  he  does  not 
need  it  for  that  purpose,  no  error  will  be  committed  by  allowing 
him  to  take  the  document.  To  place  in  his  hands  the  memo- 
randum, under  such  circumstances,  is  regarded  as  the  doing  of 
an  idle  thing,  which  does  not  prejudice  the  party  against  whom 
lie  testifies.'^ 

(2.)  Rigid  of  the  other  Painty  to  Inspect  the  Document. — 
Where  a  paper  is  handed  to  a  witness  in  order  to  refresh  his 
memory,  the  other  party  has  a  right  to  inspect  it  for  the  purpose 
of  cross-examination,  and  it  is  error  to  deny  this  right. '^  But  he 
has  only  the  right  to  inspect  such  parts  of  it  as  the  witness  consults 
to  aid  his  memory,  or  as  relate  to  the  subject  of  his  testimony.* 
And  this  rule  seems  to  apply  only  in  cases  where  the  memorandum 
is  used  by  the  witness  in  court ;  it  has  been  held  that  the  memo- 
randum itself  need  not  be  produced  in  court,  but  that  notes  taken 
from  it  may  be  used.*  Accordingly,  where  the  superintendent 
and  house  surgeon  of  a  hospital,  after  having  refreshed  their 
memories  by  the  records  of  the  hospital,  testified,  from  their  own 
recollection,  as  to  certain  facts  therein  contained  as  to  the  ad- 
mission of  a  patient  into  the  hospital,  etc.,  it  was  held  that  the 
court  committed  no  error  in  receiving  this  testimony  without  the 
production  of  the  books  in  open  court. ^     A  witness,  it  seems, 

'  Howie  V.  Rea,  75  N.  C.  326.  Barb.  201;  Com.  v.  Jeffs,  131  Mass.  5; 

2  Chute  V.  State,  19  Minn.  271.  Com.  v.  Haley,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  587. 

^  Cliute  V.  State,  19  Minn.  271;  Rex  ^  Com.  v.  Haley,  supra. 

w.  Ramsdeu,  2  Carr.  &  P.  603;  Hardy's  ^  Hamilton   v.    Rice,    15   Tex.  382; 

Case,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  824;  Merrill  v.  ante,  §  401,  subsec.  2. 

Ry.  Co.,  16. Wend.  586,  600;   1  Greenl.  «  State  v.  Collins,  15  S.  C.  373;  s.  c. 

Ev.,  §  466;  Tibbetts  v.  Sternberg,  66  40  Am.  Rep.  697. 


364  EXA3IINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp,  Tr.» 

may  refresh  his  memory  from  memoranda  made  by  him  in  books, 
without  being  required  to  produce  the  books ;  ^  at  most,  the  pro- 
duction of  them,  if  he  has  not  been  summoned  to  produce  them, 
will  be  a  matter  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court. ^ 

(3.)  Manner  in  Which  Memorandum  Used  by  Witness. — A 
witness  may  be  required,  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  to 
look  at  a  memorandum  or  papers,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  his 
recollection.^  The  manner  in  which  a  witness  shall  be  allowed 
to  refresh  his  recollection,  by  referring  to  a  writing,  must  be  left 
to  some  extent  to  the  discretion  of  the  presiding  judge ;  a  discre- 
tion to  be  exercised  with  reference  to  the  circumstances  of  the 
case,  and  sometimes  it  is  presumed,  with  reference  to  the  conduct 
and  bearing  of  the  witness  upon  the  stand.*  Thus,  it  is  within 
the  discretion  of  the  court  to  refuse  to  require  the  witness  to 
examine  all  the  memoranda  before  giving  his  testimony,  and  then 
to  lay  them  aside  and  not  to  refer  to  them  again  while  testifying, 
especially  where  they  consist  of  numerous  large  books. ^  If  the 
witness  cannot  read  and  write,  but  has  nevertheless  made  his 
mark  to  a  certain  memorandum  produced  to  refresh  his  recollec- 
tion, it  may  not  be  read  to  the  witness  in  the  presence  of  the 
jury,  but  the  witness  may  be  permitted  to  withdraw,  with  one  of 
the  counsel  on  each  side,  and  the  paper  may  there  be  read  over 
to  him  without  comment,  after  which  he  may  testify  from  his 
recollection  as  thus  refreshed.'' 

(4. )  Whether  the  Memorandum  can  he  put  in  Evidence.  — Up- 
on this  point  it  is  difficult  to  state  a  uniform  or  satisfactory  rule. 

1  Trustees  v.  Bledsoe,  5  Iiul.  133;  ^  Chapin  v.  Laphara,  20  Pick. 
State  V.  Cheek,  13  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  lU.       (Mass.)  4(j7. 

This  ruling  will  not  apply  to  hooks  of  ■*  Johnson  v.   Coles,  21  Minn.  108, 

account,  which,  on  proof  of  their  hav-  111. 

ing  been  correctly  kept,  become,  in  ^  ii)icl.  It  is  proper  to  allow  wit- 
some  jurisdictions,  original  evidence,  nesses  to  refer  to  a  book  of  original 
See  Furmau  v.  Peay,  2  Bail.  (S.  C.)  entries  made  by  himself  for  the  pur- 
394;  State  v.  Cardoza,  11  S.  C.  195,  pose  of  fixing  dates.  McCausland  v. 
239;  Bank  v.  Zorn,  14  S.  C.  444.  Ralston,  12  Nev.  195. 

2  Com.  V.  Lannan,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  «  Com.  v.  Fox,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 
563.     Contra,  that  the  books  must  be  585. 

produced :  Hall  v.  Ray,  18  N.  H.  126. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XVI.]       USE    OF    MEMORANDA.  365 

One  idea  admits  the  memorandum  in  evidence  in  connection  with 
the  testimonj^of  the  witness.^  But  the  general  rule  seems  to  be, 
that  the  fact  that  the  recollection  of  the  witness  has  been  refreshed 
by  the  use  of  a  memorandum,  so  that  he  is  able  to  testify  to  the 
fact,  does  not  entitle  either  party  to  put  the  memorandum  in 
evidence.^  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  that,  "  if  the  witness, 
after  examining  the  memorandum,  cannot  state  the  facts  from 
independent  recollection,  but  can  testify  that  he  knew  the  con- 
tents of  the  memorandum  at  or  about  the  time  it  was  made,  and 
knew  them  to  be  true,  both  the  memorandum  and  the  testimony 
of  the  witness  are  admissible.'*^  Or,  negatively,  the  memoran- 
dum itself  is  not  admissible  in  evidence,  except  in  cases  where 
the  witness,  at  the  time  of  testifying,  has  no  recollection  of  what 
took  place,  further  than  that  he  accurately  reduced  the  whole 
transaction  to  writing.*  In  other  words,  the  entries  or  memo- 
randa of  transactions  made  by  a  witness  are  admissible  only  when 
the  memory  of  the  witness  is  at  fault.  If  he  can  refresh  his 
memory  by  an  inspection  of  the  writing,  and  then  testify  from 
personal  recollection,  the  written  data  will  be  excluded  from  evi- 
dence.^ When,  therefore,  a  witness  had  testified  from  his  own 
recollection  to  certain  transactions  in  which  he  took  part,  e.g., 
interviews  between  himself  and  the  defendant,  it  was  error  to 
admit  in  evidence  a  written  memorandum  of  such  transactions 
kept  by  him,  the  entries  in  which  were  made  at  the  time  of  the 
transactions,  for  the  purpose  of  corroborating  his  testimony.^ 
As  already  seen,'  it  is  the  right  of  the  opposite  party  to  inspect 

1  Watson  V.  Walker,  23  N.  H.  471;  485;  Russell  v.  Hudson  River  Co.,  17 
Webster  v.  Clark,  SON.  H.  245;  Tattle  N.  Y.  134;  Guy  v.  Mead,  22  N.  Y.  462; 
V.  Robinson,  83  N.  H.  104.  Marcly  v.  Shultz,  23  X.  Y.  346;  Brown 

2  Com.  V.  Jeffs.,  132  Mass.  5;  Field  v.  Jones,  46  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  400;  Driggs 
V.Thompson,  119  Mass.  151;  Alcock  v.  Smitli,  45  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  447; 
V.  Royal  Exchange  Ins.  Co.,  13  Ad.  &  Flood  v.  Mitchell,  68  N.  Y.  507;  Wiglit- 
EI.  (x.  s.),  292;  Com.  v.  Ford,  130  man  v.  Overhiser,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.),  282; 
Mass.  64.  Meacham  v.  Pell,  51  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  65; 

3  Jaques   v.    Horton,  76   Ala.    238,  Butler  v.  Benson,  1  Id.  526. 

243;  Acklen  V.  Hickman,  63   Ala.  494.  ^  ^yigi^ti^i-ii^    „_    Overliiser,    supra. 

•*  Kent  V.  Masson,  1   Bradw.   (111.)  Compare    Folsora  v.  Apple  River  &c. 

466.  Co.,  41  Wis.  602,  607. 

^  Halsey   v.    Sinebaugh,    15   N.    Y.  '  Supra,  subsec.  1. 


366  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr.y 

the  memorandum  and  to  cross-examine  the  witness  in  reo-ard  to 
it;  and  it  may  be  shown  to  the  jury,  not  for  the  purpose  of  es- 
tablishing the  facts  tlierein  contained,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  that  it  would  not  properly  refresh  the  memory  of  the 
witness.  But  even  in  such  a  case,  only  those  portions  of  the 
memorandum  Avhich  relate  to  the  cause  on  trial  and  the  testimony 
of  the  witnesss  can  be  put  in  evidence."  ^  It  is  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  say  that,  where  a  witness  uses  a  memorandum  which  it- 
self is  admissible  in  evidence,  it  is  no  objection  that  he  reads 
from  it  to  the  jury,  instead  of  its  being  read  to  the  jury  by  coun- 
sel, according  to  the  usual  practice.'^ 

1  Com.  ?;.  Jeffs,  132  Mass.  5.     Opin-  2  jjaynor    v,     Norton,     31     Mich. 

ion  by  Endicott,   J.   Citing  Com.    v.      210. 
Haley,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  587. 


Tit.    Ill,  Cb.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  ol)7 


CHAPTEE     XVII. 


OF  THE  CROSS-EXAMINATION. 


Article  I.  — In  General. 

Article  II.  —  American  Rule  of  Strict  Cross-examination. 

Article  III.  —  Questions  Affecting  Credibility. 


Article  I.  —  In  General. 
Section 

405.  Object  of  Cross-examination. 

406.  Riyht  to  Cross-examine. 

407.  Leading  Qnestions. 

408.  Sifting,  Modifying  and  Extending  the   Direct  Examination  —  Making  it 

More  Explicit. 

409.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

410.  [Further  Illustrations.]     Circumstances  Attending  a  Conspiracy. 

411.  [Further  Illustrations.]     Length  and  Circumstances  of  Possession,  etc» 

412.  [Further  Illustrations.]     Right  to  the  Whole  of  a  Conversation. 

413.  [Further  Illustrations.]     Reasons  for  Opinion  as  to  Value. 

414.  [Continued.]     Instances  Under  the  Last  Rule. 

415.  Great  Latitude  Allo^ved. 

416.  Especially  Where  Fraud  is  Involved. 

417.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

418.  Control  of  the  Limits  of  Cross-examination. 

419.  Court  may  Curtail  Needless  Repetitions. 

420.  Prescril)e  what  Counsel  shall  Examine  and  Cross-examine. 

421.  Prescribe   Order  in  Case  of  Several  Defendants  having  Separate  De- 

fenses. 

422.  Allow  Re-cross-examination  on  the  Same  Subject. 

423.  Whether  Admissibility  of   Matter  on  Cross-examination  depends  upon 

its  Admissibility  on  Direct  Examination. 

424.  Cross-Examining    an    Adverse    Witness  whose    Deposition  has    been 

Taken. 

425.  Not  Necessary  to  State  what  Facts  the  Question  will  Elicit. 

§  405.  Objects  of  Cross-examination. — All  cross-examination 
expends  itself  in  three  efforts:  1.  To  sift,  explain  or  modify 
what  has  been  said  on  the  direct  examination.  2.  (Under  the 
English  rule  in  force  in  some  American  State  courts)  to  develop 


368  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I   TllOnil).  Tl"., 

new  matter  favorable  to  the  cross-examining  party.     3.  To  dis- 
credit the  witness. 

§  406,  Right  to  Cross-examine.  —  "  The  benefit  of  cross-ex- 
amination, is  an  essential  condition  to  the  reception  of  direct 
testimony  ;  "  ^  that  is  to  say,  testimony  is  not  admissible,  if  the 
party  against  whom  it  is  to  be  used,  or  those  in  privity  with  him, 
have  no  opportunity  of  cross-examining  the  witness.^  The  right 
of  cross-examination  being  a  substantial  and  a  very  important 
rin'ht,  it  is  error  to  restrict  it,  so  far  as  to  prevent  the  cross-ex- 
aminino-  party  from  going  fully  into  all  matters  connected  ^itli 
the  examination  in  chief.  "  The  importance  of  the  right  of  full 
cross-examination,"  says  Scott,  J.,  "  can  scarcely  be  overesti- 
mated. As  a  test  of  the  accuracy,  truthfulness  and  credibility 
of  testimony,  it  is  invaluable.  It  is  the  clear  right  of  the  cross- 
examining  party  to  elicit  suppressed  facts,  which  weaken  or  qualify 
the  case  of  the  party  examining  in  chief,  or  support  the  case  of 
the  cross-examining  party. ^  In  any  view,  the  right  of  cross-ex- 
amination extends  to  all  matters  connected  with  the  res  gestoeA 
A  witness  may  be  cross-examined  as  to  his  examination  in  chief 
in  all  its  bearings,  and  as  to  whatever  goes  to  explain  or  modify 
what  he  has  stated  in  his  examination  in  chief,"  und  prejudice 
will  he  j^resumed  where  this  right  is  denied.^  K  party,  called  by 
his  opponent  as  a  witness,  has  a  right  to  be  cross-examined  by 
his  own  counsel.  Accordingly,  where  the  plaintiff  had  examined 
the  defendant  as  a  witness,  it  was  error  to  prevent  the  defend- 
ant, on  cross-examination,  from  answering  questions  rele- 
vant to  the  matter  of  the  examination  in  chief,  and  favorable 
to  his  side  of  the  case.^  It  is  error  to  refuse  permission  to  cross- 
examine  a  witness  for  the  prosecution,  in  a  criminal  case,  for  the 
purpose  of  .showing  hostility.^ 

1  Heath  v.  Waters,    40     Mich.   457,  ''  Citing  Whart.  Ev.,  §  529. 

471  '"  Martin  v.  Elden,   32   Oh.  St.  2<S2, 

2  Sperry  ?7.  Moore,  42  Mieh.  353,  287;  citing  Wilson  v.  Wagar,  26  Mich. 
301;  Duller  N.  P.  231),  242;  1  Stark.  Ev.      452. 

61,02,409,  34;  Best  Ev.  (Woods'  ed.),  «  Reeve  v.  Dennett,  141  Ma.ss.  207. 

§  496;  1    G.reeul.  Ev.,  §    163;  I  Wlmrt.  '  People  v.   Lee  All  Chuck,  (,&  Cal. 

Ev.,§177.  662. 
=»  Citing  Pow.  Ev.  380. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  369 

§  407.  Leading  Questions.  —  Leading  questions  may  always 
be  put  on  cross-examination,  "svhether  the  witness  is  a  willing  or 
adverse  one  for  the  party  calling  him;  ^  except  where,  under  the 
American  rule  of  strict  cross-examination,  the  cross-examining 
party  transcends  the  limits  of  the  direct  examination,  and  thereby 
makes  the  mtness  his  own.^ 

§  408.  Sifting,  3Iodifying  and  Extending  the  Direct  Exam- 
ination—  Making  it  more  Explicit. — A  primary  object  of  cross- 
examination  is  to  enable  the  opposing  party  to  sift  the  statements 
made  by  the  witness  on  his  direct  examination ;  to  sup})ly  omis- 
sions, to  test  the  accuracy  of  his  recollection,  to  develop  facts 
which  diminish  the  probability  of  his  statements,  and  to  extend  his 
statements  as  to  matters  touched  upon  in  his  direct  examination,  so 
as  to  make  them  more  explicit  and  complete.  Within  reasonable 
limits,  a  cross-examining  party  has  a  riglit  to  demand  details  and 
particulars  of  the  nuitters  stated  in  general  terms  by  the  witnesis 
on  his  direct  examination,  and  it  is  error  to  deny  tliis  right. 
The  reason  is  that  "  cross-examination  is  important,  not  only  as 
a  means  of  getting  out,  in  full  detail,  all  the  facts  within  the  range 
of  the  subject  matter  of  the  direct  examination,  but  it  is  also  an 
important  means  of  testing  the  memory  of  a  witness,  as  well  as  a 
potent  means  of  ascertaining  the  truth  of  his  statements."  ^  But 
this  right  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to  allow  the  cross-examining 
party  to  put  JisJiing  questions,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
facts  which  may  assist  him  in  his  prosecution  or  defense,  such  as 
the  names  of  other  witnesses  acquainted  with  the  subject  of  the 
inquiry.  "  Litigants,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Cliffoni,  "  ought  to  pre- 
pare their  cases  for  trial  before  the  jury  is  impaneled  and  sworn; 
and,  if  they  do  not,  they  cannot  complain  if  the  court  excludes 
questions  propounded  merely  to  ascertain  the  names  of  persons 
whom  they  desire  to  call  as  witnesses  to  disprove  the  case  of  the 
opposite  party."  * 

1  Parkiu  v.  Moou,  7  Carr.  &  P.  408,  ^  stcrm  v.  United  States,  94  U.  S, 

2  Post,  §  433.  76,  81. 
^  Hylaud  v.  Milner,  d'J  Ind.  308,  310, 

opiaiou  cy  Eiiiott,  J. 

24 


370  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

§  409.  [Continued.]  Illustrations.  —  Thus  where  a  witness  who  was 
an  administrator  testified  to  some  facts  touching  his  administration,  it  was 
held  that  he  might  be  interrogated  /?<Z/^  in  regard  thereto,  — meaning 
so  far  as  the  matters  souglit  to  be  drawn  out  affected  his  credibility  or 

related  to  the  issues.^ So,  a  defendant  who  becomes  a  witness  in 

his  own  behalf,  and  undertakes,  on  his  direct  examination,  to  state  all 
that  transpired  between  two  points  of  time,  may  be  asked  on  cross-ex- 
amination whether  he  has  omitted  anything  pertinent  to  the  case  ;  and  his 
attention  may  be  directed  to  the  precise  point,  by  asking  him  if  some 

specified  thing  did  not  occur. ^ So,  where  the  question  in  dispute 

was  as  to  the  ececution  of  a  woie,  and  the  witness  for  the  plaintiff  had 
testified  as  to  such  execution,  it  was  held  competent  and  proper  to 
cross-examine  him  (under  the  English  rule)"*  as  to  all  the  circumstances 
connected  with  it,  and,  among  others,  as  to  the  consideration  of  the 
note.^ So,  a  witness  having  testified  that  he  managed  certain  prop- 
erty as  the  agent  of  the  plaintiff,  the  witness'  wife,  —  which  property 
had  been  attached,  at  the  suit  of  one  Newman,  as  the  property  of  the 
witness, — was  asked  on  cross-examination:  "  What  was  the  under- 
standing between  yourself  and  Newman,  relative  to  attaching  these  cattle, 
just  previous  to  the  commencement  of  the  attachment  suit?"  It  was 
held  that  this  question  was  proper  on  cross-examination,  and  that  the 

court  erred  in  excluding  it.^ So,  where  a  witness,  called  by  the 

defendant  in  a  criminal  trial,  is  interrogated  as  to  the  conduct  and 
presence  of  the  accused  up  to  and  at  the  tiyne  of  the  alleged  commission 
of  the  crime,  it  is  not  improper  to  cross-examine  him  as  to  the  conduct 
and  presence  of  the  accused  aftej-  that  date,  without  limiting  the  State's 

counsel  to  the  exact  time  mentioned  in  the  examination  in  chief. ^ 

So,  on  the  cross-examination  of  the  prosecuting  witness  on  an  indictment 
for  larceny,  who  claims  to  have  been  robbed  of  a  large  sum  of  money, 
questions  tending  to  elicit  the  fact  that  he  was  indebted  considerably 
and  straightened  at  the  time  of  the  alleged  larceny,  and  that  his  stock 
of  goods  was  small,  and  also  tending  to  show  that  he  had  made  state- 
ments on  the  preliminary  examination  of  the  prisoners,  which  made  out 
his  inventory  to  be  very  much  larger  than  he  knew  it  to  be  in  fact,  — 
were  held  admissible,  as  bearing  upon  the  probabilities,  for  the  purpose 
of  testing  his  oharacter  and  credit.     The  court  said:    "  The  authorities 

1  Barker  v.  Blount,  (;3  Ga.  424.  ^  Steinberg  v.  Meany,  53  Cal.  425. 

2  People  V.  Russell,  4(;  Cal.  121.  6  Mariou  v.  State  (Neb.),  29  N.  W. 

3  Post,  §430.  Rep.  911. 
*  Lemprey  v.  Muuch,  21  Minu.  379. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  371 

do  not  recognize  such  an  inquiry  as  so  connected  with  the  merits  as  to 
be  open  to  impeachment,  but  it  is  within  the  range  of  a  proper  cross- 
examination."  1 So,  a  witness  who  has  testified  as  to  character 

may,  of  course,  be  cross-examined  as  to  details,  times  and  places. ^ 

§  410.  [Further  Illustration,]  Circumstances  Attending  a  Con- 
spiracy. —  On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  burning  a  barn  to  defraud 
an  insurance  compan}'^,  Henry  Hamilton,  a  witness  for  the  prosecution, 
gave  testimony  respecting  what  took  place  at  a  certain  party  or  dance 
at  Joseph  Hamilton's  house  on  the  night  of  the  fire.  He  was  asked 
whether  the  dance  was  not  talked  of  some  time  before  it  was  gotten  up  ; 
but  the  court  ruled  this  out",  under  objection  of  the  defendant.  An- 
other witness  for  the  prosecution,  named  Fuller,  had  given  an  account 
of  a  plan  proposed  by  the  conspirators  for  burning  the  barn,  which  was 
in  substance  that,  in  order  to  prevent  any  suspicion,  a  dance  should  be 
gotten  up  at  another  person's  house,  and  that,  during  the  course  of  the 
the  evening,  one  of  the  Hamiltons  should  go  out  for  a  supply  of  cider 
and  take  advantage  of  that  opportunity  to  light  a  candle,  which  would 
take  some  time  to  burn  down  to  the  straw,  so  that  they  would  be  away 
at  the  party  at  the  time  the  fire  should  break  out,  and  thus  escape  sus- 
picion. The  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  ruling  of  the  court,  in  thus 
curtailing  the  cross-examination  of  Hamilton  was  error.  Campbell,  J., 
said:  "  If  the  party  had  been  arranged  and  invitations  given,  earlier 
than  the  alleged  interview  with  Fuller,  then  his  whole  story  would  be 
falsified.  This  was  then  a  vital  point  in  the  case.  It  was  veiy  clearly 
legitimate  on  cross-examination,  upon  the  strictest  'rules.  It  referred 
to  the  very  dance  concerning  which  the  witness  had  been  examined 
in  chief,  and  was  offered  as  relevant  to  the  subject  as  any  of  the  other 
circumstances  on  which  he  had  been  questioned."  ^ 

§  411.  [Further  Illustrations.]  Length  and  Circumstances  of 
Possession,  etc.  — Applying  the  rule  that  the  cross-examination  may 
properly  be  carried  into  all  the  surrounding  circumstances,  for  the  purpose 
of  testing  fully  the  accuracy  and  credibility  of  the  witness,  it  has  been 
held,  in  an  action  of  replevin  by  A.  against  B.,  a  sheriff,  to  recover  pos- 
session of  goods  levied  upon  by  B.  under  process  against  C,  where  A., 
in  support  of  his  title,  offered  a  witness  who  testified  that,  on  the  day  of 

^  People  V.  Morrigau,  29   Mich.  5.  •  Jackson  v.  State,  78  Ala.  471. 

Compare  Wilbur  v.   Flood,   16  Mich.  ^  Hamilton  u.  People,  29  Mich.  173^ 

40.  ISl 


372  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoiUp.  Tr., 

the  levy  he,  the  witness,  was  in  possession  of  the  goods  as  the  agent  or 
servant  of  A.,  the  court  did  not  err  in  permitting  the  defendant  to  cross- 
examine  the  witness  as  to  the  time  during  which  he  had  been  in  posses- 
sion, in  whose  employ  he  had  been  during  such  time,  and  the  manner  in 
which  he  entered  into  the  employ  of  the  plaintiff.!  -  -  -  -  So,  in  an 
action  of  replevin,  brought  against  an  attaching  creditor  of  the  plaintiff's 
vendor,  the  plaintiff  having  shown  no  title  but  possession  merely,  it  was 
held  competent  for  the  defendant  to  cross-examine  as  to  the  nature 
and  length  of  the  possession,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  it  was 
colorable  and  of  testing  the  witness'   means  of  knowledge. ^ 

§  412 .  [Further  Illustrations.  ]  Right  to  the  whole  of  a  Con- 
versation. —  Where  a  conversation  is  called  out  by  one  party,  it 
is  the  right  of  the  other  party,  upon  cross-examination,  to  develop 
the  whole  of  the  conversation,  so  far  as  it  may  bear  upon  the 
issues  or  affect  the  credibility  of  the  witness ;  ^  and  this  rule  ap- 
plies equally,  whether  the  conversation  was  brought  out  on  direct 
examination  or  on  cross-examination;  it  may,  therefore,  apply 
in  respect  of  the  re-examination.^  So,  where  a  witness  on  his 
direct  examination  testified  that  a  witness  for  the  opposite  party 
had,  on  another  trial,  testified  to  certain  facts,  it  was  proper,  on 
cross-examination,  to  ask  the  witness  what  oilier  facts  such  other 
witness  testified  to  on  such  other  trial  .^ 

§  413.  [Further  Illustration.]  Reasons  for  Opinion  as  to 
Value. — Where  a  witness  has,  on  his  examination  in  chief, 
given  his  opinion  as  to  value,  he  may  be  cross-examined  in  full 
respecting  his  reasons  for  such  opinion;   and  here  the  rule  ap- 

1  Blake  V.  Powell,  26  Kan.  320.  Greeul.   Ev.,    §   201;    2    Wlmrt.    Ev., 

2  Thoruburgh  v.  Hand,  7  Cal.  554.  §§  1108,  1109. 

3  AdUisou  V.  State,  48  Ala.  478;  ^  Carey  r.  Richmond,  92  lud.  259. 
Phares  V.  Barber,  61111.272;  Sager  u.  Compare  Harper  v.  Harper,  57  Ind. 
State,  11  Tex.  App.  110;  Metzer  v.  547.  But,  it  has  been  ruled  that  where 
State,  39  lud.  596;  Fletcher  v.  State,  the  party's  own  witness  fix^t  speaks  of 
49  lud.  124;  s.  c.  19  Am.  Rep.  673;  the  conversation,  although  on  cross- 
Harness  V.  State,  57  lud.  1.  examinatiou,  the  party  is  not  thereby 

•*  Roberts  v.  Roberts,  85  N.  C.  9;  entitled  to  make  all  that  was  said  evi- 

Mclntyrev.  Thompson,  14  Bradw.  (111.)  deuce  iu  liis  own  behalf.     Addison  v. 

.554;    Hatch   v.  Potter,   2  Gilm.    (111.)  State,  48  Ala.  478. 
725;  Phares  V.  Barbour,  61  111.  271;   1 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATIOiSr.  373 

plies  that  gi^eat  latitude  should  be  allowed  in  cross-examination,^ 
the  limits  of  which,  where  no  rule  of  law  is  violated,  are  within 
the  discretion  of  the  presiding  judge. ^  A  question  is  proper 
which  enables  the  jury  to  see  upon  ivhat  basis  the  witness  has 
made  his  estimate  of  value,  or  which  connects  his  general  esti- 
mates of  value  with  the  thing  in  respect  of  which  the  injury  is 
predicated.^ 

§  414.  Instances  Under  the  Last  Rule.  —  Where  a  witness  testified 
that  a  horse  was  worth  $9,000,  it  was  not  error  to  ask  him,  on  cross-ex- 
amination, whether  he  would  give  $3,000  for  the  horse;  and  the  witness 
having  testified  that  he  had  no  money,   it  was  not  error  to  ask  him 

whether  he  would  give  his  note  for  that  price.* A  witness,  called  to 

testify  as  to  the  value  of  property,  fixed  it  at  $3,000.  On  his  cross-ex- 
amination, he  was  asked  whether  he  had  not,  as  an  insurance  agent, 
offered  and  written  a  policy  of  insurance  on  the  same  property  at  a 
valuation  of  $4,000.  It  was  held  error  to  reject  this  question. 
It  was  admissible,  upon  the  principle  which  permits  statements  made  by 
witnesses  out  of  court,  different  from  those  which  they  have  testified 
to  at  the  trial,  to  be  shown.  Lake,  C.  J.,  said:  "The  value 
of  the  proposed  testimony,  as  tending  to  discredit  the  witness,  rests 
upon  the  very  reasonable  presumption  that  he  would  not,  in  the 
very  important  matter  of  taking  an  insurance  risk,  value  the  prop- 
erty  higher   than    what  he   really   believed   it  to   be  worth."  ^ 

1  Mo.  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Haines,  10  Kan.  have  the  right  to  give  their  opinion 
439;  Central  Branch  &c.  R.  Co.  w.  An-  based  upon  actual  sales  known  by 
drews,  30  Kau.  590;  Atcliisou  &c,  R.  them  to  have  been  made;  yet  it  would 
Co.  V.  Blaclishire,  10  Kau.  477,  48G;  be  going  too  far  to  hold  that  the  trial 
Marliel  u.  Moudy,  13  Neb.  323,  327.  court  errs  iu    rejecting    an  offer  to 

2  Miller  v.  Smith,  112  Mass.  470.  prove  a  mere  proposition  by  the  wit- 
'  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Blaclishire,      ness  to  sell  property  similar  to  that 

10  Kau.  477.    Witnesses  as  to  value  can  iu  dispute,  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  its 

base  their  opinions  on  actual  sales  of  value.     Thompson  v.  Moiles,  4(5  Mich, 

which  they  have  knowledge,  but  can-  42.     The  proposition  is  not  well  rea- 

not,  it  has  been  ruled,  be  cross-exam-  soned  by  the   court,  and  the  conclu- 

ined  as  to  what  they  have  offered  to  sion  is  unsatisfactory.     An  offer  to  sell 

sell  similar  property  for.     Thompson  similar  property  at  a  different  value 

Wo  Moiles,  46  Mich.  42.  would  be,  iu  some  sense,  equivalent  to 

4  Miller  v.  Smith,  112  Mass.  470.  a  statement  made  by  the  witness  out 

^  Markel  v.  Moudy,   13    Neb.   323,  of  court  contradicting  a  similar  state- 

327.     It  has  been  held  that,  while  wit-  ment  made  by  him  in  court,  aud  such 

mrsses,  called  to  testify  as  to  value,  evidence  is  always  admissible. 


374  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr. , 

In  a  proceeding  to  condemn  land  for  a  railroad,  the  following  ques- 
tions and  answers  were  given  on  cross-examination:  "  Q.  Take 
plaintiff's  land  just  as  it  is,  and  suppose  the  railroad  ran  through 
the  valley  without  running  through  the  land,  what  is  the  difference 
of  value,  compared  with  the  value  as  the  road  now  is?  A.  I  would 
rather  have  the  land  without  the  road  running  through  it,  but  don't 
know  what  the  effect  on  the  general  market  would  be."  "  Q.  Have 
you  not  a  piece  of  land  in  the  neighborhood  of  plaintiff  which  you  are 
offering  to  sell,  and  desirous  to  sell,  through  which  the  railroad  runs? 
A.  Yes,  I  have."  "  Q.  State  whether  or  not  these  facts  might  not  bias 
3^our  judgment  as  to  value  of  Mr.  Blackshire's  land?  A.  I  think  not." 
It  was  held  that  there  was  no  error  in  permitting  this  latitude  of  cross- 
examination. ^  In  another  like  case,  on  a  trial  before  a  justice, 

the  plaintiff  was  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf.  Upon  his 
examination  in  chief,  he  testified,  among  other  things,  that  he  was  ac- 
quainted with  the  value  of  property  in  his  vicinity,  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Lis  lots,  at  the  time  the  railway  was  constructed  in  the  alley-way,  and 
it  was  his  opinion  that,  immediately  before  the  railroad  was  there  con- 
structed, his  property  was  worth  $10,000,  and  that,  immediately  after- 
wards, it  was  worth  only  $6,000,  and  that  the  depression  of  the  value  by 
reason  of  the  construction  of  the  railway  was  $4,000.  Afterwards, 
upon  cross-examination,  he  was  asked  the  following  questions :  "  What 
would  be  the  value  of  a  strip  of  ground  fifteen  feet  wide,  taken  from 
the  south  end  of  these  lots  (around  the  east  end)  out  to  Main  street ; 
beginning  at  Tenth  street,  take  a  strip  fifteen  feet  wide  off ;  then  again 
from  the  south,  north  on  the  east  side  out  to  Main  street?"  "  What,  in 
your  opinion,  would  be  the  depreciation  of  the  value  of  the  remaining 
property,  as  an  entirety,  by  reason  of  the  taking  from  them  fifteen 
feet  off  the  south  end  of  the  lots,  and  fifteen  feet  off  the  side  of  the 
property  to  Main  street?  "  Upon  objection  of  the  plaintiff,  these  ques- 
tions were  excluded.  The  plaintiff  having  recovered  a  verdict  and 
judgment  for  $2,000  damages,  the  jury  finding  specially  thiit  the  plaint- 
iff's property  without  the  alle3'-way  was  worth  $5,000  and  with  the 
alley  $7,000,  it  was  held  on  appeal  that,  under  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  great  latitudeshould  have  been  allowed  in  the  cross-examina- 
tion of  the  witnessess,  giving  evidence  merely  as  to  their  opinions  in 
respect  of  value  and  damages,  and  that  tlie  court  below  erred  in  re- 
stricting the  cross-examination  of  the  plaintiff  as  a  witness. ^ 

1  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  u.  Blackshire,  2  Ceiit.    Braiicli  &c,  K.    Co.  v.  An- 

10  Kan.  477,  486.  drews,  30  Kan.  u'JO. 


Tit.    Ill,  Ch.   XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION. 


375 


§  415.  Great  Latitude  allowed. — The  general  rule,  there- 
fore, is  that  a,  cross-examination  should  be  permitted  as  to  all 
matters  developed  on  the  direct  examination,^  and  that  great  lat- 
itude should  be  allowed  in  conducting  the  same,^  the  extent  and 
limits  of  which,  where  no  rule  of  law  is  violated,  rest  in  the  sound 
dificretion  of  the  trial  court. ^  The  rule,  then,  is  that,  for  the 
purpose  of  testing  the  accuracy  of  the  recollection  of  the  witness 
or  of  affecting  his  credibility,  the  cross-examination  may  in  gen- 
eral be  extended  into  all  the  circumstances  surrounding  or  affect- 
ing the  transaction  which  he  has  detailed  in  his  direct  examination. 
"A  cross-examination,"  said  Brewer,  J.,  '•  is  not  limited  to  the 
very  day  and  exact  fact  named  in  the  direct  examination.  It 
may  extend  to  other  matters  which  limit,  qualify  or    explain  the 


1  Sinister  ■;;.  Stout,  30  Kau.  529; 
Commissiouers  v.  Craft,  G  Kau,  145; 
Suumer  I'.  Blair,  9  Kan.  521;  Callisou 
y.  Smith,  20  Kau.  28;  1  Greeul.  Ev., 
§  4i5. 

2  Atchisou  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackshire, 
10  Kau.  477,  487;  lugraiu  r.  State,  07 
Ala.  <;7,  71.  See  also  Stoudeuuieier  v. 
■Williamson,  29  Ala.,  558;  Re  Carmi- 
chael,  3()  Ala.  514.  On  the  trial  of  an 
iudictment  for  murder,  it  has  been  said 
that  the  broadest  latitude  should  be 
allowed  the  defendant  in  the  cross- 
examination  of  t^ucli  of  the  State'' s  loit- 
nesses  as  were  active  partisans  in  the 
difficulty  which  led  to  the  killing,  and 
who  are  hostile  in  their  feelings  toward 
the  defendant;  and,  on  the  other  iiaud, 
that  the  examination  of  such  wit- 
nesses by  the  people  should  be  cor- 

.respondingly    restricted.     Sutton    v. 
People,  119  111.  250. 

^  Miller  v.  Smith,  112  Mass.,  470, 
476;  Hathaway  v.  Crocker,  7  ]\Ietc. 
2(;2,  2(i6;  Com.  v.  Sacket,  22  Pick. 
(Mass.)  394;  Wiuship  v.  Neale,  10 
Gray  (Mass.),  382;  Swan  v.  Middle- 
sex, 101  Mass.  173;  Johnston  v.  Jones, 
1  Black  (U.  S.),  209,  226;  Fry  v. 
Beuuett,  3  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  200;  Knight 


V.  Cuunington,  6  Hun  (N.  Y.),  100; 
Wallace  v.  Taunton  Street  Ry.  Co., 
119  Mass.  91;  Ledford  v.  Ledford,  95 
Ind.  283;  Oliver  v.  Pate,  43  Ind.  132; 
AVachstetter  v.  State,  99  Ind.  290; 
s.  c.  50  Am.  Rep.  94.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Kansas  say:  "Great  lati- 
tude is  and  should  be  allowed  iu 
the  cross-examination  of  a  witness  as 
to  his  interest  in  the  suit,  his  friend- 
ships or  hostility  towards  the  parties, 
his  motives  and  prejudices."  State 
V.  Collins,  33  Kan.  77,  80.  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  Wisconsin  has  said: 
"  On  the  cross-examiuation  of  a  wit- 
ness, anything  which  shows  his  friend- 
ship or  enmity  to  either  of  the  parties 
to  the  suit  is  commonly  a  proper  sub- 
ject of  inquiry.  So  also  is  everything 
which  tends  to  show  that,' in  the  cir- 
cumstances iu  which  he  is  placed,  he 
has  a  strong  temptation  to  swear 
falsely.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that 
the  jury  are  the  sole  judges  of  the 
credibility  of  the  witness,  and  that 
whatever  tends  to  assist  them,  in  the 
judgment  which  they  are  to  form  up- 
on this  subject,  ought  not  to  be  with- 
held from  them."  Kellogg  v.  Nelson, 
5  Wis.  125,  131. 


o76  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tr., 

facts  stated  in  the  direct  examination,  or  modify  the  inferences 
deducible  therefrom,  provided  only  that  such  matters  are  directly 
connected  with  the  facts  testified  to  in  chief."  ^  But,  while  great 
latitude  is  allowed  to  the  cross-examining  counsel  in  putting 
questions  having  tendency  to  disclose  the  animus  of  the  witness 
toward  the  parties,  yet  it  is  plain  that  questions  may  be  asked 
under  this  head,  which  so  far  exceed  the  hounds  of  courtesy  and 
propriety,  that  it  is  no  error  to  refuse  to  allow  the  witness  to 
answer  them.  It  was  so  held,  on  the  trial  of  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion for  theft,  where  counsel  for  the  defendant,  on  cross-examin- 
ation of  the  jDrosecuting  witness,  asked,  '"Don't  you  love  the 
defendant?  "  ^ 

§  416.    [Continued.]     Especially  where  Fraud  is  involved. — 

"  Great  latitude,"  said  Marston,  J.,  "  has  always  been  allowed 
the  cross-examination  in  this  class  of  cases,  especially  where 
one  of  the  parties  to  the  alleged  fraudulent  transaction  is  upon 
the  stand.  In  cases  of  fraud  no  definite  fixed  rule  can  be  laid 
down;  as  to  do  so  would  but,  in  many  cases,  be  laying  down  rules 
for  the  guidance  of  parties  about  to  perpetrate  frauds.  Much 
must  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  judge."  ^  For  obvious 
reasons,  where  the  question  relates  to  the  bona  fides  of  a  transfer 
of  a  merchant's  stock  of  goods,  or  whether  a  particular  con- 
veyance was  concocted  for  the  i)urpose  of  hindering,  delaying 
or  defrauding  the  creditors  of  the  vendor,  the  widest  latitude, 
in  the  cross-examination  of  ix  party  to  the  conveyance,  should  be 
allowed.*  It  is  pro[)er  to  extend  the  inquiry  into  all  tlie  circum- 
stances of  the  transfer  of  the  goods  to  the  witness,  which  tend  to 
show  its  fraudulent  character  and  purpose,  and  the  fraudulent 
nature  of  his  possession  of  them.^     But,  whilst  this  is  so,  it  has 

1  Blake   v.   Powell,    26   Kan.,   320,  2  Bluut    v.    State,    9     Tex.     App. 

326.     See  to  the  same  effect  Coates  v.  234. 

Hopkins,  34   Mo.    135   Detroit  &c.    E.  ^  jacobson   v.    Metzger,  35    Mich. 

Co.  u.  VauSteiubur-j;,  17Mich.  99,  109;  103.     So  held  in  Anderson  u.  Walter, 

Haynes     v.    Ledyard,   33    Mich.    319;  34  Mich.  113. 
Fergnsou  v.  Rntlierford,  7  Nev.  385;  *  Kalk  v.  Fielding,  50  Wis.  339 

Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackshire,  10  ^  Bowers  v.  Mayo,  32  Mimi.  241. 

Kan.  477;  Field  v.  Uavis,  27  Kan.  400. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION,  377 

been  held,  under  the  American  rule,^  that  a  cross-examination  con- 
cerning otiier  transfers  not  referred  to  in  the  examination  in 
chief,  is  not  permissible,  ^  —  a  conclusion  which  maybe  regarded 
as  doubtful,  since  the  question  is  largely  one  of  intent.^ 

§  417.  [CoNTiNTJED.]  Illustrations. — Thus,  it  appearing,  from  the 
cross-examination  of  a  mortgagee  of  a  stock  of  merchandise,  that  he  and 
the  mortgagor  had  an  interview,  shortly  after  the  giving  of  the  mort- 
gage and  before  the  attachment  was  levied,  —  it  was  held  that  the  de- 
fendant should  have  been  allowed  to  ask  further  questions  adapted  to 
elicit  from  the  witness  evidence  as  to  whether,  at  such  interview,  the 
mortgagor  had  informed  the  plaintiff  that  he  was  making  large  sales  of 
mortgaged  goods   and  receiving  large  sums  of  money  therefor,  without 

accounting  to  the  plaintiff  for  the  same.^ In  another  case,  where  the 

question  in  issue  was  the  bona  fides  of  a  sale  of  a  stock  of  goods,  it  ap- 
peared that  the  sale  was  made  in  haste,  the  vendor  not  taking  an  in- 
voice or  otherwise  determining  the  amount  of  the  goods,  and  leaving  the 
country  immediately,  with  the  cash  portion  of  the  purchase  price.  The 
purchaser  having  testified,  on  direct  examination,  that  the  reason  the 
vendor  gave  for  the  hasty  sale  was  that  he  was  in  a  scrape  with  a  girl 
and  was  afraid  of  prosecution  thereupon,  a  question  was  asked  one  of 
the  witnesses,  on  cross-examination,  what  kind  of  a  trouble  tlie  vendor 
said  he  was  in  with  the  girl,  and  one  or  two  other  questions  were  asked 
tending  in  the  same  direction,  all  of  which  were  ruled  out  by  the  court. 
It  was  held  that  this  was  error.  On  cross-examination,  the  party  deny- 
ing the  bona  fides  of  the  sale  should  have  been  allowed  to  inquire  as  to 
all  that  the  vendor  said  in  reference  to  the  scrape  with  the  girl ;  and 
this  for  two  reasons :  ( 1)  A  full  cross-examination  might  have  disclosed 
that  the  pretended  reason  was  wholly  fictitious,  and  so  understood  by  the 
purchasers ;  or  (2)  it  miglit  have  disclosed  that  he  was  seeking  to  evade 
liability  in  a  bastardy  action,  for  the  support  of  an  illegitimate  child,  and 
so  informed  the  purchasers  —  in  either  of  which  cases  the  evidence  would 
have  been  material ;  ^  since  a  conveyance  made  to  avoid  one's  lialiility 
for  the  support  of  a  bastard  child  is  a  conveyance  in  fraud  of  creditors? 
and  void.^ 

1  Post,  §  432.  3  Schuster     r.    Wingert,    30    Kan. 

2  Clark  V.  Reiniger,  GG  la.  507.  529. 

^  Ante,  ^  i32,  et  seq.  6  ^s  held    iu    Daiuou   v.    Bryant,  2 

^  Kalb  V.  Fielding,  50  Wis.  339.  Pick.  (Mass.)  411. 


378  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOIlip.  Tr., 

§   418.   Control  of  the  Limits  of    Cross-examination.  —  So, 

the  limit  to  Avhich  a  cross-examination  shall  be  extended  and  the 
mode  in  which  it  shall  be  conducted,  are,  as  we  shall  still  further 
see,  subject  in  a  very  large  measure  to  the  discretionary  control 
of  the  trial  court.  The  propriety  of  allowing  a  question  on 
cross-examination,  which  misrecites  the  testimony  of  the  witness, 
and  is  calculated  to  lead  him  into  error,  is  within  the  discretion  of 
the  court.  "  On  this  point,"  say  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia, 
"  we  simply  rule  this :  It  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  both  to  protect 
the  witness  under  cross-examination  from  being  unfairly  dealt 
with,  and  to  allow  a  searchinoj  and  skillful  test  of  his  intelliireuce, 
memory,  accuracy,  and  veracity.  As  a  general  rule,  it  is  better 
that  cross-examination  should  be  too  free  than  too  much  re- 
stricted. This  is  a  matter  that  necessarily  belongs  to  and  abides 
in  the  discretion  of  the  court.  *  *  *  There  must  be  allowed 
some  degree  of  skill,  if  not  sharpness,  in  conducting  cross-ex- 
aminations; because  a  witness,  however  fair  and  honest  and 
truthful,  may  not  be  careful  enough;  and  it  is  to  the  interest  of 
justice  to  expose  the  blundering  of  a  witness,  as  well  as  his  will- 
ful departures  from  veracity.  A  jury  ought  to  be  made  to  know 
what  character  of  mind  they  have  before  them  on  the  witness 
stand;  whether  they  have  a  careful,  cautious  witness,  or  one 
who  is  disposed  to  take  things  on  trust.  That  is  quite  essential. 
But  the  court  is  there  watching  the  proceedings,  and  acquainted 
with  all  the  surroundings ;  it  is  proper  to  leave  such  a  question 
to  the  discretion  of  the  court."  ^ 

§  419.  Court  may  curtail  Needless  Repetitions. —  As  a  gen- 
eral rule  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  allow  cross- 
examining  counsel  to  require  the  witness  to  rej^eat  in  detail  what 
he  has  fully  staled  on  his  direct  examination.^  It  was  so  held 
where  a  conversation,  partly  in  a  foreign  language,  had  been  tes- 
tified to  and  interpreted  by  the  Avitncss  on  cross-examination.^ 
How  many  times  the  same  question  shall  be  repeated  on  cross- 

1  Harris  v.  Ceutnil   K,  Co    (Ga.),  3  2Siniouv.HomeIns.Co.,58Mich,278. 

S.  Kast.  Rep.  355.  3  Ulric  v.  People,  39  Mich.  245,  251. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XYII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  379 

examination,  and  how  far  the  witness  shall  be  compelled  to  an- 
swer, are  obviously  matters  within  the  discretion  oi  the  presiding 
judge,  and  not  the  subject  of  exception. ^  But,  as  elsewhere 
seen,'  this  rule  cannot  be  aiplied  so  as  to  restrain  the  cross-ex- 
amining party  from  calling  out  the  details  of  matters  which  have 
been  stated  by  the  witness,  on  his  direct  examination,  in  general 
terms  only. 

§  420.  Prescribe  what  Counsel  shall  Examine  and  Cross- 
examine. —  It  is  said  by  Lake,  J.,  speaking  for  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Nebraska:  "A  court  may  doubtless  make  reasonable 
rules  for  the  reuulation  and  examination  of  witnesses,  and  qo  so 
far  even  as  to  require  the  attorney  who  begins  either  the  exam- 
ination in  chief  or  the  cross-examination,  to  complete  it.  To 
this,  however,  there  must  necessarily  be  some  exceptions, — as 
where,  during  an  examination,  the  attorney,  from  any  cause,  is 
disabled  to  proceed;  in  such  case  it  may,  of  course,  be  concluded 
by  another.  But  no  rule  can  be  upheld  that  arbitrarily  dictates 
which  of  several  attorneys  in  a  case  —  there  beino-  no  disaa'ree- 
ment  between  them  —  shall  examine  or  cross-examine  a  witness, 
or  that  requires  the  same  attorney  who  took  part  in  the  examin- 
ation in  chief,  to  conduct  the  cross-examination.  A  rule  of  this 
sort  could  serve  no  good  purpose,  and  Avould  unwarrantably  in- 
terfere with  the  constitutional  right  of  a  party  to  select  his  own 
counsel  to  represent  him  in  the  several  branches  of  the  case. 
One  attorney  may  be  employed  with  special  reference  to  the  ex- 
amination or  cross-examination  of  witnesses,  or  of  a  particular 
witness,  another  to  argue  questions  of  law  to  the  court,  and  still 
another  to  su  •.  up  the  case  to  the  jury,  and  to  do  this  is  a  right 
which  no  court  can  rightfully  deny."  " 

1  Demerritt  v.  Randall,  116  Mass.  witnesses,  an  assistant  counsel  is  not 
331.  prevented  from  oljjectiug  to  questions 

2  Ante,  §§  40G,  408.  put  in  cross-examination  to  a  -Rituess, 

3  Olive  V.  State,  11  Neb.  4,  2(;.  who  had  been  cross-examined  in  chief 
Under  Micliigan  circuit  court  rule  No.  by  his  coadjutor  on  the  same  side. 
63,  providing  that,  on  the  trial  of  Baumeier  v.  Antiau  (Mich.),  31  N.  W. 
issues  of  fact,  one  counsel  only  on  each  Eep.  888. 

iSlde  shall  examine  and  cross-examine 


380  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOlllp.  Tr., 

§  421.  Prescribe  Order  in  Case  of  Several  Defendants  hav- 
ing separate  Defenses. — The  order  in  which  several  defend- 
ants, having  separate  defenses,  shall  cross-examine  the  plaintiff's 
witnesses,  present  their  defense,  and  make  their  argument,  rests 
in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge. ^  Although  their  de- 
fenses may  be  separate,  yet  if  their  interests  are  identical,  this 
discretion  will  not  be  abused  by  confining  the  cross-examination 
on  behalf  of  all  the  defendants  to  one  counsel,  the  same  as  though 
their  defense  were  joint. ^ 

§  422.   Allow  Re-cross-examination  on  the  Same  Subject.  — 

To  allow  a  witness  to  be  recalled  and  cross-examined  again  on  the 
same  subject  is  a  matter  purely  discretionary  with  the  trial  court, 
and  is  the  subject  of  exception  only  when  the  discretion  is 
abused.  "^ 

§  423.  Whether  Admissibility  of  Matter  on  Cross-examina- 
tion Depends  upon  its  Admissibility  on  Direct  Examination.  — 

Upon  this  subject,  it  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Brewer:  "Asa 
rule,  the  admissibility  of  a  cross-examination  depends  upon  the 
admissibility  of  the  direct  examination.  If,  upon  any  matter,  the 
testimony  in  chief  is  excluded,  no  cross-examination  thereon  is 
allowed.  The  fact  that  testimony  has  been  taken  by  deposi- 
tion before  the  trial  in  no  manner  affects  the  question  of  the 
competency  of  each  and  every  part  of  it.  Its  competency  is 
determined  in  the  same  manner,  and  upon  the  same  principles, 
as  though  the  witness  was  present  on  the  stand  and  being  inter- 
rogated in  person.  A  question  which,  if  the  witness  were  present, 
counsel  could  not  ask,  cannot  be  asked  in  deposition  ;  and  if 
asked  and  answered,  must  be  stricken  therefrom."  Accordingly, 
where  the  answers  to  the  direct  interrogatories  in  a  deposition 
were  excluded  for  want  of  sufficient  identification  in  respect  of 
time  and  place,  it  was  held  that  the  party  offering  the  deposition 
could  not  read  the  answers  given  in  response  to  the  cross-inter- 

J  Fletcher  v.  C'rosbie,  2  IMood.  &  174;  Masou  v.  Ditcliboiiruc,  1  IMood. 
Rob.  417.  &  Rob.  4G2  ji. 

2  Cliippendale   v.  Massou,  4   Camp.  '  Knight    v.    Cimningtonj    6    Hun 

(N.  Y.),  190. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  381 

rogatories. ^  But  it  has  been  held  that  this  rule  cannot  be  made 
to  work,  as  it  were,  in  a  converse  manner,  so  as,  where  the  irrel- 
evant evidence  has  been  admitted  on  the  direct  examination,  to 
allow  the  opposite  party  to  follow  up  and  extend  the  irrelevant 
inquiry  on  the  cross-examination.  In  order  that  this  restriction 
shall  work  no  hardship  or  inequality,  it  is  ruled  that,  when  this 
privilege  is  denied  to  the  cross-examining  party,  he  may  ask 
the  court  to  ride  out  the  evidence  already  received  in  chief,  so  far 
as  it  is  irrelevant,  and  if  the  court  should  refuse  to  do  this,  it 
would  be  ground  for  a  new  trial.  The  court,  in  thus  holding 
that  the  error  of  one  party  does  not  justify  the  continued  propa- 
gation of  the  error  by  the  other,  say:  "The  maxim  ^  similia 
similihus  curantur  '  has  been  applied  to  some  extent  in  medicine^ 
but  the  principle  has  never  been  applied  to  the  cure  of  errors  in 

§  424.  Cross-examining  an  Adverse  Witness,  whose  Depo- 
sition has  been  taken. — Statutes  exist  in  many  jurisdictions 
enabling  a  party  to  compel  the  attendance  of  an  adverse  witness 
whose  deposition  has  been  taken,  and  to  cross-examine  him  in 
respect  of  his  testimony  given  in  such  deposition.  It  is  a  sound 
conclusion,  in  the  construction  of  these  statutes,  that  a  party  who 
thus  subpcenas  and  cross-examines  the  adverse  witness,  does  not 
thereby  make  him  his  own  witness.^ 

1  Callison  v.  Smith,  20  Kau.  28,  37.  and  subjecting  liim  to  the  usual  peu- 

2  Phelps  V.  Huut,  43  Couu.  194,  200,  alties  agaiust  -o-ituesses  fcr  failing  to 
opinion  by  Loomis,  J.  obey  subpoenas.     When  such  a  witness 

3  By  §  3842  of  the  Code  of  Teuues-  is  brought  into  court  under  this  sec- 
see,  edition  of  1858,  it  was  provided  tion,  or  under  §  3836,  he  continues  to 
that,  "  if  the  adverse  party  should  de-  be  the  witness  of  the  party  who  took 
sire  to  have  any  witness  cross-exam-  his  deposition,  and  is  subject  to  cross- 
ined  in  open  court  Avhose  deposition  esamiuation  as  such.  It  is  therefore 
has  been  taken,  he  may  compel  the  error  for  the  trial  court  to  rule  that, 
attendance  of  such  witness,  as  in  other  by  summoning  his  adversary's  wit- 
cases,  unless  the  witness  is  exempted  ness  for  cross-examination  under  this 
by  law  from  the  usual  penalties."  statute,  the  party  makes  the  witness 
This,  it  is  said,  is  merely  an  extension  his  own.  Sweat  v.  Rogers,  6  Heisk. 
of  the  provisions  of  §  3830  of  the  same  (Tenn.)  117,  122.  In  Ford  v.  Ford,  11 
code,  enabling  the  adverse  party  to  Humph.  (Teuu.)  89,  a  similar  ruling 
compel  the  attendance  of  such  witness  was  made  construing  a  similar  statute. 


382  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

§  425.  Not  Necessary  to  State  what  Facts  the  Question  will 
Elicit.  —  "It  is  not  necessary,  on  cross-examination,  to  state 
what  facts  it  is  expected  the  answer  will  ellicit;  on  direct  exam- 
'inatiou  this  is  essential,  but  not  on  the  cross-examination.^ 
The  reason  is,  that  the  cross-examiner  does  not  call  the  witness 
for  the  purpose  of  proving  anything ;  the  witness  is  called  by 
the  adverse  party,  and  the  cross-examiner  is  seeking  to  extort 
from  him  a  qualification  of  his  testimony  in  chief.  He  cannot 
be  presumed  to  know  what  the  answers  of  the  witness  w'ill  be  to 
questions  propounded  in  a  proper  cross-examination,  nor  would  he 
be  bound  by  such  answers.  *'  The  value  of  a  cross-examination, 
as  a  test  of  truth,  would  be  lost  in  the  case  of  a  crafty  and  un- 
reliable witness,  if  the  examiner  were  bound  to  disclose  in  ad- 
vance the  purpose  and  intent  of  every  question  asked."  ^  In 
one  jurisdiction  there  is  a  modified  view  that,  even  where  2i  party 
is  under  cross-examination,  the  court  may  exercise  a  sound  dis- 
cretiony  in  requiring  counsel  to  make  the  relevancy  of  his  ques- 
tions apparent.^ 

Article  II.  —  American  Rule  of  Strict  Cross-Ex amination. 

Sectiox 

430.  Euglish  Kulc  that  the  Witness  may  be  Cross-examiued  ou   the  Whole 

Case. 

431.  Applications  of  this  Rule. 

432.  American  Kule  of  Strict  Cross-examination. 

433.  Scope  of  the  American  Rule. 

434.  Defendant  cannot  Introduce  his  Defense  by  Cross-examination. 

435.  Confined  to  the  Testimony  in  Chief  of  the  Particular  witness,  or  Ex- 

tended to  all  the  Plaintiff's  Evidence. 
430.  Lil)erality  in  applying  the  Kule  —  Ho\y  far  Relaxed  in  Discretion. 

437.  [Illustnitiou.]     Witness  to  prove  Execution  not  Cross-examiued  as  to 

Consideration. 

438.  [Coutiuued.J     Witness   to   ]*rove    Identity  not   Cross-examiued  as  to 

Consideration. 

439.  [Continued.]     Defendant's  Title  in  Ejectment. 

440.  [Continued.]     Fui-ther  Illustrations  of  the  Rule. 

MIyland  V.  :Milucr,  ;)!)Ind.  308,  310;  280.     To  the   same   effect  see   Burt  w. 

Wood  V.  State,  'J2  lud.    20'J;   Harness  State,  23  Uli.  St.  3iU,  402. 
V.  State.  .57  Ind.  1.  »  cjty  Bank  v.  Keut,  57  Ga.  285. 

2  Martin  r.  Eldeu,  32   Oh.    St.  282, 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  383 

Sectiox 

441.  [Coutinued.]     Illustrative  Cases  not  within  the  Rule. 

442.  Effect  of  the  Rule  —  When  makes  Adversary's  Witness  one's  own. 

443.  Leading  Questions  Developing  new  Matter. 

444.  [Continued.]     Reason  of  the  Rule  which  admits  Leading  Questions. 

445.  [Continued.]     Cross-examination  of  the  Adverse  Party. 

446.  Cross-examination  in  Criminal  Cases. 

§  430.  English  rule  that  the  Witness  may  be  Cross-exam- 
ined on  the  whole  case.  — The  English  rule  on  cross-examination 
is  that,  when  a  witness  has  been  introduced,  sworn  and  examined 
as  to  any  material  point  in  the  case,  the  other  party  may  cross- 
examine  him  as  to  the  wdiole  case,  including  any  new  matter  of 
defense;  but  the  extent  to  which  he  may  be  allowed  to  press  the 
witness  with  leading  questions  will  depend  upon  the  circumstances 
of  the  case,  the  demeanor  of  the  witness,  his  apparent  bias  and 
other  considerations,  and  must,  to  a  great  extent,  be  left  to  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge. ^  This  rule  is  adopted  by 
several  of  the  American  State  courts. ^  Its  reason  has  been 
thus  stated:  "  The  oath  administered  to  a  witness  requires  him 
to  speak  the  truth,  the  luJiole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth; 
and  therefore  when  a  witness  is  put  upon  the  stand,  he  ought  to 
be  allowed  an  opportunity  for  stating  all  the  facts  wiihin  his 
knowledge  bearing  upon  the  issues  involved  in  the  case,  and 
should  not  be  confined  to  those  facts  only,  about  which  the  party 
who  offers  him   as  a  witness  chooses  to  interrogate  him.     It  is 

»  2  Phil.    Ev.    896-911;    Morgan    v.  w.  Kankey,  6  Mo.  433;  Brown  ?;.  Burrus, 

Brydges,  2  Stark.  314;  Rex  v.  Brooke,  8  Mo.  26;  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Sil- 

Id.  472.  ver,  56  Mo.  265;   State  v.   Sayres,   58 

-  Massachusetts:  Webster  v.  Lee,  5  Mo.      585.       Wisconsin:       Kuapp      v. 

Mass.   335;    Merrill   v.   Berkshire,    11  Schneider,    24    Wis.    70.      Louisiana: 

Pick.     (Mass.)    269,    274;    Moody    v.  Durnford  t?.  Clark,  1  Mart.  (La.)  202; 

Rowell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  490,  4!IS;  s.  c.  Davidson  v.  Lallande,  12  La.  Ann.  826, 

28  Am.  Dec.  317:  Blackington  v.  John-  828;  Nicholson  v.  Desobry,  14  La.  Ann. 

son,  126  Mass.  21;  Beal  i;.  Nichols,  2  81,   84;   King  v.  Atkins,  33   La.   Ann. 

Gray  (Mass.),  262.     New  York:  Yiw'xq^  1057,1064.     South  Carolina:  Kihlevv. 

y.  Jackson,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  166;  s.  c.  Mcllwain,  16  S.  C.  551.     It  was  as- 

19  Am.  Dec.  571;  Fulton  v.  Stafford,  2  sumed  that  this  was  the  rule  in  Cliuton 

Wend.    (N.   Y.)    483.     [But  doubtful:  v.    JIcKenzie,    5    Strobh.    L.   36,    41. 

see  next   section.]      Vermont:  Liusley  Alabama:  Kelly  i'.  Brooks,  25  Ala.  523; 

V.  Lovely,  26  Vt.   123.     Ohio:  Legg  v.  Fralick  v.  Presley,  29  Ala.  457,  461. 
Drake,  1  Oh.  St.  286.     Missouri:  Page 


384  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  TIlOlll}).  Tr., 

very  true  that  the  other  party  may  put  him  ou  the  stand  as  his 
witness  and  examine  him  as  to  any  fa'^ts  within  his  knowledge 
which  he  may  desire  to  bring  before  the  court.  But  he  is  not 
oblio-ed  to  do  so;  and  it  may,  and  often  does  happen,  that  the 
other  party  would  prefer  to  forego  the  opportunity  of  bringing 
out  such  other  facts,  rather  than  adopt  one  of  his  adversary's 
witnesses  as  his  own.  In  such  case  the  result  would  be  that  the 
witness  would  have  no  opportunity  of  telling  the  whole  truths  as 
he  had  been  sworn  to  do."^ 

§  431.  Applications  of  tlie  Rule. — Under  the  English  rule, 
where  a  witness  has  been  called  by  one  party,  the  other  party 
may  cross-examine  him,  although  no  question  ha.s  been  asked  him 
in  chief .'-^  But  if  the  plaintiff's  counsel  calls  a  witness  by  mis- 
take, he  cannot  be  cross-examined.^  And  if  a  witness  is  called, 
and  has  only  answered  an  immaterial  question,  when  his  exam- 
ination is  stopped  by  the  judge,  the  opposite  party  will  have  no 
riiiht  to  cross-examine  him.*  And  where  a  witness  has  said 
nothing  in  chief,  he  cannot  be  cross-examined  to  discredit  him.^ 

§  432.    American   Rule  of  strict  Cross-examination. — The 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  and  the  courts  of  some  of 
the  American  States  have  adopted  the  contrary  rule,  which  is 
sometimes  called,  by  way  of  distinction,  the  American  rule,  and 
sometimes  the  rule  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States. 
This  rule  is,  that  a  party  has  no  right  to  cross-examine  except  as 
to  facts  and  circumstances  connected  with  the  matter  stated  in 
the  direct  examination  of  the  witness,  and  that,  if  he  wishes  to 
examine  him  as  to  other  matters,  he  must  do  so  by  making  him 
his  own  witness,  and  by  calling  him  as  such  in  the  subsequent 
progress  of  the  cause. ^ 

'  Kiljlcr  V.  Mclhvaiii,   16   S.  C.  550,  •'''  Bi'acegirdle   v.   Bailey,  1   Fost.  & 

557.  Fill.  536. 

2  Phillips  V.  Middlesex,  1  Esp.  355.  •>  rhiladclphia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stimp- 

=»  Clifford  V.  Hunter,  3  Car.  &  V.  16;  son,  14  Pet.  (U.   S.)  448;  Houghton  v. 

s.  c.  Mood.  &  M.  103;  Wood  u.  Mack-  Jojies,  1   Wall.  (U.   S.)    702;  Wills  v. 

insou,  2  Mood.  &  Hob.  273.  Kussell,  100   U.  S.  621;   1  Green).  Ev., 

■^  CreevytJ.  Carr,  7  Car.  &  P.  64.  §  445.     This  rule  has  been  adopted  :l- 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  Xyil,]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION. 


385 


§  433.   Scope  of  the  American  Rule.  —  According  to  a  very 

learned  and  accurate  writer,  "  the  limits  of  a  strict  cross-examina- 
tion, within  the  meaning  of  this  rule,  include  whatever  tends  to 
qualify  or  explain  his  testimony,  or  rebut  or  modify  any  inference 
resulting  from  it. "  ^  In  Pennsylvania  it  is  said  in  a  late  case :  "  It 
has  been  reiterated  in  this  State  that  cross-examination  must  be 
contined  to  matters  which  have  been  stated  in  examination  in 
chief,  and  to  such  questions  as  may  tend  to  show  bias  and  inter- 
est in  the  witness ;  that  to  permit  a  party  to  lead  out  new  matter, 
constituting  his  own  case,  under  the  guise  of  a  cross-examina- 
tion, is  disorderly  and  often  unfair  to  the  opposite  party;  and 
that  these  rules  are  established  for  the  purpose  of  eliciting 
truth  and  preserving  the  equality  of  rights  of  parties  in  trials 
of  causes."  ^  In  a  case  in  Arizona,  where  this  question  was  very 
exhaustively  and  thoughtfully  discussed  by  Dunne,  C.  J.,  the 
following  rules  were  laid  down  as  applications  of  the  Ameri- 
can doctrine:  "1.  When  an  adverse  witness  has  testified-  to 
any  point  material  to  the  party  calling  him,  he  may  then  and 
there  be  fully  cross-examined  and  led  by  the  adverse  party,  upon 
all  matters  pertinent  to  the  case  of  the  party  calling  him,  except 


the  following  States:  Pennsylvania: 
Hughs  V.  Westmorehiud  Coal  Co.,  104 
Peiiu.  St.  207,  213;  Mouougahela 
Water  Co.  v.  Stewartson,  9(5  Pa.  St. 
436;  Jackson  v.  Litch,  G2  Pa.  St.  451. 
Maryland:  Herrick  v.  Sworaley,  50 
Md.  439,  455:  Griffith  v.  Diffeuderffer, 
50  Md.  4()r),  478.  Indiana:  Stiuhouse 
V.  State,  47  lud.  17 ;  Aurora  v.  Cohl), 
21  Ind.  493;  Pattou  v.  Hamilton,  12 
lud.  250.  Illinois:  Stafford  v.  Fargo, 
35  HI.  481;  Lloyd  v.  Thompson,  5 
Bradw.  (111.)  90,  ijii;  Stevens  r.  Brown, 
12  Bradw.  (111.)  G19,  (122;  Bell  v. 
Prewitt,  02  111.  301.  Iowa:  Glenn  v. 
Gleason,  01  la.  28,  32;  Pellersells  v, 
Allen,  56  la.  717;  s.  c.  10  N.  \V.  Rep. 
201.  Nebraska:  Clough  v.  State,  7 
Neb.  320,  341;  Boggs  v.  Thompson,  13 
Neb.  403;  Davis  r.  Neligh,  7  Neb.  84; 
Cod   v.   Eoclie,    15  Neb.    24;    s.  c.    17 


N.  W.  Rep.  119.  Neio  York:  Neil  v. 
Thorn,  88  N.  Y.  270,  275;  Hartness  v. 
Boyd,  5  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  503.  [lu  Neil 
V.  Thorn,  supra,  it  Is  saM  that  the  trial 
court  may,  in  its  discretion,  relax  the 
rule,  so  as  to  allow  the  cross-examin- 
ing party  to  go  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  direct  examiuatiou.]  California: 
McFaddeu  v.  Mitchell,  01  Cal.  148. 
Nevada:  Ferguson  v.  Rutherford, 
7  Nev.  385,  390.  Arizona:  Rush  v. 
French,  1  Ariz.  99,  139. 

1  Al)b.  Tr.  Brief,  40;  citing  Wilson 
w.  Wagar,  26  Mich.  452;  Campau  r. 
Dewey,  9  Id.  381,  419;  Haynes  v.  Led- 
yard,  33  Id.  319;  Ferguson  v.  Ruther- 
ford, 7  Nev.  385;  Baird  r.  Daly,  08  N. 
Y.  547,  550;  Mayer  i'.  People,  80  N.  Y. 
304,  378. 

2  Hughes  V.  AVestmoreland  Coal 
Co.,  104  Pa.  St.  207,  2? 3. 


25 


386  EXAMIXATIOiV    OF    AVITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl',, 

exclusively  new  matter ;  and  nothing  shall  be  deemed  new  mat- 
ter except  it  be  such  as  could  not  be  given  under  a  general  de- 
nial. 2.  The  fact  that  evidence,  called  forth  by  a  legitimate 
cross-examination,  happens  also  to  sustain  a  cross-action  or  coun- 
ter-claim, affords  no  reason  why  it  should  be  excluded.  3.  The 
party  entitled  to  cross-examine  may  waive  his  right  to  do  so 
at  the  time,  and  recall  the  witness  and  cross-examine  him  after 
he  opens  his  case.  4.  The  court,  in  its  discretion,  may  forbid 
the  cross-examining  party  putting  leading  questions,  when  objec- 
tion is  made  that  the  w^itness  is  biased  in  favor  of  the  party  cross- 
examining,  and  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  objection  is 
good."  ^ 

§  434.  Defendant  cannot  introdnce  liis  Defense  by  Cross- 
examination. —  Where  this  rule  prevails  a  defendant  cannot,  by 
cross-examining  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  except  by  consent  of 
parties  and  permission  of  the  court,  open  up  his  own  defense  by 
interrogating  the  witness  as  his  own  witness. ^  But  he  may 
cross-examine  as  to  all  that  constitutes  the  cause  of  action, 
thouo;!!  not  with  reo^ard  to  matters  in  confession  and  avoidance.^ 
He  may,  according  to  principles  already  stated,*  sift  and  probe 
the  direct  examination  to  the  fullest  extent.  As  was  well  said 
by  Mr.  Justice  Christiancy:  "  All  testimony  elicited  on  cross- 
examination,  consisting,  as  it  does,  of  facts  which,  relating  to 
the  direct  examination,  may  have  been  omitted  or  concealed  in 
that  examination,  or  facts  tending  to  contradict,  explain  or  mod- 
ify some  inference  which  might  otherwise  be  drawn  from  them, 
must,  in  the  nature  of  things,  constitute  a  part  of  the  evidence 
given  in  chief,  and  both  alike  and  taken  together  must  therefore 
be  treated  as  evidence  given  on  the  part  of  the  party  calling  the 


^  "Rush  V.  French,  I  Ariz.  T.  99,  139.  ^  Hendersou  v.  Hydraulic  Worlvs,  9 

2  D:i  Lee  ?;.  Blackburn,  n  Kan.  190;  Phila.  (Pa.)  100. 

Malone  v.    Do^lierty,  79  Pa.    St.   4(i;  ^  Ante,  %  408. 

Elmaker  v.   Buckley,  16    Serg.  &  R.  ^  Wilsons.   Wager,  26  Mich.   452; 

72;  MacKiuley  w.  McGregor,  3  Whart.  quoted  with  approval  in  Callison  v 

(Pa.)   370;  Floyd  v.  Bovard,  6   Watts  Smith,  20  Kan.  28,  37. 
&  S.  (Pa.)  75. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  387 

§  435.   Coufinecl  to  the  Testimony  in  Chief  of  the  Particular 
Witness,  or   Extended   to  all    the    Plaintiff's  Evidence. — -In 

jurisdictions  \Yhere  this  rule  prevails,  a  tendency  is  discovered  to 
relax  its  strictness,  so  far  as  to  allow  the  defendant  to  cross- 
examine  the  plaintiff's  witnesses  as  to  all  the  facts  which  have 
been  developed  by  the  testimony  given  for  the  plaintiff,  whether 
delivered  by  the  particular  witness  or  by  other  witnesses.  Thus, 
in  Pennsylvania,  while  it  is  conceded  that  "  cross-examination,  as 
a  general  thing,  is  only  regular  when  confined  to  the  testimony 
given  by  the  witness  in  chief  ,^  the  modified  vieiv  has  been  laid 
down,  that  it  ought  not  to  transcend  the  testimony  in  chief,  taken 
as  a  whole,  or  in  other  words,  the  case  which  the  witnesses  on 
the  other  side  are  called  to  prove.  If  it  is  confined  to  narrower 
limits,  the  plaintiff  may  distribute  the  case  arbitrarily  among  the 
witnesses,  and,  by  restricting  each  to  a  particular  line,  prevent 
the  disclosure  of  truths  which  he  desires  to  conceal."  ^  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  Nevada  have  also  laid  down  a  modified  rule,  by 
stating  that  the  one  invariable  test  by  which  to  determine  whether 
the  cross-examination  can  be  permitted  is,  Does  it  concern  new 
matter  of  defense  or  not  ?  '^ 

§  436.  Liberality  in  Applying  the  Rule  —  How  far  Relaxed 
in  Discretion.  —  One  court  has  gone  so  far  as  to  hold,  even  in 
civil  cases,  that  when  such  cross-examination  is  carried  to  an 
unreasonable  length  on  new  matters,  whereby  improper  testimony 
is  obtained,  it  is  error.*  But  another  court  has  said:  "  The  pur- 
pose of  the  rule  might  often  be  defeated  by  a  rigid  enforcement 
of  the  rules  in  all  cases.  In  the  order  of  examination  of  wit- 
nesses and  the  introduction  of  testimony,  much  must  be  left  to 
the  discretion  of  the  court  below.  This  court  has  rareh%  if  ever, 
reversed  for  an  error  in  permitting  a  violation  of  the  rules  relat- 

i  Helser  r.  McGratli,52Pa.  St.  531.  483;    Moody     v.    Rowell,     17     Pick. 

2  Heudersou  v.  H\-draulic   Works,  (Mass.)   490,  497;  Beal  r.   Nichols,  2 

9  Phila.  (Pa.)  100,  opinion  by  Hare,  P.  Gray  (Mass.),  2G2;  Liusley  v.  Lovely, 

J.     Such  also  is  the  rule  of   the   com-  2ij  \t.  123. 

man  law  as  practiced  in  New  York,  ^  Ferguson  v.  Rutherford,   17  Nev= 

Massacliusetts  and  Vermont.     Pulton  390. 

Bank  v.    Stafford,   2   AVend.    (N.   Y.)  ^  Bell  v.  Pruitt,  G2  111.  362. 


3>8  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 

ing  to  cross-examination,  which  does  not  result  to  the  prejudice  of 
the  part}'."^  In  the  opinion  of  another  court  we  find  the  follow- 
in<;  hinfjuagfe  :  "As  to  wliat  are  and  what  are  not  circumstances 
connected  with  the  testimony  in  chi(>f ,  is  sometimes  very  diffi- 
cult of  determination,  owing  to  the  remote  connection  between 
the  direct  examination  and  the  facts  sought  to  be  elicited  by  the 
cross-examination  ;  and,  unless  a  trial  court  should  so  far  over- 
step the  bounds  as  to  admit  that  in  cross-examination  which 
clearly  has  no  connection  with  the  direct  testimony,  an  appellate 
court  would  not  be  justified  in  reversing  a  judgment  for  such 
cause,  especially  where  the  cross-examination  is  upon  facts  com- 
petent to  be  proved  under  the  issues  in  case.  In  such  questions, 
very  much  must  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court."  ^ 
Another  court,  in  applying  the  rule,  holds  that  it  \snot  necessary 
that  the  jjr6'c«se  subject  should  have  been  called  to  the  attention 
of  the  witness  on  the  direct  examination,  but  the  cross-examina- 
tion should  be  allowed  to  extend  to  any  matter  not  foreign  to  the 
subject  of  the  direct  examination,  and  tending  to  limit,  explain 
or  modify  the  same.^  In  another  court,  where  the  action  was 
upon  a  promissory  note,  and  its  genuineness  was  put  in  issue,  a 
witness  who  had  testified  in  chief  that  he  knew  the  defendant's 
handwriting  and  that  the  note  was  in  his  handwriting,  was  asked, 
on  cross-examination,  when  he  first  saw  the  note.  It  was  held, 
applying  the  same  liberal  rule,  that  this  question  grew  legiti- 
mately out  of  the  direct  examination,  since  it  had  a  tendency  to 
elicit  from  the  witness  what  opportunities  he  had  had  of  exam- 
ining the  signature.*  For  the  same  reason,  it  was  permitted  to 
ask  the  witness  on  cross-examination,  who  showed  him  the  note,® 
So,  another  court  has  held  that,  on  the  cross-examination  of  a 
witness  Avho  has  given  evidence  making  out  a  iwima  facie  case 

1  Hughes tJ.  Woslinort'landCoul Co.,  E.  Co.    v.   Van    Steiuberg,    17   Mich. 

104  Pa,  St.  207,  213.  'J'.). 

"^  Glenn  v.  Gleuson,  01  la.  28,  32.  ''  Ilerrick  r.  Swoinlcy,  ;16  Md.  439, 

^  Haynes  v.  Ledyard,  33  Mich.  319.  455.     Compare  Griffith  v.  Diffeuderf- 

See  as  to  the  Miciiigau  rule,  Chandler  fer,  50  Md.  400,  478. 

».  Allison,  10  Mich.  400;  Thompson  v.  ^  Herrick  v.  Swomley,  supra. 

Rioliards,  14   Mich.   172;    Detroit   &c. 


Tit.  HI,  Ch.  XVri.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  389 

for  the  plaintiff,  it  is  competent  to  draw  out  any  facts  which 
would  tend  to  destroy  the  case  thus  made  out.i 

§  437.  [Illustration.]  Witness  to  prove  Execution  not  Cross- 
ExAMiNED  A3  TO  CONSIDERATION.  — A  frequBiit  iiistancB,  and  one  which 
throws  into  contrast  the  English  and  American  rule,  is  that,  under 
the  English  rule,  a  witness  called  by  the  plaintiff  for  the  purpose  of 
proving  the  execution  of  the  written  contract  which  is  the  foundation  of 
the  suit,  may  be  cross-examined  by  the  defendant  as  to  its  consideration, 
and  the  defendant  may  contradict  his  statements  concerning  such  con- 
sideration.-^ But,  under  the  American  rule,  a  witness  called  by  the 
plaintiff  for  the  purpose  of  proving  the  execution  of  the  contract  sued 
on,  cannot  be  cross-examined  as  to  its  consideration  ;  but  if  the  defend- 
ant would  have  his  testimony  en  that  point,  lie  must  call  him  as  his 
own  witness.  2 

§  438.  [Continued].  Witness  to  Prove  Identity  not  Cross-ex- 
amined AS  to  Consideration.  —  By  parity  of  reasoning,  under  the 
American  rule,  witnesses  called  to  prove  identity  cannot  be  cross-exam- 
ined as  to  consideration.  Thus,  in  a  contest  between  the  mortgagee  of 
chattels  and  an  alleged  purchaser,  the  mortgagee  called  the  mortgagor 
as  a  witness  and  proved  by  him  the  single  fact  that  the  chattels  were 
the  same  which  were  described  in  the  mortgage.  The  court  then  per- 
mitted, against  objection,  a  lengthy  cross-examination  of  the  witness, 
in  regard  to  the  consideration  of  the  mortgage  and  various  other  mat- 
ters not  touched  upon  in  the  examination  in  chief,  and  a  verdict 
resulted  against  the  mortgagee.  It  was  held  that  for  this  error  the 
judgment  must  be  reversed.  ■* 

§  439.  .[Continued.]  Defendant's  Title  in  Ejectment. — The 
defendant's  title  in  ejectment  is  not  new  matter,  within  the  meaning  of 
this  rule  ;  and  therefore  questions  may  be  asked,  on  cross-examination 
of  the  plaintiff's  witness  in  ejectment,  eliciting  answers  which  set  up  the 
defendant's  title. ^  But  in  Illinois  it  is  held  that,  where  the  plaintiff  in 
ejectment  files  an  affidavit  that  he  claims  title  through  a  common  source 

*  .Tacobson    v.    Metzger,   35    Mich.  Cal.   U.S.     Compare    Leavitt   v.  Stan- 

10.3.  sell,  U  Mich.  424. 

2  Lanipvey  v.  Munch,   21  Minn.  379.  *  Bell  v.  Pruitt,  02  111.  3()2. 

■^  Yomnan's   v.     Carney,    (\2     Wis,  5  Marshall   v.  Shafter,  32  Cal.  176; 

i>90,   582,     McFaddeu    c.  Mitchell,    Gl  Kush  r.  French,  1  Ariz.  T.  90,  130. 


390  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

with  the  defendant,  and  the  defendant,  or  liis  agent  or  attorne}', 
denies  under  oath  that  he  claims  title  through  such  source,  or  states 
that  he  claims  title  through  some  other  so  urce,  —  the  latter  will  not  be 
subject  to  a  cross-examination  as  to  his  source  of  title.  So  held  as  to 
the  effect  of  a  statute  touching  the  action  of  ejectment.^ 

§  440.  [Continued.]  Further  Illustrations  of  the  Rule.  — An 
illustration  of  the  ridiculous  consequences  which  flow  from  a  strict 
application  of  the  American  rule  is  found  in  a  case  in  Indiana,  where 
the  relatrix  in  a  prosecution  for  bastardy  having  testified  as  a  witness, 
the  defendant  asked  her  what  was  tlie  colo7'  of  the  hair  and  eyes  of  the 
child.  It  was  held  that  this  question  was  properly  excluded,  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  an  attempt  to  introduce  new  defensive  matter  by 
cross-examining  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  which  was  inadmissible. ^ 

§  441.  [Continued.]  Illustrative  Cases  not  within  the  Rule.  — 
On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  seduction  under  a  promise  of  mar- 
riage, witnesses  had  testified,  on  behalf  of  the  State,  that  the  defendant 
kept  company  with  the  female  alleged  to  have  been  seduced,  and  that 
they  had  walked  and  rode  together  a  few  times.  It  was  held  that  these 
witnesses  might  be  asked,  on  cross-examination,  vfheiher  other  onen  had 
not  kept  company  with  her  in  like  manner.  Tbe  court  said:  "  The  fact 
stated  by  the  witnesses,  in  their  direct  examination,  was  introduced  to  cor- 
roborate the  testimony  of  the  girl,  and  as  tending  to  show  that  a  prom- 
ise of  marriage  had  been  made  by  the  appellant.  The  object  of  the 
cross-examination  was  to  overthrow  or  weaken  tlie  effect  of  the  evi- 
dence.    For  that  purpose  it  was  proper,  and  the  court  erred  in  refusing 

it."  ^ Where,  in  an  action  against  executors  on  certain  promissory 

notes  purporting  to  be  those  of  the  testator,  the  plaintiff  was  allowed, 
without  objection,  to  testify  that  the  testator  had  signed  the  notes,  and 
the  notes  were  thereby  admitted  in  evidence,  making  a  prima  facie  case 
for  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held  competent  for  the  defendant  to  cross-ex- 
amine the  plaintiffs  as  to  where,  when,  under  what  circumstances,  and  for 

what  consideration,  the  notes  were  signed.'* In  a  suit  by  a  passenger 

on  a  stage  coach  against  the  proi)rietors  as  common  carriers,  to  recover 
damages  for  personal  injuries  sustained  by  the  upsetting  of  the  coach, 
the  plaintiff,  testifying  as  a  witness,  stated  that  he  was  received  by  the 

1  Thatcher    v.   Olmstcad,    110  111.  »  Stiuhouse  r.  State,  47  Intl.  17. 
26.  *  Gleuu  V.  Gleasou,   61   la.   28,  31. 

2  Hull  V.  State,  93  lud.  128. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XVII. J       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  391 

driver,  as  a  passenger  from  Boulder  to  Helena,  without  charge,  and  that 
one  of  the  defendants  had  said,  since  the  accident,  that  the  driver  had 
orders  to  carry  him  without  fare  to  Helena.  On  cross-examination,  he 
was  asked  whether  his  fare  was  not  demanded  before  the  accident  at 
Jefferson  —  a  station  between  Boulder  and  Helena, —  whether  he  had 
not  refused  to  pay  it,  or  to  leave  the  coach  when  required  to  do  so. 
These  cross-questions  were  objected  to,  and  the  objection  sustained  by 
the  trial  court.  It  was  held  that  they  related  to  the  transaction  in- 
quired of   in  chief,  and  should  have  been  allowed.  ^ In  a  suit  by  a 

commission  merchant  to  recover  of  the  person  for  whom  he  had  made  the 
purchase,  for  loss  on  a  resale,  for  want  of  putting  up  a  further  margin, 
the  defendant  has  the  right,  in  Illinois,  on  cross-examination,  to  inquire 
when,  where,  and  in  what  manner  the  purchase  was  made  for  him,  and 
whether  the  plaintiff  has  settled  the  purchase,  and  if  so,  what  was 
paid  to  him,  and  the  manner  it  was  paid,  — for  the  purpose  of  showing 
whether  the  mode  of  dealing  was  fair  and  free  from  fraud  and  injustice 
or  wrong  to  him.- 

§  442.  Effect  of  the  Rule  — When  makes  Adversary's  Wit- 
ness One's  Own.  — The  effect  of  the  Amerieau  rule  is  that, 
where  a  party,  on  the  cross-exuminutiou  of  a  witness,  draws  out 
new  matter  not  inquired  about  in  the  examination  in  chief,  he 
makes  the  Avitness  his  own  in  respect  of  such  new  matter,  and 
gives  the  right  to  the  party  originally  calling  the  witness,  to  cross- 
examine  him  on  such  new  matter.'^ 


§  443.  tieading  Questions    in    Developing  New  Matter.  — 

Under  the  English  rule,  as  applied  in  several  American  jurisdic- 
tions,* the  cross-examining  counsel  may  put  leading  questions  to 
the  witness,  even  while  developing  new  matter  not  touched  upon 
in  the  examination  in  chief.®  Other  courts,  which  follow  the  so- 
called  American  rule,''  have  declared  that,  when  the  cross-exam- 
iner proceeds  to  develop  new  matter,  the  witness  becomes  so  far 

1  Gihiier  v.  Higley,  110  U.  S.  47  ^  Dickenson  i\  Sliee,-t  Esp.fil;  Moody 

2  Oklershaw    v.    Kuowles,    101    III.      r.  Rowell,    17   Pick.  (Mass.)  490,  498; 
117.  s.  c=  28  Am.  Dec.  317;  Beal  v.  Nichols, 

^  So  held  in  Bassham  v.  State,  38  2  Gray  (Mass.),  2G4;  Jacksou  v.  Var- 

Tex^  G22,  aud  cases  iu  the  next  sec-  rick,  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  238. 
tiou  «  Ante,  §  432. 

*  Ante,  §  430, 


392  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

his  07vn  witness^  that  it  is  not  proper  for  him  to  ask  leading 
questions  in  respect  of  such  new  matter.^  "  A  different  rule," 
says  Finch,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of 
New  York,  "  would  enable  a  party  to  develop  his  defense 
untrammelled  by  the  rules  which  govern  a  direct  examination, 
and  give  him  an  advantage  for  which  we  can  see  no  just  reason. 
As  to  the  new  matter  the  witness  becomes  his  own,  and  in  sub- 
stance and  effect  the  cross-examination  ceases.  That  is  properly 
such  only  while  it  is  directed  to  the  evidence  given  in  behalf  of 
the  adversary.  When  it  passes  })eyond  that,  it  becomes  the 
direct  and  affirmative  evidence  of  the  party,  and  should  be  sub- 
jected to  the  appropriate  restraints.  There  is  no  reason,  in  the 
nature  of  the  case,  why  a  direct  examination  should  be  guarded 
against  the  evil  and  danger  resulting  from  leading  questions, 
which  does  not  apply  to  an  effort  upon  cross-examination  to  in- 
troduce a  new  and  affirmative  defense."^  A  modified  view  is 
found  in  the  decisions  of  several  of  the  courts  which  follow  the 
American  rule,  which  is  to  the  effect  that  a  leading  question  in 
respect  of  new  matter,  though  objectionable,  may  be  allowed^ 
or  denied*  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.  The  courts  which 
adhere  to  this  rule  generally  hold  that  a  party  cannot  cross-ex- 
amine his  adversary's  witness  as  to  new  matter,  in  order  to 
introduce  his  own  case,  untrammelled  by  the  rules  of  direct 
examination.^     In  New  York  it  was    early  laid  down  that  the 

1  Harrison  V.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  son   v.    Son,  2   Caines  (N.    Y.),    178; 

(U.  S)5S0;  Landsberger  u.  Gorliam,  5  People  ^i.  Moore,  15  Wend.   (N.  Y.) 

Cal,  451;  Aitkenv.  Moudenhall,  25Cal.  419, 

213;  Wetherbee  v.  Dunn,  32  Cal.  10(1;  2  people    v.  Oyer    &  Terminer,   83 

Harper  v.  Lampins:;,  33  Cal.  ()41,  047;  N.  Y.  438,   459;  affirming  s.  c.  19  Hun 

Ferguson  v.   liutherford,  7   Nev.  385,  (N.  Y.),  91  where  the  subject  is  fully 

390.     See  also  Houghton  v.  Jones,  1  and  ably  discussed  by  Brady,  .J. 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  705;  Jaci<son  v.  Feather  »  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3  Wash.  C.  C. 

R.  W.  Co.,  14  Cal.  19,  24;  Thornton  v.  (U.  S.)  5.S0. 

Hook,  36  Cal.  223;  Ellmaker  v.  Buck-  *  Ellniaker  v.  Buckley,  IG  Serg.  &  R. 

ley,  10  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  72,  77;  Pliila-  (Pa.)  72,  77. 

delphia  &c.   R.   Co.   v.   Stimpson,    14  ^  Castor  v.  Bavington,  2   AVatts  & 

Pet.  (U.  S.)  448;  Castor  v.  Bavington,  S.  (Pa.)  505;  Floyd  v.  Bovard,  6  Ibid. 

2  Watts  &   S.    (Pa.)    505;     Floyd  v.  75;    Philadelphia  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Stimp- 

Bovard,  6  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  75;  Jack-  son,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  448. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVll.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  393 

cross-examination  of  a  witness  in  such  a  manner  as  to  call  forth 
new  matter,  made  him  the  witness  of  the  cross-examining  party, ^ 
and  it  was  said  that  the  court  ought  not,  except  in  peculiar 
cases,  to  permit  a  direct  examination,  meaning  the  examination 
of  the  adversary's  witness  on  new  matter,  to  assume  the  form  of 
a  cross-examination. 2  The  conclusion  seems  to  be  that  the  ques- 
tion rests  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  presiding  judge. ^ 

§  444.  [CoNTixuED.]  Reasons  of  the  Rule  Which  Ad:mits  Lead- 
ing Questions.  —  In  stating  the  reason  of  this  rule  in  a  leading  case 
in  Massachusetts,  Chief  Justice  Shaw  said:  "  On  the  whole,  the  court 
are  of  opinion  that  the  weight  of  authority  is  in  favor  of  the  right  to 
put  leading  questions  under  the  circumstances  stated,  and  that  this  is 
confirmed  by  practice  and  experience.  It  is  most  desirable  that  rules 
of  general  practice,  of  so  much  importance  and  of  such  frequent  re- 
currence, should  be  as  few,  simple  and  practical  as  possible,  and  that 
the  distinctions  should  not  be  multiplied  without  good  cause.  It  would 
be  often  difficult,  in  long  and  complicated  examinations,  to  decide 
whether  a  question  applies  wholly  to  new  matter,  or  to  matter  already 
examined  into  in  chief.  The  general  rule,  admitted  on  all  hands,  is 
that,  on  a  cross-examination,  leading  questions  may  be  put;  and  the 
court  are  of  opinion  that  it  would  not  be  useful  to  engraft  upon  it  a 
distinction  not  in  general  necessary  to  attain  tlie  purposes  of  justice  in 
the  investigation  of  the  truth  of  facts ;  that  it  would  often  be  diffi- 
cult of  application,  and  that  all  the  practical  good  expected  from  it 
may  be  as  effectually  attained  by  the  exercise  of  the  discretionary 
power  of  the  court,  where  the  circumstances  are  such  as  to  require  its 
interposition."  ^  After  many  years'  experience  of  the  workings  of  this 
rule,  the  Massachusetts  court  say,  in  a  more  modern  case:  "Experi- 
ence has  shown  that  this  rule  is  convenient  and  easy  of  application  in 
practice,  and  works  no  disadvantage  to  the  party  producing  a  witness. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  different  rule,  by  making  it  necessary  for  the  court, 
during  the  examination  of  the  witness,  constantly  to  determine  what 
is  or  what  is  not  new  matter,  upon  which  the  opposite  party  has  a  right 

1  Jacksou  V.  Son,  2  Caines  (N.  Y.),  3  people  v.  Genet,  19  Him  (N.  Y.), 
178;  People  i\  Moore,  15  \yen(l.  (N.  91,  100;  s.  c,  s^ib  nom.  People  v.  Oyer 
YO  419,  423.  &  Terminer,  affirmed,  83  N,  Y.  438. 

2  People  V  Mather,  4  Wend.  (N.  ^  Moody  v.  Powell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.) 
Y  )  229,  248.  490,  499;  s.  c.  28  Am.  Dec.  317. 


394  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl"., 

to  put  leading  questions,  leads  to  confusion  and  delay  in  tlie  progress  of 
trials."! 

§  445.  [Continued.]  Cross-examination  of  the  Adverse 
Party.  —  A  greater  latitude  is  allowed,  under  the  Aiuoricaii  rule, 
in  the  cross-examination  of  a  party  who  testifies  in  his  own  be- 
half; but  this  matter  rests  very  largely  in  the  control  of  the  trial 
court,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  which  is  not  review- 
able on  error. 2  A  statute  of  Pennsylvania,  of  which  there  are 
no  doubt  counterparts  in  other  States,  is  as  follows  :  "  A  party 
to  the  record  of  any  civil  proceeding  in  law  or  equity,  or  a  per- 
son  for  whose  immediate  benefit  such  proceeding  is  prosecuted  or 
defended,  may  be  examined  as  if  under  cross-examination,  at  the 
instance  of  the  adverse  party,  or  any  of  them,  and  for  that  pur- 
pose, may  be  compelled,  in  the  same  manner,  and  subject  to  the 
same  rules  of  examination  as  any  othtu-  witness  to  testify;  but 
the  party  calling  for  such  examination  shall  not  be  concluded 
thereby,  but  may  rebut  it  by  counter  testimony."  ^  Under  this 
statute  it  is  held  that,  Avhen  a  party  is  called  as  a  witness  by  his 
adversary,  leading  questions  may  be  put  to  him,  and  there  may 
be  drawn  from  him  any  facts  or  admissions  which  weaken  his 
case  or  strengthen  his  adversary's.* 

§  44G.  Cross-examination  in  Criminal  Cases.  —  Where  the 
State  introduces  a  witness  and  examines  him, the  defendant  may, 
under  the  English  rule,  cross-examine  him  as  to  all  matters 
involved  in  the  case,  no  matter  how  fornud  or  unimportant  the 
examination  in  chief  may  have  been.^  Indeed,  the  rules  of  evi- 
dence are  the  same  in  civil  and  criminal  cases;  and  in  both 
it  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  how  far  he  will  allow  the 
examination  in  chief  of  a  witness  to  be  by  leading  questions,  or 
to   assume  the  form  of  a  cross-examination."     But  in  one  juris- 

'  Beal  V.   Nichols,   2  Gray  (Mass.)  ■»  Ikibaker    r.    Taylor,   7(5    Pa.    St. 

264,  oi)iiiiou  by  Biiiclow,  J.  83. 

2  ]{L'a  V.  Missouri,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  •'''  State  r.  Brady,  87  Mo.  142. 

532,  542.  «  Keg.    v.   Murphy,    8    Car.    &    P. 

3  l\-iiu.     Act    April    ir.tli,    18(;'J;    1      297. 
Bright.  Purd.  Dig.  (524,  pi.  17. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  395 

diction  a  distinction  is  taken  between  the  right  of  the  State  to 
cross-examine  witnesses  for  the  accused,  and  the  right  of  the  ac- 
cused to  cross-examine  witnesses  for  the  State.  The  accused 
.must  be  allowed  to  cross-examine  tlie  witnesses  of  the  State  as  to 
any  fact  tending  to  establish  his  defense,  whether  it  be  or  be  not 
connected  witli  the  facts  testified  to  in  his  examination  in  chief. ^ 
In  a  capital  trial,  where  the  defendant,  upon  cross-examination 
of  a  witness  for  the  State,  by  direct  questions,  disclosed  for  the 
first  time  the  commission  of  another  crime  by  him  than  that  for 
which  he  was  on  trial,  —  it  was  held  no  ground  for  reversing  the 
judgment,  that  the  State  was  afterwards  permitted  to  prove,  by 
another  witness,  the  same  facts,  in  relation  to  a  crime  which  had 
already  been  brouoht  out  by  such  cross-examination. ^ 


Article  III.  ■ —  Ql'estigxs  Affecting  Credibility. 

Section 

450.  Relatious  between  'Witness  and  Parties  —  Facts  Sliowiug  Bias  or  Pre- 

judice. 

451.  TVliether  Details  and  Particulars  of  Ill-Tvill  may  be  Shown. 

452.  Remoteness  of  111  Feeling  in  Point  of  Time. 

453.  Attempts  to  Suborn  other  Witnesses. 

454.  Previous  Offer  of  Prosecutor  to  Settle. 

455.  Other  Illustrations  of  the  foregoing  Principles. 

456.  [Continued.]     Further  Illustrations. 

457.  [Continued.]     Further  Illustrations. 

458.  Questions  affecting  Cliaracter  of  "Witness. 

459.  [Continued.]     Judicial  Expressions  on  this  Question. 

460.  [Continued.]     Views  of  Dr.  Greenleaf. 

461.  Cross-examination    as    to    coUateral    Matters     affecting    Credibility. 

(1.)  Viewtliat  such  Cross-examination  is  not  Permissible. 

462.  Illustrations  of  the  Eule  last  Stated. 

463.  [P^xception.]     Where  Counsel  Promise  to  show  Relevancy. 
464c  [Continued.]     (2.)  Sucli  Inquiries  Permissible  in  Discretion. 

465.  Illustrations  of  this  Rule. 

466.  [Continued.]     Contrary  and  confusing  Views. 

467.  Arrested,  Indicted,  Convicted. 

468.  Questions  creating  Prejudice,  but  not  affecting  Credibility.. 

1  State    V.     Swayze,    30  La.   Ann.  2  g^ate    v.    Kriug,    74     Mo.     612, 

1323,   1327:    State  v.  Thomas^  32  La.      631. 
Ann.  34'J,  351. 


396  EXAMINATION  OF  AviTNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr. 

Section 
4(Ji).  Cross-esaraiuation  ou  collateral  [Matters  for  the  Purpose  of  Contradic- 
tion. 

470.  If  AVituess  Answers,  Answer  Conclusive. 

471.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

472.  [Continued.]     Instances  of  Convictions  Reversed  for  a  Violation  of  this 

Eule. 

473.  [Coutiniied.]     What  if  Question  Answered  v^ithout  Objection 
474k  Where  the  opposite  Party  is  a  Witness. 

475.  Right  of  Witness  to  Explain. 

§  450.  Relations  Between  Witness  and  Parties  —  Facts 
Showing  Bias  or  Prejudice  —  It  is  one  of  the  objects  of  a  cross- 
examination  to  discover  the  motives,  inclinations  and  prejudices  of 
the  witness,  for  the  purpose  of  reducing  the  effect  which  might 
otherwise  be  given  to  his  evidence.^  Accordingly,  it  has 
been  w^ell  said  that  "  it  is  always  competent  to  show  the  relations 
which  exist  between  the  witness  and  the  party  against,  as  well  as 
for  whom  he  was  called."  ^  The  general  rule  is  that  anything 
tending  to  show  bias  or  prejudice  on  the  part  of  a  witness  may 
be  brought  out  on  his  cross-examination.  The  reason  for  the  rule 
is,  that  such  matters  affect  the  credit  of  the  witness,  and  it  is 
therefore  material  to  indulge  in  such  an  inquiry.^  For  this  pur- 
pose it  is  competent  to  inquire  of  the  witness  concerning  acts, 
declarations  and  circumstances,  showing  the  existence  of  hostile 
feelings  or  j)fGJudice ;  and  the  latitude  of  cross-examination  is  not 
restricted  by  the  fact  that  the  witness  is  a  party  testifying  in  his 
own  behalf.*     The  slate  of  mind  and  feelings  of  a  witness  may 

1  1  Greenl.  Ev.  (12th  ed.),  §  446.  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Camp.  637;  Atty.- 

2  Starks  V.  People,  5  Denio(N.  Y.),  General  v.  Hitchcock,  11  Jur.  478; 
106.  See  also  Newton  v.  Harris,  2  Morgan  v.  Frees,  1  Am.  L.  Reg.  92; 
Seld.  (N.  Y.)  345;  Cameron  v.  Mont-  Chapman  v.  Coffin,  14  Gray  (Mass.), 
gomcry,  13  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  128;  How-  454;  Davis  v.  Roby,  64  Me.  430;  Cam- 
ard  V.  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  4  Denio  eron  v.  Montgomery,  13  Serg.  &  R. 
(N.  Y.),  502;  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Loomis,  (Pa.)  128;  Batdorff  v.  Bank,  61  Pa.  St. 
32  N.  Y.  127;  Madden u.  Koester,  52  la.  183;  1  Whart.  Ev.,  §  566;  1  Greeni.  Ev. 
693;  People  v.  Furtado,  57  Cal.  346;  (13th ed.),  §§  449,  455,  459,  461. 
Dance  v.  McBride,  43  la.  624;  Miles  *  Watson  v.  Twombly,  60  Ne  H. 
w.  Sackett,  30  Ilun  (N.  Y),(i8;  Com.  u.  491;  Brewer  v.  Crosby,  11  Gray 
Gallagher,  12G  Mass.  54.  (Mass.),  29;  People  v.  Casey,  72  N.  Y. 

3  State   V:  Krum,  32  Kan.  372,  373;  393,  398. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  397 

materially  affect  his  testimony,  and  the  credit  of  a  witness,  upon 
whose  testimon}'  in  part  the  issue  is  to  be  determined,  is  not  a 
collateral  and  immaterial  matter.^  "  Otherwise,  biased  or  de- 
pendent witnesses,  a  parent,  child,  brother,  sister  or  person  with 
strong  motives  for  prejudice  or  partialit}',  —  might  be  put  on  the 
stand  by  defendant,  and,  in  the  absence  of  any  question  by  his 
counsel  on  the  subject,  the  State  would  be  prevented  from  putting 
the  jury  in  possession  of  the  fact  of  such  relat  ionship ,  which  would 
be  entitled  to  lewitimate  consideration,  as  affectino;  the  weio-ht  and 
credibility  of  the  testimony."  ^  So,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting 
the  credibility  of  a  witness,  he  may  always  be  cross-examined  as 
to  his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  suit."^  It  may,  therefore,  be 
laid  down,  as  a  general  rule,  that  any  question  is  proper  which 
tends  to  show  that  the  personal  situation,  or  interest  of  the  wit- 
ness, may  have  influenced  the  testimony  given  by  him  on  direct 
examination.^ 

§  451.  Whether  Details  and  Particulars  of  Witness's  Ill- 
will  may  be  shown. — To  this  end,  it  has  been  held  that  it 
is  competent,  on  cross-examination,  where  the  witness  has  ad- 
mitted his  ill-will  toward  a  party,  to  go  into  the  details  and  par- 
ticulars of  such  ill-will,   for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  extent 

1  Watson  V.   Twombly,   GO  N.    H.  such  party.    No  citation  of  authorities 

491;  Martin  v.  Taruham,  25  N.  H.  195;  is  needed  on  a  point  so  well  settled." 

Folsom  t).  Brawn,  Id.   114;  Combs  v.  People  r.  Benson,  52  Cal.  380. 
AViuchester,    39    N.    H.     13;    Carr  v.  3  Vaughan  v.  Westover,  4  Thoiup. 

Moore,  41  N.  H.  131;  Sumner  v.  Craw-  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  310;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v. 

ford,  45  N.  H.  41(i;  Collins  u.  Stephen-  Slioles,  20  Wis.  35;  Cornell  v.  Barnes, 

sou,   8   Gray    (Mass.),     488;    Day  -y.  26  Wis.  473;  Suit  «.  Bounell,  33  Wis. 

Stickney,  14  Allen  (Mass.),  255.  180.     See    also    Starks    v.    People,   5 

■■^  State  V.  Willingham,  33  La.  Ann.  Denio  (N.  Y.),  lOG;  Peoples.  Cunuing- 

537,  opinion  by  Feuuer,  J.     On   this  ham,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),  524;  Newton  v. 

subject  the   Supreme  Court  of   Cali-  Harris,  6  N.  Y.  345;  Wells  v.  Kelsey, 

fornia  has  said:  "It  is  perfectly  well  37  N.  Y.  143,  146;  McCabe  v.  Brayton, 

settled  that,  on  cross-examination,  a  38  N.  Y.    196;   People  v.  Albright,  23 

witness  may  be  interrogated  as  to  any  How.    Pr.    (N.     Y.)    306;    Turner    v. 

circumstance  which  tends  to  Impeach  Austin,  16  Mass.  181,  185;  Garfield  v. 

his  credibility,  by  showing  that  he  is  Kirk,  65  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  464;  Knight  v. 

biased  against  the  party  conducting  Forward,  63  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  311,  320. 
the  cross-examination,  or  that  he  has  *  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Blackshire, 

an  interest  in  the  result  adverse   to  10  Kan.  477,  487. 


398  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

of  his  bias  and  prejudice.  Johnson,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  said:  "The  defendants  were  entitled  to  know  the 
character  and  extent  of  the  feeling  of  enmity  which  the  wit- 
ness entertained  toward  them.  The  question  of  bias  and  preju- 
dice, and  how  far  her  hostility  towards  the  defendants  may  have 
affected  her  testimony,  are  for  the  jury,  and  they  cannot  prop- 
erly determine  this  until  they  learn  the  degree  and  intensity  of 
the  hostile  feeling."  ^  In  like  manner,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Minnesota  has  said:  "  The  object  of  this  kind  of  testimony  is  to 
show  bias  and  prejudice  on  the  part  of  the  witness,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  leading  the  jury  to  scrutinize  and  perhaps  to  discredit 
the  testimony.  If  testimony  of  this  character  is  to  be  received, 
it  should  be  received  in  its  most  effective  form,  so  that  the  pur- 
poses for  which  it  is  introduced  may  be  best  accomplished.  A 
mere  vague  and  general  statement  that  hostile  feeling  existed 
would  possess  little  force.  It  certainly  must  be  proper  to  ask 
what  the  expression  of  hostility  was,  for  the  purpose  of  inform- 
ing the  jury  of  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  hostile  feeling,  so 
that  they  may  determine  how  much  allowance  is  to  be  made  for 
it."  ^  But,  in  the  opinion  of  another  court,  the  rule  is  that  the 
witness  may  be  interrogated  as  to  the  state  of  his  feelings  to- 
wards one  of  the  parties,  but  that  it  is  not  competent  to  inquire 
into  the  cause  of  such  feelings. "^  On  a  somewhat  similar  view, 
in  a  criminal  trial,  it  has  been  held  error  to  permit  the  State's 
counsel,  in  cross-examining  the  defendant's  witnesses,  to  inquire  of 
them  as  to  the  particulars  of  a  difficulty  which  they  have  had 
with  the  prosecutor,  they  having  denied  ill-feeling  toward  him.^ 

§   452.     Remoteness   of  Ill-Feelings   in  Point  of   Time.  — 

But  the  unkind  feeling  must  be  shown  to  exist  when  the  evidence 
is  given.     The  witness  may  have  been  angry  at  the  party  years 

1  State  V.  Collins,  3:3  K.iu.  77,  3  Conyars  v.  Field,  01  Ga.  L'oS; 
81.  Bishop  V.  State,  1)  Ga.  2(J0. 

2  State  V.  Dee,  U  Miun.  35,  39.  *  Patmaii  v.  State,  (!1  Ga.  379.  It 
See  also  Batdorf  v.  Bauk,  (11  Pa.  is  respectfully  submitted  that  the  con- 
st, 179,  183;  Davis  v.  Roby,  (!4:  Me.  ceptiou  of  this  court  is  unsound,  for 
427,  430;  McFarlin  v.  State,  41  Tex.  the  reasons  given  by  the  Kansas  and 
23.  Minnesota  courts,  as  above. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  399 

before  the  trial,  and  the  anger  may  have  entirely  disappeared. 
Unless  it  is  made  to  appear  that  the  unkind  feeling  exists  at  the 
trial,  or  that  it  has  arisen  so  recently  that  it  may  be  presumed  to 
have  continued  down  to  the  trial,  evidence  to  show  it  is  inad- 
missible.^ 

§  453.  Attempts  to  Suborn  other  Witnesses. —  For  the  pur- 
pose of  affecting  the  credibility  of  the  witness  by  showing  his 
animus  against  the  cross-examining  party  and  the  extent  to  which 
he  is  willing  to  go  in  defeating  the  latter,  it  is  competent  to 
ask  the  witness  on  cross-examination,  with  the  requisite  circum- 
stances of  time,  place  and  person,  whether  he  has  not  attempted 
to  suborn  or  get  out  of  the  way  other  witnesses  subpoenaed  on 
behalf  of  the  cross-examining  party. ^  But,  as  was  decided  by 
the  judges  in  an  answer  to  a  question  propounded  by  the  Lords,^ 
it  is  not  competent  to  prove  such  attempts  at  subornation  or  tam- 
pering with  witnesses,  without  first  laying  a  foundation  therefor, 
by  interrogating  the  witness  whom  it  is  intended  thus  to  accuse.* 

§  454.   Previous  Offer  of  tlie  Prosecutor  to  settle.  —  It  has 

been  held  that  the  prosecuting  witness,  in  a  criminal  case,  cannot 

1  Higham  v.  Gault,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  questious   put  to   the  witness  would 

383.  not,  if  answered  either  way,  elicit  an- 

-  Tlie  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &Bing.  swers  tending  to  show  this,  they  are 

312;  Morgan  v.  Frees,  15  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  '  properly  excluded.    Oberf elder  w.  Kav- 

352;   State  v.  Downs  (Mo.),  3  S.  W.  anaugh  (Neb.),  32  N.  W.  Rep.  296;  s.c. 

Rep.  219;  s.  c.  91  Mo.  19.     Compare  21   Neb.  483.     On  a  criminal  trial  in 

Oberf elder  v.    Kavanaugh    (Neb.),  32  Missouri  a  witness  for  the  State  stated 

N.  W.  Rep.  290;  s.  c.  21  Neb.  483.  on  his  cross-examination  that  he  did 

3  Tlie  Queen's  Case,  supra.  not,  at  a  designated  time  and  place, 

■*  So  held  in  Bates  v.  Holladay,  No.  say  to  a  relative  of  the  defendant  tliat 

3804,  St.  Louis  Court  of  Appeals,  MS.  he  and  another  witness  would  leave, 

In  Lord  Stafford's  Case,  7  How.  St.  and  not  be  Avitnesses  against  the  de- 

Tr.  1294,  1400,  witnesses  for  the  crown  fendant,  if  tlie  person  addressed  would 

were  allowed  to  testify  to  attempts  at  pay  him  $100.     It  was   held   that  the 

subornation,   of    which  the   prisinier  defendant  had  the  right  to  contradict 

protested    his    innocence,    without    a  this  denial  —  to  prove  by  the  person 

previous  foundation  being  laid.     But  to  whom  this  offer  had  been  made  that 

this     decision,    although     sometimes  the  witness  had  made  it.    The  question 

cited  by  American  courts,  should  not  was  not  collateral  to  the  case  on  trial, 

be  regarded  as  of  any  authority  upon  State  v.  Downs   (Mo.),   3  S.  W.   Rep. 

the  point.     It  was  held  that  where  the  219;  s.  c.  91  Mo.  19. 


400  EXAMINATIOX    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

be  asked,  on  cross-examination,  whether  he  had  not  frequently, 
during  the  session  of  the  court,  offered  to  the  prisoner  that  if  the 
prisoner  would  settle  the  subject  matter  of  the  indictment,  he, 
the  prosecuting  witness,  would  leave  the  court  and  not  appear 
against  the  prisoner.  The  reason  was,  that  this  testimony  did 
not  tend  to  impair  the  credibility  of  the  prosecuting  witness.^ 

§  455.  Other  Illustrations  of  the  Foregoing  Principles. — Ac- 
cordingly, in  an  action  brought  by  certain  executors  against  a  co-exec- 
utor, to  recover  the  vahie  of  a  certain  promissory  note  given  by  the 
latter  to  ttie  testator,  a  witness  called  by  the  plaintiffs,  whose  testimon}'- 
tended  to  establish  the  defendant's  liabihty,  was  asked,  on  cross-exam- 
ination, whether  it  was  not  after  a  request  to  the  executors  to  pa}'  a  sum 
which  they  alleged  she  owed  the  estate,  that  she  first  gave  the  informa- 
tion of  the  facts  to  which  she  had  testified.  It  was  held  that  the 
referee  erred  in  refusing  to  allow  this  question  to  be  put.^  -  -  -  -  So, 
it  has  been  held  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  judge,  to  allow  a 
witness  for  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case  to  be  asked,  on  cross- 
examination,  whether  he  has  offered  a  certain  person  money  to  be  a 
surety  on  the  defendant's  appeal  bond.^  -  -  -  -  On  the  cross-examina- 
tion of  the  State's  witness  in  a  criminal  case,  he  may  be  asked  whether 
he  has  not  told  the  defendant  that  he  had  been  his  friend,  but  was 
then  his  enem}^,  and  intended  to  have  him  prosecuted  on  the  charge 
for  which  he  was  then  being  tried. ■*  -  -  -  -  Where  a  defendant  was 
on  trial  for  a  homicide  committed  while  an  attempt  was  being  made  to 
expel  him  from  premises  claimed  by  the  deceased,  it  was  held  that  a 
witness  for  the  prosecution  might  properly  be  asked,  on  cross-examina- 
tion, whether  he,  the  witness,  had  agreed  to  be  present  and  to  aid  the 
deceased  in  the  expulsion  of  the  defendant.  The  court  said:  "The 
defendant  had  a  right  to  have  that  question  answered,  and  to  have  the 
jury  give  it  such  weight  as  they  might  think  it  entitled  to.  The  ques- 
tion whether  the  witness  had  a  right  to  participate  in  the  expulsion  of 
the  defendant  is  quite  immaterial, 'as  the  object  of  the  question  was  to 
draw  out  a  statement  which  would  enable  the  jury  to  determine  what 
relations,  if  any,  the  witnesses  sustained  toward  the  deceased  and  the 
defendant  respectively."  ^ Where,  in  an  action  against  a  corpora- 

>  People  V.  Geuung,  11  Wend.  19.  '  Sager    v.    State,    11    Tex.    App. 

2  Miles  V.  Sackett,  30  Hmi  (N.  Y.),      110. 

68.  5  People  v.   Fartado,  57  Cal.  3i6, 

3  Com.  V.  Gallagher,  IL'G   Mass.  54.      opiuiou  by  Sharpsteiu,  J. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  401 

tion,  it  appears  that  its  president  and  treasurer  are  members  of  another 
corporation,  havinsj  persons  in  its  employ,  and  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  in 
examining  a  witness  for  the  defendant,  asks  him  if  he  is  not  an  em- 
ploye of  the  latter  corporation,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  bias,  no 
exception  lies  to  the  exclusion  of  the  evidence.  Such  evidence  was 
admissible  only  within  the  discretion  of  the  judge,  and  it  did  not 
appear  that  in  excluding  it,  his  discretion  had  been  abused. ^ 

§  456.  [Continued.]  Further  Illustrations. —  In  a  civil  action 
for  damages  for  the  seduction  of  the  plaintiff's  wife,  a  witness  for 
tlie  plaintiff,  Lohman,  testified  that  he  went  to  the  phiintiff's  house  one 
day  to  see  the  plaintiff;  that  the  front  door  was  opon  ;  that  he  went  in 
without  rajiping,  or  ringing  the  bell,  or  otherwise  announcing  himself; 
that  he  went  to  the  door  of  the  bed-room,  which  was  shut,  and,  without 
even  rapping  at  the  door  or  otherwise  announcing  himself,  opened 
it  and  saw  the  defendant  standing  in  the  room  and  Mrs.  Dance 
(the  plaintiff's  wife)  on  the  bed  with  her  person  somewhat  exposed. 
In  cross-examination,  the  defendant's  counsel  asked  the  witness  what 
he  wanted  to  see  Mr.  Dance  about,  to  which  plaintiff' s  counsel  objected 
and  the  court  sustained  the  objection.  It  was  held  that  this  was  error. 
Adams,  J.,  said:  "This  question,  we  think,  should  have  been  allowed. 
If  the  object  of  the  visit  was  really  not  to  see  Mr.  Dance,  but  to  pene- 
trate to  Mrs.  Dance's  bed-room,  whether  on  a  voyage  of  pleasure  or 
discovery,  it  was  proper  that  the  jury  should  know  it.  The  evidence 
tends  to  show  that  Lohman  was  an  unsuccessful  candidate  for  Mrs. 
Dance's  favor,  and  this  fact  also,  as  well  as  his  familiarity  or  boldness 
in  the  plaintiff's  house,  made  him  a  worthy  subject  of  cross-examination 
within  all  reasonable  latitude.'"^ In  the  same  trial,  the  witness  Loh- 
man was  aske<l,  on  cross-examination,  whether  he  did  not  write  to  Mrs. 
Dance  (the  plaintiff's  wife)  while  she  was  in  Michigan,  in  the  fall  of  1873. 
The  plaintiff's  counsel  objected  to  the  question,  and  the  court  sustained 
the  objection.  It  was  held  that  the  court  erred  in  this  ruling.  Adams, 
J.,  said:  "The  bed-room  occurrence  was  in  the  fall  of  1872.  If,  the 
next  fall,  he  was  writing  her  letters  of  either  love  or  friendship,  it  would 
tend  to  show  that  the  interpretation  put  by  him  on  the  bed-room  occur- 
rence was  not  at  that  time  such  as  to  impair  his  admiration  for  her. 
Again,  it  was  proper  to  show,  upon  cross-examination  of  the  witness, 
whether  Mrs.  Dance  answered  his  letters,  that  the  jury  might  judge,  in 

^  Wallace?'.  Tauuton  Street  Ry.  Co.,  -  Dauce  v.  McBride,  43   Iowa,  624, 

119  Mass,  91.  627. 

26 


402  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoUip.  Tr., 

case  she  did  not,  whether  he  was  testifying  under  bias  or  ill-feehng, 
either  towards  her  or  towards  the  defendant,  who  is  supposed  to  have 
participated  more  largely  in  her  favoritism.  "^ 

§  457.  [Continued.]  Further  Illustrations. —  Counsel  for  the 
State,  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  has  the  right,  on  the  cross-examina- 
tion of  a  witness  for  tlie  defendant,  to  ask  him  what  "  the  feelings  are 
between  him  and  one  of  the  State's  witnesses,  thougli  nothing  on  this 
point  has  been  brought  out  in  the  examination  in  chief.'-  -  -  -  -  On  this 
ground,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  murder^  it  was  held  compe- 
tent to  ask  a  witness  the  following  question:  "I  will  ask  you  now, 
Mr.  Carroll,  if,  in  Pike  Payne's  saloon  in  the  town  of  Red  Bluff,  in  the 
presence  of  Mr.  McGowan  and  Mr.  Thatch,  both  witnesses  in  this  case, 
you  did  not  make  the  remark  that  Wasson  [the  defendant]  ought  to 
have  been  hung 'before  he  left  Butte  Creek?"  3  -  -  -  -  So,  a  witness  may 
be  asked  on  cross-examination,  whether  he  has  not  been  active  in  pro- 
curing testimony  in  the  case,  and  if  he  denies  this,  he  may  be  contra- 
dicted. 4  _  .  _  _  Whether  the  plaintiff  (the  witness)  had  not,  prior  to 
the  date  of  tlie  act  for  which  the  action  was  brought,  made  a  similar 
charge  against  the  defendant,  may  likewise  be  asked. ^ 

§  458.   Questions  affecting    Character    of    Witness. — It  is 

sometimes  laid  down  without  qualitication  that,  ou  cross-examina- 
tion, a  witness  may  be  compelled  to  answer  any  questions  which 
tend  to  test  his  credibility  or  to  shake  his  credit  by  injuring  his 
character,  however  irrelevant  to  the  facts  in  issue,  or  however 
disgraceful  the  answer  may  be  to  himself,  except  where  the  answer 
would  expose  him  to  a  criminal  charge.^  But  the  prevailing 
opinion  seems  to  be  that,  except  in  cases  where  the  witness 
is  the  prisoner  on  trial,  the  extent  to  which  an  inquiry  vf'iW  be 
allowed  in  his  past  life,  with  the  view  of  affecting  his  credibility, 
rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court. ^ 

1  Dance  v.  McBride,  43  Iowa,  (!24,  <!  MulloriJ.  St.  Louis  Hospital  Assn., 
628.                                                                       5  Mo.  App.  390;  s.  c.  affirmed,  73  Mo. 

2  State  V.   \VilIiuy;hani,  33  La.  Ann.       243. 

537.  '  Real  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  270;  Ryai\ 

^  People  V.  Wasson,  Co  Cal.  538.  v.  People,  19  Ilun  (N.  Y.),  188.     Set 

■*  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173;  also  Maine  v.  People,  9  Hun  (N.  Y.), 

182;    Geary  v.   People,   22  Mich.  220.  113;     Vaughn    v.  Westover,    2    Hun 

5  Watsonw.  Twombly,  GON.  H.  491.  (N.   Y.),   43;     Stokes    v.   People,    53 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  403 

§  459.  [Contimied.]  Judicial  Expressions  on  this  Ques- 
tion.—  Many  expressions  are  found  in  the  judicial  opinions  to 
the  effect  that  the  trial  courts  should  fix  the  limits  of  the  cross- 
examination  of  the  witnesses,  where  the  questions  tend  to  de- 
velop the  real  character  of  the  witness,  with  great  hesitation. 
Thus,  in  a  case  in  New  York  it  is  said  by  Peckham,  J.:  "I 
wish  to  say  that,  in  my  opinion,  as  a  general  rule,  evidence  on 
cross-examination,  tending  to  impeach  the  credibility  of  a  wit- 
ness, shoidd  be  rejected  with  very  great  caution  ;  its  exclusion 
can  rarely  be  proper."  ^  So,  in  another  case  in  the  same  court 
is  said  by  Allen,  J. :  "In  the  latitude  of  cross-examination,  and 
to  enable  the  jury  to  it  understand  the  character  of  the  witness 
they  are  called  upon  to  believe,  collateral  evidence  is  allowed 
from  the  witness  himself,  tending  to  discredit  and  disgrace  the 
witness  under  examination."  ^  In  a  later  case  in  the  same  court, 
where  the  question  was  elaborately  examined,  it  is  said  by 
Grover,  J.  :  "  It  is  well  settled  that,  for  the  purpose  of  impair- 
ing the  credit  of  a  witness,  by  evidence  introduced  by  the  oppo- 
site party,  such  evidence  must  go  to  his  general  character.  *  *  * 
It  is  held,  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  his  testimony,  the 
witness  may  be  asked,  upon  cross-examination,  as  to  specific 
acts.  This  shows  that,  upon  a  cross-examination  of  a  witness, 
with  a  view  of  testing  his  credibility,  inquiries  are  proper  as  to 
facts  not  competent  to  be  proved  in  any  other  way.  *  *  * 
In  such  examination  the  presumption  is  strong  that  the  witness 
will  protect  his  credibility,  as  far,  at  least,  as  truth  will  warrant. 
All  experience  shows  this  to  be  so.     It  would  be  productive  of 

N.  Y.  164;  Russell  v.  St.  Nicholas  1(55:  State  i?.  R.  R.,  58  N.  11.410,412 
&c.  Co.,  51  N.  Y.  (343;  Allen  f.  Bodiiie,  Plummer  v.  Ossipee,  59  N.  H.  55,  57 
6  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  383;  Storm  -y.  United  Free  v.  Buckingham,  59  N.  H.  219 
States,  94  U.  S.  7G,  85;  Sturgisu.  Rob-  Merrill  v.  Perkins,  59  N.  H.  343,  345 
bins,  62  Me.  289,  293;  Prescott  v.  Perking  i?.  Towle,  59  N.  H.  583;  Til- 
Ward,  10  Allen  (Mass.) ,  203, 200 ;  Wroe  ton  v.  Am.  Bible  Society,  60  N.  H.  377, 
V.  State,  20  Oh.  St.  460;   1  Greenl.  Ev.,  384. 

§  449;  People  v.  Arnold,  40  Mich.  710;  i    Le   Beau   v.  People,  34  N.  Y.  223, 

Great  Western  &c.  Co.  v.  Loomis,  32  N.  234. 

Y.  127;  Bank  v.  Sleramons,  34  Oh.  St.  2  Newcorab    v.   Griswold,  24   N.  Y, 

142 ;  People   v.  Court,   83  N.   Y.    436,  298. 
460;    Gutterson  v.    Morse,    58    N.    H. 


404  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

great  injustice,  often,  if,  where  a  witness  is  produced  of  wliom 
the  opposite  party  has  before  never  heard,  and  who  gives  material 
testimony,  and  from  some  source,  or  from  the  manner  and  ap- 
pearance of  the  witness,  such  part}^  should  learn  that  most  of  the 
life  of  the  witness  had  been  spent  in  jails  and  other  prisons  for 
crimes, —  if  this  fact  could  not  be  proved  by  the  witness  him- 
self, but  could  only  be  shown  by  records  existing  in  distant  coun- 
ties, and  perhaps  States,  which,  for  the  purposes  of  the  trial, 
are  wholly  inaccessible.     No  danger  to  the   party  introducing 
the  witness  can  result  from  this  class  of  inquiries,  while  their 
exclusion  might,  in  some  cases,  wholly  defeat  the  ends  of  justice. 
My  conclusion  is  that  a  witness,  upon  cross-examination,  may  be 
asked  whether  he  has  been  in  jail,  the  penitentiary,  or  State 
prison,  or  any  other  place  that  would  tend  to  impair  his  credibil- 
ity, and  how  much  of  his  life  he  has  passed  in  such  places."^ 
In  a  civil  case  in  Michigan,  Campbell,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion 
of  the  court  says:    "  It  has  always  been  found  necessary  to  allow 
the  witnesses  to  be  cross-examined,  not  only  upon  the  facts  in- 
volved in  the  issue,  but  also  upon  such  collateral  matters  as  may 
enable  the  jury  to  appreciate  their  fairness  and  reliability.     To 
this  end  a  large  latitude  has  been  given,  where  circumstances 
seemed  to  justify  it,  in  allowing  a  full  inquiry  into  the  history 
of  witnesses,  and  into  many  other  things  tending  to  illustrate 
their  true  character.     This  may  be  useful  in  enabling  the  court  or 
jury  to  comprehend  just  what  sort  of   person  they  are  called 
upon  to  believe,  and  such  a  knowledge  is  often  very  desirable. 
It  may  be  quite  as  necessary,  especially  where  strange  or  sus- 
picious witnesses  are  brought  forward,  to  enable  counsel  to  ex- 
tract from  them  the  whole  truth  on  the  merits.     It  cannot  be 
doubted  that  a  previous  criminal  experience  will  depreciate  the 
credit  of  a  witness  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  in  the  judgment 
of  all  persons,  and  there  must  be  some  means  of  reaching  this 
history.     The  rules  of  law  do  not  allow  specific  acts  of  miscon- 
duct,   or  specific  facts  of  a  disgraceful  character  to  be  proved 
against  a  witness  by  others.     *     *     *     Unless  the  remedy  is 

1  Real  V.  reople,  42  N.  Y.  270,  281. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XYIL]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  405 

found  in  cross-examination,  it  is  practically  of  no  account.  It 
has  always  been  held  that,  within  reasonable  limits,  a  witness 
may,  on  cross-examination,  be  very  thoroughly  sifted  upon  his 
character  and  antecedents.  *  *  *  Wq  think  a  witness  may 
be  asked  concerning  all  antecedents,  which  are  really  signifi- 
cant, and  which  will  explain  his  credibility.  *  *  *  fjg  must 
be  better  acquainted  than  others  with  his  own  history,  and  is  un- 
der no  temptation  to  make  his  own  case  worse  than  truth  will 
warrant.  There  can  with  him  be  no  mistakes  of  identity.  If 
there  are  extenuating  circumstances,  no  one  else  can  so  readily 
recall  them.  We  think  the  case  comes  within  the  well  established 
rules  of  cross-examination,  and  that  the  few  authorities  which 
seem  to  doubt  it  have  been  misunderstood,  or  else  have  been 
based  upon  a  fallacious  course  of  reasoning,  which  would,  in 
nine  cases  out  of  ten,  prevent  an  honest  witness  from  obtaining 
better  credit  than  an  abandoned  ruffian."  ^  In  a  criminal  case 
subsequently  before  the  same  tribunal,  the  same  learned  justice 
said:  "  The  quality  of  such  testimony  can  never  be  regarded  as 
entirely  separated  from  the  character  which  is  indicated  by  their 
crimes;  and,  if  the  position  they  occupy  indicates  moral  turpi- 
tude, there  is  a  necessity  for  more  thorough  cross-examination, 
and  nothing  ought  to  be  shut  out  which  can  sensibly  aid  in  ex- 
plaining their  credibility,  unless  there  is  some  fixed  rule  of  law 
that  excludes  ic."  ^ 

§   460.     [Continued.]      Views   of    Dr.  Greenleaf. —  In    his 

work  on  Evidence,  while  recognizing  the  fact  that  the  courts  are 
not  in  perfect  harmony  upon  this  subject.  Dr.  Greenleaf  uses  the 
following  language:  "  There  is  certainly  great  force  in  the  argu- 
ment that,  where  a  man's  liberty,  or  his  life,  depends  upon  the 
testimony  of  another,  it  is  of  infinite  importance  that  those  who 
are  to  decide  upon  that  testimony  should  know,  to  the  greatest 
extent,  how  far  the  witness  is  to  be  trusted.  They  cannot  look 
into  his  breast  to  see  what  passes  there,  but  must  form  Iheir 
opinion    on   the    collateral    indications  of   his    good    faith  and 

1  ^Yilbur    V.   Flood,    16   Mich.    40,  2  Foster   v.  People,    18   Mich    266, 

•i3.  271. 


406  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

sincerity.  AVhatever,  therefore,  may  materially  assist  them  in 
this  inquiry  is  most  essential  to  the  investigation  of  truth;  and 
it  cannot  but  be  material  for  the  jury  to  understand  the  charac- 
ter of  the  witness  whom  they  are  called  upon  to  believe,  and  to 
know  whether,  although  he  has  not  been  convicted  of  any  crime, 
he  has  not  in  some  measure  rendered  himself  less  credible  by  his 
disgraceful  conduct.  The  weight  of  this  argument  seems  to  have 
been  felt  by  the  judges  in  several  cases  in  which  questions  tend- 
ing to  disgrace  the  witness  have  been  permitted  in  cross-exam- 
ination. *  *  *  Nor  does  there  seem  to  be  any  good  reason 
why  a  witness  should  be  privileged  from  answering  a  question 
touching  his  present  situation,  employment  and  associates,  if  they 
are  of  his  own  choice;  as,  for  example,  in  what  house  or  family 
he  resides,  what  is  his  ordinary  occupation,  and  whether  he 
is  intimately  acquainted  and  conversant  with  certain  persons,  and 
the  like;  for,  however  these  may  disgrace  him,  his  position  is 
one  of  his  own  selection.  *  *  *  Xhe  State  has  a  deep  in- 
terest in  the  inducements  to  reformation  held  out  by  the  protect- 
ing veil  which  is  thus  cast  over  the  past  offenses  of  the  penitent; 
but  where  the  inquiry  relates  to  transactions  comparatively  recent, 
bearing  directly  upon  the  present  character  and  moral  principles 
of  the  witness,  and  therefore  essential  to  the  due  estimation  of  his 
testimony  by  the  jury,  learned  judges  have  of  late  been  disposed 
to  allow  it."  1 

§  461.  Cross-examination  as  to  Collateral  Matters  affecting 
Credibility.  —  (!•)  View  that  such  cross-examination  is  not 
permissible.  — Upon  this  subject  there  appear  to  be  two  views: 
1.  That  a  witness  cannot  be  cross-examined  at  all,  as  to  matters 
which  arc  collateral  to  the  issues  on  trial,  and  which  do  not  con- 
cern his  relations  or  feelings  toward  the  parties  or  toward  the 
action,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credibility.  2.  That  such 
inquiries  may  be  permitted  by  the  court  in  the  exercise  of  a 
sound  discretion.  There  is  also  a  third  rule,  upon  wliich  all 
courts  are  agreed,  which  is,  that  a  witness  cannot  be  cross-exam  ■ 

1  Greeul.  Ev.  (14th  ed.),  §§  455,  45(5,  459. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  407 

ined  as  to  independent  collateral  facts,  for  the  mere  purpose  of 
impeaching  him  by  contradiction. ^  The  English  and  some  of 
the  American  courts  hold  that  evidence  of  particular  collateral 
facts  cannot  be  adduced  in  any  case,  whether  civil  or  criminal, 
in  order  to  discredit  a  Avitness.'^ 

§462.  [CoxTixuED.]  Illustrations  OF  THE  Rule  LAST  Stated. — On 
the  trial  of  an  issue  "  whether  (during  a  certain  period)  there  arose  from 
the  works  of  the  defendants  noisome,  offensive,  noxious  or  unwhole- 
some smoke,  and  other  vapors,  to  the  nuisance  of  the  plaintiff,  where- 
by the  produce  of  his  garden  was  deteriorated,"  evidence  was  adduced, 
for  the  plaintiff,  to  show  that  the  smoke  and  other  vapors  from  the  de- 
fendants' Avorks  bad  injured  the  produce  of  other  gardens  in  the  neigh- 
borhood ;  and  also,  for  the  defendants,  to  show  that  their  works  did  not 
injure  the  produce  of  any  other  grounds,  and  one  of  the  defendants' 
witnesses,  haAing,  on  his  examination  in  chief,  described  several  gar- 
dens in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Avorks  as  in  the  utmost  health,  was 
asked,  on  cross-examination  by  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  whether  he  knew 
Glasgow  Field  (grounds  in  the  neighborhood),  and  having  answered  that 
'  he  knew  Glasgow  Field,  and  never  knew  of  any  damage  done  there,' 
he  was  asked  whether  he  had  known  of  any  sum  haA  ing  been  paid  by 
the  defendants  to  the  proprietors  of  Glasgow  Field  for  alleged  damage 
there,  occasioned  by  their  works.  It  was  held  that  the  question  was  in- 
admissible, as  leading  to  a  new  collateral  inquiry,  which,  answered  either 

way,  could  not  affect  the  issue,  or  test  the  credit  of  the  witness.^ 

In  an  action  of  trover  for  converting  pension  money  collected  by  the 
defendant  for  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held  not  error  to  refuse  to  allow  a 
witness  for  the  plaintiff  to  be  cross-examined  as  to  whether  he  had 

been  arrested  for  conspiring  to  procure   fraudulent   pensions.* 

•On  the  trial  of  an  action  on  the  warranty  of  a  horse,  the  plaintiff  can- 
not be  asked,  on  cross-examination,  how  many  other  purchases  of  horses 

he  had  made  and  tried  to  set  aside  within  the  last  twenty  years. ^ 

On  the   trial  of   a   bastardy   suit,    the   prosecutrix,    after  being  com- 

1  Post,  §  409.  3  Teuuaut  v.  Hamiltou,  7  CI.  &  Fin. 

2  Hex     V.    Watsou,   2     Stark.    149;       122;  s.  c.  1  Rob.  .s21. 

Spencoly   v.  DeWillott,   7    East,  108;  ^  Marks   v.  Hilsendegeu,  41!   Mich, 

s.  c.   3  Smitla,  289;  Marks  v.  Hilseii-  336.     See     also    Bissell    v.  Starr,    32 

ck'gen,  40  M\c\\.  336;    Bi.ssell  v.  Starr,  Mich.  299. 

32  Midi.  299;   Teuuaut  v.  Hamilton,  7  ^  llussell  v.  Cruttendeu,    53  Conn. 

CI.  &  Fiu.  122.  504. 


408  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr. ^ 

pelled,  on  cross-examination,  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  the  time, 
place  and  attending  circumstances  of  the  alleged  illicit  intercourse,  was 
asked  where  she  went  and  dined  that  day,  — the  counsel  proposing  to 
follow  this  up  by  showing  that  she  had,  on  different  occasions,  made 
different  statements  in  this  respect.  The  court,  having  sustained  an 
objection  to  the  question,  it  was,  on  a|)peal,  held  no  error,  —  the  Su- 
preme Court  taking  the  view  that  the  matters  proposed  to  be  drawn  out 
were  collateral ;  and  also  that,  while  it  might  have  been  proper  to  allow 
questions  as  to  her  movements  and  conduct,  yet  her  answers  on  such 
collateral  matters  would  be  conclusive  for  the  purpose  of  laying  a 
ground  to  impeach  her.i 

§  463.  [Exception.]  Where  Counsel  Promise  to  show  Rel- 
evancy. —  Upon  a  principle  already  explained, ^  the  judge  may, 
even  under  this  strict  rule,  in  his  discretion,  allow  the  defendant's 
counsel  to  cross-examine  as  to  facts  which  appear  to  be  irrelevant, 
if  he  undertakes  that  it  shall  be  shown  by  other  evidence  that  they 
are  relevant.^ 

§  464.  [Continued.]  (2.)  Such  Inquiries  Permissible  in 
Discretion.  — The  other  and  better  view  is,  that  it  is  within  the 
discretion  of  the  presiding  judge  to  determine  whether,  in  view 
of  the  evidence  which  has  been  introduced,  and  of  the  nature  of 
the  testimony  given  by  the  witness  in  chief,  it  is  fit  and  proper 
that  questions  of  the  kind  should  be  overruled,  or  to  what  extent 
such  a  cross-examination  should  be  allowed.*  In  one  jurisdiction 
this  rule  has  been  stated  thus:  "How  far  justice  requires  a 
tribunal  to  go  from  the  issue  for  the  trial  of  collateral  questions  ; 
how  much  time  should  be  sjDent  in  the  trial  of  such  questions  \ 
what  evidence  may  be  excluded  for  its  remoteness  of  time  and 

1  Moore    v.    People,    108    111.    484.  2  Ante,  §  351. 

But,    imder    the    English    rule,  in    a  ^  Haigh  v.   Belcher,  7    Car.    &   P. 

prosecution  for  rape,  it  was  held  error  389. 

to  refuse  to  allow  defendant's  coun-  ^  Storm  v.  United  States,  94  U.  S. 

sel  to  ask  the   prosecuting  witness  on  7(3;  Johnstons.  Jones,  1  Black  (U.  S  ), 

cross-examination,  what    her    object  209;  State  t;.  Rollins,  77  Me.  380;  Peo- 

was   in  going  to  Scott's  station,  the  pie  v.  Blakeley,  4  Park.   Cr.    (N.  Y.) 

place  wliere  the  rape   was  alleged  to  176;  Pooler  v.  Curtiss,  3  Thomp.  &  C. 

have  been  committed.     State  u.  Hart-  (N.  Y.)'228;  Scheuck  v.  Griffin,  38  N. 

nett,  75  Mo.  251.  J.  L.  403,  471. 


Tit.   Ill,  Cll.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  409 

place ;  and  what  evidence  is  otherwise  too  trivial  to  justify  a  pro- 
longation of  the  trial,  —  are  often  questions  of  fact  to  be  deter- 
mined at  trial."  ^  It  follows,  where  this  ride  prevails,  that  the 
decision  of  the  judge,  in  the  exercise  of  this  discretion,  is  not 
subject  to  revieio,  except  in  cases  of  manifest  injustice  or  abuse ;  - 
but  in  one  jurisdiction,  as  hereafter  seen,^  convictions  have  been 
reversed  for  trivial  violations  of  this  rule. 

§  465.  [Continued.]  Illustrations  of  this  Rule. — Thus,  it  is 
witWn  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to  permit  a  witness  to  be 
cross-examined,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  credibihty,  as  to  his  belief 
in  the  existence  of  God  and  a  state  of  future  rewards  and  punishments  ;  * 
or  whether  he  has  not  committed  a  particular  act  of  immorality  or  crim- 
inality,  the  fact  of  which,  if  true,  would  injuriously  affect  his  credit  as  a 
witness,^  —  as  whether  he  has  been  indicted  for  assault  and  battery  ;  ^  or 
whether  he  had  deserted  from  the  army,  or  had  been  charged  with  crime, 
no  attempt  having  been  made  to  impeach  him  b}^  contradiction  on  these 
collateral  matters ;  '''   or  how  many  times  he  has  been  in  prison  ;  ^  or 

whether  he   has  been  arrested  for  vagrancy.^ The  extent  of  this 

discretion  is  also  illustrated  by  a  ruling  that  it  is  not  error  for  which  a 
judgment  Avill  be  reversed,  that  the  presiding  judge  allowed  counsel  to 
cross-examine  a  witness  as  to  the  contents  of  a  paper  which  was  inci- 
dental and  collateral  to  the  issues,  when  the  object  of  the  cross-exam- 
ination was  to  affect  the  credibility  of  the  witness  merel3\'*' In  a 

prosecution  for  larceny  from  a  store,  committed  while  the  merchant's  at- 
tention was  engaged  by  the  defendant,  he  was  tried  as  an  accomplice, 

1  Watson  V.  Twombly,  00  N.  H.491  392;  Smith  v.  Yaryan,  (.9  lud.  Uo;  s. 
493.  c.  35  Am.  Rep.  232. 

2  GreatWest.  Turup.  Co.  i?.  Loomis  «  Ryan  v.  People,  19  Him  (X.  Y.), 
.32  N.  Y.  127;  Le  Beau  v.  People,  34  N.'  188;  distiuguishiug  People  v.  Brown, 
Y.  223;  West  v.  Lynch,  7  Daly  (N.  Y.),  72  N.  Y.  571.  See  also  People  v.  Genet, 
247.  19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  92,  102. 

^  Post,^  472.  "  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173, 

^  Clinton  v.  State,  33  Oh.  St.  27,  34 ;  183. 

Wroe  V.  State,  20  Oh.  St.  4(50;  Stanbro  *  People  v.  Hovey,  29  Hun  (X.  Y.), 

V.   Hopkins,   28    Barb.    (N.   Y.)    270;  383,390. 

People  V.  McGarren,  17  Wend.  (X.  Y.)  ®  People  v.  Manning,   48  Cal.  335. 

460;  2  Tayl.  Ev.,  §  1258.  But  see  post,  §  467. 

5  South  Bend  v.   Hardie,   98   Ind.  w  Klein  v.  Russell,  19  AYall.  (U.  S.) 

577,   583.     Compare  Bersch   v.   State,  433. 
13   lud.  434;  Wilson  v    State,  16  Ind. 


410  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

the  merchant  being  the  complaining  witness ;  and,  having  said  tliat  he 
had  once  been  a  member  of  a  banking  firm,  was  asked  on  cross-exam- 
ination the  following  question:  "  Did  you  not,  while  a  member  of  that 
firm,  extract  from  an  envelope  securities  which  were  left  in  your  vault 
for  safe  keeping,  and  use  the  proceeds  for  stock  speculations  in  New 
York?"  It  was  held  that,  although  the  witness  might  refuse  to  crim- 
inate himself,  yet  as  this  was  a  personal  jnHvilege  which  he  might  waive, 

the  question  should  have  been  allowed. ^ So,  in  a  civil  action  for 

indecent  assault  upon  a  woman,  it  was  held  proper  to  cross-examine  the 
defendant,  testifying  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  as  to  whether  he 
had  ever  been  arrested  on  a  criminal  charge  made  by  another  woman, 
and  whether  he  had  settled  it  b}^  the  payment  of  money.  Graves,  J., 
said:  '-The  jury  were  required  to  decide  on  the  value  of  his  testi- 
mony tendered  in  his  own  behalf,  and  it  was  competent  to  call  upon 
him  to  inform  them  of  such  incidents  of  his  life,  not  amounting  to  self- 
crimination,  as  would  assist  them  in  placing  an  accurate  estimate  upon 
his  statements  as  a  witness;  and  the  questions  objected  to  called  for 

nothing  more." So,  on  the  trial  of  a  bastardy  proceeding,  the 

court  refused  to  allow  the  complaining  witness  to  be  asked,  on  cross- 
examination,  whether  she  had  not,  and  whether  her  mother  with  her  had 
not,  stated  to  various  persons  named,  that  the  complainant  was  going  to 
get  a  prostitute,  then  in  the  House  of  Correction,  out  of  it,  and  hire  her 
to  swear  a  case  against  the  respondent.  Having  refused  this,  the 
court  allowed  the  complainant's  own  counsel  to  ask  her  for  her  version 
of  this  conversation.  "These  rulings,"  said  Campbell,  J.,  were  er- 
roneous and  injurious  to  the  respondent.  Such  questions  were  admissi- 
ble on  two  grounds.  They  were  directly  important  in  bearing  on  the 
character  and  veracity  of  the  witness,  and  they  bear  also  on  her  disposi- 
tion to  resort  to  criminal  practices  to  injure  him.  And  it  is  very  clear 
that  it  was  improper  to  allow  her  to  give  her  own  version  without  cross- 
examination,  and  shut  out  cross-examination."  ^ The  defendant 

in  a  murder  trial  insisted  that  he  was  acting  in  self-defense.  The  only 
witness  who  was  present  at  the  shooting  was  the  wife  of  the  deceased, 
and  her  testimony  was  in  direct  opposition  to  that  of  the  defendant. 
On  her  cross-examination,  the  defense  offered  to  prove  by  her  that  she 
had  previously  been  married  to  one  man,  from  whom  she  had  never 
been  divorced ;  that  she  then  lived  with  another,  who,  by  reason  of  her 
conduct,  became  jealous,  and  shot  her,  afterwards  killing  himself ;  that 

1  People  V.  Arnold,  40  Mich.  710.  »  People  v.  "White,   53  Mich.    537, 

2  Lelaud  v.  Kauth,  47  Mich.  508.  539. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  411 

she  and  the  deceased  lived  together  as  man  and  wife  until  the  pre- 
vious fall,  and  that  they  were  married  by  reason  of  the  regulations 
governing  the  military  reservation  on  which  they  lived.  This  offer  was 
rejected.  It  was  held  that  this  was  error;  the  rejected  questions 
were  proper  cross-examination,  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  her 
testimony'.  ^ 

§  466.  [Continued.]  Contrary  and  Confusing  Views. —  Contrary 
and  confusing  views  are  sometimes  met  with  upon  this  question.  In  one 
jurisdiction  it  is  not  competent,  on  cross-examination,  to  ask  the  witness 
whether  he  has  not  comimtted  certain  acts,  although  the  commission 
of  such  acts,  if  admitted,  would  have  a  tendency  to  discredit  his  testi- 
mony, by  showing  that  he  is  a  man  of  bad  character.  He  cannot,  for 
instance,  be  asked  if  he  has  not  been  concerned  in  a  particular  transac- 
tion which  involved  an  attempt  to  cheat  and  swindle."^  -  -  -  -  In  another 
State,  in  an  action  by  a  father  for  the  seduction  of  his  daughter,  her 
character  for  chastity  being  involved  in  the  question,  of  damages,  evi- 
dence of  her  particular  acts  of  sexual  immorality  has  been  held  admissi- 
ble ;  and  yet  it  has  been  held  that  in  such  a  case  the  principal  female 
witness  cannot,  over  objections  by  her  counsel,  be  asked,  on  cross-ex- 
amination, whether  she  had  not  been  previousl3^  criminally  intimate 
with  other  men.  The  reasoning  was,  that  in  her  character  as  witness 
she  stood  as  any  other  witness  in  the  case,-*  and  that  in  that  character 
she  could  be  impeached  onl}-  ' '  in  the  usual  mode,  through  general  ques- 
tions.'^ -  _  -  .  But  the  same  court  has  held,  in  a  later  case,  that,  in  an  ac- 
tion by  a  female  for  her  own  seduction,  or  in  a  case  of  bastardy,  it  is 
competent  to  ask  the  prosecuting  witness,  on  cross-examination, 
whether  she  had  sexual  intercourse  with  any  person  other  than  the  de- 
fendant about  the  time  the  child  was  begotten,  as  this  would  be  a  proper 
Cact  to  be  considered  in  estimating  the  damages.^  .  .  .  _  Another 
court,  which  has  vacillated  with  reference  to  the  rule  of  the  preceding 
section,  seems  to  have  taken  the  view  in  one  case  that  evidence  that  a 
witness  made  statements  in  other  cases,  or  generally,  of  his  being  02^en 
to  bribery,  does  not  come  within  any  recognized  rule  of  impeachment, 
unless  such  facts  have  created  for  him  a  reputation  for  untruth,  and  then 

1  United    States  v.   Wood  (Dak.),  ^  Long  v.    Morrison,  14   lud.    595. 

33  N.  W.   Rep.    59.    Francis,   J.  dis-  Compare    Wilson    v.    State,    1(J    lud 

seuted.  392. 

^  Madden  v.  Koester,  52  la.  G92.  ^  Smith  r.    Yarvau,  69  lud.  445;  s.c 

3  Shattuck  V.  Myers,  13  Ind.  14(3.  35  Am.  Eep.  232. 


412  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tr., 

itisonly  the  reputation  which  is  admissible,  and  not  its  cause.  1  -  -  -  -  A 
witness  had  testified,  on  her  examination  in  chief,  in  a  criminal  case,  as 
to  what  took  place  at  two  interviews  between  her  and  the  accused,  and, 
on  cross-examination,  stated  that  there  had  been  several  interviews  be- 
tween the  two  interviews  which  she  had  spoken  of.  It  was  held  that 
the  witness  would  not  be  required  to  state  generally  what  took  place  at 
these  interviews,  but  only  so  much,  if  anything,  us  bore  upon  the  is- 
sue.-^ - The  defendant  in  a  criminal  prosecution  proved,  by  two  of 

the  State's  witnesses,  upon  their  cross-examination,  that  they  had  ex- 
pressed to  L.  their  willingness,  for  a  bribe,  to  leave  the  State,  so  as  not 
to  appear  as  witnesses  against  the  prisoner.  Upon  a  subseque^it  exam- 
ination of  L.,  on  behalf  of  the  prisoner,  touching  his  negotiations  with 
those  witnesses  in  regard  to  the  matter  of  the  bribery,  it  was  held  that 
the  motive  and   purpose  of  L.  in  the  transaction  were  not   admissible. ^ 

§  467.  Arrested,  Indicted,  Convicted. — There  is  a  confu- 
sion in  the  authorities  as  to  whether  a  witness  may  be  asked,  on 
cross-examination  whether  he  has  been  arrested,  indicted  or  con- 
victed upon  a  criminal  charge.  One  of  the  difficulties  grows  out 
of  the  question  whether  such  a  matter  can  be  proved  by  secondary 
evidence  —  even  by  the  admission  of  the  witness,  who  must  of  all 
men  be  certain  of  the  fact  if  it  existed.  The  strain  about  sec- 
ondary evidence  in  such  a  case  is  a  mere  quibble,  totally  desti- 
tute of  common  sense.  One  court  has  held  that  a  party  seeking 
to  impeach  a  witness  may,  on  cross-examination,  ask  him  whether 
he  has  been  convicted  of  a  felony,  and  if  so,  what  sentence  was 
imposed  upon  him.*  The  same  court  has  held  tliat  it  is  compe- 
tent to  ask  a  witness  on  cross-examination  whether  he  has  been 
arrested  for  vagrancy,  —  the  objection  that  the  question  calls  for 
secondary  evidence  not  being  tenable,  since  the  fact  of  an  arrest 
does  not  necessarily  imply  any  record  showing  it.^  Another 
court  has  held  that  a  witness  cannot  be  asked  on  cross-examination 
whether  he  has  been  indicted  for  a  crime, —  as,  for  instance,  per- 
jury.    Assuming  that  the  question  whether  a  witness  has  been  in 

1  Haiuiltou  1).  People,  2;>  Mich.  175,  ^  People   v.    Rodrigo,  6!J   Cal.   (!01; 
183.  s.  c.  S  Crim.  Law  Mag.  503. 

2  Mitchell  \i.  Com.,  75  Va.  856.  ^  People  v.  Manniug,  48  Cal.  335. 

3  Cheltou  V.  Stale,  45  Mel.  505. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  413 

dieted  merely  for  a  crime,  instead  of  asking  him  whether  he  has 
been  convicted  of  a  crime,  is  competent  at  all,  it  has  been  held  in 
some  jurisdictions  that  such  a  fact  cannot  be  proved  by  the  ad- 
mission of  the  witness  upon  cross-examination,  but  can  only  be 
proved  by  the  record,  i  In  another  case  in  the  same  State  a  pris- 
oner, testifying  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  was  asked  on  cross- 
examination  by  the  State's  attorney:  "  How  many  times  have 
you  been  arrested?"  This  was  objected  to  by  the  prisoner's 
counsel  as  incompetent,  irrelevant,  tending  to  degrade  the  wit- 
ness, etc.  The  objection  was  overruled  and  the  prisoner's 
counsel  excepted.  The  witness  answered:  "Five  times,  I  be- 
lieve." It  was  held  that  the  evidence  was  inadmissible  as  an 
impeachment  of  the  prisoner's  character,  either  generally  or  in 
respect  of  truth  and  veracity. ^ 

§  468.  Questions  creating  Prejudice,  but  not  affecting  Cred- 
ibility. —Within  the  rule  of  the  preceding  text,'^  questions  which 
might  excite  prejudice  against  the  witness,  but  the  answers  to 
which  would  not  properly  affect  his  credibility,  are  not  allowed 
to  be  put  on  cross-examination.  Thus,  it  has  been  held,  but  it 
is  conceived  on  a  doubtful  view  of  the  proper  application  of  this 
principle,  that,  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  mortgage  as  usurious, 
where  a  witness  for  the  defendant,  who  had  acted  for  him  in  the 
negotiation  of  the  mortgage,  was  questioned  as  to  whether  he 
had  not,  on  other  loans  of  defendant  to  other  parties,  taken  notes 
from  them  in  excess  of  legal  interest  paid  to  defendant, —the 
question  was  inadmissible  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the  credit 
of  the  witness.^ 

§  469.  Cross-examination  on  Collateral  Matters  for  the 
Purpose  of  Contradiction.— All  courts  agree  that  a  witness  can- 

1  Peck  r.  Yorks,  47  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  32  N.  Y.  229,  238;  and  distinguish 
131,    134;    Newcomb  v.    Griswold,  24      Brandon  r.  People,  42  N   Y   265 

2  Bro^yn  v.  People,  8  Hun  (N.  Y.),  <  pooler  v.  Curtiss,  3  Thomp.  &  C. 
562.  The  court  cite:  Jackson  t;.  Os-  (N.  Y.)  228;  denying  the  dictum  of 
born,  2  AVend.  (N.  Y.)  555;  People  v.  Peckhani,  J.,  in  Ross  v.  Ackermau,  46 
Oay,  7  N.  Y.  378;  Lipe   v.  Eisenlerd,  N.  Y.  210. 


414  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tr. , 

not  be  cross-examined  as  to  any  matters  which  are  purely  coL 
hiteral  to  the  issues  on  trial,  with  the  view  of  impeaching  him  by 
contradiction. 1  The  rule  is  somewhat  differently  stated  and 
applied  by  different  authorities.  It  is  thus  stated  by  Mr. 
Starkie:  "  It  is  here  to  be  observed,  that  a  witness  is  not  to  be 
cross-examined  as  to  any  distinct  collateral  fact,  for  the  purpose 
of  afterwards  impeaching  his  testimony  by  contradicting  him."  ^ 
"  The  rule  does  not,  of  course,  exclude  the  contradiction  of  a  wit- 
ness as  to  any  facts  immediately  connected  with  the  subject  of 
the  inquiry,  wliich  in  themselves  would  otherwise  be  legitimate 
evidence  in  the  cause."  ^  It  is  thus  stated  by  the  late  Judge 
Taylor:  "  In  accordance  with  this  general  principle,  a  witnesss 
may  be  cross-examined  as  to  a  former  statement  made  by  him 
relative  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  cause,  and  inconsistent  with 
his  present  testimony."  ^  Professor  Greenleaf  says:  "It  is  a 
well  settled  rule  that  a  witness  cannot  be  cross-examined  as  to  any 
fact  which  is  coUateral  and  irrelevant  to  the  issue,  merely  for 
the  purpose  of  contradicting  him  by  other  evidence,  if  he  should 
deny  it,  thereby  to  discredit  his  testimony."  Mr.  Starkie's 
statement  has  been  adopted  by  some  courts  ^  and  criticised  by 
others.''  In  Massachusetts  it  is  said:  "  The  rule  which  excludes 
all  evidence  tendintj  to  contradict  the  statements  of  a  witness  as 
to  collateral  matters  does  not  apply  to  any  facts  immediately 
and  properly  connected  with  the  main  subject  of  inquiry."  ^  In 
Indiana  it  is  added:  "  These  decisions, however,  do  not  go  to  the 
extent  of  limiting  the  right  to  cross-examine,  for  the  purpose  of 
laying  a  foundation  for  an  impeachment,  to   particular  matters 

1  Clinton  u.    State,    33  Oh.    St.   27,  -   1  Stark.  Ev.  9th  Ed.  200. 

34;   Speuceley  v.  De  Willott,  2   Lewin  ^  Id.  203. 

C.  R.  155,  n.;  s.  c.    7  East.  110;   Smith  ^  Tayl.  Ev.  (8th  ed.),  §  1445. 

V.    State,   5  Neb.  183;    Henderson  v.  *  Lawrence  f.  Lanning,  4  Ind.  I94; 

State,  1  Tex.  App.  432;  People  v.  De-  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  42. 
vine,  44  Cal.  452,  458;  People  v.  Eur-  ^  Atty.-Gen.  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Esch. 

tado,  57  Cal.  346;  Hester  w.  Com.,  85  91;  Hildeburn  v.   Curren,  65  Pa.   St. 

Pa.  St.  139,  157;  Harris  v.  Wilson,  7  59. 

Wend.  (N.  Y.)   57;  Lee  v.  Chadsey,  2  '  Com.    v.    Hunt,  4   Gray  (Mass.), 

Keyes  (N.  Y.),  546;  People  v.  Cox,  21  421. 
Hun  (N.  Y.),  47. 


Tit.  Ill,   Cb.  XVII.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION. 


415 


testified  to  by  the  witness  on  his  direct  examination:  nor  do  they 
limit  the  cross-examination  to  such  matters  as  bear  directly  and 
immediately  upon  the  issue.  The  effect  of  proving  contradictory 
statements  extends  no  further  than  the  question  of  credibility. 
Such  evidence  does  not  tend  to  establish  the  truth  of  the  matters 
embraced  in  the  contradictory  statements;  it  simply  goes  to  the 
credibility  of  the  witness.^  This  consideration  in  itself  supplies 
a  strono;  reason  for  alio  wins;  a  liberal  latitude  in  cross-examininof 
for  the  purpose  of  laying  the  foundation  for  impeachment ;  for 
a  witness  who  tells  a  falsehood  concerning  a  matter  incidentally 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action,  is  as  likely  to  testify 
untruly  as  if  the  falsehood  had  directly  affected  the  issue.  It  is 
difficult  to  perceive  why  a  material  falsehood  concerning  a  matter 
collaterally  related  to  the  main  issue,  is  not  as  effective  against 
the  credibility  of  the  witness,  ms  one  immediately  bearing  upon 
the  question."  ^     The  rule  was  thus  stated  by  Baron  Alderson  in 


1  Citiug  Davis  v.  Harclj-,  7<j  lud. 
272;  Docks  v.  Stoue,  13  Miuu.  43^. 

2  Seller  v.  Jeukius,  97  lud.  430, 
435.  The  Supreme  Court  of  ludiaua 
seems  to  have  settled  upou  the  idea 
that  the  rule  does  uot  limit  the  cross- 
examination  to  sucli  matters  as  bear 
directly  and  immediately  upou  the 
issue,  although  they  must  be  con- 
nected with  the  subject  matter  of  the 
action.  Tlie  court  say:  ''We  are  not 
to  be  understood  as  holding  that  mat- 
ters foreign  to  the  subject  matter  of 
the  action,  or  vxiioUy  irrelevant  to  tlie 
issue,  can  be  used  for  the  purpose  of 
impeachment;  but  we  hold,  with  the 
authorities  cited,  that  where  the  mat- 
ters properly  come  up  on  cross-ex- 
amination, they  may  be  made  use  of 
for  the  purpose  of  impeachment, 
though  the  specific  matter  was  not  ex- 
plicitly developed  in  tlie  direct  exam- 
iuatiou."  The  court  then,  after  pro- 
ceeding to  give  the  definitions  of 
several  text  writers  as  to  the  meaniuj;^ 
of  the   word  "  issue  "  aud  the  word 


"relevant,"  proceed    to   say:    "His 
statements     concerning    the     matter 
which,  as  a  witness,  he  declares  to  be 
true,  must  be   relevant  to  tlie   issue, 
even  using  that  word  iu  its  strict  tech- 
nical sense.     If  his  statements  out  of 
court  are  untrue,  then  they  conduce  to 
the  truth  of  a  pertinent  hypothesis, 
namely,   the  hypotliesis  that  the  ap- 
pelhint's  statemeuts  tending  to  estab- 
lish his  charge  were  uot  true;  so  that 
even  taking  the  word   <  issue  '  in  its 
strict   technical    sense,     evidence  of 
statements  containing  an  account  of 
his  cliarge  against'  the    appellee  are 
relevant.     That  the  statements  given 
out  of  court  may  tend  to  discredit  the 
statements  made  in  court  teuding  to 
prove  the  plea  of  justification,  is  evi- 
dent when  it  is  brought  to  miud  that 
if,  out  of  court  he   made  one   cliarge, 
and  in  court  testified  to  the  truth  of  a 
different  one,   there  would  be   a  ma- 
terial inconsistency  in  his  testimony." 
Seller  v.   Jenkins,   supra,   opinion  by- 
Elliott,  J. 


416  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.        [1  Thonip.   Tl'., 

a  leading  case:  "A  witness  may  be  asked  any  question  which, 
if  answered,  would  qualify  or  contradict  some  previous  part  of 
that  witness'  testimony,  given  at  the  trial  of  the  issue ;  and  if 
that  question  is  so  put  to  him  and  answered,  the  opposite  party 
may  then  contradict  him,  —  and  for  this  simple  reason,  that  the 
contradiction  qualifies  or  contradicts  the  previous  part  of  the 
witness'  testimony,  and  so  removes  it."^ 

§470.  [Continued."]  If  Witness  Answers,  Answer  Conclu- 
sive.—  If  he  is  so  cross-examined,  the  cross-examining  party 
makes  him  his  own  witness  in  respect  of  such  matters,  and  cannot 
contradict  the  testimony  which  he  gives. ^  The  reason  of  the  rule 
has  been  variously  stated.  In  one  case  it  was  said  to  be  that  the 
time  of  the  court  is  too  limited  to  admit  of  collateral  inquiries.^ 
The  more  usual  reason  which  the  courts  give  is,  that  such  a  practice 
would  confuse  the  jury  by  an  interminable  multiplication  of 
issues.*  But  this  rule  never  applies  to  testimony  which  is  not 
collateral,  but  which  is  material  to  the  issue.  When  a  party, 
brino-sout  evidence  on  cross-examination,  which  is  material  to  the 
issue,  he  is  not  necessarily  bound  by  it,  but  may  contradict  it  by 
other  w^itnesses.^  The  reason  is  that  a  contrary  rule  would  result 
in  making  his  opponent's  witness  bis  own,  by  the  mere  fact  of 
cross-examining  him,  and  would  have  the  effect  of  depriving  a 
party  of  the  advantage  of  a  cross-examination,  so  necessary  to 
the  sifting  of  the  truth  and  the  attainment  of  justice. 


1  Atty.-Geu.  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch.  319,  327;  State  v.  Pattersou,  74  N.  C. 
91,  102.  157;  Harris  v.  Tippett,  2  Camp.  637; 

2  Leavitt  v.  Stansell,  44  Mich.  424;  Rex  w.  Watson,  2  Stark,  llfi,  149;  Rex 
People  V.  McKeller,  53  Cal.  (i5;  People  v.  Kudge,  Peake  Add.  Cas.  232 ;  Madden 
V.  Bell,  53  Cal.  119;  Newberry  v.  Furni-  v.  Koester,  52  Iowa,  (593;  Hawkins  v. 
val,  4G  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  139;  Crounse  Pleasants,  71  N.  C.  325;  State  v.  Rob- 
V.  Pitch,  6  Abb.  Pr.  (n.  s.)  (N.  Y.)  185;  erts,  81  N.  C.  606;  State  v.  Patterson, 
Kaler  I'.  Builders' Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  346. 

120Mass.  333,  336;  Farnumu.  Farnura,  ^  Att'y-Geu.  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Exch. 

13  Gray  (Mass.),  508;  Coin.  v.  Cain,  14  91. 

Gray  (Mass.),  7;  Fletcher  ??.  Boston  &  •*  Spcuceley   r.  l)c  Willott,   7  East, 

Maine R.  R.,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  9;  People  108. 

V.  Webb  (Cal.),  11  Pac.  Rep.  509;  s.  c.  &  jsjewberry   v.   Furnival,   46   How. 

70  Cal.  120;  Gaines  v.  Com.,  50  Pa.  St.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  139. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  Xyil.]       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  417 

§  471.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. — Under  this  rule,  where,  upon 
the  trial  of  a  proceeding  in  bastardy,  the  defendant  asked  the  prosecu- 
trix, on  cross-examination,  if  she  had  ever  had  sexual  intercourse  with 
A.,  to  which  she  replied  that  she  had  not,  —  it  was  held  that  the  ques- 
tion was  collateral  and  irrelevant,  and  the  answer  of  the  prosecutrix, 
conclusive  on  the  defendant,  and  that  the  court  did  not  err  in  excluding 

the  testimon}'  of  A.  in  contradiction  thereof.  ^ So,  where  a  witness  on 

his  cross-examination  was  asked  whether  the  prosecutor  had  not  paid 
him  for  coming  from  another  State  to  be  a  witness,  and  he  answered 
that  he  had  not,  it  was  held  incompetent  for  the  defendant  to  introduce 

witnesses  to  prove  declarations  that  he  had  been  so  paid.^ In  a 

civil  case,  the  defendant  called  George  Morse,  for  the  purpose  of  im- 
peaching the  plaintiff,  Mr.  Wilder,  as  a  witness.  Morse  gave  testimony 
to  the  effect  that  the  plaintiff's  general  reputation  for  truth  and  ver- 
acity was  bad.  He  was  then  asked  by  the  defendant  this  question : 
"Did  Mr.  Wilder  state  to  you,  in  a  certain  conversation,  that  he  re- 
garded it  as  no  wrong  to  swear  falsely  against  such  a  man  as  Albert 
Morse?"  This  was  objected  to,  the  objection  overruled,  and  an  ex- 
ception taken.  Tlie  witness  answered,  "  He  did,"  though  he  could  not 
tell  "  how  long  ago  it  was."  It  was  held  that,  to  allow  this  question 
was  error,  for  which  the  judgment  should  be  reversed.*^ In  an  ac- 
tion on  a  policy  of  insurance  against  fire,  the  issues  were  whether  an 
addition  to  the  building,  in  which  was  the  property  insured,  materially 
increased  the  risk,  and  whether  the  insurer  assented  to  the  addition  be- 
ing made.  A  witness  for  the  defendant,  who  had  the  general  manage- 
ment of  his  business,  was  asked,  on  cross-examination,  whether  the 
plaintiff  did  not,  in  an  interview  with  him,  show  him  a  letter  containing 
this  statement:  "All  my  companies  have  paid,  and  I  see  no  reason 
v\'hy  the  others  should  not  pay."  The  witness  answered  in  the  nega- 
tive. It  was  held  that  this  evidence  was  collateral  and  irrelevant  to 
the  issues  of  the  trial,  that  the  witness  could  not  be  contradicted  upon 
this  point,  and  that  the  admission  of  a  letter  written  by  an  agent  of 
other  insurance  companies,  containing  such  a  clause,  with  evidence 
that  it  was  shown  to  the  witness,  gave  the  defendant  good  ground  of 
exception.'* A  defendant  charged  with  an  indecent  assault,  hav- 
ing been  cross-examined  as  to  alleged  indecencies  in  respect  of  other 

1  States.  Patterson,   7i  N.  C.  157.  3  wilder   r.   Peabo:ly,    21  Huu  (N. 

2  Stater.  Patterson,  2  Ived  L.  (X.      Y.),:37i;. 

C.)  346.  See  also  Clark  v.  Clark,  Go  •«  Kaler  v.  Bniklers  Mutual  Ins.  Co., 
N.  C.  655.  120  Mass.  333. 

27 


418  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   ThoiUp.   Tr.^ 

persons,  and  having  denied  them,  — evidence  in  disproof  of  these  im- 
putations on  the  one  side,  or  in  respect  of  them  on  the  other,  is  properly- 
rejected  under  the  foregoing  rule,  as  relating  to  collateral  issues.  ,  The 
plaintiff  is   bound  by  the  defendant's  answers  as  to  these   collateral 

matters.^ So,   where  the  mother  of   the  accused,    on  a   criminal 

trial,  was  called  by  the  defense  and  gave  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
the  accused  was  at  home  at  the  time  a  certain  letter  was  delivered,  and, 
having  stated  on  cross-examination  that  sbe  did  not  know  that  the  ac- 
cused wrote  a  letter  on  the  morning  of  the  day  the  one  in  question  was 
delivered,  she  was  subsequently  asked  on  cross-examination  whether 
she  did  not  tell  certain  persons  named  that  the  accused  had  written  a 
letter  on  the  morning  of  that  day,  and  she  replied  that  she  did  not. 
Subsequently  these  persons  were  called  and  allowed,  against  the  ob- 
jection of  the  accused,  to  testify  that  the  mother  had  told  them  that  the 
accused  had  written  a  letter  on  the  morning  of  that  day.  The  mother 
had  made  no  reference  to  the  writing  of  the  letter  in  her  direct  exami- 
nation. It  was  held  that  the  prosecution,  by  attempting  to  prove  by  her 
that  the  accused  had  written  one  on  the  day  in  question,  had  made  her, 
for  that  purpose,  their  own  witness,  and  could  not  thereafter  discredit 
her  testimony  in  regard  to  it,  by  showing  contradictory  statements 
made  to  other  persons  when  not  under  oath.'-^ 

§  472.  [Continued.]  Instances  of  Convictions  Reversed  for  a 
VIOLATION  of  this  Rule.  — A  witucss  for  the  defendant,  on  a'  criminal 
trial,  on  cross-examination,  stated  that  he  lived  in  the  City  of  San 
Francisco  ever  since  the  year  1855,  except  that  he  had  been  out  of 
the  city  for  the  space  of  two  years,  working  on  a  ranch  in  Marin 
county.  He  also  stated  that  he  had  testified  in  this  cause,  as  a 
witness  for  the  prisoner,  at  a  former  trial.  He  was  then  asked 
by  the  people's  counsel,  whether  he  had  not  testified  at  the  former 
trial  that  he  had  lived  in  Mai-in  County  four  years,  or  that  he  had 
been  in  that  county  six  or  seven  years  since  the  year  1855,  and  he 
answered  that  he  had  not  so  testified.  In  rebuttal,  the  people,  in  order 
to  contradict  the  witness  on   this  point,    were  permitted  by  the  court, 

1  Tolraan  v.  .Tohustone,  2  Fost.   &  350.  It  is  said  in  People  v.  Cox,  supra, 

Fin.  m.  that  Greenfield  v.  People,  13  Hun  (N. 

^  People  V.  Cox,  21  Hun  (N.  Y.),  47.  Y.),  244,  was  not  intended  to  be  car- 
Compare  Honan  v.  Cregan,  (5  Rob.  (N.  ried    beyond  the   above    authorities, 
Y.)    188;    Com.    v.    Bean,    111    Mass.  some  of  which  are  therein  cited. 
438;  Thomas    v.  David,  7  Carr.    &  P. 


Tit.   Ill,   Ch.  XVII.J       THE    CROSS-EXAMINATION.  419 

against  the  objections  of  the  prisoner,  to  read  to  the  jury  a  portion  of 
the  evidence  given  by  the  witness  at  the  former  trial,  and  by  which  it 
was  made  to  appear  that  he  had,  in  point  of  fact,  testified  as  claimed 
by  the  counsel  for  the  prosecution,  and  had  stated  at  the  former  trial 
that  he  had  been  absent  from  San  Francisco  and  in  Marin  county 
some  sis  or  seven  years  since  the  year  1855.  For  this  trivial  departure 
from  the  rules  of  evidence  a  conviction   of  felony  was  reversed  and 

the  cause  remanded  for  a  new  trial. ^ On  a  trial  for  murder  the 

defendant  was  examined  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  and,  on  his 
cross-examination  testified,  that  the  deceased,  on  the  occasion  of  the 
quarrel  which  resulted  in  his  death,  called  the  defendant  and  his  brother 
"  damned  sons  of  bitches."  The  witness  further  testified:  "That  is 
not  the  first  time  I  ever  heard  him  use  that  kind  of  language.  Have 
heard  him  use  it  frequently.  I  do  not  know  as  he  was  a  practical 
swearer."  The  prosecution  called  several  witnesses  in  rebuttal,  who 
were  permitted  to  testify,  against  the  objection  of  the  defendant,  that 
they  were  intimately  acquainted  with  the  deceased  in  his  life  time,  and 
that  he  was  not  a  profane  swearer,  and  that  they  never  heard  him  use 
profane  language.  The  defendant  excepted  to  the  ruling  of  the  court ; 
and,  because  the  prosecution  was  allowed  to  go  into  this  collateral  and 
irrelevant  matter,  which  could  not  possibly  affect  the  merits  of  the  case 
or  prejudice  the  accused  in  any  way,  a  conviction  was  reversed  and  a 
new  trial  ordered.'^  Such  decisions  are  a  mere  travesty  upon  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice. 

§  473.  [Continued.]  AVliat  if  Question  answered  without 
Objection.  —  Although  the  witness  may  be  asked  such  an  irrele- 
vant and  collateral  question  and  may  answer  it  without  objection, 
evidence  cannot  be  afterwards  admitted  to  contradict  his  testi- 
mony in  respect  of  such  collateral  matter.'^  But  the  answers 
are  evidence  in  the  case,  and  when  they  tend  to  affect  the  credi- 
bility of  a  witness,  are  to  be  ^veighed  and  considered  by  the  jury.* 

§  474.  Where  the  Opposite  Party  is  a  Witness.  —  It  has  been 
suggested,  on  grounds  that  are  obviously  sound,  that  the  fact 
that  the  wdtuess  is  a  party  to  the  action,  will  justify  the  court,  in 

1  People  ".  McKeller,  53  Cal.  65.  See  also  Goodhand  v.  Bentou,  fi    Gill 

2  People  V.  Bell,  53  Cal.  119.  &  J.  (Md.)  4S1. 

3  Sloau  V.  Edwards,  (11  IMd.  00,  105.  ■»  Craig  v.  Rohrer,  G3  111.  325. 


420  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   TllOIiip.  Tr., 

its  discretion,  in  allowing  even  a  broader  range  of  cross-exami- 
nation than  would  be  allowed  where  the  witness  is  not  a  party. ^ 
But  at  the  same  time  it  is  held  that  this  is  not  the  rigid  of  the 
adverse  party,  but  that  the  rules  of  cross-examination  are  the 
same,  whether  the  witness  be  a  party  or  not.^  Thus,  the  plaintiff 
having  testified  in  his  own  behalf,  in  a  suit  against  a  city  for 
personal  injury  claimed  to  have  been  received  from  a  defective 
sidewalk,  the  defendant  proposed,  by  cross-examining  him,  to 
show  that,  three  years  before,  he  had  combined  with  others  to 
defraud  an  insurance  company  which  had  taken  a  risk  upon  his 
life.  It  was  held  that  such  cross-examination  might,  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  trial  court,  be  either  refused  or  permitted  without 
error,  the  witness  not  claiming  his  privilege.^  Reasoning  from 
the  same  premises,  it  has  been  held  that  a  defendant  who  offered 
himself  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  might  be  asked  whether 
he  had  not  disposed  of  his  property  so  as  to  avoid  the  payment  of 
any  recovery  in  the  action  then  being  tried;  whether,  since  such 
disposal,  he  had  not  been  engaged  in  selling  the  same  property ; 
and  whether  he  had  not  gone  to  New  York  to  consult  a  spiritualist 
in  regard  to  the  money  which  was  the  subject  of  the  contro- 
versy, —  and  his  answers  to  these  questions  were  held  the  proper 
subjects  of  comment  to  the  jury.*  But  this  rule  does  not  extend 
so  far  as  to  render  it  proper  to  allow  frivolous  and  immaterial 
questions.^ 

1  Norris  v.  Cargill,  57  Wis.  251,  "Did  you  tell  Mr.  Beach  or  Mr.  Hoy t 
255;  Kuapp  v.  Schuei'ler,  24  Wis.  70.  (plaiutiff's  attorneys),  or  either  of 
The  suljject  of  the  cross-exaraiuation  them,  how  much  Mr.  Arts  owed  you 
of  accused  persons,  who  offer  them-  wheu  you  brought  this  suit?  "  It  was 
selves  as  witnesses  in  criminal  trials,  held  that  these  questions  were  prop- 
is  reserved  for  a  future  chapter.  Fost,  erly  excluded.  It  was  utterly  imraa- 
chap.  23.  terial  under  whose  advice  or  direction 

2  Norris  V.  Cargill,  swpra;  Howland  the  suit  was  brought;  nor  could  a 
V.  Jenks,  7  AVis,  57.  communication  of  facts  made  to  the 

5  South  Bend  v.  Hardy,  98  Ind.  577.  plaintiffs  counsel  be  introduced  in  ev- 

4  State  ex  rel.  v.  Phillips,  70  N.  C.  idence.     Walthelm  v.  Arts,  70  la.  609; 

4G2.  s.  c.  31  N.  W.  Rep.  953.  In  Georgia  a 

^  Thus,  in  a  civil  case  in  Iowa,  the  ruling  of  the  trial  court  was  sustained, 

plaintiff  was  asived  on  cross-examiua-  in    suppressing  a    series    of    interrog- 

tion:  "Who  told  you   to  1)i-iiig  tliis  atories    sued    out     by    the    plaintiff, 

r^uit  against  liim  (defendant)  V  also,  on    tlie     ground    tliat    one     of     the 


Tit.    Ill,  Cll.  XVII.]       THE    CKOSS-EXAMIXATION.  421 

§  475.  Right  of  Witness  to  Explain.  — A  witness  is  entitled 
to  explain  his  declarations,  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  showing 
an  apparent  hostility  against  the  defendant.^  Where,  on  the 
cross-examination  of  a  witness,  collateral  facts  are  called  out 
from  him  tending  to  create  a  distrust  in  his  integrity,  fidelity  or 
truth,  it  is  competent  for  the  adverse  party  to  ask,  on  re-exam- 
ination an  explanation^  which  will  tend  to  support  his  testimony, 
although  the  circumstances  thus  proved  are  foreign  to  the  main 
issue,  and  would  not  have  been  permitted  but  for  the  previous 
cross-examination/''  Thus,  if  he  admits  on  cross-examination 
that  he  has  given  contrary  testimony,  — as,  for  instance,  before 
a  committing  magistrate  in  the  same  case, — he  may,  on  re- 
examination, be  permitted  to  state  that  such  former  testimony 
was  given  in  consequence  of  threats  of  personal  violence  by  the 
opposing  witness.^  So,  where  a  witness  is  interrogated,  on 
cross-examination,  as  to  former  inconsistent  declarations,  and 
denies  that  he  made  them,  he  may  state,  in  rebuttal,  wJiat  he  did 
saj/  on  the  particular  occasion.*  So,  if  the  plaintiff's  testimony 
is  assailed  by  that  given  for  the  defendant,  setting  up  a  new  state 
of  facts,  the  plaintiff  may  explain  away  or  modify  the  facts  b}' 
re-examination  or  by  rebutting  testimony.  Thus,  where  a  de- 
fendant,  on  a  trial  for  stabbing,  gave  in  evidence  a  previous 

cross-interrogatories  had  not  heea  fitlly  on  cross-examination,  to  conversations 

answered.     Tlie  court  said :  ''Where  a  with    the  defendant,  the    defendant, 

party  to  a  cause  makes  himself  a  wit-  called  as  a  witness  by  the  plaintiff, 

ness  in  his  own  behalf,  he  should  be  may  be  examined  on  the  subject  of  the 

held  to  answer  strictly  and  minutely  same  conversations.    Homansr.  Corn- 

every    interrogatory  put    to    him    of  ing,  (30  N.  H.   418.     See  also  Laws  of 

which  he  has  knowledge,  and   if   he  New  Hampshire,  chap.  228,  §  15. 

neglects  to  answer,  or  answers  eva-  ^  State  v.  Stewart,  11  Ore.  52.     As 

sively,  such  testimony  should  be  re-  to  the  right  of  a  witness  to  explain  a 

jected.     Howai"di\  Chamberlin,  68  Ga.  mistake  made  in  his  testimony  on  the 

(i84,  ()!)().     This  was  probably  ruled  in  trial  of  another  case  between  the  same 

conformity  with  some   statutory  re-  parties,   see  McDonald  v.  McDonald, 

quirement;  the  general  rule  would  be  55  Mich.  155. 

that  the  failure  to  answer  the  cross-  -  United  States  v.  Eighteen  Barrels 

interrogatories  fully  would  go  merely  of  High  Wines,  8  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  475, 

to  the  credibility  of  the  witness  and  be  478. 

a  subject  of  comment  before  the  jury.  ^  Lewis  v.  State,  35  Ala.  380. 

Whei-e  the  plaintiff's  witness  testified,  ^  Haley  v.  State,  G3  Ala.  83. 


422  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl*., 

difficulty  or  quarrel  on  the  same  day,  to  show  a  conspiracy  to  do 
him  bodily  harm,  it  was  competent  for  the  State  to  prove  other 
incidents  of  such  previous  difficulty,  in  order  that  the  jury  might 
better  understand  the  real  merits  of  the  case.^  A  witness  having 
testified  to  certain  facts  was  asked  on  cross-examination  if  he  had 
not  made  a  different  statement  to  A.,  and  he  replied  that  he  had 
not.  The  adverse  party  afterwards  called  A.  as  a  witness,  who 
testified  that  the  former  witness  had  made  a  different  statement 
to  him.  The  former  witne^ss  was  again  recalled  and  stated  what 
he  did  say  to  A.,  and  was  going  on  to  give  the  further  conversa- 
tion between  him  and  A.  upon  the  subject,  when,  on  objection  of 
the  adverse  party,  the  court  ruled  it  out.  It  was  held  that  the 
party  calling  the  witness  was  entitled  to  have  the  whole  conver- 
sation detailed  so  far  as  it  related  to  the  same  subject.^ 

s  McAffee  v.  State,  31  Ga.  411.  «  Harrison's  Appeal,  48  Coim.  202. 


Tit.  Ill,  CI).  XVIII.]       THE    HE-EXAMIXATION,  423 


CHAPTER      XVIII. 

OF  THE  KE-EXAMIXATION. 
Sectiox 

480.  Purpose  of. 

481.  Developing  New  Matter  brought  out  on  Cross-examination. 

482.  Wlien  not  Permitted  witliout  Leave  of  Court. 

483.  Re-examiaation  as  to  Incompetent  and  Irrelevant  Matters. 

484.  Limits  of  Re-examination  as  to  Former  Statements. 

485.  [Continued.]     An  Illustration  of  the  Rule. 

480.  Re-examination  as  to  Reasons  for  Animosity  towards  Accused. 

§  480.  Purpose  of. — After  the  witness  has  been  cross-ex- 
amined, he  may  often  be  re-examined  by  the  party  originally 
calling  him.  The  re-examination  sustains,  in  respect  of  the 
cross-examination,  a  relation  similar  to  that  which  the  cross-ex- 
amination sustains  to  the  direct  examination.  Its  object  is  to 
develop,  explain,  or  modify  any  new  matter  which  may  have 
been  brought  out  on  the  cross-examination. 

§  481.  Developing  Xew  Matter  brought  out  on  Cross-ex- 
amination. —  The  privilege  which  is  extended  to  the  cross-exam- 
ining party,  of  developing  and  following  into  detail  matter  which 
has  been  brought  out  on  the  direct  examination,  extends  equally 
to  the  other  party,  in  respect  of  new  matter  which  is  brought  out 
on  cross-examination.  When,  therefore,  a  witness  has,  on  cross- 
examination,  detailed  a  part  of  a  conversation,  the  other  party 
has  a  right,  on  re-examination,  to  have  him  state  the  whole  of  the 
conversation,  so  far  as  it  is  material  to  the  issues. ^  So,  the  re-ex- 
amination of  a  witness  should  be  permitted  in  respect  of  matters 
drawn  out  on  the  cross-examination,  or  which  furnish  cir- 
cumstances by  which  a  material  transaction  is  impressed  on 
the   witness'    mind.^     It   is    obviously    competent   for   a  party 

1  Roberts   v.  Roberts,  85  N.   C.  '.).  2  Farmers   &c.  Bank  v.   Young,  36 

See  Cabiness  v.  Martin,  4  Dev.  L.  (N.      la.  44. 
C.)  106;  Gray  v.  Cooper,  65  N.  C.  183. 


424  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I  Thoilip.  Tr. , 

to  recall  a  witness,  once  sworn  and  examined  in  his  behalf,  for 
re-examination  in  rehuttal^  without  express  leave  of  the  court. ^ 
Under  the  American  rule,^  where  the  cross-examiner,  in  develop- 
ing new  matter,  thereby  makes  the  witness  his  own,  it  fol- 
lows, in  the  view  of  some  courts,  that  the  party  who  orig- 
inally called  the  witness  may  follow  up  the  line  of  inquiry 
thus  touched  upon,  by  a  re-examination,  which  re-exam- 
ination is  in  the  nature  of  a  cross-examination  of  the  de- 
fendant's witness.^  But  this  rule  has  no  application  where  the 
matter  brought  out  is  not  new  matter,  but  is  merely  matter 
which  was  touched  upon  in  the  examination  in  chief.  If  this 
matter  was  not  competent,  it  does  not  afford  a  justification  to 
the  party  who  originally  stirred  it,  to  go  on  and  develop,  in  re- 
examination, a  greater  mass  of  incompetent  evidence  of  the  same 
character.  Thus,  on  the  examination  of  a  witness  for  the  plaint- 
iff, certain  evidence,  touching  transactions  between  the  plaintiff 
and  his  deceased  partner,  was  ruled  out  under  the  defendant's 
objection,  the  same  being  clearly  incompetent  under  the  statute. 
On  cross-examination,  the  defendant  asked  the  witness  a  ques- 
tion touching  the  evidence  so  ruled  out,  which  the  witness  an- 
swered.  On  re-direct  examination,  the  witness  was  permitted  by 
the  court,  against  the  defendant's  objection,  to  enter  into  a  full 
explanation  of  the  matter.  The  Supreme  Court  held  that  this 
was  error.* 

§   482.   When  not  Permitted  without  leave  of  Court.  —  It  is 

an  established  rule,  both  of  courts  of  law  and  of  equity,  founded, 
it  is  believed,  upon  a  sound  policy,  that  a  witness  cannot,  with- 
out express  leave  of  court,  be  re-examined  as  to  matter  upon 
which  he  has  already  been  examined  in  chief,  unless  it  becomes 
necessary  or  proper  in  view  of  his  cross-examination.^  But 
where  a  witness  is  recalled,  and  objection  is  made  to  his  examina- 

1  Osborue  v.  O'Reilly,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  1104;  Osborne  v.  O'Rielly,  34  N.  J.  Eq. 
60,  60.  (;o,  (i(!.     See  also  Crawford  v.  Berthof, 

2  Ante,  §  432.  1  N.  J.  Eq.  458;  Delaney  v.  Noble,  3N. 

3  Gray  V.  Cooper,  (55  N.  C.  183.  J.  Eq.   441;    Hanson  v.    Presbyterian 

4  Jackson  u.  Evans,  73  N.  C.  128.  Cluirch,    11  N.  J.  Eq.   441;   Svvartz  v. 

5  Whart.   Ev.,  §  574;   Dan.  Cli.  Pr.  Chickerin<r,  58  Md.291,  2!)7. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XVIIL]       THE    RE-EXAMINATIOX.  425 

tion,  it  will  not  be  assignable  for  error  that  the  court  permitted 
him  to  be  examined,  unless  the  ground  of  the  objection  was 
stated. 1  Such  testimony,  in  a  chancery  case,  should  be  ex- 
cluded on  exception.^  But  the  passing  of  an  order  allowing  the 
re-examination  of  a  witness  in  equity,  is  a  matter  resting  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  which  discretion  is  not  subject  to  review 
on  appeal.^ 

§  483.  Re-exainiuatioii  as  to  Incompetent  and  Irrelevant 
Matters.  —  If  one  side  introduces  evidence  irrelevant  to  the  is- 
sue, which  is  prejudicial  and  harmful  to  the  other  party,  then, 
although  it  come  in  without  objection,  the  other  party  is  entitled 
to  introduce  evidence  which  will  directly  and  strictly  contradict 
it.  The  government,  in  a  criminal  trial,  waives  the  strict  rule  to 
this  extent,  by  its  misstep  of  introducing  illegal  evidence;  but  the 
respondent  is  not  entitled  to  &  further  relaxation  of  the  common 
rule ,  because  he  could,  by  his  objection,  have  excluded  the  illegal 
or  ir  relevant  evidence.*  This  is  just  and  proper,  to  enable  the 
other  party  to  explain  away  the  prejudicial  effect  of  the  evidence, 
which,  in  many  cases  cannot  be  cured  by  an  instruction  withdraw- 
ing it  from  the  attention  of  the  jury.  Thus,  where,  in  a  criminal 
trial,  the  State's  attorney  was  allowed  by  the  court  to  ask  the  de- 
fendant's witnesses  wdiere  they  came  from  when  they  came  to  the 
witness  stand,  to  which  they  answered  that  they  came  from  jail,  — 
it  was  held  error  not  to  allow  them  to  state  on  what  charofe  they 
were  committed  to  jail,  though  they  could  not  regularly  be  dis- 
credited by  such  testimony.^  In  one  jurisdiction,  wdiere  the  rule 
prevails  that  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  in  a  criminal  trial  is 
as  much  the  people's  witness  when  under  cross-examination  as 
when  being  examined    in  chief,''  the  conclusion  has  been  drawn 

1  Osborne  v.  O'Reilly,  34  N.  J.  Eq.  9  Allen  (Mass.),  (',7;  Parker  v.  Dudley, 
60,  m.  118  Mass.  G02,  (,i05;     Phillips  v.  Hoyle, 

2  Swartz  t?.  Chickering,  58  Md.  291,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  568;  Eddy  v.  Gray, 
297.  4  Allen  (Mass.),  435;   Coin.  v.  Fitzser- 

3  Swartz  V.  Chickering,  58Md.  291,  aid,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  297;  Brown  v. 
297.  Perkins,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  89. 

*  State  V.  Witham,  72  Me.  531,   536;  a  stute  v.  Ezell,41  Tex.  35. 

Stater.  Sargent,  32  Me.  431;  Williams  ^  Wagner  v.  People,  30  Mich.  384; 

V.  Gilman.  71  Me.  ?1:  Mowry  v.  Smith,      Wilson  v.  Wagar.  26  Mich-  45S,  IcS 


426  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

that  the  mere  fact  that  a  witness  has  been  permitted,  on  cross- 
examination  on  a  subject  touched  uponintlie  direct  examination, 
to  detail,  without  objection,  evidence  whicli  is  hearsay  merely, 
will  not  authorize  the  calling  out  of  tJie  rest  of  the  story,  against 
objection,  on  the  re-direct  examination,  on  the  claim  that  it  is  a 
part  of  the  same  conversation.^  Elsewhere  it  is  ruled,  on  a  con- 
ception analogous  to  the  doctrine  of  estoppel,  that  it  is  not  ground 
of  error  that  a  witness,  on  his  re-examination,  is  permitted  to  re- 
peat incompetent  evidence  which  has  been  brought  out  on  the 
cross-examination.^ 

§  484.  Limits  of  Re-examination  as  to  former  State- 
ments. —  Professor  Greenleaf  says:  "  After  a  witness  has  been 
cross-examined  respecting  a  former  statement  made  by  him,  the 
party  who  called  him  has  a  right  to  re-examine  him  to  the  same 
matter.  The  counsel  has  a  right,  upon  such  re-examination,  to 
ask  all  questions  which  may  be  proper  to  draw  forth  an  explana- 
tion of  the  sense  and  meaning  of  the  expressions  used  by  the 
witness  on  cross-examination,  if  they  be  in  themselves  doubtful, 
and  also  of  the  motive  by  which  the  witness  was  induced  to  use 
those  expressions ;  but  he  has  no  right  to  go  further,  and  to  in- 
troduce matter  new  in  itself,  and  not  suited  to  the  purpose  of 
exphiining  either  the  expressions  or  motives  of  the  witness."  ^ 

§  485.  [Continued.]  An  Illustration  of  the  Rule.  —  Upon  the 
trial  of  an  indictment  for  arson  a  witness  for  the  State,  on  his  direct 
examination,  testified  that,  in  a  conversation  with  liira  on  a  certain 
occasion,  the  accused  said  to  him,  "  I  suppose  you  are  going  to  send 
me  up  on  that  buggy  scrape."  On  his  cross-examination  the  witness 
explained  that  the  words  "  buggy  scrape  "  referred  to  a  buggy  which 
one  L.  had  caused  the  accused  to  be  arrested  for  steahng  a  few  days 
before,  and  that  the  witness  had  been  employed  by  L.  to  look  it  up 
and  had  recovered  it.  On  his  re-direct  examination,  the  witness  was 
permitted,  against  objection,  to  testify  "  what  he  knew  and  what  he 
did  in  regard  to  that  buggy  scrape,"  and  to  detail  facts  having  a  strong 
tendency  to  show  that  the  accused  had  stolen  the  buggy.     It  was  held 

MVagner  ?7.  People,  30  Mich.  384.  3  i  Greenl,    Ev.,   §  iCT.     So  held  in 

2  Goodmau  v.  Keuuedy,  10  Neb.  270.      Schaser  v.  State,  36  Wis.  429,  432. 


Tit.  in,   Ch.  XVIII.]       THE    RE-EXAMINATION.  427 

that  this  was  new  matter,  not  admissible  within  the  foregoing:  rule  in 
respect  of  re-direct  examination,  and  that  its  admission  was  fatal 
error. '  The  decision  is  supportable  on  the  ground  that  the  evidence  was 
incompetent,  since  it  was  evidence  of  another  and  a  distinct  offense,  of 
a  diferent  character  from  the  one  on  trial ;  but  the  opinion,  so  far  as  it 
holds  that  it  is  fatal  error,  in  a  criminal  or  in  a  civil  trial,  for  the  judge 
to  allow  new  matter  to  be  gone  into  on  re-direct  examination,  is  mani- 
festly unsound.  Such  a  matter,  by  the  best  authority  and  reason,  is 
left  to  rest  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  judge. - 

§  486.  Re-examination  Jis  to  Keasoiis  of  Aiiiinosity  towards 
Accused.  — In  Louisiana,  it  is  held  that,  where  a  witness  for  the 
State,  on  cross-examination,  admits  that  his  feelings  to  the  ac- 
cused are  unfriendly,  the  counsel  of  the  State  cannot,  on  the  re- 
examination, ask  the  witness  to  state  the  reasons  of  his  animosity. 
The  reason  is  that,  to  permit  the  State's  witness  thus  to  detail 
the  causes  of  his  animosity  towards  the  accused,  is  to  suffer  him 
to  testify  to  matters  which  are  wholly  irrelevant  to  the  issues  on 
trial,  and  also  to  give  him  an  opportunity  of  poisoning  the  minds 
of  the  jury  against  the  accused,  by  relating  facts  and  circum- 
stances, and  making  accusations,  wholly  disconnected  with  the 
charge  for  which  the  accused  is  being  tried,  without  an  opportun- 
ity of  defense  or  reply  being  offered  to  the  accused.  Such  an 
irregularity  has  been  held  good  ground  for  reversing  a  convic- 
tion.^ The  rule,  heretofore  explained,  that  such  statements  are 
collateral  to  the  inquiry,  in  the  sense  that  the  cross-examining 
party,  by  interrogating  the  witness  concerning  them,  makes  the 
witness  his  own  witness,  so  that  he  is  bound  by  his  answers, 
does  not  apply ;  and  it  is  error  to  reject  the  contradictory  evi- 
dence on  this  ground.*  Thus,  it  is  comi)eteut,  for  the  purpose  of 
impeaching  the  credibility  of  a  witness,  to  show  that  there  has 
been  a  quarrel  between  him  and  the  party  against  whom  he  testi- 
fies ;  and  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  cause  of  the  quarrel  should 
be    connected    with   the    subject-matter   of   the    suit    on  trial. 

1  Schaser  v.  State,  3G  AVis.  429.  *  Bosboroiigh  v.  State  (Tex.  Ct.  of 

2  Ante,  §349.  App.),  8  Crim.  Law  Mag.  751;  s.  c.  21 

3  State  V.  Gregory,  33  La.  Aim.  737.       Tex.  App.  G72. 


428  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

Where  the  party  against  whom  a  witness  testifies  asks  him,  on 
cross-examination,  whether  there  has  not  been  such  a  quarrel,  he 
does  not  thereby  make  the  witness  his  own  witness  so  as  to  preckicle 
himself  from  contradicting  him.^  The  rule  which  thus  requires 
a  foundation  to  be  laid,  applies  equally  to  the  case  of  oral  state- 
ments and  to  a  previous  deposition  given  by  the  witness.^  Ac- 
cordingly, it  has  been  held  that,  where  the  deposition  of  the  wit- 
ness has  been  read  in  evidence,  and  the  opposing  party  produces 
another  and  a  conflicting  deposition  of  the  same  witness,  in  an- 
other action  between  the  same  parties,  of  a  prior  date,  and  offers 
to  introduce  the  same  to  impeach  the  witness,  and  the  court  of  its 
own  motion  excludes  the  testimony,  it  is  not  error. ^  It  has  even 
been  held  that,  where  the  deposition  of  a  deceased  witness  had  been 
by  consent  read  in  evidence,  another  and  conflicting  deposition  of 
the  same  witness,  at  a  prior  trial,  could  not  be  read,  in  order  to 
impeach  the  witness,  for  the  reason  that  the  attention  of  the 
witness  had  not  been  called  to  the  conflict  between  the  two  dep- 
ositions.* But  this  last  holding  does  not  seem  to  be  supported 
by  reason  ;  since  the  prior  deposition  would  certainly  have  some 
tendency  to  impair  the  effect  of  the  latter  one,  and  since  the 
death  of  the  witness  has  rendered  it  impossible  to  examine  him 
respecting  the  discrepancy  between  the  two. 

1  Beardsley  v.  Wiklraan,  41  Conu.  ^  Greer  u.  Higgius,  20  Kan.  420, 424. 
515.  *  Hubbard  v.  Briggs,  31  N.  Y.  51P 

2  Cropsey  v.  Averill,  8  Neb.  157.  Runyau  v.  Price,  15  Oh.  St.  1, 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIX.]       INDIRECT   IMPEACHMENT.  429 


CHAPTER    XIX. 

OF  INDIRECT  IMPEACHMENT. 

Section 

489.  P'our  Modes  of  Impeachiuii  the  Credit  of  a  Witness. 

490.  Riglit    to    Impeach    l^y    Proof    of  previous    Coutradictory    or    hostile 

Statements  or  Acts. 

491.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

492.  Previous  Declarations  of  Witness  not  Evidence  in  Chief. 

493.  Rule  does  not  Extend  to  contrary  Expressions  of  Opinion. 

494.  Degree  of  Contradiction  does  not  Determine  Competency. 

495.  Not  necessary  that  previous  Declarations  should  have  been  Intention- 

ally False. 

496.  Necessity  of  Laying  Foundation. 

497.  When  Foundation  need  not  be  laid. 

498.  What  if  no  Objection  is  made. 

499.  Rule  applies  to  Evidence  of  Previous  Threats  or  Hostile  Statements. 

500.  Rule  Tvhere  the  Contradictory  Declaration  is  in  Writing. 

501.  [Continued.]     Manner  of  Interrogating  the  Witness  as  to  such  Writing. 

502.  Particularity  in  laying  the  Foundation. 

503.  Contradictory  Testimony  given  on  a  Former  Occasion. 

504.  Former  Testimony,  how  T*roved. 

505.  Proving  the  Contradictory  Statements  in  other  Cases. 
50G.  RuleTvhere  the  Witness  admits  such  Statements. 

507.  What  if  Witness  says  he  does  not  Remember. 

508.  Answer  Categorically,  and  Explain  on  Re-examination. 

509.  Impeachment  of  Married  Woman  by  Evidence  of  Conspiracy  by  Hus- 

band, 

510.  Recalling  Opponent's  Witness  to  put  Impeaching  Questions,- 

511.  Impeachment  of  one's  own  Witness. 

512.  Exception  where  the  Party  is  Surprised  or  Entrapped  by  the  Witness. 

513.  Exception  in  the  case  of  a  Hostile  Witness. 

514.  Assailing  Credit  of  Witness  called  by  both  Parties. 

515.  Contradicting  the  Statements  of  one's  own  Witness. 

§    489.   Four  Modes  of  Impeaching-  the  Credit  of    a  Wit- 

5JCSS.  — There  are  but  four  modes  of  impeaching  the  credit  of  a 
witness:  1.  By  cross-examination.  2.  By  proving  previous  con- 
tradictory statements  or  acts.  3.  By  producing  the  record 
of  his  conviction  of  some  infamous  crime.     4.  By  adducing  gen- 


430  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

eral  evidence  tending  to  show  that  he  is  unworthy  of  belief  on 
his  oath. ^  The  Jirst  has  been  ah'eady  considered ; '-^  the  second 
will  be  considered  in  this,  and  the  third  and  fourth,  in  the  succeed- 
ing chapter. 

§  490.  Right  to  Impeach  hy  Proof  of  Previous  Contra- 
dictory or  Hostile  Stateuients  or  Acts.  —  It  is  the  absolute  right 
of  a  cross-examining  party  to  lay  a  foundation  for  impeaching  a 
witness,  by  interrogating  him  as  to  whether  or  not  he  has  made 
contrary  declarations  on  a  former  occasion,  and  the  exclusion  of 
questions  put  for  this  purpose  is  error  for  which  new  trial  will 
be  granted;  ^  and  where  the  proper  foundation  has  been  laid,  as 
hereafter  explained,  it  is  the  right  of  the  party  seeking  to  im- 
peach the  witness,  to  introduce  such  impeaching  evidence,  and  the 
exclusion  of  it  will  be  error. ^  The  acts  of  the  witness,  relevant  to 
the  subject  of  the  action  and  inconsistent  with  his  testimony,  may 
be  shown  as  affecting  his  credibility.^ 

§  491.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. — A  witness  testified  in  his 
direct  examination,  that  he  had  no  ill  feeling  against  the  accused,  when 
he  approached  him,  just  before  the  difficulty  which  occasioned  the  in- 
dictment. It  was  error  to  exclude  his  testimony,  on  cross-examina- 
tion, regarding  his  declarations,  made  just  before  the  difficulty,  showing 

a  different  state  of  feeling.^ A  witness   had  testified,  on  his  direct 

examination,  as  to  the  unprojitableness  of  keeping  a  certain  railroad 
eating  house.  It  was  held  competent  to  ask  him,  on  his  cross-examina- 
tion, whether  he  had  not  published  the  following  notice,  and  to  offer  the 
notice  in  evidence:  "For  sale.  Railroad  Eating  House,  with  furni- 
ture and  good  will,  on  line  of  Union  Pacific  R.  R.  in  Nebraska;  regu- 
lar eating  house  for  all  trains;  large  trains  and  large  profits;  terms, 
part  on  cash  and  part  on  time.     For  particulars  address,"  etc.^ 

^  Rexw.  Watsou,  2    Stark.  116,  149:  Rep.  4;  State  v.  Downs  (Mo.),  3  S.  W. 

Speucely  v.  DeWillott,  7  East,  108;  s.  c  Rep.  219;  s.  c.  91  Mo.  19. 

3  Smith,  289.  fi  Hyland  v,    Miluer,    99    Ind.    308; 

2  Antr,  chap.  XVII.  ante,  §450. 

^  Pruitt  V.   Brockman,  46   Ind.  SH;  6  McFarlin  ?».  Sttite,  supra. 

McFarlin  V.  State,  41  Tex.  23;  Tiiruey  ^Market   v.    Moudy,   13   Neb.    323, 

V.  State,  9  Tox.  App.  193.  327. 

*  Joseph   V.   Com,   (Ky.),  ]    S.    W. 


Tit     III,  Ch.  XIX.]       INDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  431 

§   492.   Previous  Declarations    not   Evidence   in    Chief. 

What  a  witness,  who  is  not  a  party,  states  out  of  court,  is  not  evi- 
dence in  chief,  to  prove  the  fact  as  stated  by  him ;  but  can  only  be 
shown  to  discredit  his  testimony  at  the  trial,  when  his  testimony 
is  contradicted  by  such  outside  statements. i  The  effect  of  prov- 
ing contradictory  statements  extends  no  further  than  the  ques- 
tion of  credibility;  it  does  not  tend  to  establish  the  truth  of  the 
matters  embraced  in  the  contradictory  statements ;  it  simply  goes 
to  the  credibility  of  the  witness. 2 

§   493.   Rule  does  not  extend  to  Contrary  Expressions  of 
Opinion.  —  The  rule  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to  introduce  pre- 
vious expressions  of  opinion  made  by  the  witness.     Thus,  on  the 
trial  of  an  indictment  for  a  criminal  offense,  the  defendant  can- 
not show  that  a  witness,  who  has  testified  to  circumstances  tend- 
ing to  connect  him  with  the_crime,  had  previously  expressed  the 
opinion  that  he,  the  defendant,  was  innocent;   since  the  expres- 
sion of  such  an  opinion  would  not  tend  to  contradict  the  facts  to 
which  the  witness  testified.^     So,  where,  in  an  action  for  dam- 
ages for  an  assault  and  battery,  a  witness  was  asked,  on  cross- 
examination,  whether  he  had  not  gone  to  the  plaintiff  "s  store  some 
time  after  the  occurrence,  and  there  stated  to  the  plaintiff  that 
the  assault  upon  him  was  a  great  outrage,  and  that  he  would  be 
foolish  if  he  did  not  make  the  defendant  smart  for  it;   and  the 
plaintiff  then,  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  the  witness,  was 
allowed  to  testify,  against  the  objection  of  the  defendant,  that  the 
witness  had  come  to  his  store  a  week  after  the  occurrence,  where, 
after  the  plaintiff  had  explained  the  occurrence  to  the  witness,' 
the  witness  had  said  that  it  was  a  great  outrage,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  should  make  the  defendant  smart  for  it.* 

§  494.   Degree  of  Contradiction  does  not  determine  Com- 
petency.—The  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  say:  "There  must  be 

1  Law  ^'.  Fairfield,  40  Vt.  425.  3  Com.  v.  Moonev,  110  Mass   99 

^  Seller  ^.Jenkins,  97  Ind.  430,435;  4  gloau    v.   Edwards,    01    Md.    90, 

Davis  V.  Hardy,  76  Ind.  272;  Hicks  v.  104. 
Stoue,  13  Miuu.  434. 


432  EXAMixATiox  OF  wirxKssEs.      [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

contradiction  between  the  statements  alleged  to  have  been  made 
out  of  court,  and  those  made  on  the  witness  stand ;  but  the  degree 
of  contradiction  does  not  determine  the  competency  of  the  im- 
peaching testimony,  however  much  that  consideration  may  affect 
its  potency."  ^  The  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota  expresses  the 
same  conclusion  thus:  "The  admissibility  of  the  discrediting 
testimony  does  not  depend  on  the  degree  of  variance  between  it 
and  the  subsequent  testimony.  If  it  differs  in  any  material  par- 
ticular, it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  what  effect  such  difference 
in  statements  shall  have  on  the  witness'  credit."  ^ 

§  495.  Not  necessary  that  previous  Declarations  Intention- 
ally False.  —  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  previous  contradictory 
statements  should  be  intentionally  false.  Accordingly,  it  was 
held  error  for  the  court  to  give  the  following  cautionary  instruc- 
tion to  the  jury:  "  The  court  instructs  for  the  plaintiff  that, 
before  the  jury  can  allow  any  contradiction  of  the  testimony  of 
any  of  the  witnesses  to  affect  their  credibility  in  this  suit,  the 
jury  must  be  satisfied,  from  the  evidence,  that  such  contradiction 
is  not  only  true,  but  is  upon  a  matter  material  to  the  issue  in  this 
case,  and  also  that  the  testimony  so  contradicted  was  intention- 
ally false."  ^ 

§  496.  Necessity  of  Laying  Foundation. —  "  The  rule,"  said 
Mr.  Chief  Justice  Waite,  "  is  that  the  contradictory  declarations 
of  a  witness,  whether  oral  or  in  writing,  made  at  another  time, 
cannot  be  used  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching,  until  the  witness 
has  been  examined  upon  the  subject,  and  his  attention  particu- 
larly directed  to  the  circumstances,  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  him 
full  opportunity  for  explanj^tion  or  exculpation,  if  he  desires  to 
make  it."  ^     Stated  in  the  more  usual  way,  the  witness'^must  first 

1  Seller  v.  Jenkins,  i)7  Ind.  430,  439,  16  How.  (U.  S.)  38,  46;  Seller  v.  Jenk- 
opinion  by  Elliott,  J.  ins,  97  Ind.  430,  433;  laeav.  Chadsey,  2 

2  Tmklepaugh  v.  Rounds,  24  Minn.  Keyes  (N.Y.),  543,  553;  State  w. Wright, 
298.  75   N.    C.  439;    The    Queen's   Case,  2 

3  Craig  ?».  Rohrer,  G3  111.  325.  Brod.  &  Bmg.   284,    313;    Conrad  v. 

4  Steamboat  Clias.  Morgan,  115  Griffey,  16  How.  (U.  S.)  38;  Hooper  u. 
U.  S.  69.     So  held  m  Conrad  y.  Griffey,  Moore,  3  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  428;  Howe 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XIX.]       INDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT. 


433 


be  interrogated  concerning  the  supposed  contradictory  state- 
ments, together  with  the  circumstances  of  time,  place  and  person 
involved  in  the  supposed  contradiction.^ 

§  497.  When  Foundation  need  not  be  laid.  —  The  rule 
which  requires  the  foundation  thus  to  be  laid  does  not  apply  where 
the  party  himself  is  a  witness;  since  his  previous  self-disserv- 
ing declarations  are  always  admissible  against  him  ;2  but  he  may, 
of  course,  always  be  asked  whether  he  has  npt  made  contrary 
self-disserving  statements  respecting  the  matter  in  issue. ^  It  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  the  rule  does  not  extend  so  far' as 
to  preclude  the  cross-examining  party  from  contradicting  the 
witness  as  to  any  fact  as  to  which  he  has  testified  in  chief, 
without  thus  interrogating  him  on  cross-examination  with  the 
view  of  lavino;  a  foundation.     Thus,  in  an  action  for  assault  and 


Machine  Co.  v.  Clark,  15  Kan.  492; 
Payne  v.  State,  GO  Ala.  80,  89;  see  cases 
in  2  Brick.  Dig.  548,  §§  117,  118; 
Sprague  v.  Cadwell,  12  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
518:  Booker  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  5tj4; 
Budloug  V.  Nostrand,  24  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  25;  Brig;2:s  v.  Wheeler,  16  Hun 
(N.  Y.),  583.  In  Massachusetts 
and  Maine  the  rule  seems  to  be 
that  contradictory  statements  of  the 
witness  are  allowed,  "nithoutauy  pre- 
vious iuterroiration  of  him  about  them. 
Mauniug,  ,J.,iu  Payne  v.  State,  CO  Ala. 
80,  89;  Baker  v.  State  (Wis.), 33  N.  W. 
Eep.  52;    s.  c.  69   Wis.  32. 

1  People  V.  Devine,  44  Cal.  452, 
Upon  the  cross-examination  of  a  wit- 
ness for  the  prosecution  in  a  criminal 
trial,  an  affidavit  which  had  been  made 
by  the  witness  was  offered  by  the  de- 
fendant, for  the  purpose  of  impeaching 
her  testimony.  It  was  held  that  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  affida- 
vit was  made,  and  the  conversation 
had  by  the  witness  with  the  person  at 
whose  instance  it  was  made,  were  ad- 
missible as  parts  of  the  transaction. 


People  V.  Smallmau,  55  Cal.  185.  It  is 
not  necessary  that  the  impeaching 
testimony  should  be  directed  to  the 
contradiction  of  the  testimony  given  by 
the  witness  sought  to  be  impeached  on 
his  direct  examination;  it  is  compe- 
tent when  it  contradicts  statements 
made  by  him  to  questions  propounded 
to  him  on  his  cross-examination.  Sel- 
ler V.  Jenkins,  97  Ind.  430,  437; 
Greenfield  v.  People,  13  Hun  (X.  Y.), 
242.  In  Seller  v.  Jenkins,  the  follow- 
ing cases  were  cited  by  the  court  as 
applications  of  this  rule:  Dillon  v. 
Bell,  9  Ind.  320;  Brown  r.  State,  24 
Ind.  113;  Thompson  v.  State,  15  Ind. 
473. 

2  Collins  V.  Mack,  31  Ark.  685,  694. 

^  Thus,  in  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  injuries  from  falling  into  an 
excavation,  the  plaintiff  may  be  asked 
whether  he  has  not  stated  that  he  had 
only  been  a  little  hurt,  he  having  testi- 
fied in  chief  that  he  had  l)eeu  severely 
hurt.  Monongahela  Water  Co.  v. 
Stewartsou,  96  Pa.  St.  436. 


28 


434  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoilip.   Tu.^ 

battery,  the  defendant  testified  as  a  witness,  on  his  direct  exam- 
ination, that  he  had  no  feelings  of  enmity  against  the  phiintiff  at 
the  time  of  the  assault.  It  was  held  competent  to  prove,  by 
another  witness,  without  laying  a  foundation  on  the  cross-exam- 
ination of  the  defendant,  that  the  defendant  had,  prior  to  the 
assault,  made  declarations  showino;  feelino-sof  enmitv  ajjainst  the 
plaintiff.^  But,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,  where  the  question  as 
to  hostile  feelinofs  has  not  been  g-one  into  on  direct  examination, 
there  is  a  view  that  the  foundation  must  be  laid  on  cross-examin- 
ation before  evidence  of  declarations  tending  to  show  such  feelings 
can  be  introduced.'-^ 

§   498.    [Continued.]     What  if  no  Objection  is  made. —  The 

grounds  on  which  the  foregoing  rule,  which  requires  a  founda- 
tion to  be  laid  by  first  interrogating  the  witness  on  cross-examina- 
tion, is  usually  put,  is  that  it  is  the  right  of  the  witness  to  have 
the  opportunity  of  explaining.  If  it  is  a  pi'ivilege  personal  to 
him,  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  it  can  not  be  waived  by  the 
party  whose  witness  he  is ,  without  his  consent ;  but  that  if  the 
impeaching  testimony  is  introduced  without  the  foundation  first 
being  laid,  he  has  the  rigid  of  subsequent  explanation.  ^  We 
find,  however,  that  it  has  been  held  competent  for  a  cor- 
oner's clerk  to  read,  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  a  wit- 
ness in  a  criminal  trial,  his  previous  deposition,  taken  before 
the  coroner  and  subscribed  and  sworn  to  by  him,  without 
askino;  him  on  cross-examination  concernino-  the  makino;  of  such 
deposition,  where  no  objection  is  made  to  the  reading  of  it  on 
that  score.* 

§  499.  Rule  applies  to  Evidence  of  Previous  Threats  or 
Hostile  Statements.  —  According  to  some  opinions,  the  rule 
which  thus  requires  a  foundation  to  be  laid,  applies  to  evidence 
of  previous  threats  or  hostile  declarations,  made  by  the  witness 
against  the  cross-examining  party.  Thus,  in  a  criminal  trial,  the 
defendant  proposed  to  prove  that,  since  the  alleged  assault,  the 

1  Lucas  V.  Flinn,  35  Iowa,  9,  14.  ^  Stephens   v-    People.    19  N.  Y. 

2  Post,  §  499.  549,  573. 

3  Henderson  v.  State,  70  Ala.  29. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIX.]       INDIRECT    I5IPEACHMENT.  435 

prosecuting  witness  had  threatened  to  poison  him.  But,  as  the 
prosecuting  witness,  when  on  the  stand,  had  not  been  interro- 
gated as  to  whether  he  had  made  such  threats,  it  was  held  that 
evidence  was  properly  excluded. ^  It  is  always  competent  for 
the  cross-examining  party  to  put  questions  to  the  witness,  tending 
to  show  his  bias,  prejudice  or  ill-will  against  such  party,  and,  if 
the  witness  denies  making  such  statements,  to  prove  that  he  did 
make  them.^  It  is  said  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  California: 
"  No  mode  of  ascertaining  the  state  of  feelings  of  the  witness 
exists,  except  that  disclosed  by  the  declarations  or  the  acts  of 
the  witness  sought  to  be  impeached  by  these  declarations.  The 
same  principle,  which  assures  to  him  the  privilege  of  explanation 
when  contradictory  declarations  are  offered,  applies  to  assure 
him  the  rigid  of  explanation  when  declarations  of  hostility  are 
sought  to  be  introduced.  *  *  *  Wg  can  see  no  distinction 
between  admitting  declarations  of  hostility  of  the  witness,  by 
the  way  of  impairing  the  force  of  his  testimony,  and  admitting 
contradictory  statements  for  the  same  purpose,  so  far  as  this 
rule  is  concerned;  for  in  either  case,  an  opportunity  should  be 
given  the  witness  to  explain  what  he  said."  ^ 

§  500.  Rule  where  the  Contradictory  Declaration  is  in  Writ- 
ing. —  "  If,"  said  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Waite,  "•  the  contradictory 
declaration  is  in  writing,  questions  as  to  its  contents,  without  the 
production  of  the  instrument  itself,  are  ordinarily  inadmissible, 
and  a  cross-examination  for  the  purpose  of  laying  a  foundation 
for  its  use  as  impeachment,  would  not,  except  under  special  cir- 
cumstances, be  allowed,  until  the  paper  was  produced  and  shown 
to  the  witness  while  under  examination.  Circumstances  nuiy 
arise,  however,  which  will  excuse  its  production.  All  the  law 
requires  is,  that  the  memory  of  the  witness  shall  be  so  re- 
freshed by  the  necessary  inquiries  as  to  enable  him  to  explain,  if 

1  Booker  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  504.  »  Baker  v.  Joseph,  16  Cal.  173,  178, 
Compare  Briggs  v.  Wheeler,  16  Huu  quoted  and  affirmed  iu  State  v.  Stew- 
(N.  Y.),  583;  ante,  §450.  art,  11  Ore.  52.     See  Davis  v.  Frauke, 

2  Scott  V.  State,  64  Ind.  400 ;  Sager  33  Gratt.  (Va.)  425 ;  1  Whart.  Ev.,  §  566. 
--.'.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  110;  ante,  §450. 


436  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoiup.  Tl'., 

he  can,  and  desires  to  do  so.  Whether  this  has  been  done  is 
for  the  court  to  determine  before  impeacliing  evidence  is  ad- 
mitted." ^ 

§  501.  [Continued.]  Manner  of  Interrogating  the  Witness 
as  to  sucli  Writing.  — When  the  depositions  of  a  witness,  on  the 
preliminary  examination  of  the  accused,  are  talcen  down  in  writ- 
ing, read  over  to  the  witness,  assented  to  by  him  as  correct,  and 
by  him  signed,  — then,  upon  plain  principles,  where  the  witness 
is  asked  whether  he  made  the  statement  contained  in  the  deposi- 
tion, and  answers  in  the  negative,  the  deposition  is  admissible  in 
evidence  for  the  purpose  of  impeachment.^  It  has  been  held  not 
proper  to  cross-examine  the  witness,  by  first  reading  what  pur- 
ports to  be  his  previous  deposition,  and  then  asking  him  whether 
he  had  so  testified.  The  correct  rule  is  said  to  he^  first  to  prove 
the  deposition  to  be  his,  and  tlien  to  read  it  as  evidence,  and  to 
cross-examine  the  witness  as  to  any  supposed  discrepancies  be- 
tween his  testimony  in  court  and  the  deposition.^  An  obvious 
way  of  proving  the  deposition  to  be  that  of  the  witness  Avould  be 
to  put  it  into  his  hands  and  ask  him  whether  it  was  his  deposi- 
tion. But,  according  to  one  view,  it  is  not  necessary  to  do  this; 
all  that  is  required  is  to  prove  that  he  is  the  witness  who  was 
sworn  and  examined  by  the  commissioner  taking  the  deposition 
and  whose  answer  the  commissioner  purports  to  give,  without 
submitting  the  deposition  to  him  to  be  read,  before  he  is  asked 
by  counsel  whether  he  has  not  made  certain  answers  therein  con- 
tained, or  before  proving  that  the  answers  were  read  over  to 
him  before  he  signed  the  deposition.* 

1  The   Charles   Morgan,    115  U.  S.  self  being  presumptively  the  best  evi- 

69,  77.     See  also  Morrison  v.  Myers,  deuce  of  the  fact.     State  v.  Tickel,  13 

11  la.  538;  Samuels  v.  Griffith,  13  la.  Nev.  502,  508.     But  there  should  be  no 

103;  Stephens  v.  People,  19  N.  Y.  549;  doubt  about  it.    See  the  Queen's  Case, 

Honstine  v.  O'Donnell,  5  Hun  (N.  Y.),  2  Brod.  &  B.  287;  Newcomb   v.  Gris- 

472.       It  has  been  thought  doubtful  wold,  24  N.  Y.  298;  Lightfoot  v.  Peo- 

Tvhether  the    cross-examining    party  pie,  16  Midi.  512;  Gaffney  v.  People, 

may  riglitfully  ask  tlie  witness  as  to  the  50  N.  Y.  4I(i. 

coutciits  of  his  former  deiyosition,  for  ^  state  v.  Tickel,  13  Nev.  502,  508. 

the  purpose  of  laying  a  foundation  for  ^   Cropsey  v.  Averill,8  Neb.  151,  157. 

his   impeachment,    tlie    deposition  it-  ^  Ecker  t?.  McAlister,  45  Md.  291. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIX.]       INDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  437 

§  502.  Particularity  in  laying  the  Foundation.  —  The  ques- 
tion propounded  to  a  witness  on  cross-examination,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  hijing  ground  to  impeach  him  by  proof  of  contradictory 
statements  out  of  court,  must  clearly  state  the  time  icJien,  the 
place  where  and  the  person  to  lohom  the  statements  were  made.^ 
General  questions  whether  he  has  ever  said  this  or  that,  whether 
he  has  always  told  the  same  story,  and  the  like,  are  not  compe- 
tent.^ Thus,  the  question  whether  a  witness  has  not  recently 
made  certain  specified  statements  "  to  different  parties  in  talk- 
ing of  the  matter,"  is  incompetent  because  not  sufliciently  defi- 
nite." ^  So,  a  witness  for  the  State  in  a  criminal  trial  was 
asked,  on  cross-examination:  "  Have  you  not  said  yourself,  that 
3'ou  thought  the  defendant  half  crazy,  and  did  not  know  what  he 
was  doing  at  the  time?"  It  was  held  that  there  was  no  error  in 
ruling  out  this  question  upon  objection.*  But  it  is  not  necessary 
to  put  to  the  witness  the  precise  question  which  it  is  intended  to 
put  to  the  witness  by  whom  he  is  to  be  impeached ;  the  form  of 
the  question  is  in  the  discretion  of  the  court. ^ 

§  503.  Contradictory  Testimony  given  on  a  former  Occa- 
sion.—  A  witness  may  be  impeached  by  showing  that  he  testi- 
fied differently  at  a  former  trial.^  But  a  witness  cannot  be  im- 
peached by  showing  that  certain  circumstances,  to  which  he  has 
testified  on  the  present  trial,  were  omitted  by  him,  when  testify- 
ing concerning  the  same  occurrence  on  a  former  trial  of  the  ac- 
tion, unless  at  the  former  trial  his  attention  was  particularly  called 
to  such  circumstances.^  Notwithstanding  the  policy  of  the  law  en- 
forces, in  some  of  the  States,  by  statutes,  the  secrecy  of  proceed- 
ings before  grand  juries^  it  has  been  held  competent  to  ask  witness 
on  cross-examination  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  him  by  con- 

1  Hill  V.  Gust,  45  Ind.  45,  51;  DaLee  125;  Hotchkiss  v.  Germauia  Fire  Ins. 
V.  Blackburn,  11  Kan.  190,  Co.,  5  Huu  (N.  Y.),  90,  94. 

2  Heuderson  ?;.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  «  State  v.  McDouald,  G5  Me  4G(J; 
432;  Tredway  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  608-  Hampton  v.  State,  45  Tex.  154. 

3  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Vau  Etteu,  '  Huebner  v.  Eoosevelt,  7  Daly 
107  U.  S.  325.  (N.  Y.),  Ill ;  Com.  v   Hawkins,  3  Gray 

■*  State  V.  Kinley,  43  la.  294.  (Mass.),  4(J3. 

5  Sloan  V.  X.  Y.  C.  R.  Co.,  45  N.  Y. 


438 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thomp.  T:., 


tradiction,  whether  he  did  not  make  contradictory  statements  be- 
fore the  grand  jury.^  On  tlie  contrary,  it  is  held  in  another  juris- 
diction that  the  minutes  of  the  witness'  testimony  before  the 
grand  jury,  or  the  substance  of  his  testimony  taken  before  an 
examining  magistrate,  are  in  no  proper  sense, the  writing  or  the 
act  of  the  witness,  and  consequently  that  such  writings  are  not 
admissible  in  evidence,  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  the  witness 
by  contradicting  him,  even  after  a  foundation  has  been  laid  by  his 
cross-examination.^  It  has  been  ruled  not  competent  to  ask  a 
witness  as  to  what  he  had  sworn  to  on  a  former  occasion,  with  a 
view  to  impeach  him,  where  his  testimony  on  the  former  occa- 
sion was  not  admissible  in  evidence.^  This  holding  was  er- 
roneously supposed  to  fall  within  the  rule  that  a  witness  cannot  be 
examined  upon  coZ?a^era/  w«/^erswitha  view  to  his  impeachment.* 

§  504.  Former  Testimony,  how  Proved.  —  Where  the  former 
testimony  is  in  the  form  of  a  deposition,  subscribed  and  sworn 


1  Bressler  v.  People  (Ill.)>  8  Crim, 
Law  Mag.  466;  s.  c.  117  111.  422;  Bur- 
dik  V.  Hunt,  43  Ind.  382,  389.  The 
court  say:  'It  has  beeu  more  than 
once  decided  by  this  court  that  the 
oath  of  grand  jurors  to  keep  their  pro- 
ceedings secret,  does  not  prevent  the 
public  or  an  individual,  from  proving 
by  one  of  the  jurors,  what  passed  be- 
fore the  grand  jury."  Burnham  v. 
Hatfield,  5  Blackf.  (Ind.)  21;  Shat- 
tuck  V.  State,  11  Ind.  473.  The  court 
also  hold  that  the  statute  of  that  State, 
prescribing,  as  a  part  of  the  grand 
juror's  oath,  "  that  you  will  not  dis- 
close any  evidence  given  or  proceed- 
ings had  before  the  grand  jury"  (2 
Gav.  &  Ilyrd.  Ind.  Stat.  386,  form  56) 
was  not  intended  to  change  the  pre- 
viously existing  rule  on  this  subject. 

^  State  V.  Hayden,  45  la.  11, 13.  In 
so  holding  Mr.  Justice  Rothrock,  in 
giving  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said : 
"The  witness  is  in  no  way  connected 
with  the  act  of  taking  tliese  minutes 
of  his  testimony;  tliey  are  not  required 


to  be  read  over  to  him  nor  to  be  signed 
by  him.  Unlike  a  deposition  or  affida- 
vit, they  do  not  purport  to  give  state- 
ments of  fact  in  full,  but  are  what  the 
law  requires, —  *  mere  minutes.'  They 
are  often  taken  down  by  persons 
wholly  inexperienced  in  reducing  the 
language  of  others  to  writing.  A  long 
experience  upon  the  District  Bench 
has  enabled  the  writer  hereof  to  ob- 
serve that  the  evidence  taken  before 
grand  juries  is  often  of  the  most  in- 
definite and  uncertain  character,  and 
if  used  as  the  means  of  impeaching 
witnesses,  would  lead  to  the  grossest 
Injustice  to  witnesses,  and  tend  to 
defeat  a  proper  administration  of  jus- 
tice." In  State  v.  Hull,  26  la.  292  and 
State  V.  Collins,  32  la.  36,  the  ques- 
tion above  decided  had  been  left  un- 
determined. In  State  v.  Ostrander,  18 
la.  435,  it  is  held  that  the  minutes 
taken  before  tlie  grand  jury  are  not 
admissil)le  as  independent  evidence. 

3  Mltchum  V.  State,  II  Ga.  615,  616. 

4  Ante,  §  469. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XIX.]       INDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  439 

to  by  the  witness,  that  is  undoubtedly  the  best  evidence.^  On  the 
trial  of  an  indictment  for  murder,  the  dejyosition  of  a  witness, 
given  before  the  coroner's  jury,  and  certified  and  returned  by 
the  coroner  to  the  trial  court,  as  required  by  statute,  is  admis- 
sible in  evidence,  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting  the  statement 
of  a  witness,  made  under  oath,  on  the  trial  of  the  person  accused 
of  having  murdered  the  deceased. ^  The  testimony  of  a  witness 
at  a  former  trial  may  be  also  proved  by  any  one  who  heard  and 
recollects  it.  The  fact  that  there  was  a  legally  appointed  sten- 
ographer present  at  the  former  trial,  who  took  notes  of  the  testi- 
mony, and  who  could  give  better  evidence  of  it  than  a  witness 
who  heard  it  could  from  his  recollection,  does  not  exclude  the 
testimony  of  such  other  witness.  There  is  no  rule  of  law  which 
makes  a  stenographer  the  only  competent  witness  in  such  a  case, 
and  the  rule  which  requires  the  production  of  the  best  evidence 
is  not  applicable.  Walton,  J.,  said:  "  Nothing  more  is  intended 
by  that  rule  than  that  evidence  which  is  merely  substitutionary 
in  its  nature  shall  not  be  received,  so  long  as  the  original  evidence 
can  be  had.  It  does  not  allow  secondary  evidence  to  be  substi- 
tuted for  that  which  is  primary.  It  will  not  permit  the  contents 
of  a  deed,  or  other  written  instrument,  to  be  proved  by  parol, 
when  the  instrument  can  be  produced.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  choice  of  ivitnesses.  It  never  excludes  a  witness  upon  the 
ground  that  another  is  more  credible  or  reliable."^  It  is  not 
error  to  refuse  to  allow  a  transcribed  phonograpJiic  report  of  the 
testimony  of  a  witness,  given  on  a  former  trial,  to  be  read,  for  the 
purpose  of  contradicting  him,  unless  the  legislature  has  declared 
that  -  such  report  shall  be  evidence.  The  reason  is  that  such 
stenographic  reports  are  not  seen  by  the  witness,  and  that  they 
may  be  fair  and  truthful  reports  of  the  testimony  of  the  witness, 
and  may  not.  They  are  merely  in  the  nature  oi  private  meraor- 
anda^  taken  for  the  convenience  of  the  parties,  and  are  in  no 
sense  a  deposition^  unless  made  such  by  statute.*     But  the  rule 

•  Compare  «H<e,  §  48G.  Compare   Com.    v.    Hawkius,    3   Gray 

2  People  V.  Ueviiie,44:  Cal.  452,  459;  (IMass.),  463. 
Rex  V.  Oldroyd,  1  Riiss.  &  Ry.  C.  C.  88  ;  3  state  v.  McDonald,  65  Me.  4G6. 

Stephens    v.   People,    19     N.   Y.    549.  <  Phares  v.  Barber,  61  111.  272,  276. 


440  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I  Thoilip.   Tr., 

is  different,  where  the  testimony  has  been  taken  down  by  a  com- 
missioner and  duly  certified  by  him,  although  not  read  over  by 
the  witness  before  signing.^ 

§  505.  Proving  the  Contradictory  Statements  in  other 
Cases. — In  a  casein  Connecticut  it  is  said  by  Pardee,  J.,  in 
giving  the  opinion  of  the  court:  "  The  party  offering  proof  con- 
cerning these  variant  statements,  is  not  only  permitted,  but  is 
bound  to  give  so  much  of  the  conversation,  in  connection  with 
which  they  are  said  to  have  been  made,  as  will  enable  the  triers 
to  know  both  their  form  and  meaning."  ^  The  deposition  of  the 
person  with  whom  the  alleged  conversation  took  place  is  admis- 
sible to  impeach  the  witness,  notwithstanding  it  was  taken  under 
a  commission,  at  the  execution  of  which  the  witness  sought  to  be 
impeached  was  not  examined.^  It  is  said  to  be  a  matter  of  dis- 
cretion  with  the  trial  court,  whether  testimony  contradicting  the 
statement  which  the  plaintiff 's  witness  has  made  on  cross-exami- 
nation, will  be  brought  in  before  the  plaintiff  rests,  or  called  later, 
after  the  plaintiff  has  rested.^ 

§  506.  Rule  where  the  Witness  admits  such  Statements.  — 

Where  the  witness  admits  the  statement  which  he  is  alleged  to 
have  made  out  of  court,  no  other  proof  of  his  having  made  it  is 
allowable.^ 

§   507.  What  if  Witness  says  he  does  not  Remember. —  It  is 

competent  to  impeach  a  witness,  in  a  criminal  case,  by  proof  of 
contradictory  statements,  made  by  him  on  a  previous  examination 
touching  the  same  matter,  although,  when  cross-examined  as  to 
such  statements  for  the  purpose  of  laying  a  predicate  for  his 
impeachment,  he  answers  that  he  "  does  not  remember  "  whether 
he  made  the  contradictory  statements  or  not.^     A  witness  can- 

1  Ecker  v.  McAllister,  45  Md.  291.  ■■  Lishtfoot  v.  People,  16  Mich.  507, 

2  Beardsley   v.  Wiklmau,  41    Coiui.  512;  State  v.    Tickel,  13  Nev.  502,  508. 
515.  «  Payne  v.  State,  60  Ala.  80,  86.     It 

3  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  seems  that  the  cases  upon  this  point 
39  Md.  329,  354.  have    not    been  uniform.     It   seems 

■*  Wilder  v.  Peabody,  21   Hun  (X.      from   statements  made  by  Phillips  in 
Y.),  370,  378.  his  work  on  evidence  (2  Phil.  Ev.  (5th 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XIX.]       INDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT. 


441 


not,  bj  answering  that  he  has  no  recollection  of  having  made  the 
former  statement  imputed  to  him,  defeat  the  right  of  the  im- 
peaching party  to  prove  that  he  did  make  such  statement. ^  For 
like  reasons,  where  the  witness  neither  admits  nor  denies,  on  his 
cross-examination,  that  he  has  made  a  certain  declaration,  or 
given  certain  testimony,  contrary  to  that  which  he  has  given  on 
the  witness  stand,  tlie  adverse  party  may,  by  subsequent  testi- 
mony, prove  the  fact.^ 

§   508.  Answer  categorically  and  explain  on  Re-exaniina- 

tion. —  Where,  on  cross-examination,  for  the  purpose  of  rebuttal 
and  discrediting  a  witness,  he  is  asked  if  he  did  not  give  certain 
different  testimony  on  a  former  examination,  he  must  answer 
categorically.  If  he  wishes  to  explain  wliat  he  did  say,  or  to 
explain  any  other  matter  touching  his  former  testimony,  he  may 
be  allowed  to  do  so  on  re-direct  examination. "^ 


Am.  ed.)  960),  that  on  one  occasion 
Chief  Justice  Tindal  said  that  he 
had  "never  heard  sucli  evidence 
admitted  in  contradiction  except 
wliere  the  witness  liad  expressly  de- 
nied the  statement,"  and  rejected  the 
evidence,  and  that  Lord  Abinger,  C.  B., 
had  expressed  a  similar  opinion.  But 
Baron  Parke  in  a  case  before  him,  held 
that  contradictory  statements  of  the 
witness  could  be  introduced  to  im- 
peach his  evidence,  although,  in 
order  to  lay  a  foundation  for  them  and 
to  enable  the  witness  to  explain  them 
(and  some  believe  for  that  purpose 
only),  "the  witness  must  be  asked 
whether  he  ever  said  what  is  suggested 
to  him,  with  the  name  of  the  person 
to  whom  or  in  whose  presence  he  had 
said  it,  or  some  other  circumstance 
sufficient  to  designate  the  particular 
occasion.  If  the  witness  *  *  *  ad- 
mits the  conversation  imputed  to  him, 
there  is  no  necessity  to  give  further 
evidence  of  it;  but,  if  he  says  he  does 


not  recollect,  that  is  not  an  admission 
and  you  may  give  n\  evidence  on  the 
other  side  to  prove  that  the  witness  did 
say  what  was  imputed,  always  sup- 
posing the  statements  to  be  relevant 
to  the  matter  in  issue."  In  Alabama 
Mr.  Justice  Manning  said:  "  We  agree 
with  Mr.  Phillips  that  the  ruling  of 
Baron  Parke  is  the  most  sound  and 
fittest  to  be  followed.  If  the  rule  were 
otherwise,  it  might  happen  that,  under 
the  pretense  of  not  remembering,  a 
witness,  who  has  made  a  false  state- 
ment, and  knows  it  to  be  false,  would 
escape  contradiction  and  exposure." 
Payne  v.  State,  GO  Ala.  80,  89.  See 
also  Holbrook  v.  Holbrook,  30  Vt. 
433. 

1  Ray  V.  Bell,  2-t  111.  Ui,  451 ;  Nute 
V.  Nute,  41  N.  H.  GO. 

2  Bressler  v.   People  (111.) ,  8  Crim. 
Law  Mag.  4GG;  s.  c.  117  111.  422. 

*  Bressler  v.  People  (111.),  8  Grim. 
Law  Mag.  4GG;  s.  c.  117  111.  422. 


442  EXAMiNATiox  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr. , 

§  509.  Impeachment  of  Married  Woman  by  Evidence  op  Conspi- 
racy BY  Husband.  —  It  has  been  held  that,  where  a  married  woman 
testifies  as  a  witness  for  the  prosecution  in  a  criminal  case,  the  defend- 
ant cannot,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  her  credibility,  introduce  tes- 
timony tending  to  prove  a  conspiracy  on  the  part  of  her  husband  to 
obtain  his  property  by  falsely  prosecuting  him.  The  court,  speaking 
through  McKinstry,  J.,  say:  "  There  is  nothing  in  the  relation  of  hus- 
band and  wife  from  which  it  can  be  inferred  that  the  latter  is  a  party  to 
an  offense  committed  by  the  former,  or  which  directly  tends  to  prove  her 
a  party.  Proof  of  the  relationship  alone  would  not  make  a  case  to  go  to 
the  jury  against  a  wife,  however  strong  the  case  against  the  husband. 
The  offer  of  defendant  was  properly  rejected,  there  being  no  statement 
therein  of  the  existence  of  such  evidence  of  complicity  on  the  part  of  the 
witness  in  the  alleged  conspiracy,  as  would  have  justified  a  court,  if  the 
witness  had  been  on  trial  for  the  crime,  in  submitting  the  question  of 
guilt  to  the  jury."  ^  The  conclusion  of  the  court  is  more  than  doubt- 
ful. The  question  is  entirely  different  from  the  question  which  would 
be  presented  if  the  married  woman  were  thus  on  trial  for  a  conspiracy. 
She  would  be  surrounded  with  a  presumption  of  innocence,  and  it 
would,  on  the  plainest  principles,  be  necessary  to  make  a  case  against 
her  by  proof,  not  merely  by  such  proof  as  might  raise  a  remote  infer- 
ence as  to  her  complicity,  but  by  proof  overthrowing  the  presumption 
of  innocence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  But  where  a  man  is  prose- 
cuted for  a  crime  —  in  the  particular  case,  the  crime  of  rape,  —  and  a 
married  woman  appears  as  a  witness  against  him,  the  fact  that  her 
husband  has  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  obtain  his  property  by  the  co- 
ercion of  a  criminal  prosecution,  may  well  be  considered  as  affecting 
the  credibility  of  the  wife ;  since  wives  are  known  to  be  in  constant  as- 
sociation with  their  husbands  and  under  their  influence  and  coercion. 
Every  intelligent  juror  would  give  weight  to  such  evidence. 

§  510.  Recalling  Opponent's  Witness  to  put  Impeaching" 
Questions. — Where  the  defendant  on  a  criminal  trial  recalled 
a  witness  and  put  to  him  questions  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching 
him,  it  was  held  error  to  exclude  the  questions  on  the  ground 
that,  by  recalling  the  witness,  the  defendant  had  made  him  his 
own  witness.^  On  this  subject  it  is  said  by  Prof.  Greenleaf: 
"  Whether,  when  a  party  is  once  entitled  to  cross-examine  a  wit- 
ness, this  right  continues  through  all  the  subsequent  stages  of 

»  People  V.  Parton,  49  Cal.  G32,  G37.  2  gtiite  v.  Jones,  64  Mo.  391,  396. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cb.  XIX.]       IXDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  443 

the  cause,  so  that  if  the  party  should  afterwards  recall  the  same 
witness,  to  prove  a  part  of  his  own  case,  he  may  interrogate  him 
by  leading  questions,  and  treat  him  as  the  witness  of  the  party 
who  first  adduced  him,  is  also  a  question  upon  which  different 
opinions  have  been  held.  Upon  the  general  ground  on  which 
this  course  of  examination  is  permitted  at  all,  namely,  that  every 
witness  is  supposed  to  be  inclined  most  favorably  towards  the 
party  calling  him,  there  would  seem  to  l)e  no  impropriety  in 
treating  him,  throughout  the  trial,  as  the  witness  of  the  party 
who  first  caused  him  to  be  summoned  and  sworn."  ^ 

§  511.  Impeachment  of  One's  Own  Witness.  —  The  general 
rule  on  this  subject  is,  that  a  party  cannot  impeach  a  witness 
whom  he  has  called  himself,  either  by  proving  that  his  character 
for  veracity  is  bad,  or  by  proving  that  he  has  made  declarations 
out  of  court  contradictory  to  those  made  by  him  on  the  witness 
stand  ;^  but  it  is  always  competent,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting 
the  credibility  of  a  witness,  to  show  that  he  is  more  favorable  to 
the  opposite  party  than  to  the  jtarty  calling  him.^  Some  of  the 
cases  assert  the  hard  ground  that  a  party  cannot  be  allowed  to 
discredit  a  witness  called  by  him,  in  any  degree,  even  when  the 
witness  has,  been  also  called  by  the  opposite  party ,  and  the  dis- 
crediting testimony  relates  solely  to  facts  drawn  out  by  him.* 
The  reason  of  the  rule  is,  that  the  party  has  given  credit  to  the 
witness  by  presenting  him  to  the  court,  and  that  he  ought  not  to 
have  the  privilege  of  accepting  the  testimony  if  it  be  for  him, 
and  rejecting  it  if  it  be  against  him.*  Thus,  a  party  calling  a 
witness  cannot  show,  for  the  purpose  of  discrediting  him,  that  he 
has  conspired  to  extort  money  from  the  parties  in  interest  on  the 
side  in  behalf  of  which  he  has  been  called.** 


1  1  Greenl.  Ev,,  §  447.  179;    Swett  v.   Shumway,    102    Mass. 

2  People  V.  Safford,  5  Deuio  (N.  365,  309;  Geary  u.  People,  22  Mich.  221. 
Y.)  112;  Thompsou  v.  Blauchard,  4  *  Com.  «.  Hudson,  11  Gray  (Mass.), 
N=  Y.  303,  311;    Coulter  v.   American  G4;  Craig  v.  Grant,  6  Mich.  447. 

&c,  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  585,  589;  Sissou  v.  ^  1   Greenl.  Ev.,  §442;    Coulter    v. 

Conger,  1  Thomp.  &C.  (N.Y.)  5G4,  568.  American  &c.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  585,  589. 

2  .Jones  V.  People,  2  Colo.  351,  358;  ^  Sissou  v.  Conger,  1  Thomp.  &  C. 

Batdorf  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  61   Pa.  St.  (N.  Y.)  5G4,  568. 


444  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tl'., 

§  512.  Exception  where  the  Party  is  Surprised  or  Entrapped 
by  the  Witness. —  An  exception  to  this  rule  has  been  admitted, 
where  the  party  calling  the  witness  has  been  surprised  by  the  tes- 
timony of  the  witness  on  the  stand, —  as  where  the  witness,  after, 
taking  the  stand,  testifies  differently  from  the  statements  which 
he  had  made  before  the  trial,  concerning  the  facts,  to  the  party  call- 
ing him  as  a  witness.  In  such  a  case,  on  grounds  of  obvious  jus- 
tice, the  party  is  not  concluded  by  the  treacherous  conduct  of  his 
witness,  but  is  allowed  to  show  contrary  declarations  made  by  the 
witness.  ^  The  party  may  contradict  his  own  witness  by  showing 
that  he  has  made,  at  other  times,  statements  inconsistent  loith  his 
testimony/;  but  he  cannot  do  this  without  first  calling  his  atten- 
tion to  the  circumstances  and  occasion  of  the  supposed  state- 
ments ;  they  can  under  no  circumstances  be  used  as  substan- 
tive evidence  to  support  the  party's  case.^  In  Alabama  a  party 
may  ask  his  own  witness  w'hether  he  has  not,  on  a  former  occa- 
sion, made  statements  inconsistent  with  his  testimony  on  the 
trial. '^  But  "it  is  not,"  said  McCay,  J.,  in  Georgia,  "sufiicient 
that  he  shall  have  made  contradictory  statements ;  such  state- 
ments must  have  deceived  and  led  the  complaining  party  to  in- 
troduce him,  and  thus  unwittingly  to  have  been  damaged  by 
statements  different  from  what  he  expected.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances, the  law  permits  a  party  to  violate  that  salutary  rule 
which  assumes  that  one  who  brings  a  witness  before  a  court 
has  at  least  confidence  in  his  truthfulness . "  *  The  strict  rule ,  1  hat 
a  party  who  brings  a  witness  into  court  to  testify,  even  as  to  a 
single  point,  vouches  for  his  credibility,  and  cannot  thereafter 
discredit  him,  even  though  he  is  called  by  the  other  party  to  tes- 
tify as  to  other  matters,  has  in  many  cases  worked  such  injustice 
that  it  has  been  broken  into  in  some  jurisdictions  by  statute.^ 
In  one  jurisdiction,  under  a  statute,**  even  direct  impeachment  is 
permitted  under  such  circumstances.^ 

1  1  Greenl.  Ev.    §444,  note  1;  Mel-  3  Campbell  v.  State,  23  Ala.  44,  V6;. 

huish  V.  Collier,  19  L.  J.  (Q.  B.)  493;  Hemius^way  v.  Garth,  51  Ala.  530. 
People  V.Jacobs,   49   Cal.    384;    (lis-  ^  McDauiel  «.  State,  53  Ga.  253. 

tiuguishing  Com.   v.   Welsh,    4   Gray  ^  Mass.  Stat.  1869,  chap.  425. 

(Mass.),  535.  «  Georgia  Code,  1873,  §3809. 

2  Newell  w.  Homer,120  Mass.  277, 283.  ^  Skipper  v.  State,  59  Ga.  66. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XIX.]       INDIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  '  445 

§  513.  Exception  IN  THE  Case  OF  a  Hostile  Witness. —  In  Colo- 
rado, an  exception  to  the  rule  has  been  admitted,  so  as  to  allow  the  party 
calling  the  witness  to  prove  that  he  has  previously  made  statements  in- 
consistent with  his  testimony  on  the  witness  stand,  delivered  at  the  in- 
stance of  the  opposite  2^arty.  In  so  holding,  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Hallett 
said :  "  When  applied  to  testimon}"  called  out  hy  the  party  who  seeks 
to  discredit  the  witness,  the  reason  is  of  great  force  ;  but  it  has  little  ap- 
plication to  testimony  drawn  from  the  same  witness  by  the  opposite 
party.  B3'  bringing  a  witness  into  court,  the  party  vouches  for  his 
general  character  for  truth,  and  for  the  truth  of  his  statements  in  re- 
gard to  the  particular  matter  of  which  he  inquires.  Further  than  this, 
neither  the  reason  of  the  rule,  nor  the  policy  of  the  law  can  besafel}''  ex- 
tended. Even  as  to  the  matter  as  to  which  the  witness  is  interrogated, 
if  he  declares  against  the  party  calling  him,  it  is  still  open  to  proof  by 
the  testimony  of  other  witnesses.  It  is  obvious  that  a  party  may  be 
willing  to  accept  the  testimony  of  a  witness  on  one  point,  while  he  would 
be  utterly  unwilling  to  accept  his  testimony  upon  another  point ;  and  it 
is  equally  plain  that  a  witness  may  testify  trul}'  as  to  one  fact,  and  un- 
truly as  to  another.  If,  by  calling  a  witness  to  prove  a  single  fact,  a 
party  shall  be  held  to  affirm  his  truthfulness  absolutely  and  in  all 
things,  the  rule  would  appear  to  be  a  hard  one.  It  is  often  necessary 
for  a  party  to  call  his  adversary,  or  a  witness  who  is  hostile  to  him, 
and  who  is  a  principal  witness  for  his  adversary,  to  prove  a  single  fact. 
And  if  in  such  case  the  witness  is  subsequently  called  by  the  opposite 
party,  justice  requires  that  the  party  first  calling  him  should  be  per- 
mitted to  show  the  interest  or  hostility  of  the  witness,  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  the  latter  is  unworthy  of  belief  generally,  but 
that  he  is  more  favorable  to  one  part}^  than  to  the  otlier."  ^ 

§  514.  Assailing  Credit  of  Witness  called  by  both  Part- 
ies.—  When,  therefore  a  witness  had  been  called  in  a  criminal 
trial  by  both  parties,  it  was  held  competent  for  the  government 
to  ask  him  whether,  in  relation  to  the  matters  as  to  which  he  had 
testified  on  behalf  of  the  defendant,  he  had  not  given  a  different 
account  at  another  time  and  place.  The  evidence  was  regarded 
as  admissible,  because  it  had  a  tendency  to  prove  that  the 
witness  was  more  favorable  to  the  prisoner  than  to  the  govern- 
ment.^ 

^  Joues  V.  People,  2  Colo.  351,357.  -  Jones   r.  People,  5  Colo.  351,  355. 


446  .  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  515.  Contradicting' the  Statements  of  One's  Own  Witness. — 

The  rule  does  not  extend  so  far  that  the  party  is  estopped  by  the 
statements  of  his  witness.  He  is  not  conclusively  bound  by  them. 
While  he  may  not  impeach  the  character  of  his  witness  for 
veracity,  or  interrogate  him  as  to  contradictory  statements  pre- 
viously made  by  him,  or  interrogate  him  with  a  view  to  affect 
his  credibility  merely,  or  introduce  other  evidence  for  that  pur- 
pose,—  he  may,  nevertheless,  contradict  him  as  to  a  fact  mate- 
rial in  the  case,  although  the  effect  of  such  contradictory 
evidence  may  be  to  discredit  him ;  but  he  cannot  introduce  such 
evidence  when  it  is  only  material  in  so  far  as  it  bears  upon  his 
credibility.  In  other  words,  contradiction  is  allowed,  though 
impeachment,  direct  or  indirect,  is  not.^ 

1  Skipper  v.   State,    59  Ga.  63,  66;  Coulter  U.American  &c.  Co.,  56  N.  Y. 

Mechanics'  Bank   v.  Kawls,  7  Ga.  191,  585,  589;  Sisson  v.  Conger,  1  Thomp. 

198,  199;    Burklialter  v.  Edwards,  16  &  C.  (N.  Y.)  564,  568. 
Ga.   593;     1  Greenl.   Ev.,    §   442,  443; 


Titn  III,  Ch.  XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  447 


CHAPTER     XX. 

OF  DIRECT  IMPEACHMENT. 
Section 
620.  Preliminary. 

521.  Error  to  Exclude  Competent  Impeaching  Testimony. 

522.  Impeachment  by  Evidence  of  Bad  Character. 

523.  By  Evidence  of  Bad  Cliaractcr  for  Veracity. 

624.  Specific  Acts  not  Inquired  into. 

625.  Character  of  Female  Witness  for  Chastity. 
520.  Limitations  as  to  Time  and  Place. 

527.  Extent  of  the  Reputation. 

528.  Reputation  Defined. 

629.  Mode  of  Examining  the  Impeaching  "Witness. 

530.  [Continued.]     Of  Cross-examination. 

531.  What  Interrogatories  after  Foundation  laid. 

532.  Whether  Impeaching  Witness  would  Believe  the  Impeached  Witness  on 

Oath. 

533.  Reason  of  the  Rule  which  Admits  this  Question. 
534:.   Reason  of  the  Opposing  Rule. 

635    Impeaching  by  Pi'oof  of  Conviction  of  a  Felony   or  other    Infamous 
Crime. 

536.  By  Evidence  that  the  Witness  is  of  a  Defective  Mind  or  Memory. 

537.  Inadmissible  Modes  of  Impeaching. 

§  520.  Preliminary.  —  Having  concluded  the  subject  of  in- 
direct impeachment,  that  is,  of  impeachment  by  proof  of  contra- 
dictory declarations  or  statements,  let  us  next  consider  the  modes 
in  which  a  witness  may  be  subjected  to  what  is  termed  direct 
impeachment.  We  find  that  this  maybe  done  in  three  ways: 
1.  By  proof  of  bad  character  for  veracity,  or  in  some  jurisdic- 
tions, of  general  bad  character.  2.  By  proof  that  the  witness 
has  been  convicted  of  a  felony  or  other  infamous  crime.  3.  By 
proof  that  the  witness  is  of  defective  memory,  or  is  otherwise 
mentally  infirm,  in  such  a  sense  as  to  disqualify  him  as  a  witness 
or  impair  his  credibility.  It  is  said  in  Illinois  by  Mr.  Justice 
Craig,  following  a  dictum  of  Starkie,^  that  the  general  rule  as 

i  2  Stark.  Ev.  (9th  ed.)  364.  ' 


448  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoinp.  Tl*., 

to  the  admissibility  of  evidence  of  the  moral  character  and  con- 
duct of  a  person  in  society,  confines  such  proof  to  three  classes, 
namely:  1.  To  afford  a  presumption  that  a  particular  party  has, 
or  has  not  been  guilty  of  a  criminal  act.  2.  To  affect  the 
damages  in  particular  cases,  where  their  amount  depends  upon 
the  character  and  conduct  of  any  individual.  3.  To  impeach  and 
confirm  the  character  of  a  witness. ^  With  the  last  we  have  now 
to  deal. 

§  521.  Error  to  Exclude  Competent  Iinpeacliiiig  Testi- 
mony. —  Where  competent  impeaching  testimony  is  seasonably 
offered,  it  is  error  to  exclude  it,  for  which  error  a  judgment  will 
be  reversed ;  ^  though  a  neiu  trial  will  not  be  granted  merely  be- 
cause the  unsuccessful  party  has  discovered  new  or  additional  im- 
peaching testimony.'^ 

§  522.   Impeachment  by  Evidence  of  bad  Character.  —  In 

some  jurisdictions,  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  a  witness,  it  is 
competent  to  prove,  by  testimony  of  other  witnesses,  that  his 
general  character  or  reputation  is  bad,  in  the  community  where 
he  resides  or  has  recently  resided.*  Where  this  doctrine  pre- 
vails, the  inquiry  extends  to  the  general  moral  character  of  the 
witness,^  and  it  is  proper  to  interrogate  the  impeaching  witness 
thus:  "Do  you  know  the  defendant's  general  character  in  the 
neighborhood  where  he  lives,  for  truth  and  veracity,  honesty, 
chastity  and  morality?  "  ^ 

1  Berclell  v.  Berdell,  80  111.  604,  607.  Teese  v.  Huutiugdou,  23  Hotv.  (U.  S.) 

estate  v.  Thomas  (lud.),  10  West.  2.     By  statute   in    Indiana,    "In     all 

Rep.  808.  questions  affecting  the  credibility  of  a 

^  Porter  t\  State,  2  Ind.  435;    State  witness,  his  general  moral  character 

V.  Clark,  K!  Ind.  97 ;  Jackson  v.  Sharpe,  may  be  given  in  evidence."     Ind.  Acts 

29  Ind.  167.  1881,  pages  157,  158;  Crim.  Code  Ind., 

■*  State  V.  Shields,  13  Mo.  236;  Day  §  230;    Morrison   v.  Slate,  76  Ind.  335. 

V.  State,  13  Mo.  422;   State  v.  Hamil-  This  rule  has  been  introduced  in  yl?-- 

ton,  55  Mo.  420;   State  r.  Breeden,  58  kansas   by   statute.     Gautt  Ark.  Stat., 

Mo.    507;    State    v.   Clinton,   67    Mo.  §  2524;  Majors  ■??.  State,  29  Ark.  112. 
380;    s.   c.  29    Am.    Rep.    506.     Upon  ^  gtate  r.  Breeden,  58  Mo.  507. 

the  question  whether  the   inquiry  ex-  ^  State  v.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380;  s.  c. 

tends  in  ordinary  cases  to  the  char-  29  Am.  Rep.  506.     In    California  the 

acter  of  the  witness  for  morality,  see  statutory  rule  in  civil  cases  is  as  fol- 

the  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Clifford  in  lows:  "A  witness  maybe  impeached 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  449 

§  523.   By  Evidence   of  bad  Character    for    Veracity.  —  In 

other  jurisdictions  the  inquiry  is  confined  to  the  character  of  the 
witness  for  veracity.^ 

§  524.  Specific  Acts  not  Inquired  into.  — Under  either  rule, 
the  evidence  is  confined  to  the  general  character  of  the  witness, 
or  to  his  general  character  for  veracity.  Particular  acts  cannot 
be  gone  into  ;  since  this  would  raise  a  multiplicity  of  issues 
which  the  party  callini^  the  witness  cannot  be  expected  to  be 
prepared  to  meet,  and  which  could  serve  no  other  purpose  than 
to  distract  the  attention  of  the  jury  from  the  main  issue. ^  Thus, 
it  is  not  competent  to  impeach  a  witness  by  proving  that  he 
has  lied  on  other  occasions.^  But  when  sustaining  testimony 
as  to  general  reputation  is  given  by  a  witness,  it  seems  to  be 
the  rule  that,  on  his  cross-examination,  with  the  view  to  lessen 
the  effect  of  his  testimony,  or  to  show  a  bias  in  favor  of  the  party 
who  has  called  him,  but  not  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the 
particular  facts, —  the  witness  may  be  asked  whether  he  has  not 
heard  reports  which  tend  to  contradict  the  purport  and  effect  of 
his  testimony.'*  A  person  who  states  that  he  has  no  knowledge 
of  the  general  character  of  a  witness,  save  only  as  connected 
with  "some  alleged  frauds,"  is  not  competent  as  an  impeaching 
witness.^ 

bythe  party  against  whom  he  is  called,  .Johns.  (N.   Y.)    505;  Rex  v.   Hemp,  5 

by  contradictory  evidence,  or  by  evi-  Carr.  &  P.  4G8.     See  also  Harrington 

dence  that  his  general  reputation  for  v.  Lincoln,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  133.     Car- 

truth,  honesty   or  integrity  \s   bad,  but  penter  v.  Blake,    10  Hun  (N.    Y.),358; 

not  by  evidence  of  particular  wrong-  Bakemau  v.  Rose,  14  Wend.    (N.  Y.) 

ful  acts,  except  that  it  may  be  shown  110;  Corning  v.  Corning,  (J  N.  Y.  104; 

bythe  cross-examination  of  the  wit-  Fox  v.  Com.  (Ky.),  1  S.  W.  Rep.  396; 

ness,  or  the  record  of  the  judgment,  Leverich    v.     Frank,    6    Ore.    212;    1 

that  he  has  been  convicted  of  a  fel-  Greenl.      Ev.,    §   4C1;    Wehrkamp    v. 

ony."     Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  2051.  Willett,   4    Abb.  App.    Dec.    (N.    Y.) 

1  Fry   V.  Bank,  11   HI.  373;  Dimick  548. 

V.   Do^^Tis,  82  111.  570,  573;  Rudsill  v.  3  Com.    v.  Ford,  130  Mass.  CA;  s.  c. 

Slingerlaud,  18  Minn.  380.  39  Am.  Rep.  426. 

2  Douglas  V.  Taussey,  2  Wend.  *  Carpenter  v.  Blake,  10  Hun 
(N.  Y)352;  Com.  u.  Moore,  3  Pick.  (N.Y.),  358;  Leonard  z?.  Allen,  11  Cush. 
(Mass.)  194;  Curtis  v.  Fay,  37  Barb.  (Mass.)  241;  Rex  v.  Martin,  6  C.  &  P. 
(X.  Y.)   69;  Rex    v.  Rudge,  2  Peake  562. 

N.  P.  Cas.,  232;  Jackson  v.  Lewis,  13  ^  Sorrelle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  535. 

29 


450 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thom[).   Tl'., 


§  525.   Character  of    Female  Witness  for    Chastity.  —  An 

exception  to  the  rule  which  ignores  evidence  of  immorality  for 
the  purpose  of  impeachment,  is  made  in  cases  where  men  are  in- 
dicted for  sexual  offenses  against  women.  Thus,  in  cases  of  rape, 
or  assault  with  intent  to  commit  rape,  the  inquiry  as  to  the  rep- 
utation of  the  prosecutrix  is  not  confined  to  veracity,  but  ex- 
tends to  her  chastity.^  Yet  the  general  holding  of  the  courts 
is  that  evidence  of  sexual  prostitution  is  not  admissible  to  im- 
peach a  witness,  or  to  affect  his  or  her  credit  in  any  other  class 
of  cases,2  though  there  is  some  opinion  to  the  contrary.^ 

§  526.  Limitations  as  to  Time  and  Place. — The  inquiry 
must  in  general  be  restricted  to  the  community  in  which  the 
witness  resides  or  has  recently  resided.^  But  this  rule  is  not 
imperative ;  the  inquiry  may  be  extended  to  general  reputation 
at  'A  former  period  and  in  another  neigJiborltood,  if  it  be  not  too 
remote  in  point  of  time.^  The  general  effect  of  the  decis- 
ions is  that  the   inquiry   should  relate    to    a    period    of    time 


1  Pleasants  v.  State,  15  Ark.  ()52. 

2  Diinick  v.  [Downs,  82  111.  570, 
573;  Bakeman  v.  Rose,  18  Wencl.  (N. 
Y.)  14:8;  Spears  v.  Forrests,  15  Vt. 
435;  Com.  v.  Churchill,  11  Mete. 
(Mass.)  538;  Evans  v.  Smith,  5  T.  B. 
Men.  (Ky.)  3(;3. 

3  It  has  been  held  that  a  witness 
testifying  in  an  action  for  slander,  for 
calling  her  a  thief,  could  not  be  im- 
peached by  giving  in  evidence  a  letter 
written  by  her  to  another  person  con- 
taining lauguage  which  would  indi- 
cate that  she  was  unchaste,  and  such  a 
letter  was  properly  excluded.  This 
was  ruled  under  a  statute  (Ore.  Civ. 
Code,  §  830)  which  recites  that  "a 
witness  may  be  impeached  by  contra- 
dictory evidence,  or  by  evidence  that 
his  general  reputation  for  truth  is 
bad,  or  that  his  moral  character  is 
such  as  to  render  him  unworthy  of 
belief,  but  not  by  evidence  of  particu- 


lar wrongful  acts."  Leverichv.  Frank, 
6  Ore.  212.  But  the  conclusion  of  the 
court  was  rested  on  the  ground  that 
the  effect  of  introducing  the  letter 
would  be  to  attempt  to  impeach  the 
character  of  the  witness  by  evidence 
of  particular  acts  of  immorality. 

"  Marion  v.  State  (Neb.),  29  N.  W. 
Rep.  911. 

5  Brown  v.  Leuhrs,  1  Bradw.  (111.) 
74;  Teese  v.  Huntingdon,  23  How. 
(U.  S.)  14;  Holmes  I?.  Stateler,  17  111. 
453;  State  v.  Lanier,  79  N.  C,  622; 
Com.  i;.  Billings,  97  Mass.  407;  Rath- 
bun  V.  Ross,  4(i  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  127; 
Sleeper  v.  Van  Middlesworth,  4  Denio 
(N.  Y.),'431;  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §§141, 
142.  Compare  Willard  v.  Goodenough, 
30  Vt.  393;  Luther  v.  Skeen,  8  Jones  L. 
(N.  C),  350;  State  v.  Speight,  (;9  N.  C. 
72;  State  v.  Parks,  3  Ircd.  L.  (N.  C). 
29(5;  State  v.  0'Neale,4  Ired.  L.  (N.C.) 
88;  Stratton  v.  State,  45  Ind.  408 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  451 

near  the  time  of  the  trial.  Unless  some  little  latitude  is  al- 
lowed, it  has  been  well  said  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  im- 
peach the  most  corrupt,  or  to  sustain  the  most  truthful  witness.^ 
The  obvious  reason  is  that  reputation  is  a  thing  of  slow  growth ; 
it  is  not  formed  in  a  day,  nor  is  it  suddenly  changed  in  a  day. 
Accordingly,  it  has  been  said  that  it  is  competent  for  the  parties 
to  give  evidence  of  the  character  of  a  witness  within  a  reasonable 
time  before  the  trial. ^  Another  court,  relapsing  into  a  poetical 
vein,  has  suggested  that  the  former  character  of  the  witness  is 
relevant  only  "  as  it  blends  with  the  continuous  web  of  life  and 
tinges  its  present  texture."  ^  Again,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
the  period  of  time  to  Avhich  the  inquiry  may  be  extended  is,  to 
some  extent,  at  least,  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court.*  In  a 
case  of  bastardy,  it  was  held  incompetent  to  prove  the  character 
of  the  prosecuti'ix  for  chastity  at  a  period  prior  to  the  begetting 
of  the  child. ^  In  another  case  the  same  court  held  that  the  in- 
quiry could  not  be  extended  back  to  a  period  of  Jive  years  before 
the  time  of  the  trial ;^  and  where  an  attempt  was  made  to  im- 
peach a  witness  by  evidence  of  statements  made  out  of  court, 
in  conflict  with  his  testimony  on  the  trial,  and  evidence 
had  been  given  of  the  good  character  of  the  witness, — it 
was  held  not  error  to  admit  testimony  that  his  character  was 
also  good  tiuo  years  before,  in  a  different  neighborhood.'^ 
Another  court  has  ruled  that  evidence  of  bad  reputation  for 
veracity,  four  years  previous  to  the  trial,  may  be  admitted  to 
impeach  a  witness  who  has  no  lixed  domicile,  who  has  been  out 
of  the  State  over  a  year  of  this  time,  and  whose  residence  at  the 
place  of  such  reputation  was  as  long  as  at  any  other  place.  In 
such  a  case  it  is  not  improper  to  allow  a  larger  range  of  inquiry 
than  would  be  proper  where  there  has  been  a  more  fixed  domi- 

1  Stratton    v.    State,   45  lud.    468,  ^  Walkers     v.     State,     6      Blackf. 
472.  (lud.)   1. 

2  Ibid.    473.      Compare    Aurora    v.  *  Rucker  v.  Beaty,  3  Ind.  70.     Cora- 
Cobb,  21  Ind.  492,  510.  pare  King    v.    Kearsey,    2    lud.    402. 

*  Willard  v.   Goodeuough,   30  Vt.  Chauce  v.  ludiauapolis  &c.  R.    Co.,   32 

393.  lud.  472. 

•*  Stratton    v.   State,   45    Ind.    468,  '  Stratton  v.  State,  45  lud.  468. 

473. 


452  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

cile.^  In  another  jurisdiction  it  has  been  held  that  evidence  of 
the  reputation  of  the  witness  for  truth  and  veracity  at  a  different 
pkice  of  residence,  and  at  a  period  of  time,  tivo  years^  and  even 
seven  years,^  before  the  trial,  is  admissible  for  the  purpose  of 
impeaching  him.*  In  an  important  case  in  Michigan  it  was  laid 
down  by  Campbell,  J.,  speaking  for  the  court:  "  Where  an  im- 
peached witness  has  changed  his  domicile,  there  appears  to  be 
no  objection  to  showing  his  reputation  in  both  places,  within  a 
reasonable  limit  of  time.  But,  as  the  only  object  is  to  know 
whether  he  is  to  be  believed  at  the  time  when  he  testifies,  a  wit- 
ness knowing  his  reputation  tJien,  should  state  that  knowledge, 
although  he  may  also  be  authorized,  in  addition,  to  show  what 
his  reputation  had  been  elsewhere  before.'''  ^ 

§  527.  Extent  of  the  Reputation.  — It  is  not  competent  to 
show  what  two  or  three  persons  only  may  say  concerning  the 
witness  sought  to  be  impeached,  but  the  inquiry  should  extend 
to  the  general  estimation  in  which  he  is  held  by  his  neighbors 
iind  acquaintances.^  But  a  witness  is  competent  to  speak  of  the 
general  character  of  another  witness,  without  being  able  to  say 
that  he  knows  what  a  majority  of  the  neighbors  of  such   other 

1  Keator  v.  People,  32  Mich.  484.  moteness,  but  is  it  not  still  light?  The 
("Compare  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich,  remoteness  of  time  and  place  are  also 
173.  circumstances  and  facts  to  "which,  or- 

2  Lawson  v.  State,  82  Ark.  220.  dinarily,   under    proper   instructions, 

3  Snow  V.  Grace,  29  Ark.  131.  the  jury  will  give  due  weight.     If  this 

4  In  so  holding  it  was  reasoned  by  sort  of  testimony  is  to  be  admitted  at 
Williams,  Sp.  J. :  '*  That  the  repata-  all,  it  would  be  difficult  to  draw  the 
tion  a  witness  has  for  truth  is  a  mere  line  and  say  when  it  —  the  evidence  of 
circumstance,  which  the  rules  of  law  reputation  —  ceases  to  be  fact  and  be- 
allow  to  be  considered  by  the  jury,  to  comes  a  question  of  law."  At  the 
aid  them  in  determining  the  degree  of  same  time  it  is  admitted  that  there  are 
credit  to  be  given  the  witness,  and  is  cases  where  the  testimony  would  be 
purely  a  question  of  fact.  If  so,  does  so  remote  as  to  time  that  the  court,  in 
not  reputation  at  some  other  time  than  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  might 
that  of    testifying,   and    some    other  exclude  it. 

place  than  that  of  the  then  residence,  ^  Hamilton  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173, 

equally  tend  to  shed  light  upon  the  188. 

question  of  credit?     The  light  may  be  **  Matthewson  v.  Burr,  G   Neb.  312. 
dim  and  flickering  on  account  of  re- 


Tit.   Iir,   Ch.  XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  453 

witness  have  said  about  him  or  thought  of  him.     The  reason  is, 
that  "  it  may  so  happen  that  a  man  has  a  reputation,  well  estab- 
lished, either  good  or  bad,  and  yet  a  majority  of  his  neighbors 
may    never    have     spoken    upon    the    subject,     or    expressed 
their  thoughts  in  any  manner  Avhatever."     Again,  "  there  may 
not  have  been  a  majority  who  have  expressed  an  opinion  to  the 
witness  ;  nor  may  he  be  able  to  say  with  positive  knowledge  what 
the  majority  think  ;  nor  may  he  have  heard  any  one  else  say  what 
a  majority  said  or  thought;   and  yet  he  may  himself  be  com- 
petent to  swear  what  his  general  reputation  is.     A  person's  posi- 
tion in  the  community  may  be  so  obscure  that  very  few  of  his 
neighbors  know  anything  of  him.     His  general  character  may  be 
very  circumscribed.     To  hold  that  he  could  not  prove  his  general 
character,  except  by  witnesses  who  could  swear  as  to  what  the 
majority  of  his  neighbors  said  and  thought  of  him,  would.be  to 
deprive  him  of  the  benefit  of  this  species  of  testimony."  i     But 
the  production  of  one  loitnexs  only  to  prove  the  fact,  would  not 
usually  be  satisfactory,    although  the  law  does  not  fix  any  re- 
quired number. 2 

§  528.  Reputation  Defined.—  In  a  case  in  Iowa,  several  witnesses 
were  introduced  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  another  witness.  The 
court  instructed  the  impeaching  witness,  before  allowing  them  to 
testify,  that  a  man's  reputation  for  truth  and  veracity  is  what  the  per- 
sons who  deal  and  associate  with  him  say  about  him.  The  Supreme 
Court  did  not  approve  this  definition.  Adams,  J.,  said :  "This  defini- 
tion, we  think,  is  not  broad  enough.  A  man's  reputation  for  veracity 
IS  what  is  said  of  him  in  the  community  in  which  he  lives.  Those  who 
deal  and  associate  with  him  may  say  nothing  about  his  veracitv,  while 
theremamder  of  the  community  may  regard  and  speak  of  him  as  a  no- 
torious liar."  3 

§  529.     Mode  of  Examining    Impeaching   Witnesses.  —  It 

is  necessary  here,  as  in    many  other    cases,  to   lay  a  foundation 

'  Dav-e    V.    State,  22  Ala.   23,    38;  3  Dance   v.    McBride,    43    la.    624 

Eobinson  v.  State,  16  Fla.  835,  839.  629. 

2  Wafford  r .  State,  44  Tex.  439. 


454  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

for  the  introduction  of  evidence  of  the  reputation  of  the  witness 
sought  to  be  impeached,  before  such  evidence  can  be  introduced. 
Thus,  it  is  necessary  for  the  impeaching  witness  to  show  that  he 
has  lived  in  the  same  comnmnity  with,  or  knows  the  reputation 
of  the  witness  sought  to  be  impeached,  or  of  the  party  whose 
character  is  in  question;  and  until  this  is  shown,  it  is  not  proper 
to  interrogate  him  on  the  subject.^  It  is  competent  to  ask  the 
impeaching  witness  what  is  the  general  rejnifation  of  the  im- 
peached witness  for  truth,  instead  of  asking  him  what  is  the 
general  character  of  such  witness  for  truth.  "  It  is  true,"  said 
Mr.  Justice  Strong,  "  that  in  many  cases  it  has  been  said  that 
the  regular  mode  of  cross-examining  is  to  inquire  whether  the 
witness  knows  the  general  character  of  the  person  whom  it  is  in- 
tended to  impeach ;  but  in  all  such  cases  the  word  '  character  '  is 
used  as  synonymous  with  '  reputation.'  What  is  wanted  is  the 
common  opinion,  that  in  which  there  is  general  concurrence,  — 
in  other  words,  general  reputation  or  character  attributed.  That 
is  presumed  to  be  indicative  of  actual  character,  and  hence  it  is 
regarded  as  of  importance  when  the  credibility  of  a  witness  is  in 
question."^  It  is  not  enough  that  the  impeaching  witness  pro- 
fesses merely  to  state  7vhat  he  has  heard  others  say ;  for  these 
others  may  be  but  few.  He  must  be  able  to  state  what  is  gen- 
erally said  of  the  person,  by  those  among  whom  he  dwells,  or 
with  whom  he  is  chiefly  conversant;  for  it  is  this  only  that  con- 
stitutes his  general  reputation  or  character.  Ordinarily ,  the  wit- 
ness ought  himself  to  come  from  the  neighborhood  of  the  person 
whose  character  is  in  question.  If  he  is  a  stranger,  sent  thither 
by  the  adverse  party  to  learn  his  character,  he  will  not  be  allowed 
to  testify  as  to  the  result  of  his  inquiries."^  Where  the  im- 
peaching witness  was  asked  whether  "  he  knew  the  general  char- 
acter of  the  defendant  in  his  neighborhood,  yrom  rumor, '^  and 
answered  that  he  did,  and  that  it  was  bad,  it  was  held  that  the 
question  should  not  have  been  allowed.  ^ 

1  People  V.  Eodriijjo  (Cal.),  8  Crim.  ^  Sorrelle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  534,  539. 
Law  Mag.  503.                                                 reaffirmed  iu  Hadjo  v.  Goodeu,  13  Ala* 

2  Knode  v.  Williamsou,  17  Wall.  (U.      718,  721. 

S.)  580,  588.  ^  Haley  v.  State,  03  Ala.  83. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  455 

§  530.  [Continued.]  Cross-examining  him.  — Where  a  witness  had 
testified  as  to  the  reputation  of  another  for  veracity,  it  was  held 
error  to  exclude,  on  cross-examination,  the  questions:  "  Wliat  makes 
reputation?'^  and  "  What  is  reputation?''  The  testimony  seems  to 
have  been  excluded  under  the  idea  that  it  called  for  a  conclusion  of  law ; 
but  the  court  held  that  this  could  not  be  so,  since,  if  reputation  were  a 
conclusion  of  law,  the  witness  ought  not  to  have  been  called  to  prove 
reputation  at  all.  The  court  said:  "  The  reputation  of  a  party  in  his 
neighborhood  is  not  a  conclusion  of  law,  it  is  a  fact ;  but  it  is  one  about 
which  many  honest  and  well  meaning  witnesses  have  mistaken  or  im- 
perfect conceptions.  *  *  *  Itseemstous  that,  after  the  appellee's  wit- 
ness had  testified  in  chief  that  he  knew  the  general  reputation  of  the 
appellee  in  his  neighborhood,  the  appellant  had  the  right,  clearly  and 
unquestionably^  to  cross-examine  him  as  to  his  means  of  knowledge,  and, 
to  that  end,  to  inquire  of  him  what  constituted  reputation.  In  our 
opinion  the  court  erred  in  sustaining  the  appellee's  objection  to  the 
questions  above  set  out,  propounded  by  the  appellant."  ^ 

§    531.  AVhat  Interrogatories  after  Foundation  laid.  — If  a 

witness  testifies  that  lie  knows  the  reputation,  or  reputation  for 
veracity,  of  the  impeached  witness  in  the  neighborhood  where  he 
lives,  this  may  be  followed  up  with  the  question  whether  that 
reputation  is  good  or  bad ;  and  if  the  witness  answers  that  it  is 
bad,  by  the  question  whether,  from  that  reputation,  the  impeach- 
ing witness  would  believe  him  under  oath.^  The  opposite  party, 
then,  upon  cross-examination,  will  have  the  opportunity  of  ascer- 
taining the  extent  of  the  information  of  the  witness  and  the 
sources  of  his  knowledge.^  The  following  form  of  qyestion  is 
sanctioned  by  the  authority  of  Lord  Ellenborough:  "  Have  you 
the  means  of  knowing  what  the  general  character  of  the  witness 

i  Hutts    V.    Hutts,    G2     lud.     215,  been    ruled    that,    where    a    witness, 

224.  called  to  sustaiu  an  impeached  witness, 

2  Kobinson  v.  State,  IG  Fla.  835,  states,  on  his  direct  examination,  that 
840.  Compare  Crabtree  v.  Hageu-  he  has  heard  the  character  of  the  wit- 
baugh,  25  111.  233 ;  Boon  v.  Weathered,  ness  spoken  against,  —  it  is  admissible 
23  Tex.  675;  Sorrelle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  for  the  party  calling  him  to  ask  him  to 
534;  Hadjor.  Gooden,  13  Ala.  718,  721.  give  the  names  of  the  parties  referred 
See  next  section,  to  by  him.    Bakeman^7.  Rose,  18  Wend. 

3  Robinson  v.  State,  sxipra.     It  has  (N.  Y.)  146. 


456 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.        [1  TllOIlip.   Tr., 


is;   and  from  such   knowledge   of  his   general  character,  would 
you  believe  him  on  his  oath?  "  ^ 

§  532.  Whether  the  'impeaching  Witness  would  believe 
Impeached  Witness  on  Oath.  —  Contrary  to  the  erroneous  text 
of  Greenleaf,'^  the  English,^  and  prevailing  American  rule  is, 
that  it  is  competent  to  ask  the  impeaching  witness  whether,  from 
his  knowledge  of  the  reputation  of  the  impeached  witness,  or  his 
knowledge  of  the  reputation  of  the  latter  for  veracity,*  he  would 
believe  him  on  oath.^ 

§  533.  Reason  OF  the  Rule  which  admits  this  Question.  — The  ex- 
istence of  this  rule  is  an  undisputed  branch  of  legal  doctrine,  and  the 
reasons  upon  which  it  is  founded  were  thus  stated  at  length  in  an  opin- 
ion of  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan  by  Mr.  Justice  Campbell: 
"  The  purpose  of  any  inquiry  into  the  character  of  a  witness  is  to  enable 
the  jury  to  determine  whether  he  is  to  be  believed  on  oath.  Evidence 
of  his  reputation  would  be  irrelevant  for  any  other  purpose,  and  a  rep- 
utation which  would  not  affect  a  witness  so  far  as  to  touch  his  credibil- 
ity under  oath,  could  have  no  proper  influence.  The  English  text- 
boolvs  and  authorities  have  always,  and  without  exception,  required  the 
testimony  to  be  given  directly  on  this  issue.  The  questions  put  to  the 
impeaching  and  supporting  witnesses  relate,  first,  to  their  knowledge  of 


1  Mawson  v.  Hartsink,  4:  Esp.  102; 
recommeuded  by  Senator  Tracy  in 
Bakeman  v.  Rose,  18  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
146,  151;  and  by  Collier,  C.  J.,  in  Sor- 
relle  v.  Craig,  9  Ala.  534,  539. 

2  1  Greenl.  Ev.  §  4(51. 

3  1  Stark.  Ev.  237  eJ  seg;  2  Phill. 
Ev.  (Edward's  Edition)  955,  958;  Reg. 
V.  Brown,  L.  R.  1  Cr.  Cas.  Res.  70. 

*  According  to  the  rule  prevailing  in 
the  particular  jurisdiction.  Ante  §§ 
522,  523. 

fi  Adams  v.  Greenwich  Ins.  Co.,  70 
N.Y.  1G6, 170;  People  W.Davis, 21  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  309;  Hamilton  v.  People, 
29  Mich.  173;  Keator  v.  People,  32 
Mich.  484;  Uhl  v.  Com.,  6  Gratt. 
(Va.)     70G;      People     v.     Mather,    4 


Wend.  (N.  Y.)  229;  People  v.  Rector, 
19  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  569;  People  v. 
Davis,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  309;  Titus  v. 
Ash,  24  N.  H.  319;  Bogle  v.  Kreitzer, 
46  Pa.  St.  465;  Lyman  y.  Philadelphia, 
56  Pa.  St.  488;  Knight  v.  House,  29 
Md.  194;  Stevens  v.  Irwin,  12  Cal. 
306;  People  v.  Tyler,  35  Cal.  553; 
Eason  v.  Chapman,  21  111.  33;  Wilson 
V.  State,  3  Wis.  798;  Stokes  v. 
State,  18  Ga.  17;  Taylor  u.  State,  16 
Ga.  7;  Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  92;  M'Cutchen??.  M'Cutchen, 
9  Port.  (Ala.)  650;  Mobley  v.  Hamit, 
1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky. )  590;  United 
States  V.  Van  Sickle,  2  McLean  (U. 
S.),  219. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT.  457 

the  reijutation  for  truth  and  veracity  of  the  assailed  witness ;  and, 
second,  whether,  from  that  reputation,  they  would  believe  him  under 
oath.  The  only  controversy  has  been  whether  or  no  the  grounds  of  belief 
must  rest  upon,  and  be  confined  to  a  knowledge  of  reputation  for  ver- 
acity only.  But  as  to  that  the  authorities  are  harmonious.  The  reason 
given  is  that,  unless  the  impeaching  witness  is  held  to  showing  the  ex- 
tent to  which  an  evil  reputation  has  affected  a  person's  credit,  the  jury 
cannot  accurately  tell  what  the  witness  means  to  express  by  stating  that 
such  reputation  is  good  or  bad,  and  can  have  no  guide  in  weighing  his 
testimony.  And  since  it  has  become  settled  that  they  are  not  bound  to 
disregard  a  witness  entirely,  even  if  he  falsifies  in  some  matters,  it  be- 
comes still  more  important  to  know  the  extent  to  which  the  opinion  in 
his  neighborhood  has  touched  him.  It  has  also  been  commonly  observed 
that  impeaching  questions  as  to  character  are  often  misunderstood,  and 
witnesses,  in  spite  of  caution,  base  their  answer  on  bad  character  gen- 
erally, which  may  or  may  not  be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  impair  confidence 
in  testimony.  "When  the  question  of  credit  under  oath  is  distinctly 
presented,  answers  will  be  more  cautious."  i  "  The  objection  alleged 
to  such  an  answer  by  a  witness,"  continued  Campbell,  J.,  "  is  that  it 
enables  the  witness  to  substitute  his  opinion  for  that  of  the  jury ;  but 
this  is  a  fallacious  objection.  The  jury,  if  they  do  not  act  from  per- 
sonal knowledge,  cannot  understand  the  matter  at  all,  without  knowing 
the  witness'  opinion,  and  the  ground  on  which  it  is  based.  It  is  the 
same  sort  of  difficulty  which  arises  in  regard  to  insanity,  to  disposition 

1  Hamilton  i\  People,  29  Mich.  173,  declared  that  the  question  was  not 
185,180.  The  learned  judge  criticised  presented  by  the  record  for  decision, 
the  dictum  of  Prof.  Greenleaf  (1  He  also  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that 
Greenl.  Ev.  §  -liil) ,  to  the  effect  that  the  the  American  editors  of  Phillipps  and 
American  authorities  on  this  subject  Starkie  do  not  appear  to  have  dis- 
disfavored  the  English  rule;  and  covered  auy  such  conflict,  and  do  not 
stated  that,  of  the  cases  cited  by  the  allude  to  it;  whereas  they  do,  as  many 
author  in  support  of  this  doctrine,  not  decisions  do,  refer  to  the  kind  ofrepu- 
one  contained  a  decision  upon  the  iaftow  which  should  be  shown,  whether 
question,  and  only  one  contained  more  for  veracity  merely  or  for  other  moral 
than  a  passing  dictum,  not  in  auy  qualities  also.  He  also  pointed  out 
way  called  for.  The  decision  referred  that  in  Webber  v.  Hauke,  4  Mich.  198, 
to  was  Phillipps  v.  Kingfield,  19  Me.  no  question  arose  on  the  record  except 
375.  The  learned  judge  pointed  out  as  to  the  species  of  reputation,  and  the 
that  the  authorities  referred  to  in  that  neighborhood  and  time  of  its  exist- 
case  contained  no  such  decision  and  ence,  saying  that  what  was  said  fur- 
that  the  Maine  court,  after  reasoning  ther  was  not  in  the  case,  and  could 
out  the  matter  somewhat    carefully,  not  dispose  of  the  matter. 


458  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES,     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

or  temper,  to  distances  and  velocities,  and  many  other  subjects,  where 
a  witness  is  only  required  to  show  his  means  of  information,  and  then 
state  his  conclusions  or  belief  based  on  those  means.  If  six  witnesses 
are  merely  allowed  to  state  that  a  man's  reputation  is  bad,  and  as  many 
say  it  is  good,  without  being  questioned  further,  the  jury  cannot  be 
said  to  know  much  about  it.  Nor  would  any  cross-examination  be 
worth  much,  unless  it  aided  them  in  finding  out  just  how  far  each  wit- 
ness regarded  it  as  tainted."  ^  The  learned  judge  concluded  with  this 
statement:  "  Mr.  Greenleaf  himself  intimates  that  it  might  be  a  proper 
inquiry  on  cross-examination.  We  think  the  inquiry  proper,  when 
properly  confined  and  guarded,  and  not  left  to  depend  on  any  basis 
but  the  reputation  for  truth  and  veracity.  And  we  also  think  that  the. 
cross-examination  of  impeaching  or  sustaining  testimony  should  be  al- 
lowed to  be  full  and  searching. "  - 

§  534.  [Continued.]  Reasons  for  the  Opposing  Rule. — In  a 
case  in  Texas  where  the  subject  is  extensively  examined,  it  was  said  by 
Bell,  J. :  "Where  the  impeaching  witness  is  asked,  '  Whether  or  not 
he  could  believe  the  other  under  oath,'  he  is  more  likely  to  give  an  an- 
swer suggested  by  his  personal  knowledge,  or  prompted  by  his  per- 
sonal feelings,  or  his  individual  opinion,  than  he  is  when  asked 
whether  or  not  he  is  acquainted  with  the  general  reputation  of  "the 
impeached  witness  for  truth,  and  whether  it  is  good  or  bad.  If  the  im- 
peaching witness  states  that  he  is  acquainted  with  the'  general  reputa- 
tion of  the  former  witness  for  truth  in  the  community  where  he  lives, 
he  may  then  be  properly  asked  whether  that  general  reputation  is  such 
as  to  entitle  the  witness  to  credit  on  oath,  or  any  other  form  of  words 
may  be  used  which  do  not  involve  a  violation  of  the  cardinal  prin- 
ciples that  the  inquiry  must  be  restricted  to  the  general  reputation  of 
the  impeached  witness  for  truth  in  the  community  where  he  lives,  or  is 
best  known  ;  and  tliat  the  impeaching  witness  must  speak  from  gen- 
eral reputation  or  report,  and  not  from  his  own  private  opinion.  "^ 
Following  this  ruling,  it  has  been  held  proper,  where  an  impeaching 
witness  has  stated  that  he  knows  the  witness'  character  for  truth  and 
veracity  in  the  neighborhood  in  which  he  has  live  d  and  that  it  is  bad, 
to  exclude  the  further  question,  "  from  that  repu  tation  would  you  be- 
lieve him  on  oath?"  ^ 

1  TT;imiltoii  v.  People,  29  Mich.  173,  ^  Boon  v.  Wethered,  23Tex.  (;75, 686, 
ISO.  *  Marshall    v.    State,    5  Tex.   App. 

2  Ibid.  187,  188.  •  274,  2',)3. 


Tit.  Ill,   Ch.  XX.]       DIRECT    IMPEACHMENT. 


459 


§  535.  Impeachment  by  Proof  of  Conviction  of  Felony  or 
other  Infamous  Crime,  — It  is  competent,  for  the  purpose  of 
impeaching  a  witness,  to  put  in  evidence  the  record  of  a  convic- 
tion of  feh)ny  or  other  infamous  crime. ^  But  under  this  rule, 
a  witness  cannot  be  impeached  by  })roving  that  he  has  been  con- 
victed of  a  simple  misdemeanor,  such  as  assault  and  battery ,2  or 
the  violation  of  a  city  ordinance. ^  For  stronger  reasons,  the 
record  of  a  mere  complaint  or  indictment,  charging  a  crime,  is  not 
admissible,  for  this  does  not  impeach  the  Avitness;  *  since,  "  until 
convicted,  the  law  presumes  the  person  indicted  to  be  innocent 
of  the  charge."  ^  The  record  is  the  only  competent  evidence  of 
the  fact  of  such  a  conviction;  ^  though,  as  elsewhere  seen,^  the 


1  Carpenter  v.  Nixou,  5  Hill  (X.  Y.), 
200 ;  Newcomb  v.  Griswold,  24  N.  Y. 
300. 

2  By  statute  in  Indiana,  a  witness 
might  be  impeached  by  proving  by  the 
record  that  he  had  been  convicted  of 
an  infamous  crime ;  but  it  was  held 
that  this  cannot  be  done  by  show- 
ing that,  on  an  indictment  for  assault 
and  battery  -with  intent  to  commit  a 
rape,  he  had  Ijeen  convicted  of  a  simple 
assault  and  battery;  since  this  was  not 
an  infamous  crime.  Gleuu  v.  Clore, 
42  lud.  00.  As  to  what  is  an  infamous 
crime  see  Pruitt  v.  Miller,  3  Ind.  10. 

^  The  Statute  of  Ohio  provides  that, 
"  No  person  shall  be  disqualified  as  a 
witness  in  any  criminal  prosecution  by 
reason  of  his  interest  in  the  event  of 
the  same,  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  or 
by  reason  of  his  conviction  of  any 
crime;  but  such  interest  or  conviction 
may  be  sliown  for  the  purpose  of  af- 
fecting his  credibility."  66  Oh.  Laws, 
308;  Rev.  (1880),  §  7284.  It  is  held 
that  the  conviction  referred  to  in  this 
section,  which  may  be  shown  for  the 
purpose  of  affecting  the  credibility  of 
the  witness,  is  such,  aud  such  only,  as, 
before  the  enactment  of  the  section, 
would   have    disqualified   the    person 


from  testifying  as  a  witness.  Con- 
victions for  violations  of  city  ordi- 
nances never  disqualified  a  person  from 
testifying  in  auy  cause;  aud  therefore 
such  convictions  cannot  be  shown, 
under  this  section,  for  the  purpose  of 
affecting  the  credibility  of  the  wit- 
ness Coble  V.  State,  31  Oh.  St.  100. 

4  People  V.  Gay,  7  N.  Y.  378;  Lipe 
V.  Eisenlerd,  32  N.  Y.  238;  Jackson  v. 
Osljorn,  2  AVend.  (N.  Y.)  555;  West  v. 
Lynch,  7  Daly  (X.  Y.),  245. 

5  West  V.  Lynch,  supra.  Thus,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  fact  that  the 
witness  has  been  indicted  tor  forgery  or 
perjury  is  inadmissible  as  affecting  his 
character  without  proof  of  conviction 
under  the  indictments.  Jackson  v. 
Osborne,  supra. 

^  In  Georgia,  the  rule  of  law  con- 
cerning secondary  evidence  has  been 
carried  to  the  extent  of  holding  that  it 
is  not  competent  to  show,  on  the 
cross-examination  of  a  witness,  foi- 
the  purpose  of  impairing  his  testi- 
mony, that  he  had,  during  the  terra  of 
court  then  in  session,  pleaded  guilty 
to  a  criminal  offense ;  the  record  of  the 
plea  of  guilty  was  held  the  only  proper 
evidence.    Johnson  v.  State,  48  Ga.  116. 

'  Ante,  §  404.  405,  407. 


460  EXAMINATION    OF    "WITNESSES.        [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

rules  of  practice  in  some  jurisdictions  allow  such  a  question  to 
be  put  by  the.  witness  on  cross-exaDiination^  but  he  cannot  be 
contradicted  by  the  record  if  he  denies  the  fact. 

§  536.  By  Evidence  that  the  Witness  is  of  Defective  Mind 
or  Memory.  —  A  person  entirely  without  memory  is  incompetent 
as  a  witness,  and  if  his  memory  is  naturally  weak,  or  has  been 
impaired  by  disease  or  age,  his  testimony  will  naturally  have  less 
weight  with  a  jury  than  if  his  memory  is  sound  and  unimpaired. 
It  is  therefore  competent  to  give  evidence  that  the  memory  of  a 
witness  is  weak,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  testimony. ^  It 
is  not  necessary  that  such  testimony  should  be  given  by  an  ex- 
pert."^ 

§  537.  Inadmissible  Modes  of  Impeaching.  — It  is  not  ad- 
missible, for  the  purpose  of  impeaching  a  witness,  to  prove  that 
he  is  a  chronic  witness  for  particular  cases.  Thus,  in  a  late  crim- 
inal case  in  Mississippi,  in  an  indictment  for  gaming,  the  defendant 
offered  to. prove  that  a  certain  witness  for  the  State  had  already 
made,  in  the  form  of  witness  fees,  about  $20  that  week,  by  testi- 
fying for  the  State  in  several  cases.  It  was  held  that  the  court 
correctly  excluded  this  evidence.  "  Such  evidence,"  said  Cooper, 
C.  J.,  "  would  not  prove  or  tend  to  prove  that  he  ought  not  to 
be  believed."  ^  Nor  can  evidence  be  introduced  to  affect  the 
credibility  of  a  witness,  by  showing  that  he  testified  on  a  former 
trial  and  was  not  believed  by  the  jury.^ 

1  Isler  V.  Dewey,  75  N.  C.  4G6.  »  Rebecca  Lea  v.   State  (Miss.),  1 

2  Ibid.;  Clary  v.  Clary,    2  Ired.  L.       So,  Rep.  2U;  s.  c.  CA  Miss.  294. 

(N.  C.)  78;  Bailey  v.  Pool,  13  Ired.  L.  -^  Scheuck  v.  Griffin,  38  N.  J.  L.  463, 

(N.  C.)  404.  471. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBORATING   AND    SUSTAINING.  461 


CHAPTER      XXI. 

CORROBORATING  AND  SUSTAINING  WITNESSES. 

Section 

541.  Right  to  Introduce  Corroborating  Testimony. 

542.  Witness'  own  Evidence  as  to  Corroborating  Facts. 

543.  Additional  Evidence  of  tlie  Facts  Testified  to  by  tlie  Impeached  Wit- 

ness. 
644.  Where  Witnesses  are  Assailed  in  Rebuttal. 

545.  In  Cases  where  Testimony  of  a  Single  Witness  is  Insufficient. 

546.  CoiToboratiou  of  Accomplice  Testimony. 

547.  [Continued.]     Parties  to  an  Incestuous  IntercoursCo 

548.  [Continued.]     By  what  Evidence  Corroborated. 

549.  [Continued.]     By  Evidence  of  Previous  Consistent  Declarations. 

550.  [General  Rule.]     Supporting  Testimony  not  Admissible  in  Chief. 

551.  Right  to  Sustain  by  Proof  of  Good  Character. 

552.  View  that  any  Species  of  Assault  lets  in  Evidence  of  Good  Character. 

553.  [Continued.]     Reasons  for  the  foregoing  View. 

554.  Witness  Impeached  by  Contradiction,  sustained  by  Good  Character. 

555.  [Continued.]     A  Contrary  View. 

556.  Where  the  Witness  has  committed  an  Offense  which  affects  his  Char- 

acter. 

557.  [Continued.]     Contrary  and  Confusing  Views. 

558.  [Continued.]     AVhere  Third  Parties  have  Accused  tlie  Witness  of  Swear- 

ing Falsely. 

559.  Exception  in  the  Case  of  a  Subscribing  Witness  who  is  Dead. 

560.  [Continued.]     Illustration. 

561.  Exception  where  the  Witness  is  a  Stranger. 

562.  [Continued.]     Sustaining  a  Deaf  and  Dumb  Prosecutrix  in  an  Indictment 

for  Assault  with  Intent  to  Ravisli. 

563.  Laying  Foundation. 

56*.  Negative  Evidence  of  Character. 

565.  [Continued.]     Reasons  and  Illustrations. 

566.  Distance  of  Time  and  Place. 

567.  Riglit  to  Impeach  an  Impeaching  Witness, 

568.  Cross-examination  of  Sustaining  Witness. 

569.  Re-Examination. 

570.  [Georgia.]     Wliat  Sustaining  Witness  must  Swear  to. 

571.  [General  Rule.]     Declaration  out  of   Court  not  Admissible  to  Sustain 

Declaration  in  Court. 

572.  Old  Rule  that  former  Consistent  Declarations  may  be  Shown  in  Corrobo- 

ration. 


462  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp,   Tl'. , 

Section 

573.  Witness  Impeached  by  Previous  Inconsistent  Statements,  not  Sustained 

by  Evidence  of  Previous  Consistent  Statements. 

574.  Recognized  Exceptions  to  the  General  Rule. 

575.  [Continued.]     Change  of  Relation  Necessary  to  Admit  such  Evidence. 
57r..  [Another  Exception.]     Fabrication  of  Recent  Date. 

577.  [Another  Exception.]     Statements   made    Immediately  after  the  Occur- 

rence. 

578.  [Continued.]     Not  Admissible  when  made  Subsequent  to  the  Inconsist- 

ent Statements. 
570.  [Contra.]     Impeached  by  Contradictory  Statements,  Confirmed  by  Con- 
sistent Statements. 

580.  [Illustrations.]     Where  the  Witness  on  a  Previous  Occasion  testified 

less  positively. 

581.  Distinction  between  the  Case  where  the  Previous  Inconsistent  Declara- 

tions are  Established,  and  where  they  are  Left  in  Dispute. 

582.  General  Character  not  Supported  by  Previous  Declarations. 

§  541.   Right    to    Introduce     Corroborating     Testimony. — 

Where  a  witness  is  contradicted,  the  party  calling  him  lias  the 
obvious  right  to  introduce  competent  testimony  corroborating 
him,  and  no  exception  lies  to  the  hearing  of  such  testimony.^ 

§  542.   Witness'  own  Evidence  as  to  Corroborating  Facts. — 

But  a  party  cannot  support  his  own  positive  testimony  of  facts, 
stated  upon  his  own  knowledge,  by  testifying  himself  to  other 
consistent  or  corroborative  facts,  which  arc  immaterial  in  them- 
selves, and  which,  like  the  facts  sought  to  be  corroborated,  rest 
entirely  upon  his  own  oath.  "  Such  evidence,"  saidCooley,C.  J., 
"  coming  from  other  persons,  might  have  had  some  such  tend- 
ency ;  but  when  the  question  is  whether  one  fact  to  which  a  wit- 
ness testifies  is  correct,  it  can  receive  no  support  whatever  from 
his  swearins:  to  another  which,  though  consistent  with  the  first, 
must,  like  that,  rest  entirely  upon  his  own  statement."  ^         » 

§  543.  Additional  Evidence  of  the  Facts  testified  to  by  the 
Impeached  Witness.  —  Where  the  character  of  a  witness  is  im- 

1  Green  v.  Gould,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  the  purpose  of  con-oboratiug the  state- 

465.     See  also  Holbert  v.  State,  9  Tex.  ments  of  witnesses.     Buie  v.  Carver, 

App.   219.     In  an   action  to    recover  75  N.  C.  559. 

real  estate,  it  was  held  no  error  to  al-  2  Anderson  v.  Russell,  34  Midi.  109, 

low  a  deed  for  other  lands  tlian  that  in  111. 
controversy  to  be  put  in  evi(k'uce  for 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXL]     CORROBORATING  AND  sustain;ng.  463 

peached,  it  is  competent  for  the  party  calling  him  to  introduce 
further  testimony  in  support  of  the  facts  to  which  the  discredited 
witness  has  testilied.     So  held  in  a  criminal  trial,  where  one  of 
the  State's  witnesses  was  impeached  by  evidence  of  bad  char- 
acter, in  which  case  it  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  had  the  right  to 
introduce  another  witness  to  the  same  fact,  and  that  it  was  not  a 
good  objection  that  the  testimony  of  this  witness  was  not  in  re- 
buttal.^    In  1853  the  practice  was  said  to  be  in  North  Carolina, 
and,  as  the  Supreme  Court  thought,  sustained  by  good  sense,  for 
a  party  to  offer  as  many  witnesses  as  he  might  deem  necessary 
to  establish  his  allegation.     If  the  other  party  should  choose,  he 
might   rest  the  case  upon  it,  or  he  might  call  witnesses  in  his 
turn;  and  then  the  first  party  might  call  witnesses  in  reply,  and 
for  the  purpose  of  adding  to  the  strength  of  the  evidence  upon 
which  he  first  rested  his  case.     That  is  to  say,  the  party  sustain- 
ing the  burden  of  the  proof  might  call  as  many  witnesses  as  he 
might  think  necessary  to  make  out  myri ma  facie  case,  and  then, 
after  hearing  the  opposing  testimony,  if  he  should  think  it  neces- 
sary, he  might  call  other  witnesses  whose  testimony  would  sim})ly 
corroborate  that  of  his  first  witnesses.     In  support  of  this  view, 
a  remark  attributed  to  Lord  Kenyon  was  quoted  that  "it  is  not 
worth  while  to  jump  until  you  get  to  the  fence,  "  —  "  that  is," 
said  Pearson,  J.,  "there  is  no  use   of  meeting  objections  until 
they  are  presented,  or  in  piling  up  proof  until  it  is  made  neces- 
sary by  what  is  done  on  the  other  side."  2     Thus,  on  an  issue  of 
devisavit  vel  non,  the  caveator  produced  and  examined  thirteen 
witnesses,  who  testified  to  the  disputed  signature,  after  which  the 
proponent  introduced  six  witnesses,  who  swore  to  the  contrary. 
It  was  held  proper  for  the  caveator  then  to  call  his  other  witnesses 
in  support  of  those  who  had  first  testified. ^ 

§  544,  Where  Witnesses  are  Assailed  in  Rebuttal. — AVhere 
the  plaintiff,  in  rebuttal,  introduces  evidence  in  contradiction  of 
the  witnesses  of  the  defendant,   which  the  defendant  could  not 

1  John  V.  State,  16  Ga.  200.  s  Ibid. 

2  Outlaw    V.  Hurdle,   1    Jones  L. 
(N.  C.)  150. 


464  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

reasonably  have  anticipated,  which  evidence  is  offered  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  impeach  their  credibility,  the  defendant  is  entitled, 
after  the  plaintiff  has  rested,  to  support  their  credibility  by  addi- 
tional testimony.^ 

§  545.  In  Cases  where  testimony  of  Single  Witness  is  In- 
sufBcient. —  In  certain  cases  the  testimony  of  a  single  witness  is 
insufficient  to  establish  the  fact  in  issue,  and  therefore  corrobo- 
ration is  necessary,  and  unless  there  be  corroboration,  the  court 
will  direct  a  verdict  against  the  party  sustaining  the  burden  of 
proof  .^  This  happens  in  cases  of  treason,  jjerjury,  and  in  some 
others,  to  enter  upon  which  is  not  within  the  plan  of  this  work. 

§  546.  Corroboration  of  Accomplice  Testimony. — A  slight 
deviation  may,  however,  be  made  for  the  purpose  of  merely 
noticing  a  subject  of  great  interest  and  of  much  conflict  of  opin- 
ion, namely,  the  question  of  the  necessity  of  corroboration  in 
the  case  of  the  testimony  of  accomplices.  There  is  a  coiifiict 
of  oinnion  as  to  whether  a  conviction  of  crime  can  be  had  upon 
the  uncorroborated  testimony  of  an  accomplice.  The  old  En- 
glish'^ and  some  of  the  American  ^  opinion  is  to  the  effect  that  it 
can  be;  but  there  are  contrary  holdings  in  England,'^  and  the 
later  American  holdings,  founded  largely  upon  statutes,  are  also 
to  the  contrary.^     But  where  the  modern  and  more  humane  rule 

1  Wade  V.  Thayer,  40  Cal.  578.  Eeg.     v.   Magill,   Ir.    Circ.    Cas.   418. 

2  Thus,  iiiider  the  civil  code  of  There  is  a  luorft/zed  titezo  that  the  testi- 
Louisiaiia,  article  2257,  the  testimony  mouy  of  accomplices  is  admissible 
of  a  single  witness  is  not  sufficient  to  -without  corroboration,  where  they 
establish  a  contract  guaranteeing  the  have  been  kept  separate  since  their  ar- 
payments  of  the  price  of  goods  pur-  rest,  and  have  no  opportunity  to  com- 
chased  for  an  amount  exceeding  $500.  municate  with  each  otlier.  Reg.  v. 
Diclisou  V.  Sharretts,  7  La.  Ann,  54.  Aylmer,  1  Crawf.  &  D.  116. 

3  Rex  V.  Atwood,  2  Leach  C.  C.  521 ;  «  Rap.  Wit.,  §  22(i ;  citing  Marler  v. 
Jordaine  v.  Lashbrooke,  7  T.  R.  GOl,  State,  67  Ala.  55;  Lumpkin  v.  State, 
609;  Rex  v.  Jones,  2  Camp.  131;  Rex  68  Ala.  56;  People  v.  Ames,  39  Cal. 
V.  Sheehan,  Jebb  Cr.  Cas.  54.  403;  People  v.  Melvane,  39  Cal.  614; 

4  State  V.  AVolcott,  21  Conn.  272;  People  v.  Cloonan,  50  Cal.  449;  John- 
State  V.  Stebbins,  29  Conn.  463,  468;  son  r.  State,  4  Greeoie  (la.),  65;  Upton 
State  I'.  Williamson,  42  Conn.  261.  v.    State,   5    Iowa,    4(;5;    Bowling?). 

6  Eex  V.  Noakes,  5  Carr.  &  P.  326;      Commonwealth,   79  Ky.  604:  Craft  v. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXL]       CORROBORATING   AND   SUSTAINING.  465 

prevails,  it  is  conceded  that  evidence  necessary  in  order  to  cor- 
roborate the  testimony  of  an  accomplice,  so  as  to  authorize  a 
conviction  thereon,  need  not  be  of  a  conclusive  character.^  A 
statutory  rule  which  requires  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  to  be 
corroborated,  does  not  apply  to  the  testimony  of  a  feigned  ac- 
complice ^^^  and,  of  course  the  same  holding  would  apply  in  respect 
of  the  same  common-law  rule,  of  which  the  statute  is  merely 
declaratory. 

§  547.  [Continued.]  Parties  to  an  Incestuous  Intercourse.  —  It 
has  been  ruled  that  if  the  female,  with  whom  an  incestuous  intercourse 
is  alleged  to  have  been  had,  is  shown  to  have  knowingly,  voluntarily 
and  with  the  same  intent  which  actuated  the  accused,  united  with  him 
in  the  commission  of  the  offense,  she  is  an  accomplice  in  the  crime,  and 
her  uncorroborated  testimony  is  insufficient  to  support  a  conviction  of 
the  accused.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  evidence  shows  that,  in  the 
commission  of  the  incestuous  act,  she  was  the  victim  of  force,  threats, 
fraud  or  undue  influence,  so  that  she  did  not  act  voluntarily,  and  did 
not  join  in  the  commission  of  the  act  with  the  same  intent  that  actuated 
the  accused,  then  she  is  not  an  accomplice,  and  a  conviction  might  stand 
even  upon  her  uncorroborated  testimony.^ 

§  548.    [Continued.]      By  what  Evidence  Corroborated.  — 

But  it  is  nevertheless  a  rule  that  it  makes  no  difference  as  to  the 
number  of  accomplices  who  testify  without  confirmation,  since 
accomplices  cannot  corroborate  each  other.     Although  their  testi- 

Commonwealth,  80  Ky.  349;  People  v.  131,     By  §  1111  of  the  Califoruia  Penal 

Courtney,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.),  589;  People  Code,  the  evidence  which  is  necessary 

Kylaucl,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.),  568;  Lopez  v.  to  corroborate  the  testimony  of  an  ac- 

State,  34  Tex.  133;  Wright  v.  State,  43  complice  need  not  be  evidence  tending 

Tex.  170;  Nourse  v.  State,  2  Tex.  App.  to  establish  the  precise  facts  testified 

304;  Davis  t\  State,  2  Tex.  App.  588;  to  by  the  accomplice,  but  it  is  sufficient 

Eoach  V.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  4G;  Miller  if  it  tends  to  connect  the  defendant 

V.  State,   4  Tex.  App.  251 ;  Powell  v.  with  the  commission  of  the   offense. 

State,  15  Tex.  App.  441;  Dunn  v.  State,  People  v.  Cloonan,  50  Cal.  449. 
15  Tex.  App.  560;  State  v.  Howard,  32  2  people  ■;;.  Bollinger  (Cal.),  11  Pac. 

Vt.   380;  Wright    v.   State,    43    Tex.  Rep.  799. 

170.  3  Mercer  v.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  452, 

1  Best  on    Ev.,    §    171;    People   v.  465.     See  also  Freeman  v.   State,    11 

Melvane,  39  Cal.    614;   State  v.  Schla-  Tex.  App.  92;   Watson  v.  State,  9  Tex. 

ge).,  19  la.  169;  Nolan  v.  State,  19  Oh.  App.  237;  Whart.  Crim.  Ev.,  §  440. 

30 


466  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [I  Thomp.  Tr., 

mony  is  given  to  the  same  fact,  it  must  be  corroborated  by 
evidence  coming  from  an  unpolluted  source,  before  it  will  justify 
conviction,^  But  a  writing  delivered  by  one  accomplice  to  an- 
other, in  furtherance  of  the  scheme  of  crime  concocted  between 
them,  may  be  used  as  corroborating  evidence.^  And  where  an 
accomplice  testified  that  he  had  paid  a  bribe  to  the  defendant 
(on  trial  for  bribery)  by  giving  to  the  defendant  a  check  upon 
a  certain  bank,  payable  to  cash  or  bearer,  which  had  afterwards 
been  returned  by  said  bank  to  the  witness,  it  was  competent  for 
the  State,  in  corroboration,  to  show,  by  the  books  and  business 
memoranda  of  the  bank,  a  credit  to  the  defendant  for  a  like 
amount,  deposited  by  check  two  days  after  the  alleged  bribery.'^ 

§  549.   By  Evidence  of  Previous  Consistent  Declarations. — 

It  has  been  reasoned  that,  where  the  witness  is  an  accomplice, 
this  fact  alone  is  an  attack  upon  his  credibility,  and  authorizes 
the  public  prosecutor  to  prove  that  the  witness,  when  first  arrest- 
ed, had  given  the  same  relation  of  the  facts  which  he  gave  on 
the  witness  stand.*  So,  it  has  been  ruled  that,  where  a  witness 
is  called,  who,  in  the  commencement  of  his  testimony,  states 
himself  to  be  an  accomplice  of  the  accused,  it  is  regular,  before 
the  witness  is  attacked,  to  call  on  another  witness  to  prove  that 
the  first  witness  had  related  the  facts  disclosed  in  his  evidence, 
immediately  after  they  happened.^  Though,  it  is  conceded  that, 
after  the  evidence  of  the  confessed  accomplice  had  been  freed 
from  suspicion,  such  confirmatory  evidence  would  be  useless,  and 
therefore  inadmissible.^  These  holdings  are  based  on  a  view 
which,  as  we  shall  hereafter  see,^  had  a  better  foothold  in  our 
earlier,  than  in  our  later  jurisprudence,  and  are  therefore  stated 
by  the  writer  with  reserve.  In  Massachusetts,  where,  on  the 
more  general  question  of  sustaining  impeached  witnesses  by  evi- 

1  Rex  V.  Noakes,  5  Carr.  &  P.  32(i;  «  State  v.  Twitty,  2  Hawks  (N.  C), 
Reg.  V.  Magill,  Ir.  Circ.  Cas.  418.  449.    Such  evideuce  was  to  be  consid- 

2  State  V.  Kellerman,   14  Kan.    135,  ered  as  given  substantially  in  reply. 
138.  Id. 

3  State  V.  Smalls,   11  S.  C.  2(i3,  286.  6  jfji^^ 

4  People  V.  Vane,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  '  Post,  §  572. 
78. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXI.]       CORROBORATING    AND    SUSTAINING.  467 

dence  of  their  previous  consistent  declarations,  the  holdings  are 
opposed  to  those  in  North  Carolina, ^  the  following  ruling  on  this 
question  is  found:  — 

The  defendant  in  a  criminal  case,  for  the  purpose  of  impeaching 
the  testimony  of  an  accomplice,  introduced  a  letter  from  him,  admitting 
that  his  testimony  in  regard  to  the  transaction  in  controversy,  given  on 
a  former  occasion,  was  false  ;  and  the  attorney  for  the  commonwealth, 
in  order  to  show  that  the  letter  had  been  obtained  unfairly,  asked  the 
accomplice  certain  questions,  in  answer  to  which  he  testified  that  the 
letter  was  part  of  a  C3rrespondence  which  had  been  carried  on  in  jail, 
and  stated  the  means  by  which  the  correspondence  had  been  carried 
on,  the  relative  position  of  the  several  rooms,  and  the  arrangement  of 
the  prisoners  therein.  It  was  held  that  it  was  not  competent  to  call 
witnesses  to  i)rove  that  the  position  of  the  rooms  and  the  arrangement 
of  the  prisoners  therein  corresponded  with  the  account  given  by  the 
accomplice,  in  order  to  support  his  general  credit.  The  court  could 
not  perceive  how  the  circumstance  that  the  witness  told  the  truth  about 
these  public  and  common  objects,  concerning  which  he  knew  the  ])roof 
was  at  hand,  had  any  tendency  to  confirm  the  material  parts  of  his 
testimony,  involving  the  guilt  of  the  defendant.-^ 

§  550.  [General  Rule.]  Supporting-  Testimony  not  Ad- 
missible in  Chief.  —  The  general  rule  is  that  sustaining  tes- 
timony is  not  admissible  until  the  credit  of  the  witness  is 
in  some  way  impeached,  either  upon  cross-examination,  or  by 
testimony  of  other  witnesses,  and  that  mere  contradiction  amono- 
witnesses  furnishes  no  basis  for  admitting  such  evidence.^  This 
rule  has  its  aptest  illustration  in  cases  where  it  is  sought  to  sus- 
tain the  testimony  of  witnesses  by  evidence  of  their  good  charac- 
ter; 4  but  it  equally  applies  where  it  is  attempted  to  corroborate 

1  Post.  §  573.  V.  Cox,  21  lud.  15.     This  is  the  rule 

-  Com.  v.  Bosworth,22Pick.(Mass.)  uucler  the  Kentucky  Code,  §§  ()f;i-663 

397,  400.  (Bullitt's  Codes,  591-599),    Vauce  v. 

3  Auuesleyu.  Anglesea,  17  How.  St.  Vauce,   2   Mete.  v.  (Ky.)  581. 

Tr.  1348;  Fitzgerald  v.    Goff,  99  lud.  ^  People  v.  Gay,  7  N.  Y.  380;  Wil- 

28,  34;  Johusou  v.  State,  21  lud.  329;  der  v.   Peabody,   21  Hun  (N.  Y.),  376, 

Presser  v.  State  77  Ind.  274;  Brauu  v.  379;  State  v.  Ward,  49  Couu.  429,  442; 

Campbell,    86    Ind.    SK;.-    Braddee  v.  People   v.   Rector,  19   Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

Browufield,9  Watts  (Pa.),  124;  Pruitt  5C9. 


4G8  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

a  witness  by  evidence  of  his  having  made  lii'^vioiis  statements^ 
similar  to  those  delivered  on  the  witness-stand,  under  a  rule 
hereafter  considered.  The  general  rule,  therefore,  is  that  the 
evidence  which  is  usually  heard  to  sustain  a  witness  whose  credi- 
bility has  been  in  some  way  impeached,  other  than  by  mere  con- 
tradiction of  his  testimony,  cannot  be  given  in  chief. ^  Upon 
this  subject  it  has  been  well  said:  "If,  in  the  multiplicity  of 
contradictions  daily  occurring,  each  witness  was  permitted  to 
bring  other  witnesses  to  sustain  his  general  character,  and  they, 
contradicting  each  other,  should  be  permitted  to  bring  others, — 
the  whole  time  of  our  courts  would  be  taken  up  in  hearing  these 
side  questions,  until  the  matters  originally  in  litigation  would  be 
almost  lost  sight  of,  to  the  great  detriment  of  suitors."  ^ 

§  551.  Right  to  Sustain  by  Proof  of  Good  Character.  — But 

where  the  direct  impeachment  of  a  witness  is  attempted,  it  is 
always  competent  for  the  party,  whose  witness  he  is,  to  call 
other  witnesses  to  prove  that  his  character  is  good. ^  It  has  even 
been  held  that  this  may  be  done  where  the  impeaching  witness 
testifies  that  the  character  of  the  witness  assailed  is  good, — the 
view  being  that  the  mere  fact  that  his  character  is  questioned  by 
the  opposite  party,  entitles  the  party,  whose  witness  he  is,  to  sus- 
tain it.*  Where  the  plaintiff  introduv-ed  evidence  tending  to 
prove  declarations  of  the  defendant  unfavorable  to  the  charac- 
ter of  one  of  his  own  witnesses  as  to  veracity,  this  was  re- 
garded as  an  impeachment  of  the  witness'  character,  such  as 
authorized  the  defendant  to  testify  that  his  character  was  good.^ 
In  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance,  where  the  defendant's  evi- 
dence tended  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  burned  his  own  building 
and  committed  perjury  in  his  proof  of  loss,  it  was  held  that  evi- 
dence of  his  good  character  was  admissible.^ 

1  Jackson  v.   Etz,    5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)      People  v.   Rector,    19   Wend.   (N.  Y.) 
314,320;   People  v.  Vance,  12  Wend.      5G9. 

(N.  Y.)  78,  79,  per  Savage,  C.  J.  ^  Com.  v.  Ingraham,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 

2  Pruittr.  Cox,  21  Ind.  15, 16,  opin-      40. 

ion  by  Ilauna,  J.;  reaffirmed  in  Brauu  ^  Prentiss  v.  Roberts,  49  Me.  127. 

r.  Campbell,  86  Ind.  51G.  ^  j^j^^l^.y   ^.    Vermont  Mutual  Fire 

^  Clackuer  v.    State,   33  Ind.   412;      Ins.  Co.,  55  Vt.  142. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBORATING   AND    SUSTAINING.  469 

§  552.  View  that  any  Species  of  Assault  lets  in  Evidence  of 
Good  Character.  —  Some  American  courts  hold  that,  whenever 
the  character  of  a  witness  for  truth  is  attacked  in  any  way^  it  is 
competent  for  the  party  calling  him  to  give  general  evidence  of 
his  good  character  for  truth ;  and  that  it  is  immaterial  whether 
his  character  is  attacked  by  showing  that  he  has  given  accounts 
of  the  matter  out  of  court  different  from  that  given  by  him  in 
court,  or  by  cross-examination,  or  by  general  evidence  of  his 
character  for  truth. ^  This  latter  rule  has  been  applied  where  the 
motives  of  the  witness  were  assailed  on  a  severe  cross-examina- 
tion; 2  where  evidence  had  been  admitted  to  contradict  the  wit- 
ness on  an  immaterial  j)oint;^  and  even  where  an  attempt  was 
made  to  discredit  the  witness  by  disproving  material  facts  testi- 
fied to  by  him.^  Where  one  party  introduces  evidence  that  the 
witness  of  the  other  party  has  been  suborned  and  paid  for  his 
testimony,  the  party  whose  witness  is  thus  assailed  may,  in  re- 
buttal, introduce  testimony  tending  to  show  the  good  character  of 
the  witness  for  veracity.^  Another  American  court  holds 
that,  where  a  witness  testifies  to  a  material  fact,  and  the  op- 
posite party  calls  a  witness  who  contradicts  the  former  witness 
as  to  such  fact,  and  thereupon  the  former  witness  is  allowed  to 
be  sustained  by  evidence  of  good  character,  the  contradicting 
witness  may  be  so  sustained.^ 

§  553.  [Continued.]  Reasons  for  the  Foregoing  View. — In  a 
case  in  New  York,  Duer,  J. ,  while  conceding  the  rule  in  that  State  is  not 
as  last  above  stated,  said  tliat,  if  the  question  were  an  open  one,  he 
would  not  hesitate  to  hold  that  evidence  of  the  good  character  of  a 
witness  ought  to  be  admitted,  in  every  case  in  which  the  veracity  of  the 
witness,  and  not  merely  the  truth  of  his  testimony,  is  denied  by  the 

1  Paine  v.  Tilden,  20  Vt.  554;  State  peachment  by  evidence  of  previous  in- 

«.  Roe,  12  Vt.  93;  Sweet  v.  Sherman,  consistent  statements). 
21  Vt.  24;  Isler  v.  Dewey,  71  N.  C.  14;  2  Richmond  v.  Richmond,  10  Yerg. 

George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  300,  (Teun.)  343. 

315.     So  held  under  statutes :  Glaze  v.  3  Newton  v.  Jackson,  23  Ala.  335. 

Whitley,    5   Ore.    1(;4;    Richmond    v.  *  Davis   v,    State,   38   Md.  15.     See 

Richmond,    10    Yerg.     (Tenn.)     343;  also  State  u.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  493. 
Hadjo  V.   Goodeu,    13  Ala.  718    (im-  =  People  v.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  61,  64. 

«  Davis  V.  State,  38  Md.  15,  49. 


470  EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

adverse  party.  He  also  said :  "  An  attack  upon  the  moral  character  of 
a  witness  is  permitted,  because,  when  successful,  it  creates  a  probabil- 
ity that  he  has  sworn  falsely  in  the  testimony  that  he  has  given ;  and  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  an  opposite  probability  is  created,  when  the 
character  of  the  witness,  a  man  of  integrity  and  truth,  is  fully  estab- 
lished. It  therefore  seems  to  me  tliat  the  evidence  is,  in  its  nature, 
corroborative,  and  as  such,  ought  to  be  admitted  in  every  case  in  which 
intentional  falsehood,  no  matter  upon  what  ground,  is  imputed  to  a 
witness.  There  is  a  fallacy  in  the  assertion  that,  when  the  general 
character  of  a  witness  has  not  been  impeached  by  the  adverse  party,  it 
is  admitted  to  be  good.  All  that  is  admitted  is,  that  his  character  can 
not  be  shown  to  be  positively  bad ;  but  tliis  is  no  i*eason  for  excluding 
evidence  to  show  that  it  is  positively  good.  Nor  is  it  difficult  to  see 
that,  in  many  cases,  the  exclusion  of  such  evidence  may  be  a  source  of 
error  and  injustice.  The  relation  given  by  a  witness  may  be  very  im- 
probable in  itself,  j^et  perfectly  true ;  for  experience  attests  the  just- 
ness of  the  observation  that  '  truth  is  not  unfrequently  stranger  than 
fiction.'  But  it  is  obvious  that  the  improbability  of  the  relation  may 
lead  a  jury  to  discredit  a  witness  wlio,  if  it  was  clearly  proved  to  them 
that  he  was  a  man  distinguished  for  his  probity  and  strict  adherence  to 
truth,  they  would  not  hesitate  to  believe.  It  is  obvious  that  the  prob- 
ability that  he  has  sworn  truly,  arising  from  the  moral  excellence  of 
his  character,  might  very  reasonably  outweigh,  in  the  minds  of  the  jury, 
the  opposite  probability,  arising  from  the  nature  of  the  facts  to  which 
he  has  testified.  In  judging  of  the  credit  to  be  given  to  the  narrative, 
where  the  facts  are  remarkable  and  unusual,  we  are  all  of  us  governed 
by  the  knowledge  we  have,  or  the  estimate  we  have  formed,  of  the  moral 
character  of  the  person  from  whom  the  narrative  proceeds ;  and  it  is 
not  easy  to  understand  why  the  evidence  that  determines  the  judgment 
of  every  reasoning  person,  in  the  ordinary  transactions  of  life,  should 
be  withheld  from  the  consideration  of  a  jury."  ^ 

§  554.  Witness  Impeached  by  Contradiction  Sustained  by 
good  Character.  —  Some  Amoricun  courts  hold  that  witnesses, 
who  have  been  impeached  by  evidence  of  previous  contradictory 
statements  made  by  them,^  may  be  sustained  by  evidence  that  they 
are  of  good  character  for  veracity.^     But  where  the  impeaching 

1  Leouoriv.  Bishop,  4  Duer  (X.  Y.),  3  Clark  v.  Bond,  29  Ind.  555;  Haley 
420,  422.                                                           V,  State,  G3  Ala.  83;  Isler  v.  Dewey,  71 

2  Ante,  §  490.  N.  C.    14 ;    Glaze   v.  Whitley,  5   Ore. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.   XXI.]       CORROBORATING    AND    SUSTAINING.  471 

party  has  merely  laid  the  foundation  for  introducing  evidence  of 
the  .su[)posed  contradictory  statements,  but  has  not  introduced 
such  evidence,  the  party  calling  the  witness  will  have  no  right  to 
introduce  evidence  of  good  character  to  sustain  him ;  for  until 
he  is  impeached,  such  evidence  is  premature.^ 

§  555.  [Continued.]  Contrary  View. —  Many  other  Ameri- 
can courts  hold  that  evidence  of  the  good  character  of  the  wit- 
ness for  veracity  is  admissible  only  when  his  general  character, 
or  his  character  for  truth,  has  been  assailed  by  direct  evidence, 
or  by  proof  on  cross-examination  of  extrinsic  facts  going  to  his 
general  character ;  and  that  it  cannot  be  received  where  the  only 
foundation  is  inconsistencies  in  the  statements  of  the  witness  on 
cross-examination,  or  between  statements  made  by  him  on  the  wit- 
ness stand  and  statements  made  by  him  out  of  court,  or  upon  proof 
being  given  by  other  witnesses  of  material  facts  irreconcilable 
with  the  facts  proved  by  the  particular  witness ;  although  the 
necessary  consequence  of  the  proof  of  such  facts  may  be  to  im- 
jjute  fraud  or  falsehood  to  the  witness. ^ 

164;    Burrell  v.    State,  18    Tex.    713;  (N.  Y.),106.  The  statement  to  the  con- 

Paine  v.  Tildeu,  20  Vt.  554.     Compare  trary  by  Dr.  Greenleaf  (1  Greeul.  Ev., 

Harris  v.  State,  30  lud.  131;  Stratton  §  4G9)  is  iu  the  lauguage  of  a  statement 

V.  State,  45  Incl.  4(38;   State  v.  Eoe,  12  by  Mr,  Phillipps  to  which  Mr.  Phillipps 

Vt.   93;    Sweet  v.    Sherman,   21    Vt.  cites  no  authority.  Dr.  Greenleaf  cites 

23.  in  support  of  liis  statement  the  case 

1  State  V.  Cooper,  71  Mo.  436,  442.  of  Res  v.  Clarke,  2  Starkie,  241.    This 

2  People  r.  Hulse,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  does  not  bear  out  the  doctrine.  There 
300;  People  v.  Gay,  7  N.  Y.  378;  Rus-  the  prosecutrix  in  an  indictment  for 
sell  V.  Coffin,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  143;  an  assault  with  intent  to  commit  rape, 
Rogers  v.  Moore,  10  Conn.  13;  Brown  having  admitted,  on  cross-examina- 
u.  Mooers,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  451;  Hey-  tion,  that  she  had  been  sent  to  the 
wood  V.  Reed,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  574;  House  of  Correction  upon  charges  of 
AtAVOod  V.  Deai'born,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  liaving  stolen  money,  and  tliat  she  had 
483;  Boardman  v.  AYoodman,  47  N.  H.  been  admitted  into  the  Refuge  for  tlie 
120;  Braddee  v.  Browntield,  9  Destitute  and  had  remained  tliere 
Watts  (Pa.),  124;  Wertz  v.  May,  21  nearly  two  years, — it  was  held  com- 
Pa.  St.  274-,  Webb  v.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  petent  to  show  that  her  conduct,  since 
351 ;  Stamper  v.  Griffin,  12  Ga.  450,  456 ;  being  so  admitted  into  tlie  Refuge  for 
Vance  v.  Vance,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  571;  tlie  Destitute,  had  been  good.  The 
Frost  V.  McCargar,  29  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  ruling  did  not  relate  at  all  to  previous 
■617;  Chapman  v.  Cooley,  12  Rich.  L.  contradictory  statements  made  by  the 
(S.  C.)  654;   Starks  v.  People,  5  Deuio  prosecutrix. 


472  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  556.  Whore  the  Witness  has  cominittecl  an  Offense 
which  affects  his  Character. — Where,  on  cross-exainination, 
a  witness  admits,  or  where  it  is  otherwise  proved,  that  he  has 
been  convicted  of  a  crime,  or  has  committed  an  offem^e  which 
affects  his  character,  the  person  who  calls  him  is  permitted  to 
prove  that  his  general  character,  since  being  convicted  of  the 
offense,  has  been  good.^  Where  a  witness  is  impeached  by  pro- 
ducing the  record  of  his  conviction  of  a  felony  or  infamous 
crime,  it  is  not  a  new  thing  to  allow  his  character  to  be  sustained 
by  witnesses  who  testify  that  his  subsequent  character  has  been 
ffood.  This  was  allowed  bv  Lord  Holt  on  the  trial  of  Henry 
Harrison  for  murder,  in  1(392.  The  record  of  the  indictment 
and  conviction  of  a  witness  for  extortion,  was  produced  to  im- 
peach him.  Afterwards  another  witness.  Captain  Cannon,  was 
called,  who  was  asked  by  Lord  Holt  to  tell  the  court  of  what 
reputation  the  witness  was  at  the  present  time;  and  Captain 
Cannon  said:  "  My  lord,  he  is  now  of  none  of  the  clearest  repu- 
tation." 2  And  so,  where  an  attempt  was  made  to  show  that  a 
certain  witness  had  himseJf  committed  the  crime  of  which  the 
defendant  stood  charged,  and  that  he  had  by  false  testimony,  by 
his  management  of  the  case,  and  by  improperly  interfering  with 
defendant's  witnesses,  attempted  to  excidpate  himself  hy  con- 
victino;  an  innocent  man, —  it  was  held  that  evidence  of  his  o-ood 
character  for   veracity    was    admissible.     The  court  reasoned: 

1  Rex  u.  Clarke,  2  Stark.  241;  Com.  Liucolu,  s^ipra,  it  was  held  that  evi- 

??.  Green,  17  Mass.  515,   541;  Webb  v.  deuce  iutroduced  for  the  purpose  of 

State,  29  Oh.  St.  351;  Gertz  w.    Fitch-  impeaching  a  witness  to  the  effect  that 

burg  &c.  R.  Co.,    137  Mass.  77  (dis-  he  has  been  tried  for  a  crime  in  an- 

tinguishing  Harrington  v.   Lincoln,  4  other   State   does   not    authorize   the 

Gray  (Mass.)  503,  5(18.)    See  also  Com.  party  calling  the  witness  to   sustain 

V.  Ingraham,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  46.     In  his  testimony  by  evidence  of  his  good 

Russell  V.  Coffin,  8  Pick.   (Mass.)  143,  character   for    truth    and    integrity. 

154,   the   court  referred  to  this  prin-  The   question  is  not  well    reasoned, 

ciple,  with  the   observation  that  they  and  the  conclusion  seems  to  be  wrong 

did  not  ol)ject  to  it.     It  was  also  cited  in  principle;   since  such  evidence  may 

with  approval  In  Braddee  v.  Brown-  fairly  be  supposed  prejudicial  to  the 

field,  9  Watts  (Pa.),  94.     It  is  compe-  witness  in  the  minds  of  the  jui-y. 
tent  to  give  such  evidence  under  the  2  Harrison's  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr. 

California  statute.     People  ii.  Aniana-  801,  802. 
cus,    50   Cal.  233.     In  Harrington    v. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXL]       CORROBORATIXG    AND    SUSTAINING.  473 

"  While  it  is  true  evidence  cannot  be  given  to  prove  an  infamous 
crime  against  a  witness,  of  which  he  has  not  been  convicted,  for 
the  purpose  of  impeaching  his  credit,  yet  where  the  question  as 
to  whether  the  witness  is  guilty  of  such  a  crime  becomes  the 
legitimate  subject  of  inquiry  on  the  trial,  we  think  his  reputa- 
tion for  truth  ma}^  be  proved  to  rebut  any  imputation  against 
his  credit  which  the  evidence  of  guilt  makes  ag-ainst  him."  ^ 
But  in  such  a  case,  the  character  of  the  witness  may  not  be  sus- 
tained by  showing  that  he  was  in  fact  innocent^  for  the  record 
of  the  conviction  is  conclusive.'^ 

§  557.  [Continued.]  Contrary  and  Confusing  Views. —  It  is  to 
be  regretted  that  authority  is  not  uniform  on  the  question  what  species 
of  assaults  upon  the  character  of  a  witness  will  authorize  evidence  of 
good  character  to  sustain  hira.  In  a  criminal  case  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  New  York,  it  was  held  that  the  fact  that  the  witness  admits,  on 
his  cross-examination,  that  he  has  been  prosecuted  and  bound  over,  on  a 
charge  of  perjury,  will  not  authorize  the  party  calling  the  witness  to  give 
evidence  of  his  general  good  character, — the  court  reasoning  that  a  party 
can  only  give  such  evidence  when  impeaching  witnesses  have  been  called 
on  the  other  side,  and  that,  by  impeaching  witnesses  is  meant  only  such 
witnesses  as  have  spoken  to  general  character  for  truth. ^  -  -  .  . 
The  court  went  into  a  great  deal  of  learning  to  reason  itself  into  a 
conclusion  which  is  obviously  unsound  in  principle.  To  call  out,  on 
cross-examination  of  a  witness,  the  fact  that  he  has  been  prosecuted, 
though  unsuccessfully,  for  perjuiy,  would  ordinarily  prejudice  his 
character  and  testimony  in  the  minds  of  the  jury,  and  clear!}'  the 
party  calling  him  ought  to  be  allowed  thereafter  to  sustain  his  testi- 
mony by  evidence  tending  to  show  his  good  character.  -  -  -  -  Evi- 
dence tending  to  contradict  a  witness,  and  also  to  show  that  he  has 
conspired  with  the  party  calling  him,  to  cheat  and  defraud  the  opposite 
party,  does  not,  it  has  been  held  on  equally  doubtful  grounds, 
authorize  the  party  calling  him  to  introduce  evidence  of  his  character 
for  honesty,  integrity  and  moral  worth,  as  well  as  for  truth  and 
veracity 


4 


1  Webb  V.  State,  29  Oh.  St.  351,  358.  308;  s.  c.  affirmed,  7  N.  Y.  378  (Rug- 

2  Gertz  V.  Fitchburg  &c.  R.  Co.,  gles,  C.  .J.,  and  Willes,  J.,  disseiitiug.) 
137  Mass.  77;  Com.  v.  Gallagher,  12G  •*  Hey  wood  v.  Reed,  i  Gray  (Mass.), 
Mass.  54.  574. 

s  People  V.  Gay,  1  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.) 


474  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

§  558.  [Continued.]  Where  Third  Parties  have  Accused  the 
Witness  of  Swearing  Falsely. — Equally  untenable  seems  another  hold- 
ing of  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York.  A  witness'  character  for  ver- 
acity was  attacked  by  asking  him,  on  cross-examination,  whether  third 
persons  had  not  accused  him  of  swearing  falsely.  He  answered  in  the 
affirmative.  It  was  held  that  this  did  not  operate  to  let  in  evidence 
showing  that  his  character  for  truth  and  integrity  had  always  been 
good.^  The  court  reasoned  that  because  the  impeaching  evidence  was 
not  competent,  that  is,  because  the  question  put  on  cross-examination 
was  not  competent,  —  and  ought  not  to  have  been  put  and  answered,  the 
party  whose  witness  he  was,  was  thereby  cut  off  from  removing  the  dis- 
paraging effect  of  the  answer, —  and  this,  although  the  question  put  on 
cross-examination  was  objected  to  by  the  party  calling  the  witness  who 
was  thus  assailed. 

•  §  559.  Exception  in  the  Case  of  a  Subscribing- Witness  who 
is  Dead. — An  exception  to  this  rule  has  been  admitted  by  the 
English  judges,  in  the  case  where  the  subscribing  witnesses  to  a 
will,  or  one  of  them,  is  dead,  and  the  will  is  impeached  on  the 
ground  of  fraud,  —  in  which  case  they  have  admitted  evidence 
to  support  the  characters  of  such  deceased  subscribing  witnesses.^ 
In  so  holding  LordKenyon  said:  "  In  the  great  case  of  Jolliffe's 
Will,  Lord  Dudley  and  Ward,  and  other  persons,  were  examined 
as  to  the  character  of  the  person  by  whom  the  will  was  prepared ; 
and  the  legality  of  admitting  such  evidence  was  not  doubted.^ 
But  Lord  Ellenborough  justly  held  that  the  rule  has  no  applica- 
tion where  the  subscribing  witness  is  not  dead,  and  no  shade  is 
cast  upon  bis  character  by  the  evidence.^ 

§  560.  [Continued.]  Illustration. —  The  validity  of  a  will  was  im- 
peached on  the  ground  of  total  incapability  in  the  testatrix  to  make  any 
will  at  the  time  when  it  was  supposed  to  have  been  made.  The  names 
of  three  witnesses  were  regularly  subscribed,  as  attesting  its  execution. 
These  were  a  Mr.  Gale,  an  attorney  by  whom  it  was  prepared ;  one 
Re3'nolds,  liis  cleric ;   and    one  Cooperson.     The  two   former  witnesses 

1  Hannah    v.    McKellop,   49  Barb.  3  Stephenson  v.  Walker,  supra. 
(N.  Y.)  342.  *  Bishop  of  Durham  v.  Beaumont, 

2  Stephenson  v.  Walker,  4  Esp.  50;  1  Camp.  207. 
Provis  V.  Reeil,  3  Moore  &  P.  4. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBORATING   AND    SUSTAINING.  475 

were  dead.  Evidence  was  given  tending  to  show  that,  when  the  will 
was  signed,  the  testatrix  was  in  a  state  of  stupor,  and  that  the  pen  was 
guided  in  her  hand,  without  her  seeming  to  know  what  she  did.  Lord 
Kenyon  allowed  several  witnesses,  particularly  of  the  legal  profession, 
to  be  called  and  asked  as  to  the  general  character  of  Gale  and  Reynolds, 
and  whether  they  were  persons  of  good   reputation  and  likely   to    be 

guilty  of  such  conduct  as  was  imputed  to  them.^ In  another  such 

case,  imputations  having  been  cast  upon  the  character  of  the  deceased 
attorne3'by  whom  the  will  was  prepared,  and  who  was  one  of  the  attest- 
ing witnesses,  the  evidence  charging  him  with  fraud  in  the  execution 
of  the  will,  it  was  held  that  the  devisee  might  call  witnesses  to  show  his 
general  good  character.  In  so  holding,  Best,  C.  J.,  said:  "  Courts  of 
law  lay  down  principles  according  to  the  necessity  of  the  case  before 
them.  Here,  the  character  of  the  deceased  attorney,  when  attacked, 
could  only  be  protected  by  calling  witnesses  to  show  that  he  was  not 
capable  of  the  fraudulent  conduct  imputed  to  him,"  '^ 

§  561.  Exception  "Where  the  Witness  is  a  Stranger. — In  Con- 
necticut, while  the  general  rule  is  conceded  that  a  witness  cannot  be 
supported  by  evidence  of  his  general  character  for  truth,  until  after  a 
general  impeachment  of  it, — yet  an  exception  to  the  rule  has  been 
adopted  in  the  case  where  the  witness  is  in  the  situation  of  a  stranger. 
There,  they  allow  him  to  be  supported  by  evidence  of  his  general  good 
character  for  veracity,  although  it  has  not  been  impeached. ^  But  it  is 
held,  in  applying  this  exception,  that  evidence  of  his  good  character  in 
other  respects  than  veracity,  is  not  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  sus- 
taining him.* 

§562.  j  Continued,  1  Sustaininga  Deaf  and  Dumb  Prosecu- 
trix,—  Where  the  prosecutrix,  who  w^as  also  the  principal  witness 
fertile  State,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  an  assault  with  intent 
to  ravish  her,  was  a  deaf  and  dumb  person,  it  was  held  that  the 
public  prosecutor  was  entitled  to  support  her  testimony  by  evi- 
dence that  her  general  character  for  truth  was  good,  althouo-h  no 
impeachment  of  her  character  had  been  attempted ;  ^  for  one  who 

1  Stephenson  v.  Walker,  i  Esp,  20  Coiiu,  354,  oii4.  Compare  Eogers  v. 
5<J.  Moore,  10  Coun.   12. 

2  Provis  V.  Reed,  3  Moore  &  P.  *  Merriam  v.  Hartford  &c.  R.  Co,, 
4,  9.                                                                   siipi-a. 

8  Merriam  v.  Hartford  &c.  R,  Co.,  '"  State  v.  De  Wolf,  S  Couu,  93,  100. 


476  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        fl  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

could  neither  hear  nor  speak  might  well  be  regarded  as  a  stranger 
in  the  community  in  which  she  lived. 

§  563.  Laying  Foundation.  — But  here,  as  in  the  case  of  the 

examination  of  impeaching  witnesses,  before  the  sustaining  wit- 
ness can  properly  testify,  a  foundation  should  be  laid,  by  asking 
him  if  he  knows  the  general  character  of  the  witness  who  is 
assailed  (in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  inquiry  is  as  to  general 
character),  or  his  general  character  for  truth  and  veracity  (in 
those  jurisdictions  where  the  inquiry  is  thus  limited),  in  the 
community  where  he  resides  or  has  recently  resided.  Until  this 
is  done,  he  cannot  be  heard ;  ^  after  it  is  done,  he  may  be 
allowed  to  say  whether  or  not,  from  that  reputation,  he 
would  believe  the  impeached  ivitness  on  oath ;  ^  but  without 
this  foundation,  he  cannot  so  testify.^  But  where,  without  the 
asking  of  this  specific  question,  a  witness,  whose  deposition  was 
taken,  stated  that  the  general  character  of  the  impeached  witness 
was  good  and  that  he  was  entitled  to  full  credit  on  oath,  this  was 
deemed  sufficient.^ 

§  564.  Negative  Evidence  of  Character.  —  Negative  evidence 
of  character,  by  which  is  meant  that  the  witness  has  long  been 
acquainted  with  the  person  whose  character  is  in  issue  and  has 
never  heard  it  questioned,  —  is  competent,  and  it  has  been  held 
error  to  exclude  it.^  The  reason  is  that  the  fact  that  a  person's 
character  is  not  questioned  is,  on  grounds  of  common  experience, 
excellent  evidence  that  he  gives  no  occasion  for  censure,  or,  in 
other  words,  that  his  character  is  good.^ 

1  Cook  V.  Huut,  24  111.  536,  550;  18;  Taylor  u.  Smith,  16  Ga.  7,  10;  Peo- 
Clay  r.  Kobinsou,?  W.  Va.  350,  363.  pie  v.   Davis,  21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)   309, 

2  Clay    V.    Robinson,   supra;    ante,      315;  Morss  v.  Palmer,  15  Fa.  St.  51, 
_  §  532.  57;  Davis  v.  Prauke,  33  Gratt.    (Va.) 

3  Lyman  v.  Philadelphia,  56  Pa.  St.      4U. 

488,  502;  ante,  §  529.  "  State   v.  Lee,   supra,   opinion  by 

•*  McCutchen  v.  McCutcheu,  9  Port.  Berry,  J.     A  similar  reason  was  given 

(Ala.)  650;  Paine  w.Tilden,  20  Vt.  554;  by  Berkshire,  J.,  in  Lemons  v.  State, 

Sweet  V.  Sherman,  21  Vt.  23.  supra.     See  the  following  authorities, 

5  State  u.  Lee,  22  Minn.  407;  Lemony  as  showing  the  extent  to  which  the 

V.  State,  4  W.  Va.  755;  State  ?;,  Nelson,  old  rule  in  this  regard  has  been  relax- 

58  Iowa,  208;  Bucklin  v.  State,  20  Oh.  od:  Reg.  v.  Rowton,  2  Beun.  &.  II.  Cr. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBORATING    AND    SUSTAINING.  477 

§  565.  [Continued.]  Reasons  and  Illustrations.  — "A  ver^-  sen- 
sible and  commendable  instance  of  the  relaxation  of  the  old  and  strict 
rule,  is  the  reception  of  negative  evidence  of  good  character,  —  as  for 
example,  the  testimony  of  a  witness  who  swears  that  he  has  been  ac- 
quainted with  the  accused  for  a  considerable  time,  under  such  circum- 
stances that  he  would  be  more  or  less  likely  to  hear  what  was  said  about 
him,  and  has  never  heard  any  i-emark  about  his  character ;  the  fact  that 
a  person's  character  is  not  talked  about  at  all  being,  on  grounds  of 
common  experience,  excellent  evidence  that  he  gives  no  occasion 
for  censure,  or,  in  other  words,  that  his  character  is  good."  ^  In 
like  manner,  it  was  ruled  in  Pennsylvania,  that  it  is  competent  evi- 
dence in  support  of  character,  that  a  witness,  acquainted  with  the 
witness  assailed  and  living  in  his  neighborhood,  never  heard  his 
character  for  truth  spoken  against  or  questioned.  The  court,  speak- 
ing through  Rogers,  J.,  said:  "It  is  certainly  some  proof  that  a 
person  against  whom  the  tongue  of  slander  has  never  been  heard 
to  wag,  is  not  so  destitute  of  truth  and  sincerity  as  that  he  ought  not 
to  be  believed  on  his  oath.  The  evidence  is  not  easily  reconcilable 
with  the  charge  that  he  is  totally  unworthy  of  credit.  The  presumption  is, 
if  the  charge  be  true,  it  must  have  been  heard  by  those  who  lived  near, 
and  were  in  daily  intercourse  with  him.^  In  like  manner,  in  a  case  in 
New  York,  where  the  sustaining  witness  testified  that  he  had  never  heard 
the  character  of  the  impeached  witness  for  truth  and  veracity  spoken  of, 
but  who  also  testified  that  he  knew  the  witness  and  the  persons  with 
whom  he  associated, — it  was  held  that  he  might  properly  be  asked  whether 
he  would  believe  the  impeached  witness  on  oath.  Nelson,  C.  J.,  said: 
' '  If  such  a  question  might  not  be  permitted,  the  most  respectable  man 
in  the  community  might  fail  in  being  supported,  if  his  character  for 
truth  should  happen  to  be  attacked.  Living  all  his  life  above  suspicion, 
his  truth  would  rarely  be  the  subject  of  remark.  A  neighbor  might  be 
obliged  to  admit,  as  in  this  case,  that  he  had  never  heard  it  spoken  of, 

Cas.  333  and  note;  Gaudolfo  v.  State,  him  uuworthy  of  credit  on  his  oath, 
11  Oh.  St.  11-t;  1  Tayl.  Ev.  (8tli  ed.),  before  he  can  give  his  own  declaration 
§350;  1  Bish.  Cr.  Proc,  §  4S9.  But  that,  from  his  cliaracter,  he  would  not 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Georgia  believe  him  under  oath."  Artope  v. 
Code  (Ga.  Code  1873,  §§  3873,  3874),  it  Goodall,  53  Ga.  318,  324. 
is  held  that  "  if  the  sustaining  witness  ^  State  v.  Lee,  22  Minn.  407,  409, 
is  not  able  to  say  that  the  general  opinion  by  Berry,  J.  To  the  same  doc- 
character  of  the  impeached  witness  is  trine  see  Gandolfo  v.  State,  11  Ohio 
not  bad,  he  should  at  least  be  required  St.  114,  117. 
to  state  that  it  is  not  such  as  to  render  -  Morss  v.  Palmer,  15  Pa.  St.,  51, 57, 


478  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

and  yet  undoubtedly  be  competent  to  sustain  him."  ^  The  same  view- 
has  been  taken  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia,  in  an  opinion  in  which 
it  is  said :  "  Certainly,  the  sort  of  silent  respect  and  consideration  with 
which  one  is  treated  and  received  by  those  who  know  him,  is  some  in- 
dex of  what  they  think  of  him  as  a  man  of  veracity.  And,  indeed,  if 
he  is  a  person  whom  they  think  very  highly  of,  that  is  about  the  only 
index.  The  character  for  truth  of  such  person  is  never  discussed  — 
questioned  —  spoken  of.  To  discuss,  question,  or  even  perhaps 
to  speak  of  one's  reputation  for  truth,  is  to  admit  that  two  opinions 
are  possible  on  the  point.  Suppose  the  question  were,  what  was  the 
character  of  Washington  among  his  neighbors  for  truth,  could  the 
answer  be  anything  but  this :  '  I  never  heard  it  questioned  —  discuss- 
ed—  spoken  of;  and  yet  I  know  it  to  have  been  excellent.'  "  ^  It  was 
therefore  held  that  the  testimony  of  witnesses  to  the  effect  that  they 
were  acquainted  with  the  character  of  the  impeached  witness  for  truth 
in  their  neighborhood,  and  that  from  their  acquaintance,  thence 
derived,  they  would  believe  him  on  his  oath,  although  they  had  never 
heard  his  character  spoken  of,  was  proper  to  be  considered  by  the  jury.^ 
So,  in  a  civil  case  in  Virginia,  a  witness  was  asked  whether  he  knew  the 
general  character  of  the  plaintiff  for  truth  and  veracity.  He  replied 
that  he  had  known  the  plaintiff  six  or  seven  years,  and  knew  his  gen- 
eral character  for  truth  and  veracity  as  we'll  as  any  other  man's  char- 
acter against  whom  he  had  never  heard  anything  alleged,  and  that  he 
had  never  heard  his  character  called  in  question.  It  was  likewise  held 
that  this  was  proper  evidence  to  go  to  the  jury. ^ 

§  566.  Distance  of  Time  and  Place.  —  It  has  been  ruled  that 
evidence  in  support  of  the  character  of  an  assailed  witness  need 
not  be  confined  to  the  same  neighborhood,  or  to  the  same  time 
spoken  of  by  the  assailing  witness,  but  that  the  party  attempting 
to  sustain  the  witness  may  prove  his  character  for  veracity  years 
previously,  and  in  a  different  county,  in  which  he  has  resided. 
The  reasons  in  support  of  this  conclusion  were  thus  stated  by 
Rogers,  J.:  "It  is  contended  that  the  testimony  in  support  of 
character  must  take  no  wider  range,  but  must  be  confined  to  the 

1  People  V.  Davis,  21  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  3  ji)i^_ 

309,315.  *  Davis  v.  Frauke,  33  Gratt.   (Va.> 

3  Taylor    v.    Smith,    IG  G:i.    7,    10,  414. 
opinioa  by  Beuulug,  J. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XXI.]       CORROBORATING   AND    SUSTAINING.  479 

same  neighborhood  and  the  same  time.  It  must  be  observed  that 
witnesses  have  rights,  as  well  as  parties.  It  is  too  often  the  case 
that  they  are  set  up  as  marks  to  be  shot  at,  and  sometimes  are 
compelled  to  defend  themselves  against  sudden  ruthless  assaults, 
of  which  they  had  no  previous  notice.  However,  a  correct  and 
proper  rule  has  been  adopted,  that  greater  latitude  is  allowed  in 
support,  than  in  attacking  character.^  *  *  *  j^  ^j-^^  party 
making  the  assault  is  allowed  to  choose  his  own  neighborhood  and 

CD  O 

his  own  time,  it  may  be  difficult,  in  many  cases,  to  parry  the  attack. 
It  allows  him  an  unjustifiable  advantage,  of  which  the  witness,  who 
is  most  interested,  would  have  great  right  to  complain.  The  not 
coming  from  what  is  termed  his  immediate  neighborhood,  may 
lessen  its  weight,  but  certainly  does  not  destroy  the  competency 
of  the  evidence.  The  same  may  be  said,  with  equal  force,  as  to 
time.  It  is  sometimes  convenient  for  a  party  to  rid  himself  of  a 
troublesome  witness,  deposing  to  facts  on  which  the  cause  turns; 
it  is  sometimes  easy  to  excite  a  prejudice  against  him,  in  the 
town,  village,  or  neighborhood  where  he  resides.  To  confine 
him,  in  vidication,  to  the  same  place  where  the  atmosphere  has 
been  polluted  by  sinister  arts,  no  man's  character  would  be  safe."  ^ 

§  567.  Right  to  Impeach    an    Impeaching  Witness. — The 

rule  is  that  the  general  character,  or  general  character  for  ver- 
acity, of  eve7'i/  loitness  who  testifies  in  a  case,  may  be  impeached 
by  the  opposite  party.  It  hence  follows  that  a  witness  called  to 
impeach  the  character  of  another  witness,  may  himself  be  im- 
peached by  the  same  method.^  It  is  said  by  the  late  Judge 
Taylor,  in  speaking  of  a  witness  whose  general  character  for  ver- 
acity has  been  impeached:  "The  party  calling  him  may  re- 
establish his  credit  by  attacking  the  general  character  of  the 
impeaching  witnesses.  How  far  this  plan  of  recrimination  may 
be  carried  at  common  law  is  not  yet  determined,  though  in  courts 
of  equity  the  practice  is  in  conformity  with  the  rule  of  the  civil 
law."  *     The  rule  of  the  civil  law,  here  alluded  to,  permitted  the 

1  Citing  Chess    i'.  Chess,    1   Peun.  ^  starks  v.  People,  5  Deuio  (N.  Y.), 
41.                                                                        10(1;  State  v.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  493. 

2  Morss  V.  Palmer,  15  Pa.  St.  51,  oC.  *  2  Tayl.  Ev.  (8th  ed.),  §  1473. 


480  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoUip.  Tr., 

discreditmg  witness  himself  to  be  discredited  by  other  witnesses, 
but  allowed  the  recrimination  to  extend  no  further. 

§   568,   Cross-Examination  of  Sustaining  Witness. —  Where 

a   witness  deposes  to    good  character    of    an  assailed   witness, 
he  may  be  asked,  on  cross-examination,  whether  the  impeached 
witness  has  been  reputed   to   have  been   arrested  for  felony, ^ 
and  whether  he  has  not  heard  neighbors  of  such  party  testify,  in 
a  previous  action  against  the  party,  that  his  reputation  was  bad.^ 
A  prisoner  on  trial  for  highway  robbery  called  a  witness  who  de- 
posed that  he  had  known  the  prisoner  for  years,  during  which 
time  the  prisoner  had    borne  a  good  character.     On   cross-ex- 
amination, it  was  proposed  to  ask  the  witness  whether  he  had 
not  heard  that  the  prisoner  was  suspected  of  having  committed  a 
robbery,  which  had  taken  place  in  the  neighborhood  some  years 
before.     This  was  objected  to  as  raising  a  collateral  issue,  but 
Mr.  Baron  Parke  overruled  the  objection,  saying:    "  The  ques- 
tion is  not  whether  the  prisoner  was  guilty  of  that  robbery,  but 
whether  he  was  suspected  of  having  been  implicated  in  it."  ^    So, 
in  a  prosecution  for  murder,  a  witness  swore  that  he  knew  the 
general  character  of  the  j^risoner  for  peace  and  quietude  in  the 
neighborhood,  and  that  it  was  good.     On  cross-examination,  he 
•was  asked  whether  he  had  not  heard  that  defendant  had  killed  a 
man  in  the  State  in  Georgia.     He  was  allowed,  against  objection, 
to  answer  this  question.     It  was  held  that  in  this  the  court  com- 
mitted no  error.     Stone,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
said:    "In   estimating    character  the    shadings,  as  well    as  the 
brio-hter  hues,  should  be  considered.     They  all  go  to  make  up 
character — reputation  —  the  estimation  in  which  the  person  is 
held.     But  it  is  only  character,  and  not  the  particulars  or  details 
of  independent  acts  which  can  be  inquired  into."  * 

1  Wachstetterw.  state,  99  Ind.  290;  "distinguished"   in    the   subsequent 

s.  c.  50  Ain.  Rep.  94.     The  same  court  case  of  McDoiiel  v.  State,  90  lud.  320. 

in  a  previous  case  held  it  iiicorapeteut  Compare  Hollaud  v.    IJarues,  53  Ala. 

to  ask  a  sustaining  witness  on  cross-  83;  s.  c.  25  Am.  Rep.  595. 
examination  if  he  had  heard  his  neigh-  ^  Hutts  v.  Ilutts,  ()2  Ind.  240. 

bors  say  that  the  slieriff  had  come  to  ^  Rex  v.  Wood,  5  Jur.  225;  cited  ir 

arrest    him    for    larceny.     Oliver    v.  Best  Ev.,  §  201. 
Pate,  43  Ind.  132.     But  this  case  was  *  Ingram  v.  State,  67  Ala.  67,  72.' 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBORATING    AND    SUSTAINING.  481 

§  569.  Re-examination.  —  If  sustaining  witnesses  admit,  on 
cross-examination,  that  tliere  are  reports  in  the  neighborhood  un- 
favorable to  the  character  of  the  witness  assailed,  it  is  competent, 
on  re-examination,  to  interrogate  them  concerning  the  nature  of 
those  reports, e.r/.,  to  ask  them  whether  they  are  not  in  respect  of 
drinking  and  horse-trading.  This  is  necessary,  in  order  that  the 
jury  may  judge  in  what  respect  the  reports  affect  the  character  of 
the  witness,  and  whether  they  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to  impair 
his  credibility.  1 

§  570.  [Geokgia.]  What  Sustaining  Witness  must  swear  to.  — 
Under  the  Code  of  Georgia,  to  impeach  a  witness  by  proof  of  general 
bad  character,  the  impeaching  witness  should  be  first  asked  as  to  his 
knowledge  of  the  general  character  of  the  witness  ;  next,  as  to  what  that 
character  is ;  and  lastly,  whether,  from  that  character,  he  would  believe 
him  on  his  oath.'^  By  another  section,  "  the  witness  may  be  sustained  b}' 
similar  proof  of  character."  -^  It  would  seem  that  these  provisions  are 
merely  declaratory  of  the  common  law.  Construing  them,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  that  State  has  said:  "  If  the  sustaining  witness  is  not  able  to 
say  that  the  general  character  of  the  impeached  witness  is  not  bad,  he 
should,  at  least,  be  required  to  state  that  it  is  not  such  as  to  render 
him  unworthy  of  credit  on  his  oath,  before  he  can  give  his  own  declara- 
tion, that,  from  this  character,  he  would  believe  the  other  on  his  oath."^ 

§  571.  [General  Rule.]  Declaration  out  of  Court  not 
admissible  to  Sustain  Declaration  in  Court.  —  The  general 
rule  is  that  the  previous  declaration  of  a  witness  out  of  court  is 
not  admissible  to  sustain  his  evidence  given  in  court. ^  Thus,  it 
has  been  ruled  that  a  party  who,  in  the  progress  of  a  trial, 
makes  use  of  a  deposition,  may  not  be  allowed  to  strengthen  it 
by  a  so-called  disclosure  of  the  same  witness,  made  at  the  time  of 
taking  the  poor  debtor's  oath,  before  two  justices  of  the  peace 
and  quorum.^     So,  as  a  general  rule,  what  a  party  swore  to  on  a 

1  Stape  u   P(!oplo,  85  N.  Y.  390.  (N.  Y.)   U7;  Nichols   v.   Stewart,   20 

2  Georgia  Code  1873,  §  3873.  Ala.  358;   Stolp   t).  Blair,  68   111,    541; 

3  Ilnd  ,  5  3874.  State  v.  Thomas,  3  Strobh.  L.  (S.  C.) 

4  Artopc  V.  Goodali,  53  Ga.  319,  269;  Bailey  v.  State,  9  Tex.  App.  98; 
325.  People  v.   Hulse,  3   Hill   (N.  Y.),  309 

5  Riney  v    Vaiilandingham,  9   Mo.  (Coweu,  J.,  dissenting). 

816;  People  v.  Finnegau,   1  Park.  Cr.  «  Smiths.  Morgan,  38  Me.  468. 

31 


482  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr. , 

former  occasion,  cannot  be  given  in  evidence  in  his  favor,  though 
it  may  be  against  him.^  Where  a  witness — a  deaf-mute  — was 
discredited  by  evidence  tending  to  sliow  that  slie  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  a  Supreme  Being  or  of  the  obligations  of  an  oatli,  and 
tlie  party  whose  witness  she  was,  tendered  evidence  to  the  effect 
that  she  had  related  the  same  transaction  to  which  she  testified,  in 
a  similar  manner,  to  a  friend  of  hers,  —  it  was  held  that  evi- 
dence of  these  statements  was  rightly  rejected,  as  being  no  more 
than  hearsay  evidence;  "  and  because,  in  the  case  of  a  witness 
already  laboring  under  suspicion,  they  are  rarely  calculated  to 
increase,  in  any  degree,  the  confidence  due  to  his  testimony."  ^ 
It  has  been  well  said  that:  "  To  extend  the  doctrine  to  witnesses 
who  are  not  impeached,  would  result  in  making  a  witness'  credi- 
bility depend  more  upon  the  number  of  times  he  had  repeated 
the  same  story,  than  ui)on  the  truth  of  the  story  itself,  and  tend 
to  render  the  proceedings  on  each  trial  interminable."  ^ 

§  572.  Old  Rule  that  Former  Consistent  Declarations  may  be 
SHOWN  IN  Corroboration.  —  It  was  early  held  in  Pennsylvania  that, 
where  a  witness  is  impeached  by  evidence  as  to  his  character  for 
veracity,  and  is  also  contradicted,  it  is  competent  to  give  evidence  of 
what  he  swore  to  on  a  former  trial,  for  the  purpose  of  corroborating 
his  testimony.^  An  early  case  in  Maryland  supported  the  same  view. 
The  action  was  ejectment,  and  the  question  became  material,  whether 
a  certain  child  had  been  born  alive  or  dead.  The  deposition  of  a  doc- 
tor of  medicine  was  read,  to  the  effect  that  he  assisted  at  the  accouch- 
ment,  and  that  the  child  was  born  alive.  To  overthrow  this,  testi- 
mony was  given  to  the  effect  that  the  deponent  was  not  present  at  the 
accouchment  at  all.  The  party  offering  the  deposition  then  offered  to 
prove,  for  the  purpose  of  corroborating  the  testimony  of  the  deponent, 
that  he  had,  two  or  three  days  after  the  birth  of  the  child  and  before 
the  date  of  the  deposition,  declared  tlie  same  facts  to  which  he  had  de- 
posed. It  was  held  that  this  evidence  should  have  been  admitted, — 
the  court  saying:  "  Where  the  credibility  of  the  witness  is  attacked  by 
the  opposite  party,  his  prior  declarations  may  be  given  in  evidence  to 

1  Eobcrtson  u.  Caw,  3  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  3  Bailey  v.  State,  9  Tex,  App.  98, 
410.  100,  opinion  by  Wliite,  P.  J. 

2  Muusou  V.  Hastings,  12  Vt.  ■*  Henderson  v.  Jones,  10  Serg,  & 
346.  R.  (Pa.)  322. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBORATING    AND    SUSTAINING.  483 

show  bis  consistency."  1  One  decision  is  found  which  goes  to  the 
wild  length  of  holding  that,  where  evidence  is  addnced  which,  contradicts 
a  witness  upon  an  immaterial  point,  the  party  calling  him  may  intro- 
duce witnesses  to  sustain  his  general  character,  although  the  opposite 
party  disclaims  any  intention  of  discrediting  him."^  These  conceptions 
take  root  in  some  early  English  authority,  which  will  now  be  explained. 
In  an  old  case,  William  Maynard,  a  witness,  was,  as  appeared  by  his 
own  evidence,  guilty  of  a  felony,  to  wit,  robbery,  together  with  others, 
which  robbery  was  the  subject  of  the  action,  which  was  an  action  of 
trespass.  He  had  not  been  joined  with  the  other  defendants,  in  order 
that  he  might  be  a  witness  for  the  plaintiff.  He  was  allowed  to  testify, 
and  afterwards  several  witnesses  were  received  and  allowed  to  prove 
that  William  Maynard  did,  at  several  times,  discuss  and  declare  the 
same  things,  and  to  the  like  purpose,  that  he  testified  now ;  and  my 
Lord  Chief  Baron  said:  "  Though  a  hearsay  ought  not  to  be  allowed 
as  direct  evidence,  yet  it  might  be  made  so  to  this  purpose,  viz.,  to 
prove  that  William  Maynard  was  consistent  to  himself,  whereby  his 
testimony  was  corroborated."^  Mr.  Justice  Builer,  in  his  work 
called  Nisi  Prius,  citing  the  last  named  case,  said:  "  But,  though 
hearsay  be  not  allowed  as  direct  evidence,  yet  it  has  been  admitted 
in  corroboration  of  a  witness'  testimony,  to  show  that  he  affirmed 
the  same  thing  before,  on  other  occasions,  and  that  he  is  still  con- 
sistent to  himself,"^ — without  offering  any  opinion  as  to  the  pro- 
priety of  the  rule.  In  like  manner,  it  was  said  bj'  Mr.  Serjeant  Hawkins : 
"What  a  witness  hath  been  heard  to  say  at  another  time  may  be  given 
in  evidence,  in  order,  either  to  invalidate  or  confirm  the  testimony  which 
he  gives  in  court."  ^  Chief  Baron  Gilbert,  in  his  work  on  evidence,  in 
treating  of  hearsay  evidence,  says :  "  But  although  hearsay  is  not  allowed 
as  direct  evidence,  yet  it  may,  in  corroboration  of  a  witness'  testimony, 
to  show  that  he  affirmed  the  same  thing  on  other  occasions,  and  that  the 
witness  is  still  consistent  with  himself ;  for  such  evidence  is  only  in 
support  of  the  witness  that  gives  his  testimony  upon  oath."  ^  So,  on 
the  trial  of  Sir  John  Friend  for  treason,  Lord  Chief  Justice  Holt 
allowed  Bertham,  a  witness,  to  testify  that  Captain  Blair  had  told  him, 
for  two  years  past,  that  Sir  John  Friend  was  to  have  a  regiment  of 
horse  which  was  to  be  raised  and  lie  posted  about  the  town,  that  Cap- 

1  Cooke   V.  Curtis,     6    Harr.  &  J.  3  Lutterell  v.  Reynell,  1  Mod.  282. 
(Md.3  93.                                                              4  Bull.  N.  P.  29i  b. 

2  Newton     v.     Jackson,     23  Ala.  s  Hawk.  P.  C,  bk.,  2,  ch.  4G,  §  14. 
335.  6  Gilb.  Ev.  890. 


484  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

tain  Blair  was  to  be  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  regiment,  and  that  the 
witness  was  to  be  lieutenant  to  Captain  Blair  in  his  troop.  Lord  Holt 
said:  "That  is  not  evidence  against  Sir  John  Friend.  He  [the  wit- 
ness] is  only  called  to  confirm  the  testimony  of  Captain  Blair, —  that 
Blair  spoke  of  it  long  before  he  gave  his  evidence,  and  so  it  is  not 
anew  thing  invented  by  him."i  In  another  case,  such  confirmatory 
evidence  was  offered  and  admitted  in  chief,  which  would  not  now  be 
alio  wed. 2  For,  notwithstanding  these  decisions  and  dicta,  it  is  well 
settled  that  such  evidence  is  not  receivable  to  confirm  the  testimony 
of  a  witness,  until  it  has  been  assailed  by  evidence  of  previous  inconsist- 
ent statements  made  by  him ;  since,  to  receive  it  would  involve  the 
solecism  of  attempting  to  support  testimony  given  upon  oath,  by  state- 
ments made  not  on  oath,  which  are  mere  hearsay.^ 

§  573.  Witness  Impeached  by  Previous  Inconsistent  State- 
ments not    Sustained  by  Previous   Consistent    Statements. — 

By  the  weight  of  authority,  where  the  testimony  of  a  witness 
is  discredited  by  evidence  that  he  has  made  statements  out  of 
court  inconsistent  with  his  sworn  testimony,  it  is  not  competent, 
for  the  purpose  of  sustaining  him,  to  prove  that,  at  other 
times,  he  has  made,  out  of  court,  statements  which  are  con- 
sistent with  his  sworn  testimony.^  A  fortiori,  such  testimony  is 
not  admissible, to  confirm  the  testimony  of  another  ivitness  testi- 
fying to  the  same  fact.^  Thus,  where  the  prisoner  was  on  trial 
for  the  crime  of  robbery  committed  upon  the  person  of  one 
Terhune,  it  was  held  that  the  statements  which  Terhune  had 
made  to  a  witness,  immediately  after  the  alleged  robbery,  con- 

1  Friend's  Case,  13  How.  St.  Tr.  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)412;  Butler  r.  Truslow, 
32,  33.  55  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  293;  Reed  v.  Spauld- 

2  Harrison's  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr;  iug,  42  N.  H.  114;  Smith  v.  Stickuey, 
861.  ir  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  481);  Robb  v.  Hack- 

3  Tliis  was  distinctly  ruled  iu  Rex  ley,  23  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  50;  United  States 
V.  Parker,  3  Dougl.  242,  where  the  v.  Holmes,  1  Cliff.  (U.  S.)  98,  105; 
doctrine  of  Lutterell  t).  Reyuell,  sMp?'a,  People  v.  Doyell,  48  Cal.  85;  Dushon 
was  declared  not  to  Ije  the  law.  v.   Merchauts'     lus.     Co.,     11     Mete. 

4  Nichols  V.  Stewart,  20  Ala.  358;  (Mass.)  199.     So  held  iu  Cora.  v.  Wii- 
Com.  w.Jenkius,  10  Gray  (Mass.),  485,  son,    1    Gray    (Mass.),   337;    Com  v. 
489;  Ware  v.  Ware,  8  Me.  42;  State  v.  Jenkins,  10  Gray  (Mass.),  489. 
Vincent,   24  la.  570,   575;    Ellicott  v.  ^  State  u.  Parish,  79  N.  C.  610. 
Pearl,    1   McLean  (U.   S.),   20G;  s.  c. 


I 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXL]       CORROIiOKATI^G    AND    SUSTAINING.  485 

sistent  with  his  statements  made  as  a  witness,  were  not  admissi- 
ble for  the  purpose  of  corroborating  his  statements  as  a  witness.* 
But  in  one  jurisdiction,  the  case  of  a  woman  swearing  to  a  rape 
committed  upon  her  ^  has  been  held  to  form  no  exception  to 
the  foregoing  rule.  On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  such 
an  offense,  alleged  to  have  been  committed  on  board  a  vessel, 
the  prisoner  attempted  to  discredit  the  testimony  of  the  pros- 
ecutrix,—1.  By  showing,  on  her  cross-examination,  that  her 
story  was  improbable  in  itself.  2.  By  disproving  some  of  the 
facts  to  which  she  testitied.  3.  By  evidence  that  her  conduct, 
while  on  board  the  vessel  and  afterwards,  was  inconsistent 
with  the  idea  of  the  offense  having  been  committed.  4.  By 
calling  v/itnesses  to  show  that  the  account  which  she  had 
given  of  the  matter  out  of  court,  did  not  correspond  with  her 
statements  under  oath.  It  was  held,  that  this  was  not  an  attack 
upon  the  complainant's  general  character,  and  therefore,  that 
evidence  of  her  good  character  was  not  admissible  in  reply. 
Cowen,  J.,  dissented,  holding  that  evidence  of  the  complainant's 
contradictory  statements  out  of  court  affected  her  general  char- 
acter, and  consequently  that  evidence  of  her  good  character  be- 
came admissible.  2 

§  574.  Recognized  Exceptions  to  the  Rule.  — There  are  cer- 
tain recognized  exceptions  to  the  foregoing  rule,  as  to  which  all 
the  authorities  agree.  Thus,  where  the  witness  is  charged  with 
testifying  under  the  influence  of  some  motive  prompting  him 
to  make  a  false  statement,  it  may  be  shown  that  he  made 
similar  statements  at  a  tim  e  when  the  imputed  motive  did  not 
exist,  or  when  motives. of  interest  would  have  induced  him  to 
make  a  different  statement  from  that  which  he  actually  made.  * 

»  People  V.  Fiuuegan,   1   Park.   Cr.  kiss  v.  Germania  Eire  Ins.  Co  ,  5  Hun 

^^:  ^-^   ^*^-  (N.  Y.),  90;   State   v.    Petty,  21   Kan. 

-  Post,  §  577.  54,  60.     See  also  People  v.  Moore,  15 

3  People  V.   Hulse,  3  Hill    (N.  Y.),  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  419;  State  v.  De  Wolf, 


8  Conn.  93;  Wriglit  v.  DeKlyne,  1  Pet 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  199;  Henderson  ??.  Jones 
10  Sersf.  &  R.    (Pa.)  332;    Packer  v. 
V.  Cheatham,  6  Lea  (Tenu.) ,  2 ;  Hotch-      Gonsalus  1  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  526 ;  People 


■»  Gates  V.  People,  14  111.  433,  438;      C.  C.  (U.  S.)  199;  Henderson  ?7.  Jones' 
Stolpi;.  Blair,  68  HI.  541,  544;  Hayes      10  Serg.  &  R.    (Pa.)  332;    Packer  v. 


486  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoUip.  Tr., 

Accordingly  a  confession  by  an  accomijUce^  given  before  he  had 
received  a  promise  of  personal  exemption  if  he  would  become  a 
State's  witness,  may  well  be  received,  as  corroborating  the  tes- 
timony^ given  by  him  on  the  witness  stand. ^ 

§  575.  [Continued.]  Chanj^e  of  Relation  Necessary  to  Ad- 
mit such  Evidence.  —  In  such  a  case,  denying  the  general  right 
to  admit  such  evidence,  it  has  been  said:  "  To  make  the  former 
statements  of  the  witness  competent  in  his  own  favor,  it  should 
ordinarily  be  made  to  appear  that,  at  the  time  he  made  the  state- 
ments, he  stood  in  some  different  relation  to  the  cause  or  party 
from  what  he  now  occupies,  and  that  the  change  in  his  position 
has  been  such  that,  though  his  present  statement  is  in  favor  of 
his  interest,  yet  that  the  former  one,  at  the  time  it  was  made, 
must  have  been,  or  at  least  must  have  appeared  to  be,  directly 
against  his  interests.  And  any  such  statements  by  a  witness, 
made  at  any  time,  and  offered  as  evidence  in  his  own  favor, 
after  he  has  been  impeached,  should  be  received  with  great 
caution."  '^ 

§576,    [Another  Exception.]      Fabrication  of  Recent  Date. 

So,  in  contradiction  of  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  wit- 
ness' account  of  the  transaction  was  a  fabrication  of  a  recent 
date,  it  may  be  shown  that  he  gave  a  similar  account,  before 

V.  Vane,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  419 ;  Clapp  under  the  influence  of  some  motive 
V.  Wilson,  5  Den.  (N.  Y.)  286.  This  prompting  him  to  make  a  false  or  col- 
rule  was  thus  stated  in  an  opinion  ored  statement,  then,  he  may  be  al- 
drawn  up  by  Miller,  .J.,  in  the  Court  of  lowed  to  show  in  reply,  that  he  has 
Appeals  of  New  York,  but  not  re-  made  similar  declarations,  at  a  time 
ported,  because  not  concurred  in  fully  when  the  motive  imputed  to  him  did 
by  all  the  members  of  the  court:  "As  not  exist."  Eailway  Co.  v.  Warner 
a  general  rule,  such  evidence  is  inad-  (memorandum  in  G2  N.  Y.  651)  ;  quoted 
missible,  as  the  witness  cannot  be  and  followed  in  Herrick  v.  Smith,  13 
allowed  to  corroborate  his  statement  Hun  (N.  Y.),  446,  448. 
in  court  by  what  Avas  said  by  him  out  ^  See  the  reasoning  of  Brousou,  J., 
of  court.  There  ai'e,  however,  excep-  in  liobl)  v.  Hackley,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
tions  to  this  rule.     In  case  an  attempt  50. 

is  made  to  discredit  the  witness  on  the  '^  Reed  v.    Spaulding,  42  N.  11.  114, 

ground  that  his  testimony  was  given  123,  opinion  by  Sargent,  J. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXL]       CORROBORATING    AXD    SUSTAINING.  487 

its  effect  and  operation  could  be  foreseen.^  Thus,  where  it 
was  proved,  with  a  view  to  discredit  a  witness,  that  he  had  given, 
on  other  occasions,  a  week  or  ten  days  after  the  time  of  tlie  trans- 
action of  which  he  testitied,  a  very  different  account  from  what 
he  had  given  on  the  stand,  —  it  was  hekl  admissible  to  support 
him,  by  showing  that,  immediately  after  the  transaction,  he  had 
given  the  same  account  which  he  had  given  upon  the  stand. ^ 

§  577.  [Another  Exception,]  Statements  inade  immedi- 
ately after  the  Occurrence. —  A  moditied  rule  has  been  thus 
laid  down  in  a  recent  decision  in  Kansas:  *'If  a  witness  be  im- 
peached by  proof  of  his  having  previously  made  statements  out 
of  court,  inconsistent  with  his  testimony  in  court,  he  may  then 
be  corroborated  by  evidence  of  other  statements  made  by  him 
out  of  court,  in  harmony  with  his  testimony,  if  made  immedi- 
ately after  the  occurrence  of  which  he  has  testified  took  place,  and 
made  before  he  has  had  any  reason  or  ground  for  fabricating  an 
untrue  or  false  statement;  and  such  corroborating  evidence  is 
not  limited  to  those  statements  made  by  him  before  the  time 
when  his  statements,  given  in  evidence  to  impeach  him,  were 
made,  but  may  be  extended  to  other  statements  made  by  him  after- 
wards." ^  Thus,  in  an  action  by  husband  and  wife  for  a  personal 
injury  upon  the  wife.  Lord  Holt  admitted  evidence  of  what  the 
wife  had  said,  immediately  upon  receiving  the  hurt,  and  before 
she  had  time  to  devise  or  contrive  anything  for  her  own  advan- 
tage.* So,  on  a  trial  for  rape,  where  the  testimony  of  the 
prosecutrix  was  impeached  by  })roof  of  inconsistent  statements 
made  by  her  on  the  preliminary  trial  before  a  justice  of  the 
peace,  it  was  competent  for  the  prosecution,  in  corroboration 
to  prove  the    declarations  of  such  witness  on  the  day  following 

1  Gates   V.  People,  U  111.  433,  438,  10   Serg.  &  R.    (Pa.)    323.     See   also 

per  Treat,  C.  J.;   Stolp  v.  Blair,  G8  111.  States.  Hendricks,  32  Kan.  559. 

541,    544,  per  Sheldou,   J.;    State  v.  2  preuch  v.  Merrill,  6   N.    H.    465 

Petty,  21  Kan.  54;  Brousou,  .T.jiu  Robb  (with    which    compare    Spauldiug  v. 

V.    Hackley,  23  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  50,  54;  Reed,  42  N.  II.  114.) 

Eliicott  V.   Pearl,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  412,  3  state  v.   Hendricks,  32    Kan.   559, 

439,  per  Story,  J.;   Hester  t?.  Com.,  85  5G3. 

Pa.    St.   140,  158;  Henderson  t!.  Jones,  ■*  Thompson  r.  Trevanion,  Skin.  402. 


488  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tr. 

the  commission  of  the  crime. ^  The  reader  will  here  recall  the 
doctrine  of  immediate  outcry  applicable  to  such  prosecutions. 
"Upon  accusations  for  rape,  where  the  forbearance  to  mention 
the  circumstance  within  a  reasoable  time  is  in  itself  a  reason 
for  imputing  fabrication,  unless  repelled  by  other  considera- 
tions, the  disclosure  made  of  the  fact,  upon  first  opportunity 
after  its  commission,  and  the  apparent  state  of  mind  of  the  party 
who  has  suffered  the  injury,  are  always  regarded  as  very  ma- 
terial, and  the  evidence  of  them  is  constantly  admitted  without 
objection."^  It  has  been  held,  on  doubtful  grounds,  in  a  case 
in  admiralty,  that  the  protest  of  the  captain  and  crew  of  the 
vessel,  made  the  morning  after  the  collision,  may  be  considered 
as  evidence  corroborative  of  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  in 
court,  when,  as  to  all  material  facts,  they  correspond.^ 

§  578.  [Continued  ]  Not  Admissible  when  made  subse- 
quently to  the  Inconsistent  Statements.  —  It  has  been  ruled 
that,  while  evidence  of  previous  inconsistent  declarations  may, 
such  a  case,  be  admissible,  when  made  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
inconsistent  ones,  yet  the  rule  is  otherwise  where  they  are  made 
subsequently, — the  reason,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Woodbury, 
being,  "  that  they  must  be  made  at  least  under  circumstances 
when  no  moral  influences  existed  to  color  or  misrepresent 
them."  "  But,"  continued  he,  "  when  they  are  made  subse- 
quent to  other  statements  of  a  different  character,  as  here,  it  is 
possible,  if  not  probable,  that  the  inducement  to  make  them 
is  for  the  very  purpose  of  counteracting  those  first  uttered.  This 
impairs  their  force  and  credibility,  when,  if  made  before  the 
others,  they  might  tend  to  sustain  the   subsequent  evidence  cor- 


1  state  V.  Laxton,  78  N.  C.  504,  570.  ing  a  witness,  his  general  character 

2  Sir  W.  D.  Evans  in  his  notes  to  ranst  have  been  assailed,  either  by  im- 
Pothier  on  Obligations,  vol.  2,  p.  peaching  witnesses  or  by  proof  of 
251.  extrinsic  facts  of  a  disparaging  nature. 

3  The  Pacific,  1  Xewb.  (U.  S.)  9.  Leonori  v.  Bishop,  4  Drue,  (N.  Y.), 
The  Nev^r  York  rule  solmiis  to  be  that,  420;  People  v.  Hulse,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
in  order  to  let  in  evidence  of  good  300;  People  v.  Gay,  7  N.  Y.  378; 
cliaracter  f or  the  purpose  of  sustain-  Starks  w.  People,  5  Uenio  (IS.  Y.),  lOG. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXI.]       CORROBOKATIXG    AND    SUSTAINING.  489 

responding  with  them."  ^  The  reason  was  thus  stated  by 
McKinuey,  J.:  "  To  allow  consistent  statements,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  giving  support  to  the  credit  of  the  witness,  made  after 
the  contradictory  representations  by  which  it  is  sought  to  im- 
peach him,  would  be  to  put  it  in  the  power  of  every  unprincipled 
witness  to  bolster  his  credit,  and,  perhaps,  escape  the  just  con- 
sequences of  his  own  falsehood  and  tergiversation."  ^ 

§579.  [Contra.]  Impeached  by  Contradictory  Statements, 
confirmed  by  Consistent  Statements.  —  In  the  view  of  other 
American  courts,  where  a  witness  has  been  assailed  by  evidence  of 
having  made  previous  statements,  inconsistent  with  his  testimony 
on  the  stand,  he  may  be  confirmed  by  evidence  of  having  made 
previous  statements  consistent  with  such  testimony.^  This  rule 
is  differently  stated  in  different  jurisdictions.  In  one  it  is  laid 
down  that  when  the  credibility  of  a  witness  is  attacked  from  the 
nature  of  his  evidence,  from  his  situation,  on  the  ground  of  bad 
character,  by  proof  of  previous  inconsistent  statements,  or  by  im- 
putations directed  against  him  on  cross-exaonination,  the  party 
who  has  introduced  him  may  prove  other  consistent  statements, 
for  the  purpose  of  corroborating  him.*  In  another,  it  is  stated 
in  a  much  modified  form,  by  saying  that  statements  made  by  a 
witness  corroborating  his  evidence  upon  the  trial,  made   soon 

1  Conrad  v.  Griffey,  11  How.  (U.  S.)  (N.  C.)  263;  State  v.  George,  8  Ired.  L. 
480,  491;  Queener  u.  Morrow,  1  Coldw.  (N.  C.)  324;  Johnson  v.  Patterson,  2 
(Tenn.)  124,  135;  State  v.  Petty,  21  Hawks  (N.  C),  183;  March  r.  Harrell, 
Kan.  54.  See  also  Ellicott  v.  Pearl,  10  1  Jones  L.  (JST.  C.)  329;  Brookbank  v. 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  412,438,  where  it  was  held  State,  55  lud.  169;  Dailey  v.  State,  28 
generally  that  such  evidence  was  inad-  lud.  285;  Coffin  v.  Anderson,  4  Blackf_ 
missible;  but  the  court  found  an  addi-  (Ind.)  395;^  Hayes  v.  Cheatham,  6  Lea 
tional  reason  for  supporting  the  de-  (Tenn.),  2,  10;  Third  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Hall, 
cision  of  the  trial  court  in  excluding  1  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  479;  Perkins  v.  State, 
it,  in  tlie  fact  that  the  conversations,  4  Ind.  222;  Doddt'.  Moore,  92  lud.  397; 
testified  toby  tlie  sustaining  witnesses,  Coffin  v.  Anderson,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
were  subsequent  to  those  testified  to  395;  Beaiichamp  v.  State,  6  Blacltf. 
by  the  impeaching  witnesses.  Contra,  (Ind.)  299;  Dailey  v.  State,  28  Ind, 
Brookbank  v.  State,  55  Ind.  169.  285;  Dossettu.  Miller,  3  Sneed  (Tenn.), 

2  Queener  v.  Morrow,  1  Coldw.  72;  Lyles  u.  Lyles,  1  Hill  Ch.  (S.  C)  76. 
(Tenn.)  124,  135.  *  March u.  Harrell,  1  Jones L.(N.C.) 

3  Hoke    V.    Fleming,   10    Ired.    L.      329;  Isler  v.  Dewey,  71  N.  C.  14. 


490  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

after  the  transaction  to  which  it  rehites,  or  when  he  was  not 
under  the  inliuence  of  any  motive  to  rehite  the  transaction  un- 
truthfully, are  competent,  where  it  is  shown  that  he  had  given  a 
different  relation  of  the  occurrence,  or  that  he  testified  under  the 
influence  of  a  motive  calculated  to  induce  him  to  testify  falsely.^ 
According  to  one  vie  w,  evidence  of  such  statements  made,  in  har- 
mony with  the  testimony  given  by  the  witness  in  court,  is  not 
limited  to  such  declarations  as  were  made  jjrioi'  to  the  time  when 
his  conflicting  declarations,  given  in  the  impeaching  evidence, 
are  claimed  to  have  been  made.^ 

§580.  [Illustration.]  Where  the  Witness  on  a  Previous  Occasion 
Testified  less  Positively. —  A  novelillustration  of  this  principle  is  fur- 
nished in  a  case  in  Vermont,  where,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  crime, 
the  respondent,  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  evidence  of  certain  witnesses 
as  to  his  identity  with  the  criminal,  introduced  evidence  tending  to  show 
that,  at  a  preliminary  examination  of  the  respondent,  they  testified  less 
positively  on  that  point;  but  it  also  appeared  that  the  same  witnesses, 
directly  after  the  commission  of  the  offense,  asserted  positively  the 
identity  of  the  respondent  with  the  person  whom  they  saw  commit  the 
crime,  and  at  the  same  time  caused  his  arrest.  It  was  held  that  such 
statements  and  such  action  on  the  part  of  the  witnesses,  so  near 
the  time  of  the  commission  of  the  offense,  tended  to  corroborate  their 
testimony  as  to  identity,  and  that  the  judge  committed  no  error  in 
making  this  suggestion  to  the  jury.^ 

§  581.  Distinction  between  the  Case  where  the  Previous 
Inconsistent  Declarations  are  established,  and  where  they  are 
left  in  Dispute.  —  A  distinction  has  been  taken  between  a  case 
where  the  witness  concedes,  or  where  other  testimony  conclu- 
sively establishes,  the  fact  of  his  having  made  prior  statements 
inconsistent  with  his  testimony  on  the  witness  stand,  and  the  case 
where  the  fact  of  his  having  made  such  prior  statements  is  left 
by  the  testimony  in  doubt  or  in  dispute.  In  the  former  case, 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Michigan   concede  that  evidence  of  his 

1  Hotchkiss  V.  Germjinia  Fire   Ins.  2  Rrookbank  r.  State,  55  Ind.  169 

Co.,  5   Hun   (N.  Y.),  On,  95;    Robb    v.  ^  State  v.  Deniiiii,  a2  Vt.  158. 

Hackley,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  50. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXL]       CORROBORATING    AND    SUSTAINING.  491 

prior  consistent  declarations  would  not  be  admissible  in  corrob- 
oration, while  in  the  latter  case  such  evidence  would  be  admis- 
sible.^    Ill  the  opinion  of  the  court,  given  by  Mr.  Justice  Cooley, 
the  folio wino-  lanojuao-e  occurs:    "If  it  were  an  established  fact 
that  the   witness  had   made   the  contradictory  statements,    we 
should  say  that  the  supporting  evidence  here  offered  was  not 
admissible.     If  a  witness  has  given  different  accounts  of  an  affair 
on   several   different  occasions,  the  fact  that   he   has    repeated 
one  of  these  accounts  oftener  than  the  opposite  one,  can  scarcely 
be  said  to  entitle  it  to  any  additional  credence.     A  man  untruth- 
ful out  of  court  is  not  likely  to  be  truthful  in  court ;  and  where 
the  contradictory  statements  are  proved,  a  jury  is  generally  jus- 
tified in  rejecting  the  testimony  of  the  witness  altogether.     But 
in  these  cases,  the  evidence  of  contradictory  statements  is  not 
received  until  the  witness  has  denied  making  them,  so  that  an 
issue  is  always  made  between  the  witness  sought  to  be  impeached 
and  the  witness  impeaching  him.     The  jury,  therefore,  before 
they  can  determine  how  much  the  contradictory  statements  ought 
to  shake  the  credit  of  the  witness,  are  required  first,  to  find,  from 
conflicting  evidence,  whether  he  made  them   or  not;   and  the 
question  we  now  are  to  decide  is  whether,  upon  an  issue  of  this 
character,  evidence  like  that  received  by  the  circuit  judge  was 
admissible.     The  proper  test  for  the  admissibility  of  evidence 
ought  to  be,  we  think,  whether  it  has  a  tendency  to  effect  belief 
in  the  mind  of  a  reasonably  cautious  person,  who  should  receive 
and  weigh  it  with  judicial  fairness.     Now,  there. are  many  cases 
in  which,  if  evidence  is  given  of  statements  made  by  a  witness  in 
conflict  with  those  he  has  sworn  to,   his  previous  statements 
should  not  only  be  received  in  support  of  his  credit,  but  would 
tend  very  strongly  in  that  direction.     If,  for  instance,  the  wit- 
ness is   himself  the  prosecutor,  and  has  already  made    sworn 
complaint,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  we  suppose,  that  the  pendency 
of  this  complaint,  its  contents,  and  the  relation  of  the  witness  to 
it,  might  be  put  in  evidence,  and  that  they  would  raise  a  strong 
probability  that  the  testimony  to  conflicting  accounts  as  having 

1  Stewart  v.  People,  23  Mich.  G3  (Campbell,  C.  J.,  dissenting  on  both  points). 


492  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

been  given  about  the  same  time,  was  either  mistaken  or  corrupt. 
Suppose  a  man  to  be  testifying  in  a  case  in  which  he  had  spent 
a  considerable  period  of  time  and  a  hirge  sura  of  money  in  pur^ 
suins  an  alleged  criminal  to  conviction,  and  he  is  confronted 
with  evidence  of  his  own  conflicting  statements;  the  rule  would 
be  exceedingly  unjust,  as  well  as  unphilosophical,  which  should 
preclude  his  showing,  at  least  by  his  own  evidence,  such  circum- 
stances of  his  connection  with  the  case  as  would  make  the  im- 
peaching evidence  appear  to  be  at  war  with  all  the  probabilities. 
And  other  cases  may  readily  be  supposed  in  which,  under  the 
peculiar  circumstances,  the  fact  that  the  witness  has  always  pre- 
viously given  a  consistent  account  of  the  transaction  in  question, 
might  well  be  accepted  by  the  jury  as  almost  conclusive  that  he 
had  not  varied  from  it  in  the  single  instance  testified  to,  for  the 
purposes  of  impeachment.  It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  any 
arbitrary  rule  which  could  be  properly  applied  to  every  case  in 
which  this  question  could  arise ;  but  we  think  there  are  some 
cases  in  which  the  peculiar  circumstances  would  render  this 
species  of  evidence  important  and  forcible.  The  tender  age  of 
the  principal  witness  might  sometimes  be  an  imjwrtant  consid- 
3ration,  and  the  fact  that  the  previous  statemeut  was  put  in 
writing,  —  as  it  was  in  this  instance,  — at  a  time  when  it  would 
be  reasonably  free  from  suspicion,  might  very  well  be  a  con- 
trolling circumstance.  We  think  the  circuit  judge  ought  to  be 
allowed  a  reasonable  discretion  in  such  cases,  and  that,  though 
such  evidence  would  not  generally  be  received,  yet  that  his  dis- 
cretion in  receiving  it  ought  not  to  be  set  aside,  except  in  a  clear 
case  of  abuse."  ^ 

§  582.  General  Character  not  Supported  by  Previous  Dec- 
larations.— It  has  been  ruled  m  Vermont  that,  where  a  witness 
has  been  discredited  by  evidence  of  his  having  given  a  different 
relation,  even  when  this  evidence  appeared  from  his  own  cross- 
examination,  he  might  be  sustained  by  evidence  of  general  good 
character.'^     But  the  same  court  holds  that  the  converse  of  this 

1  Stewart  v.  People,  23  Mich.  G3,  2  gtate  v.   Eoe,   12  Vt.  110;   ante,. 

74.  §  552. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cb.  XXL]       CORROBORATING   AND    SUSTAINING.  493 

proposition,  that  when  his  general  character  is  impeached,  he 
may  be  sustained  by  proof  of  prior  statements  consistent  with 
his  testimony,  —is  not  the  law.i  Where  a  party  testifies  in  his 
oion  behalf,  evidence  of  previous  inconsistent  declarations  are 
admissible  against  him,  without  laying  any  foundation  for  the 
introduction  of  the  same  by  cross-examining  him ;  merely  because 
they  are  declarations  against  his  interest,  and  such  declarations 
are  always  original  evidence  against  a  party.^  The  mere  fact 
that  evidence  of  such  declarations  has  been  given,  does  not,  it 
has  been  held,  authorize  the  party  to  introduce  witnesses  in  sup- 
port of  his  general  character.^ 

1  Gibbs  V.  Linsley,  13  Vt.  208.  3  Owens  v.  White,  28  Ala.  413. 

2  Blossom  V.  Barrett,  37  N.  Y.  434, 
438. 


494  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [I  Thouip.  Tr., 


CHAPTER     XXII. 


OF  THE  EXAMINATION  OF  EXPEKTS. 


Article    I.  —  Direct  Examination. 
Article  II.  —  Cross-Examination. 


Article  I.  —  Direct  Examination. 

Section 

587.  Expert  Witnesses,  how  Examined. 

588.  Laying  the  Foundation. 

589.  Opinion  based  on  the  Personal  knowledge  of  the  Expert. 

590.  Medical  Opinion  based  on  Statements  of  Patient. 

591.  Medical  Opinion  upon  Symptoms  stated  by  Unsworn  Persons. 

592.  Facts  and  Opinions  Mingled. 

593.  Witness  not  to  Decide  Disputed  Questions  of  Fact. 

594.  But  Examined  on  Hypothetical  Facts. 

595.  Not  to  give  Opinions  based  upon  Hearing  the  Evidence. 
590.  [Continued.]     Observations  on  the  above  Rule. 

597.  [Continued.]     Not  to   give   Opinions  upon  Depositions    Submitted    to 

them. 

598.  [Continued.]  Farther  Illustrations. 

599.  [Contra.       When  the  Evidence  may  be  Submitted  to  Experts. 

600.  [Continued.!  In  Actions  for  the  Value  of  Services. 

601.  [Continued.]  Other  Instances  where  this  has  been  done, 

602.  [Continued.]  What  if  Expert  has  not  heard  all  the  Testimony. 
603    [Continued.]  Opinion  founded  on  an  Opinion. 

604.  Hypothetical  Questions,  how  framed. 

605.  Must  not  embrace  Matters  within  Ordinary  Experience. 

606.  Must  be  based  on  Evidence. 

607.  Latitude  in  framing  tliem. 

608.  No  Objection  that  they  Contain  Errors. 

609.  Not  Necessary  to  state  Fact.s  as  Proved. 

610.  Need  not  Embody  all  the  Facts. 

611.  [Continued.]     Dicta  upon  this  Subject. 

612.  Long  Hypothetical  Questions  Objectionable, 

613.  [Continued.]     Whether  Witness   concurs   in  the  Testimony  of  Another 

Expert. 

614.  [Continued.]     Instances  of  Proper  Hypothetical  Questions. 


Tit.   IIT,  Ch.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  495 

Section 

615.  Whether  Expert  can  give  Opinion  upon  tlie  Whole  Case. 

616.  [Continued.]     Instances  of  Questions  Bad  because  calling  for  a  Decis- 

ion of  the  Case. 

617.  What  if  the  Answers  go  beyond  the  Question. 

618.  Keasons  on  Examiuation-iu-Chief. 

619.  Opinions  founded  upon  BooliS. 

620.  Experiments  in  the  Presence  of  the  Jury. 

621.  Medical  Opinions  as  to  the  Permanency  of  Physical  Injury. 

§  587.  Espert  Witnesses,  how  Examined.  —  Expert  wit- 
nesses are  generally  examined  upon  hypothetical  questions^  as- 
suming the  existence  of  facts  which  there  is  substantial  evidence 
tending  to  prove. ^  They  are  sometimes  allowed  to  give  their 
opinions  upon  evidence  which  they  have  heard  detailed  by  wit- 
nesses.^  They  often  give  their  opinion  based  upon  their  own 
knowledge  of  the  facts  of  a  particular  case.^  Medical  experts  are 
sometimes  permitted  to  give  an  opinioE  based  upon  facts  com- 
municated to  them  by  their  patient^  and  by  them  communicated 
to  the  jury.^  Experts  are  sometimes,  though  rarely,  allowed  to 
make  experiments  in  the  presence  of  the  jury.^ 

§  588.  Laying  the  Foundation.  — A  witness  cannot  be  per- 
mitted to  give  his  opinion  as  an  expert,  until  it  appears,  by  a 
preliminary  examination,  that  he  is  a  person  of  skill  in  the  par- 
ticular department  of  science  or  special  matter  in  which  his 
opinion  is  desired.  So,  too,  where  he  is  called  upon  to  testify 
from  his  own  knowledge,  it  must  appear  that  he  has  trustworthy 
information  or  knowledge  of  the  facts  involved,  and  upon  which 
his  opinion  is  to  be  founded,  before  he  can  testify  as  an  expert.^ 

1  Post   §  594.  personal   knowledge  of  the    case    in 

^  Post,  §  599.  whicli    the    services     were     claimed 

3  Post.  §  589.  to    have    been    rendered,    or    of   the 

*  Post,  §  590.  amount  and  character  of   such  serv- 

^  Post.  §  620.  ices,  the  party    calling  him    had  no 

fi  Heald  r  Thing,  45  Me.  392      Ac-  right  to  ask  him,  e.^r.    "from  what  you 

cordingly,   where  it  was  not  shown  know  of  this  case,  what  do  you  think 

that  an  attorney   at  law    called  as   a  would  be  a  fair  amount  for  Todd's 

witness    on  the  question  of  the  value  services?"      Williams    v.     Brown,  28 

of  another  attorney's  services  had  any  Oli.  St.  547. 


496  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoUip.  Tr., 

Questions  which  are  directed  to  him  for  the  purpose  o±  hiying  this 
foundation,  present  a  preliminary  question  of  fact  for  tlie  decision 
of  tlie  judo-e,^  In  questioning  a  medical  expert  with  this  end  ii? 
view,  it  is  obviously  proper  to  ask  him  luhcu  experience  he  has  had 
with  the  particular  disease  or  physical  injury  which  is  the  subject 
of  the  investigation;  and  where  he  has  beer  afflicted  with  the  dis- 
ease himself,  it  has  beer  hek  that  he  may>  state  that  fact  to  the 
jury ;  since  the  fact  would  render  it  more  probable  thai  he  had 
made  the  disease  the  subject  of  a  special  study  and  investigation. ^ 

§  589.  Opinions  based  on  the  Personal  Knowledge  of  tlie 
Expert —  Expert  witnesses  are  allowed  to  give  opinions  based 
upon  their  personal  knowledge.^  This  is  seen  every  day  in  our 
trial  courts  in  actions  for  damages  for  physical  injuries,  where 
the  physician  who  has  attended  upon  the  plaintiff  is  allowed  to 
o-ive  his  opinion  as  to  the  duration  and  probable  extent  of  the 
injuries  complained  of.  The  opinion  of  a  physician,  who  has 
personal  knowledge  of  the  conduct  and  habits  of  a  person,  is 
competent  evidence  as  to  the  .sfm^^y  of  such  person;  ^  so,  in  fact, 
is  the  opinion  of  a  non-expert      On  an  issue  of  sanity,  physicians 

1  Ante,  §  323.  "ot    a    wholly    unimportant  fact.     It 

2  Thus,  in  a  late  case  in  Illinois,  an  tended  to  add  strength  to  the  witness' 
expert  witness,  a  physician  of  thirty  testimony  as  an  expert  in  being  calcu- 
years  standing,  introduced  by  the  lated  to  excite  in  him  a  peculiar  inter- 
plaintiff  in  an  action  for  physical  in-  est,  and  lead  him  to  give  special  study 
jury,  was  allowed  to  testify  "  I  am  to  that  sul)ject  of  injury.  We  see  no 
paralyzed  on  the  left  side,  —  my  arm  just  ground  of  complaint  on  defend - 
and  leg.  Have  no  pr;\ctical  use  of  ant's  part  in  not  excluding  this  evi- 
them,  but  I  can  move  the  leg  along."  dence."  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
The  court  refused  the  defendant's  mo-  Lambert  (Sup.  Ct.  111.),  10  North  E. 
tion  to    strike  out    this  evidence.     It  Eep.  219;  s.  c.  119  111.   256. 

was  a  controverted  question  whether  ^  Pelamourges  v.  Clark,  9  Iowa    1 ; 

or  not  the  plaintiff  was  paralyzed  in  State  u.  Stickley,  41  Iowa,  232;  1  Redf. 

her  left  leg    and  arm  by    the    Injury  Wills,   137;   Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 

which  she  had   received.     It  was  held  Falvey,    104   lud.  409,   418;    Burns  v. 

that  no  error  was   committed  in  the  Barenfleld,  84  Ind.  4;5;  Lawson  Exp.  & 

ruling.   Mr.  Justice  8h(^]don,  in  giving  Op.  Ev.  144;  Boardman  v.  Woodman, 

the  opinion  of   the  court,  said:  "It  Is  47  N.  H.  120,  13.5. 
true  that  the  witness'  paralysis  was  *  People  v.  Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358. 

not  within  the  issue ;  and  yet  it  was 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XXir.]        THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  497 

may  be  asked  whether,  from  the  circumstances  of  the  patient 
and  the  symptoms  which  they  observed,  they  are  capable  of 
forming  an  opinion  of  the  soundness  of  his  mind;  and  if  so, 
whether  they  can  thence  conckide  that  his  mind  is  sound  or  un- 
sound; and  in  either  case,  they  are  properly  required  to  state  the 
circumstances  or  symptoms  from  which  they  draw  their  con- 
clusions, to  the  end  that  the  jury  may  the  better  judge  of  the 
value  of  the  same.^ 

§  590.  Medical  Opinion  based  on  Statements  of  Patient.  — 

The  opinion  of  a  medical  expert  may  rest  in  part  on  statements 
made  to  him  by  his  patient,  and  by  him  communicated  to  the 
jury.  Upon  this  subject  the  authorities  are  in  harmony,  though 
there  is  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  whether  statements  of 
past  symptoms  may  be  taken  into  consideration/'' 

§  591.  Medical  Opinion  upon  Symptoms  stated  by  other  Un- 
sworn Persons,  —  On  an  issue  of  insanity  a  physician  who  has 
visited  the  person  wdiose  sanity  is  in  question,  in  consultation 
with  his  attending  physician,  is  not  permitted  to  give  in  evidence 
the  declarations  made  to  him  at  the  time,  either  by  the  defendant's 
wife,  physician,  or  other  attendant,  as  to  his  previous  symptoms 
or  condition.  Such  statements  are  properly  excluded  as  hear- 
sa}'.^  Nor  will  such  a  witness  be  permitted  to  give  his  opinion  of 
the  mental  condition  of  the  person  in  question,  based  upon  the 
representations  thus  made  to  him,  in  connection  with  the  symp- 
toms which  he  discovered  by  personal  observation  and  examina- 
tion. His  opinion  should  be  formed  entirely  from  his  own 
observation    and   examination  of   his    patient's    symptoms    and 

1  Hathoni  u.  Kiua;,  8  Mass.  371.  Bate,    1    Swan  (Teuu.),    279;   Illiuois 

2  Louisville  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Suttou,  42  HI.  438;  State 
104  lud.  409,  419;  Cartilage  Tump.  Co.  v.  Gedicke,  43  N.  J.  L.  86;  Eckles  v. 
V.  Andrews,  102  lud.  138;  Elkhart??.  Bates,  26  Ala.  (355;  Quaife  «.  Chicago 
Eitter,  66  lud.  136;  Barber  v.  Merriani,  &c.  R.  Co.,  48  Wis.  513;  s.  c.  33  Am, 
11  Allen  (Mass.),  322;  Thompson  v.  Kep.  S21;  Brown  »,  N,  Y,  &c.  R.  Co., 
Trevauion,  Skinner,  402;  Aveson  v.  32  X,  Y.  597;  Towle  v.  Blake,  48  N,  H. 
Kinuaird,  6  East,  188;  Bacon  v.  Charl-  2. 

ten,   7  Cush.    (Mass,)    581;    Denton?;.  ^  jjeald  w.  Thing,  45  Me.  392. 


498  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [ITliomp.  Tr., 

condition.^  The  reason  of  the  rule  which  excludes  the  declara- 
tions as  incompetent,  excludes  also  an  opinion,  based  in  whole  or 
in  part  thereon.^ 

§  592.  Facts  and  Opinion  Mingled.  — On  an  issue  of  sanity 
or  insanity,  a  witness,  who  has  had  op})ortunities  of  knowing  and 
observing  the  person  in  question,  may  not  only  depose  to  the 
facts  which  he  knows,  but  he  may  also  give  his  opinion  or  belief 
as  to  his  sanity  or  insanity.^ 

§  593.  Witness  not  to  decide  Disputed  Questions  of  Fact,  — 

Expert  witnesses  cannot  be  called  upon  to  decide  disputed  ques- 
tions of  fact,  thereby  assuming  the  office  of  the  jury.* 

§  594.  But  Examined  on  Hypothetical  Facts.  — The  proper 
mode  of  examination  is  upon  facts  hypothetically  stated;^  or,  as 
it  is  sometimes  said,  upon  a  hypothethical  case,  stated  to  them 
and  so  proved  as  to  resemble,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  case  under 
consideration  ^ 

§  595.  Xot  to  give  Opinions  based  vipon  Hearing  the  Evi- 
dence.—  The  general  rule  is  that  it  is  not  the  province  of  an 
expert  witness  to  draw  inferences  from  the  evidence  of  other  wit- 
nesses, unless  the  facts  testified  to  are  clear  and  uncontroverted, 
or  to  take  into  consideration  such  facts  a^  he  can  recollect  as 
having  been  testified  to,  and  thus  form  an  opinion  ;  but  he  should 

1  Heald  r.  Thiug,  45  Me.  392.  testimony  of  the  witnesses  and  read  it 

2  Ibid.  over  to  the  experts,  to  enable  them  to 

3  Chiry  V.  Chiry,  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  express  an  opinion  as  to  the  sanity  or 
78;  ante,  §  589.  insanity  of  the   accnsed  in  a  criminal 

4  Hitchcock  V.  Bnrgett,  38  Midi.  trial.  Choice  v.  State,  31  Ga.  424. 
501;  Craig  u,  Noblesville  &c.  K.  Co.,  ^  Spear  «.  Richardson,  37  N.  H.  24; 
98  Ind.  109;  Burns  v.  Barenfleld,  84  Woodbury  v.  Obear,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 
Ind.  43;  Livingston  v.  Com.,  14  Graft.  4G7;  United  States  v.  McGlue,  1  Curt. 
(Va.)  592;  United  States  v.  McGlue,  1  (U.  S.)  1;  Guitterraan  v.  Liverpool  &c. 
Curtis  C.  C.  1.  To  the  like  effect  see  Steamship  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  358;  Davis  i'. 
Ilcald  I'.  Thing,  45  Me.  392;  1  Greenl.  State,  35  Ind.  490;  Livingstone  v.  Com., 
Ev.,  §  440;  Kedf.  Am.  Cas.  on  Law  of  14  Gratt.  (Va.)  592. 

Wills,  40;   1  Wliart.  Ev.,  §  452.     It  is,  «  lioardmau  v.  Woodman,  47  N.  H. 

therefore,  improper  to  take  down  the       120,  135. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMIXATIOX    OF    EXPERTS.  4dV 

have  full  knowledge  of  the  ascertained  or  supposed  state  of 
facts,  on  which  his  opinion  is  desired.^  It  is  therefore  improper, 
in  most  cases,  and  therefore  error,  to  submit  to  him  the  testi- 
mony detailed  by  the  witnesses  in  their  hearing,  and  to  ask  him 
his  opinion  thereon.^ 

§596.  [Continued.]  Observations  on  the  Above  Rule. —  In  the 
celebrated  case  of  M'Naghten,  the  following  question  was  put  by  the 
lords  to  the  judges:  "Can  a  medical  mau,  conversant  with  the  dis- 
ease of  insanity,  who  never  saw  the  prisoner  previously  to  the  trial,  but 
who  was  present  during  the  whole  trial  and  the  examination  of  all  the  wit- 
nesses, be  asked  his  opinion  as  to  the  state  of  the  prisoner's  mind  at  the 
time  of  the  commission  of  the  alleged  crime,  or  his  opinion  whether  the 
prisoner  was  conscious  at  the  time  of  doing  the  act,  that  he  was  acting 
contrary  to  law,  or  whether  he  was  laboring  under  any,  and  what  delu- 
sion at  the  time?"  To  this  the  judges,  speaking  through  Tindal,  C.  J., 
answered:  "  In  answer  thereto,  we  state  to  your  lordships,  that  we 
think  the  medical  man,  under  the  circumstances  supposed,  cannot  in 
strictness,  be  asked  his  opinion  in  tlie  terms  above  stated  ;  because  each 
of  those  questions  involves  the  determination  of  the  truth  of  the  facts 
deposed  to,  which  is  for  the  jury  to  decide,  and  the  questions  are  not 
mere  questions  upon  a  matter  of  science,  in  which  case  such  evidence 
is  admissible.  But,  where  the  facts  are  admitted  or  not  disputed,  and 
the  question  becomes  substantially  one  of  science  only,  it  may  be  con- 
venient to  allow  the  question  to  be  put  in  that  general  form,  though 
the  same  cannot  be  insisted  on  as  a  matter  of  right."  ^  This  decision 
in  the  highest  judicial  tribunal  of  Great  Britain,  is  generally  regarded 

as  having  established  the   modern  law  upon  the  question. On  a 

trial  for  murder,  subsequently  occurring,  evidence  was  called  on  the 
prisoner's  behalf,  to  prove  his  insanity.  A  physician,  who  had  been 
in  court  during  the  whole  trial,  was  then  called,  on  the  part  of  the 
prosecution,  and  asked  whether,  having  heard  the  whole  evidence,  he 
was  of  opinion  that  the  prisoner,  at  the  time  he  committed  the  alleo-ed 
act,  was  of  unsound  mind.  It  was  held,  notwithstanding  the  opinion 
of  the  judges  in  the  case  of  McNaghten,  that  such  a  question  ought  not 

1  Guittermau  V.Liverpool &c.  Steam-  (U.    S.)    3G3,   309;  McMechen  w.  Mc- 
ship  qo.,83  N.  Y.  358.  Mecheu,  17  W.  Va.   684,   694;  Keg.  v. 

2  Woodbury     v.     Obear,     7     Gray  P'rauces,  4  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  57. 
(Mass.),   4i;7;    Jamesou  v.  Driukald,  3  ji'Xaghteii's   Case,  10  CI.   &  Fiu. 
12  Moore,  148;  The  Clenieut,  2  Curt,  200,  211. 


500  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl*. 

to  be  put,  but  that  the  proper  mode  of  examination  was  to  take  par- 
ticular facts,  and,  assuming  them  to  be  true,  to  ask  the  witness  whether, 
in  his  judgment,  they  were  indicative  of  insanity  on  the  part  of   the 

prisoner  at  the  time   the  alleged    act  was  committed. ^ "  This," 

said  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  "  would  be  especially  irregular,  where  the  evi- 
dence is  conflicting,  because  it  puts  it  in  the  power  of  the  expert  to  give 
an  opinion  upon  the  credibility  of  the  testimony  and  the  truth  of  the 
facts,  which  is  purely  a  question  for  the  jury  ;  and  then,  upon  the  value 
and  efficacy  of  the  facts  and  circumstances,  in  his  opinion  thus  proved, 
upon  the  question  of  soundness  of  mind."  - 

§  597.  [Continued.]  Not  to  give  Opinions  upon  Depositions  Sub- 
mitted TO  Them.  —  Experts  called  in  a  case  in  admiralty  cannot  give 
their  opinions  upon  depositions  submitted  to  them,  but  they  must  be 
examined  upon  a  hypothetical  state  of  facts  submitted  to  them  by  the 
court,  which  facts  the  trier  of  the  facts  finds  to  be  established  by  the 
evidence."^ Upon  the  trial  of  an  action  brought  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  the  breach  of  a  charter-party,  the  principal  question  was 
whether  or  not  the  ship,  which  had  been  disabled  by  a  storm  while  near 
the  port  of  Vera  Cruz,  could  have  put  into  any  of  the  ports  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  or  the  Southern  Atlantic  States.  Upon  the  trial, 
experts,  called  on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff,  were  asked,  against  the  de- 
fendant's objection  and  exception,  the  following  question:  "Under 
the  state  of  facts  mentioned  in  that  deposition,  what  ports  could  the 
captain  have  made  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico?"  They  were  also  asked 
other  questions  of  a  similar  import.  It  was  held  error  to  admit  these 
questions,  since  they  required  each  witness  to  determine  for  himself 
what  facts  were  proved  Ijy  the  deposition,  and  thus  to  usurp  the  func- 
tions of  a  jury.'' 

§  598.  [Continued.]  Further  Illustrations. — So,  in  a  contest 
touching  the  validity  of  a  will,  it  is  not  admissible  to  ask  a  medical  ex- 
pert whether,  after  having  heard  the  evidence,  he  is  or  is  not  of  opinion 
that  the  testator  was  of  sound  mind.^  .  _  .  _     Nor  can  he,  in  such  a  case  be 

1  Reg.  V.  Frances,  4  Cox  Cr.  Cas.  57.  ^  Woodbury     v.      Obear,    7     Gray 

2  Woodbury  v.  Obear,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  4(17;  Butler  f.  St.  Louis  Life 
(Mass.),  467,  471.  lus.   Co.,  45  Iowa,   93.     See   further, 

3  Tlie  Clemeut,  2  Curt.  (U.  S.)  3(;3,  Pliillips  v.  Star,  26  Iowa,  349;  State 
3G9.  V.  Felter,  25  Iowa,  07;   1    GreeuL    Ev. 

*  Dolz  V.  Morris,  10  IIuu  (N.  Y.),  §  440.  See  also  Freeman  r.  Lawrence, 
201.  11  Jones  &  Sp.  (43  N.  Y.  Sup.,)  288. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  501 

asked  to  give  his  conclusion,  in  view  of  tlie  testimony,  as  lie  has  heard 

it,  in  connection  with  his  own  personal  knowledge  of  the  testator,  i 

It  was  so  held  where  a  physician  examined  as  an  expert  was  asked  a 
question  in  these  words:  "  Now,  then,  you  will  state  to  the  jur^'  if  the 
symptoms  and  indications  testified  to  by  the  witnesses  were  proved, 
and  if  the  jury  were  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  them,  —  I  wish  you  to  state 
whether,  in  your  opinion,  having  heard  all  the  symptoms  and  indications, 
Joseph  Hickenbottom  was  of  sound  or  unsound  mind,  and  if  unsound, 

what  is  the  nature  and   character  of   that  unsoundness?"  ^ So, 

where  on  a  trial  for  murder,  a  physician,  who  stated  that  he  had  heard 
the  statements  of  the  witnesses  as  to  the  circumstances  which  immedi- 
ately preceded  the  illness  of  the  deceased,  the  appearance  of  the  body 
after  death,  the  condition  of  the  limbs,  etc.,  and  could  therefrom 
offer  an  opinion  as   to  the  cause  of   death,  was  permitted  to  testify 

what,  in  his  opinion,  was  the  cause  of  the  death,  —  this  was  error. ^ 

So,  in  an  action  for  damages  growing  out  of  a  maritime  collision,  it  was 
held  improper  to  ask  a  nautical  expert  whether  he  thought,  having 
heard  the  evidence  in  the  case,  that  the  conduct  of  the  captain  was  cor- 
rect or  not.^ In  an  action  against  a  common  carrier  by  sea,  to  recover 

damages  for  injury  to  the  freight  by  a  collision  with  a  collier,  after  a 
protest  or  statement  as  to  the  circumstances  attending  the  injury  and 
the  management  of  the  vessel  had  been  given  in  evidence,  and  after  wit- 
nesses  had   testified  in   reference   thereto,  there   being  a  discrepancy 

1  Thus,  on   a   question   respecting  insane — based  upon  my  own  personal 

insanity  of  a  deceased  person,  an  ex-  knowledge."     Tlie     Court:    "He     is 

pert  witness  had  given  his   opinion  giving  you  a  hypothetical  case."     Q. 

based  on  his  personal  observation  and  (to  the   same  as   before).     "  I  want 

treatment  of    the    deceased.      After-  the  opinion  now  with  your  own  indi- 

wards,  in  answer  to  certain  questions  vidual    observation    from    what   has 

propounded  to  liira,  he  stated  that  he  reached  you  in  the  testimony?"     A. 

had  heard  all  the   testimony  that  had  "  The  testimony    has  not  served  to 

been  given  iu  the  case.    The  plaintiff's  induce   me  to  change  my  opinion  al- 

counsel  then  propounded  to  him  the  ready  expressed."     It  was   held   that 

following  questions:  "  Q.     I  will  put  the  ruling  of  the  court  in  allowing 

this  question.     In  view  of  the  testi-  these  questions  to  be  put,  against  ob- 

mouy  as  you   have  heard  it,   and  in  jection,  was  prejudicial  error.     Butler 

connection  with  your  own  knowledge  v.    St.  Louis  Life   Ins.  Co.,  45  Iowa, 

of  the  state  of  Mr.  Butler  at  the   time  93. 

he  was  iu  the  asylum  in  1847,  in  your  ^  Smith  v.  Hickenbottom,  57  Iowa, 

opinion,  was  he  or  not,  at  that  thue,  733,  738. 

insane?"     A.  "  That   opiuiou   I    have  ^  state  v.  Bowman,  78  N.  C.  509. 

already  expressed — that  he  was  not  ^  Sills  v.  Brown,  9  Car.  &  P.  GOl. 


502  EXAMIXATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoiUp.   Tl'., 

between  the  protest  and  some  of  the  testimony,  and  the  evidence  cov- 
ering a  great  variety  of  facts,  a  witness  called  as  an  expert  by  the 
plaintiff,  after  having  testified  that  he  had  heard  the  testimony  read  to 
the  jury  on  the  previous  da}^  and  the  protest,  and  had  heard  the  testi- 
mony of  one  or  two  of  the  witnesses  and  the  circumstances  as  detailed 
by  them, —  was  asked,  "  under  the  circumstances  detailed  by  these 
witnesses  and  in  the  protest,"  and  under  certain  circumstances  which 
were  specified,  "  what,  in  your  opinion,  should  have  been  done  by  the 
persons  in  charge  of  the  steamship?"  It  was  held,  applying  the  fore- 
going principle,  that  the  question  was  incompetent. ^ 

§  599.  [Contra.]  When  the  Evidence  may  be  Submitted 
to  Experts.  —  Contrary  to  the  foregoing,  there  is  considerable 
judicial  opinion,  apparently  following  the  lead  of  M' NagJiten's 
Case'^  to  the  effect  that  the  cases  where  the  expert  cannot  be 
asked  to  give  his  opinion  upon  the  testimony  as  he  has  heard  it 
detailed  by  the  witnesses,  are  those  in  which  the  facts  are  con- 
troverted.^ Upon  this  subject  it  has  been  reasoned:  "  Where 
the  facts  stated  are  not  complicated,  and  the  evidence  is  not 
contradictory,  and  the  terms  of  the  question  require  the  witness 
to  assume  that  the  facts  stated  are  true,  he  is  not,  [where  he  is 
called  upon  to  give  an  opinion  upon  the  evidence  which  he  has 
heard,]  required  to  draw  a  conclusion  of  fact."  * 

§  600.  [Continued.]  In  Actions  for  the  Value  of  Services. —  In 
an  action  for  work  and  labor,  after  plaintiff  had  testified  as  to  the  char- 
acter of  the  services  rendered,  he  called  a  witness  who  was  asked: 
"What  were  his  services,  as  he  describes  them,  worth  a  month?" 
This  was  objected  to,  upon  the  ground  that  it  was  not  competent  for 
the  witness  to  give  an  opinion  based  on  the  plaintiff's  statement.  The 
objection  was  overruled.  It  w^as  held  that  this  was  not  error,  since  the 
question  did   not  call  upon  the  witness  to   determine  the  truth  of   the 

1  Guitterman  U.Liverpool  &c. Steam-  (U.  S.)  1;  aud  In  Guittermau  v.  Liver- 
ship  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  358  (deuyiug  Feu-  pool  &c.  Steamship  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  358; 
wick  V.  Bell,  1  Car.  &  K.  312,  aud  and  in  Davis  v.  State,  35  lud.  49G. 
distinguishing  Trausportatiou  Line  v.  Compare  Fairchild  v,  Bascomb,  35  Vt. 
Hope,  95  U.  S.  297).  398. 

2  10  CI.  &  Fiu.  200,  211;  ante,  §59G.  *  Iluut  v.   Lowell   Gaslight  Co.,  8 

3  This  seems  to  have  beeu  assumed  Alleu  (Mass.),  169,  opiuiou  by  Chap- 
in  United   States  v.  McGlue,  1   Curt.  mau,J. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  503 

plaintiff's  evidence,  but  was  siinpl}'  asking  him  what  were  the  serv- 
ices worth,  assuming  that  they  were  rendered  as  described,  and  leaving 

the  jury  to  determine  that  question. i A  phj'sician  who  had  testified 

to  his  knowledge  of  cases  of  cancer  and  of  the  value  of  services  in  earing 
for  them,  who  also  testified  that  he  had  heard  the  evidence  of  other 
physicians  who  had  treated  and  who  described  the  cancer  in  question, 
and  had  heard  the  testimony  of  the  plaintiff's  wife  read,  but  who  had 
no  personal  knowledge  of  the  case,  was  asked:  "  What  would  be  the 
value  of  the  services  rendered  by  her  in  nursing  and  dressing  the  can- 
cer?" This  was  objected  to,  and  the  answer  was  received  under  excep- 
tion. It  was  held  that  this  mode  of  interrogation  was  erroneous  ;  since 
the  question  called  upon  the  witness  to  assume  the  correctness  of,  and 
to  draw  inferences  from  the  evidence  of  other  witnesses,  and  that  his 
opinion  should  have   been    ol)tained   by  stating  to  him  a   hypothetical 

case.'- But  in   such  a  case,  a  phj'sician   who  knows  the  value  of 

such  services,  and  who  is  also  acquainted  with  the  particular  case,  may 
give  his  opinion  as  to  the  value  of  the  services  sued  for.^ 

§  601.  [Continued.]  Other  Instances  where  this  has  been 
Done.  — Cases  are  found  where  medical  experts,  who  have  heard  the 
evidence,  have  been  allowed  to  give  tlieir  opinion  based  thereon.  Thus, 
in  a  criminal  case  where  the  prisoner's  defense  was  insanity,  a  medical 
man,  who  had  sat  through  the  trial,   might,  it  was  held  by  Park,  J.,  be 

asked  whether  the  facts  proved  showed  symptoms  of  insanity.'*^ An 

expert  who  was  present  at  the  trial  and  who  heard  all  the  testimony  of 
the  witnesses  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  in  regard  to  the  sanity  of  the 
party,  was  asked:  "  Upon  the  hj'pothesis  that  the  testimony  given  by  the 
witnesses  in  this  case,  etc.,  is  all  true,  then  what  would  be  your  opinion" 
of  the  sanity  of  the  party.  It  was  held  that  this  question  was  substantially 
correct,  as  it  was  in  effect  putting  a  hypothetical  state  of  case   to  the 

witness,  from  which  his  opinion  was  to  be  given. ^ In  an  action 

against  a  gaslight  company,  for  a  negligent  injury  caused  by  an  escape 
of  gas  from  its  main  pipe  into  the  public  street,  exceptions  to  the  fo.l- 
lowing  question,  put  to  three  medical  experts,  were  held  not  well  taken: 
"  Having  heard  the  evidence,  and  assuming  the  statements  made  by  the 
plaintiffs  to  be  true,  what,  in  your  opinion,  was  their  sichiess,  and  do 

1  McColhim  V.  Seward,  62  N.  Y.  317.  •»  Rex  v.  Searle,  1  Mood.  &  Eob.  75. 

*    Reynolds    v.  Robiusou,    64  N.  Y.  ^  Negro   Jerry   v.    Towusheud,    9 

589.  Md.  145,  159. 
3  Reynolds  V.  Robiusou,  supra. 


504  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  ThoniD.  Tr., 

you  see  any  adequate  cause   for  the  same?  "  ^ So,  where,  in  an 

action  for  malpractice  by  a  surgeon,  an  expert  had  heard  the  testi- 
mony of  a  particular  witness  as  to  the  manner  in  which  the  operation 
had  been  performed,  and  was  thereafter  questioned  as  follows:  "  Sup- 
pose his  statement  relative  to  the  amputation  and  its  subsequent  treat- 
ment to  be  trutliful,  was,  or  was  not,  the  amputation  well  performed? 
Was  the  subsequent  treatment  of  the  patient  proper  or  improper? 
And,  in  your  opinion,  was,  or  was  not,  the  death  of  the  patient  the  re- 
sult of  any  neglect  or  want  of  skill  in  the  surgeon?  " —  it  was  held  that 
the  court  erred  in  rejecting  these  questions,  though,  as  the  testimony 
of  the  witness  had  been  put  to  the  expert  as  a  supposed  case,  the  error 

was  without  prejudice.'-^ So,   it  has  been  held,  in  an    action  for 

work  and  labor,  where  the  value  of  the  services  is  in  question,  that  it  is 
competent  for  a  witness,  who  has  heard  tlie  testimony  of  another  wit- 
ness as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  services  rendered,  to  give  an  opin- 
ion as  to  their  value.  The  court  said:  "The  question  directed  the 
attention  of  the  witness  to  the  testimony  of  a  single  witness  upon  a  sin- 
gle subject,  and  was  not  other  in  effect  than  it  would  have  been,  if  the 
counsel  had  recited  the  statement  of  services  rendered  by  the  party, 
and,  on  that  statement,  asked  an  opinion  of  their  value."  This 
was  equivalent  to  a  question,  "assuming  that  the  services  rendered 
were  as  described  by  the  witness,  what  were  they  worth?  "  ^ 

§  602.  [Contiiiiied.]  What  if  the  expert  has  not  heard 
all  the  Testimony.  —  A  medical  expert  called  as  a  witness  is  not 
qualified  to  express  an  opinion,  based  on  previous  testimony  in 
the  case,  where  he  has  not  heard  all  the  testimony  which  may 
have  been  material  to  the  subject  of  the  inquiry.*  Thus,  it  is  not 
competent  for  a  medical  Avitness  who  has  not  heard  all  the  testi- 
mony, given  in  a  case  of  murder,  tending  to  show  the  mental 
condition  of  the  defendant,  where  the  defense  is  insanity,  to  give 
an  opinion  founded  upon  the  portion  heard  by  him,  as  to  his 
sanity.^ 

§  003.    [Continued.]      Opinion  founded  on    an  Opinion. — 

It  has  been  said  that  an  expert  may  give  his  opinion  to  the /ac(s 

1  Hunt  V.  Lowt'U  Gaslijjjlit  Co.,  8  ■*  Carpenter  v.  Blake,  2  Laus.  (N. 
Allen  (Mass.),  I(i9.                                          Y.)  20(5;   People  v.  Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358; 

2  Wright  V.  Hardy,  22  Wis.  348.  s.  c.  1  Park,  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  495. 
'  Seymour  v.  Fellows,  77  N.  Y.  178.  ^  People  v.  Lake,  snpra. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  505 

testified  to  by  the  witnesses,  but  not  upon  their  —  opinions,  which 
means  that  an  expert's  opinion  cannot  be  founded  upon  an 
opinion.^ 

§  604.  Hypothetical  Questions,  how  Framed. — The  rule, 
then,  is  that  the  hypothetical  questions  must  be  based  either 
upon  the  hypothesis  of  the  truth  of  all  the  evidence,  or  upon  a 
hypothesis  specially  framed,  of  certain  facts  assumed  to  be 
pi'oved,  for  the  purpose  of  the  inquiry.  Such  questions  leave  it 
for  the  jury  to  decide,  in  the  first  case,  whether  the  evidence  is 
true  or  not,  and  in  the  second  case,  whether  the  particular  facts 
assumed  are  or  are  not  proved. ^  It  should  exclude  any  opinion 
of  the  witness  as  to  the  way  in  which  disputed  facts  should  be 
found. "^ 

§  605.  [Continued.]  Must  not  embrace  Matters  within 
Ordinary  Experience. — The  hypothetical  questions  must  not 
embrace  matters  within  the  range  of  ordinary  human  experience; 
because,  as  to  such  matters,  the  opinions  of  the  twelve  men  in 
the  jury  box  are  better,  in  the  eye  of  the  law,  than  those  of  the 
experts.* 

* 

§  606.  Must  he  Based  on  tlie  Evidence. — Hypothetical 
questions  must  present  facts  which  the  evidence  tends  to  prove; 
if  the  facts  embraced  in  them  are  not  proved  or  attempted  to  be 
proved,  they  are  to  be  excluded  by  the  court  upon  objection.^ 
There  must  be  testimony  tending  to  jyrove  every  supposed  state 
of  fact  embraced  therein.^  The  hypothesis  must  be  clearly 
stated,  so  that  the  jury  may  know  with  certainty  upon  precisely 

1  Walker  v.  Fields,  28  Ga.  237.  s  state   v.    Anderson,    10   Ore   4i8, 

2  Gottlieb?;.  Hartmau,  3Col.  53,  G3;  455;  Williams  v.  Brown,  28  Oh.  8t. 
adopting  Carpenter  u.  Blake,  2  Laus.  547;  Bomgardner  v.  Andrews,  55  la. 
(N.  Y.)  206.  638;  Hurst  v.   Railway  Co.,  49  la.  76; 

3  Livingstone  v.  Com.,  14  Gratt.  Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind.  550,  554; 
(Va.)  592.  Bishop  v.  Spiuiug,  38  Ind.  143;  Haish 

*  State   V.  Anderson,    10   Ore.    448,       v.  Payson,  107  111.  365. 
455;  Hill   v.   Portland  &c.  R.  Co.,  55  ^  Hathaway  v.  National  Life  Insur- 

Me,  439.  auce  Co.,  48  Vt.  336. 


'506  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

what  state  of  assumed  facts  the  expert  bases  his  opinion. ^  Mere 
fanciful  questions,  where  there  is  no  evidence  at  all  in  support  of 
the  facts  assumed,  or  questions  assuming  facts  which  are 
wholly  irrelevant  to  the  subject  of  the  investigation,  should  be 
excluded. 2  But  where  there  is  evidence,  either  directly  proving 
the  facts  assumed,  or  evidence  from  which  such  facts  may  be 
inferred,  the  court  cannot  invade  the  province  of  the  jury  and 
decide  the  facts.  "  It  is,"  said  Elliott,  J.,  "only  where  there 
is  no  evidence  at  all  in  support  of  the  facts  assumed,  or 
where  the  question  is  clearly  irrelevant,  or  where  it  is  merely 
speculative ,  or  where  it  is  itnproperly  framed ,  that  the  court  may 
interfere.-^  Within  this  rule,  whether  the  facts  are  all  proved, 
upon  which  the  hypothetical  question  is  based,  or  to  what  ex- 
tent they  are  proved,  is  a  question,  not  for  the  court,  but  for  the 
jury.*  In  fine,  there  should  be  evidence  in  support  of  the  hy- 
pothesis, of  such  probative  strength  that,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples prevailing  in  the  particular  jurisdiction,  the  judge  would 
be  warranted  in  submitting  such  facts  to  the  jury  for  their  find- 
ing. In  general,  it  is  sufficient  that  there  is  substantial  evidence 
tending  to  establish  the  hypothesis;  for  the  judge  cannot  say, 
before  the  question  reaches  the  jury,  whether  or  not  it  has  been 
established.^ 

§  GOT,  Latitude  iu  Framing  them.  —  It  was  said  in  one  case 
that  "some  latitude  must  necessarily  be  given,  in  the  examina- 
tion of  medical  experts,  and  in  the  propounding  of  hypothetical 
questions  for  their  opinion,  the  better  to  enable  the  juiy  to  pass 
upon  the  questions  submitted  to  them.  The  opinion  is  the  opin- 
ion of  the  expert,  and  if  the  facts  are  found  by  the  jury,  as  the 
counsel,  by  his  questions,  assumes  them  to  be,  the  opinion  may 
have  some  weight;  otherwise,  not.  It  is  the  privilege  of  the 
counsel,  in  such  cases,  to  assume,  within  the   limits  of  the  evi- 

,  1  McMecheu  v.   McMecheu,  17   W.  ^  Louisville   &c.  K.    Co.  v.  Falvey, 

Va.  684.  104  lud.  409,  420. 

2  People  V.  Augsbury,  97  N.  Y.  501.  *  Ibid.- 

See  also  Fairchikl  v.  Bascomb,  35  Vt.  ^  Nave  u.  Tucker,  70  lud.  15,  18. 

398;  Williams  17.  Browu,  28  0h.  St.  547. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  507 

deuce,  any  state  of  facts  which  he  claims  the  evidence  justifies^ 
and  have  the  opinion  of  experts  upon  the  facts  thus  assumed."  ^ 

§  608.  Xo  Objection  that  they  contain  Errors.  —  It  i^  no  ob- 
jection to  a  hypothetical  question  that  the  state  of  facts  which  it 
assumes  is  erroneous,  if  within  the  possible  or  probable  range  of 
the  evidence;  since  the  judge  cannot  decide,  as  a  preliminary 
question  on  an  objection  to  evidence,  whether  it  is  erroneous  or 
not,  —  the  question  being  for  the  jury.^ 

§  609.  Not  Necessary  to  State  Facts  as  Proved.  —  It  is  gen- 
erally said  in  the  books  that,  in  putting  hypothetical  questions 
to  an  expert  w^itness,  counsel  may  assume  the  facts  in  accordance 
with  his  theory  of  them;  it  is  not  essential  that  he  state  them  to 
the  witness  as  they  have  actually  been  proved."^  In  discussing 
this  question,  it  was  said  by  Folger,  J.:  *'The  claim  is,  that  a 
hypothetical  question  may  not  be  put  to  an  expert,  unless  it 
states  the  facts  as  they  exist.  It  is  manifest,  if  this  is  the  rule, 
that,  in  a  trial  where  there  is  a  dispute  as  to  the  facts,  which  can 
be  settled  only  by  the  jury,  there  would  be  no  room  for  a  hypo- 
thetical question.  The  very  meaning  of  the  word  is  that  it  sup- 
poses, assumes  something,  for  the  time  being.  Each  side,  in  an 
issue  of  fact,  has  its  theory  of  what  is  the  true  state  of  the  facts, 
and  assumes  that  it  can  prove  it  to  be  so,  to  the  satisfaction  of 
the  jury;  and,  so  assuming,  shapes  hypothetical  questions  to  ex- 
perts accordingly."^ 

§  610.  Xeed  not  embody  all  the  Facts. —  In  general,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  hypothetical  questions  should  embody  all  the 
facts  exhibited  by  the  evidence;  it  is  sufficient,  on  the  contrary, 
that  they  embody  such  a  state  of  facts,  fairly  within  the  range 
of  the  evidence,  as  the  counsel  propounding  them  deem  to*have 

1  Filer  v.  New  York  &c.  R.  Co.,  49  Steamship  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  3o8;  Cowley 
N.  Y.  42,  46.  r.  People,  Id.  4(34. 

2  Hartuett  v.  Garvey,  6(3  N.  Y.  641.  *  Cowley  v.  People,   83  N.  Y.  4G4, 

3  Lovelady  v.   State,   14  Tex.  App.  470;  s.  c.  38  Am.  Rep.  464. 
545,560;    Guittermau  ?7.  Liverpool  &c. 


508  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl*., 

been  proved.^  But  where  the  facts  are  not  in  dispute,  it  is  proper 
to  require  that  the  hypothetical  question  shall  embrace  them  all, 
and  that  the  witness  shall  take  them  all  into  consideration,  in 
giving  his  answer.'^  Where,  however,  the  evidence  is  conflicting^ 
or  the  facts  are  in  dispute,  the  party  examining  an  expert  wit- 
ness is  at  liberty  to  frame  a  hypothetical  state  of  facts,  within 
the  limits  of  the  evidence,  according  to  Ids  tJieory  of  what  the 
evidence  tends  to  prove,  or  of  what  the  finding  of  the  jury  should 
be  ;  and  it  will  be  no  objection  that  it  is  partial,  and  does  not 
cover  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  or  all  the  ultimate  facts  which 
there  is  evidence  tending  to  prove. ^ 

§  611.  [Continued.]  Dicta  upon  this  Subject.  — Thus,  in  a  case 
in  Indiana,- it  was  said  by  Elliott,  J.:  "A  doctrine  which  requires  a 
prosecutor  to  assume  and  embody  in  one  question  conflicting  testimony, 
cannot  be  defended  on  any  ground  consistent  with  sound  reason.  It 
would  operate  unjustly  in  practice,  because  it  would  impose  upon  an 
examining  counsel  the  necessity  of  assuming  as  true  that  which  he 
denies  intact,  and  thus  the  jury  would  be  confused  and  perplexed  by  an 
apparent  admission  of  facts  antagonistic  to  the  theory  of  the  prosecu- 
tion. It  would  require  tiie  court,  whenever  an  objection  was  interposed, 
to  determine  what  facts  were  proved,  and  what  were  not,  and  thus  com- 
pel an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the  jury.  It  would  produce  endless 
wrangling  and  confusion,  darken  and  obscure  the  investigation  of  the 
recondite  subject  of  mental  capacity,  and  place  the  falsest  testimony 
and  the  absurdest  statements  on  an  equality  with  the  truest  and  most 
reasonable.  On  the  other  hand,  no  harm  can  be  done  the  accused  by 
holding  that  the  examining  counsel  may  assume  such  a  case  as  the  evi- 
dence, in  his  judgment,  makes  out,  and  which  keeps  within  the  range  of 
the  relevant  testimony,  because  the  prisoner's  counsel  may,  on  cross- 
examination,  add  to  the  hypothetical  case  supposed  by  the  prosecutor, 
such  facts  as  he  deems  the  evidence  to  have  established,  or  subtract 
from  it  such  facts  as  he  supposes  to  have  been  disproved,  or  not  to  have 

1  Goodwiu  V.  State,  96  Ind.  550,  554  v.  State,  66  lud.  94;  s.  c.  32  Am.  Rep. 

(denying  People  v.  Thurston,  2  Park.  99;  Nave  v.  Tucker,  70  lud.  15;  Bishop' 

Cr.    (N.    Y.)   49);    Louisville    &c.    R.  v.  Spiuing,  38  Ind.  143;  Davis  v.  State, 

Co.  V.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  412;  Elliott  v.  35  Ind.  496;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  760. 
Russell,  92   Ind.   526;    Vauvalkeubt'rg  2  d^vIs  u.  State,  35  Ind.  496. 

V.   Vanvalkenborg,   90  lud.  433,   437;  ^  Davis  u.  State,  35  lud.  496. 

Fulwider  v.  Ingels,  87  Ind.  414;  Guetig 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  509 

been  proved."  ^  lu  like  manner  it  is  said  by  Worden,  C.  J.,  in  an 
earlier  case  in  the  same  State:  "  The  party  seeking  an  opinion  in  snch 
case  may,  within  reasonable  limits,  put  his  case  hypothethically,  as  he 
claims  it  to  haA^e  been  proved,  and  take  the  opinion  of  the  witness 
thereon  ;  leaving  the  jury,  of  course,  to  determine  whether  the  hypo- 
thetical case  put  is  the  real  one  proved."  -  Upon  the  same  subject  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  has  said:  "  The  rule  in  that  respect  must 
be  that,  in  propounding  a  h3'pothetical  question  to  the  expert,  the  party 
may  assume  as  proved,  all  facts  which  the  evidence  in  the  case  tends  to 
prove,  and  the  court  ought  not  to  reject  the  evidence,  on  the  ground 
that,  in  his  opinion,  such  facts  are  not  established  by  the  preponder- 
ance of  evidence.  What  facts  are  proved  in  the  case,  when  there  is 
evidence  to  prove  them,  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  and  not  for  the 
court.  The  party  has  the  right  to  the  opinion  of  the  expert  witness  on 
the  facts  wliich  he  claims  to  be  the  facts  of  the  case,  if  there  be  evi- 
dence in  the  case  tending  to  establish  such  claimed  facts,  and  the  trial 
judge  ought  not  to  reject  the  question  because  he  may  think  such  facts 
are  not  sufflciently  established."  ^  In  short,  the  rule  seems  to  be  that 
a  physician  testifying  as  an  expert  cannot  be  permitted  to  decide  upon 
the  credibility  of  witnesses,  or  to  take  into  consideration  facts  known  to 
him  and  not  communicated  to  the  jury;  but  after  having  communi- 
cated such  facts  in  his  testimony,  he  may  take  them  into  consideration 
in  forming  his  opinion.* 

§  612.  Long-  Hypothetical  Questions  Objectionable. — The 

giving  of  long  hypothetical  questions,  which  assume  the  existence 

*  Gooclwiu  V.  State,  9G  lud.  550,  554.  sel  in  such  case  to  assume,  within  the 
2  Bishop  V.  Spiuiug,  38  lud.  143.  limits  of  the  evidence,  any  state  of 
To  the  same  effect  see  Guitterinau  v.  facts  which  he  claims  the  evidence 
Liverpool  &c.  Co.,  83  N.  Y.  358;  justifies,  aud  have  the  opiuiou  of  ex- 
Davis  V.  State,  35  lud.  496;  s.c.  9  Am.  perts  upon  the  facts  thus  assumed." 
Rep.  7(J0;  Guetig  v.  State,  66  lud.  94;  Lawsou  Exp.  &  Op.  Ev.  153. 
Nave  V.  Tuclier,  70  lud.  15.  It  is  said  ^  Quiuu  v.  Biggius,  G3  Wis.  (364, 
by  a  recent  writer  on  this  subject:  670. 

"  If  framed  ou  the  assumption  of  cer-  *  Koeuig  v.  Globe  Mutual  Life  lus. 

tain  facts,  counsel  may    assume  the  Co.,  10  Hun    (N.   Y.),   558;    Huut  v. 

facts  in  accordance  with  his  theory  of  Lowell  Gaslight  Co.,  8  Allen  (Mass.), 

them,  it  not  being  essential  that   he  169;  Van  Zaudt  v.  Mutual  Benefit  lus. 

should  state  the  facts  as  they  actually  Co.,  55  N.  Y.  169;  s.  c.  14  Am.  Kep.  215; 

exist."       Rogers'    Expert  Test.    39.  Bush  r.  Jackson,  24  Ala.  273;  Bennett 

Another  recent  writer  thus  states  the  v.  Fail,  26  Ala.  605;   Louisville  &c.  R. 

rule:  "  It  is  the  privilege  of  the  couu-  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  lud.  409,  419. 


510  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'.,, 

of  a  multitude  of  facts,  is  erroneousA  The  reason  of  this  rule 
is  thus  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Campbell:  "  In  most  cases  it  asks 
the  witness  to  usurp  the  functions  of  the  jury,  and  may  often 
lead  them  to  disregard  their  own  functions  and  accept  conclu- 
sions which  they  should  form  for  themselves.  But  it  may  also 
be  observed  that  another  result,  even  where  the  question  involves 
science,  is  nearly  as  dangerous.  No  opinion  of  a  scientific  ques- 
tion can  be  of  any  service  to  a  jury,  either  in  giving  them  direct 
knowledge,  or  in  enabling  them  to  compare  opinions,  unless  they 
know  just  what  elements  enter  into  the  opinion.  Human  mem- 
ory is  not  usually  so  tenacious  that  a  question  of  such  great 
length,  involving  many  distinct  facts  or  elements,  can  be  fully 
remembered  by  the  witness  to  whom  it  is  propounded  on  the 
stand;  and  it  is  practically  unlikely,  if  not  impossible,  that  when 
he  answers  it,  he  answers  it  with  a  view  of  all  these  separate  ele- 
ments. He  necessarily  answers  it  by  assuming  for  himself  what 
is  material  and  what  is  immaterial,  and  if  he  were  at  the  same 
time  to  show  what  matters  he  has  eliminated,  there  could  be  no 
difficulty  in  ascertaining  what  is  needed,  and  testing  all  witnesses 
by  the  same  standard.     But  where  this  process  is  repeated  by 

1  People  V.  Browu,  53  Mich.  531 ;  immediate  gains,  his  rescue  from  im- 
Haish  V.  Paysou,  V2  Bradw.  (111.)  539,  pending  perils,  the  superior  advan- 
54:();  s,  c.  affirmed  on  this  poiut,  107  tages  which  he  thereby  acquired  over 
111.  365,  371.  This  case  furnishes  a  other  persons  with  whom  he  had  no 
strikingly  fantastic  illustration  of  an  connection;  a  victory,  whose  stnpen- 
abuse  of  the  rule  in  this  regard.  The  dous  results  to  the  defendant,  the  ar- 
so-called  hypothetical  question  was  gumeut  traced  down  through  the  next 
long  enough  to  fill  two  and  a  half  succeeding  fourteen  years  of  the  un- 
pages  of  a  book  of  standard  law  re-  certain  future,  showing  that  the  de- 
ports. It  was,  according  to  the  de-  fendant  might  realize,  as  a  crowning 
scriptiou  of  the  appellate  court,  resnlt  of  the  plaintiff's  services,  the 
"replete  with  absolute  assertions  of  great  sum  of  $1,120,000,  if  he  would 
facts  and  even  extended  into  the  do-  but  attend  to  his  business  during  that 
main  of  pure  speculation."  It  was  time."  And  although  it  was  put  to 
"a  high-sounding  prologue;"  it  six  expert  Zaio«/e/'S  on  a  question  of  the 
"abounded  with  strong  adjectives,"  value  of  professional  services,  it  was 
and  with  "now  and  then  a  rhetorical  drawn  in  si;ch  a  manner  as  obliged  the 
expletive,"  and  "  embodied  a  rather  court  to  assume  that  even  they  would 
vigorous  argument  to  prove  the  mag-  not  be  aljle  to  understand  it,  and  it 
uitude  of  the  victory,  which  the  plaint-  was  therefore  held  bad. 
iffs  had   won   for   the  defendant;   his 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  511 

different  witnesses,  they  may  not  all  act  on  the  same  basis,  and 
fonllicts  of  opinion  will  appear,  which  are  more  apparent  than 
real.  In  science,  as  everywhere  else,  all  inquiries  should  be  brief 
and  clear  enough  to  leave  out  all  rubbish  and  direct  attention  to 
tangible  results."  ^  There  is  another,  and,  within  certain  limits, 
an  obviously  sound  view,  which  was  thus  expressed  in  a  late 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  given  by  Mr. 
Justice  Field:  "  The  length  of  hypothetical  statements  presented 
to  a  witness  to  ascertain  his  opinion  upon  any  matter  growing  out 
of  the  facts  supposed,  will  necessarily  depend  upon  the  simple  or 
complicated  character  of  the  transactions  recited,  and  the  num- 
ber of  particulars  which  must  be  considered  for  the  formation  of 
the  opinion  desired;  and  this  subject,  like  the  extent  to  which 
the  examination  of  a  witness  may  be  allowed,  must,  in  a  great 
degree,  be  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  court."  ^ 

§  613.  Whether  Witness  concurs  in  the  Testimony  of  An- 
other Expert. —  An  expert  who  has  heard  the  testimony  of  an- 
other expert,  may  not  properly  be  asked  whether  he  concurs 
therein,  and  if  not,  wherein  he  differs  from  it.  Such  a  mode  of 
eliciting  the  opinion  of  the  witness  may  have  the  merit  of  being 
expeditious,  but  it  may  be  attended  with  unfairness  toward  the  wit- 
ness himself,  as  well  as  toward  the  opposite  party.  "  Witnesses 
called  upon  to  testify  professionally  should  be  left  free  to  give 
their  own  individual  opinion,  ui)on  the  facts  involved,  uncon- 
nected with,  and  untrammeled  by  the  opinions  of  others  who 
may  have  been  examined."  ^ 

§  614.  [Continued.]  Instances  op  Proper  Hypothetical  Ques- 
tions.—  In  an  action  for  damages  against  a  druggist  for  selling  opium 
to  the  plaintiff 's  wife,  whereliy  she  became  sick,  emaciated,  etc.,  the 
following  question  was  put  to  a  doctor  of  medicine:  "  In  your  judg- 
ment, speaking  from  your  experience  as  a  ph3'sician  and  surgeon,  what 
would  tlie  natural  result  of  three  of  these  bottles  of  opium,  called  laud- 

'  People  y.  Brown,  53  Mich.  531,  535.  3  Home  v.    Williams,  12   lud.  325, 

2  Forsythe  v.   Doolittle,  7  Sup.  Ct.      329,  opinion  by  Wordeu,  J. 
Rep.  408;   s.  r.  120  U.  S.  73. 


512  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

anum,  be  upon  Mrs.  Hoard,  as  you  know  tlie  Avoman,  and  her  situation 
and  constitution,  and  all  that?  "  It  was  held  that  the  question  was 
clearly  proper.  The  court,  speaking  through  Foster,  J.,  said:  "If  it 
had  been  based  upon  the  evidence  which  had  then  been  given,  there  is 
good  ground  for  holding  that  it  should  have  been  excluded,  because 
the  witness  would  have  been  called  upon  to  determine  as  to  the  truth  or 
the  falsity  of  all  of  the  evidence,  and  he  would  have  also  to  found  his 
conclusions  as  to  the  effect  to  be  given  to  it,  both  of  which  belong  ex- 
clusively to  the  jury ;  while,  in  the  form  in  which  the  question  M^as  put, 
if  the  jury  found  that  the  facts  proved  did  not  warrant  any  or  all  of  the 
assumptions  of  the  hypothetical  question,  they  would  treat  the  answer 
of  the  doctor  as  not  relevant  to  the  case.  The  true  rule  is  to  state  a 
hypothetical  case  to  the  witness."  ^ The  following  form  was  ap- 
proved in  a  case  where  it  was  deemed  proper  to  take  the  opinions  of 
witnesses  upon  the  evidence,  as  they  had  heard  it:  -^  "  Suppose  all  the 
facts  stated,  by  the  several  witnesses  to  be  true,  was  Mr.  Wood- 
bury laboring  under  an  insane  delusion,  or  was  he  of  an  unsound 
mind?"  ^  -  -  -  -  In  another  case  the  same  court  ruled  that  the  proper 
question  to  be  put  to  a  medical  witness  was  this:  "  If  the  symptoms 
and  indications  testified  to  by  the  other  witnesses  are  proved,  and  if 
the  jury  are  satisfied  of  the  truth  of  them,  wliether  in  his  opinion, 
the  party  was  insane,  and  what  was  the  nature  and  character  of  the  in- 
sanity ;  what  state  of  mind  did  they  indicate,  and  what  he  would  expect 
to  be  the  conduct  of  such  person  in  any  supposed  circumstances."'* 

§  615.  Whether  Expert  can  give  Opinion  upon  the  whole 
Case. —  It  has  been  ruled,  and  the  decision  followed,  that,  where 
scientific  men  are  called  as  witnesses,  they  are  not  entitled  to  give 
their  opinions  as  to  the  merits  of  the  case,  but  only  as  to  the 
facts  as  proved  at  the  trial. ^  This  is  undoubtedly  the  general 
rule,  as  shown  by  the  cases  in  the  next  section.  It  is  equally 
true  that  great  difficulty  must  arise  in  applying  it,  where  the  is- 
sue is  whether  a  certain  person  was,  at  the   doing  of  a  certain 

1  Hoard  v.  Pock,  5(3  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  ^  Jameson  v.  Driukald,  12  Moore, 
203,  210.  148;    reople  v.  Lake,  12  N.  Y.  358,  i)er 

2  Ante,  §  5;»i).  Haud,   J.     See  also   Kex  v.    AYrlglit, 

3  Woodbury  v.  Obear,  7  Gray  Russ.  &  Kir.  456;  Norman  v.  Wells,  17 
(Mass.),  4G7,  4G8.  Wend.    (N.   Y.)    136,    161;  Mayor    v. 

•»  Com.  V.  Rogers,  7  Mete.  (Mass.)  Pentz,  24  Weud.  (N.  Y.)  668;  Fish  u. 
500,  505.  Dodd,  4  Deiiio  (X.  Y.),  311. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXlI,  j       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  513 

act,  sane  or  insane,^  and  it  is  believed  that  in  most  of  these  cases 
the  question  is  so  framed  —  and  unavoidably  so  —  as  to  call  for 
the  opinion  of  the  expert  upon  the  very  fact  in  issue.  What 
else  can  he  generally  answer  in  such  a  case?  Moreover,  the 
view,  already  shown,^  that,  in  certain  cases,  experts  may  be 
permitted  to  give  their  opinions  upon  the  evidence  as  they  have 
heard  it  detailed  by  the  witnesses,  would  seem  to  carry  with  it 
the  conclusion  that  the  opinions  which  they  are  to  give  are  opin- 
ions upon  the  main  issue.  Accordingly,  we  find  that  it  has  been 
held  not  a  good  objection  that  the  question  goes  to  the  whole 
merits,  and  that  the  witness  is  required  to  give  an  opinion  upon 
the  very  question  which  the  jury  are  to  determine.  It  was  so 
held,  where  a  person,  skilled  in  the  art  of  navigation,  was  asked 
to  ivhat  the  loss  loas  atlribuiahle.'^  But,  in  general,  the  hypo- 
thetical questions  may  and  must  be  so  framed  as  to  call  for  the 
opinion  of  the  witness  upon  an  assumed  state  of  facts,  without 
requiring  him  inform  (though  it  ma}^  require  him  in  substance) 
to  decide  the  whole  controversy.  Perhaps  a  good  instance  of 
this  is  afforded  by  a  ease  where  the  action  was  against  a  carrier 
by  water,  to  recover  damages  for  a  loss  of  goods  alleged  to  have 
occurred  through  the  negligence  of  the  defendant's  servants  and 
agents,  while  towing  the  plaintiff's  barge  from  Jersey  City  to 
New  Haven,  through  Long  Island  Sound.  It  was  held  that  no 
error  was  committed  by  asking  an  expert:  "  AVith  your  experi- 
ence, would  it  be  safe  or  prudent  for  a  tug  boat  on  Chesapeake 
Bay,  or  any  other  tide  water,  to  take  three  boats  abreast,  with 
a  high  wind  ?  "  * 

§  616.  [Continued.]  Instances  of  Questions  Bad  because  call- 
ing FOR  A  Decision  of  the  Whole  Case.  —  But,  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  injuries  alleged  to  have  been  sustained  by  the  plaintiff's 
canal-boat,  t\i\'o\xgh.t\iQ  negligence  of  the  defendant,  it  was  held  improper 
to  ask  a  witness  for  the  defendant  as  follows :  "  Did  Mr.  Carpenter  (the 
plaintiff),  in  your  opinion  as  a  canal-boat  man,  in  any  way  omit  or  neg- 

^  People  V.  Lake,  supra.     Compare  *  Walsh     v.    "Washington     Marine 

White  V.  Bailey,  10  Mich.  155.  Ins.  Co.,  32  N.  Y.  427,  443. 

2  Ante,  §  599.  *  Transportation  Line  v.   Hope,  95 

U.  S.  297. 
33 


514  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tr., 

lect  to  do  anything  which  he  might  have  done  to  save  his  boat?"  ^ 
The  court  said:  "An  expert  may  be  asked  whether  certain  acts,  which 
are  proven,  are  seamanlike  and  proper,  under  a  given  state  of  circum- 
stances ;  but  he  cannot  be  allowed  to  express  an  opinion  as  to  what  was, 

or  was  not  done  as  matter  of  fact."  - So,  in  an  action  for  damages 

against  a  railioay  company,  grounded  upon  negligence,  it  is  not  compe- 
tent for  the  defendant  to  aslc  a  witness,  who  is  an  experienced  railroad 
man,  whether  or  not,  in  his  opinion,  certain  signals  "  were  reasonable  or 
unreasonable,"  "  prudent  or  extraordinary  ;  "  or  whether  or  not  simi- 
lar signals  are  given  by  other  railway  corporations.  Such  questions 
sought  to  obtain  from  the  witness  answers  to  questions  which  the  jury 
were  to  answer,  where  the  facts  were  of  a  character  equally  within  the 
knowledge  and  comprehension  of  the  jury  as  of  the  witnesses.  They 
asked  for  mere  naked  expressions  of  opinion  as  to  the    character  and 

quality  of  acts  which  were  open  to  common  observation.^ So,  on 

the  trial  of  an  action  for  damages  resulting  in  death,  the  deposition  of 
a  medical  man  was  read,  containing  the  following  question  and  answer: 
"  Do  you  think  that,  with  different,  or  in  the  exercise  of  greater  care, 
he  would  probably  have  recovered ?  "  Answer:  "  The  treatment  and 
care  of  Laughlin  were,  in  my  opinion,  prudent.  I  believe  a  change  in 
either  would  not  have  produced  any  different  results."  It  was  held 
that  this  should  have  been  excluded.  The  court  said:  "  This  question 
and  answer  put  the  witness  in  the  place  of  the  jury,  to  determine  the  ul- 
timate fact,  and  it  was  therefore  error  to  admit  them.  The  witness 
might  properly  state  what  facts  he  knew  respecting  the  treatment  and 
care,  and  then  give  his  medical  opinion  upon  such  facts.;  or  he  might 
be  asked  his  opinion  upon  an  assumed  state  of  facts,  which  the  testi- 
mony of  the  other  witnesses  tended  to  establish.  But  such  a  question, 
as  asked,  was  improper,  because  the  witness  might  base  his  opinion 
upon  facts  which  he  assumed,  but  which  the  jury  might  not  find,  or 
which  had  no  existence  in  the  case.  A  medical  man's  opinion  is  very 
competent  when  the  facts  upon  which  it  is  based  are  testified  to  b}^  him- 
self, or  by  others  ;  but  his  opinion,  without  the  facts,  is  not  competent, 
because  he  is  not  authorized  to  find  or  assume  the  facts  at  his  pleasure ; 
they  are  to  be  found  by  the  jury,  and  if  they  do  not  exist  as  he  as- 
sumes them,  his  opinion  may  go  for  naught."  ^ So,  in  an  action 

1  Carpenter  v.  Eastern  Trausporta-  ^  Hill  v.  Portland  &c.  R.  Co.,  55  Me, 
tion  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  574.  439. 

2  Carpenter  v.  Eastern  Transporta-  ■*  Muldowney  v.   IlUnois    Cert.   E, 
tion  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  574,  579.  Co.,  39  la.  (JIG,  (522. 


Tit.  Ill,   Ch.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  515 

against  a  surgeon  for  the  negligent  and  unskillful  treatment  of  a  dislo- 
cated arm,  the  defendant  claimed  "  consecutive  luxation,"  or  a  dis- 
placement after  an  actual  reduction.  It  was  held  that  it  was  not 
competent  to  ask  a  surgical  witness,  "  Do  you  believe,  from  what  you 
have  heard  of  the  testimony  in  this  case,  that  this  arm  has  been  the, 
subject  of  consecutive  luxation?" — since  this  required  the  witness  to 
perform  the  function  of  the  jury.^ A  medical  witness  having  tes- 
tified to  seeing  the  decedent,  some  two  or  three  months  before  the  mak- 
ing of  the  will,  which  was  challenged  on  the  ground  of  a,ioant  of  testa- 
mentary capacity,  was  asked:  "From  what  you  saw,  what  was  his 
mental  capacity?  "  This  question  was  understood  as  referring  to  his 
mental  capacity  to  make  a  will,  and  it  was  held  incompetent,  because 
presenting  to  the  witness  a  question  of  law,  and  not  of  medical  science,- — 
a  conclusion  which  does  not  seem  to  be  sound. 

§   617.   What  if   the  Answers   go  beyond  the  Questions.  — 

It  is  no  objectiou  to  the  answers  of  the  experts,  that  they  include 
considerations  not  referred  to  in  the  questions,  as  constituting 
the  basis  of  the  opinions  given,  provided  they  are  such  as  the 
testimony  tends  to  prove,  and  such  as  might  properly  have  been 
included  in  the  questions.^ 

§  618.  Reasons  on  Examination-in-cliief. — An  expert  may 
give  the  grounds  and  reasons  of  his  opinion,  on  his  examination- 
in-chief,  as  well  as  the  opinion  itself;  it  is  not  necessary  that  he 
should  wait  to  have  them  drawn  out  on  cross-examination.^ 

§619.  Opinions  founded  upon  Books.  —  While  medical 
books,  which  are  stated  by  medical  witnesses  to  be  works  of 
authority,  cannot  be  put  in  evidence  upon  an  issue  upon  which 
they  might  speak,  yet  medical  witnesses  may  be  asked  their 
judgment,  and  the  grounds  of  it,  upon  the  question ;  and  it  is  no 
objection  to  their  answers  that  they  are  in  some  degree  founded 
upon  these  books,  as  apart  of  their  general  knowledge.^ 

1  Carpeutev  v.  Blake,  2  Laus.  (N.  Y.)  ^  Keith  v.  Lathrop,  10  Cush.  (Mass.) 
20(5.                                                                      454;     Cora.     v.    Webster,     5      Cush. 

2  White  V.  Bailey,  10  Mich.  155.  (Mass.)  295,  301;  Collier  v.  Simpson, 

3  Hathaway  v.   National  Life  Ins.       5  Car.  &  P.  73. 

Co.,  48  Vt.  33G.  5  Collier  v.  Simpson,  5  Car.  &  P.  73. 


516  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOHip.  Tr., 

§  620.  Experiments  in  the  Presence  of  the  Jury.  —  These 
are  generally  discountenanced,  owing  to  the  liability  which  exists 
of  the  jurors  being  imposed  upon  by  skillful  manipulation  or 
jugglery.^  On  the  other  hand,  experiments  coming  within  the 
range  of  ordinary  knowledge  or  experience  may  well  be  per- 
mitted, and  circumstances  can  be  imagined  under  which  the 
refusal  to  permit  them  would  be  error.  Such  a  case  arose  in 
Iowa.  The  action  involved  the  genuineness  of  the  signature  to 
a  note.  The  clerk  of  the  court  was  called  by  the  defendant  as 
an  expert.  He  testified  that,  in  his  opinion,  certain  signatures 
were  not  made  with  the  same  ink.  Being  recalled  by  the  plaintiff, 
he  stated  that,  since  his  examination  by  the  defendant,  he  had 
examined  writings  upon  the  court  record  made  with  the  same 
ink,  which  apparently  differed  in  color.  He  accounted  for  this 
difference  by  the  fact  that  a  blotting  pad  had  been  used  in  the 
one  case  and  not  in  the  other.  Being  asked  to  point  out  the  dif- 
ference on  the  record,  and  illustrate  the  effect  of  the  blotting 
pad,  an  objection  of  the  defendant  thereto  was  sustained.  This 
"was  held  error.'- 

§  621.  Medical  Opinion  as  to  the  Permanency  of  Physical 
Injury.  —  In  every  action  for  damages  for  a  physical  injury,  all 
the  damages  accruing  from  the  injury,  past,  present  and  pros- 
pective, must  be  included  in  the  one  recovery.^  It  is  therefore 
competent,  in  order  to  assist  the  jury  in  arriving  at  a  conclusion 
as  to  the  character  of  an  injury  and  the  probability  of  its  per- 
manency, to  take  the  opinion  of  medical  experts  on  the  subject.* 

1  See  post,  ch.  XXVII.  Wilt  v.  Vickers,  8  Watts  (Pa.),  227; 

2  Fanners'  &c.  Bauk  v.  Young,  36  Kent  v.  Lincoln,  32  Vt.  591;  Johnson 
Iowa,  45.  V.   Central  &c.   R.    Co.,   56  Vt.    707 

3  Elkhart  v.  Ritter,  66  lud.  136 ;  Hoard  v.  Peck,  56  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  202 
North  Vernon  u.  Voegler,  103  lud.  314;  Montgomery  v.  Scott,  34  Wis.  338 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Baddeley,  54  111 
Ind.  409,  422.  19;   s.  c.  5  Am.  Rep.  71;   Anthony  v 

4  Finney  v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat  Smith,  4  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  503;  Louisville 
Co.,    12  Abb.   Pr.    (x.  s.)    (N.  Y.)    1;  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  swpra. 

Filer  v.  N.  Y.  &c.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  42; 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXII.]       THE   EXAMINATION   OF   EXI^EKTS.  517 

Article  II.  — Cross-Examination. 
Sectiox 
625.  Incompleteness  of  Hypothesis  of  one  Party  remedied  by  Cross-Exam- 

luation. 
020.  Facts  and  Eeasous  on  Cross-Exaraiuatiou. 

627.  Questions  going  beyond  the  Scope  of  the  Evidence. 

628.  Scope  allowed  in  Cross-Exaraining  a  Medical  Expert. 

629.  [Illustration.]     What  a  Doctor  "would  Think  if  he  should  Find  a  Man 

Dead  with  Certain  Appearances. 

630.  Cross-Examination  of  Medical  Experts  who  have  examined  the  Body  of 

the  Plaintiff. 

631.  Irrelevant  Facts  admissible  for  the  Purpose  of  Testing  Knowledge  of 

Expert. 

632.  [Continued.]     Illustration  — Cross-Examination  as  to  Age. 

633.  Reading  Books  of  Science  to  Expert  to  test  his  Knowledge. 

634.  Questions  affecting  Credibility. 

635.  Instance  of  an  Improper  Cross-Exaraiuatiou  under  the  Araerica«  Rule. 

§  625.  Incompleteness  of  Hypothesis  of  one  Party  rem- 
edied by  Cross-examination. —  When  the  witness  has  expressed 
an  opinion  based  upon  facts  assumed  by  the  party  whose  witness 
he  is,  the  other  party  may  cross-examine  him,  by  taking  his 
opinion,  based  upon  any  other  state  of  facts  assumed  by  him  to 
have  been  proved  by  the  evidence,  provided  that  such  hypotheti- 
cal state  of  facts  is  within  the  scope  of  the  evidence.  Such  a 
cross-examination,  to  reach  its  true  vahie,  should  develop  fully 
the  reasons  upon  which  the  expert  bases  his  oi)inion.  The  cross- 
examining  counsel  should  be  allowed  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
expert  to  any  and  every  view  of  the  facts  which  will  tend  to  test 
the  correctness  of  his  opinion.  This  right  of  cross-examination 
has  been  justly  characterized  as  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the 
defendant  in  a  criminal  trial,  especially  where  the  experts  are  in- 
troduced and  examined  in  rebuttal,  so  that  the  defendant  cannot 
introduce  them  as  his  own  witnesses  at  that  stage  of  the  case,  or 
bring  others  to  overcome  their  evidence.^ 

§  626.  Facts  and  Reasons  on  Cross-examination.  —  A  fam- 
iliar illustration  of  the  rule  that  the  expert  is  to  give,  on  cross- 

'  Davis  V.  State,  35  Iiid.  490. 


518  EXAMINATION   OF    WITNESSES.       [I  Thomp.  Tl'., 

examination,  the  reasons  for  his  opinion,  is  found  in  a  proposi- 
tion already  stated/  tliat  where  a  witness  has  given  his  opinion 
as  to  value,  he  may  be  asked,  even  on  his  examination-in-chief, 
the  facts  and  reasons  on  which  his  oi)iuion  is  founded. ^ 

§  62T.  Questions  going  beyond  the  Scope  of  the  Evi- 
dence.—  Such  being  the  scope  of  the  cross-examination,  it  is 
obvious  that  it  will  not  be  a  good  objection  to  a  question,  that 
it  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  evidence ;  since  questions  propounded 
for  the  purpose  of  eliciting  the  reasons  upon  which  the  expert 
bases  his  opinion,  or  the  extent  of  his  knowledge,  may  often  go 
beyond  the  evidence.  Thus,  in  an  action  for  injuries  causing 
death,  where  the  injury  happened  in  a  steamboat  explosion  and 
the  body  was  subsequently  found  in  the  water,  it  was  held  that 
a  medical  witness,  who  had  examined  the  body  and  testified  that 
death  was  caused  by  drowning,  might  properly  be  asked,  ''  What 
would  have  been  the  indications  if  a  person  had  been  suffocated 
first,  and  had  afterwards  fallen  into  the  water?" — although 
there  was  no  evidence  that  this  was  the  fact.^ 

§  628.  Scope  allowed  in  cross-examining-  a  Medical  Ex- 
pert. —  In  a  case  in  Indiana  it  is  said  by  Elliott,  J. :  "In  cross- 
examining  a  medical  expert,  counsel  have  a  right  to  assume  the 
facts  as  they  believe  them  to  exist,  and  to  ask  the  expert's 
opinion  upon  the  facts  thus  assumed.  An  examination-in-chief 
cannot  be  so  conducted  as  to  compel  the  cross-examining  counsel 
to  merely  follow  the  line  of  questions  that  are  asked ;  but  when 
a  general  subject  is  opened  by  an  examination-in-chief,  the  cross- 
examining  counsel  may  go  further  into  details,- and  may  put  the 
case  before  the  expert  witness  in  various  phases.  Each  side  las 
a  right  to  take  the  0})inion  of  the  witness  upon  his  theory  of  the 
facts  established  by  the  evidence.  While  it  is  true  that  a  cross- 
examination  must  be  confined  to  the  subject  of  the  examination- 
in-chief,  it  is  not  true  that  the  cross-examining  party  is  confined 

1  Ante^ilS.  3  Ericksou  v.  Smith,  2  Abb.  App. 

2  Dickeiisou  v.  Fitcliburg,  13  Gray      Dec.  (N.  Y.)  G5. 
(Mass.),54G. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATIOX   OF    EXPERTS.  519 

to  any  particular  part  of  the  subject.  He  has  a  right,  iu  such  a 
ease  as  this,  to  leave  out  of  the  hypothetical  question  facts  as- 
sumed by  the  counsel  on  the  direct  examination,  if  he  deems 
them  not  proved  ;  and  he  also  has  a  right  to  add  to  the  question 
such  facts  as  he  thinks  the  evidence  establishes."  ^ 

§  G29.  [Illustration.]  What  a  Doctor  would  Think  if  he  should 
Find  A  Man  Dead  avith  certain  Appearances.  — Where  a  medical  ex- 
pert testified,  on  a  trial  for  manslaughter,  which  was  committed  by 
striking  the  deceased  upon  the  head  with  a  stone,  that  the  appearances 
disclosed  upon  a  jwst  mortem  examination  of  the  head  of  the  deceased, 
as  described  by  another  witness,  were  those  of  apoplexy, —  it  was  held 
that  he  might  be  asked  on  cross-examination,  what  he  would  think  to 
be  the  cause  of  death,  if  he  should  find  a  man  dead,  and  ajjost  mortem 
examination  should  disclose  similar  appearances  to  those  described, 
and  it  should  be  proved  that  he  had  been  struck  violently  upon  the 
head  wiih  a  stone. - 

§  630.  Cross-exaiuiuation  of  Medical  Experts  who  have  ex- 
amined the  Body  of  tlie  Plaintiff . —  In  an  action  for  personal 
injuries,  "  where  medical  experts  are  ordered  to  examine  a 
plaintiff,  and  they  are  called  and  questioned  by  the  defendant  as 
to  the  result  of  their  examination,  the  plaintiff  has  a  right  to  ask, 
on  cross-examination,  how  the  examination  was  conducted,  and 
this  necessarily  includes  the  right  to  ask  what  questions  were 
propounded  to  the  plaintiff.  If  it  were  otherwise,  the  plaintiff 
could  not  get  fully  before  the  jury,  the  method  of  investigation 
pursued  by  the  medical  experts  ;  and  to  deny  this  would  be  an 
unjustifiable  restriction  of  the  important  right  of  cross-examina- 
tion." ^  Another  reason  adduced  in  support  of  the  same  view 
is  the  rule  that,  where  a  party  gives  evidence  of  ajJcirt  of  a 
transaction^  his  adversary  has  a  right  io full  details  of  the  trans- 
action.* 

1  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  regarded  as  within  the  rule  laid  down 
104:  lud.  400,  421.  See  also  Davis  v.  in  Woodbury  u.  Obear,  7  Gray  (Mass.), 
State,  35   lud.   406;  s.  c.  0  Am.  Rep.      4(J7. 

700;  Rogers  Exp.  Test.,  40.  3  Louisville  &c.   R.  Co.  v.  Falvey, 

2  Cora.  V.  Mullius,2  Allen  (Mass.),      104  lud.  409,  417. 
295.     This  mode  of  interrogation  was  •*  Ibid. 


520  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOUip.  Tl'., 

§  G31.  Irrelevant  Facts  admissible  for  the  purpose  of  test- 
injf  Kiiowleclj;e  of  Expert. —  It  is  laid  down  by  Mr.  Justice 
Stephen  in  his  work  on  evidence  that,  "  facts  not  otherwise  rele- 
vant, are  deemed  to  be  relevant,  if  they  support,  or  are  inconsis- 
tent with  the  opinions  of  experts,  when  such  opinions  are 
deemed  to  be  rckn^ant.''  ^  The  reason  given  for  this  rule  is  that 
it  is  a  proper  rule  to  be  resorted  to,  in  order  to  test  the  capacity 
of  the  witness,  and  to  ascertain  the  reasonableness,  or  establish  the 
unreasonableness  of  his  opinion.^  It  is  therefore  admissible,  on 
the  cross-examination  of  an  expert  witness,  to  state  hypothet- 
ical cases  to  him,  and  to  ask  his  opinion  thereon,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  testing  his  knowledge  and  skill. -^ 

§  632.  [Continued.]  Illustration  —  Cross-examination  as  to 
Age. —  In  an  action  by  a  lady  agaiusta  raih-oad  company  for  a  physi- 
cal injury,  a  witness  for  the  defendant  was  asked,  among  other  questions, 
what  the  apparent  age  of  the  plaintiff  was.  To  this  he  answered:  "  In 
my  opinion  she  was  twenty-two  or  twenty-three,  say  twenty-four  or 
twenty-five;  from  twenty -three  to  twenty-five  in  appearance."  On 
cross-examination  the  plaintiff 's  counsel  pointed  out  a  bystander  and 
asked  the  witness :  "How  old  do  you  think  he  is."  The  witness  an- 
swered: "  Well,  I  think  he  is  about  fifty-five."  In  giving  evidence  in 
rebuttal  the  plaintiff  called  the  bystander,  wlio  testified  that  his  age 
was  forty-six.  It  was  held,  applying  the  above  rule,  tliat  in  allowing 
this  to  be  done  the  court  committed  no  error.  It  was  competent,  for 
the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  witness  was  not  capable  of  judging  of 
the  age  of  a  person  by  his  appearance.  "* 

§  G33.  Readiiit?  Books  of  Science  to  Expert  to  test  -his 
Knowledge. —  Where  a  physician  testitied  as  to  the  symptoms 
of  a  disease  of  which  a  person  died  whose  life  was  insured, 
and  lU'onounced  it  deliinion  tremens,  induced  by  the  use  of  intox- 
icating liquors,  it  was  held  that  paragraphs  treating  of  that  disease 

»  Steph.  Ev.,  art.  50.  104  Ind.  400;  Davis  u.    State,  35   lud. 

2  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  49(i,  498;  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  7(50;  Rog- 
104  Intl.  409,  424;    Folkes  v.  Chadd,  3      ers'  Exp.  Test.  50. 

Doug.    157;    Davis  v.    State,   35  lud.  "»  Louisville   &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Falvey, 

496;  s.  c.  9  Ara.  Rep.  700.  104  lud.  409,  423. 

3  Louisville   &c.  R.  Co.  v.   Falvey, 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XXII.]       THE    EXAMINATION    OF    EXPERTS.  521 

might  be  read  to  him,  and  that  he  might  be  asked,  on  cross-ex- 
amination, whether  he  agreed  with  the  authors,  as  one  of  the 
means  of  testing  his  knowledge,  and  that  this  was  in  no  just 
sense  reading  books  of  science  to  the  jury.  At  the  same  time 
the  court,  speaking  through  Scott,  J.,  said:  "The  rule  an- 
nounced may  be  liable  to  abuse.  Great  care  should  always  be 
taken  by  the  court  to  confine  such  cross-examination  within 
reasonable  limits,  and  to  see  that  the  quotations  read  to  the  wit- 
ness are  so  fairly  selected  as  to  present  the  author's  views  on  the 
subject  of  thQ examination."  ^ 

§  634.  Questions  Affecting  Credibility. —  It  is  competent 
to  cross-examine  an  expert  witness  as  to  the  fee  which  has  been 
paid  him  for  attending  at  the  trial  in  the  character  of  an  expert. 
Nevertheless,  as  there  is  nothing  discreditable  to  the  party  or  the 
witness,  in  the  one  paying  and  the  other  receiving  a  reasonable 
fee,  it  is  proper  for  the  court,  on  request,  or  even  without  request, 
to  say  so  to  the  jury,  in  instructing  them.  ^ 

§  635.  Instance  of  an  improper  Cross-examination  under  the 
Ajierican  rule.  —  In  a  case  in  California,  where  the  American  rule  of 
strict  cross-examination'^  obtains,  an  expert  witness,  called  on  behalf  of  the 
plainti:ff,  had  testified  that  he  had  made  a  2^ost  mortem  examination  of 
the  body  of  George  W.  Gridley,  and  as  to  the  condition  of  the  brain, 
pelvic  viscera,  and  particularly  the  kidneys  and  bladder  and  the  pros- 
tate gland  and  urethra;  that  he  had  found  nitrate  of  urea  in  crystals  in 
washing  the  membranes  of  the  brain  and  crystals  of  urea  in  the  arach- 
noid sac,  etc.  ;  that  the  kidneys  were  apparently  in  a  normal  state, 
except  that  they  were  engorged  with  blood ;  that  the  membranes 
of  the  brain,  the  pia  mater,  the  arachnoid  and  dura  mater  were 
'•thickened,  discolored,  adherent,  and  matted  together;"  and  that 
the  prostate  gland  was  enlarged,  thickened,  and  indurated,  and 
its  walls  pressed  together.  In  his  opinion,  the  deceased  must 
have  been  of  unsound  mind  for  five  years  prior  to  his  death, 
by  reason  of  tlie  facts  that  the  condition  of  the  prostate  gland 
had  obstructed   the  elimination   of    urea,    causing   it    to   enter   into 

1  Conn.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  ^  Alford  v.  Vincent,  53    Mich.    555. 

89  111.  516.  3  Ante,  §  432  et  seq. 


522  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOlUp.  Tr., 

the  circulation  and  poisoning  the  branial  membranes,  and  that  the 
patient  had  diod  of  uraomic  convulsions,  thus  produced;  that  the 
thickened  condition  of  the  brain  coverings  established  insanity,  and 
that  the  thiclcening  produced  by  the  chronic  uraematic  poisoning  must 
have  been  gradual,  continuing  several  j'cars.  One  B.,  called  as  an  ex- 
pert witness,  b}'  the  defendant,  after  stating  that  he  had  been  a  prac- 
ticing physician  and  surgeon  since  1804  (about  17  j-ears),  that  he  was 
a  graduate  of  certain  medical  schools,  and  that  he  had  been  superin- 
tendent al)out  two  j^ears  of  an  insane  asylum  in  Lancashire,  Elngland. 
proceeded  to  testify,  in  effect,  that  he  had  never  known  crystals  of  urea  to 
be  found  in  the  brain  or  any  of  its  surroundings;  that>  nitrate  of  urea 
is  [)erfectl3'  soluble  in  water  ;  that  uric  and  urea  are  specifically  different. 
He  added,  that  taking  the  condition  of  the  coverings  of  the  brain  and 
the  brain  itself,  and  of  the  kidneys,  the  bladder,  the  prostate  gland, 
and  the  urethra,  as  descril)ed  by  M.  and  by  Dr.  C.  [who  bad  assisted 
atthe  jw.si  mortem  examination],  he  could  not  understand  how  an}' such 
condition  of  his  brain,  or  of  its  membranes  could  be  attributed  to  urae- 
mic  poisoning,  without  disease  of  the  kidneys  antedating  it ;  and  de- 
clared that  disease  or  unsoundness  of  mind  could  not  be  predicated  on 
the  condition  of  the  coverings  of  the  braia  as  described  by  M.  and  C. 
On  cross-examination  of  B.  the  plaintiff  wished  to  put  to  him  a  h3'po- 
thetical  question,  in  all  respects  similar  to  such  questions  proi)Ounded 
to  the  plaintiff  's  witness  on  direct  examination.  It  was  held  that,  since 
the  testimony  of  B.  on  direct  examination  was  confined  to  a  contradic- 
tion of  the  tlieor}'  of  M.  as  to  the  mental  unsoundness  of  Gridle\'  pro- 
duced by  slow  uraemic  poisoning,  the  question  was  not  proper  on  cross- 
examination  ;  as  the  answer  of  the  witness  thereto,  if  it  sustained  the 
plaintiff's  views,  would  have  constituted  part  of  her  case,  which  should 
have  been  made  out  before  she  rested.  Nor  was  the  question  proper  as 
testing  the  capacity  of  B.,  as  an  expert;  for  if  the  answer  of  B.  had 
been  the  same  as  that  given  by  the  plaintiff's  experts,  it  would  have 
strengtlienud  the  plaintiff's  affirmative  case  ;  if  different,  it  would  have 
tended  no  more   to  prove  the  incompetency  of  B.  than  to  prove  the 

incompetency  of  the  plaintiff's  experts.^ In  another  jurisdiction  it 

has  l)ecn  held  that  where  a  witness  has  testified,  l)ut  not  as  an  exi)ert, 
under  the  so-called  American  rule,  it  is  not  comi)etout  to  put  to  him 
questions  on  cross-examination  which  would  be  only  admissible  in  case 
of  an  expert  witness ;  the  cross-examining  party  must  call  him  as  his 
Qwn  ivitness.- 

'  Gridley  y.  Boggs,  G2  C:il.  V.n.  ^  Olmstoad  v.  Gere,  100 Pa.  St   127. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXIII.]       THE   ACCUSED   AS    WITNESSES.  523 


CHAPTER    XXIII. 

OF  THE  ACCUSED  AS  WITNESSES. 
Section 

640.  Competency. 

641.  lu  the  Case  of  Persons  jointly  Indicted. 

642.  Subject  to  the  same  Rules  of  Examination  as  other  Witnesses. 

643.  And  to  the  same  Modes  of  Impeachment. 

644.  Whether  taking  the  stand  -n-aives  Privilege  against  Self-Crimination. 

645.  Jury  entitled  to  draw  Inferences  from  Witness'  Demeanor. 

646.  And  the  State's  Counsel  may  Comment  on  the  Same. 

647.  Testimony,  Evidence  against  him  on  a  Subsequent  Trial. 

648.  May  Testify  as  to  his  Intent  or  Motive. 

649.  View  that  he  may  be  Cross-Examined  as  any  other  Witness. 

650.  [Continued.]     Interrogated  as  to  former  Arrests  and  Convictions. 

651.  [Continued.]     Illustrations  of  this  View. 

652.  View  that  Cross-Examination  is  coufiued  to  Examination-in-Chief. 

653.  [Continued.]     Previous  Arrests,  Convictions,  etc.,  not  Inquii-ed  into. 

654.  Crimes  not  affecting  Credibility. 

655.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

§  640.  Competency.  —  Defendants  in  criminal  cases  were  in- 
competent as  witnesses  at  common  law,^  but  have  been  made 
competent  by  enabling  statutes  in  most  American  jurisdictions ;  ^ 
and,  in  other  jurisdictions  where  legislation  has  not  progressed 
so  far,  statutes  exist,  as  seen  in  the  next  chapter,  allowino;  the 
accused  to  make  an  unsworn  statement.  The  enabling!:  leoishition 
of  the  States  did  not  em})()wer  defendants  in  the  Federal  courts, 
to  testify  in  their  own  behalf;  ^  though  this  defect  has  been 
hitely  remedied  by  Federal   legislation.^     The  effect  of  such  en- 

1  Deloohery  v.   State,  27   Ind.  521  2  See  the  statutes  in  Rap.  Wit.,  chap, 
(defendant  in  a  proceeding  for  surety  258  et  seq.     See  also  as  to  such  stat- 
for  the  peace  incompetent) ;    United  lUes  and  the  extent  to  which  tliey  en- 
States  V.  Black,  12  Nat.  Bk.  Reg.  340  able  the  prisoner  to  testify,  Hoagland 
(in  a  criminal  proceeding  under  the  v.  State,  17  Ind.  488. 
late  Bankrupt  Act) ;  Stevick  v.  Com.,  3  Uuitecl   States    v.    Hawthorne,    1 
78    Pa.   St.  460    (where  a    count  for  Dill.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  422. 
felony  was  joined  with  one  for  misde-  *  2  Rev.  Stat.  U.   S.,  Sup.  vol.   1,  p. 
raeauor) ;  Hunter  v.  Com.,  79  Pa.  St.  312. 
503  (same  subject). 


524  EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.       [1  TllOllip.  Tr., 

ablino:  statutes  will  be,  unless  their  terms  are  restrained,  to  make 
the  accused  in  a  criminal  case  competent,  even  under  circum- 
stances where  another  witness  would  not  be  competent.  Thus,  it 
was  held,  construing  the  statute  of  New  York,  that  a  prisoner 
was  a  competent  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  although  he  had  been 
sentenced  upon  a  conviction  for  felony,  and  was  unpardoned.^ 
Where  a  prisoner,  testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  stated  on  cross- 
examination,  that  he  had  been  in  the  State  prison  and  had  served 
out  his  term,  it  was  held  error  for  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury 
to  disregard  his  testimony  for  that  reason.'^ 

§  641.  In  the  Case  of  Persons  jointly  Indicted.  —  In  the  case 
of  persons  jointly  indicted,  if  there  has  been  a  severance,  one  de- 
fendant may  call  his  late  co-defendant  as  his  own  witness,  as  a 
matter  of  right, ^  and  it  has  been  held  that  he  may  do  so,  under  such 
a  statute,  where  there  has  been  no  severance.*  This  is  an  excep- 
tion to  the  rule  of  the  common  law^  that  persons  jointly  indicted 
are  not  competent  witnesses  for  each  other. 

§  642.  Subject  to  the  same  Rules  of  Examination  as  other 
Witnesses. —  It  has  been  held  in  several  jurisdictions  that,  where 
the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case  offers  himself  as  a  witness  in  his 
own  behalf,  he  is  subject  to  the  same  rules  as  to  examination, 
cross-examination  and  impeachment  as    other  witnesses.^     Ac- 

1  Delaraater  v.  People,  5  Lans.  State  u.  Witham,  72  Me.  531 ;  People u. 
(N.  Y.)  632;  Newman  v.  People,  63  McGimgill,  41  Cal.  429;  State  v.  Ober, 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  G30.  52   N.  H.  459;    s.  c.   13  Am.  Rep.  88; 

2  Newmau  v.  People,  supra.  Norfolk    v.   Gaylorcl,   28    Corm.   309; 

3  State  V.  Nash,  10  la.  81.  rietclier  v.  State,  49  Iiul.  124;  s.  c.  19 

4  State  u.  Gigher,  23  la.  318.  Am.  Eep.  073;    Merslion  v.  State,  51 

5  Patterson  v.  People,  4G  Barl).  lud.  14;  Morrison  v.  State,  76  Ind.  335; 
(N.  Y.)  625;  Taylor  y.  People,  12  Hun  State  v.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380;  s.  c.  29 
(N.  Y.),  212.  Am.  Rep.  506;  note  to  State  v.  White, 

6  State  V.  Cohn,9  Nev.  179;  State  v.  19  Kan.  445;  27  Am.  Rep.  140;  Com.  v. 
Huff,  11  Nev.  17,  27;  State  v.  Red,  53  Nicliols,  114  Mass.  285;  Com.  v.  Rey- 
la.  69;  State  v.  Miller,  53  la.  209;  nolds,  122  Mass.  454;  State  r.  Went- 
Braudon  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  265;  Fra-  wortii,  65  Me.  234;  Connors  v.  Peoi)le, 
lich  V.  People,  65  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  48;  50  N.  Y.  240;  Stover  v.  People,  56  N. 
McGarry  v.  People,  2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  Y.  315;  1  Grecnl.  Ev.  (13th  ed.),  §  4.-)l 
227;  People  y.  Carey,  17  AH).  L.  .J.  432;  and   cases    in  note;   Wliart.  Crini.  Ev. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXIII.]       THE    ACCUSED    AS    WITNESSES. 


525 


cordiugly,  it  is  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court, 
not  only  to  allow  State's  counsel  to  cross-examine  him,  but  also 
to  recall  him  after  he  has  left  the  stand  for  the  purpose  oi  further 
cross-examination }  His  counsel  may  interrogate  him,  as  in  the 
case  of  any  other  witness,  and  it  is  error  for  the  judge  to  deny 
this  right  and  to  direct  the  prisoner  to  make  a  general  statement."^ 
He  has  a  right  to  explain  any  circumstance  in  evidence  which 
works  to  his  prejudice,  the  same  as  a  party  testifying  in  a  civil 
case  would  have.-^ 

§  643.  And  to  the  same  Modes  of  Impeachment. — While 
the  general  proposition  is  true  that  the  moral  character  of  the  ac- 
cused in  a  criminal  case  is  not  in  issue,  unless  he  chooses  to  brins: 
it  into  question  by  first  offering  evidence  in  support  of  it,^  it  has 
become  the  rule  in  some  jurisdictions  that,  if  he  avails  himself 


(8th  ed.),  §§  470,  6G9  and  notes;  Peo- 
ple V.  Reiuhart,  39  Cal.  449 ;  Com.  v. 
Bonner,  97  Mass.  587;  Com.  v.  Morgan, 
107  Mass.  199.  In  Maine  the  following 
language  was  used  by  Peters,  C.  J.,  in 
discussing  this  question:  "  When  the 
accused  volunteers  to  testify  in  his 
own  behalf  at  all,  upon  the  issue 
whether  the  alleged  crime  has  been 
committed  or  not,  he  volunteers  to 
testify  in  full.  His  oath  in  such  case 
requires  it.  If  he  waives  the  consti- 
tutional privilege  at  all,  he  waives  it 
all.  He  cannot  retire  under  shelter 
when  danger  comes.  The  door  opened 
by  him  Is  shut  against  his  retreat. 
The  object  of  all  examinations  is  to 
elicit  the  whole  truth,  and  not  a  part 
of  it.  Under  our  rule,  the  cross-ex- 
amination of  a  witness  is  not  confined 
to  the  matters  inquired  of  in  chief.  A 
party  testifying  as  his  own  witness 
can  be  examined  just  as  any  other  wit- 
ness could  be,  in  any  respect  material 
and  relevant  to  the  issue.  To  some 
extent  more  may  be  elicited  from  him 
than  from  a  common  witness,  because 


his  statements  are  admissions  as  well 
as  testimony.  Any  other  construction 
would  render  the  statute  a  shield  to 
crime  and  criminals."  State  w.Witham, 
72  Me.  531,  533. 

1  State  V.  Cohn,  9  Nev.  179,  188. 

2  Clark  V.  State,  50  lud.  514;  Dou- 
ohue  V.  People,  5(;  N.  Y.  208  (construc- 
tion of  a  statute  authorizing  a  convict 
to  be  sworn,  and  making  him  "  a  com- 
petent witness  against  any  fellow- 
prisoner,  for  any  offense  actually 
committed  while  in  prison)." 

3  Thus,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment 
for  murder,  the  State  gave  in  evidence 
the  fact  of  a  whispered  conversation, 
two  days  after  the  homicide,  between 
the  defendant  and  the  wife  of  the  mur- 
dei'ed  man,  she  being  jointly  indicted 
with  him.  It  was  held  that  he  had  a 
right  to  testify  as  to  what  Avas  said  in 
that  conversation.  Morrow  v.  State, 
48  Ind.  432. 

4  Fletcher  v.  State,  49  Ind.  124; 
Knight  V.  State,  70  Ind.  375;  Morri- 
son V.  State,  76  Ind.  335,  337. 


526 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOllip.  Tr., 


of  the  privilege  of  testifying,  he  testifies  under  the  same  rules, 
and  may  be  impeached  in  the  same  manner,  as  other  witnesses.^ 
The  fact  of  his  having  been  previously  convicted  of  crime,  may 
be  proved  for  this  purpose ;  ^  though  it  has  been  held  that  this 
fact  cannot  be  drawn  from  him  on  cross-examination,  since  it  is 
provable  by  the  record  only,Hhat  being  the  best  evidence.^  The 
State  may  afterwards  examine  witnesses  to  prove  his  general 
bad  character  or  reputation/ 

§  644.  Wlietlier  taking  the  Stand  waives  Privilege  against 
Self -crimination.  — It  is  a  sound  view,  in  the  interpretation  of 
such  statutes,  that  they  do  not,  by  enabling  the  prisoner  to  tes- 
tify in  his  own  behalf,  place  him  in  a  worse  j^osltion  than  that 
which  another  witness  would  occupy.  By  electing  to  take  the 
stand,  he  does  not  waive  his  privilege  against  self-crimination, 
so  as  to  be  obliged  to   answer  a  question,  the  answer  to  which 


1  Mershon  v.  State,  51  lud.  14; 
State  V.  Beal,  68  Ind.  345;  Morrison  v. 
State,  76  Ind.  335;  State  v.  Clinton,  G7 
Mo.  380;  s.  c.  29  Am.  Rep.  506;  Bran- 
don V.  People,  42  N.  Y.  265;  Connors 
«.  People,  50  N.  Y.  240;  Fletcher  v. 
State,  4!)  Ind.  124;  s.  c.  19  Am.  Rep. 
673;  Mershou  v.  State,  51  Ind.  14; 
Fletcher  v.  State,  49  Ind.  124.  In  Mis- 
souri  the  law  is  in  this  sliape,  that  in  a 
criminal  trial  where  the  defendant  of- 
fers himself  as  a  witness  in  his  own  be- 
half, it  is  not  error  to  allow  the  State, 
over  his  objection,  to  examine  witness- 
es touching  his  general  moral  charac- 
ter. He  may  be  impeaclied  as  any  other 
witness,  except  that,  on  liis  cross-ex- 
amination, he  can  only  be  examined  as 
to  matters  in  respect  of  which  he  has 
testified  on  his  examination-m-chief. 
State  V.  Bulla  (Mo.),  6  West.  Rep.  440. 
On  the  last  point  see  State  v.  Palmer 
(Mo  ) ,  5  West.  Rep.  387 ;  State  v.  Grant, 
79  Mo.  113;  State  t\  Clinton,  67  Mo. 
380.  W^e  understand  tlie  Missouri  rule 
to   mean  that,  while   such  a  witness 


may  be  impeached  by  independent  tes- 
timony, yet  it  is  not  competent  to  lay 
a  foundation  for  impeachimg  him  by 
asking  questions  on  his  cross-exam- 
ination as  t  o  his  former  antecedents 
declarations,  etc.,  as  may  be  done  in 
the  case  of  other  witnesses.  But  he 
may  be  impeached  by  disproving  facts 
stated  by  him,  the  same  as  any  other 
witness  may.  State  v.  Rider  (Mo.),  6 
West.  Rep.  458,  461. 

2  People  V.  Reinhart,  39  Cal.  449, 
per  Rhodes,  J. 

^  People  V.  Reinhart,  supra. 

*  Newcomb  v.  Griswold,  24  N.  Y. 
298;  People  v.  Herrick,  13  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  82;  Rex  v.  Inhabitants  &c.,  8  East, 
77;  Carpenter  v.  Nixon,  5  Ilill  (N.  Y.), 
260. 

*  State  V.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380;  State 
V.  Beaty,  25  Mo.  App.  214;  People  v. 
Beck,  58  Cal.  212.  Under  the  Cali- 
fornia statute,  tlie  iucpiiry  extends  to 
his  character  for  truth,  honesty  and 
integrity.  Cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  2051 ; 
Cal.  Penal  Code,  §  1102. 


Tjt.   Ill,  Ch.  XXIII.]       THE    ACCUSED    AS    WITNESSES.  527 

might  furnish  evidence  which  would  subject  him  to,  or  which 
could  be  used  against  him  in,  another  criminal  prosecution.^ 
We  find,  however,  that  some  courts  have  taken  the  view  that  the 
defendant,  by  taking  the  stand  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf, 
waives  the  privilege  which  another  witness  would  have  in  respect 
of  self-crimination.^ 

§  645.  Jury  entitled  to  draw  Inferences  from  Witness'  De- 
meanor. —  If  such  a  witness  refuses  to  answer  proper  and  com- 
petent questions,  the  refusal  is  a  circumstance  from  which  the 
jury  are  at  liberty  to  draw  inferences  unfavorable  to  him.^ 

§  646.  And  the  State's  Counsel  may  comment  on  the 
same.  — While  the  mere  failure  of  the  prisoner  to  take  the  witness 
stand  in  his  own  behalf  is  not,  under  most  statutes,  the  subject 
of  observation  by  the  State's  counsel  in  the  presence  of  the 
jury,*  yet  if  he  does  exercise  his  privilege  by  taking  the  witness 
stand,  his  testimony  is  the  subject  of  fair  comment,  precisely 
like  the  testimony  of  any  other  witness.^  This  right  of  fair 
comment  extends  to  his  conduct,  demeanor  and  appearance  while 
so  testifying.^  "  The  same  rights  exist  in  favor  of  the  district 
attorney,  to  comment  upon  his  testimony,  or  his  refusal  to  an- 
swer any  proper  question,  or  to  draw  all  proper  inferences  from 
his  failure  to  testify  upon  any  material  matter  within  his  knowl- 
edge, as  with  other  witnesses."  ^ 

1  People  V.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571.  »  state  v.  AVitham,  72  Me.  534.     So 

2  Com.  B,  Lannau,  13  Allen  (Mass.),  in  a  civil  case:  Andrews  v.  Erye,  104 
564;  Cora.  v.  Price,  10  Gray  (Mass.),  Mass.  234;  Whart.  Ev.,  §§  533, 
472;  State  v.  Ober,  52  N.  H.  459.  54G,  12G0;  Hauof  ?;.  State,  37011.  St. 
Compare  Foster  v.  Pierce,    11  Cash.  178. 

(Mass.)  437;  Low  v.  Mitcliell,  18  Me.  *  Post,  §  1004. 

372,  374;  Roddy  v.  Finuegau,  43  Md.  ^  State  v.  Anderson  CNIo.),  8  Crim. 

490;  State  v.  Fay,  43  Iowa,  651.     It  has  Law  Mag.  519;  s.  c.  89  Mo.  312. 

been  held  that,  where  a  party  in  a  civil  ^  State  v.  Graynor  (Mo.),  6  "West. 

action  testifies  in  his  own  behalf,  he  Rep.  207. 

thereby  waives  the  privilege  of  refusing  '  State  V.Harrington,  12  Xev.  125. 

to  answer  pertinent  questions  on  the  See  also  People  v.  Tyler,  36  Cal.  522 ; 

ground  of  self-crimination.     Este  v.  People  u.  McGungill,  41  Cal.  429;  State 

Wilshire,  44  Oh.  St.  636  (Owen,  C.  J.  v.  Huff,  11  Nev.  27. 

dissenting). 


528  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoilip.   Tr., 

§  647.  Testimony  Evidence  against  liiiu  on  a  Subsequent 
Trial.  — If  the  accused  waives  his  privilege  and  takes  tlie  witness 
stand  in  his  own  belialf,  at  any  stage  of  the  prosecution,  he 
waives  it  for  every  subsequent  stage.  Thus,  if  he  gives  testimony 
on  his  preliminary  examination,  the  same  maybe  put  in  evidence 
asrainst  him  on  the  trial. ^  So,  if  he  takes  the  stand  as  a  witness 
on  his  own  behalf  on  one  trial,  what  he  so  testifies  may  be  put 
in  evidence  against  him  on  a  subsequent  trial. ^  These  decisions 
proceed  upon  the  obvious  principle  that  statements  or  admissions, 
voluntarily  made  by  a  party,  are  always  evidence  against  him. 

§  648.  May  testify  as  to  his  Intent  or  Motive.  —  As  already 
seen,^  it  is  competent  for  a  party  testifying  as  a  witness  to  state 
what  his  intent  was  in  doing  a  particular  act,  whenever  the  ques- 
tion of  intent  is  material  to  the  issue.*  This  rule  of  evidence  is 
of  great  value  to  persons  accused  of  crime  who  may  elect  to  tes- 
tify in  their  own  behalf;  since  in  most  crimes  and  misdemeanors 
intent  is  a  necessary  ingredient  of  the  offense.  Under  this  rule, 
the  accused,  when  so  testifying,  is  competent  to  state  what  the 
intent  was,  with  which  he  did  the  act  imputed  to  him  as  a  crime.^ 
He  may  explain  what  he  mpant  by  words  shown  to  have  been 
used  by  him.^  Where  the  charge  is  murder  and  the  accused  sets 
up  the  so-called  "  plea  of  self-defense,''  he  is  entitled  to  testify 
whether,  at  the  moment  when  he  committed  the  fatal  act,  he  did 
or  did  not  really  believe  that  he  was  in  danger  of  death  or  great 
bodily  harm  at  the  hands  of  the  deceased.^  Where  the  charge 
is  assault  and  battery  with  intent  to  ravish,  he  may  testify  that  the 


1  People  v.  Kelley,  47  Cal.  125;  state  Mo.  627,  034;  Thacher  v.  Phinney,  7 
V.  Glass,  50  Wis.  218.  Compare  Peo-  Alleu  (Mass.),  14G;  Snow  v.  Paine,  114 
pie  V.  Gibbous,  43  Cal.  557.  Mass.  520. 

2  Com.  V.  Reynolds,  122  Mass.  454.  ^  Boleu  v.    State,    2(5    Oh.    St.   371 ; 

3  Ante,  §383.  Kerraius  v.  People,  GO  N.  Y.  221;  State 
■*  Greer  v.  State,  53  Ind.  420  (over-  v.  Banks,  73   Mo.  592;   s.  c,  reversed 

ruling  Zimraerraau  v.   Marchland,  23  ou  another  point,  10    Mo.  App.  Ill; 

Ind.  474,  and  qualifying  Columbus  v.  Babcock  v.  People,  15    Huu  (N.  Y.), 

Dalin,  31]  Ind.  330) ;  Thurston  v.  Cor-  347. 

nell,  38  N.  Y.  281;   White  v.  State,  53  «  People  v.  Farrell,  31  Cal.  577. 

Ind.    5:»5;    Van   Sickle   v.    Brown,  G8  ^  State  v.  Harrington,  12  Nev.  126. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch,   XXIII.]       THE    ACCUSED    AS    WITNESSES.  529 

assault  was  made  with  a  different  intent ;  ^  and  where  the  charge 
is  larceny,  he  may  testify  as  to  what  his  intention  was  in  resi)ect 
of  the  goods,  at  the  time  when  they  came  into  his  possession. ^ 

§  649.  View  that  lie  may  be  Cross-Examined  as  any  other 
Witness. — There  is  a  difference  of  view  as  to  the  scope  of  cross- 
examination,  where  the  accused  in  a  criminal  case  offers  himself 
as  a  witness.  One  view  is  that,  unless  the  lan2:uao:e  of.  the  statute 
is  restrained,  it  places  him,  in  respect  of  his  cross-examination,  in 
the  same  situation  as  that  of  any  other  witness.-*  So,  where  a 
party  in  a  civil  action  becomes  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  he 
thereby  subjects  himself  to  all  the  rules  regulating  the  direct  and 
cross-examination  of  other  witnesses.*  Accordino;  to  this  view, 
his  cross-examination  is  subject  to  the  same  rules,  and  the  same 
questions  may  be  put  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his 
credibility.^  Questions  calling  for  facts  in  his  history,  which 
would  disgrace  him  or  disparage  his  character,  may  be  put  to 
him,  where  they  might  be  put  to  any  other  witness.^  Under 
this  view,  he  may  refuse  to  answer  a  question  which  would  dis- 
grace him,  ^  under  the  same  circumstances  which  would  entitle 
any  other  witness  to  exercise  that  privilege.^  But  this  is  his 
privilege  an  a  loitnes'^,  and  not  as  a  party .^  He  therefore  can- 
not, through  his  counsel,  object  to  a  question  put  to  him  on  the 
witness  stand,  ui>on  this  ground ;  but  if  he  does  not  wish  to  an- 
swer it,  he  must  claim  his  privilege.^''  But  this  view  is  very  much 
discarded, 'AS  we  shall  presently  see,  and  some  of  the  cases  cited  in 
this  section  must  be  regarded  as  overruled  in  the  same  jurisdictions, 

§650.  [Continued.]  Interrogated  as  to  former  Arrests 
and  Convictions.  —  Under  this  view,  whether  a  witness,  or  de- 

'1  Greer  v.  State,  53  lud.  420.  •»  Clark  v.  Reese,  35  Cal.  89. 

2  White  V.  State,  53  lud.  5!)5.  '"  Gill   v.   People,    5    Thorap.    &  C. 

3  Connors   v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  240;       (N.  Y.)  308. 

Fralich  v.  People,  G5  Barb  .   (N.  Y.)  48;  6  Braudou  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  265. 

People  V.  Reiuhart,  39  Cal.  449;   State  ^  AntP.,  §287. 

V.  Abrams,  11   Ore.  1<;9,  173;    State  v.  ^  People  v.  Reiuhart,  39  Cal.  449. 

Ober,  52  N.  H.  459;  s.  c.   13  Am.  Rep.  »  Ante,  §306. 

88;   State  v.  Efler,  85  N.  C.  585.  ^^  People  v   Reiuhart,  supra. 

34 


530  EXAMINATION    OF    AVITNESSES.       [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

fenclant  in  a  criminal  trial  testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  may  be 
asked  on  cross-examination  touching  his  commission  of  another 
crime,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  his  credibility,  is  a  matter 
resting  largely  within  the  discretion  of  tlie  trial  court.  "  The 
limits  to  which  a  witness  may  be  cross-examined  on  matters  not 
relevant  to  the  issue  for  the  purpose  of  judgiug  of  his  character 
and  credit  from  his  ow'n  voluntary  admissions,  rest  in  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  court  trying  the  cause.  Such  questions  maybe 
allowed  where  there  is  reason  to  believe  it  will  tend  to  the  ends 
of  justice ;  but  they  ought  to  be  excluded  when  a  disparaging 
course  of  examination  seems  unjust  to  the  witness  and  uncalled 
for  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case."^ 

§651.  [Continued.]  Illustrations  of  this  View. — Forinstance, 
where  the  prosecution  is  for  the  unlaivful  selling  of  intoxicating  liquors, 
he  may  be  asked  whether  he  has  not  recently  been  tried  and  convicted 

several  times  for  the  unlawful  seUing  of  such  Hquors.'- So,  it  has 

been  held  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to  allow  a  witness  to 
be  asked,  "  Are  you  not  now  under  indictment  for  murder  in  the  second 

degree  in  this  court?"  ^ So,  where,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment 

for  murder  in  the  first  degree,  the  accused  took  the  stand  as  a  witness 
in  his  own  behalf,  it  was  held  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to 
allow  the  State's  counsel  to  ask  him,  on  cross-examination,  whether  he 

had  not  once  before  been  arrested  for  an  assault  with  intent  to  kill.^ 

So,  it  was  held  that  a  prisoner,  testifying  in  her  own  behalf,  might  prop- 
erly be  asked  whether  she  had  ever  been  arrested  for  theft, ^  the  ques- 
tion being  one  which  the  court,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  might 

1  Wroe  V.    State,  20   Oh.    St.   400;  offered  in  a  case  where  the  accused 

Hanoff  V.  State,  37   Oh.  St.  178,  181;  testifies  as  a  witness  in  his  own  be- 

State  V.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90;  State  v.  half.     State  v.  Watson,  65  Me.  74,  79. 

Lawhoru,  88  N.  C.  634;  State  v.  Pat-  And  it  is  not  admissible  for  the  ac- 

tersou,  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  346;  State  v.  cused  to  give  evidence  to  contradict 

Garrett,  Busbee    (N.  C),  357.     Com-  it;  it  imports  absolute  verity.     Ibid: 

pare   State  v.  Davidson,  67  N.  C.  119;  State  v.  Lang,  63  Me.  215. 
People  V.  Clark  (N.  Y.),  8  N.  East  Rep.  ^  state  v.  Pfefferle,  36  Kan.  90. 

38.    By  the  statute  of  Maine  the  record  ^  Wroe  v.  State,  20  Oh.  St.  460. 

of  a  previous  conviction  of  a  criiniual  *  Hanoff  v.  State,  supra.     Compare 

offense  is  made  competc'ut  to  affect  the  Lee   v.    State,  21  Oh.  St.   151;  People 

credibility  of  a  witness.     Rev.  Stat.  v.  Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  288. 
Me.,  chap.  82,  §  94;  State  v.  Wat.son,  «  Brandon  v.  People,  42  N.   Y=  265-. 

63  Me.  128.     Such   a   record    may   be 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXIII.]       THE    ACCUSED    AS    WITNESSES.  531 

allow  in  the  case  of  another  witness.^  .  .  .  .  AYhere  a  witness  was  on 
trial  for  a  felonious  assault  and  elected  to  testify  as  a  witness  in  his 
own  behalf,  it  was  held  that  the  people  might  ask  him,  on  cross-exam- 
ination, "  How  many  times  have  you  been  arrested?"  ^ 

§  652.  View  that  Cross-Extiniinatiou  is  Confined  to  Exaui- 
ination-in-Chief .  —  The  other,  and  more  widely  prevailing  view 
is  that  the  cross-examination  of  the  accused  is  confined  to  those 
matters  which  were  touched  upon  in  his  examination-in-cliief, 
and  that  it  cannot  extend  beyond  this,  although  the  questions 
may  pertain  to  the  issues.^  If  the  trial  court  permit  a  more 
extensive  cross-examination,  the  constitutional  privilege  of  not 
being  a  witness  against  himself  is  violated.^  Irrespective  of 
the  terms  of  the  statute,  or  of  the  considerations  touchino- 
the  privilege  of  the  accused,  this  would  be  the  view  where 
the  American  rule  of  strict  cross-examination,  already  con- 
sidered,^ prevails;  ^  whereas  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the 
English  rule  prevails,  the  defendant,  by  taking  the  witness  stand 
in  his  own  behalf,  might  subject  himself  to  the  hazards  of  a  gen 
eral  cross-examination.^  In  any  view,  the  accused  may  be  inter- 
rogated as  to  any  matter  concerning  which  he  has  testified  on  his 
direct  examination.^  In  one  jurisdiction,  which  follows  the  so- 
called  American  rule,  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  prosecution 
testified  that  two  of  the  prosecutino;  witnesses  had  a  o-ruda'e 
against  him.  It  was  held  inadmissible  for  his  counsel  to  ask  him 
to  state  the  grounds  of  the  grudge,  for  the  reason  that  such  evi- 
dence would  introduce  collateral  issues.^ 

1  LeBeau  v.  People,  34  N.  Y.  223;  ute  the  rule  was  otherwise.  State??. 
Great  Western  &c.  E.  Co.  v.  Loomis,  Clinton,  07  Mo.  330;  State  v.  Cox,  67 
32  N.  Y.  127;  ante,  §  -liU.  Mo.  392;   State  v.  Eugaii,  (38  Mo.  214; 

2  Couuors  V.  People,  50  N.  Y.  240.  State  v.  Testermau,  68  Mo.  408. 

3  State  u.  Charaberlaiu,  89Mo.  129;  •*  People  v.  O'Brien,  m  Cal.  602 
s.  c.  1  S.  W.    Rep.    145;  State  v.  Mc-  (McKee,  J.,  dissenting). 

Graw,  74  Mo.  573;   State  v.  Turner,  76  ^  Ante,  §  432. 

Mo.  350;  State  v.  McLaughlin,  76  Mo.  «  As  in  California:  People  v.  Mc- 

320;   State  v.  Porter,  75  Mo.  171;  State  Guugill,  41  Cal.  429. 

V.  Douglass,  81  Mo.  231;  State  v.  Pat-  '  Cora.  v.  Mullen,  97  Mass.  545. 

terson,  88  Mo.  88;  State  v.  Lurch,  12  »  People  v.  Russell,  46  Cal.  121. 

Ore.   99;    State   u.  Saumlers,  14  Ore.  "  Chelton  r.  State,  45  Md.  564. 

300.     Under  a  former   IMissouri  stat- 


532  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

§  G53.  [Coiitiimed.J  Previous  Arrests,  Convictions,  etc., 
not  inquired  into. —  As  already  seen,  ^  it  is  a  general  rule  api)li- 
cable  to  the  cross-examination  of  witnesses,  that  it  is  within  the 
discretion  of  the  court  to  allow  collateral  facts  affecting;  the 
credibility  of  the  witness,  to  be  inquired  into,  subject  to  another 
rule,  that  his  answers  are  conclusive  and  cannot  be  contradicted. 
Under  this  view,  as  also  seen,  the  witness  may  be  questioned 
concerning  previous  arrests  and  convictions  for  crime.  But  un- 
der the  view  stated  in  the  preceding  section,  where  the  accused, 
on  a  criminal  trial,  avails  himself  of  the  privilege  afforded  by  the 
enabling  statute,  and  takes  the  witness  stand  in  his  own  behalf, 
he  cannot  be  interrogated  as  to  previous  arrests,  convictions,  or 
other  disparaging  circumstances  in  his  history.  He  cannot  be 
examined,  against  his  objection,  as  to  former  indictments  against 
him  for  other  offenses  not  pertaining  to  the  issue  to  be  tried. '^ 
He  cannot  be  required  to  answer  such  a  question  as,  "  Did  you 
not  belong  to  Jesse  James'  gang?"^  He  cannot  be  required  to 
answer  questions,  the  answers  to  which  would  disgrace  him  and 
disparage  his  character.^  He  cannot  be  required  to  write  his 
own  name,  or  that  of  another  person,  in  the  presence  of 
the  jury,  in  order  that  they  may  compare  it  with  the  signa- 
ture on  a  note,  which  he  is  charaedwith  havino-  uttered  knowinoj 
it  to  be  forged  —  the  reason  being  that  such  a  course  violates 
the  prisoner's  right  of  not  giving  criminating  evidence  against 
himself.^  He  cannot  be  asked  whether  he  has  been  con- 
victed of  crime,  —  the  reason  that,  in  a  criminal  cause,  a  wit- 
ness cannot  be  impeached  or  sustained  by  proof  of  general 
moral    character,*'   and,    a  fortiori^    by  proof   of    an  is  olated 


^  Ante,  §§  404,  465.  which  we  have   been  thus  far  happily 

2  Smith  V.  State,  70  Aha.  21.  delivered." 

3  Clarke  v.  State,  78  Ala.  474.     lu  ■«  Ilayward  v.   People,  90  111.   492;. 
the    opinion  in  this    case  the   court  Gifford  v.  I'eople,  87  111.  210;  People 
quote   the    following  observation  of  v.   Hambliu,   C8   Cal.    101;    People  v. 
Campbell,  J.,  in  People  v.  Thomas,  9  Elster  (Cal.),  3  West  Coast  Rep.  33,  37. 
Mich.  314:  "But,  perhaps,  the  worst          ^  State  v.  Lurch,  12  Ore.  99. 

thing  would  be  the  degradation  of  our  ^  Fletcher    v.    State,    49    Ind.  124c 

criminal  jurisprudence  by   converting  This,  though  the  rule   in  Indiana,  is 

it  into  an   inquisitorial  systc':ii,  from  not  tlie  universal  rule.     Ante,  §  552. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXIII. ]       THE    ACCUSED    AS    AVITNESSES.  533 

act  of  good  or  bad  conduct.^  He  cannot  be  asked,  on  cross- 
examination,  whether  he  had  killed  a  man  in  another  State,  or 
how  often  he  had  been  without  a  pistol,  or  whether  he  had  not 
been  at  target  practice  most  of  the  time  at  a  particular  place,  — 
the  reason  being  that,  to  compel  a  prisoner  thus  to  testify  as  to 
his  whole  life  on  the  witness  stand,  would  not  merely  discredit 
hira  as  a  witness,  but  would  prejudice  the  jury  against  him  and 
against  his  defense  in  a  particular  case.-^  But  his  examination 
should  be  limited  to  matters  pertaining  to  the  issue,  in  order  to 
prevent  a  conviction  of  one  offense  by  proof  that  the  accused 
may  have  been  guilty  of  another,^  To  require  the  prisoner,  as 
the  price  of  taking  the  witness  stand  in  his  own  behalf,  to  run 
the  gauntlet  of  being  interrogated  as  to  every  disparaging  fact 
connected  with  his  past  history,  is  deemed  to  deprive  him  in  a 
large  measure  of  the  privilege  conferred  by  the  enabling  statute, 
and  also  to  violate  his  constitutional  privilege  against  self-crimi- 
nation. The  reason  given  for  the  conclusion  of  the  foreiroinsr 
cases,  by  Chief  Judge  Church,  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New 
York,  has  been  frequently  quoted  with  apjiroval  by  other  courts: 
"  By  taking  the  stand  as  a  Avitness,  while  he  may  subject  himself 
to  the  rules  applicable  to  other  witnesses,  he  is  not  thereby 
deprived  of  his  rights  as  a  party;  and  it  follows  that  his  counsel, 
while  he  is  in  the  witness  box,  has  a  right  to  speak  for  him,  and 
that  an  error  committed  by  the  court  against  him  may  inure  to 
his  benefit  as  a  party.  Especially  ought  this  protection  to  be 
afforded  to  persons  on  trial  for  criminal  offenses,  wdio  often,  by 
a  species  of  moral  compulsion,  are  forced  upon  the  stand  as  wit- 
nesses ;  and  being  there,  are  obliged  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  their 
whole  lives  on  cross-examination,  and  every  immorality,  vice  or 
crime  of  which  they  may  have  been  guilty  or  suspected  of  being 
guilty,  is  brought  out,  ostensibly  to  affect  credibility,  but  prac- 
tically used  to  produce  a  conviction  for  the  particular  offense  for 
which  the  accused  is  being  tried,  upon  evidence  w^hich  otherwise 
w^ould  be  deemed  insufficient.     Such  a  result  is  manifestly  un- 

1  Parley  ■«.  state,  57  lud.  331.  3  People  v.  Brown,   72  N.  Y.    571; 

2  State  V.  Saumlers,  U  Ore.  300.  Clarke  v.  State,  78  Ala.  474,481. 


534  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOllip.   Tr., 

just,  and  every  protection  should  be  afforded  to  guard  against 
it."  1 

§  654.  Crimes  uot  Affecting-  Credibility.  —  For  stronger 
reasons,  an  accused  person  who  takes  the  witness  stand  in  his 
own  behalf,  cannot  be  interrogated  as  to  other  offenses,  or  acts  of 
misconduct,  which  do  not  necessarily  affect  his  credit  or  ve- 
racity .^  In  so  holding,  it  was  said  by  Mr.  Chief  Judge  Church, 
in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals:  "The 
discretion  which  courts  possess,  to  permit  questions  of  particu- 
lar acts  to  be  put  to  witnesses  for  the  purpose  of  impairing  cred- 
ibility, should  be  exercised  with  great  caution,  when  an  accused 
person  is  a  witness  on  his  own  trial.  He  goes  upon  the  stand 
under  a  cloud;  he  stands  charged  with  a  criminal  offense,  not 
onh',  but  is  under  the  strongest  possible  temptation  to  give  evi- 
dence favorable  to  himself.  His  evidence  is  therefore  looked 
upon  with  suspicion  and  distrust;  and  if,  in  addition  to  this,  he 
may  be  subjected  to  a  cross-examination  upon  every  incident  of 
his  life,  and  every  charge  of  vice  or  crime  which  may  have  been 
made  against  him,  and  which  have  no  bearing  upon  the  charge  for 
which  he  is  being  tried,  he  may  be  so  prejudiced  in  the  minds  of 
the  jury  as  frequently  to  induce  them  to  convict,  upon  evidence 
which  otherwise  would  be  deemed  insufficient.  It  is  not  legiti- 
mate to  bolster  up  a  weak  case  by  probabilities  based  upon  other 
transactions.  An  accused  person  is  required  to  meet  the  specific 
charge  made  against  him,  and  is  not  called  upon  to  defend  him- 
self against  every  act  of  his  life.  *  *  *  ]^^o  r^le  of  law  is 
violated,  in  requiring  that,  to  entitle  questions'  to  be  put  to  ac- 
cused persons,  which  are  irrelevant  to  the  issue,  and  are  calcu- 
lated to  prejudice  him  with  the  juiy,  they  should  at  least  be  of  a 
character,  which  clearly  go  to  impeach  his  general  moral  charac- 
ter, and  his  credibility  as  a  witness.     The  old  rule,  not  to  allow 

1  People   V.   Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571,  2  people  v.   Crapo,    7G   N.    Y.  288, 

574    (distiuguishiug  People  v.  Brau-  289,293;    Peoples.   Browu,  72  N.   Y. 

clou,   42  N.  Y.  265;  People  v.  Conuors,  571;  State  v.  Huff,  11  Nev.  17,  20.    See 

50  N.  Y.  240:  People  v.  Real,  42  N.  Y.  24  N.  Y.  299;  Gale  v.  People,  2G  Mich. 

270.)  159. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXIll.]       THE    ACCUSED    AS    WITNESSES.  535 

irrelevant  questions  to  such  persons,  would  be  preferable,  and 
more  in  accordance  with  sound  principles  of  justice ;  but  it  is  un- 
necessary in  this  case  to  go  bej^ond  the  requirement  that  the 
answer  must  tend  directly  to  impeach  him."  ^  In  an  earlier 
case  in  the  same  State  it  was  said,  on  obvious  grounds,  by  Jewett, 
J.,  that,  "  the  single  fact  that  he  [the  witness]  had  been  com- 
plained of  and  held  for  trial,  for  the  commission  of  a  crime,  did 
not  affect  his  moral  character."  ^ 

§  655.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. — Thus,  it  has  been  held  that 
a  prisoner,  on  trial  for  burglary  and  larceny,  who  elects  to  take  the 
stand  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  cannot  be  asked,  on  cross-examina- 
tion, whether  he  has  been  arrested  on  a  charge  of  bigamy.'-^ On  the 

same  principle,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  the  defendant,  on  trial  for 
murder,  takes  the  witness  stand,  he  cannot  be  cross-examined  as  to  as- 
saults QXi(\  batteries;  since,  while  this  might  carry  the  inference  that  he 
was  a  violent  and  dangerous  man,  it  would  not  tend  to  prove  that  he 
was  a  liar.  Accordingly,  the  foUowing  line  of  cross-examination  of  the 
defendant  in  such  a  case,  permitted  by  the  court  against  the  objection 
of  the  defendant's  counsel,  was  held  prejudicial  error:  "  Q.  How  many 
times  have  3'ou  been  arrested  in  Virginia  City  for  unlawfully  beating 
men  and  women?  A.  Three  times,  I  believe.  Q.  Were  30U  convicted 
each  time?  A.  Yes,  sir.  Plead  guilty  twice  and  was  tried  two  times. 
Q.  What  was  the  name  of  that  woman  j'^ou  were  arrested  for  beating? 
A.  Katie  Devine.  Q.  Was  that  one  of  the  persons  that  you  assaulted,  and 
was  convicted  of  the  offense?  A.  I  believe  it  was.  Q.  Do  you  know 
Mr.  Robe}'?  A.  Yes,  sir.  Q.  You  were  arrested  and  charged  with 
beating  him  and  cutting  off  his  beard?  A.  I  was.  Q.  And  convicted? 
A.  I  was.  Q.  Were  you  arrested  for  striking  a  man  with  a  monkey 
wrench?  A.  No.  Q.  You  threw  it  at  him  and  was  convicted  of  as- 
sault and  battery?  A.  I  was."  ^  For  like  reasons,  it  has  been  held  er- 
ror to  allow  the  State  to  ask  the  prisoner,  on  the  witness  stand,  '*  How 
many  times  have  you  been  arrested?"  *'' But  the  same  court,  in  a 

1  People   V.   Crapo,    70   N.  Y.   288,  the    objectiou    did    not    involve  the 

289,293;  Folger  and  Earl,   JJ.,   dis-  point  under  consideration, 
sented.      The     Chief    Judge,    iu   his  2  people  v.  Gay,  7  N.  Y.  378. 

opinion,  distinguishes  People  v.  Bran-  ^  People  v.  Crapo,  76  N.  Y.  288. 

don,  42  N.  Y.  2G5,  and  People   v.  Con-  *  State  v.  Huff,  11  Nev.  17,  26. 

nors,  50  N.  Y.  2-tO,  on  the  ground  that  «  People  v.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571. 


536  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   TllOllip.  Tl., 

later  decision,  has  declared  a  rule  whicli  seems  mucli  better  calculated 
to  subserve  tlie  rights  of  society  and  to  develop  the  real  object  of  a  ju- 
dicial inquiry,  the  ascertaining  of  the  truth.  It  is,  that  it  is  within  the 
sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court  how  far  the  examination  of  a  prisoner, 
who  elects  to  talce  the  stand  in  his  own  behalf,  may  be  carried  with  ref- 
erence to  his  past  history  and  mode  oflife.^ 

1  People  V.  Clark  (N.  Y.  Ct.  of  App.),  8  N.  East.  Eep.  38. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXIV.]  UNSWORN  statement  of  accused.       537 


CHAPTEE  XXIV. 

OF  THE  UNSWOEN  STATEMENT  OF  THE  ACCUSED. 

Section 

660.  Right  to  make  a  Statemeut  at  Coraraou  Law. 

661.  Unsettled  State  of  the  Law. 

662.  [Continued.]     Prisoner's  Counsel  not  allowed  to  make  it. 

663.  Under  American  Statutes. 

664.  In  the  Nature  of  Evidence. 

665.  Rebutting  such  Statement. 

666.  Omission  to  make  Statement. 

667.  Prisoner,  how  Assisted  by  his  Counsel. 

668.  [Continued.]     Observations  on  this  Question. 

669.  Cross-Examination  on  the  Statement. 

670.  Not  Subject  to  Impeachment.  . 

§  660.  Right  to  make  a  Statement  at  Common  Law. — At 

common  law  the  defendant  was  often  accorded  the  right  to  make 
an  unsworn  statement  to  the  jury  in  his  own  behalf,  at  least  in 
capital  cases.  The  right  has  been  more  recently  allowed  in 
England  in  cases  not  capital,  the  authorities  in  that  country  not 
being  united  as  to  whether  it  may  be  exercised  only  in  cases 
where  the  defendant  has  not  the  aid  of  counsel.^  How  far  the 
prisoner  is  allowed  to  make  an  unsworn  statement  of  facts, 
by  the  rules  of  procedure  in  American  courts,  in  the  absence  of 
a  statute  authorizing  it,  is  perhaps  a  matter  of  doubt.  In  most 
of  the  American  constitutions  there  is  a  provision  that  "  in  all 
criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  has  a  right  to  be  heard  by 
himself  and  counsel,  or  either."  ^  It  has  been  supposed  that 
such  a  constitutional  provision  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to  require 
the  court  to  allow  the  prisoner  to  make  an  unsworn  statement 
of  the  facts,  beyond  giving  his  explanation  of  the  inculpatory 
evidence  wdiich    has  been   adduced  against  him.     He  cannot,  it 

1  Whart.   Crim.   Ev..    §   427.     And  2  Ala.  Const.  1875.,  art.  1,  §  7. 

see  the  jaext  section,  infra. 


538  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl*., 

has   been   ruled,  make  au  unsworn  statement  in  the   nature  of 
substantive  evidence.^ 

§  GG 1 .  Unsettled  state  of  the  Law  in  England.  —  There  has  been,  un- 
less within  a  very  recent  period,  no  settled  rule  on  this  subject  in  England. 
In  one  case  where,  at  the  close  of  the  case  of  the  prosecutor,  counsel 
for  the  prisoner  proposed  that  the  prisoner  should  make  his  own  state- 
ment before  the  counsel  addressed  the  jiuy,  Baron Gurney,  having  con- 
ferred with  Baron  Alderson,  said:  "  My  brother  Alderson  informs  me 
that  he  allowed  it  to  be  done  in  the  instance  which  has  been  referred 
to,  which  was  a  very  peculiar  case ;  and  as  it  has  been  already  per- 
mitted before  at  these  assizes,  I  will  not  refuse  to  allow  it  in  this  in- 
stance;  but  I  think  that  it  ought  not  to  be  drawn  into  a  precedent." 
The  prisoner  then  read  a  written  statement  to  the  jury,  which  did  not 
aid  him  much,  for  the  verdict  was  guilty. ^  In  the  "  very  peculiar 
case"  where  Baron  Alderson  allowed  such  a  statement  to  be  made, 
counsel  for  the  prisoner,  in  commencing  his  address  to  the  jury,  ex- 
pressed regret  that,  as  the  prisoner  was  defended  by  counsel,  he  could 
not  be  allowed  to  make  his  own  statement.  Baron  Alderson  replied: 
"  I  see  no  objection  in  this  case  to  his  doing  so  ;  I  have  read  the  state- 
ment he  made  before  the  magistrate.  I  think  it  is  right  that  a  person 
should  have  an  opportunity  of  stating  such  facts  as  he  ma}^  think  ma- 
terial, and  that  his  counsel  should  be  allowed  to  comment  on  that 
statement,  as  one  of  the  circumstances  of  the  case.  On  trials  for  high 
treason,  the  prisoner  is  always  allowed  to  make  his  own  statement,  after 
his  counsel  has  addressed  the  jury.  It  is  true  that  the  prisoner's 
statement  may  often  defeat  the  defense  intended  by  his  counsel ;  but  if 
so,  the  ends  of  justice  will  be  furthered.  Besides,  it  is  often  the  genu- 
ine defense  of  the  party,  and  not  a  mere  imaginary  case  invented  by  the 
ingenuity  of  counsel."  The  prisoner  then  made  the  same  statement  as 
he  had  done  before ;  that  the  prosecutor  had,  in  the  first  instance, 
threatened  to  shoot  him,  and  had  snapped  the  gun  at  him.  His  counsel 
then  addressed  the  jury  and  commented  on  his  statement,  as  according 
with  the  evidence,  and  only  supplying  what  was  otherwise  deficient  in 
it.  The  indictment  was  for  maliciously  wounding  with  intent  to  do 
grievous  bodily  harm  ;  the  verdict  was  guilty  of  an  assault  merely.-^ 
Another  English  judge  seems  to  have  conceived  the  rule  to  be  that  if, 
in  a  case  of  felony,  the  prisoner's  counsel  had  addressed  the  jury,  the 

1  State  V.  McCall,  4  Ala.  043.  ^  Rgg.  v.  Malings,  8  Carr.  &  P.  242. 

2  Kfii.  r.  Walking,  S  Carr.  &  P.  243. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXIV.]    UKSNVORN    STATEMENT    OF    ACCUSED.  539 

prisoner  himself  would  not  be  allowed  to  address  the  jury  also.  Thus 
where,  in  such  a  case,  the  prisoner's  counsel  had  addressed  the  jiiry,  at 
the  conclusion  of  his  speech  the  prisoner  wished  to  make  a  statement, 
but  Coleridge,  J.,  said:  "  Prisoner,  your  counsel  has  spoken  for  you. 
I  cannot  hear  both."  ^ 

§  6G2.  [CoxTiNUED.]  Prisoner's  Counsel  not  allowed  to  matte 
IT.  —  But,  while  the  prisoner  would  not  be  allowed  to  make  a  statement 
where  he  had  counsel  who  addressed  the  jury  for  him,  the  prisoner's 
counsel  was  not  allowed  to  detail  the  prisoner's  account  of  the  matter  to 
the  jury  for  the  prisoner.  In  a  case  of  felony,  the  prisoner's  counsel, 
in  addressing  the  jur}',  was  proceeding  to  tell  them  that  he  was  in- 
structed b}^  the  prisoner  that  the  oats,  which  were  the  subject  of  the 
larceny  charged  in  the  indictment,  had  lieen  delivered  to  the  prisoner 
by  one  Dunn,  and  that  the  prisoner  was  ignorant  of  their  having  been 
stolen.  But  Coleridge,  J.,  said:  ''  I  cannot  permit  a  prisoner's  coun- 
sel to  tell  the  jury  anything  which  he  is  not  in  a  situation  to  prove.  If 
the  prisoner  does  not  employ  counsel,  he  is  at  liberty  to  make  a  state- 
ment for  himself  and  tell  his  own  story  ;  which  is  to  have  such  weight 
with  the  jury,  as,  all  circumstances  considered,  it  is  entitled  to;  but  if 
he  employs  counsel,  he  must  submit  to  the  rules  which  have  been  es- 
tablished with  respect  to  the  conducting  of  cases  by  counsel."  In 
summing  up  Coleridge,  J.,  also,  said :  "  The  counsel  for  the  prisoner 
cannot  be  allowed  to  state  the  prisoner's  story,  unless  he  is  able  to 
confirm  it  by  evidence ;  as  the  prosecutor  and  prisoner,  if  they  employ 
counsel,  must  be  put  in  the  same  situation."  ^  This  question  came 
up  in  the  trial  of  O'Doiinell,  before  Mr.  Justice  Denmaa,  in  1883, 
who  refused  to  allow  Mr.  Russell,  of  counsel  for  the  prisoner,  to  re- 
hearse the  statement  of  the  circumstances  of  the  homicide,  as  the 
prisoner  had  stated  them  to  him.  The  discussion  of  the  subject  led 
to  a  correspondence  between  the  Attorney-General  and  Lord  Coleridge, 
the  Lord  Chief  Justice  of  England,  which  developed  the  fact  that,  on 
November  26,  1881,  all  the  judges  of  England  liable  to  try  prisoners, 
had  held  a  meeting  in  the  room  of  the  Queen's  Bench  Division,  which 
had  resulted  in  passing  the  following  resolution,  with  the  concurrence 
of  all  present  except  Hawkins  and  Stephen,  JJ.,  who  dissented, — 
nineteen  judges  having  concurred  therein:  "  That,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  judges,  it  is  contrary  to  the  administration  and  practice  of  the 
criminal    law,  as   hitherto    allowed,  that  counsel  for  prisoners  should 

1  Keg.  V.  Boucher,  8  Carr.  &  P.  Ul.  2  ]jeg.  r.  Beard,  8  Carr.  &  V.  142. 


540  EXAMINATION"    OF    WITNESSES.        [I  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

state  to  the  jury,  as  alleged  existing  facts,  matters  which  they  have 
been  told  in  their  instructions,  on  the  authority  of  the  prisoner,  but 
which  they  do  not  propose  to  prove  in  evidence. "  i  It  thus  appears  that, 
by  relaxing  the  rigor  of  the  old  rule  which  denied  a  prisoner  the  bene- 
fit of  counsel  except  to  argue  questions  of  law  to  the  court,  the  prisoner 
was,  in  a  very  important  respect,  placed  in  a  worse  position  than  that  in 
which  he  stood  before. 

§  663.  Under  American  Statutes.  —  Statutes  exist  in  several 
American  jurisdictions,  allowing  the  defendant,  in  a  criminal  trial, 
to  make  an  unsworn  statement  of  facts  to  the  jury ;  though  in 
most  States,  enabling  acts  exist  (considered  in  the  preceding 
chapter)  under  which  the  prisoner  has  the  option  of  being  sworn 
as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf.^  Such  statutes,  being  just  and 
humane  in  purpose,  slioukl  receive  a  construction  which  will  give 
them  full  effect.^ 

§  664.  In  tlie  Nature  of  Evidence.  —  While  there  is  judicial 
opinion  to  the  effect  that  such  a  statement,  when  the  subject  of 
argument,  should  be  dealt  with  as  a  statement,  and  not  con- 
founded with  testimony,^  yet  the  general  opinion  is  that  it  is  in 
the  nature  of  evidence,  and  that  the  jury  are  to  give  it  such 
weight  as  they  think  it  entitled  to.^  They  are  to  consider  its 
probability  or  improbability  with  reference  to  the  situation  of 
the  defendant,  his  demeanor  in  making  the  statement,  its  in- 
trinsic character,  its  harmony  with  the  other  evidence  in  the  case, 
and  the  like  circumstances.^     It  is  said  that  it  is  subject  to  the 

1  See  18  Am.  Law  Rev.  97.  Durant  v.  People,  13  Mich.  351;  Annis 

2  In  People  v.  Thomas,  9  Mich.  314,  u.  People,  13  Mich.  511,  519.  See  also 
it  was  decided  that  Statute  125  of  Washburu  v.  People,  10  Mich.  372; 
1861,  enacted  in  that  State,  did  not  People  r'.  Thomas,  9  Mich.  314;  Reich 
extend  so  far  as  to  allow  a  defendant  v.  State,  03  Ga.  GIG;  Pease  v.  State,  G3 
in  a  criminal  case  to  be  sworn  in  his  Ga.  G31. 

owu  behalf,  but  only  allowed  him  to  ®  Blackburn  v.    State,  71   Ala.  319; 

make    an  unsworn   statement    to  the  s.  c.    4G   Am.  Rep.   323;     Chappell    v. 

jury.  State,  71  Ala.  322 ;  People  v.  Arnold,  40 

3  Annis  v.  People,  13  Mich.  511,  Mich.  710;  Miller  v.  State,  15  Fla.  577; 
519.                                          '  Barberi?.  State,  13  Fla.  675,  681;  Bond 

■»  Brown  v.  State,  GO  Ga.  210.  v.  State,  21    Fla.  738;  Brown  v.  State, 

s  People  V.    Arnold,  40  Midi.   7in;       60  Ga.  210;  Ross  v.  State,  59  Ga.  248, 


Tit   III,  Ch,  XXIV.]  UNSWORN  statement  of  accused.       541 

ordinary  intrinsic  tests  of  credibility  governing  the  s^Yorn  testi- 
mony of  witnesses,  such  as  the  character  of  the  defendant,  his 
demeanor  on  the  witness  stand,  his  intelligence,  the  accuracy  of 
his  memory,  the  inherent  probability  of  his  statement,  its  con- 
sistency with  itself  and  with  the  other  circumstances  of  the  case; 
or  the  lack  of  these  elements  of  veracity,  together  with  many 
other  considerations  liable  to  affect  its  credibility,  or  afford  any 
reasonable  presumption  of  its  probability  or  improbability.^ 
Uppn  this  princi})le  it  is  held  error  for  the  court  to  charge  the 
jury  in  respect  of  its  probative  value. '^  Being  in  the  natm'e  of 
evidence  and  a  subject  for  the  consideration  of  the  jury  as  such, 
it  is  the  privilege  of  the  defendant's  counsel  to  comment  upon  it 
in  argument^  and  the  denial  of  this  privilege  is  error. ^  It  may 
be  regarded  as  evidence  against  him,  as  well  as  evidence  for  him. 
In  other  words,  so  far  as  it  confesses  or  admits  anything,  it 
stands  on  the  same  footing  as  any  other  confession  or  admission.^ 
It  is  therefore  generally,^  though  not  always,^  held  error  for  the 
court  to  instruct  the  jury  that  it  is  not  to  be  considered  as  evi- 
dence. 

§  665.  Rebutting^  such  Statement.  — After  the  prisoner  has 
made  his  statement,  it  is  competent  for  the  prosecution  to  give 
evidence  rebutting  the  facts  therein  stated.  It  was  justly  said 
that,  if  the  contrary  view  were  to  be  taken  of  the  statute,  "  the 
legislation,  which  has  proved  in  so  high  a  degree  beneficent  and 
just,  might  easily,  in  the  case  of  the  most  dangerous  offenders, 
become  a  protection  to  crime,  instead  of  the  shield  to  innocence 
it  was  designed  to  be."  ^ 


1  Blackburn  v.  State,  71  Ala.  319;  ^  Barber  v.  State,  13  Fla.  675,  G81; 
s.  c.  4G  Am.  Rep.  323.  reaffirmed  iu   Miller  v.  State,  15  Fla. 

2  Ibid.  577. 

3  Beasley  v.  State,  71  Ala.  328.  So  6  Ross  v.  State,  59  Ga.  248.  As  to 
held  iu  Euglaud,  uuder  the  comraou-  the  luauuer  of  instructing  juries  with 
la;v  practice  of  allowiui?  the  prisoner  reference  to  the  value  of  such  state- 
to  make  a  statemeut.     Reg.  v.  Malings,  •   ment,  see  post,  §§  2448-2450. 

8  Carr.  &  P.  242.  7  Burden  v.  People,  26    Midi.    162, 

*  See  reasouing  iu  Browu  v.  State,  166. 
58  Ga.  212. 


542  EXAMINATIOX    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tl"., 

§  6G6.  Omission  to  make  Statement.  —  The  omission  of  a 
defendant  to  avail  himself  of  the  statutory  privilege  of  making 
a  statement  to  the  jury,  is  not  matter  which  they  are  entitled  to 
consider,  in  determining  the  question  of  his  guilt.  It  is,  there- 
fore, error  for  the  court  to  instruct  them,  that  they  may  take 
that  into  consideration,  and  give  it  such  weight  as  they  may 
think  tit,  with  the  other  evidence.^ 

§  667.  Prisoner,  how  Assisted  by  his  Counsel.  — In  deliver- 
ing his  unsworn  statement,  the  accused  is  not  examined  as  a 
witness,  and  his  counsel  has  no  right  to  put  questions  to  him; 
though  it  is  supposed  that  this  might  be  allowed  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court;  2  and  he  may  receive  suggestions  ivom.  his  coun- 
sel, first  submitted  in  loriting  to  the  court, ^  provided  they  are 
not  leading  in  their  form.^ 

§  668.  [Continued.]  Observations  on  this  Question. — In  a  case 
arising  under  the  Michigan  statute,  the  question  was  presented  whether 
the  prisoner  was  entitled  to  any  aid  from  counsel  in  making  his  state- 
ment. The  case  was  an  indictment  for  larceny,  and  one  of  the  defend- 
ants went  iqjon  the  witness  stand,  and  without  being  interrogated, 
made  a  statement  under  the  statute ;  ^  but  in  such  statement  said 
nothing  upon  the  subject  of  his  knowledge  of  the  mare,  which  was 
alleged  to  have  been  stolen,  but  did  make  a  statement  in  reference  to 
other  material  points  in  the  case.  Whereupon  the  counsel  for  the  de- 
fendants proposed  to  call  the  attention  of  this  defendant,  while  upon  the 
stand,  to  a  subject  which  he  had  omitted  in  the  following  words:  "I 
call  your  attention  to  the  subject  of  your  knowledge  of  the  stolen  mare, 
so  that  you  may  make  a  statement  in  reference  to  it  or  not;"  which 
proposition  was  made  in  writing  and  submitted  to  the  court  and  to  the 
prosecuting  attorney,  without  being  made  icnown  to  the  defendant  or  to 
any  other  person.  The  prosecuting  attorney  objected,  on  the  ground 
that  the  statement  to  be  made  by  the  defendant  must  be  made  without 
interrogation  by  counsel,  while  he  was  upon  the  stand.  The  circuit 
judge  sustained  the  objection,  and  the  defendant  left  the  stand.  But 
he  afterwards  requested  the  court  to  let  him  make  a  further  statement, 

1  Bird  V.  State,  50  Ga.  585.  »  Annis  v.  People,  13  Mich.  611,  519. 

2  Brown  v.  State,  58  Ga.  212;  Aiiuis  *  People  v.  Morrigan,  2i)  Midi.  5,  8. 
j;.  People,  13  Mich.  511.                                       s  Mich.  Laws  18(il,  p    1G8. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XXIV.]    UNSWORN    STATEMENT    OF    ACCUSED.  543 

which  request  was  granted  ;   whereupon  he   went  upon   the  stand  and 
stated   as    follows:   "I    know   nothing   about   the   stealing,   and  had 
nothing  to  do  with  it."     Upon  these  facts  two  questions  were  presented 
to  the  Supreme  Court  for  decision :   (  1 )  whether  the  court  erred  in  the 
ruling,  and  if  so,  then  (2)  whether  the  error  was  cured  by  the  defend- 
ant afterwards  going  upon  the  stand  and  making  the  statement  he  did. 
It  was  held,  on  plausible  grounds,  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  the  ruling, 
and,    on   very   doubtful   grounds,    that   the    error  was  not  cured  by 
the  prisoner  afterwards  going  upon  the  stand  and  amending  his  state- 
ment.    Coolc}',  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  tlie  court,  after  recurring 
to  the  reason  and  policy  of  the  statute,    as    already   stated,  ^  and   to 
the  propi-iety   of  giving   it   a  just   and   humane   construction,    said: 
*'The   defendant,  when  he  goes  upon  the   stand,  may  fairly   be  sup- 
posed  to    understand    what  facts,    within  his   knowledge,    will   have 
a  bearing   upon    the  case,  and   will   tend    to  remove   any  suspicion 
which    the     sworn    evidence     has    cast    upon     him.     There     is     no 
propriety,  therefore,  in   his  cousel  being  allowed  to   question    him  as 
a  witness  is   questioned,  and  the  statute  which  allows  him  to  '  make  a 
statement '  evidently  does  not  contemplate  that  his  knowledge  of   the 
case  shall  be  drawn  from  him   by  questions  in  the  usual  form.     But 
to  hold  that,  the  moment  the  defendant  is  placed  upon  the  stand,  he 
shall  be  debarred  of   all  assistance  from   his  counsel  and  left   to  go 
through  his  statement  as  his   fears   or  his  embarrassment  may  enable 
him,  in  the  face  of  the  consequences  which  may  follow  from  imperfect 
or  unsatisfactory  explanation,  would,  in  our  opinion,  be  to  make  what 
the  statute  designed  as  an  important  privilege  to  tlie  accused,  a  trap 
into  which  none  but  the  most  cool  and  self-possessed  could  place  himself 
with   much    prospect   of   coming  out  unharmed.     An   innocent    man 
charged  with  a  heinous  offense,  and  against  whom  evidence  of  guilt  has 
been  given,  is  much  more  likely  to  be  overwhelmed  by  his  situation  and 
embarrassed,  when  called  upon  for  explanation,  than  the  offender  who  is 
hardened  in  guilt;  and  if  he  is  unlearned,  unaccustomed  to  speak  in 
public  assemblies,  or  to  put  together  his  thoughts  in  consecutive  order 
anywhere,  it  will  not  be  surprising  if  his  explanation  is  incoherent,  or 
if  it  overlooks  important  circumstances.     The  weak  in  mind  and  body 
are  precisely  the  class  most  needing  the  protection  of  the  statute,  and 
they  are  the  very  classes  who,  in  most  cases,  would  receive  no  benefit 
from  it,  if  the   construction  adopted  by  the  circuit  judge  is  correct. 
The  fact  is  illustrated  in  the  case  before  us.     The  defendant  went  upon 

1  Ante,  §§  wa,  ^■,^^^. 


544  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Tboilip.  Tr., 

the  stand  and  made  a  statement  in  reference  to  some  material  facts,  but 
left  it  witliout  saying  a  word  about  the  property  he  was  accused  of  bav- 
ins: stolen.  This  omission  could  not  fail  to  have  its  effect  ag^ainst  him 
in  the  minds  of  the  jury ;  and  if,  in  fact,  he  was  an  innocent  man, we  can 
only  attribute  the  omission  to  some  embarrassment  springing  from 
the  unaccustomed,  and  to  him  momentous,  circumstances  surround- 
ing his  attempt  at  explanation.  The  manner  in  whicli  the  counsel 
sought  to  call  his  attention  to  the  subject  to  which  he  should  direct  his 
explanation  was  quite  unobjectionable,  and  was  well  calculated  to  se- 
cure to  the  defendant  the  benefits  intended  by  the  law,  without  endan- 
gering public  justice.  The  defendant,  through  embarrassment,  defect 
of  memory,  or  other  reason,  having  failed  to  make  his  explanation  full, 
the  counsel  proposed  to  call  his  attention  to  the  topics  he  had  omitted, 
that  he  might  make  further  explanation  in  regard  to  them  if  he  saw  fit. 
This  was  not  done,  however,  by  the  way  of  question  addressed  directly 
to  the  defendant,  but  the  proposition  was  delivered  in  writing  to  the 
judge,  that  it  might  have  his  approval  before  the  prisoner  should  be 
informed  what  it  was.  Tliis  precaution  was  eminently  proper,  and,  if 
adopted,  as  we  think  it  should  generally  be,  will  prevent  the  privilege 
being  abused  and  being  made  a  means  by  which  counsel  may  indicate 
to  a  prisoner  what  they  desire  to  have  him  say.  And  the  judge, 
although  allowed  to  pass  upon  the  propositions  and  reject  such  as  are 
improper,  should  not  be  regarded  as  possessing  unlimited  j^ower  to 
reject  at  discretion,  but  as  bound  to  allow  all  that  are  made  in  good 
faith,  and  with  a  view  only  to  call  the  attention  of  the  defendant  to  the 
subjects  to  which  he  should  address  himself.  The  error  in  this  case  was 
not  cured  by  the  prisoner  going  upon  the  stand  and  making  a  further 
statement.  The  last  statement  was  as  defective  as  the  first,  and  could 
scarcely  have  been  made  by  any  man  in  the  form  it  was,  unless  he  was 
laboring  under  great  embarrassment.  The  prisoner  needed  the  aid 
which  counsel  proposed  to  give,  as  much  aid  this  time  as  he  had  needed 
it  before ;  and  the  ruling  which  the  court  had  made,  and  which  was 
sweeping  in  its  extent,  excluded  all  such  aid."  ^ 

§  6G9  .Cross-Examiiiation  on  the  Statement.  —  Under  the 
statute  of  Michigan  allowing  defendants  to  make  such  state- 
ments,^ the  defendant  "  may  be  cross-examined  upon  any  sueh 

1  Auuis  V.  People,  13  Mich.  511,  519,  2  Comp.   Laws  Mich.   1871,  §   5967. 

521. 


Tit.   Ill,  Cll.   XXIV.]    UNSWORN    STATEMENT    OF    ACCUSED.  545 

statement.'^  The  statute  does  not  state  whether  the  statement 
is  to  be  under  oath  or  not,  but  the  rulings  under  it  are  that  it  is 
made  ivitliout  oaiJi.^  But  under  the  Alabama  statute,  it  is  held 
that  the  defendants,  thus  making  statements,  not  being  witnesses, 
and  their  statements  not  being  strictly  evidence,  it  results,  that 
they  are  not  subject  to  examination  or  cross-examination  as  wit- 
nesses are.^  Under  the  Michigan  statute,  the  cross-examination 
is  not  allowed  to  go  beyond  the  statement,  and  to  extend  over  the 
entire  issue,  as  it  might  if  the  defendant  were  a  general  wit- 
ness ;  neither  will  it  be  allowed  to  go  into  any  of  the  collateral 
inquiries  whereby  a  witness'  credit  or  memory  is  sometimes 
tested.-^ 

§  670.  Not  Subject  to  Impeacbment. — From  the  same 
reasoning  as  to  the  effect  of  the  Alabama  statute,  the  conclusion 
has  been  reached  that  while  the  statement  may  be  subject  to  all 
the  tests  for  ascertaining  truth  which  spring  out  of  the  proof  in 
the  case,  the  con.sistenc3^  or  probability,  velnon,  of  the  statements 


1  Duraut  u.  People,  13  Mich.  351; 
People  V.  Joues,  24  Mich.  215;  De  Foe 
V.  People,  22  Mich.  224;  People  v.  Ar- 
uold,  40  Mich     710. 

2  Chappellv.  State,  71  Ala   322,  327. 

3  People  V.  Thomas,  9  Mich.  314, 
321.  The  court  add  that:  "  While  his 
coustitutioual  right  of  declining  to  an- 
swer questions  cannot  be  removed, 
yet  a  refusal  by  a  party  to  answer  any 
fair  question,  not  going  outside  of 
what  he  has  offered  to  explain,  would 
have  its  proper  weiglit  with  the  jury." 
Keaffirmed  in  Gale  v.  People,  2G  Mich. 
157,  IGO.  In  the  latter  case  Cooley,  J., 
in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court, 
after  remarking  on  the  beneficent  pur- 
pose of  the  statute,  said:  "  Few  men, 
however  innocent,  could  safely  go  up- 
on the  stand,  to  answer  a  criminal 
charge,  If  they  must,  at  their  peril,  be 
prepared  to  give  satisfactory  answers 
to  questions     regarding    their    whole 


former  life,  or,  if  they  decline  to  do 
so,  have  their  triers  informed  that  the 
information  they  decline  to  give,  it  was 
proper  for  the  prosecution  to  call  out, 
and  tliat  the  refusal  to  respond  to  the 
questions  justly  subjected  them  to  un- 
favorable inferences.  Such  would  be 
the  practical  result  of  a  refusal  to  an- 
swer an  interrogatory  which  the  court 
had  sustained  after  objection  was 
made.  A  review  of  tlie  evidence  in 
this  case  suggests  very  forcibly  that, 
however  full  may  be  the  explana- 
tions, a  list  of  questions  which  assume 
the  existence  of  damaging  facts  may 
be  put  in  such  a  manner  and  with  such 
persistency  and  show  of  proof,  as  to 
impress  a  jury  that  there  must  be 
something  wrong,  even  though  the 
prisoner  fully  denies  it,  and  there  is  no 
other  evidence."  Gate  v.  People, 
s^ipra. 


546  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoilip     Tl'., 

made,  the  defendant's  manner  in  making  them,  the  interest  he 
must  feel  in  the  result,  —  the  defendant  making  such  a  statement 
cannot  be  impeached  as  a  witness,  either  by  proof  of  bad  charac- 
ter, upon  cross-examination,  or  by  other  proof  of  extrinsic  facts 
introduced  for  such  purpose.^ 

1  Chappell  V.  State,  71  Ala.  322,  327. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  547 


CHAPTER    XXV. 

OBJECTIONS    TO    EVIDENCE    AND    EXCEPTIONS    TO   THE    RULINGS 

THEREON. 

Article    I. — Tenders  of  Evidence. 

Article  II. — Objections  to  Evidence  and  Exceptions. 

Article  III. — Striking  out  and  Withdrawing. 


Article  I.  —  Tenders  of  Evidence. 
Section 

675.  Court  Rules  upon  all  Offers  of  Evidence. 

676.  Evidence  to  be  admitted  if  Prima  Facie  Relevant. 

677.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

678.  Offer  must  show  Materiality. 

679.  [Continued.]     Counsel  required  to  state  the  S^^bstance  of  the  Offer. 

680.  [Continued.]     Aliter  on  Cross-examination. 

681.  Tender  of  Witness  Competent  as  to  some  Matters  only. 

682.  When  Witness  presumed  Material. 

683.  Questions  must  be  Speciflc. 

684.  Question  must  be  Relevant  at  the  Time. 

685.  Counsel  must  have  Witnesses  ready  to  sustain  Offer. 

686.  Must  not  repeat  Offer  after  Adverse  Ruling. 

687.  When  Offer  not  majje  in  Hearing  of  Jury. 

§  675.   Court  Rules  upon  All  Offers  of  Evidence.  — At  the 

outset  it  is  to  be  observed  that  it  is  for  the  court  to  rule  upon  all 
offers  of  evidence,  and  to  decide,  when  necessary,  all  questions 
of  fact  which  are  involved  in  the  question  whether  the  evidence 
is  admissible.^ 

§  G7G.   Evidence  to  be  admitted  if  Prima  Facie  Relevant. — 

Where  an  instrument  of  evidence  is  offered,  and  its  relevancy  is 

^  Ante,    chap.     XIII.;     Currier    v.  ris  u.  Wilson,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  57;  Cli- 

Bank  of  Louisville,  5   Cold.    (Tenn.)  quot's  Champagne,  3  Wall.  (U.  S.)  114; 

460;  Tabor  v.  Stauniels,   2   Cal.   240;  Prall  v.  Hiuchmau,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.), 

Robinson  v.  Ferry,  11  Conn.  460;  liar-  351. 


548  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomj).   Tl\, 

supported  by  other  testimony,  the  judge  will  admit  it,  when  suf- 
ficient supporting  evidence  has  been  heard  to  warrant  the  jury  in 
inferring  tlie  existence  of  the  fact  upon  which  its  relevancy  de- 
pends.^ This  is  not  a  negation,  but  is  an  affirmation  of  the  prin- 
ciple already  discussed,  that  questions  of  fact  involved  in  pre- 
liminary offers  of  evidence  are  first  to  be  decided  by  the  judge. 
Where  proof  of  one  fact  is  necessary  to  let  in  proof  of  another 
fact,  and  there  is  evidence  conducing  to  prove  the  preliminary 
fact,  the  court  should  not,  as  a  general  rule,  exclude  the  main 
evidence  from  the  jury.'-^  The  rule  under  this  head  was  thus 
stated  by  Marshall,  C.  J.,  in  the  Kentucky  Court  of  Appeals: 
"If  the  fact  on  which  the  relevancy  of  the  disputed  evidence  de- 
pends be  merely  preliminary,  and  not  otherwise  essential  than  as 
it  may  lay  the  foundation  for  receiving  the  evidence  in  question, 
then  it  may,  perhaps,  in  all  cases,  be  proper  to  make  the  admis- 
sibility of  the  disputed  evidence  depend  upon  the  judge's  opinion 
as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  proof  to  establish  the  preliminary 
fact.  But  where  the  preliminary  fact  is  otherwise  material  in 
the  cause,  and  essentially  involved  in  the  issue,  the  general  prac- 
tice is,  to  admit  the  evidence,  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  judge, 
there  be  evidence  conducing  to  prove  the  preliminary  fact,  and 
from  which  a  jury  might  rationally  infer  it.  A  contrary  prac- 
tice would,  in  many  instances,  as  in  this,  take  the  whole  case 
from  the  jury,  and  subject  it  to  the  decision  of  the  judge  upon 
the  weight  of  the  evidence,  thus  destroying  the  established  dis- 
tinction between  their  respective  functions.  When  it  is  neces- 
sary to  prove  a  deed,  the  instrument  is  assumed  to  be  read  to  the 
jury,  upon  evidence  conducing  to  prove  its  execution.  Could  a 
judge  afterwards  exclude  it  on  motion,  on  the  ground  that  the 
j)roof  of  its  execution  was  not  fully  satisfactory  to  his  mind? 
Or  could  he  have  rejected  it  on  this  ground,  even  in  the  first  in- 
stance? The  execution  of  the  deed,  being  a  material  fact  in  the 
the  issue,  the  judge  does  not  decide  it  peremptorily,  though 
it  is  in  one  aspect  a  preliminary  fact;  but,  having  decided  that 
there    is  evidence  conducing  to  i)rovc   it,  he   places  the  whole 

1  Wiuslo-vv  V.  Bailey,  K!  Me.  311).  ^  Sneariiiijeu   v.  Leach,    7  B.  Mou. 

(Ky.)  2S7. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cb.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  549 

question  before  the  jury.  We  are  satisfied  that,  in  this  and 
similar  cases,  where  the  relevancy  of  one  fact  depends  upon 
another  material  fact  in  the  cause,  the  admissibility  of  the 
evidence  in  support  of  the  dependent  or  secondary  fact, 
depends  not  upon  the  absolute  proof  of  the  principal  fact, 
but  upon  tliere  being  such  evidence  as  conduces  to  prove  it, 
and  as  would  authorize  the  jury  to  find  it."  ^  This  is  agreeable 
to  the  view  taken  by  another  court,  that,  where  the  preliminary 
proof  is  clear  and  uncontradicted,  the  court  will  decide  the  ques- 
tion of  admissibility;  but  if  it  is  doubtful,  it  will  submit  the 
matter  to  the  jury,  and  let  them  decide  the  doubt,  when  such 
doubt  depends  upon  a  question  of  fact,-  —  that  is,  will  admit  the 
evidence.  But  as  already  seen,^  the  judge  can  never  allow  the 
jury  to  say,  in  the  first  instance,  whether  an  objection  to  evi- 
dence shall  be  sustained.  Thus,  where  a  party  offers  to  prove  a 
contract  by  parol  evidence,  and  it  is  objected  that  the  contract 
was  reduced  to  writing,  and  a  witness  is  introduced  to  show  that 
there  was  a  writing,  he  must  state  the  contents  of  it  to  the  courts 
so  that  the  court  may  judge  whether  it  relates  to  the  same  con- 
tract or  to  something  else;  and  it  is  error  to  leave  this  fact  to 
the  jury.^  While  the  authorities  leave  this  question  in  a  state  of 
embarrassment,  3'et  in  view  of  what  has  already  been  said,^  the 
following  propositions  may  be  safely  affirmed:  1.  The  judge  will 
never  submit  to  the  jury,  in  the  first  instance,  whether  an  objec- 
tion to  testimony  shall  be  sustained  —  to  do  this  is  error.  2. 
Where  the  evidence  fairly  tends  to  support  the  preliminary 
proposition  of  fact,  the  existence  of  which  is  necessary  to  the  ad- 
mission of  the  evidence,  the  judge  will  admit  it,  and  let  the  jury 
say  what  weight  and  effect  they  will  give  to  it ;  and  it  is  error  to 
withhold  it  from  them.  3.  The  decision  of  the  judge  in  admit- 
ting evidence,  where  it  has  been  necessary  to  decide  a  preliminary 
question  of  fact,  will  not  be  overthrown  by  a  reviewing  court, 
where  there  is  any  substantial  evidence  to  support  his  conclusion. 

1  Swearingeu  v.  Leach,  7  B.  Mon.  *  Eatlif  v.  Hurtley,  olred.  L.  (N.  C.) 
(Ky.)  287.  545. 

2  Fniik  r.  Kiocaid,  5  Md.  405.  5  ^^nf,  ch.  XIII. 

3  Aide,  j   318. 


550  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOllip.   Tl'., 

§677.  [Continued.]  Illustrations. — This  corresponds  to 
what  has  ah-eady  been  observed/  that,  where  the  fact  which  the 
judge  must  decide  on  a  preliminary  offer  of  evidence  involves 
the  decision  of  the  whole  case^  the  judge  merely  decides,  and  so 
cautions  the  jury,  that  the  fact  has  been  2}^^oved  to  him.  Where 
the  fact  involved  in  the  preliminary  offer  decides  the  whole  case, 
and  there  is  substantial  evidence  in  support  of  it,  it  is  error  for 
the  judge  to  reject  the  evidence ;  since  this  ruling,  by  withholding 
the  question  from  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  jury,  has  the  effect 
of  usurping  their  province.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  a  case 
where  the  defendant,  in  an  action  of  trespass,  justified  under  an 
execution  issued  by  a  magistrate  and  assigned  to  such  defendant. 
The  plaintiff  objected  to  the  admission  of  the  execution  in  evi- 
dence, and  offered  to  prove  that  the  plaintiff  therein  was  dead 
before  it  was  issued.  The  court  received  evidence  touching  the 
question  of  the  death,  and  decided  that  the  execution  was  not 
admissible  under  the  circumstances.  It  was  held  that  this  was 
error,  since  it  had  the  effect  of  withdrawing  the  question  from 
the  jury.^  So,  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  the  plaintiff  claimed 
under  a  conveyance  from  husband  and  wife,  and  insisted  that  the 
defendants  were  the  tenants  of  the  wife,  and  therefore  estopped 
from  disputing  his  title;  but  the  tenancy  was  denied,  and  the 
defendants  offered  to  prove,  by  the  former  husband  of  the  wife, 
her  alle2;cd  former  marriao-e,  and  the  court  admitted  this  evidence. 
It  was  held:  1.  That  this  evidence  was  admissible,  if  there  was 
no  tenancy,  and  that,  by  admitting  it  without  qualification,  the 
court  decided  that  there  was  none,  which  the  court  had  no 
right  to  do,  it  being  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  and  there 
being  testimony  to  show  that  there  was  a  tenancy.  2.  That, 
if  the  evidence  rendered  the  question  of  tenancy  or  no  tenancy 
a  doubtful  one  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the  court  might 
have  admitted  it,  instructing  the  jury  that  if  they  believed 
there  was  a  tenancy,  then  the  testimony  was  not  properly  before 
them.^ 

1  Ante,  §  31!).  3  j'lmk  v.  Kiucaid,  5  Md.  405. 

2  Jiay  V.  Sharp,  4  Whart.  (Pa.)  339. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  551 

§  678.  Offer  uiust  show  Materiality'.  —  In  order  to  put  the 
trial  court  in  the  wrong,  on  appeal  or  writ  of  error,  for  reject- 
ing an  offer  of  evidence  on  direct  examination,  the  offer,  as 
stated  in  the  bill  of  exceptions,  must  show  the  materiality  of  the 
evidence  which  Avas  tendered.^  Where  the  question  does  not 
suggest  the  answer,  counsel  must,  in  general,  disclose  what  it 
will  be,  or  what  he  expects  it  will  be,  or  wliat  he  i^ro^joses  to 
prove?  "Where  there  is  in  the  bill  of  exceptions  neither  a  form- 
al offer  of  evidence,  nor  any  statement  of  what  the  witness  will 
testify  to,  there  is  no  available  error. ^  Thus,  it  is  said  to  be  a 
settled  rule,  where  a  conversation  between  persons  is  offered  in 
evidence,  to  require  the  party  offering  it  to  disclose  Jiow  it  may 
be  material.*  So,  where  a  tender  of  evidence  is  made  to 
prove  certain  facts,  some  of  which  are  admissible  and  others 
inadmissible,  the  offer  is  properly  rejected  as  a  whole;  the  court 
is  not  bound  to  separate  it  and  admit  such  parts  of  it  as  are  com- 
petent, although  it  may  do  so  in  its  discretion.^  Where  a  ivitness 
which  a  party  tenders  is  competent  as  to  certain  facts,  but  not  as 
a  general  witness,  and  he  is  objected  to  as  incompetent, — the 
party  tendering  him  should  state  what  he  proposes  to  prove  by 
him,  so  that  the  court  may  know  that  it  is  proper;  otherwise  an 
appellate  court  cannot  say  that  there  is  any  error  in  refusing  to  ' 
allow  him  to  testify ."^  In  Virginia  we  find  a  quo.lifed  statement 
of  the  rule,  which  is,  that  where  an  objection  is  made  to  a  ques- 
tion, on  the  ground  of  irrelevancy ,  and  sustained,  it  is  necessary 
for  the  party  asking  the  question,  in  order  to  put  the  court  in  the 

1  United  states  V.  Gilbert,  2  Siimn.  448;  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  God- 
(U.  S.)  20.  Bauk  of  Pleasaut  Hill  r.  dard,  25  lud.  185,  191;  Shellito  v. 
Wills,  79  Mo.  275;  Aull  Saviuijs  Bauk  Sampson,  61  la.  40.  Compare  Jeuks  v. 
«.  Anil,  80  Mo.  199;  Jackson  y.  Hardin,  Knott's  Co.,  58  la.  549;  Votaw  v. 
83  Mo.  175,  187.  Diehl,  G2  la.  G76,  680;  Mitchell  v.  Har- 

2  Jackson  v.  Hardin,  supra;  Brid-  court.  Id.  349,  Martz  v.  Martz,  25 
gers     V.     Bridgers,     69     N.    C.     451;  Gratt.  (Va.)  361,367. 

Straus    V.    Beardsley,    79    N.    C.   59;  3  Batten  v.  State,  80  Ind.  395,  401, 

Oberman  v.  Coble,  13  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  ^  Trustees  v.  Brooklyn  Fire  Ins.  Co 

1;    Roberts  v.  Roberts,  85  N.   C.   9;  23  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  448. 
Mergentheim    v.    State    (Ind.),    8    N.  s  Smith  v.   Arsenal   Bank,  104  Pa. 

East.    Rep.  568;  s.    c.  107    Ind.    567;  St.  518. 
Tedrowe     v.     Esher,     56     Ind.     443,  c  Stewart  v.  Kirk,  69  111.  509. 


552  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

wrong,  to  show  upon  the  record  what  he  expects  to  prove  by  the 
witness.^  But  in  that  State  this  rule  has  no  application  where 
the  objection  is  to  the  competency  of  a  witness;  since  here  it  is  a 
question  whether  the  witness  shall  be  heard  at  all,  though  his 
testimony  be  ever  so  relevant  or  important. ^ 

§  679.  [Continued.]  Counsel  required  to  State  the  Sub- 
stance of  the  Offer. —  The  court  may,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound 
discretion,  require  counsel  to  state  the  substance  of  evidence 
which  is  tendered,  so  as  to  enable  the  court  to  judge  of  its  mate- 
riality and  relevancy  ;  ^  and  a  reviewing  court  will  not  control 
the  trial  court  in  the  exercise  of  such  a  discretion.*  If  this  is 
not  required,  and  the  evidence  is  admitted  generally,  no  error  is 
committed,  provided  the  evidence  was  competent  for  any  pur- 
pose.^ "  A  party,"  says  Parker,  J.,  "  having  a  witness  on  the 
stand,  may  be  called  upon  by  his  adversary  to  state  what  he  pro- 
poses to  prove,  and  in  that  case  he  must  state  it.  But  he  need 
make  no  such  statement,  unless  called  upon  to  do  so.  It  is 
enough  for  him  to  proceed  and  put  his  questions  to  the  witness 
unless  desired  to  state  what  he  expects  to  prove."® 

§  C80.    [Continued.]       Aliter    on     Cross-examination.  —  It 

should  be  added  that  the  foregoing  rule  is  not  applicable  on 
cross-examination.  Here  the  party  is  examining  his  adversary's 
witness,  and  from  the  nature  of  the  case  cannot  be  expected  to 
know  what  the  answers  to  his  questions  will  be.^  It  is  errone- 
ous to  reject  questions,  propounded  on  cross-examination,  which 
relate  to  the  subject  of  the  cross-examination,  even  though  it  be 
not  apparent  that  the  answers  would  have  benefited  the  cross- 
examining  party,  unless  it  affirmatively  appear  that  he  could  not 
have  been  injured   by  the  rejection ;    and  it  has  been  held  that 

1  Carpeuter  v.  Utz,  4  Gi-catt.  (Va.)  ■»  Koy  v.  Targee,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
270.                                                                       359. 

2  Martz  V.  Martz,  25  Gratt.  (Va.)  s  McClelland  v.  Lindsay,  1  Watts 
361,  307.                                                           &  S.  (Pa.)  3<;0. 

3  Morgan  v.  Browne,  71  Pa.  St.  130,  6  jjeal  v.  Finch,  11  N.  Y.  128,  135. 
130;  McClelland  v.  Lindsay,  1  Watts           '  Harness  v.  State,  57  Ind.  1;   Hutts 
&  S.  (Pa.)  360.                                                  V.  Hutts,  62  Ind.  214,  225. 


Tit.   Ill,  Cll.  XXV.]       OB.JECTIOXS    AND    EXCEPTIONS.  553 

this  error  is  not  cured  by  allowing  the  party  to  go  fully  into  the 
same  matters  with  his  own  witnesses.  He  has  a  right  to  a  full  cross- 
examination,  and  cannot,  for  that  purpose,  be  compelled  to  make 
the  witness  his  own.  "  Cross-examination,"  said  Christiancy, 
C.  J.,  "is  the  great  test  of  the  knowledge,  as  well  as  of  the  ver- 
acity of  witnesses.  The  right  to  pursue  it  may  sometimes  be 
abused;  and  when  it  is  sought  to  be  abused,  — as  when  counsel 
insists  upon  going  over  the  same  ground  again  and  again,  or 
when  it  is  apparent  that  the  Avitness  has  already  fully  answered 
without  any  appearance  of  evasion,  and  it  is  evident  the  counsel 
is  merely  pushing  the  witness  for  the  sake  of  annoyance,  or  for 
any  illegitimate  purpose,  —  it  is  competent  for  the  court  in  its 
discretion,  to  put  an  end  to  it  "  ^ 

§  681.  Tender  of  Witness  Competent  as  to  some  Matters 
only.  — Where  a  party  is  colupctent  as  a  witness  for  a  limited 
purpose,  and  tenders  himself  as  a  witness  "  generally  in  his  own 
behalf,"  it  is  error  to  exclude  him  without  being  sworn,  unless 
it  distinctly  appear  that  he  does  not  wish  to  be  sworn  at  all,  un- 
less allowed  to  give  evidence  at  large.  He  should  be  sworn,  and 
the  objection  to  his  competency  should  be  taken  to  any  evidence 
which  he  may  offer  as  to  which  he  is  incompetent.-  In  other 
words,  wdiere  a  witness  has  been  called  to  the  stand,  who  is  in- 
competent to  be  sworn  and  to  testify  on  some  matters,  but  who 
may  not  speak  of  other  matters,  it  is  not  proper  to  object  to  his 
competency  generally  and  to  exclude  him.  In  such  a  case,  it 
will  not  be  presumed  that  an  improper  question  will  be  asked  of 
him.  It  is  only  by  objecting  to  improper  questions  when  asked, 
that  a  party  can  exclude  improper  evidence,^ 

§  682.  When  Witness  presumed  Material.  —  It  has  been 
held  that,  where  a  bill  of  exceptions  states  that  a  witness  was 
asserted  to  be  competent  by  the  counsel  tendering  him,  and  was 
rejected  by  the  court,  —  a  court  of  error  will  infer  that  the  wit- 

1  O'Dounell  v.  Segar,  25  Mich.  307,  2  Brown  v.  Richardson,  20  N.  Y.  474 

374.  3  i3eal  v.  Finch,  11  N.  Y.  128,  134. 


554  EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Tbomp.  Tl'., 

ness  was  material  to  sustain  the  issue,  without  a  direct  statement 
to  that  effect  in  the  bill  of  exceptions.^ 

§  683.  Questions  must  be  Specific. — Where  questions  are  ^oo 
general  in  their  character,  they  may  be  properly  rejected  for  that 
reason  alone.  Thus,  in  an  action  against  a  sheriff  for  an  escape, 
it  was  held  that  a  new  trial  would  not  be  granted  because  the 
judge  refused  to  allow  a  question  to  be  put  in  this  form:  *'  By 
what  means  and  in  what  manner  did  the  prisoner  break  jail?" 
To  entitle  the  party  to  enter  upon  such  an  inquiry  he  should 
apprise  the  judge  of  his  intention  to  show  such  a  state  of  facts  as 
would  excuse  the  sheriff.^ 

§  684.  Question  must  be  Relevant  at  the  Time.  — In  order 
to  put  the  court  in  error  for  rejecting  a  question,  or  a  tender  of 
evidence,  it  must  appear  that  it  was  relevant  a^  tlie  time  when  it 
was  offered^  unless  the  party  offering  it  proposes  to  make  it  rele- 
vant by  the  introduction  of  some  other  evidence  distinctly 
specified.^  It  is  not  sufficient  that  it  became  relevant  by  some- 
thing that  transpired  at  a  subsequent  stage  of  the  trial.*  The 
mere  fact  that  such  evidence  may  be  a  part  of  a  chain  of  evi- 
dence^ the  other  links  of  which  the  counsel  tendering  the  evidence 
intends  to  supply,  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  put  the  court  in 
the  wrong  in  rejecting  it;  since,  as  was  well  observed  by  Gib- 
son, J.,  "  if  this  were  admitted,  no  court  could,  without  error, 
ever  reject  evidence  for  irrelevancy,  —  as  there  is  no  fact  so 
entirely  irrelevant  as  to  be  incapable  of  being  connected  with 
the  question,  however  remotely,  by  the  intervention  of  a  chain 
of  possible  circumstances.  But  the  question  is,  how  did  the 
matter  stand  as  it  was  proposed  to  the  court?  If  it  was  al- 
together irrelevant,  the  court  might  reject  it,  although  it  might 
not,  perhaps,  be  error  to  admit  it.     If  it  would  be  relevant,  when 

1  Ilausskuecht  v.  Chiypool,  1  Black  State  v.  Staley,  14  Miun.  105;  Austin  r. 
(U.  S.;,  431.  Kobertsou,  25  Miim.  431. 

2  Fairchild  v.  Case,  24  Weud.  ^  Carpenter  %\  Bennett,  4  Fla.  284, 
(N.  Y.)   381.  334;  Winlock  r.   Hardy,  4  Litt.  (Ky.) 

3  McCurry  u.  Hooper,  12  Ala.  823;  272;  Weidler  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  II 
Scotield    n.  Walrath,    35    jNIinu.    35(;;  Serg.  &  K.  (Pa.)  134. 


Tit.  IJI,  Ch.  XXV.]       OBJECTIONS    AND    EXCEPTIONS.  555 

taken  iu  connection  with  other  facts,  it  ought  to  be  proposed 
in    connection     with    those    facts,    and     an     offer   to    follow 
the  evidence  proposed,  with  proof   of  those  facts  at   the  proper 
times.     But  the   court  is    not  bound    to  spend  its  time  in  an 
mquiry  which,  from  the  showing  of  the  party,  can  produce  no 
results.     Dislocated   circumstances    may  doubtless   be  given   in 
evidence,   particularly    if  there  be   no  objection   to  the  order  of 
time;   but  the  proposal  of   the  evidence  must  contain,  in  itself, 
by  reference   to    something  that  has  preceded  it,  or  that  is  to 
follow,  information  of  the  manner  in  which  the  evidence  is  to  be 
legitimately  operative."  ^     Thus,  where  a  witness  for  the  plaint- 
iff, in  an  action  for  slander,  is  unable  to  say  whether  the  words 
were  spoken  before  or  after  the  commencement  of  the  suit,  the 
testimony  is    properly  excluded,  because  the  judge  cannot  see 
whether  or  not  it  is  relevant. 2 

§  685.   Counsel  must  Lave  Witnesses  ready  to  Sustain  Offer. 

It  is  not  competent  for  counsel  simply  to  make  an  offer  of  proof 
which  he  has  no  witnesses  to  sustain,  and  insist  upon  the  court 
deciding  the  question  which  the  offer  raises;  since  that  would  be 
invoking  from  the  court  a  decision  upon  a  mere  moot  question. 
Nor  is  it  competent  for  counsel  to  make  an  offer  of  proof,  without 
stating  to  the  court  that  he  can  sustain   it  by  competent  wit- 
nesses. ^     If  no  witnesses  are  tendered,  it  is  not  error  for  the 
court  to  reject  the  offer  for  that  reason;  and  it  follows  from  this 
that,  in  order  to  reverse  a  judgment  because  of  the  rejection  of 
a  tender  of  competent  evidence,  it  should  appear  that  a  witness 
was  offered  to  prove  it.^     But  it  does  not  follow  that  it  will  be 
presumed,  on  error,  that  the  offer  was  a  sham.     "If,"  said  Waite, 
C.  J.,  "  the  trial  court  has  doubts  about  the  good  faith  of  an 
offer  of  testimony,  it  can  insist  on  the  production  of  the  wit- 
ness, and  upon  some  attempt  to  make  the  proof,  before  it  rejects 
the  offer;   but  if  it  does  reject  it,  and  allows  a  bill  of  exceptions 
which  shows  that  the  offer  was  actually  made  and  refused,  and 

MVeidler    v.    Farmers'   Bank,    11  ^  Eschbach  t-.  Hurtt,  47  Md.  (11 

Sero.  &  R    (Pa  )  134,  139.  4  Kobinsou  ..  State,  1  Lea  (Teun.), 

Scovell  r.  Kingsley,  7  Conn.  2S4.        (;73.  ^' 


556  EXAMINATIOxN    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

there  is  nothing  else  in  the  record  to  indicate  bad  faith,  an 
appelhite  court  must  assume  that  the  proof  could  have  been 
made,  and  govern  itself  accordingly."  ^ 

§  686.  Must  not   repeat  Offers   after  Adverse   Ruling. — 

While  counsel  may  offer  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining, 
in  case  of  doubt,  a  distinct  ruling  as  to  its  admissibility,  and 
may  vary  the  form  of  the  offer  or  include  other  matters,  in 
order  that  the  particular  question  desired  may  be  distinctly 
raised  —  yet  where  an  adverse  ruling  has  once  been  obtained, 
other  offers  governed  by  such  ruling  must  not  be  made.^ 

§  687.  When  offers  not  made  in  Hearing  of  Jury. —  In  an 

important  case  in    Michigan  it   is    said:    "  If  counsel     *     *     * 
make  the  offers  in  the  presence  and  hearing  of  the  jury,  and  the 
court  permits,  them  to  be  made  in  this  manner,  the  character  of 
the  offers    so   made   may  be  such,  even  although  they  were  re- 
jected below,  as    to  require,    on  error,  a  reversal  of  the   judg- 
ment where   the    party    making  such  rejected  offers  obtains   a 
verdictand  judgment  in  the  case.     Everything  having  a  tendency 
to  prejudice  or  influence  a  jury  in  their  deliberations,  which  is  not 
le2;ally  admissible  in  evidence  on  the  trial  of  the  cause,  should  be, 
so  far  as  possible,  kept  from  coming  to  their  knowledge  during 
the  trial.     An  impression  once  made  upon  the  mind  of  a  juror, 
no  matter  how,  will  have  more  or  less  influence  upon  him  when 
he  retires  to  deliberate  upon  the  verdict  to  be  given,  and  no  mat- 
ter how  honest  and  conscientious  he  may  be,  or  how  carefully  he 
may  have  been  instructed  by  the  court  not  to  permit  such  incom- 
petent matters  to  influence  him,  or  have  any  bearing  on  the  case, 
it  will  be  very  difiicult,  if  not  impossible,  for  him  to  separate  the 
competent  from  the  incompetent,  or  to   say  to  what  extent  his 
'  impressions  or  convictions  may  be  attributed  to  that  which  prop- 
erly should  not  have  been  permitted  to  come  to  his  knowledge. 
But  whatever  the  reason  for  the  rule  may  be,  all  courts  agree  in 
excluding  incompetent  testimony,  and  that  an  error  in  this  re- 

J  Scotland  County  v.  Hill,  112  U.  S«  -  Scripps  v.  Reilly,  38  Mich.  10. 

183,  186. 


Tit.   Ill,   Cll.   XXV.]       OBJECTIONS    AND    EXCEPTIONS.  557 

spect  will  be  sufficient  cause  for  reversal.  This  rule  would  be 
but  slight  protection,  if  counsel  or  witnesses  could  be  i^ermilted 
to  make  a  statement,  but  not  under  oath,  of  the  incompetent 
testimony,  or  counsel  state  the  same  fully  to  the  jury,  in  their  ar- 
gument, or  otherwise.  The  essence  of  the  wrong  consists  in  the 
fact  that  such  incompetent  testimony  is  brought  to  the  attention 
of  the  jury,  more  than  in  the  method  adopted  in  communicating 
1  he  fact.  No  matter  how  the  information  is  derived,  the  result 
is  the  same.  In  this  case,  after  counsel  had  obtained  a  clear  and 
distinct  ruling  of  the  court  as  to  the  inadmissibility  of  a  certain 
class  of  articles  [newspaper  articles],  a  large  number  of  the 
same  class  were  offered,  and  in  making  each  separate  offer,  coun- 
sel stated  the  purport  of  the  article,  or  read  the  headings.  This 
course  Avas  objected  to,  but  permitted  by  the  court,  and  the  arti- 
cles offered  were  all  excluded,  the  objection  as  to  their  admissi- 
bility having  been  sustained.  We  think  the  course  adopted  was 
not  correct,  and  that,  although  perhaps  not  fully  covered  by  the 
letter  of  the  previous  decision  in  this  case,  yet  that  it  comes 
clearly  within  the  reason  and  the  spirit  of  the  rules  there  laid 
down.  Where  the  offer  is  likely  to  be  of  such  a  character  that  it 
would  have  a  tendencv  to  prejudice  or  influence  the  jury,  the  cor- 
rect practice  would  be  to  present  the  article,  if  in  writing,  to  the 
court  and  counsel  for  examination,  without  stating  either  the 
purport  or  substance  of  it.  The  cases  are  but  few  wdiere  such 
objectionable  articles  are  likely  to  come  up  on  the  trial,  and, 
when  such  a  case  arises,  the  good  sense  of  court  and  counsel  will 
not  only  see  the  necessity,  but  will  readily  discover  and  adopt  the 
means  requisite  to  keep  them  from  the  reach  of  the  jur3^"  ^ 

Article  II. — Objections   to  Evidence  and  Exceptions. 

Section 

690.  Necessity  of  Objecting  aud  Excepting. 

691.  Evidence  having  no  Probative  Value. 

692.  Waiver  of  Right  to  01:)ject. 

693.  Specific  Grounds  of  Objection  must  be  pointed  out. 

694.  Instances  under  the  foregoing  Rule. 

^  Scripps  V.  Eeilly,  38  Mich.  10,  U. 


558  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

Section 

695.  [Continued.]     Objections  to  Specific  Portions  of  Testimony  must  state 

clearly  tlie  Portions  Objected  to. 

696.  Exceptions  to  Testimony  ea  3Iasse. 

697.  Effect  of  sustaining  and  overruling  General  and  Specific  Objections. 

698.  If  Ground  stated,  it  must  be  a  Good  one. 

699.  Right  to  rebut  Irrelevant  Evidence. 

700.  Time  of  Objecting  and  Excepting. 

701.  [Continued.]     Objections  to  Depositions. 

702.  Error  to  admit  Depositions  de  bene  esse  when  Witness  is  present  itt 

Court, 

703.  What  the  Record  must  show. 

704.  [Continued.]     Where  the  Objection  was  Sustained. 

705.  Whether  necessary  to  repeat  Objections. 

706.  Of  AVaivers  and  Estoppels  in  Respect  of  Objections  to  Evidence. 

707.  Errors  without  Pi-ejudice. 

708.  When  Error  not  Cured  by  Subsequent  Evidence  to  the  same  Effect, 

709.  01)jections  must  be  Renewed  in  Motion  for  New  Trial. 

710.  Court  Excluding  Illegal  Evidence  of  its  own  Motion. 

711.  Prosecuting  Attorneys  not  to  Object  in  Doubtful  Cases. 

712.  Arguing  the  Objection. 

713.  Effect  of  Examination  of  a  Party  before  Trial. 

§  690.  Necessity  of  Objecting  and  Excepting. — The  gen- 
eral rule  is  that,  in  actions  at  laio,  appellate  tribunals  review  the 
judgments  of  trial  courts  only  in  respect  of  errors  of  law ;  such 
cases  are  not  re-examined  upon  the  whole  evidence,  as  is  done  in 
cases  in  equity,  admiralty  and  in  actions  for  divorce.  It 
is  therefore  necessary,  in  order  to  save  the  rulings  of  the  trial 
courts  for  review  in  actions  at  law,  to  preserve  a  record  of 
such  rulings,  by  excepting  to  them  in  the  trial  court  when  they 
are  made,  by  bringing  to  the  attention  of  the  court  the  distinct 
ground  of  the  exception,  and  by  having  the  exception  embodied 
in  a  bill  of  exceptions,  which,  when  signed  and  sealed  by  the 
judge  in  conformity  with  law,  becomes  a  part  of  the  record 
in  the  cause,  which  is  brought  to  the  appellate  court  by  appeal  or 
writ  of  error.  Unless  objections  are  seasonably  made  upon 
specific  grounds,  and  exce})tions  properly  taken  in  the  trial 
courts,  the  rulings  of  such  courts,  in  actions  at  law,  cannot  be  re- 
viewed in  the  appellate  tribunals.  If  this  were  not  the  rule,  the 
spectacle  would  be  presented  of  causes  tried  upon  one  theory  in 
the  court  of  nisi  jji'ius,  and  decided  upon  a  different  theory  in  the 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceitions.  559 

court  of  appeal.^  The  rule  is,  therefore,  general  in  actions  at 
law,  that  no  objection  to  a  ruling  made  on  the  progress  of  the 
trial  is  available  upon  error  or  appeal  unless  it  was  first  made 
and  ruled  upon  in  the  court  below. ^  Subject  to  the  qualification 
stated  in  the  next  following  section,  the  rule  applies  with  as 
much  force  to  the  objections  to  eviden(3e  as  to  objections  to  any 
other  ruling  made  in  the  progress  of  a  trial. ^  The  necessity  of 
making  seasonable  objections  to  incompetent  testimony  is  just  as 
important  in  crhninal  as  in  civil  trials,  and  where  the  defendant 
in  such  atrial  fails  to  object  to  such  testimony  when  it  is  offered, 
he  cannot  raise  the  objection  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.* 

§  691.  Evidence  having  no  Probative  Value.  — An  exception 
to  the  foregoing  rule  relates  to  cases  where  the  evidence,  which 
is  admitted  without  objection,  is  of  such  a  character  that  the  law 
ascribes  to  it  no  probative  value  whatever.  In  such  a  case,  —  at 
least  according  to  one  view,  —  if  the  jury  return  a  verdict  in 
consequence  of  it  in  an  action  at  law,  the  verdict  will  be  set  aside 
as  being  unsupported  by  evidence;  and,  as  already  suggested, 
in  suits  in  equity  and  in  other  proceedings  where  the  appellate 
court  tries  the  case  anew,  it  will  not  be  allowed  to  have  any 
weight  in  influencing  the  decree  of  the  court,  — especially  if  the 
attention  of  the  court  is  directed  to  its  want  of  probative  value. 
Notwithstanding  this,  it  is  unsafe,  whether  in  an  action  at  law  or 
in  equity,  to  allow  such  matters  to  be  rehearsed  as  evidence 
without  objection. 

§  692.  Waiver  of  Right  to  Object. — A  party  who  agrees 
that  his  adversary  may  go  into  evidence  which  may  be  inadmis- 

*  To  this  general  principle  see  Let-  Jackson   v.  Cadwell,    1  Cow.    (N.  Y.) 

ton   ».  Graves,  26  Mo.   251;  Peyton  i'.  622;   Whiteside   v.  Jackson,   1  Wend. 

Rose,  41   Mo.  257;  Jennings  ?;.  Pren-  (N.    Y.)    418;     Waters    v.    Gill)ert,   2 

tlce,  39  Mich.  421,  423.  Cash.  (Mass.)  29;  Covillaud  v.  Tanner, 

'  Spencer   v.  St.  Paul  &c.  R.  Co.,  7  Cal.  38. 
22  Minn.  30;  Rush  v.  French,  1  Ariz.  3  Hewett  tj.  Buck,  17  Me.  147. 

T.  99,  102;  Martin  v.  Travers,  12  Cal.  ^  State    v.    McLaughlin,  44  la.  82; 

243;  People  v.  Glenn,  10  Cal.  32;  Frier  State  v.  Poison,  29  la.  133. 
17.  Jackson,   8    Johns.    (N.  Y.)    496; 


560 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1   Thoillp.  Tr 


sible  if  objected  to,  cannot  afterwards  complain  of  the  reception 
of  such  evidence,  or  of  the  reception  of  otlier  evidence  of  the 
same  character.  The  reason  is,  that  modus  et  conventio  vincunt 
legem:  having  established  a  law  of  his  own,  he  must  be  content 
to  abide  by  it.  i 

§  693  Specific  Grroimcis  of  Objection  must  be  pointed  out.  — 

Where  evidence  is  objected  to  at  the  trial,  if  the  party  would 
save  an  exception  to  the  ruling  of  the  court  if  adverse  to  him, 
such  as  will  be  available  on  ai)peal  or  error,  he  must  frame 
his  objection  so  as  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  trial 
court  the  specific  ground  upon  which  he  predicates  it,  and 
this    must   be    stated    in  his   bill    of    exceptions.^     He  ivaives 


1  Rundell  v.  Butler,  10  Wend.  (N. 
Y.)  119.  Compare  Adams  v.  Farus- 
worth,  15  Gray  (Mass.),  423,  426. 

2  Dozier  v.  Jerraau,  30  Mo.  216; 
Lettou  V.  Gi'aves,  26  Mo.  250;  Camden 
V.  De  Doremus,  3  How.  (U.  S.)  515; 
Bank  of  Missouri  v.  Mercliauts'  Bauii, 
10  Mo.  123,  128;  Roussin  v.  St.  Louis 
i&c.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Mo.  244;  Weston  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Cox,  32  Mo.  456;  Buesse- 
meyer  v.  Stuckenberg,  33  Mo.  546; 
Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  37  Mo. 
338;  Peyton  v.  Rose,  41  Mo.  257,  260. 
See  also  Davidson  v.  Peck,  4  Mo.  438; 
Cozzeus  V.  Gillispie,  4  Mo.  82;  Peck  v. 
Chouteau  (Mo.),  3  S.  W.  Rep.  577; 
s.  c.  91  Mo.  138;  Shelton  v.  Durham, 
76  Mo.  434;  Primm  v.  Raboteau,  56 
Mo.  407;  Margrave  v.  Ausmuss,  51  Mo. 
561,  506;  Buckley  v.  Kuapp,  48  Mo. 
152,  164;  Woodburn  v.  Cogdal,  39  Mo. 
222;  St.  Louis  Public  Schools  v.  Ris- 
ley,  40  Mo.  357;  Fields  v.  Hunter,  8 
Mo.  128;  Dickey  v.Malechi,  6  Mo.  177, 
186;  Frost  v.  Pryor,  7  Mo.  314;  Wat- 
son V.  McClaren,  19  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
557;  Baler  v.  Berberich,  85  Mo.  50; 
5.  c.  affirmed,  13  Mo.  App.  5S7;  People 
V.  Apple,  7  Cal.  280,290;  Kileru.  Kim- 
ball, 10  Cal.  267;  Martin  v.  Travers,  12 


Cal.  243;  Baker  v.  Joseph,  16  Cal.  173, 
180;  Mabbett  v.  White,  12  N.  Y.  442> 
451;  Kan.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Painter,  9 
Kan.  620,  629;  Wilson  v.  Fuller,  Id. 
176,  186;  Walker  W.Armstrong,  2  Kan. 
198,  226;  Jackson  v.  Cadwell,  1  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  622,  639;  Michel  v.  Ware,  3 
Neb.  229,235;  Johnson  v.  Adleman,  35 
HI.  265;  Carroll  v.  Benicia,  40  Cal. 
390;  Rosenheim  v.  American  Ins.  Co., 
33  Mo.  230;  Greene  v.  Gallagher,  35 
Mo,  226;  Clark  v.  Conway,  23  Mo.  438; 
Grimm  v.  Gamache,  25  Mo.  41; 
Stone  V.  Great  Western  Oil  Co.,  41  111. 
85;  Graham  w.  Anderson,  42  111.  514; 
Howell  V.  Edmonds,  47  111.  79;  Moser 
V.  Kreigh,  49  111.  84;  Hanford  v.  Ob- 
recht,  49  111.  146;  Harmon  v.  Thorn- 
ton, 3  III.  351;  Gillespie  v.  Smith, 
29  111.  473;  Sargeaut  v.  Kellogg,  10  111. 
273;  Swift  v.  Whitney,  20  111.  144; 
Buntain  v.  Baily,  27  111.  409;  Weide  v. 
Davidson,  15  Minn.  330;  Schcll  y.  Nat, 
Bank,  14  Minn.  47;  Gilbert  v.  Thomp- 
son, 14  Minn.  544;  Bickham  v.  Smith, 
02  Pa.  St.  45;  Batdorflf  v.  Bank,  61  Pa. 
St.  179;  Moore  v.  Bank,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
302;  Elliott  v.  Piersol,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
328;  Hinde  v.  Longworth,  11  Wheat. 
199;     People    v.    Durfee    (Mich.),   29 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXy.]       OBJECTIONS    AND    EXCEPTIONS. 


561 


iall  grounds  not  so  specified. ^  The  reason  of  the  rule  is 
twofold:  1.  To  enable  the  trial  judge  to  understand  the 
precise  question  upon  which  he  has  to  rule,^  and  to  re- 
lieve him  from  the  burden  of  searching  for  objections  which 
counsel  is  unable  to  discover,  or  which  he  sees  lit  to  con- 
ceal/^ 2.  To  afford  the  opposite  party  an  opportunity  to 
obviate  it  before  the  close  of  the  trial,  if  well  taken.*  It 
is,  therefore,  a  part  of  the  rule  that  the  party  objecting  to 
testimony  will  not  be  permitted  to  change  his  ground  on  appeal ;  ® 
otherwise  the  trial  court  might  decide  the  objection  on  one  ground, 
and  the  appellate  court  on  another.^  This  would  produce  un- 
certainties and  injustice.  Thus,  it  would  be  a  monstrous  rule 
that  would  permit  a  defendant  in  an  action  of  ejectment  to  object 
to  a  deed,  on  which  the  plaintiff  dei:»ended  to  make  out  his  title, 


N.  W.  Rep.  109;  Delphi  v.  Lowery, 
74  lud.  520;  ForlMuu;  r.  Weber,  99 
lud.  588;  Carter  v.  Beuuett,  4  Fla. 
284,  337;  Camdeii  v.  Doremus,  3 
How.  (U.  S.)  515;  Elwood  v.  Dei- 
feudorf,  5  Barb.  (N,  Y.)  398,  40G. 
See  also  the  following  cases  as 
more  or  less  illustratiug  the  rule:  Ir- 
viuson  t'  Van  Riper,  34  lud.  148;  Fer- 
iteru.  State,  33  lud.  283;  Sutherlaud 
V.  Veuard,  32  lud.  483;  Hamrick  v. 
Dauville  &c.  Co.,  32  lud.  347;  Watts  v. 
Greeu,  30  lud.  98;  Sharp  r.  Fliuu,  27 
Ind.98;  Marcus  v.  State,  2G  lud.  101; 
Gibson  v.  Greeu,  22  lud.  422;  Every 
I).  Smith,  18  lud.  4G1;  Smith  v.  Alleu, 
1(5  Ind.  316;  Rowe  v.  Haines,  15  lud. 
445;  Boxley  v.  Carney,  14  lud.  17; 
Wolcott  V.  Yeager,  11  lud.  84;  Lackey 
V.  Heruby,  9  lud.  53(3;  Mauly  v.  Hulj- 
bard,  9  lud.  230;  Ellis  v.  Miller,  9  lud. 
210;  Boggsv.  State,  8  lud.  463;  Cole- 
man v.  Dobbins,  8  lud.  156;  Priddy  1'. 
Dodd,  4  lud.  84;  Prather  v.  Rambo,  1 
Blackf.  (Ind.)  189. 

1  People  V.  Manning,  48  Cal.  335. 
"  All  the  equities,"  said  Duuue,  C.  J., 
''and  all  the  presumptions  are,  not 


that  the  ruling  is  correct,  but  that  evi- 
dence offered  ought  to  come  in,  unless 
at  the  time  it  was  offered  good  reason 
is  shown  why  it  should  be  excluded. 
'Competency  is  presumed  uutil  the 
contrary  is  showu.'  "  Rush  v.  French, 
1  Ariz.  T.  99,  128;  citing  Hall  v.  Git- 
tings,  2  Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  112,  120  and 
the  cases  cited  by  Chase,  C.  J.,  at  the 
last  page;  Stoddert??.  Manning,  2  Harr. 
&  J.  (Md.)  147;  Callis  v.  Tolsou,  G 
Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  80,  91;  Saxon u.  Boyce, 
1  Bailey  (S.  C),  6G;  Smith  v.  White, 
5  Dana  (Ky.),  376,  382,  383. 

2  Brown  v.  Weightman  (Mich.),  29 
N.  W.  Rep.  98;  Dickey  u.  Malechi,  6 
Mo.  177,  186. 

3  Bundy  v.  Hyde,  50  N.  H.   121. 

4  Gill  V.  McNaraee,  42  N.  Y.  44; 
Sparrowhawk  v.  Sparrowhawk,  6  N.  Y. 
Week.  Dig.  281;  s.  c.  11  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
528;  Rush  v.  French,  1  Ariz.  T.  99, 
125. 

*  Tooley  v.  Bacou,  70  N.  Y.  34; 
Briggs  V.  Wheeler,  k;  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
583;  McDonald  v.  North,  47  Barb. 
(X.  Y.)  530. 

"  Dickey  v.  Malechi,  6  Mo.  177,  186. 


36 


562 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I   Thoi!l[).  Tr., 


on  the  ground  that  it  was  defectively  acknowledged,  and  then  to 
renew  his  objection  in  the  appellate  court,  on  that  ground  that  it 
was  a,  forgery;  or  that  he  should  object  to  it  in  the  trial  court  on 
the  ground  of  irrelevancy,  without  stating  any  other  ground,  and 
should  then  renew  his  objection  in  the  appellate  court  on  the 
ground  of  a  defective  acknowledo-ment.  Such  a  rule  would  level 
the  appellate  courts  to  the  position  of  trial  courts,  would  overturn 
all  just  conceptions  of  appellate  jn-occdure  in  cases  at  law,  and 
would  result  in  making  the  hearing  of  an  appeal  in  such  an  action 
a  trial  de  novo,  without  the  presence  of  witnesses  or  the  means 
of  obviatinii;  errors  or  omissions.^ 

§  694.  Instances  under  the  foregoing  Rule.  — Under  the  forego- 
ing rule,  objections  presented  by  the  bill  of  exceptions  in  the  following 
form:  "Counsel  for  the  plaintiff  objected,  objection  overruled  and 
plaintiff  excepted,"  are  too  general  in  their  terms  to  present  any  ques- 


1  ''The  object,"  said  Duuue,  C.  J., 
"of  requiring  tlie  groimd  of  objection 
to  be  stated,  whicli  may  seem  to  be  a 
teclinicality,  is  really  to  avoid  tecliui- 
calities  and  prevent  delay  in  tlie  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  When  evi- 
dence is  offered  to  which  there  is  some 
objection,  sulistautial  justice  requires 
tliat  the  objection  be  specified,  so  that 
the  party  offering  the  evidence  can  re- 
move it,  if  possible,  and  let  the  case 
be  tried  on  its  merits.  If  it  is  objected 
that  the  question  is  leading,  the  form 
maybe  changed;  if  that  the  evidence 
is  irrelevant,  that  the  relevancy  may 
be  shown;  if  tliat  it  is  incompetent, 
the  incompetency  maybe  removed;  if 
that  it  is  innnaterial,  its  materiality 
may  be  established;  if  to  tlie  order  of 
introduction,  it  may  be  withdrawn  and 
offered  at  another  time; — and  thus 
appeals  could  often  be  saved,  delays 
avoided  and  substantial  justice  admin- 
istered. Counsel  are  held  to  the 
grounds  of  objection  stated  at  the  time 
they  call  for  the  decision  of  tlie  court 
below;  because  tliey  are  supposed  to 


know  the  law  of  their  case,  and  if  they 
do  not  offer  objections  they  are  sup- 
posed to  waive  them,  and  evidence  ad- 
mitted without  valid  objection  should 
stand.  Counsel  must  not  be  permitted 
to  wink  at  the  introduction  of  evidence 
to  wliich  they  thiuk  there  is  a  valid 
objection,  hoping  that  it  may  benefit 
them,  and  if  it  goes  the  other  way, 
move  to  exclude  it;  neither  must  they 
be  permitted  to  plead  inattention  as  au 
excuse.  It  is  their  business  to  be  at- 
tentive on  the  trial,  and  if  they  miss  a 
point  by  neglect,  they  must  ose  it. 
Neither  can  we  allow  them  lO  strike 
between  wind  and  water  on  the  trial, 
and  then  go  home  to  ilieir  books  and 
study  out  their  objections  and  urge 
them  here.  They  must  stand  or  fail 
upon  the  case  they  made  below;  for 
this  court  is  not  a  forum  to  discuss 
new  points  of  this  character,  but  sim- 
ply a  court  of  review  to  determine 
wliether  the  rulings  of  the  court  below 
on  the  case,  as  presented,  were  correct 
or  not."     Rush  v.  French,  1  Ariz.  T. 

9'J,    124:. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTioxs  and  exceptions. 


563 


tion  for  review  on  error  or  appeal.^  So,  of  objections  on  the  ground 
that  the  evidence  is  '•  illegal  and  incompetent.'"  '^  So,  of  an  objection 
that  the  evidence  is  ^''  incompetent,^^  without  pointing  out  the  ground 
on  which  this  claim  is  inade.^  So,  of  an  objection  that  the  evidence  is 
'■'■  incompetent  and  irrelevant.,"  ^  or  '■'irrelevant,  incompetent  and  m- 
material,"  ^  or,  ^'inadmissible."^  So,  an  objection  that  testimony 
is  "  irrelevant,"  without  specifying  wherein,  how  or  why  it  is  ir- 
relevant, will  not  be  considered  on  appeal  or  error,  if  the  testi- 
mony could,  under  an}^  possible  circumstances,  have  been  relevant.'^ 
So,  where  the  objection  is  that  the  evidence  is  '■'incompetent"  and 
"  illegal  "  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  overrule  it  if  the  evidence  is  ad- 
missible for  any  purpose.^  So,  an  objection  that  evidence  is  "  irrele- 
vant, incompetent  and  immatericd  "  is  held  to  be  merely  a  general 
objection,  and  properly  overruled  if  the  evidence  is  admissible  for  any 
purpose. 9  So,  it  has  been  held  that  an  objection  that  evidence  is  "  in- 
competent," does  not  raise  any  issue  as  to  whether  the  question  is  lead- 
ing; the  onh'  way  to  raise  such  an  issue  is  to  object  specifically  that  it 
is  leading. ^°  So,  objections  that  evidence  is  "  irrelevant,  immaterial  or 
improper"  will  not  be  sufficient  to  raise  the  question  of  the  competency 
of  the  witness,  even  where  he  is  clearly  incompetent  by  express  statute. ^'^ 
So,  an  objection  to  a  deposition  for  substance  will  not  enable  the  object- 
ing party  to  claim  its  exclusion  on  the  ground  of  incompetency,  just  as 
the  court  commences  to  charge  the  jury.  The  reason  is  that  if  the  ob- 
jecting party  had  placed  his  objection  on  the  ground  of  incompetency  at 
the  time,  the  plaintiff  might  have  availed  himself  of  other  testimony  on 


1  Peck  V.  Chouteau,  3  S.  W.  Rep. 
577;  s.  c.  91  Mo.  138. 

2  Clark  V.  Couway,  23  Mo.  438. 

3  Joues  V.  Angell,  95  Intl.  370;  Lake 
Erie  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker,  94  Ind.  91; 
McClellan  r?.  Bond,  92  lud.  424;  Stan- 
ley V.  Sutherlaud,  54  lud.  339,  352; 
Harvey  v.  Huston,  94  lud.  527;  Fitz- 
patrick  v.  Papa,  89  lud.  17;  Cox  v. 
Stout,  85  lud.  422;  Underwood  v. 
Liuton,  54  lud.  468 ;  Murray  v.  Phillips, 
59  lud.  5(5;  Manning  v.  Gasharie,  27 
lud.  399;  Buudy  v.  Hyde,  50  N.  H. 
121. 

*  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey, 
104  lud.  409,415;  Over  r.  Schiffliug 
102  lud.  191;  Shafer  v.  Ferguson,  103 


lud.  90;  Botteuberg  u.  Nixon,  97  lud. 
lOti;  Joues  V.  Angell,  95  Ind.  376; 
Lake  Erie  &c.  E.  Co.  v.  Parker,  94  Ind. 
91;  Harvey  v.  Huston,  94  Ind.  527; 
McClellan  v.  Bond,  92  lud.  424;  Stan- 
ley V.  Sutherlaud,  54  Ind.  339. 

5  Lake  Erie  &.c.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker,  94 
Ind.  91,  94. 

6  Leet  V.  Wilson,  24  Cal.  398,  402. 
^  Dreux  v.  Doniec,  18  Cal.  83. 

®  Sueed)?.  Osborn,  25  Cal.  627;  Bo- 
hanau  v.  Hans,  26  Tex.  450. 

9  Voorman  v.  Voight,  46  Cal.  397. 

1"  Kan.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Pointer,  9 
Kan.  620,  627. 

^1  Cornell  v.  Barnes,  2C  Wis.  473^ 
480. 


564  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

the  particular  points.  •  So,  the  general  objection  to  the  witness  that  he 
is  "•  incompetent  "  will  not  be  available  on  appeal,  where  it  appears  that 
he  was  a  competent  witness  as  to  certain  facts,  although  he  may  have 
been  incompetent  as  to  other  facts. ^  It  is  well  laid  clown  that,  "  there 
is  a  wide  distinction  between  imniaterial  and  incompetent  evidence.  It 
may  be  material  and  tend  to  prove  the  issue,  but  incompetent  for  that 
purpose  under  the  rules  of  law.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  compe- 
tent evidence  in  a  proper  case,  but  immaterial  to  any  issue  before  the 
court.  3 

§  G95.  [Continued.]  Objections  to  Specific  Portions  of  Testi- 
mony MCST  state  clearly  THE  PORTIONS  OBJECTED  TO.  — Where  Certain 
evidence  is  objected  to,  which  is  clearly  admissible,  if  it  is  apart  of  one 
entire  conversation  on  which  the  plaintiff  relies,  but  which  is  left  in  un- 
certainty by  reason  of  the  indistinct  recollection  of  the  witness  offered 
to  prove  it,  the  court  ought  not  to  let  it  go  to  the  jury  to  be  consid- 
ered by  them,  if  they  shall  find  it  to  have  been  an  entire  conversation 
relied  upon.  In  so  holding  it  was  said  by  Church,  J.,  in  giving  the 
opinion  of  the  Connecticut  court:  "Although  it  is  the  privilege  and 
prerogative  of  the  jury  to  determine  all  matters  of  fact  which  are  in- 
volved in  the  issue  submitted  to  them,  yet  it  is  equally  the  exclusive 
duty  of  the  court  to  determine  all  matters  of  law,  even  if  they  involve 
the  necessity  of  deciding  upon  the  truth  of  facts."*  Upon  the  same 
principle  where,  in  two  instances,  after  certain  testimony  had  been  of- 
fered, the  defendant  objected  to  certain  portions  of  it  as  matter  which 
the  witness  had  testified  to  from  hearsay,  and  not  from  his  own  knowl- 
edge, and  the  court  merely  instructed  the  jury  to  reject  all  statements 
not  made  hy  the  witnesses  on  their  own  knowledge ;  and  in  one  of  the 
instances  the  plaintiff  particularly  requested  the  court  to  instruct  the 
jury  specifically  as  to  what  particular  evidence  was  to  be  thus  excluded, 
but  the  court  did  not  comply  with  the  request,  — it  was  held  that  this 
was  error."  Loomis,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court  said:  "As 
the  matter  of  admitting  or  rejecting  evidence  is  within  the  exclusive 
province  of  the  court,  and  not  of  the  jury,  it  should  not  have  been  left 
to  them  to  say  what  evidence  should  be  excluded ;  and  the  party  has  a 
right  to  know  where  he  has  taken  his  objection  with  particularity,  pre- 
cisely what  evidence  is  received  and  what  rejected.-'' 

1  Motley  V.  Head,  43  Vt.  030.  ■•  Robiusou   v.  Ferry,  11  Coun.  4(50. 

2  Forbingr.  Weber,  *i;)  Ind.  5SS.  •■*  Morford   v.    Peek,  40   Couu.    380, 
«  Feople  V,  Manuiug,4.S  Cal.  3r..l,  338.       382. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  565 

§  696.  Exceptions  to  Testimony  en  Masse.  — An  exception  to  testi- 
mony en  masse  is  unavailing,  wLiere  any  of  it  is  properly  admitted. 
Thus,  if  a  party  excepts  to  the  entire  testimony  of  a  witness,  without 
specifying  particular  portions  of  it,  and  if  any  of  it  was  properly  ad- 
mitted, the  exception  is  unavailing.  • 

§  G97.  Effect  of  Sustaining  and  Overruling  General  and  Specific 
Objections. —  In  a  case  already  much  quoted  from,  in  the  opinion  giv- 
en by  Dunne,  C.  J.,  the  following  judicious  observations  occur: 
."There  are  numerous  authorities  and  adjudications  in  support  of  the 
natural,  common-sense  proposition  that  a  general  objection  raises  no 
issue,  except  it  is  as  to  whether  the  evidence  would,  under  any 
circumstances  or  for  any  purpose,  be  admitted ;  and  that  a  spe- 
cific objection  raises  no  other  issue  than  the  particular  one 
tendered.  They  are  also  in  support  of  the  proposition  that  if 
a  judge  overrule  a  general  objection,  he  must  be  sustained  un- 
less it  clearly  appears  that,  under  no  possible  circumstances  in  the 
case  would  the  evidence  come  in  ;  and  that  if  he  sustain  a  general  ob- 
jection, he  must  be  reversed  if  it  is  possible  that,  under  any  view  of  the 
case,  the  evidence  might  be  admitted  ;  that  if  he  overrule  a  special  ob- 
jection, he  must  be  sustained  if  the  particular  objection  is  bad,  no  mat- 
ter how  many  other  good  objections  might  have  been  offered  ;  but  if  he 
sustain  a  special  objection,  he  must  be  reversed  if  the  special  objection 
urged  is  not  good,  hotwithstanding  that  there  may  be  other  objections, 
which,  had  they  been  urgi'd,  would  have  sustained  his  rulings.  The 
policy  of  the  law  is  evidently  to  admit  evidence  unless  a  good  objection 
to  it  i^ clearly  shown."  - 

§  698.  If  Ground  Stated,  it  must  be  a  Good  One.  —  Where  the 
objecting  party  states  tlie  ground  of  his  objection,  it  is  incumbent  upon 
him,  if  he  would  save  an  exception  to  the  overruling  of  it,  which  will  be 
available  on  error  or  appeal,  to  state  a  valid  ground.  If  he  fails  to  do 
this,  his  objection  will  not  avail  him,  although  he  might  have  stated  a 

1  Beebe  v.  Bull,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  the  grountl  of  the  objectiou  to  be 
504-                         '  specitied,  he   must  call  upon  the  ob- 

2  Rush  V.  French,  1  Ariz.  T.  99,  127.  jector  to  state  them  at  the  trial  and  to 
A  loose  view  is  found  iu  one  case,  have  them  incorporated  in  the  bill  of 
that  a  general  objection  to  evidence  exceptions.  Peno.  Mutual  Aid  Society 
will  enable  the  objector  to  assign  any  v.  Corley  (Pa.),  11  Ins.  Law  Jouru. 
cause  for  the  objectiou  which  is  valid.  41)3. 

If  the  proponent  of  the  evidence  wishes 


566  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

valid  ground.^  In  other  words,  he  cannot  change  his  ground  and  ob- 
ject to  the  evidence  on  one  ground,  in  the  trial  court,  and  on  another 
in  the  appellate  court. 

§  699.  Right  to  rebut  Irrelevant  Evidence.  —  Upon  this  sub- 
ject there  are  tioo  vieivs.  One  is  that,  where  one  party  introduces 
irrelevant  evidence,  the  other  is  entitled  to  rebut  it,  and  that  the 
party  first  entering  ui)on  such  line  of  inquiry,  is  estopped  to  ob- 
ject that  the  rebutting  evidence  is  irrelevant.^  Thus,  where  the 
plaintiff  was  interrogated  on  the  witness  stand  by  the  defendant, 
touching  certain  admissions  made  in  the  presence  of  certain  per- 
sons and  at  a  certain  time,  and  did  not  set  up  that  what  he  said 
was  in  reference  and  with  a  view  to  a  compromise  of  the  case, 
but  gave  his  version  of  the  conversation,  —  it  was  held  that  the 
defendant  should  be  allowed  to  give  his  version  of  the  same 
transaction,  either  by  himself  or  by  other  witnesses,  and  that  his 
version  should  not  be  ruled  out  on  the  ground  of  having  been 
made  in  view  of  a  compromise. "^  So,  where  a  defendant  is  im- 
properly permitted  to  assail  the  cJiaracter  of  the  plaintiff  by  evi- 
dence, no  error  is  committed  by  permitting  the  plaintiff  to 
countervail  it,  by  evidence  of  good  character.*  This  view  is  sup- 
ported by  the  sensible  and  just  consideration  that  evidence, 
though  immaterial,  may  be  prejudicial ;  and  if  prejudicial  the 
party  against  whom  it  is  leveled  ought  to  have  the  right  to  coun- 
tervail its  prejudicial  effect.  The  other  view  is  that  the  fact  that 
improper  evidence  has  been  used  on  one  side,  does  not  justify 
the  same  kind  of  evidence,  if  objected  to,  being  used  on  the 
other  side,^ — which  seems  to  mean  that  it  is  within  the  power  of 

1  Harris  v.  Pautima  Kaih-oad  Co.,  5  Compare  People  v.  Dowling,  84  N.  Y. 
Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  312.  47;);  Wallis  v.  Kaudall,  81  N.  Y.  1G4. 

2  Havis  V.  Taylor,  13  Ala.  324;  Hale  ^  Scales  v.  Sliackleford,  C4  Ga.  170. 
y.Philbrick,47  la.  217;  Pattou  v.  Phil-  ^  Fiudlay  v.  Pruitt,  9  Port.  (.Ua.) 
adelphia,  1  La.  Auu.  1)8;   Scattergood  195. 

t?.  Wood,  79  N.  Y.  2i;3;  Brown  u.  Per-  ^  Walkup    v.   Pratt,   5   Harr.    &   J. 

kins,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  89;  Sherwood  v.  (Md.)  51;   Mitchell  v.  Sellmau,  5  Md. 

Titman,  55  Pa.    St.   77;    INIcCartuy  v.  377;  Stringer  v.  Youug,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

Territory,    1  Neb.    121;     Thomson  v.  320,337.     In  such  a  case  it  was  saiil 

BroLhers,  5  La.  277;    Ward   v.  Wa.sh-  by  Chief  Justice  Mar.sliall:  *'  Whetlicr 

iugtou  Lis.  Co.,  (i  Bo.-^w.  (X.  Y.)  229.  a   case'  may  exist    in  which    improper 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXV.]       OBJECTIONS    AND    EXCEPTIONS.  567 

the  court  to  stop  the  progress  of  the  irrelevant  inquiry,  and  such 
is  the  rule;  ^  which  power  the  court  will  exercise,  to  avoid  the 
consumption  of  public  time  and  the  diversion  of  the  attention  of 
the  jury  from  the  real  issues  in  the  case.^  A  further  reason  is, 
that  the  plaintiff's  consent  to  the  admission  of  incompetent  evi- 
dence for  the  defendant,  furnishes  no  reason  why  he  should  be 
allowed  to  introduce  other  incomi)etent  evidence,  to  which  the 
defendant  objects.^  So,  it  has  been  ruled  that  incomi^etent  testi- 
mony cannot  be  admitted  to  rebut  incompetent  testimony  which 
has  been  offered  by  the  other  side.*  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  ruled  that  the  verdict  will  not  be  set  aside  because  this  isdone.^ 

§  700.  Time  of  Objecting'  and  Excepting-.  —  Moreover,  it  is 
incumbent  on  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  case,  as  it  is  on  a  party 
in  a  civil  case,  if  he  would  avail  himself,  on  error  or  appeal,  of 
any  irregularities  committed  on  the  trial  of  the  case,  to  make  his 
objection  and  to  save  his  exception  at  the  time  when  the  irregu- 
larity was  conmiitted.^  Objections  to  evidence  cannot,  as  a  gen- 
eral rule,  be  made  by  a  motion  to  instruct  the  jury  to  disregard 
the  i)articular  evidence.  It  has  been  well  said:  "To  allow  a 
party  to  permit,  without  objection,  the  admission  of  evidence, 
and  for  the  first  time  make  his  objection  in  instructions,  Avould  be 
intolerable  practice.  If  he  had  an  opportunity  to  interpose  an 
objection,  he  cannot  take  the  chances  that  the  testimony  will  be 
favorable  to  him,  and,  when  it  turns  out  otherwise,  raise  his 
objection;    but   must   be  held  to   have  ivaived  it."  ^     Such  an 

testimony  may  be  calculated  to  make  •''  "Wilkiusou  v.  Jett,  7  Lciiih  (Va.), 
such  an  impression  upou  the  jury,  that  115;  IManuing  v.  Burlington  &c.  R.  Co- 
no  instructions  given  by  the  judge  can  (la.),  20  N.  W,  Rep.  169;  s.  c.  CA  la. 
efface  it,  and  whether,  in  such  a  case,  240. 

testimony,  not  otherwise  admissible,  *  McCartny  v.  Territory,  1  Neb.  121. 

maybe  introduced,  which  is   strictly  ^  Furbush  r.  Goodwin,  25  N.  H.  426. 

and  directly  calculated  to  disprove  it,  '^  Bull  v.  Com.,  14  Gratt.  (Va.)  613; 

are  questions  on  wliich  this  court  does  Read  ?;.  Com.,    22   Gratt.    (Va.)  924; 

not  mean  to   indicate  any  opinion."  Stonemanv.  Com,  25  Gratt.  (Va.)  887, 

Stringer  17.  Young,  s?(y9ra.  905;  Price  u.  Com.,  77  Va.  393;  Whart. 

1  Farmers'  &c.  Bank  v.  Whiufield,  Cr.  PI.  &  Pr.  (8th  ed.)  §  77. 

24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  420.  422.  ^  Maxwell  t;.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co., 

2  Davis  V.  Keyes,  112  Mass.  436.  85  Mo.  95,  106. 


568  EXAMINATION   OF  WITNESSES.       [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

objection  comes  too  late,  when  made  for  the  first  time  in  a 
motion  for  a  neio  trial.^  If  a  party  allows  competent  evidence 
from  an  incompetent  ivitness  to  go  to  the  jury  without  objection, 
he  cannot  afterwards  complain  of  the  finding  of  the  jury  thereon, 
and  make  his  objection  for  the  first  time  on  a  motion  for  a  new 
trial. ^  It  is  not  available,  w^here  such  evidence  has  gone  in 
without  objection,  and  the  objection  is  made  for  the  first  time  to 
a  substantial  repetition  of  it.^ 

§  701.  [Continued.]  Objections  to  Depositions.  —  Objec- 
tions to  depositions,  which  might  have  been  obviated  if  made 
when  they  were  taken,  come  too  late  when  made  for  the  first 
time  at  the  trial,  when  it  is  proposed  to  read  them.  "  In  such 
cases,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Swayne,  "  the  objection  must  be  noted 
when  the  deposition  is  taken,  or  be  presented  by  a  motion  to 
suppress  before  the  trial  is  begun.  The  party  taking  the  depo- 
sition is  entitled  to  have  the  question  of  its  admissibility  settled 
in  advance.  Good  faith  and  due  diligence  are  required  on  both 
sides.  When  such  objections,  under  the  circumstances  of  this 
case,  are  withheld  until  the  trial  is  in  progress,  they  must  be  re- 
garded as  waived,  and  the  deposition  should  be  admitted  in  ev- 
dence.  This  is  demanded  by  the  interests  of  justice.  It  is 
necessary  to  prevent  surprise  and  the  sacrifice  of  subsequent 
rights.  It  subjects  the  other  party  to  no  hardship.  All  that  is 
exacted  of  him  is  proper  frankness.  The  settled  rule  of  this 
court  is  in  accordance  with  these  views."  It  was  therefore  held 
that  it  was  error  to  exclude  the  deposition  under  such  circum- 
stances.* More  broadly,  the  rule  is  that  no  objection  to  a  depo- 
sition will  be  entertained  when  made  at  the  trial,  which  could 
have  been  remedied,  if  seasonably  made  by  the  taking  of  a  new 


1  State  V.  Peak,  85  'Slo.  190;  Harvey  ^  Doaue  v.  Glenn,  21  Wall.   (U.  S.) 
V.  State,  40  Ind.  51*;.  33,  35.     See  also  York  Co.  v.  Central 

2  Atchison   &c.  R.    Co.  v.  Stanford,  R.  Co.  3  Wall  (U.  S.)   113;  Shutter. 
12  Kan.  354:,  380.  Thompson,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)   151,  IGO; 

3  McCormick  v.  Laughrau,  1(3  Neb.  Buddicum   v.  Kirk,  3  Cranch  (U.  S.), 
87.  293. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]       OBJECTIONS   AND   EXCEPTIONS. 


5G9 


deposition.^     An  objection  to  the  form  of  a  question  in  a  de- 
position debene  esse,  is  waived,  if  not  taken  before  the  officer  taking 


1  Wright  V.  Cabot,  89  N.  Y.  570; 
Corainorcial  Bank  v.  Uuiou  Bank,  11 
N.  Y,  205;  Sturm  v.  Atlantic  Mut.  Ins. 
Co.,  63  N.  Y.  87;  Zelhveirer  v.   Caffee, 

5  Duer  (N.  Y.),  100;  Union  Bank  v. 
Torrey,  2  Abb.  Tr.  (N.  Y.)  209;  Sliel- 
don  V.  Wood,  2  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  207.  In 
conformity  witli  tlie  alcove  text  the 
general  rule  is  tliat  objections  wliicli 
go  to  the  form  and  manner  of  taking 
the  deposition  must  be  made  and  set- 
tled prior  to  the  trial.  Crowell  v. 
AVesteru  R.  Bank,  3  Oh.  409;  Akers 
V.  Demond,  103  Mass.  322;  Kyle  v. 
Bostick,  10  Ala.  591 ;  Towns  v.  O'Brien, 
2  Ala.  381;  Overtone.  Tracy,  14  Serg. 

6  R.  324;  Lee  v.  Stowe,  57  Tex.  444, 
451;  Bartlett  v.  Hoyt,  33  N.  H.  151. 
Under  §  390  of  the  Civil  Code  of  Ne- 
braska objections  to  depositions,  ex- 
cept on  the  grounds  of  incompetency 
or  irrelevancy,  must  be  reduced  to 
writing  and  tiled  before  the  commence- 
ment of  the  trial  or  they  will  be  disre- 
garded. Sioux  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v. 
Finlay-son,  10  Neb.  579,  587.  See  also 
Weeks  on  Depositions,  §  404.  "  It 
may  be  taken,  as  the  rule,  that,  where 
a  party  is  deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the 
cross-examination  of  a  witness,  by  the 
act  of  the  opposite  party,  or  by  the 
refusal  to  testify,  or  other  misconduct 
of  the  witness,  or  by  any  means,  other 
than  the  act  of  God,  the  act  of  the 
party  himself,  or  some  cause  to  which 
he  assented,  that  the  testimony  given 
on  the  examination  in  chief  may  not 
be  read.  People  v.  Cole,  43  N.  Y.  508 ; 
Smith  V.  Griffith,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  333; 
Forrest  v.  Kissam,  7  Hill  (N.  Y.),  405. 
And  the  rule  may  be  applied  to  the 
examination  of  a  witness  on  commis- 
sion, or  conditionally  out  of  court, 
when,  in  such  case,  the  party  desiring 


the  benefit  of  a  cross-examination  has 
not  been  present  or  represented  at  the 
taking  of  the  testimony,  and  had  no 
opiMjrtunity  to  push  his  cross-examin- 
ation, or  to  know  of  the  refusal  of  the 
witness  to  testify,  or  of  his  neglect 
to  answer  any  question,  or  of  other 
like  misconduct  of  the  witness.  Smith 
V.  Griffith,  supra.  But  where  the 
party  is  present  at  the  examination  of 
the  witness,  in  person  or  by  counsel, 
and  is  there  fully  apprised  of  the  facts 
upon  which  he  afterwards  relies  at  the 
trial  to  suppress  the  testimony,  and 
does  not,  at  the  examination  or  after- 
wards before  the  trial,  seek  to  avail 
himself  of  them  to  that  end,  or  to 
procure  for  himself,  before  or  at  the 
trial,  the  benefit  of  a  full  cross-exam- 
ination, he  may  not,  waiting  until  the 
trial,  then  for  the  first  time  oliject  to 
the  reading  of  the  deposition,  or  move 
to  suppress  it.  He  should  take  au 
earlier  opportunity  for  action,  so  that, 
if  successful,  his  opponent  might  move 
for  a  commission  to  examine  his  wit- 
ness anew  out  of  court,  or  might  ob- 
tain a  personal  attendance  at  the  trial." 
Sturm  V.  Atlantic  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  03 
N.  Y.  77,  87,  opinion  by  Folger,  J. ; 
citing  Kimball  v.  Davis,  19  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  437;  s.  c,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
259;  Zellweger  v.Caffe,  5  Duer  (X.  Y.), 
87,  100;  Rust  v.  Eckler,  41  N.  Y.  48s ; 
Sheldon  v.  Wood,  2  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  207. 
Where  no  motion  to  suppress  deposi- 
tions has  been  made,  they  may  be  used 
at  the  trial,  although  the  personal 
attendance  of  the  witness  can  be  se- 
cured. Phenix  v.  Baldwin,  14  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  02.  In  such  a  case,  the  most 
that  can  be  said  in  favor  of  the  motion 
to  suppress  them  is,  that  it  addresses 
itself  to  the  discretion   of  the   court 


570  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [I  Thomp.  Tr., 

the  deposition.^  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  the  objection  that  a 
question  is  leading  in  its  form  is  an  objection,  not  to  the  sub- 
stance or  relevancy  of  the  evidence,  but  to  the  form  and  manner 
of  obtaining  it,  and  should  be  made  at  the  time  the  question  is 
propounded;  but  if  not  made  then,  or  within  proper  time  before 
the  cause  is  called  for  trial,  it  will  be  taken  to  have  been  Avaived.^ 
Where  a  motion  to  suppress  depositions  is  grounded  upon  the 
objection  that  certain  j^tordons  of  them  are  irrelevant,  it  will  not  be 
sustained  ;  the  remedy  is  a  motion  to  strike  out  the  irrelevant  jjarts.^ 
Coming  down  to  a  more  specific  point  of  time  it  is  held  in  In- 
diana that  the  swearing  of  the  Jury  is,  for  the  purpose  of  this 
rule,  to  be  deemed  the  commencement  of  the  trial.  The  court 
say:  "  The  rule  provided  by  the  statute  is  convenient,  as  well  as 
fair;  for  why  impanel  and  swear  a  jury  to  try  a  cause,  which 
the  parties  may  afterwards  be  prevented  from  trying  by  the 
suppression  of  depositions  after  the  jury  are  sworn?*  It  has  been 
ruled  that  it  is  irregular  to  arrest  the  reading  of  a  deposition  on 
the  ground  that  the  witness  testified  that  he  was  the  agent  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  that  his  authority  was  in  writing  and  ought  to  have 
been  produced ;  and  that  the  better  practice  is  for  the  reading 
to  proceed,  and,  upon  proof  that  the  testimony  was  illegal,  to 
move  to  withdraw  it  from  the  jury,^  —  a  conclusion  which  is 
doubtful.*^  There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  upon  the  question 
whether  a  party  who  offers  a  deposition  in  evidence,  must  read 
the  whole  of  if,  or  wlicther  he  is  at  liberty  to  read  oidi/  such 
2)arts  as  he  may  judge  favorable  to  his  case;  allowing  his 
opponent  to  read  the  remainder  as  his  own  evidence,  if  he  shall 
see   fit.     The    former  view  is  taken  in  Pennsylvania^  and    in 


and  cannot  be  claimed  as  a  matter  of  ^  Commercial  Bank  v.  Union  Bank, 

right.     Hodges   v.  Williams,  33  Hun.  11  N.  Y,  203,  210. 
(N.  Y.)  516  (decided  under  §  910  of  the  4  Qleun  v.  Clore,  42  Ind.  60,  63. 

New  York  Code  of  Civil  Procedure).  ^  Crenshaw  ?;.  Jackson,  6  Ga.  509. 

1  Hebbard  v.  Haughian,  70  N.  Y.  54.  s  Post,  §§  717,  723. 

sCrowell?;.  Western  R.  Bk.,  3  Oli.  ^  Southwark  Ins.  Co.  v.  Knight,  6 

409;  quoted  with  approval  in  Lee  v.  Whart.  (Pa.)  327.     Compare  Miles  v. 

Stowe,  57   Tex.  444,    451 ;  Puruell   v.  Stevens,  3  Pa,  St.  21. 
Gahdy,  46  Tex.  198. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XXV.]       OBJECTIONS    AXD    EXCEPTIONS.  571 

Missouri ;  ^    while   the    latter    rule    has    beeu    favored    in    New 
York.2 

§  702.  Error  to  admit  Depositions  de  bene  esse  when  wit- 
ness is  Present  in  Court.  — Under  section  8(55,  Rev.  St.  U.  S., 
providing  that  "  unless  it  appears  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court 
that  the  witness  is  then  dead,  or  gone  out  of  the  United  States, 
or  to  a  greater  distance  than  one  hundred  miles  from  the  place 
where  the  court  is  sitting,  or  that,  by  reason  of  age,  sickness, 
bodily  infirmity  or  imprisonment,  he  is  unable  to  travel  and  ap- 
pear at  court,  such  deposition  shall  not  be  used  in  the  cause," 
the  admission  of  the  deposition,  taken  de  bene  esse,  of  a  witness 
who  was  shown  to  the  court  to  be  present  in  court,  ready  and 
able  to  testifv  if  the  case  was  called,  before  the  readinor  of  the 
deposition  was  begun,  is  error. -^  This  is  in  conformity  with 
previous  rulings  of  the  same  court.  In  one  case  it  was  said  by 
Marshall,  C,  J.,  that  the  deposition  taken  under  the  statute,  de 
bene  esse,  "  can  only  be  read  wdien  the  witness  himself  is  unat- 
tainable."* In  another  case  it  was  said,  in  reference  to  this 
provision,  that  "  the  act  declares  expressly  that,  unless  the  same 
(that  is,  the  disability)  shall  be  made  to  appear  on  the  trial,  such 
deposition  shall  not  be  admitted  or  used  in  the  cause.  This  in- 
hibition does  not  extend  to  the  deposition  of  a  witness  living  a 
greater  distance  from  the  place  of  trial  than  one  hundred  miles, 
he  being  considered  permanently  beyond  a  compulsory  attend- 
ance. The  deposition  in  such  case  may  not  always  be  absolute, 
for  the  party  against  whom  it  is  to  be  used  may  prove  that  the 
witness  has  removed  within  the  reach  of  a  subpoena  after  the 
deposition  was  taken;  and,  if  that  fact  was  known  to  the  party, 
he  would  be  bound  to  procure  his  personal  attendance.  The 
onus,  however,  of  proving  this  would  rest  upon  the  party  oppos- 

Mlill    V.   Sturgeon,    28    Mo.    329;  N.    Y.    9;  Forrest   v.  Forrest,*;  Diier 

Cook   V.  Ilarrin-iton,  St.  Louis   Court  (N.  Y.),  102, 

of    Appeals,    No.    4007,    not    yet    re-  ^  Whitford   v.    Couuty   of   Clark,  7 

ported.  Sup.   Ct.  Rep.  300;   reversiug  s.c.   13 

2  Gellatly  v.  Lowery,  G  Bosw.  (X.  Y.)  Fed.  Rep.  837. 

113:    Edmonstoue    v.    Hartshorn,    1'.)  ^  The  Samuel,  1  Wheat.  (U,  S.)  15. 


572  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoilip.   Tr., 

ino;  the  admission  of  the  deposition  in  evidence.^  "It  thus 
appears,"  said  Waite,  C.  J.,  commenting  on  the  foregoing  de- 
cisions, "  to  have  been  established  at  a  very  early  date  that 
depositions  taken  de  bene  esse  could  not  be  used  in  any  case  at 
the  trial,  if  the  presence  of  the  witness  himself  was  actually 
attainable,  and  the  party  offering  the  deposition  knew  it,  or 
ouoht  to  have  known  it.  If  the  witness  lives  more  than  one 
hundred  miles  from  the  place  of  trial,  no  subpoena  need  be  issued 
to  secure  his  compulsory  attendance.  So,  too,  if  he  lived  more 
than  one  hundred  miles  away  when  his  deposition  was  taken,  it 
will  be  presumed  that  he  continued  to  live  there  at  the  time  of 
the  trial,  and  no  further  proof  on  that  subject  need  be  furnished 
by  the  party  offering  the  deposition,  unless  this  presumption 
shall  be  overcome  by  proof  from  the  other  side.  But  if  it  be 
overcome,  and  the  party  has  knowledge  of  his  power  to  get  the 
witness  in  time  to  enable  him  to  secure  attendance  at  the  trial, 
he  must  do  so,  and  the  depositions  will  be  excluded."  ^ 

§  703.  What  the  Record  must  Show.  —  Moreover,  in  order 
to  save  for  review  the  overruling  of  an  objection  to  evidence,  the 
bill  of  exceptions  must  show  that  the  objection  was  made  at  the 
time  when  the  evidence  was  offered;-^  otherwise  the  objection 
will  be  presumed  to  have  been  waived.  It  must  disclose  what 
the  witness  stated,  and  what  the  testimony  was  which  was  ob- 
jected to,  or  a  reviewing  court  will  not  interfere.*     This  question 

1  Patapsco  Insurance  Co.  v.  Soxith-  1818)  ;  Russell  v.  Ashley,  Hemp.(U.  S.) 
gate,  5  Pet.  (U.  S.)  617.  See  also  549;  Weed  v.  Armstrong,  6  McLean 
Harris  v.  Wall,  7  How.  (U.  S.)  61)3;  (U.  S.),  44.  Where  the  question  is 
Rutherford  v.  Geddes,  4  Wall.  (U.  S.)  whether  a  wituess  whose  deposition 
224.  de  bene  esse  has  been  taken,  is  phy.^i- 

2  Whitford  v.  County  of   Clark,   7      cally  able  to   attend  at  the  trial,  the 
.  Sup.  Ct.  Rep.  306,  307.     The  rulings      testimony   of    a   non-expert  may    be 

in  the  circuit   courts   of   the  United  heard   as  to  the    declarations   of    the 

States  seem  to  have   been   uniformly  wituess  touching  his  physical  condi- 

the   same  way.     Lessee   of  Peuus  v.  tion.      McArthur    v.    Soule,    5    Hun. 

Ingraham,   2  Wash.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  487  (N.  Y.)  63. 

(decided  in  1811);  Lessee  of  Brown  v.  ^  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  37 

Galloway,  Pet.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  294  (de-  Mo.  338,  841. 

cided  in  1816) ;  Pettiboue  v.  Derringer,  ■•  Jones  v.  Trustees,  1  Ind.  109. 

4  Wasli.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  219  (decided  in 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.   XXV.]        OBJECTIONS    AND    EXCEPTIONS.  573 

was  discussed  with  much  particuhirity  in  what  seems  to  have 
been  a  well  concided  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  territory  of 
Arizona,  in  an  opinion  given  by  Dunne,  C.  J.  The  court  ruled: 
"Where  a  party  objecting  is  overruled,  and  he  appeals,  he  must 
show  by  the  record:  1.  "What  the  question  was  and  what  answer 
was  given  to  it,  or  what  the  evidence  was  which  was  introduced 
against  his  objection.  "  This,"  said  Dunne,  C.  J.,  "  is  im})ortant 
because  the  evidence  admitted  may  not  injure  him.  The  answer 
may  have  been  in  his  favor.  It  is  not  necessary  that  he  should 
show  clearly  that  he  was  injured,  because  that  would  often  be 
impossible;  but  he  must  show  that  evidence  was  admitted  against 
his  valid  objection,  which,  it  may  be,  has  injured  him;  for  the 
<)})ject  of  granting  a  review  by  this  court  is  not  to  determine  the 
abstract  questions  as  to  whether  the  judge  below  ruled  correctly 
or  not,  but  to  give  relief  in  case  a  party  may  have  been  injured 
by  an  erroneous  ruling.  2,  He  must  set  out  enough  of  the  evi- 
dence to  illustrate  the  point  of  his  objection,  and  to  raise  the 
presumption  that  he  may  have  been  injured  ;  but  where  cri'or  is 
shown,  injury  will  be  presumed,  unless  the  contrary  clearly  ap- 
pears. 3.  He  must  show  what  kind  of  an  objection  was  made, 
and,  to  avail  him  here,  he  must  show  that  the  objection,  as  made, 
was  good.  Then  it  is  for  the  other  party  to  see  that  the  state- 
ment made  contains  a  showing  sufficient  to  sustain  the  admission 
of  the  evidence  as  against  the  objection  made.  The  amount  of 
showing  the  latter  party  must  make,  depends  upon  the  nature  of 
the  objection.  If  the  party  objecting  interposes  merely  a  general 
objection,  all  that  is  necessary  is  to  show  enough  to  obviate  the 
general  objection.  If  the  objection  is  specific,  all  that  is  neces- 
sary is  to  show  enough  to  obviate  the  specific  objection  as  made. 
Beyond  this  we  cannot  in  reason  require  him  to  go.  He  should 
defend  himself  against  the  i)articular  attack  made;  but  we  cannot 
ask  him  to  fortify  himself  against  all  possible  attacks  which 
might  have  been  made."  ^ 

§704.    [Continued.]      Where  the  Objection  was  sustained, — 

"  In  the  second  case,"  said  Dunne,  C.  J.,  "  where  the  party  ob- 

1  Rush  V.  Frc-ueh,  1  Ariz.  T.  'Ji),  121. 


574  EXAMINATION    OF    "WITNESSES.        [1  Tboilip.  Tr., 

jecting  was  sustained,  and  the  other  side  appeals  and  asks  to 
have  the  ruling  dechired  erroneous,  the  party  appealing  must  see 
that  the  record  shows:  1.  What  question  he  asked,  or  what 
evidence  he  sought  to  introduce.  2.  Sufficient  of  the  other  evi- 
dence to  illustrate  the  admissibility  of  that  offered.  3.  That  the 
evidence  so  offered  was  excluded.  4.  That  there  was  reason- 
able ground  to  presume  that  he  may  have  been  injured  by  such 
exclusion.  The  other  party  must  see  that  the  record  shows  good 
grounds  for  the  exclusion."  ^  To  render  an  exception  available 
in  the  Suj^reme  Court  of  the  United  States,  it  must  affirmatively 
appear  that  the  ruling  excepted  to  affected,  or  might  have  affected, 
the  decision  of  the  case.  If  the  exception  is  to  the  refusal  of  an 
interrogatoiy,  not  objectionable  in  form,  put  to  a  witness  on  the 
taking  of  his  deposition,  the  record  must  show  that  the  answer 
related  to  a  material  matter  involved;  or,  if  no  answer  was  given, 
the  record  must  show  the  offer  of  the  party  to  prove  by  the  wit- 
ness particular  facts,  to  which  the  interrogatory  related,  and  that 
such  facts  were  material. ^  Where  the  incompetency  of  the  evi- 
dence results  in  consequence  of  some  other  evidence  in  the  case, 
then  in  order  to  have  the  question  of  its  competency  reviewed, 
all  the  evidence  must  be  preserved  in  the  record;  but  in  other 
cases  this  is  unnecessary.^ 

§  705.  Whether  necessary  to  repeat  Objections. —  There  is 
authority  to  the  effect  that,  where  a  specific  objection  has  been 
made  and  overruled,  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  save  the 
rights  of  the  party,  to  repeat  his  objections  to  subsequent  ten- 
ders of  the  same  kind  of  evidence.  Thus,  it  has  been  ruled  that 
where  a  certain  question  is  objected  to  by  counsel  on  the  specific 
ground  that  it  is  not  proper  on  cross-examination,  and  a  second 
.  question  calling  for  the  further  elaboration  of  the  subject-matter 
of  the  first  is  objected  to,  although  the  specification  that  it  was 
not  proper  on  cross-examination  was  not  repeated,  it  may  fairly 

1  PiUsh  U.French,  1  Ariz.  T.  99,  122.  s  McClellan    u.    Bond,  92  lud.  424; 

2  Railroad  Co.  v.  Smith,  21  Wall.  Johnson  v.  Wiley,  74  Ind  233;  Shinier 
(U.  S.)  25();  Packet  Co. -y.  Clough,  20  v.  Butler  University,  87  Ind.  218; 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  528.  Tavey  v.  Wintrode,  87  lud.  379. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTioxs  and  exceptions.  575 

be  regarded  as  implied  that  it  was  intended  to  object  to  the 
second  question  on  the  same  ground  which  was  taken  to  the  first 
question.^ 

§  706.  Of  Waivers  and  Estoppels  in  Respect  of  Objections 
to  Evidence. —  An  error  in  admitting  evidence  is  cured  by  tlie 
act  of  the  opposing  party  in  putting  witnesses  on  the  stand  to 
})rove  the  facts  sought  to  be  proved  by  the  evidence  admitted ; 
this  upon  the  plain  principle  that  a  party  cannot  com})lain  of 
his  own  error?  Where  evidence  offered  by  one  party  is  rejected 
by  the  court,  and,  after  all  the  evidence  is  in,  a  written  admis- 
sion is  filed  by  the  other  partv,  concedino;  the  facts  which  the 
party  tendering  the  evidence  offered  to  prove  by  it,  and  a  correct 
instruction  is  given  by  the  court  applicable  to  such  facts,  the 
error  in  rejecting  the  evidence  is  cui-ed.^  The  party  who  has 
.questioned  his  own  witness  u})on  a  given  subject,  cannot  object 
to  the  cross-examination  of  the  witness  on  the  same  subject,  or 
claim  the  exclusion  of  the  answers  of  the  witness  contradictins" 
his  statements  upon  the  examinafion-in-chief.^  The  objection 
that  an  answer  is  not  responsive  to  the  question  put  to  the  witness 
is  one  which  does  not  concern  the  other  party,  if  the  answer  is 
relevant  to  the  issues.  The  party  examining  a  witness  may  some- 
times object  to  volunteered  and  irresponsive  statements  made  by 
a  witness  aside  from  his  questions;  but  if  he  is  willing  to  accept 
the  answer,  and  if  it  is  one  which  he  would  have  a  right  to  elicit, 
the  opposite  party  cannot  complain.'^  There  are  cases,  however, 
where  the  deposition  of  a  witness  is  taken  on  settled  interro<Ta- 
tories,  where  an  answer  not  called  for  may  be  objected  to  by 
either  party  for  stirprise;  inasmuch  as,  if  the  questions  had  been 
so  put  in  writing  as  to  call  for  it,  other  interrogatories  might 
have  been  framed  accordingly,  which  might  have  led  to  explana- 

1  Stephens    v.    Bro-nu,    12    Bnuhv.  (Iowa),  I'D  N.  W.  Rep.  445;  s.  c.  70  la. 
(111.)  Cld.  714. 

2  Gale  V.  Shillock  (Dakota),  29  N.  *  Artz  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  44  la. 
W.  Rep.   GCl.  284. 

3  Listou    V.    Central   Iowa   R.    Co.  ^  Hamiltou  v.  Reople,  29  Mich.  17B, 

184. 


576  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoilll).  Tr., 

tion.^  A  party  is  so  far  estopped  hy  his  oion  testimony,  that  the 
court  will  not  allow  public  time  to  })e  consumed  in  disproving  a 
fact  which  the  party  himself  has  admitted  when  testifying  as  a 
witness. 2  It  has  been  held  that,  where  a  witness  gives  testimony 
upon  the  plaintiff's  direct  examination,  and  in  reference  to  a 
matter  about  which  no  inquiry  has  been  made  by  the  defendant, 
the  plaintiff  cannot  be  allowed  to  call  witnesses  to  contradict 
him.^ 

§  707.  Errors  without  Prejudice.  —  An  error  of  the  court 
in  excluding  the  evidence  of  a  witness  does  not  injure  a  party,  if 
the  witness  is  afterwards  permitted  to  testify  fully  in  respect  of 
the  matter  excluded.*  The  admission  of  incompetent  testimony  will 
not,  in  many  cases,  avail  to  work  a  reversal  of  a  judgment,  as,  for 
instance,  where  such  testimony  relates  to  a  question  which  is  not  in 
dispute,  and  consequently  could  have  had  no  influence  on  the  re- 
sult, or  where  the  finding  must  have  been  the  same  on  the  evi- 
dence had  the  incompetent  evidence  been  excluded.^  A  party 
cannot  complain  that  the  opposite  party  lioJds  Jam  to  the  e-ffect  of 
his  own  evidence.  When,  therefore,  a  party  called  out  the  fact 
that  a  certain  bond  was  in  existence,  he  could  not  complain  that 
the  other  party  produced  the  instrument  to  confirm  the  fact.^ 
Where  a  question  propounded  by  the  prosecution  in  a  criminal 
case  was  subsequently  witJidrawn,  the  refusal  of  the  court  to  al- 
low the  answer  to  be  recorded,  was  not  such  abuse  of  discretion 
as  to  require  a  new  trial. ^  The  overruling  of  an  objection  to  an 
illegal  question  becomes  harmless  to  the  objecting  party,  where 
the  witness  answers,  either  that  he  knows  nothing  about  the  mat- 
ter, or  where  his  answer  is  favorable  to  the  objector.^ 

1  Ibid.;  Greeuman  17.  O'Counor,  25  Citizens' Bank  v.  Adams,  91  Ind.  280, 
Midi.  30.  288;  Busli  v.  Seaton,  4  lud.  522;  Man- 

2  Hinksonu.  Morrison,  47  la.  1(17.  cliester  v.  Doddridge,  3 Ind  3G0;  Park- 

3  Trustees    v.   Brookl\-n  Fire   Ins.  er  ■??.  State,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  292. 

Co.,  23  IIow.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  448.  «  Filiuore  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  2 

4  Branson  v.  Carutliers,  49  Cal.  374.  Wyo.  94. 

5  Forbing  v.    "VVel)er,   99  Ind.    588;  ^  Carters.  State,  5(5  Ga.  463. 
Anfdencarap  v.   Sniilli,   90    Ind.    328;           s  bailor  v.    "Williams,  8   Wall.    (U. 
Terre   Haute  &c,  R.    Co.  r.  Pierce,  95  S.)    107;  Lovell  v.   Davis,  101   U.    S. 
lud.  496;  Rlioads  v.  Jones,  92  Ind.  328;  541. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  577 

§  708.  When  error  not  Cured  by  Subsequent  Evidence  to 
the  same  Effect.  — The  error  of  admitting  incompetent  evidence 
is  in  most  cases  available  error,  although  the  evidence  is  merely 
cumulative.  Thus,  where  the  unsworn  declarations  of  a  person  are 
admitted,  this  will  be  error,  although  the  person  is  subsequently 
called  as  a  witness  and  testifies  to  the  same  facts;  but  whether  the 
error  will  be  sufficiently  prejudicial  in  its  character  to  work  a  re- 
versal, will  depend  ui)on  the  nature  and  surroundings  of  the  case.^ 
As  a  general  rule  the  admission  of  im})roper  evidence,  over  a 
specific  objection,  will  work  a  reversal,  although  the  evidence  was 
merely  cumulative.^ 

§  709.  Objections  must  be  renewed  in  Motion  for  New  Tri- 
al. —  In  some  jurisdictions  the  rule  is  that  objections  to  evidence, 
and  other  objections  made  at  the  trial  nuist,  in  order  to  be  available 
on  appeal  or  error,  be  renewed  by  the  objector  in  his  motion  for 
a  new  trial. ^  In  Indiana,  in  order  to  present  the  question  of  the 
rulings  of  the  court  in  admitting  or  rejecting  evidence  for  re-ex- 
amination on  a  motion  for  new  trial,  the  motion  iwu^t  point  out 
the  evidence  so  admitted  or  excluded.  A  general  complaint  that 
the  court  erred  in  admitting  illegal,  incompetent  and  irrelevant 
evidence,  or  in  refusing  to  admit  legal,  proper  and  relevant 
evidence,  does  not  direct  the  mind  of  the  court  to  the  errors 
complained  of,  and  such  a  motion  is  properly  overruled  for  that 
reason  alone.* 

§  710.  Court  excluding  Illegal  Evidence  of  its  own  Mo- 
tion.—  It  is  said  in   Georgia  that,  where  evidence  is  admitted 

1  In  Audersou  v.  Rome  &c.  R.  Co.,  2  Osgood  v.  Manhattau  Co.,  3  Cow. 

54   N.    Y,    334,   the   declarations  of   a  (X.  Y.)  C12. 

person  were  put  in  evidence,  and   he  3  Lake  Erie   &c.  R.  Co.  v,  Parker 

was  afterwards  called  as   a  witness  94Iud.  91;  McGee  r.  Robbius,  58  Ind. 

and  gave  evidence  to   the   same  facts.  4(13;    Cobb    v.    Krutz,     40     Ind.    323; 

It  was  held  that  the  error  of  allowing  McKiuuey  v.  Shaw   &c.    Co.,    51   Ind. 

his  unsworn  declarations  to    be  re-  219. 

hearsed    before  the  jury,   was    of  a  •»  Harvey  v.    Osborn,    55   lud.  535, 

character  so  prejudicial   that   it  was  549;  Ohio  &c.  R.    Co.  v.   Heniberger, 

not  cured.     Compare  Warrell  v.  Farm-  43   lud.    462;   Sherlock  v.    Ailing,    44 

lee,  IN.  Y.  519.  Ind.    184;   Meek   v.  Keeue,  47  lud.  77, 


578  EXAMINATION    OF    AVITNESSES.        [1  Th()m[l.   Tl"., 

without  objection,  if  the  court  rule  it  out,  it  is  error}  Contrary 
to  this,  it  is  held  in  J//s6'oin'«' that  the  rule  that  the  court  does  noi 
err  in  admitting  evidence  where  the  objection  to  it  is  not  specific^ 
does  not  apply  in  criminal  cases,  since  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  see  that  innocent  men  are  not  convicted.  It  is  accordingly  laid 
down  in  that  state  that,  in  criminal  cases,  the  court  should  exclude 
from  the  jury  all  improper  evidence  offered  by  the  prosecution, 
whether  the  objection  be  general  or  special.-  The  rule  is  be- 
lieved to  be  a  dangerous  one,  and  calculated  to  increase  miscar- 
riages of  criminal  justice,  already  too  numerous.  It  is  believed 
that  such  a  burden  ought  not  to  be  i)ut  upon  the  trial  court, 
except  where  the  evidence  is  of  such  a  nature  that  its  inadmis- 
sibility and  prejudicial  character  are  entirely  obvious. 

§  711.  Prosecuting  Attorneys  not  to  object  in  Doubtful 
Cases.  —  The  Supreme  Court  of  California  has  offered  these 
sound  observations  for  the  guidance  of  judges  and  prosecuting 
attorneys  in  criminal  trials:  "In  consideration  of  the  number 
of  appeals  brought  to  the  court  in  criminal  cases,  upon  technical 
points,  having  for  the  most  part  no  necessary  connection  with 
the  merits,  we  feel  warranted  in  making  some  suggestions,  an 
attention  to  which  we  are  persuaded  will  lead  to  a  more  speedy 
and  satisfactory  enforcement  of  criminal  justice.  In  capital 
cases  almost  every  case  is  appealed.  We  do  not  complain  of 
this,  even  when  the  grounds  of  appeal  do, not  present  a  plausible 
reason  for  the  reversal  of  the  judgment;  since  a  natural  sense  of 
responsibility  in  the  counsel  to  whose  hands  the  life  of  a  fellow 
being  is  confided,  may  well  influence  him  to  exhaust  every  re- 
source to  save  his  client  from  the  last  i)enalty  of  the  law.  But 
still  it  is  important  that  the  laws  should  be  enforced,  so  as  to 
render  as  certain  as  })ossible  the  conviction  of  those  guilty  of 
their  infraction.  "With  every  disposition  on  the  part  of  the 
judges  to  do  this,  the  effort  frequently  fails,  because  something 
is  done  or  omitted  which  contravenes  some  arbitrary  ortechnical 

1  Barker    *;.    Blount,    03    Ga.    423,  2  gtate  v.  O'Coiiuor,  CS  IMo.  374. 

427. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OB.JECTioNS  and  exceptions.  579 

right  of  the  iDrisoner.  Courts  have  no  power  in  criminal casesto 
affirm  a  judgment  merely  because  the  judges  are  persuaded  that, 
u})on  the  merits  of  the  case,  the  judgment  is  right.  If  any  error 
intervenes  in  the  proceeding,  it  is  presumed  to  be  injurious  to 
the  prisoner,  and  generally  he  is  entitled  to  a  reversal  of  the 
judgment;  for  it  is  his  constitutional  privilege  to  stand  upon  his 
leijal  rights  and  to  be  tried  according  to  law.  And  vet  it  very 
often  happens  that  the  matter  of  exception  taken  by  him  serves 
no  other  purpose  than  to  defeat  justice.  For  example,  a  ques- 
tion proper  in  itself  is  asked  a  witness,  and  the  court  refuses  to 
allow  the  answer;  if  answered,  the  reply  would  probably  be 
worth  little  or  nothing  to  the  defendant ;  yet  for  this  error  we 
would  be  bound  to  reverse  a  judgment  which  would  have  been 
the  same  whether  the  questions  were  answered  or  not;  for, 
though  we  might  surmise,  we  would  not  knoio  the  effect  of  the 
denial  of  this  legal  right  upon  the  jury,  who  are  the  sole  judges 
of  the  facts.  And  many  other  illustrations  might  be  given.  As 
no  man  ought  to  be  convicted  unless  on  a  full  exposure  of  the 
merits  of  the  case  if  he  is  really  guilty,  it  would  seem  that 
little  or  nothing  is  gained  by  interposing  technical  objections 
to  keep  a  knowledge  of  the  whole  case  on  its  legal  merits 
from  the  jury.  Questions  as  to  the  admissibility  of  evi- 
dence frequently  arise,  and  in  the  hurry  of  a  nisi  prius  trial,  the 
best  judge  may  err,  especially  when  suddenly  called  to  pass  upon 
them  without  the  aid  of  books  or  argument.  These  constitute 
the  usual  grounds  of  reversal.  Whenever  there  is  any  doubt  of 
the  question,  or  rather  whenever  the  evidence  proposed  by  the 
defense  is  not  plainly  inadmissible,  it  is  better  to  let  it  go  in; 
since,  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  a  single  equivocal  fact,  of  doubt- 
ful bearing  upon  the  case,  would  have  no  effect  upon  the  judg- 
ment of  the  jurors,  who  are  usually  disposed  to  pass  and  do  pass 
ui)on  the  general  merits.  Not  unfrequently  the  offer  to  make 
the  proof  and  the  exclusion  of  it  have  about  the  same  effect 
on  the  minds  of  the  jury  —  though  it  should  not  —  as  if  the 
proof  were  introduced.  If  the  course  here  suggested  were  pur- 
sued by  the  prosecuting  attorneys,  we  are  convinced  that  the 
number  of  convictions  would  not  be  less  than  at  present,  while 


580  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TilOmp.   Tl'., 

the  immbcr  of   appeals,  or  at  least  the  number  of  those  success- 
fully prosecuted  would  be  greatly  diminished."^ 

§  712.  Arguing-  the  Objection. — The  refusal  of  the  trial 
court  to  Jiear  argument  of  counsel,  as  to  the  admissibility  of  evi- 
dence, is  not  of  itself  error;  '^  though  cases  might  arise  where  it 
would  be  such  an  abuse  of  discretion  as  would  work  a  reversal 
of  the  judgment.  It  is  ruled  that,  when  a  tender  of  testimony  is 
made,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  hear  the  arguments  for 
and  against  its  admission,  openly  in  the  presence  of  thejuri/,  or 
privately  in  the  absence  of  the  jury;  and  that,  after  the  testi- 
mony has  been  admitted,  no  exception  lies,  upon  the  ground  that 
such  discussions  toolv  place  in  the  hearing  of  the  jury.^ 

§713.  Effect  of  Examination  of  a  Party  Before  Trial. —  The 
New  York  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  in  force  in  1876,  provided  that  a 
party  to  an  action  might  be  examined  at  the  instance  of  the  adverse 
party  under  the  same  rules  of  examination  as  any  other  witness."*  It 
further  provided  that  the  examination  might  be  liad  before  the  trial. 
Under  these  sections  of  the  Code,  it  has  been  held  that  a  party  ma}' 
be  examined  by  his  opponent  before  issue  joined,^  and  before  complaint 
served.^  These  examinations  are  had  for  the  purpose  of  preparing  the 
examining  party's  case  for  trial,  and  it  is  held  that  such  an  examination 
precludes  the  further  examination  of  the  party  at  the  trial  on  the  same 
subject  matter,  unless  some  reason  or  excuse  is  shown,  such  as  the 
omission  by  inadvertence  to  ask  some  questions  or  to  prove  some  facts.''' 

Article  III.  —  Striking  out  and  Withdrawing. 

Section 

715.  Power  to  Strike  Out. 

716.  Motion  to  Strike  Out. 

717.  Striking  Out  wliore  Offer  to  Conueet  not  Fullilled. 

718.  Motiou  to  Strikeout  Answer. 

1  People  V.  ^yilliaIns,  18  Cal.  1S7,  •'^  McVickar  v.  Grceuleaf,  4  Rol).  N. 
193;  repeated  in   People  v.  Devine,  44      Y.  057. 

Cal.  452,  400.  c  navemeyer  v.  Ingersoll.  1:.'   Al)l). 

2  Olive  V.  State,  11  Neb.  3.  Prac.  N.  S.,  301. 

3  State  V.  AVood,  53  N.  II.  484.  '  Wilniont  v.    Miserole,    40   N.    Y. 
■•  New     York     Code     Civ.      Proc,      Sup.  (8   .Tones   &   Sp.)  327.     Compare 

§  3i)0.  Clark  v.  Vorce,  15  Wend.  193. 


Tit,  III,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  581 

Sectiox 
71!).  Motion  to  Strike  Out  all  the  Testimony  of  a  Witness. 
7:^0.  Striking  out  Plaintiff's  Evidence  at  the  Close  of  his  Case. 

721.  [Continued.]     Right  to  Open  and  Close  ou  such  a  Motion. 

722.  Right  to  Withdraw  Evidence, 

723.  Error  of  Admitting  Incompetent  Testimony     Cured    by   Subsequently 

Withdrawing  it, 

§  715.  Power  to  Strikeout, — The  court  has,  at  any  stage  of 
the  trial,  the  discretioiiari/  power  to  exchule  evidence  iinpi-o[)erly 
admitted,  or  admitted  subject  to  exceptions.  If  its  admissibility 
depends  upon  outside  or  collateral  facts,  there  can  be  no  reason 
why  the  court  should  nothear  them  without  delay, ^  It  is  proper 
to  exercise  this  power  where  incompetent  evidence  is  admitted 
under  a  mistake  of  Jr/c(^  which  mistake  is  shown  by  subsequent 
evidence.^  This  power  may  be  excercised  at  any  time  before 
the  cause  is  finally  submitted  to  the  jury,^ 

§  716.  Motion  to  Strike  out, —  When  testimony  is  admitted 
without  objection,  and  afterwards  appears  to  be  inadmissible, 
the  proper  course  is  to  ask  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury 
to  disregard  it.  It  is  too  late  to  except  to  the  admission  of  it, 
and  if  the  exception  is  overruled,  to  assign  the  ruling  for  error. ^ 
But  in  such  a  case  the  mo' ion  to  strike  out  is  not  a  matter  of 
right,  but  addresses  itself  to  the  discretion  of  the  court. ^  It  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  it  will  be  error  for  the  court  to 
take  the  inconsistent  position  of  refusing  to  allow  the  objecting 
party  to  offer  contradictory  evidence,  and  at  the  same  time  of  re- 
fusing to  strike  out  the  testimony,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  irrele- 
vant.^ If  it  is  prejudicial,  the  objecting  party  has  the  right 
either  to  have  it  stricken  out,  or  to  rebut  it,^  so  as  to  remove  its 
prejudicial  effect  from  the  minds  of  the  jurors.  Testimony 
will  not  be  stricken  out  on  the  ground  that  the  question  to  which 

1  Maurice  v.  Wordeu,  54  Md.  23.3,  ^  Gilmore  v.  Pittsburg  &c.  R.  Co., 
251;  Montfort   v.  Rowland,    38   N,  J,       104  Pa.  St.  275, 

Eq.  ISl;  Parker   v.  Smith,  4  Cal.  105,  ^  Qawtry   v.    Doaue,  51    X.    Y.    84, 

2  People   V.  McMahon,  2   Park,  Cr.       00, 

(N.  Y.)  6r,3.  «  Gilbert  v.  Cherry,  57  Ga.  128. 

3  Judge  V.  Stone,  44  N.  H,  503;  Sel-  '  Ante,  §483. 
kirk  V.  Cobb,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  313. 


582  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

it  is  a  response  was  hading,  if  no  objection  on  such  ground  was 
made  to  the  question,  and  if  such  a  motion  is  sustained,  the  rul- 
ing will  be  error,  provided  the  testimony  stricken  out  was  rele- 
vant and  material  to  the  issue. ^  Where  a  motion  is  made  to 
strike  out  testimony  and  the  adverse  party  consents  that  the 
motion  may  be  sustained,  after  which  the  moving  party  changes 
his  mind  and  tvitJidraivs  the  motion,  but  the  court  nevertheless, 
upon  the  request  of  the  adverse  party,  strikes  out  the  testi- 
mony,—  the  party  making  the  motion  cannot  complain  of  the 
action  of  the  court,  and  the  original  admission  of  the  testimony 
ceases  to  be  available  error. '^ 

§  717.   Striking  out  where  Offer  to  Connect  not  Fulfilled. — 

Where  evidence  is  introduced,  accompanied  by  the  assurance  of 
counsel,  that  it  will  be  followed  up  by  proof  of  other  facts, 
material  and  competent,  which  will  render  its  admission  proper, 
the  judge  properly  admits  it.  But  if  this  assurance  is  not  ful- 
filled, it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  court,  upon  application  of  the 
opposing  counsel,  to  direct  the  jury  not  to  regard  it.^  But  where 
the  judge  admits  evidence  which  is  in  the  character  of  a  link  in 
a  chain  of  facts  necessary  to  make  out  the  case  of  the  proponent, 
the  mere  fact  that  the  other  links  are  not  supplied  will  not  sup- 
port an  exception  to  its  admission;  since  if  it  were  otherwise,  it 
would  result  in  the  principle  that  evidence  is  erroneously  admitted 
because  ultimately  insufficient.* 

§  718.  Motion  to  Strike  out  Answer. — It  will  often  happen 
that,  although  the  question  may  be  proper,  the  answer  will  be 
improper,  not  being  responsive  to  the  question.  In  such  a  case, 
objection  to  the  answer  must  be  taken  by  moving  to  strike  it 
out.®     So,  where  a  witness  is  asked  a  question,  and,  instead  of 

1  Williams  v.  Grand  Rapids,  53  ♦  Labroii  v.  Worau,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
Mich.  271.  91. 

2  Louisville  «&c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  ^  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Cowau,  3  Abb. 
104 Ind.  409.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  88,  90;  Roquest  v. 

3  Blackburn  V.  Beall,  28  Md.  208;  Boutin,  14  La.  An.  44.  Compare 
Forsjthe  v.  Ganson,  5  AVcnd.  (N.  Y.)  Reddiugtou  v.  Gilman,  1  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 
558;  DillJu  "y.  I'eople,  8  Mich.  357.  235;    Roberts    v.   Johnson,   37    N.   Y. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXV.]       OBJECTIONS    AND    EXCEPTIONS.  583 

answering  in  a  responsive  manner,  gives  an  expression  of  his 
opinion,  this  may  be  properly  stricken  out  on  motion.^  But 
where  the  question  foreshadows  the  answer,  and  the  question  is 
not  objected  to,  any  furthcrobjcction  isivaived."^  Thereafter  the 
refusal  of  the  court  to  strike  out  the  evidence  on  motion,  cannot 
be  assigned  for  error. ^  The  reason  is,  that  a  party  ought  not  to 
1)6  allowed  to  sit  by,  during  the  reception  of  incompetent  evi- 
dence, without  objecting  thereto,  taking  his  chances  of  any  ad- 
vantage to  be  derived  therefrom,  and  afterwards,  when  he  finds 
such  evidence  prejudicial  to  him,  to  require  the  same  to  be 
stricken  out.*  Whether,  under  such  circumstances  the  court  will 
sustain  a  motion  to  strike  out,  becomes  a  matter  of  discretion.^ 
Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  if  a  party,  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
incomjjetenvy  of  a  ivifness,  fails  to  o])jcct  to  him  when  he  is 
called,  but  allows  him  to  be  sworn  and  examined  without  objec- 
tion, he  thereby  loses  his  right  to  object  to  his  evidence ;  yet  the 
court  may,  of  its  own  motion,  if  it  appears  that  the  evidence  is 
opposed  to  the  policy  of  the  law  and  dangerous  to  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice,  suppress  it.^  The  party  moving  to  strike  out 
the  answer  of  a  witness  to  a  question  nuist  specifi/  Ins  objections 
to  the  answer,  with  as  much  particularity  as  is  required  in  an  ob- 
jection to  a  queistion.^ 

§  719.  Motion  to  Strike  out  all  the  Testimony  of  a  Wit- 
ness.—  Less  harm  is  generally  done  by  admitting  incompetent 
evidence,  than  by  excluding  evidence  which  is  competent. 
Where  the  judge  remains  in  doubt,  he  should,  therefore,  incline 
rather  to  admit  than  to  reject  the  evidence  which  is  challenged. 

Super.  157;  Gould  v.  Day,  !I4  U.  S.  405,  Paige  (N.  Y.),  60;  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  421. 
414;  Gibson  v.  Hatchett,  24  Ala.  201;  ^  Brockott  v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat 

McCabe    v.    Braytou,   38    N.   Y.    190;  Co.,  18  Fed.  Rep.  15(;. 
Spaiilding  v.  Ilallubeck,  35  N.  Y.  204.  *  Leviu  u.  Russell,  supra. 

1  Ryau  V.  People,  19  Him  (N.  Y.),  ^  poutlus  v.  People,  82  N.  Y.  340, 
188.  347;    Marks   v.    King,   64  N.   Y.    628; 

2  Levin  v.  Russell,  42  N.  Y.  251,  256;  Plainer  v.  Plainer,  78  N.  Y.  90;  Mon- 
Boone  v.  Ridgway,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  543;  fort  v.  RoAvlaiid,  38  X.  J.  Eq.  181. 
Douelson  v.  Taylor,   8  Pick.  (Mass.)  ^  Moufort  v.  Rowland,  supra. 

391;    Mohawk    Bank    v.    Atwater,    2  '  Sill  r.  Reese,  47  Cal.  294. 


584  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tl*.^ 

It  is,  therefore,  a  sound  rule  that  a  motion  to  strike  out  evidence 
because  it  is  irrelevant  and  immaterial,  ought  not  to  be  granted, 
unless  the  evidence  is  clearly  of  that  character.^  Where  com- 
petent testimony  has  been  given  by  a  witness,  a  motion  to  strike 
out  all  his  testimony  should  be  overruled,  although  some  of  it 
may  be  incompetent.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  party  to  select  the 
incompetent  from  the  competent  testimony,  and  to  point  out  in 
his  motion  the  specific  testimony  objected  to,  as  well  as  to  indi- 
cate the  character  of  his  objections.'^  "This,"  said  Elliott,  J., 
"  is  not  a  mere  arbitrary  technical  rule,  but  is  founded  on  solid 
principle  and  essential  to  the  fair  administration  of  justice.  It 
is  in  harmony  with  the  well  settled  rule  of  practice,  everywhere 
obtaining,  that  the  motion  of  the  party  must  point  out  the  spe- 
cific testimony  objected  to,  and  indicate  the  character  of  the  ob- 
jections; and  it  is  also  in  harmony  with  the  familiar  rule  that,  if 
a  demurrer  is  addressed  to  an  entire  pleading,  it  must  be  over- 
ruled, although  the  pleading  may  be  bad  in  form."^  A  motion  to 
strike  out  all  the  testimony  of  a  witness  is  properly  overruled 
where  it  appears  that  some  of  the  testimony  was  dieted  by  the 
questions  of  the  party  making  the  motion.* 

§  720.  Striking  out  Plaintiff's  Evidence  at  the  Close  of  his 
Case.  —  In  Missouri  the  court  cannot,  at  the  close  of  the  plaint- 
iff's case,  strike  out  his  testimony  on  the  ground  that  it  is  insuf- 
ficient to  make  out  his  case.  If  it  is  not  suflJcient  to  make  out 
his  case,  the  court  may  instruct  the  jury  to  find  for  the  defend- 
ant ;  but  if  it  tends  in  any  degree  to  substantiate  the  allegations 
of  his  petition,  it  must  go  to  the  jury,  who  are  the  exclusive 
judges  of  its  weight.^ 

§  721.  [Continued.]  Right  to  Open  and  Close  on  such  a  Mo- 
tion. —  A  rule  of  court  providing  that  "  on  trials  of  fact  the  plaintiff 

1  Chester  v.  Bakersfield  Town  Hull  52G;  Cuthrcll  v.  Cuthrell,  101  led.  375- 
Assn.,  64:  Cal.  42.     Kefusing  to  strike      State  v.  Hyiuer,  15  Nev.  49. 

out  impeaching  evidence:  lloyeyv.Li-dui;,  ^  Louisville  &c.    E.    Co.  v.  Falvey, 

52lu(l.  49.  '  104  lud.  410,  41G. 

2  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  *  McCarty  v.  Waterman,  9G  lad. 
104  lud.   410,  41(;;  Wolfe  y.  Pu<ili,  101  594. 

lud.    293;     Elliott   r.  Kussell,  92  lud.  ^  McFarlaud  r.  BellowS;  49  Mo.  311. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  585 

shall  have  the  opening  and  conclusion,"  does  not  apply  to  a  case  where, 
on  a  motion  by  the  defendant  for  the  exclusion  of  evidence,  he  offers 
to  introduce  evidence  exclusively  for  the  court,  for  the  purpose  of  en- 
abling it  to  determine  whether  the  evidence  sought  to  be  excluded  is 
such  a  privileged  paper  as  should  exclude  it  altogether  from  the  con- 
sideration of  the  jury.^ 

§  722.  Right  to  Withdraw  Evidence. — A  party  having 
once  introduced  evidence,  cannot  of  right  withdraw  it,  on  find- 
ing that  it  does  not  answer  his  purpose.  "  Before  the  evidence 
is  given,  it  is  w^ithin  the  control  of  the  party.  Once  given,  it 
belongs  to  the  cause,  and  is  the  common  property  of  all  the 
parties."  ^  But  where  a  party  has  tendered  evidence,  and  it  has 
been  admitted  against  the  objection  of  the  opponent,  the  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  allow  him  to  withdraw  it  before 
the  case  goes  to  the  jury.  It  is  proper  in  most  cases  for  the 
court  to  allow  the  party  thus  to  correct  the  supposed  error  into 
which  he  has  fallen,  and  not  to  run  the  risk  of  its  workiuo;  a  re- 
versal  of  the  judgment  Avhich  he  may  obtain.^  In  most  cases  the 
opposite  party  could  not  ground  an  exception  upon  the  ruling  of 
the  court  in  permitting  the  withdrawal  of  evidence  under  such 
circumstances  ;  •*  since  it  would  not  be  prejudicial  to  him,  —  though 
cases  might  occur  where  it  would  work  injury  and  prejudice,  as 
shown  in  the  next  section. 

§  723.  Wliether  Error  of  Admitting  Incompetent  Testi- 
mony Cured  by  Witlidrawing  it.  —  There  are  numerous  hold- 
ings to  the  effect  that  error  in  admitting  incompetent  testimony 
is  cured  by  subsequently  withdrawing  it  from  the  consideration 
of  the  jury,  by  directing  them   not  to  regard  it;  ^  and  there  is 

1  Maurice  y.  Wordeu,  oi  Md.  233,  *  As  was  suggested  in  Booue  v. 
251.  Puruell,  supra. 

2  Decker  v.  Bryant,  7  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  ^  Tullidge  v.  Wade,  3  Wils.  18 ;  Cora. 
183,189;  Clintou  u.  Rowlaud,  24  Barb.  v.  Shepherd,  0  Biuu.  (Pa.)  282;  Ura- 
(N.  Y.)  034.  angst  v.  Kraemer,  8  Watts  i&  S.    391: 

3  Providence  &c.  Co.  v.  Martin,  32  Minus  v.  State,  1(5  Oh.  St.  221;  Haiub- 
Md.  310,  31(5;  Booue  27.  Puruell,  28  Md.  lett  v.  Harablett,  6  N.  H.  333;  Pavey 
t)07,  G30;  Boyd  v.  State,  17  Ga.  194;  v.  Burch,  3  Mo.  447;  Beck  v.  Cole,  16 
Daveuport  V.  Harris,  27  Ga.  G8;  Gray  AVis.  95;  Hawes  v.  Gustiu,  2  Allen 
V.  Gray,  3  Litt.  (Ky.)  4G5.  (Mass.), 402;  Smith  v.  Wliitraau,  6  Al- 
len (Mass.),  562. 


586  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

equally  good  authority  to  the  contrary. ^  But  there  is  another 
class  of  cases  which  hold  that,  where  the  evidence  is  of  a  charac- 
ter clearly  prejudicial  to  the  opposing  party,  the  prejudice  may 
not  be  cured  by  withdrawing  it,  but  the  improper  admission  of 
it  is  ground  of  reversing  the  judgment.  The  same  principle 
nuist  api)ly,  where  evidence  which  is  illegally  admitted  is  subse- 
quently withdrawn  by  the  act  of  the  party.  Whether  the  with- 
drawing of  it  will  cure  the  error  of  admitting  it,  will  depend  up- 
on its  character  and  prejudicial  tendency.  Prima  facie,  it  will. 
"  The  question,"  said  Durfee,  C.  J.,  in  discussing  this  point, 
*'  is,  did  the  withdrawal  take  the  testimony  out  of  the  case?  If 
it  did,  it  is  to  be  considered  as  'if  it  had  never  been  admitted. 
We  think  the  withdrawal,  being  by  consent  of  court,  is  to  be  re- 
garded as  the  act  of  the  court,  and  that,  in  contemplation  of 
law,  it  purged  the  case  absolutely  of  the  testimony."  The  con- 
clusion was  that,  while  it  would  rest  within  the  discretion  of  the 
trial  court  to  grant  a  new  trial  for  the  admission  of  illegal  testi- 
mony  subsequently  withdrawn  by  counsel, — yet  a  judgment 
could  not  be  reversed  on  exceptions  for  this  reason. ^  The  Court 
of  Ai)peals  of  New  York  took  a  different  view  of  the  question. 
After  repeated  objections  to  illegal  questions  had  been  made  and 
overruled,  and  the  answers  of  the  witness  had  been  given,  the 
party  tendering  the  evidence  proposed  to  have  it  stricken  out. 
The  opposing  party  declined  to  accept  this  proposition,  and 
elected  to  retain  his  exception.  The  court  made  no  ruling,  and 
gave  no  instruction  to  the  jury  on  the  subject.  The  former  rul- 
ings, the  exceptions  thereto,  and  the  objectionable  testimony,  all 
remained  in  the  case.  It  was  said  by  the  reviewing  court: 
"  The  defendant's  counsel  had  the  legal  right,  after  the  evidence 
had  been  admitted  in  spite  of  his  repeated  objections,  to  insist 
upon  his  exception ;  and  it  was  not  his  duty  to  waive  it,  as  he 
would  have  done  by  accepting  the  proposal  of  the  plaintiff's 
counsel.  So  far  as  the  jury  might  be  influenced  by  the  incom- 
petent evidence,  the  mischief  was  already  clone,  and  would  not 

1  Ante,  §351;  ErbcMi  r.  Lorrillard,  19  '^  State  v.  Towk-,  13  11.  I.  GUI. 

N.  Y.    302;   O'Sullivau  v.  lloberts,    3'J 
N.  Y.  300. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cb.  XXV.]     OBJECTIONS  and  exceptions.  587 

have  been  repaired  by  the  agreement  of  counsel  to  strike  it  out. 
The  answer  of  the  witness  was  strictly  responsive  to  the  question 
objected  to,  and  the  plaintiff's  counsel  had  no  right  to  have  it 
stricken  out.  *  *  *  The  offer  of  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  if 
explicit,  would  not  have  caused  the  jury  to  overlook  this  evi- 
dence when  they  came  to  consider  the  case,  and  it  is  impossible 
to  say  that  it  did  not  have  some  influence  upon  them."  The 
court  therefore  held  that  the  error  of  admitting  incompetent 
evidence  is  not  cured  hy  the  offer  of  the  counsel  tendering  it  to 
have  it  stricken  out.^ 

1  Furst  V.  Second  Avenue  R.  Co.,  72  N.  Y.  542. 


588  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 


CHAPTER    XXVI. 

ON  THE  PRODUCTION  AND  USE  OF  BOOKS  AND  PAPEES. 

Article     I.  —  Discovery  and  Inspection. 

Article  II.  — Notice  to  Produce  and  Secondary  Evidence. 

Article  III.  —  Use  of  Books  and  Papers  at  the  Trial. 


Article  I. —  Discovery  and  Inspection. 

Subdivision  1.  —  Under  the  Federal  Statute. 

Section 

730.  Subpoena  Duces  Tecum  a  Substitute  for  Other  Methods. 

731.  Statutes  Exteudiug  to  Courts  of  Law  the  Power  to  Compel  Discovery. 

732.  Federal  Statute  does  not  Abolish  Bills  of  Discovery. 

733.  Supersedes  State  Statutes. 

73i.  Enables  Parties  to  Prepare  for  Trial.  , 

735.  Enables  the  Defendant  to  draw  his  Answer. 

736.  Does  not  Subject  Party  to  a  Penalty. 

737.  Inflicts  Non-suit  or  Default. 

738.  Production  of  Books  and  Papers  by  the  United  States. 

739.  What  the  Application  must  Show. 

740.  May  be  Made  before  Trial. 

§  730.  Subpoena  Duces  Tecum  a  Substitute  for  other 
Methods. —  As  already  sufficiently  explained,  a  trial  had  accord- 
ing to  the  ancient  common  law,  proceeded  on  the  conception  that 
it  was  a  species  of  combat  between  two  subjects,  rather  than  an 
inquisition  by  the  sovereign,  upon  the  complaint  of  one  of  them 
against  the  other,  for  the  purposes  of  justice.  A  party  was, 
therefore,  entitled  to  all  the  advantage,  in  respect  of  disclos- 
ing the  truth,  wdiich  possession  and  secrecy  could  give  him.  He 
could  not  testify  for  himself;  he  was  not  obliged  to  testify  for 
his  adversary,  nor  to  furnish  evidence  against  himself.  The 
court  of  chancery   broke   into  this    barbarous  rule  by  the  intro- 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    589 

tion  of  the  bill  of  discovery;  upoo  the  exhibition  of  which  its 
subpoena  was  issued,  followed,  if  neeessaiy,  by  other  compulsory 
process,  bringing  the  defendant  into  court,  and  searching  his 
conscience  by  means  of  interrogatories,  Avhich  he  was  compelled 
to  answer  on  oath.  No  such  power  existed  in  the  courts  of 
law  ;  or,  if  it  existed,  it  was  but  feebly  exercised,  and  only 
in  a  few  special  cases  ;^  so  that,  for  a  great  period,  the 
bill  of  discovery  in  equity,  in  aid  of  an  action  at  law,  was 
the  only  means  afforded  by  the  remedial  procedure  in  England, 
by  which  a  party  could  compel  his  adversary  to  make  disclosures 
of  material  facts  which  were  locked  up  in  his  breast  alone. 
These  facts  might  be  matters  within  his  exclusive  knowledge,  or 
evidence  of  them  might  be  furnished  by  means  of  books  or  pa- 
pers which  were  in  his  exclusive  possession.  To  compel  him  to 
disclose  the  contents  of  such  books  or  papers,  where  he  was 
privileged  against  making  such  disclosure,  the  common-law 
courts  early  resorted  to  the  writ  of  subpoena  duces  tecum,  wdiich 
has  been  defined  to  be  "  a  process  by  which  a  court,  at  the  in- 
stance of  a  suitor,  commands  a  person,  who  has  in  his  possession 
or  control  some  document  or  paper  that  is  pertinent  to  the 
issues  of  the  pending  controversy,  to  produce  it  for  use  at  the 


1  The  English  courts  of  law  have 
sometimes  exercised  a  power  analo- 
gous to  that  of  chancery,  of  compel- 
ling an  absent  party  to  produce  docu- 
ments for  inspection  (Morrow  v. 
Saunders,  1  Brod.  &Bing.  318;  Blakey 
V.  Porter,  1  Taunt.  384;  Bateinau  v. 
Philip,  4  Taunt.  157),  even  before  the 
passage  of  the  statute  conferring  such 
power  upon  the  courts  of  law.  And 
the  same  power  was  sparingly  exer- 
cised in  New  York,  in  cases  at  law, 
prior  to  the  Revised  Statutes.  Jack- 
son V.  Jones,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  17;  Law- 
rence V.  .Ocean  Ins.  Co.,  11  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)  245,  note  a;  People  u.  Vail,  2  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  G23.  Cases  where  such  re- 
lief was  refused :  Deuslow  v.  Fowler, 
2  Cow.    (N.   Y.)   592 ;  Willis  v.  Bailey, 


19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  268;  Mayu.Gwynne, 
4  Barn.  &  Aid.  301.  Discovery  in 
equity:  Lane  v.  Stebbins,  9  Paige  (N. 
Y.)  fi22.  It  was  held  that  the  Supreme 
Court  would  order  a  defendant  to 
allow  the  plaintiff  to  take  a  copy  of  a 
paper  in  his  possession,  on  which  the 
suit  was  founded,  though  the  plaintiff 
once  had  a  counterpart  which  was  lost; 
and  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  show 
that  the  paper  was  delivered  to  the  de- 
fendant to  hold  as  trustee  of  the 
plaintiff.  It  was  said  that  the  Su- 
preme Court  would  grant  this  rule,  as 
to  such  a  paper  in  all  cases  where 
chancery  would  entertain  a  bill  of 
discovery.  Wallis  v.  Murray,  4  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  399. 


590  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

trial."  ^  This  writ  extended  no  further  than  to  compel  the  pro- 
duction of  books  and  papers,  the  existence  and  character  of 
which  were  already  known  to  the  party  seeking  to  use  them  as 
evidence;  so  that,  as  already  seen,^  it  Avas  necessary  that  it 
should  describe  the  books  or  papers  required  to  be  produced, 
with  a  considerable  deo;ree  of  accuracy.'^  Beoinnins:  Aviththe  Ju- 
diciary  Act  of  1781),  as  we  shall  presently  see,^  statutes  have 
been  passed  in  many  American  jurisdictions,  extending  to  courts 
of  law  the  power  which  had  been  hitherto  possessed  by  courts  of 
chancery,  of  compelling  discovery  by  parties.  These  statutes 
seem  to  have  left  the  subpoena  duces  tecum  untouched  in  its 
former  efficacy.^  This  efficacy  has  been  greatly  enlarged  by 
other  statutes  enabling  parties  to  testify  as  witnesses;  so  that 
now  a  party  can  generally,  by  means  of  this  writ,  compel  his  ad- 
versary to  bring  into  court,  for  the  purpose  of  being  used  as  evi- 
dence on  a  trial,  any  books  or  documents  which  contain  matter 
material  to  the  issues,  subject  to  \\h  privilege,  which  has  been  al- 
ready discussed.'' 

§  731.  Statutes  Extending  to  Courts  of  Law  the  Power  ta 
compel  Discovery. —  In  section  15  of  the  Judiciary  Act  of  1789, 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  seems  to  have  enacted  the  first 
statute  extending  to  courts  of  law  the  power  which  courts  of 
chancery  hitherto  exclusively  possessed,  of  compelling  the  oppo- 
site party  to  produce  books  and  papers  for  inspection  before  or 
at  the  trial.  Sixty-two  years  after  its  adoption  in  this  country, 
it  was  adopted  and  enacted  in  England.^  This  statute  is  pre- 
served in  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States  at  section 
724.     It  is  as  follows:    ''  In  the  trial  of  actions  at  law,  the  courts 

'  KoUius,    HuiToirate,    in     Iloyt  v.  therein     named,      between    speciflfd 

Jackson,  3  Dein.  (N.  Y.)  at  p.  31)0.  dates.     It  must  identify  the  particular 

-  Ante,  §  175.  message  required.     Ex  parte  Jaynes^ 

^  It  has   been  lately   held   tiiat  the  70  Cal.  G38. 
agent  of  a  telegraph   compcmu  is   not  ■*  Next  section, 

in  contempt  for  refusing  to  obey  such  ^  Mitchell's  Case,  12  Abb.  Pr.   (N. 

a  writ,  which  commands  him  to  search  Y.)  249. 
for  and    produce  all   messages   from  "  Ante,  chap.  XII. 

and  to   a    large    number   of    persons  '  Stat.  14  &  15  Vict.,  99,  §  6. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PKODucTiox  of  books  and  papers.    591 

of  the  United  States  may,  ou  motion  and  due  notice  thereof, 
requh-e  the  parties  to  produce  books  or  writings  in  their  posses- 
sion or  power,  which  contain  evidence  pertinent  to  the  issue,  in 
eases  and  under  circumstances  where  they  might  be  compelled 
to  produce  the  same  by  ordinary  rules  of  proceeding  in  chan- 
cery. If  a  plaintiff  fails  to  comply  with  such  order,  the 
court  may.  on  motion,  give  the  like  judgment  for  the  defendant 
as  in  cases  of  non-suit;  and  if  a  defendant  fails  to  comply  with 
such  order,  the  court  may,  on  motion,  give  judgment  against 
him  by  default."  Statutes  more  or  less  similar  have  been  enacted 
in  many  of  the  States.  Thus,  section  9  of  the  Illinois  Practice 
Act,i  provides  that  the  several  courts  shall  have  power,  in  any 
action,  pending  before  them,  u})on  good  and  sufficient  cause, 
and  upon  reasonable  notice  thereof  given,  to  require  the  parties, 
or  either  of  them,  to  produce  books  or  writings,  in  their  pos- 
session or  power,  which  contain  evidence  pertaining  to  the 
issue. 2  A  similar  provision  is  found  in  the  Revised  Statutes  of 
New  York  ^  and  also  in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  of  that 
State.  *  The  federal  statute  al)Ove  quoted  does  not  a})ply  to 
proceedings  in  equity,  those  courts  having  ample  power  to  compel 
such  discovery  without  statutory  aid.^  The  later  Federal  statute" 
making  parties  to  suits  in  equity,  as  well  as  in  suits  at  laAV,  com- 
petent witnesses,  seems  to  have  largely  dispensed  with  the  aid  of 
this  statute.  A  party  may  now  examine  his  adversary,  as  he 
might  examine  any  other  witness.  Such  an  adversary  may  be 
compelled,  as  a  witness,  by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum,  to  produce 
books  and  papers  in  his  possession,  the  same  as  any  other  wit- 
ness.^ "  He  is,"  said  Wallace,  J.,  "  bound  to  obey  the  writ  and 
be  ready  to  produce  papers  in  obedience  to  the  summons.  Like 
any  other  w^itness,  it  is  his  duty  to  make  reasonable  search  for 
the  papers  and  documents  required,  if  they  are  in  his  possession; 

1  Rev.  Stat.  111.  1880,  chap.  31.  ure,  §  854;  preseut  edition  byThroop, 

2  See  also  as  to  the  North  Carolina      §  858. 

Statute,  Commissioners    v.   Lemly,  85  =  Bischoffsheim  v.  Brown,  29   Fed. 

N.  C.  341;  Strudwick  v.  Broduax,  83  Rep.  341,  per  W^allace,  J.;  infra,  §  732. 
N.  C.  401.  6  supp.  Rev.  St.  U.  S.  312. 

3  4  R.  S.  N.  Y.  1878,  P,  1G8,  §  854.  '  ]\k'rchauts'  Nat.  Bk.  v.  State  Nat. 
*  New  York  Code  of   Civil  I'roced-  Bk.,  3  Cliff.  (U.  S.)  201. 


592  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr,, 

but,  before  he  can  be  required  to  exhibit  their  contents,  he  is 
entitled  to  appeal  to  the  discretion  of  the  court,  if  any  sufficient 
reason  exists  to  protect  him  from  disclosure."  ^ 

§  732.  Federal  Statute  does  not  Abolish  Bill3  of  Discov- 
ery.—  It  has  been  thought  that  this  statute  is  not  to  be  construed 
as  taking  away  any  right  to  have  relief  by  bill  of  discovery, 
except  in  cases  where  the  remedy  therein  provided  for  is  given. 
The  bill  of  discovery  covered  many  matters  not  therein  provided 
for,  and  is  not  abolished  by  its  terms.  The  object  of  the  statute 
was  to  give  a  more  summary  remedy  in  certain  cases,  not  to  take 
away  any  existing  remedies.^ 

§  733.  Supersedes  State  Statutes. — As  the  matter  of  the 
production  of  books  and  papers  in  the  courts  of  the  United 
States  is  expressly  regulated  by  the  above  statute,  it  is  not  a 
matter  as  to  which,  under  section  914  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of 
the  United  States,  the  practice  of  State  courts  is  adopted.^ 

§  734.  Enables  Parties  to  Prepare  for  Trial.  —  Under  this 
statute,  it  has  been  held  that  the  production  of  books  and  papers 
can  be  compelled,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  a  party  to  prepare 
for  trial.  It  is  not  confined  to  the  production  of  books  and  pa- 
pers on  the  trial.*     In  this  view  it  is  only  requisite  that  the  cause 

1  Bischoffsheim  v.  Brown,  29  Fed.  is  regulated  by  the  statutes  of  the 
Eep.  341,  343.  United  States;  and  that  these  statutes 

2  United  States  v.  Hutton,  10  Ben.  make  no  provision  for  such  an  exam- 
(U.  S.)  2(j8,  278;  Bischoffsheim  v.  ination.  There  is  nothing  in  §  914  of 
Brown,  29  Fed.  Hep.  341.  the   Revised   Statutes   of    the   United 

3  United  States  v.  Hutton,  10  Ben.  States,  providing  for  conformity  of  the 
(U.  S.)  268.  See  also  Beardsley  v.  practice  of  the  Federal  courts, insults 
Littell,  14  Blatchf,  (U.  S.)  102.  It  at  law,  to  that  of  the  State  courts, 
was  held  in  this  latter  case  that  a  party  which  authorizes  the  adoption  of  the 
has  not  the  right  to  examine  his  ad-  statute  of  a  State  court,  providing  for 
versary  out  of  court  before  trial,  al-  such  an  examination.  Beardsley  v. 
though  there  is  a  statute  of  the  par-  Littell,  14  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  102.  As  to 
ticular  State  in  which  the  Federal  court  the  effect  of  §  914,  Rev.  Stat.  U.  S.,  see 
is  held,  which  gives  such  a  right.  The  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Horst,  93 
reason   is  that  the  whole   subject  of  U.  S.  291. 

oral  testimony,  in  actions  at  common  •*  Central  Bank  r.  Taylor,  2   Cranch 

law,  in  the  courts  of  the  United  States      C.  C.    (U.  S.)  427;  Jacques  v.  Collins, 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    593 

should  be  at  issue,  that  the  court  should  be  satisfied  that  the 
evidence  sougiit  for  will  be  pertinent  to  the  issue,  and  that  the 
circumstances  are  those  in  which  a  discovery  would  be  decreed 
in  chancery  ;  ^  for  the  authority  conferred  by  the  statute  can  only 
be  exercised  in  cases  where  relief  might  have  been  had  in  chan- 
cery, by  a  bill  of  discovery .- 

§  735.   Enables  the  Defendant  to    Draw  his  Answer. —  A 

bill  of  discovery  would  lie  to  obtain  the  production  of  books  and 
papers  to  enable  the  party  to  draw  his  pleading,  and,  by  anal- 
ogy, it  has  been  held  that  he  may,  under  the  above  statute,  move 
for  the  production  of  books  and  papers  in  the  hands  of  the  plaint- 
iff, for  a  like  purpose.^  It  was  ruled  by  Mr.  Justice  McLean 
that  a  motion  to  produce  a  paper  in  the  possession  of  the  plaintiff, 
which  was  necessary  to  enable  the  defendants  to  plead,  may  be 
granted,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  although  no  notice  has 
been  given;  but  he  conceded  the  rule  to  be,  that,  where  the  pos- 
session of  a  paper  is  desired  to  be  used  in  evidence,  a  notice  is 
necessary.* 

§  736.  Does  not  Subject  Party  to  a  Penalty.  — A  bill  of  dis- 
covery would  not  be  allowed  in  chancery,  in  any  case  where  it 
would  subject  the  defendant  to  a  penalty,  unless  the  bill  relin- 
quished all  claim  to  the  penalty.  As  the  Federal  statute,  above 
quoted,  merely  transfers  to  the  courts  of  law  the  power  to  com- 
pel a  discovery,  possessed  by  the  courts  of  chancery,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  power  would  not  be  exercised  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  the  infringement  of  letters-jjatent ,  where  the  pro- 
duction of  the  books  sought  for  would  furnish  evidence  which 
would  subject  the  defendant  to  a  penalty  under  the  act  of  Con- 

2  Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  23;  United  States  v.  ^  Jacques  v.  Collins,  supra. 

Youngs,  10   Ben.  (U.  S.)    204;  United  2  Fiuch  v.  Rikeman,  supra. 

States  V.  Huttou,    Id.   209;    Finch  v.  ^  United  States  v.  Huttou,  10   Ben. 

Rikeman,  Id.  301.     It  was,  however,  (U.  S.)  268,  279. 

held  by   Mr.    Justice   Curtis  that  the  *  Brouson  v.    Kensey,     3    McLean 

production  of  papers  could    only    be  (U.  S.),  180.     The  soundness  of   this 

(ioyhiiqWqA  at  tlip  trial.   lasigi  v.  Brown,  ruling  may  be  doubted. 

1  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  401. 

38 


594  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thouip.   Tr., 

gress/  and  the  plaintiff  had   not  relinquished  his   claim   to  the 
penalty.-^ 

§  737.  Inflicts  Non-suit  or  Default.  — The  above  statute  has 
so  far  altered  the  rule  of  the  common  law,  as  to  intiict  upon  the 
party  the  penalty  of  a  non-suit  or  default,  upon  the  non-produc- 
tion of  a  paper  in  obedience  to  the  court's  order,  instead  of  mere- 
ly letting  in  the  opposite  party  to  parol  proof  .^ 

§  738.  Production  of  Books  and  papers  by  the  United 
States. — Although  a  bill  of  discovery  will  not  lie  against  the 
United  States,  yet  it  has  been  held  that,  under  the  above  stat- 
ute, the  United  States  will  be  compelled  to  produce  the  official 
weigher's  returns  of  the  weight  of  merchandise,  on  the  motion 
of  a  defendant  sued  for  the  balance  of  duties  alleged  to  be  due 
thereon,  the  defense  being  that  the  dues  were  fully  paid,  and  the 
motion  being  supported  by  affidavit  that  an  inspection  of  copies 
of  the  returns  is  necessary  to  enable  the  defendant  to  prepare 
for  trial.*  In  such  an  action,  where  it  appeared  that  the  defend- 
ants were  clearly  entitled  to  the  production  of  the  papers  called 
for,  the  court  ought  to  stay  the  proceedings  until  their  produc- 
tion, and,  in  case  of  the  refusal  of  the  collector  to  exhibit  them 
within  a  reasonable  time,  to  issue  a  mandamus  for  their  produc- 
tion.^ Where  a  bill  was  filed  in  the  English  court  of  chancery, 
by  the  United  States,  for  an  account  of  certain  property  of  the 
so-called  Confederate  States,  it  was  held  by  Lord  Cairns,  L.  C, 
that,  although  a  bill  for  a  discovery  cannot  be  maintained  against 
a  sovereign  State,  yet  if  a  discovery  becomes  necessary  to  aid 
the  defendants,  the  court  may  stay  the  proceedings  until  means 
of  discovery  should  be  furnished.® 

1  5  U.  S.  Stat,  at  Large,  123.  (U.  S.)  2G8.     In  this  case  there  was  a 

2  Fiach    V.     Rickraaii,     2    Blatchf.      considerable  discussion  of  the  validity 
(U.  S.)  301.  and  effect  of  a  regulation  made  by  the 

'■^  lasigi  V.  Brown,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  collector    of  customs  under  §  251  of 

S.)  401.  the   Revised   Statutes    of  the  United 

•*  United  States  v.  Youngs,  10  Ben.  States,    touching    the    inspection    of 

(U.  S.)  2G-1;  United  States  v.  Mutton  books  and  papers  in  the  custom  house. 
10  Ben,  (U.  S.)  2G9.  «  United  States  v.  Wagner,  L.  R.  2. 

5  United  States  y.   Ilutton,  10    Ben.  Ch.  582,  595. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTiox  of  books  and  papers.    595 

§  739.  What  the  Application  must  Show.  — "  The  applicant 
must  show  that  the  paper  exists,  and  is  in  the  control  of  the 
other  party;  that  it  is  pertinent  to  the  issue,  and  that  the  case  is 
such  that  a  court  of  equity  would  compel  its  discovery."  ^ 

§  740.  May  be  made  before  Trial.  —  Even  under  a  holding 
that  the  papers  could  only  be  produced  for  the  purpose  of  being 
used  at  the  trial,  it  was  ruled,  on  grounds  of  manifest  conven- 
ience, that  the  application  for  an  order  to  produce  them  on 
notice  might  be  made  before  the  trial. ^  In  such  a  case,  Mr. 
Justice  Curtis,  at  circuit,  said:  "If  the  notice  is  made  before 
the  trial,  the  correct  practice  seems  to  be,  after  the  moving  party 
has  made  a  prima  facie  case,  to  enter  an  order  nisi,  leaving  it 
for  the  other  party  to  show  cause  at  the  trial.  He  must  then 
come  prepared  to  produce  the  paper,  if  he  fails  to  show  cause."* 

Subdivision  2. —  Under  the  Statutes  of  New  York. 

Section 
743.  Construction  of  the  New  York  Statute. 
744:.  Does  not  Extend  to  Cases  of  Tort. 

745.  Nor  to  Matters  which  are  Privileged. 

746.  Does  not  Require  a  Party  to  Disclose  his  own  Evidence. 

747.  Nor  extend  to  Discovery  of  Books  of  Corporations. 

748.  Enables  the  Plaintiff  to  Draw  his  Petition. 

749.  But  not  to  Anticipate  a  Defense. 

750.  Nor  to  Discover  the  Names  of  Proper  Parties  Defendant. 

751.  Enables  Defendant  to  Prepare  his  Answer. 

752.  An  Illustration. 

753.  Fishing  Explorations  not  Countenanced. 

754.  Inspection  of  Books  of  an  Insolvent. 

755.  Proceeding  by  Petition  and  Order  to  show  Cause. 

756.  Affidavit  by  whom  made. 

757.  What  the  Petition  must  show. 

758.  Information  and  belief  not  enough. 

759.  Certainty  Required  in  Description. 

760.  [Continued.]     Illustration. 

761.  Explicit  Denial  ends  the  Application. 

762.  Vacating  Duces  Tecum  on  Application  of  Attorney. 

763.  Appeal  from  an  Order  Granting  an  Inspection. 

764.  Question  for  Decision  on  Appeal. 

1  lasigi  V.  Brown,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  (U.  2  lasigi  v.  Brown,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  401. 

S.)  401,  402.  •■*  Ibid. 


596  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1   Thoilip.  Tl'., 

§  743.  Construction  of  New  York  Statute. — The  i)roceed- 
ing  for  ii  discovery,  according  to  the  chancery  practice,  was 
superseded  in  New  York  by  provisions  of  the  Revised  Statutes, 
and  these  in  turn  were  suiDplemented  by  a  provision  (§  388) 
of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure.^  It  has  been  hekl  that  the 
provision  of  the  code  does  not  repeal  those  of  the  Revised 
Statutes.  Not  being  inconsistent  with  each  other,  they  might 
well  stand  together,  either  as  directing  the  mode  of  mak- 
ing the  discovery,  or  as  defining  the  powers  of  the  courts  in  case 
an  order  for  a  discovery  should  be  disobeyed. ^  The  discovery 
therein  provided  for  may  be  had  as  well  afle)'  issue  Joined,  as 
before;  but  under  either  statute,  the  court  must  be  satisfied  that 
the  books  or  papers  contain  evidence  relating  to  the  merits  of  the 
action.^  The  court  must  be  satisfied  before  granting  the  order, 
that  the  discovery  is  pertinent  or  material  to  the  claim  or  de- 
fense of  the  party  seeking  the  remedy.^  And  where  the  plaint- 
iff's  claim  was  proved  prima  facie,  it  was  held  (reversing  the 
trial  court),  that  an  order  for  the  inspection  of  the  defendant's 
books,  in  order  to  get  further  proof,  should  not  have  been 
made.^ 

§  744.  Does  not  extend  to  Cases  of  Tort.  — The  provisions 
of  the  Revised  Statutes  have  been  held  co-extensive  only  with 
the  principles  of  the  former  court  of  chancery,  —  from  which 
the  conclusion  has  been  reached  that  such  an  inspection  cannot 
be  demanded  in  an  action  for  libel.^  In  an  action  for  a  personal 
tort,  brought  by  a  physician,  the  plaintiff  cannot  be  compelled 
to  make  a  discovery  of  his  books  and  papers,  for  the  purpose  of 
enabling  the  defendant  to  intercept  and  rebut  his  testimony  as  to 
the  damage  sustained  by  him,  by  showing  his  gains  from  his 
practice.^ 

1  2  R.  S.  N.  Y.  (184())  199.  ^  Sanger  v.    Seymour,  42    Huu  (N. 

2  Hoyt  V.  American  Exch.  Bauk,  1      Y.)  (Ul. 

Duer   (N.  Y.),(i52;   Morrison  w.  Stur-  e  Opilyke   v.    Marble,    18  Abb.  Pr. 

ges,  26  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  177.  (N.  Y.)  2(i(]. 

3  Morrison  v.  Sturges,  snpra.  '  Mott    v.   Consumers'    Ice   Co.,  2 
"  2  Wait  Pr.  531,  and  cases  citei,!.  Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  143. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.   XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.      597 

§  7-45.  Xor  to  3Iatters  which  are  Privileged.  —  A  physician's 
account  books,  containing  information  which  would  be  privil- 
eged as  concerns  his  patients,  are  not  subject  to  discovery 
and  exploration,  in  an  action  between  the  physician  and  a  third 
person.^ 

§  746.  Does  not  Require  Party  to  Disclose  his  own  Evi- 
dence. —  The  provision  of  section  388  of  the  New  York  Code  of 
Procedure  does  not  sanction  an  order  requiring  either  party  to 
disclose  the  evidence  which  he  intends  to  introduce  against  his 
adversar}'.^  So,  in  another  jurisdiction,  it  is  held  that  it  is  an 
abuse  of  the  power  of  compelling  the  party  to  produce  docu- 
ments, to  use  it  so  as  to  compel  the  opposite  party  to  discover 
evidence  which  is  material  to  his  case,  but  not  material  to  the 
case  of  his  opponent;  "  for  the  rule  is  that  the  defendant  has  the 
right  to  enforce  the  production  of  such  documents  by  the  plaint- 
iff, as  relate  to  his  defense,  and  does  not  extend  to  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  production  of  documents  by  means  of  which  the 
plaintiff's  case  is  to  be  established."  '^ 

§  747.  Nor  extend  to  Discovery  of  Books  of  a  Corporation.  —  It 
has  been  held,  but,  it  is  believed,  on  grounds  that  are  quite  untenable, 
that  agents  of  a  corporation  will  not  be  compelled  to  discover  the 
books  of  the  corporation.'*  It  was  also  ruled  that  the  fact  that 
the  petition  for  the  discovery  alleged  that  the  corjioration  was  fic- 
titious, made  no  difference. ^  This  would  seem  to  be  a  political  de- 
cision, not  entitled  to  much  respect.  It  is  plain  that  the  discovery 
of  the  books  of  a  corporation  cannot  properly  be  had  at  all,  except  by 
process  directed  against  the  agents  of  the  corporation  who  have  them 
in  their  custody.  The  corporation,  being  itself  an  intangible  body, 
could  not  be  imprisoned  for  contempt  ;  and  although  the  process  might 
be  in  name  directed  against  the  corporation,  it  would  be  necessary  to 
serve  it  upon  its  agents,  having  control  over  the  m  atter  of  the  produc- 
tion of  the  books. 

'  Mott   V.   Consumers'   Ice    Co.,   2  3  Abrahams  v.   Swaun,  18  W.   Va. 

Abb.  N.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  143.  274,  278. 

2  Strong  w.  Strong,  1  Abb.  Pr.  (N.s.)  *  Opdyke  v.  Marble,    18  How.   Pr. 

(N.  Y.)  233.  (N.  Y  )  266. 

5  !hid. 


598  EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thom}).  Tr., 

§  748.  Enables  Plaintiff  to  draw  his  Petition.  —  Where  an 
application  for  the  exhibition  of  a  writing  is  made  before  issue 
joined,  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  frame  his  complaint,  it  can  only 
be  granted  where  the  petition  shows  that  the  inspection  is  neces- 
sary to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  frame  his  complaint.  Where  the 
petition  contains  enough  matter  to  enable  the  plaintiff  properly 
to  frame  his  complaint,  the  application  will  not  be  granted, 
though  it  may  appear  that  certain  of  the  allegations  cannot  be 
made  upon  knowledge,  but  can  only  be  made  upon  information 
and  belief.^  The  orantino;  of  such  an  order  has  been  said  to  be  a 
matter  resting  very  largely  within  the  discretion  of  the  court. 
In  dealing  with  such  an  application,  it  was  said:  "  The  power  to 
search  through  defendant's  account  books,  in  order  to  find  iso- 
lated entries  not  particularized,  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  frame 
a  complaint,  is  open  to  great  abuse,  and  should  only  be  granted 
where  the  purpose  and  necessity  of  such  examination  are  appar- 
ent. At  a  later  stage  of  the  proceedings,  when  the  issues  be- 
tween plaintiff  and  defendants  shall  have  been  developed,  other 
appropriate  measures  can  be  taken  by  the  plaintiff  to  obtain  the 
information   now  sought,  if  it  be  found  to  be  then  necessary."  ^ 

§  749.  But  not  to  Anticipate  a  Defense.  — In  New  York  it 
is  not  usual  to  direct  a  discovery  and  inspection  of  books  and 
papers,  in  anticipation  of  a  defense,  and  with  a  view  of  enabling 
a  party  to  prepare  to  meet  it.  The  rule,  as  generally  stated,  is 
that  the  papers  to  be  inspected  must  relate  to  the  maintenance 
of  the  position  taken  by  the  applicant,  and  to  that  of  the  oppo- 
site party. '^  Accordingly,  where  the  })laintiff  moved  for  an  in- 
spection of  the  defendant's  books,  in  order  to  show  the 
non-payment  of  a  debt,  it  was  held  that,  as  the  defense  of  pay- 
ment was  an  affirmative  defense,  in  respect  of  which  the  burden 
was  on  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  an  inspec- 
tion of  his  books,  in  anticipation  of  his  defense,  and  to  meet  it."* 

1  Kafferty   v.    Williaius,   '^0    N.    Y,  Y.),  641 ;  citing  Andrews  u.  Towuseud, 

Super.  (iO.  14  Week.  Dig.  (N.  Y.)   243. 

-  Mohesy  I'.    Kaliii,   :.i)  .\.  Y.  Super.  ■*  C'lUter  r.  Pool,  54  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 

20'J.  311. 

^  Sanger  v.  Seymour,   42  Hun    (X. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.   XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.      599 

§  750.  Nor  Discover  the  Names  of  Proper  Parties  Defend- 
ant.—  In  a  motion,  under  the  provision  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  New  York,  for  the  discovery  of  the  books,  etc.,  of  a  printing 
and  publishing  company  called  "The  World  Company,"  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  the  plaintiff  to  prepare  his  complaint,  with 
the  names  of  real  defendants,  to  be  inserted  in  the  place  of  cer- 
tain fictitious  names  contained  in  the  summons,  it  was  ruled  that 
the  courts  could  not  grant  a  discovery  and  inspection  for  such  a 
purpose,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  plaintiff  in  stat- 
ing his  cause  of  action.^ 

§   751.   Enables  Defendant   to  Prepare    his    Answer.  — An 

order  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  produce,  or  give  copies  of  papers, 
to  enable  the  defendant  to  answer  the  complaint,  will  not  be 
made  when  it  is  manifest  that  the  defendant  has  no  defense 
which  he  cannot  set  up  in  due  legal  form,  without  the  aid  of  such 
papers. 2  It  is  said:  "  Discovery  may  be  ordered  to  assist  a  de- 
fendant to  facts  without  which  he  cannot  frame  an  answer  with 
safety  to  his  rights.  But  it  is  not  intended  to  protect  him  from 
answering  untruthfully,  or  to  inform  him  how  fully  he  may  have 
furnished  the  plaintiff  with  the  means  of  disproving  the  answer 
which  he  may  propose  to  interpose."  ^  The  defendant  must  show 
Jiow  or  ivJiy  it  is  necessary  to  have  the  discovery,  in  order  to  pre- 
pare his  answer.  In  other  words,  he  must  set  forth  the  neces- 
sary/rtc^*^  in  his  petition  to  show  that  such  a  discoveiy  is  nec- 
essary.* It  does  not  satisfy  this  rule  that  the  defendant  states, 
in  his  petition,  that  he  expects  to  be  able  to  prove  that  a  note  and 
acceptances,  which  are  the  foundation  of  the  action,  were 
paid  by  the  transfer  of  the  property  mentioned  and  described 
in  the  pa})ers  whereof  a  discovery  is  sought.^ 

§  752.  A\  Illustration.  — Where  an  action  was  brought  to  recover 
a  balance  of  moneys,  alleged  to  have  been  received  by  the  defendant  as 

1  Opdyke    v.    Marble,    18   Abb.  Pr.  ''  Gelstou  v.  Marshall,  G   How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  2(36.  (X.  Y.)  398. 

2  Morav.  McCredy,  2BOSW.  (X.  Y.)  ^  Gelstou  z).    Marshall,    6  How.    Pr. 
li(jy.  supiri.     See  also  Stantou  v.  Delaware 

3  Mora  v.McCredy,  2Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  Mut.  lus.  Co.,  2  Saudf.  (N.  1".)  G62. 
669. 


(JUO  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.       [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

the  plaintiff's  agent,  and  the  complaint  was  drawn  upon  the  face  of 
certain  accounts  rendered  by  the  defendant,  it  was  held  that  he  was 
entitled  to  an  order  for  the  inspection  of  the  same,  and  of  the  vouchers 
filed  by  him  in  support  thereof,  to  enable  him  to  frame  his  answer.  In 
such  a  case  the  defendant  should  be  allowed  an  inspection  of  his  book 
of  accounts,  as  the  plaintiff's  agent,  if  necessary,  to  enable  him  to  meet 
the  proofs  of  the  account  stated  thereafter  in  the  complaint,  and 
make  a  substantial  allegation  as  to  what  the  accounts  all  together  showed. 
The  allegation  in  the  complaint,  that  such  books  of  account  were  falsely 
and  fraudulently  made  up  by  the  defendant,  was  regarded  as  rendering 

it  more  proper  to  grant  an  inspection.^ In  another  case,  upon  an 

a[)i>lication  by  the  defendant  for  the  discovery  of  the  contents  of  a  letter 
written  to  him  by  the  plaintiff,  and  his  answer  thereto,  written  on  the 
same  paper,  which  were  in  the  plaintiff 's  possession,  where  such  petition 
showed  that  they  contained  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  had  no  legal  de- 
mand against  the  defendant,  the  discovery  was  granted,  the  allegation 
not  being  controverted  by  the  plaintiff.'^ 

§  753.  Fishing-  Explorations  not  Conntenanced. — The  stat- 
utes of  New  Tork,  providing  for  this  mode  of  discovery,  do  not 
countenance  fishing  explorations,  for  the  mere  pui'pose  of  obtain- 
ing evidence  or  witnesses.  If,  therefore,  the  order  for  a  dis- 
covery of  books  and  papers  does  not  show  that  the  entries  sought 
for  are  evidence,  but  only  that  they  contain  information  by  wliich 
evidence  may  be  obtained,  the  order  will  not  be  granted.-^  An 
inspection  is  denied  of  the  documents  of  the  adversary  before 
trial,  where  it  is  clear  that  they  may  be  produced  on  an  examina- 
tion of  the  adverse  party  under  a  subpcena  duces  tecum,  when 
the  only  purpose  is  to  prove  circumstances  as  the  foundation  of 
relevant  inferences,  rather  than  facts  proximately  probative  of 
an  issue.* 

§  754.  Inspection  of  Books  of  an  Insolvent.  — It  has  been  reasoned 
in  New  York,  construing  a  statute,^  that  it  is  altogether  foreign  to  the 

1  InyoMiuiugCo.  r.  Pheby,  49  N.  Y.  "i  New  Euglaud  Irou  Co.  v.  New 
Super.  392.                                                         York  Loun  Co.,  53  How.    Pr.   (N.  Y.) 

2  Livermore  v.  St.    Johu,    4    Rob.      ;3r>l. 

(N.  Y.)  12.  ^  §  21    of   the   General   Assignment 

3  Woods  V.  Figauiei-e,  25  How.  Pr.      Act  of  that  State. 
(N.  Y.)  522. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    601 

purposes  of  the  legislature  to  compel  the  assignee  to  produce  the  assign- 
or's books,  in  order  to  enable  a  creditor  to  extract  evidence  therefrom 
that  will  aid  him  in  a  litigation,  existing  or  contemplated,  not  relating 
to  the  assigned  estate.  "  An  insolvent,"  said  Van  Hoesen,  J.,  "is  un- 
der no  greater  obligation  than  a  solvent  person,  to  disclose  to  his  ad- 
versary the  evidence  on  which  he  relies.  It  cannot  add  to  the  quantum 
or  value  of  the  assigned  estate  to  show  from  the  assignor's  books  that 
he  intentionally  misrepresented  the  weight  of  tlie  hides  on  which  he  pro- 
cured a  loan  from  the  petitioner ;  nor  ought  the  assignee  to  be  com- 
pelled to  exhibit  the  evidence  which  he  has  to  show  that  the  petitioner 
took  usury  from  the  assignor."  ^  In  another  case  where,  shortly  before 
making  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors,  the  assignor  had 
allowed  a  judgment  by  default  to  be  entered  against  him,  under  which 
his  stock  in  trade  had  been  levied  upon  and  sold,  and  tlie  circumstances 
of  the  transaction  tended  to  show  that  the  claim  sued  on  was  fictitious, 
and  that  it  was  concocted  for  the  purpose  of  defrauding  the  actual  cred- 
itors of  the  assignor,  — the  court  allowed  the  assignee  to  bring  suit  for 
the  recovery  of  the  propert}',  but  refused  to  allow  him  to  examine,  under 
the  provisions  of  the  above  statute,  the  persons  who  were  alleged  to  have 
taken  part  in,  or  to  have  knowledge  of,  the  fraudulent  transaction- 
Charles  P.  Daly,  C.  J.,  said:  "  The  order  allowing  the  assignee  to  sue 
will  be  granted,  and  whatever  examination  of  parties,  or  witnesses  ma}^  be 
necessary  to  sustain  the  action,  must  be  had  in  that  action.  The  exam- 
ination allowed  by  the  Assignment  Act  is  to  aid  in  the  admin istratioyi  of 
the  assignment.  If  it  is  necessary  to  perpetuate  testimony,  then  it 
should  be  made  under  the  Revised  Statutes,  and  subject  to  the  restric- 
tions and  limitations  which,  by  adjudged  cases,  is  to  be  applied  to  such 
proceedings.  What  is  sought  to  be  done  in  this  application  is  to  go 
into  the  whole  alleged  cause  of  action,  by  the  examination  of  witnesses 
and  the  filing  of  their  testimony,  before  any  action  is  commenced.  It 
is  only  necessary  to  suggest  the  gross  abuses  that  would  arise  should 
such  a  proceeding  as  this  be  allowed.  The  examination  as  to  the  whole 
subject  of  inquiry  has  nothing  to  guide  it,  and  may  be  as  extensive  and 
irrelevant  as  the  person  who  obtains  such  an  order  wishes.  It  is  im- 
possible for  the  referee  to  determine  in  advance  what  may  or  what 
m  ay  not  be  irrelevant,  and  the  most  unrestrained  license  of  inquiry 
would  be  the  consequence.  When  an  action  is  commenced,  and  an 
issue  or  issues  have   been  found,    there  is  then  a  definite  limit  to  the 

^  Matter  of  Everit,  10  Daly  (X.  Y.),  99. 


602  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tl., 

inquirj',  and  a  means  of  determining  what  is,  or  is  not  relevant.  If  an 
examination  is  necessary  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  frame  his  complaint, 
he  must  specifically  show  why  a  discovery  is  necessary  for  that  purpose  ; 
or  if  a  discovery  is  necessary  to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  give  or  procure 
evidence,  the  necessity  for  it  must  be  shown.  All  that  was  evidently 
intended  by  the  twenty-first  section  of  the  Assignment  Act  was,  that 
parties  sliould  have,  in  their  assignment  proceedings,  the  same  power 
as  to  compelling  the  production  and  examination  of  books  and  papers, 
the  discovery  of  evidence  requisite  to  the  complete  administration  of  the 
assigned  estate  by  the  court,  or  the  perpetuation  of  testimony  where 
there  is  reason  to  apprehend  that  the  party  may  lose  it, —  which,  by  va- 
rious statutory  provisions  parties  have  in  actions,  with  the  additional 
right  of  compelling  answers  that  might  criminate  the  witness,  but  for 
the  provision  in  the  act  and  the  right  of  the  party  to  avail  himself  of 
the  testimony  so  taken  in  any  action  then  pending  or  thereafter 
brought."  ^ 

§  755.   Proceeding  by  Petition  and  Order  to  Show  Cause. — 

Under  the  New  York  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  the  proceeding  to 
compel  the  inspection  of  the  books  of  the  adversary  party,  takes 
place  upon  a  verified  petition,  praying  for  the  discovery  or  in- 
spection sought,  upon  which  the  only  order  Avhich  can  be  made 
in  the  first  instance  is  an  order  directing  the  relief  prayed  for, 
or  to  show  cause  why  it  should  not  be  had.  A  peremptory  order 
compelling  the  production  of  books  and  papers  for  examination, 
cannot  be  granted  e.x  jjft?'<f^.'- 

§  756.  Affidavit  by  Whom  Made. — The  affidavit  should  be 
made  by  the  part ij  himself  ;  if  made  by  his  attorney,  some  reason 
should  be  shown  for  his  making  it.'^  "Where  the  State  (or  the 
people  of  the  Suite)  are  moving  parties  in  the  application,  the 
necessary  facts  must  not  only  be  stated,  but  the  person  from 
whom  the  information  is  derived  should  Jdmself  make  the  aflida- 
vit  or  i)etition,  and  state  the  facts  positively,  or  else  state  the 
nature  of  the  information  which  he  has  of  the  facts. ^ 

»  Matter   of    Burtm-tt,    8  Daly   (N.  "  Thelps  v.   Piatt,  J4  Barb.   (N.  Y.) 

Y.)'  3(;3.  ').->-. 

2  i)ick  y.  Phillips,  41   Ilmi   (N.  Y.),  'People     v.      Kector,    0    Abb.    Pr. 

on:;-  (N.  Y.)  177. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    603 

§  757.  What  the  Petition  must  Show. —  The  petition  must 
point  to  the  places  where  the  information  sought  for  exists,  or 
describe  the  entries,  other  than  by  merely  stating  their  supposed 
effect  as  evidence.  It  must  also  show  the  expediency  or  neces- 
sity of  resorting  to  this  mode  of  proof.  If  it  is  deficient  in 
these  particulars,  the  inspection  will  be  denied.^  It  must  state 
definitely  what  it  is  that  the  petitioner  seeks  to  discover,  so  that 
the  court  may  see  that  it  is  material  to  the  case.'^  It  must  show 
that  entries,  affecting  or  throwing  some  lio;ht  on  the  matters  in 
controversy,  exist,  or,  at  least,  enough  to  call  upon  the  adverse 
party  to  show  whether  they  do  or  do  not  exist.  It  must  show 
that  such  entries  are  material,  and  it  must  state  facts  from 
which  the  court  can  see  that  they  are  material,  in  addition  to 
stating  other  matters  prescribed  by  court:  rules  regulating  such 
applications.^  The  entries,  of  which  a  discovery  is  sought, 
must  be  described  with  sufficient  certainty,  to  ena})le  the  adverse 
party  to  ascertain  whether  they  exist  and  are  in  his  possession.* 
Such  a  petition  will  not  be  granted  where  it  prays  for  a  discov- 
ery, generally,  of  all  the  books,  papers,  and  correspondence  of  the 
adverse  party,  containing  entries  made  during  a  period  of  several 
years,  relating  to  purchases  of  a  specified  commodity.^ 

§   758  Information    and    Belief    not  Enough. — It    is   not 

enough  that  the  party  believes  or  is  advised  that  a  paper  contains 
material  evidence.  Facts  must  be  shown  to  support  such  belief. 
Nor  is  it  enough  that  the  paper  may,  or  probably  will,  furnish 
information  to  obtain  evidence  which  may  be  material.  The 
paper  itself,  must  contain  the  evidence,  either  by  itself  or  in  con- 
nection with  other  evidence.^  An  affidavit  seeking  such  a  dis- 
covery and  inspection,  sworn  to  on  information  and  belief,  that 
the  books  of  a  corporation  will  show  the  names  of  proper  par- 

J  New   England    Iron   Co.  v.  New  ■*  People  v.  Rector,  supra. 

York  Loan  Co.,  55  How.  Pr.  (N.Y.)  351.  ^  Cas.sard  v.  Hiuraan,  supra. 

2  People  V.  Rector,  6  Abb.  Pr.  ^  Morrison  v.  Sturges,  26  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  177;  AValkeru.  Granite  Bank,  (N.  Y.)  177;  Strong  v.  Strong,  1  Abb. 
19  Abb.  Pr.  (N.Y.)  111.  Pr.  N.  S.  (N.  Y.)  233;  Husson  v.  Fox, 

3  Cassard     v.    Hiumau,      6     Duer  15  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  404. 
(N.  Y.),  695. 


60'4  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [I  Thoilip.  Tr., 

ties  defendant  against  whom  it  is  desirable  to  bring  an  action  for 
libel,  has  been  denied.^  It  must  state  this  po,sz7iye??/,  not  on  in- 
formation or  helief;  and  the  absence  of  a  party  will  not  excuse 
the  want  of  such  positive  information,  unless  the  affidavit  sets 
forth  the  sources  and  grounds  of  such  information  and  belief  .^ 
In  such  a  case  it  was  said:  "  The  uniform  course  of  decision  has 
been  against  any  attempt  to  use  this  power  of  the  court  for  the 
mere  purpose  of  hunting  for  evidence,  without  some  knowl- 
edge on  the  part  of  the  applicant  as  to  what  the  entries  are,  and 
in  what  paper  or  book  it  is  contained.  It  is  very  evident,  no 
such  knowledge  exists  in  the  present  case,  and  the  whole  petition 
rests  upon  the  supposition  that  there  must  be  some  entries  in  the 
defendant's  books,  and  if  the  plaintiff  can  obtain  an  inspec- 
tion, he  can  obtain  some  information  beneficial  to  him  in  con- 
ducting this  prosecution.  Such  a  rule,  if  carried  out  to  this  ex- 
tent, would  give  to  a  party  the  privilege  of  always  examining  his 
adversary's  books,  if  he  can  swear  that  the  litigation  relates  to 
matters  which  ought  to  be  entered  in  the  books,  and  that  he  can 
swear  that  he  believes  that  he  keeps  correct  ones."^ 

§  759.  Certainty  required  in  Description. — Practical  cer- 
tainty is  required  in  the  description  of  the  books  and  papers 
which  are  to  be  produced,  as  in  the  case  of  a  subpoena  duces 
tecum. ^ 

§  760.  [Continued.]  Illustration.  —  An  order  req-uiring  the  pro- 
duction of  "  books  and  papers,  if  any  such  there  are,  touching  the  bus- 
iness relations  of  the  defendants  as  between  themselves  and  third 
parties,  which  would  refer  to,  or  would  cover  or  include,  the  purchase 
of  the  said  ice,"  —  has  been  held  too  vague  and  indefinite  to  be  en- 
forced. ^ 

§  761.  Explicit  Denial  ends  the  Application. — An  explicit 
denial  by  the  party   that  there  are  any  such  entries,  books   or 

1  Opdyke  r.  Marble,  18  Abb.  Pr.  *  Ante,  §750;  Olncy  v.  Hatcliff,  37 
(N.  Y.)  2(!(;;  Walker  v.  Granite  Bauk,       Ilun  (N.  Y.),  28(1. 

19  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  111.  ^  Oluey  v.  Hatcliff,  37  IIuu  (N.  Y.), 

2  Walker  u.  Granite  P,ank,  iiupra.  28(J. 

3  Ibid.,  opiuiou  by  Ini^raham,  P.  J. 


Tit.  Ill,  Cll.  XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.       605 

papers,  under  his  control,  ends  the  appHcation.  He  cannot,  it 
has  been  ruled,  })e  subjected  to  a  fishing  examination.^ 

§  762.  Vacatixg  Duces  Tecubi  on  Application  of  Attorney.  —  In 
a  case  in  New  York,  brought  to  recover  moneys  alleged  to  have  been 
taken  from  the  plaintiffs'  firm  by  the  defendant,  while  employed  by  the 
plaintiffs  as  a  book-keeper  or  clerk,  the  defendant  alleged  that  the 
moneys  were  taken  in  pursuance  of  an  arrangement  with  one  Clyde, 
who  was  then  the  senior  partner  of  the  plaintiffs'  firm,  by  which  the  de- 
fendant was  to  have  one-fourth  of  the  profits.  The  defendant  sub- 
poenaed one  of  the  plaintiffs  to  produce  the  books  of  the  firm.  The 
subpoena  was  thereafter  set  aside,  on  an  application  of  the  plaintiffs, 
based  upon  an  affidavit  of  one  of  their  attorneys,  stating  that  he  be- 
lieved that  the  subpoena  was  served  with  a  view  of  annoying  the  plaint- 
iffs, and  that  the  books  called  for  were  from  forty  to  fifty  in  number. 
It  was  held  that  the  court  erred  in  granting  the  application  to  vacate 
the  subpoena ;  that  if  the  subpoena  was  too  broad,  the  court  should  have 
required  the  plaintiff  to  allow  the  defendant  to  inspect  the  books,  or 
should  have  compelled  them  to  produce  copies  of  such  portions  of  the 
books  as  were  material  to  the  issues.  The  court  said:  "  The  case  to 
be  tried,  in  such  a  case,  is  stifled  without  a  trial.  The  materiality  of 
evidence  should  be  determined  at  the  trial,  where  an  exception  is  pos- 
sible to  a  ruling  of  the  judge  before  whom  the  trial  is  had.  In  this 
case,  if  the  books  are  material,  there  is  no  remedy.'"-^ 

§  763.   Appeal  from   an  Order  Granting   an  Inspection.  — 

In  New  York  an  appeal  lies  to  the  Supreme  Court,  at  general 
term,  from  an  order  made  at  special  term,  granting  or  denying 
to  a  party  leave  to  inspect  and  examine  the  books  of  the  party 
appealing.  Such  an  order  is  regarded  as  disposing  of  a  sub- 
stantial right. "^  But  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  New  York  does  not 
revise  such  orders.  That  court  has  said :  "  Whether  the  subpoena 
duces  tecum  should  be  set  ix^xde,  \s ws  matter  of  discretion  in  the 
cou'"t  below ;  and  whether  permission  to  inspect  and  copy  plaint- 

1  Hoyt   V.    American   Exch.   Bk.,    1  ^  Clyde    v.  Rogers,  24  Huu  (N.  Y.), 

Duer  (N.  Y.),  652.     lu  this  case,  the  145. 

mode    of   making    application  for  the  ^  xhompsou  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  9  Abb. 

discovery  under  the  Revised   Statutes  Pr.    (x.  s.)     (N.    Y.)   212;   Woods   v. 

and  Code   of  Civil  Procedure  of  New  Figaiiiere,  25  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  522. 
York,  is  stated. 


606  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

iff  s  books  should  be  granted,  was  also  matter  of  discretion. 
These  are  matters  of  practice,  with  which  we  have  no  jurisdic- 
tion to  interfere.  The  appeal  should  therefore  be  dismissed  with 
costs."  ^ 

§  704.  Question  for  Decision  on  Appeal. — On  an  appeal 
from  such  an  order,  the  question  for  decision  is,  whether  suffi- 
cient evidence  appears  to  satisfy  the  court  that  the  books  called 
for  are  material  and  necessary  for  the  applicant,  as  claimed;  and 
it  has  been  ruled  that,  where  there  is  no  denial  of  the  facts 
alleged,  the  applicant  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  all  intend- 
ments and  inferences  which  may  be  drawn  from  the  allegations 
made  by  him.-^ 


Article  II.  —  Notice  to  Produce  and  Secondary  Evidence. 

Subdivision  1.  —  JSfotice  to  Produce. 

Section 

770.  Necessity  of  the  Notice. 

771.  Notice  not  Complied  with,  lets  iu  Secondary  Evidence. 

772.  Object  of  requiring  Notice. 

773.  Exception  where  the  Pleadings  give  Notice. 

774.  Dispensed  with  when  Paper  iu  Court. 

775.  Notice  to  Produce  a  Notice  not  Necessary. 

776.  Not  to  Produce  a  Notice  to  au  Indorser. 

777.  Exception  in  the  Case  of  Recorded  Deeds. 

778.  Exception  where  the  Opposite  Party  has  Obtained  the  Paper  Surrepti- 

tiously. 

779.  Whether  Notice  in  Writing  or  by  Parol. 

780.  Description  of  the  Papers  in  the  Notice. 

781.  Notice  to  Agent  or  Attorney. 

782.  Length  of  Time  of  Notice. 

783.  Instances  where  Length  of  Time  was  held  Suflicient. 
784r.  Instances  where  Length  of  Time  was  held  Insutticient. 

785.  Notice  applies  to  any  Subsequent  Trial. 

786.  Evidence  of  the  Possession  of  the  Documents. 

787.  Evidence  to  Excuse  their  Production. 

788.  Where  the  Document  is  held  by  a  Tliird  Party. 

1  Clyde  V.  Rogers,  87  N.  Y.  625;  s.c.  -  Tliompson  v.  Erie  Ry.  Co.,  9  Abb. 

in  court  below,  2-1  Hun  (N.  Y.),  145.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  (N.  Y.)  212. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    607 

Section 

789.  Party  failiug  to  Produce  cannot  meet  Secondary  Proof  Avith  like  Proof. 

790.  [Continued.]     A  Contrary  View. 

791.  After  Paper  Produced,  Secondary  Evidence  not  Admissible. 

792.  What  Secondary  Evidence  may  be  given. 

793.  Answer  to  Notice  not  Evidence. 

79-1.  Presumption  of  Contents  in  Case  of  Failure  to  Produce. 
795.  Evidence  of  Attempts  to  Destroy  or  Fabricate  Evidence. 
79G.  Secondary  Evidence  as  to  Incidental  and  Collateral  Papers. 

§  770.  Necessity  of  the  Notice.  — Where  a  written  instrument 
is  in  the  posses.sion  of  the  opposite  party  and  is  material  to  the 
issues,  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents  is  not  in  general  ad- 
missible, unless  a  seasonable  notice  to  produce  it  upon  the  trial, 
has  been  served  upon  such  party  or  his  counsel,  and  not  complied 
with.^  And  it  is  error  to  allow  a  copy  to  be  given  in  evidence, 
without  proof  of  a  previous  notice  to  produce  the  original.^ 
Except  as  hereafter  stated,  preliminary  notice  to  produce  the 
instrument,  before  resorting  to  inferior  evidence  of  its  contents, 
is  indispensable.  "  Inconvenience  or  absence  from  the  State  is 
not  an  excuse  for  omitting  this  notice;  the  exception  would  be 
where  the  party  himself  could  not  be  found  after  diligent  inquiry. 
Then  the  law  would  treat  the  instrument  as  lost.  Other  excep- 
tions are,  where  the  action  is  brought  for  the  instrument  itself, 
when  proof  of  notice  is  not  necessary.  The  action  for  the  in- 
strument is  a  demand  for  the  production  of  it."^  Roundly 
stated,  the  rule  is  that,  in  order  to  lay  a  foundation  for  secondary 
evidence,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  oricinal  writingr  is  lost  or  tie- 
stroked  by  time,  mistake  or  accident,  or  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
adverse  party,  who  has  had  due  notice  to  produce  it  on  the  trial. ^ 
The  rule  is  the  same  in  criminal  as  well  as  in  civil  cases. ^     A 


1  Grimes  v.  Fall,  15  Cal.  (33;  Farm-  -  Richards  v.  Richards,  37  Pa.  St. 

ers'  &c.  Bank  v.  Lonergan,  21  Mo.  -t<J;  228. 

Williams  v.  Benton,  12  La.  Ann.  91;  ^  Carland  v.   Cunningham,    37  Pa. 

Anderson  Bridge  Co.  v.  Applegate,  13  St.  228,  232,  opinion  by  Thompson,  J. 

Ind.   399;    Potier  v.  Barclay,  15  Ala.  •*  Anderson  Bridge  Co.  i?.  Applegate, 

439;  United   States  v.   Winchester,  2  13  Ind.  339. 

McLean  (U.  S.),  135;  Fuller  v.  Hoyt,  »  United   States   v.   Winchester,    2 

14  Tex.  49;  Murchison  v.  McLeod,  2  McLean  (U.  S.),  135. 
Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  239. 


608  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

demand  before  suit  brought  for  the  delivery  of  the  instrument, 
does  not  take  the  phiee  of  a  notice  to  produce  it  for  evidential 
purposes  upon  the  trial. ^ 

§  771.  Notice  not  Complied  with  lets  in  Secondary  Evi- 
dence.—  Conversely,  if  a  seasonable  notice  to  produce  has  been 
given  and  disregarded,  parol  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the 
paper  will  be  heard,  or  a  copy  of  it  will  be  admitted  in  evidence, 
on  proof  that  it  is  a  copy.'^  Where  one  party  gives  to  the  other 
notice  to  produce  certain  instruments  of  writing  known  to  be  in 
his  possession,  and  the  party  so  notified  fails  to  produce  them,  it 
is  competent  to  inquire,  upon  cross-examination  of  a  witness  for 
such  party,  what  are  the  contents  of  such  instruments.^ 

§  772.  Object  of  requiring-  Notice  to  Produce.  — The  object 
of  requiring  notice  to  produce  to  be  given,  is  to  prevent  the 
party  to  whom  the  notice  is  directed  from  being  taken  by  siirjjrise.^ 

§  773.  Exception  where  the  Pleadings  give  Notice. — Ac- 
cording to  numerous  holdings,  notice  to  produce  an  original  paper 
is  not  required,  where  the  form  of  the  action,  or  the  pleadings  are 
such  as  to  give  notice  that  its  production  will  be  necessary  at  the 
trial,  to  contradict  the  evidence  of  the  other  party .^  Thus,  where 
the  action  is  brought  for  fhe  2)Ofisession  of  the  jiaper  itself,  ^•.9'-!i 

1  Fuller  V.    Hoyt,   U   Tex.    49.     It  2  McKellip   v.  Mcllheuuy,  4  Watts 

has  been  held  that  a  party  may  testify  (Pa.),  317;  Augur   Steel    &c.    Co.    v. 

orally  as  to  the  amount  clue  him,  from  Whittier,    117    Mass.   451;    Comraou- 

a  writteu  account  of  a  sale  sliown  him,  wealth  v.  Goldstein,  114  Mass.  272. 

made  by  the  defendant  as  his  factor,  ^  Pangboru  v.  Continental   Ins.  Co. 

without  giving  the  plaintiff  notice  to  (Michigan),  29  N.  W.  Rep.  475. 

produce  it,  —  the  theory  of  the  court  •*  Field    v.    Zamansky,     9     Bradw. 

Ijeiug  that,  as  the  account  of  the  sale  (111.)  47;    Milliken  v.  Barr,  7  Pa.  St. 

was  made  by  a  third  party  person,  to  23. 

wit.au  auctioneer,  it  was  not  such  an  ^  Nealley  v.   Greenough,  25  N.  H. 

instrument  as  must  be   produced   in  325;   llammon  v.    Hopping,  13  Wend, 

evidence.     First  National  Bank  w.  De-  (N.  Y.)    503;  How  v.  Hall,    14   East, 

catur,  50  111.  321.     Compare  Weaver  v.  274;    Scott   v.   Jones,  4     Taunt.    865; 

Crocker,  49  111.  401,  where  a  somewhat  Whitehead   v.    Scott,  1    Mood.  &K.  2; 

similar  ruling  was   made.      But    the  Buciier  v.  Jarratt.  3   Bos.  &  Pul.  143; 

soundness   of  these   holdings    seems  Jolley  v.  Taylor,  1   Camp.  143;  People 

doubtful.  V.    Holbrook,   13   Joims.   (N.    Y.)    90; 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    609 

an  action  of  trover,  a  notice  to  produce  it  is  not  necessary.^  So, 
in  assumpsit  against  a  carrier  for  the  non-delivery  of  written  in- 
struments, it  is  not  necessary  to  prove  a  notice  to  the  defendant 
to  produce  them,  before  giving  parol  evidence  of  their  contents. ^ 
So,  the  defendants  to  an  action  are  entitled,  on  the  trial,  without 
notice,  to  the  production  of  all  papers  which  formed  any  part  of 
the  contract  sued  on.'^  So,  in  an  action  for  damages  iov  forging  a 
note,  evidence  that  the  note  was  in  the  hands  of  the  defendant, 
and  that  it  was  forged,  is  admissible,  without  producing  the  note, 
or  giving  the  defendant  notice  in  the  declaration  to  produce  it.^ 
So,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  the  larceny  of  hank-notes 
or  other  written  instruments,  where  the  stolen  property  is 
alleged  to  be  in  the  possession  of  the  accused,  parol  evidence 
may  be  given  of  their  contents,  without  notice  to  the  accused  to 
produce  them;  ^  though  there  is  opinion  to  the  contrary.^  But 
in  the  last  view,  where  notice  has  been  given  and  refused,  copies 
may  be  given  in  evidence.  It  is  no  argument  to  say  that,  be- 
cause the  defendant  was  under  bond  to  produce  the  originals, 
and  thus  give  evidence  against  himself,  their  contents  cannot  be 
l^roved  by  copies.^ 


Hardin  v.  Kritsineer,  17  Johns. (N.  Y.) 
•iWd;  Bissell  v.  Drake,  19  Jolnis.  (N. 
Y.)  G6;  McCleau  v.  Hertzog  (J  Serg. 
&  E.  (Pa.)  154;  Cora.  v.  Messiuger,  1 
Biuu.  (Pa.)  273;  Lawson  v.  Bachmau, 
81  N.  Y.  616:  Howell  v.  Huyck,  2  Abb. 
App.  Dee.  (N.  Y.)  423;  Hooker  v. 
Eagle  Bank,  30  N.  Y.  83,  86.  This 
rule  has  been  denied  in  Alabama, 
where  it  has  been  held  that  secondary 
evidence  of  tlie  written  demand  and 
notice,  given  by  a  landlord  to  his 
tenant,  which  is  made  necessary  by  a 
statute  to  enaljle  the  landlord  to 
maintain  against  the  tenant  an  action 
of  unlawful  detainer,  cannot  l)e  shown 
by  secondary  evidence  in  such  an  ac- 
tion, without  a  notice  to  produce  the 
original.  Dumas  v.  Hunter,  30  Ala. 
75. 

1  McCleau  v.  Hertzog,  6  Serg.  &  K. 


(Pa.)  154;  People  v.  Holbrook,  13 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  90.  See  also  Ross  v. 
Bruce,  1  Day  (Conn.),  100;  Scott  v. 
Stark,  4  Taunt.  865;  Rose  v.  Lewis,  10 
Mich.  483. 

2  JoUey  V.  Taylor,  1  Camp.  143, 
per  Lord  Mansfield,  C.  J. 

■^  Dewitt  V.  Prescott,  51  Mich.  298, 
301. 

^  Bruce  v.  Ross,  1  Day  (Conn.), 
100. 

5  McGinuis  v.  State,  24  Ind.  500 
(overruling  Williams  v.  State,  16  Ind. 
461);  Com.  v.  Messinger,  IBinn.  (Pa.) 
273;  State  v.  Gurnee,  14  Kan.  Ill, 
120. 

"  Rex  V.  Ilaworth,  4  Car.  &  P. 
254. 

'  Le  Merchand's  Case,  cited  in 
Leach's  Cr.  Cas.  336,  n.  See  other 
cases  cited  in  tlie  same  note. 


39 


610  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoni[).   Tl',, 

§  774.  Dispensed  with  when  Papers  in  Court.  —  Accord- 
ing to  one  view,  where  the  papers  asked  for  are  in  court,  in  the 
hands  of  the  attorney  of  the  opposite  party,  there  is  no  neces- 
sity for  a  previous  notice.  In  such  a  case,  it  was  said:  "No 
surprise  or  hardship  could  result  from  his  being  required  to  pro- 
duce them  on  demand."  ^  But,  according  to  another  view, 
notice  to  produce  is  necessary,  even  though  the  paper  is  in  court 
at  the  trial.  This  is  not  required  in  order  that,  upon  proof  of 
such  notice,  the  party  having  the  custody  of  the  paper  may  be 
compelled  to  furnish  evidence  against  himself;  but  it  is  required 
to  lay  the  foundation  for  the  introduction  of  secondary  evidence 
of  the  contents  of  the  paper.  "  This  rule,"  it  has  been  observed, 
"is  of  immense  importance  to  prevent  surprise  indeed,  it  has 
been  held  that  proof  that  the  adverse  party  or  his  attorney,  has 
the  instrument  in  court,  does  not  make  notice  to  produce  it  un- 
necessary, for  the  object  of  the  notice  is  not  only  to  produce  the 
paper,  but  to  give  the  party  an  opportunity  to  provide  proper 
testimony  to  support  or  impeach  it."  -  But  upon  a  motion  or 
rule,  reciting  matters  appearing  in  the ^les  of  the  court,  they  may 
be  produced  without  further  formality.^ 

§   775.     Notice    to     produce     a    Notice     not    Necessary. — ; 

"Every  written  notice,"  said  Gibson,  C,  J.,  "is,  for  the  best 
of  all  reasons,  to  be  proved  by  a  duplicate  original ;  for  if  it  were 
otherwise,  the  notice  to  produce  the  original  could  be  proved 
only  in  the  same  way  as  the  original  notice  itself,  and  thus  a 
fresh  necessity  would  be  constantly  arising,  ad  infinitum^  to 
prove  notice  of  the  preceding  notice."  ^ 

§  776.  Not  to  produce  a  Notice  to  an  Indorser. — Perhaps 
not  for  this  reason,  a  written  notice  to  an  indorser  of  a  promis- 
sory note  may  be  proved  by  parol,  without  giving  notice  to  par- 
ties to  produce  the  writing ;  ^  but  more  probably  for  the  reason 

1  Field     V.     Zaraausby,     n      Bradw.  ''  Eisenhart  v.  Slayinaker,  14  Sers;. 
(111.)  479.                                                            &   R.  (Pa.)  153;  reaffirmed  in  Morrow 

2  Millikeu    v.     Barr,   7   Pa.    St.    23,       y.  Com.,  48  Pa.  St.  305. 

opinion  l)y  Burnside,  ,J.  '"  Eaiile    Bank  v.    Cliapiu,    3  Pick. 

3  Souderv.  Lippiucott,48N..T.L.  437.       (Mass.)   180;   Central  Bank  r.    Allen, 


Tit.   Ill,   Cll.   XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPF.RS.      611 

that  such  a  notice  consists  of  a  few  simple  facts,  the  nature  of 
which  is  well  known. 

§  777.  Exceptions  in  the  Case  of  Recorded  Deeds.  —  An  ex- 
ception to  the  foregoing  rule  is  admitted  in  the  case  of  recorded 
deeds.  Here  a  certified  copy  from  the  record  may  be  used,  on 
the  proper  preliminary  proof  being  made,  without  notice  to  the 
opposite  party  to  produce  it.^  There  are  holdings  to  the  effect 
that,  if  the  deed  has  been  recorded,  a  transcript  from  the  record 
may  be  introduced,  provided  the  party  make  oath  that  the  original 
is  not  in  his  custody,  and  is  beyond  his  control. ^ 

§  77S.  Exception  where  the  Opposite  Party  has  Obtained  the 
Paper  Surreptitiously.  —  The  affidavit  of  a  party  to  a  cause, 
that  an  original  paper,  of  which  he  has  had  the  custody,  has  dis- 
appeared without  his  consent,  and  has  been  seen  in  possession  of 
the  counsel  of  the  opposite  party,  has  been  held  sufficient  proof 
to  let  in  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents. '^ 

§  779.  Whether  Notice  in  Writing  or  by  Parol.  —  It  has  been 
said  tliat  the  general  rule  of  practice,  regarding  a  written  notice 
to  produce  papers,  has  reference  only  to  the  i^reliminar}^  prepa- 
rations for  the  trial,  and  that  the  reason  of  the  rule  does  not  ap- 
ply to  a  notice  given  in  the  presence  and  hearing  of  the  court, 
while  the  trial  is  in  progress.  It  was  therefore  held  that  a  verbal 
notice,  given  at  a  previous  meeting  before  a  referee,  was  good.* 

§  780.   Description  of  the  Papers  in  the  Notice.  — As  in  the 

case  of  a  subpoena  duces  tecum, ^  reasonable  or  practical  certaintv 
in  the  description  of  the  pa})ers,  the  production  of  which  is  re- 
quired, is  generally  insisted  upon;   since  it  would  be  unjust  to  let 

16   Me.  41;    Roberts  v.   Bradshaw,    1  358;    Mariner  v.   Saunders,    5    Gilra. 

Stark.  28;  Kine  u.  Beaumout,  7  J.  B.  (III.)  113;  Bowman   v.  Wettig,  39  111. 

Moore,  112.  410,  422.     In    Missouri    without    the 

1  Bowman  v.  Wettig,  39  111.  410.  oath:  Barton  r.  Murrain,  27  Mo.  235; 
The  proof  which  was  held  sutlicient  in  Avery  v.  Adams,  69  Mo.  003. 

this   case    was,    that    the    party   had  ^  ]\iorgan  v.  Jones,  24  Ga.  155. 

searched  for  the  deed  unsuccessfully,  *  Kerr  v.  McGuire,  28  ^.  Y.  446, 

and  could  not  produce  it.  ^  Ante,  §  175. 

2  Ferguson  v.  Miles,  3  Gilm.    (111.) 


612  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmj).  Tl'., 

in  secondary  evi^ience  of  a  paper,  upon  a  notice  to  produce  which 
failed  to  specify  the  character  of  the  paper  intended.  It  has 
been  held  that  a  notice  to  produce  "  all  letters,  papers  and  doc- 
uments, touching  or  concerning  the  bill  of  exchange  mentioned 
in  the  declaration  in  this  cause,  and  the  debt  sought  to  be  recov- 
ered," —  is  too  general.^  In  general,  where  the  notice  is  such 
that  the  party  to  whom  it  is  delivered  could  not  mistake  the  pa- 
per intended,  it  will  be  held  sufficient.'^  It  will  be  good,  although 
informal  and  «ua6*cw?"rt^e  in  certain  particulars,  —  as,  for  instance, 
as  to  the  date  of  the  paper,  — if  it  fairly  apprize  the  party  what 
paper  is  to  be  produced.^  Accordingly,  a  notice  describing  a 
letter  as  inclosed  in  an  envelope,  has  been  held  sufficient  to  call 
for  both  the  envelope  and  the  inclosure.*  In  an  action  against  a 
person  seeking  to  charge  him  as  a  partner,  a  notice  to  produce 
"all  papers  pertaining  to  the  partnership"  calls  for  any  (ieec^ 
which  the  defendant  may  have  making  him  a  partner.^ 

§  781.  Notice  to  Agent  or  Attorney.  —  Notice  need  not,  in 
general,  be  given  to  the  party  himself  ;  notice  to  his  agent  or  at- 
torney is  sufficient,®  even  in  penal  actions.^ 

§  782.  Length  of  Time  of  Notice.  —  "  The  length  of  time," 
says  Clopton,  J.,  "  for  which  notice  should  be  given,  depends 
on  the  attendant  circumstances,  and  the  time  required  to  ob- 
tain the  paper.  The  notice  should  be  for  a  reasonable  time  — 
sufficiently  long  to  enable  the  party  to  procure  and  produce  it 
without  undue  inconvenience.  If  the  paper  is  not  in  court,  and 
cannot  be  produced  without  delaying  the  trial,  notice  should  be 
o;iven  prior  to  the  trial ;  but  when  the  paper  is  in  court,  and  in 
the  power  of  the  party  to  i)roduce  immediately,  notice  at  the  trial 
is  sufficient."  ^ 

1  Frauce  v.  Lucy,  Ry.  &  M.  341.  '  Gates  v.  Winter,  3  T.  R  30G. 

2  Graham/?.  01dis,lFost.&  Fin.  2G2.  »  Littletons.  Clayton,  77  Ala.  571, 

3  Franliu.  Manny,  2Daly  (N.  Y.),92.  574,   575.     "Due  notice,"  under   tlie 
*  United  States  v.  Duff,  6  Fed.  Rep.  North  Carolina  statute,  means  sufficient 

45.  time  to  enal)le  the  party  to  have  the 

•^  Jones  r.  Parker,  20  N.  II.,  31.  document  present  when    called    for. 

«  Attorney-Gen.  r.  Le   Merchant,  2  McDuuakU'.  Carson,  95  N.  C.  378. 

T.  R.  203  n.;  ante,  §  l'.»0. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.      613 

§  783.  Instances  wheke  Length  of  Time  was  held  Sufficient.  — 
It  is  said  by  Russell :  "  In  ^owu  cases,  service  of  notice  on  the  attor- 
ney, on  the  evening  before  the  trial,  is  in  general  sufficient."  i  When, 
therefore,  notice  to  produce  a  letter  was  served  upon  the  defendant's 
attorney  on  the  afternoon  of  the  day  before  the  trial,  at  twenty  minutes 
before  five  o'clock,  and  he  had  his  office  in  the  same  town  and  near  the 

place  of  trial,  it  was  held  that  the  length  of  time  was  sufficient.- 

A  notice  given  on  the  2)receding  evening  was  held  sufficient,  where  the 

counting  house  of  the  party  was  very  near  the  court  house. ^ Where 

both  parties  lived  in  London,  a  notice  served  on  defendant's  attorney 
at  seven  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  day  before  the  trial,  was  held  not 

too  late.  ^ Wliere  one  of  the  parties  lived  in  the  assize  town,  and 

the  plaintiff's  attorney  served  the  defendant's  attorney  in  the  assize 
town,  on  the  commission  day,  with  notice  to  produce  a  paper,  and  paid 
the  expense  of  going  to  fetch  it,  and  the  defendant's  attorney  said  that 
that  was  of  no  use,  as  the  paper  was  not  in  existence,  —  it  was  held  that 
the  plaintiff  might  give  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents,  as  the  state- 
ments of  the  defendant's  attorney  that  it  was  not  in  existence  obviated 
any  objection  to  the  lateness  of  the  service    of  the  notice  to  produce. 

§  784.  Instances  where  Length  of  Time  was  held  Insufficient.  — 
Unless  under  special  circumstances,  a  notice  to  parties  is  insufficient 
which  barely  allows  time  to  procure  them  by  telegraphic  communication 
with  clients.^ Notice  given  to  a  party  dnriug  the  trial  is  not  suffi- 
cient, unless  it  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court,  that  the  paper  is 
in  court  at  the  time  and  in  possession  of  the  party,  or,  if  elsewhere,  that 

it  would  be  of  easy  access.'' Where  the  trial  was  at  the  Middlesex 

sittings  (in  London),  and  the  plaintiff  resided  in  London,  notice  served 
upon  him  at  half  past  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  before  the  trial,  was 
too  late.*^ So,  where  the  notice  was  served  on  the  plaintiff  's  attor- 
ney at  a  quarter  before  nine  on  the  night  before  the  trial,  it  was  held  that 
it  was  too  late.^ A  notice  to  produce  deeds  was  served  on  the  de- 
fendant's attorney  in  Essex  on  Saturday,  the  commission  day  of  the 
assizes  being  Monday.  The  attorney  went  to  London  and  fetched 
them.     A  notice  was  served  on  the  commission  day  evening,  to  pro- 

1  2  Russ.  ou  Crimes,  743.  s  Foster  v.  Pointer,  9  Car.  &  P.  718. 

2  Uuited  States  v.  Duff,  6  Fed.  Rep.  «  Dewitt  v.  Prescott,  51  Mich.  298. 
45.  '  Atwell  V.  Miller,  6  Md.  11. 

3  Shreve  v.  Dulauey,  1  Crancli  C.  C.  «  Lawrence  v.  Clark,  U  Mees.  &  W. 
(U.  S.)  499.  249. 

*  Leaf  V.  Butt,  1  Car.  &  M.  451.  »  Holt  v.  Meirs,  9  Car.  &  P.  ]91. 


614  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [I  Tliomp.  Tr., 

duce  another  deed.  The  attorney  stated  that  he  had  been  to  town  and 
fetched  the  deeds,  and  that,  if  the  plaintiff  would  pay  the  expense  of 
sending  for  this  from  town,  where  it  was,  it  should  be  had.  The  plaint- 
iff did  not  offer  to  pay  such  expense,  and  the  trial  was  had  on  Thurs- 
day. It  was  held  by  Lord  Tenterden,  C.  J.,  that,  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  give  secondaiy  evidence  of  the 

last  mentioned  deed.^ Where  the  notice  was  given  the  day  previous 

to  the  trial,  to  produce  a  paper  which  was  eiglity  miles  distant,  in  the 
trial  of  another  person,  the  reviewing  court  refused  to  take  judicial 
notice  of  facts  which  would  imply  that  the  paper  could  not  be  obtained, 
so  as  to  exclude  secondary  evidence,-  —  in  other  words  would  not, 
upon  these  facts,  say  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  admitting  such  evi- 
dence. A  notice  given  several  days  before  the  term  at  which  the  cause 
was  tried,  was  deemed  j^^i ma  facie  sufficient,  although  the  party  refus- 
ing the  notice  resided  without  the  State,  —  the  court  reasoning  that,  if 
he  was  willing  to  produce  it,  but  unable  to  do  so,  because  of  the  short- 
ness of  the  notice,  he  should  have  applied  for  a  continuance.^ 

§  785.  Notice  applies  to  any  Subsequent  Trial.  —  Where  a 
paper  is  produced  at  one  trial,  it  should  remain  on  hie,  unless 
leave  is  granted  to  withdraw  it  for  special  reasons,  so  that  it  may 
be  used  at  another  trial  in  case  a  new  trial  is  awarded.  "  If  a 
party  is  notilied  that  a  paper  is  wanted  at  one  trial,  it  is,  or 
should  be  known  by  such  party  that,  if  there  be  a  new  trial,  the 
paper  will  be  wanted  again."*  On  this  principle,  as  already 
seen,^  an  admission  made  at  the  first  trial  of  a  cause,  if  reduced 
to  writing,  or  incorporated  into  the  record,  will  be  binding  upon 
the  party  making  it,  at  another  trial,  unless  the  trial  judge,  in 
the  exercise  of  his  discretion,  thinks  proper  to  relieve  him  from 
it;  ^  and  the  power  of  the  trial  judge  to  grant  this  relief  may  be 
doubted.  Upon  the  same  analogy,  where  notice  is  given  to  pro- 
duce a  paper  at  a  trial,  that  is  a  sufficient  notice  to  produce  the 
same  paper  at  any  subsequent  trial  of  the  same  cause. ^  If  given 
before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  it  is  available  on  a  trial  in  a  higher 
court,  to  which  the  cause  has  been  appealed.^ 

1  Curtis  V.  Spitty,  3  Burn.  &  Aid.  182.  s  Ante,  §  193. 

2  Cody  V.  Hough,  20  111.  43.  «  Holley  v.  Young,  (!8  Me.  215. 

3  Jefford  V.  Kiuggold,  <i  Ala.  544.  ''  liawson  v.  Kuight,  73  Me.  840. 

■»  Riiwsou  V.  Kuight,  73  Me.  3i3.  »  Readt'.  Moore,  19  Johns. (N.Y.)337. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXYL]  PRODUCTION  of  books  and  papers.    615 

§  786.  Evidence  of  the  Possession  of  the  Documents.  — The 

party  giving  the  notice  is  bound  to  prove  the  books  or  documents 
to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  opposite  party,  or  under  his  power  or 
control,  before  secondary  evidence  of  their  contents  will  be  re- 
ceived. He  must  prove  this  by  comj^etent  evidence.  He  cannot 
.  prove  it  by  the  admissions  of  otJier  persons^  whose  admissions  are 
not  binding  upon  the  party. ^  But  cogent  evidence  is  not  re- 
quired. Where,  after  notice  to  produce,  bare  evidence  is  given 
that  the  document  is  in  the  i)ossession  of  the  ixartv  receivino-  the 
notice,  if  it  is  not  produced,  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents 
will  be  heard. '^  It  is  sufficient  evidence  to  let  in  secondary  proof 
of  the  contents  of  a  Avritten  instrument,  that  it  was  last  seen  in 
the  possession  of  the  party  invited  to  produce  it.^  Evidence 
that  the  document  is  in  the  hands  of  the  arjenl  of  the  party  notified 
to  produce  it,  —  e.r/.,  where  the  defendant  is  a  ship-owner,  and 
the  document  is  in  the  hands  of  the  captain,  —  is  sufficient  to  let 
in  secondary  evidence  of  its  content,  if  it  is  not  produced.* 

§  787.  Evidence  to  Excuse  their  Production. —  The  party 
notified  to  produce  the  document,  may  produce  evidence  show- 
ing that  it  is  lawfully  out  of  his  j^osse^sion,  whereupon  the  judge 
will  decide  whether  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents  can  be 
admitted,  —  the  question  being  exclusively  within  his  cogni- 
zance.^ 

.  §  788.  [Continued.]  Where  the  Document  is  lield  by  a 
third  party. —  "  In  order  to  let  in  secondary  evidence,  the  instru- 
ment need  not  be  in  the  actual  possession  of  the  party;  it  is 
enough  if  it  be  in  his  power,  which  it  would  be  if  in  the  hands 
of  a  party  in  whom  it  Avould  be  wrongful  not  to  give  up  pos- 
session to  him.  But  he. must  have  such  a  right  to  it  as  would  en- 
title him,  not  merely  to  inspect,  but  to  retain."^  It  was 
accordingly  held  that,  where  a  document  was  in  the  hands  of  one 

1  Birkbeck  ?7.  Tucker,  2  Hall  (N.Y.),  ^  Baldney  v.  Eltchie,  1   Stark.  333. 
121.                                                                       5  Harvey  v.  Michell,  2   Mood.  &  R, 

2  Robb   V.    Starkey,    2    Car.    &   K.      366;  «?iie,  §  318  e«  sery. 

JiS.  6  Parry  v.  May,  1  Mood.  &   K.  279, 

3  Norton  v.  Ileyward.  20  Me.  359.  280,  opiuiou  by  Littledale,  ,J. 


616  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tu., 

who  occupied  the  position  of  a  stake-holder  between  the  party 
invited  to  produce  it  and  a  third  person,  secondary  evidence  of 
its  contents  would  not  be  admitted.^  But  where  the  writing  is 
in  the  possession  of  a  third  person,  who  resides  out  of  the  jurh- 
diction  of  the  court,  and  does  not  appear  to  be  in  the  possession 
of  the  opposite  party,  secondary  evidence  of  it  will  be  let  in 
without  a  notice  to  produce  it.'^ 

§  789.  Party  Failing  to  Produce,  cannot  meet  Secondary 
Proof  with  Like  Proof. —  The  party  who  refuses  to  produce 
documentary  evidence,  when  required  by  an  order  of  the  court, 
cannot,  because  of  his  contumacy,  be  allowed  to  meet  secondary 
proof  of  their  contents  with  like  proof  ;  he  can  only  rebut  such 
secondary  proof  by  producing  the  instruments  themselves.-^ 

§  790.  [Continued.]  A  Contrary  View.  —  The  contrar}- has  been 
held  in  Michigan,  and  in  a  case  where  there  was  merely  a  notice  to 
produce  but  no  order  of  court.  Notice  to  produce  a  paper  having 
been  given  and  not  complied  with,  an  alleged  copy  was  offered  in  evi- 
dence, and  received  against  objection.  Thereafter,  the  objecting  party 
offered  to  prove  that  this  copy  was  not  a  copy  of  any  paper  which  he 
had  ever  assisted  in  making,  or  which  had  been  in  his  possession.  This 
evidence  vras  ruled  out,  and  it  was  hekl  error.  The  court  did  not  per- 
ceive any  sound  reason  why  the  document  itself  should  be  excluded,  if 
he  had  it,  and  said:  "  There  is  no  authority  for  such  exclusion,  where 
it  relates  to  his  own  case,  even  where  not  produced  when  called  for  by 
his  adversary."  The  court  also  denied  this  doctrine  of  estoppel,  as  one 
not  calculated  to  promote  justice,  and  observed  further:  "  If  such  rule 
could  ever  have  been  proper,  there  can  be  no  reason  for  it  now,  when 
parties  are  competent  witnesses,  and  can  be  compelled,  by  suhpcena 
duces  tecu7n,  to  bring  into  court  any  paper  in  their  hands,  which  their 
adversaries  have  a  right  to  inspect  and  prove."  "*  But  it  would  never- 
theless seem  that  where  a  party  refuses,  after  proper  notice,  to  produce 
a  paper,  it  would  be  a  mere  trifling  with  justice  to  allow  him  to  introduce 
it,  after  thus  driving  his  adversary  to  experiment  with  secondary  proof. 

1  Parry  v.  May,  I  Mood.  &  K.  279,  18;  Piatt  v.  Piatt,  58  N.  Y.  646,  649, 
opinion  by  Littledale,  .1.  Doon  v.  Doualier,  113  Mass.  151. 

2  Shepard  v.  Giddiugs,  22  Couu.  •*  Molton  v.  Masou,  21  Mich.  364, 
282.  -^"O)  opinion  by  Campbell,  J. 

3  Bogart  V.  Brown,  5  IMcli.  (Mass.) 


Tit.   Ill,  ('h.   XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPEliS.      ()17 

§  791.  After  Papp:r  produced,  Secondary  Evidence  not  Admissi- 
ble. —  After  a  paper  is  produced  in  compliance  witli  the  notice,  if  the 
producing  party  offers  to  verify  it  by  his  oath,  the  other  party  cannot 
refuse  to  use  it,  and  cannot  be  allowed  to  introduce  a  copy  in  the  first 
instance,  on  the  allegation  that  the  paper  produced  is  not  genuine ; 
although  he  may  show  wherein  it  is  erroneous  or  defective  after  he 
once  introduces  it.  "  It  seems  to  us,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Miller,  "that 
the  court  was  right  in  refusing  to  admit  in  the  first  instance  what  was 
conceded  to  be  a  cop3%  when  that  which  was  at  least  prima  facie  the 
original  was  in  court,  to  answer  the  notice  of  the  party  desiring  to  use 
the  copy.  How  far  the  plaintiff  could  have  been  permitted  to  show  a 
variance  of  the  defendant's  paper  from  the  genuine,  after  it  was  once 
introduced,  we  need  not  inquire.  But  a  copy  could  not  be  introduced 
until  what  seemed  to  be  the  original  had  been  before  the  court  and  be- 
come the  subject  of  inspection  by  the  jury."  i  The  propriety  of  this 
holding  is  very  doubtful.  Upon  what  principle  does  the  mere  produc- 
tion of  a  paper,  in  response  to  a  notice,  authenticate  it  as  the  paper 
called  for  in  the  notice  ?  Why  should  the  fact  that  his  adversary  is 
willing  to  verify  the  paper  with  his  oath,  make  it  incumbent  on  him  to 
accept  that  oath  and  make  the  paper  his  evidence,  or  be  estopped  from 
proving  the  fact?  Why  should  a  party  be  required  to  put  in  evidence 
a  paper  the  authenticity  of  which  he  denies,  merely  because  the  other 
party  has  seen  fit  to  produce  it  in  response  to  a  notice,  it  may  be  to 
produce  something  else?  If  be  should  put  it  in,  as  above  suggested, 
upon  what  principle  could  he  thereafter  deny  its  authenticity?  The 
true  rule  is  that  evidence  of  the  contents  of  a  writing  which  is  merely  suh- 
stitutionary,  cannot  be  given  where  the  writing  is  in  court  or  capable  of 
being  produced ;  but  the  rule  can  have  no  just  application  where  the 
identity  of  the  writing  which  is  in  court,  with  the  writing  whose  contents 
it  is  sought  to  prove,  is  unsettled  or  in  dispute. 

§  792.  What  Secondary  Evidence  may  be  Given.  — The  re- 
fusal of  the  party  to  produce  the  paper  upon  notice,  does  not 
dispense  with  the  best  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the  paper, 
which  is  attainable  in  the  absence  of  the  paper  itself,  nor  does  it 
allow  its  substance  to  be  made  out  by  anything  less  than  satisfac- 
tory evidence  of  all  that  is  essential. ^ 

1  Stitt    V.   Huidekopers,    17    Wall.  2  Moltou  v.  Mason,  21  Mich.  364. 

(U.  S.)  385,  397. 


618  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  793.  Answer  to  T^otice  not  Evidence.  —  Before  the  passage 
of  modern  statutes  a  court  of  law  did  not  have  power  to  compel 
the  party  to  produce  the  paper.  It  was,  therefore,  not  incum- 
bent on  him  to  produce  it,  or  to  give  any  reason  why  he  would 
not.  It  was  held  to  follow  from  this,  that  any  answer  which 
he  might  make  to  such  a  notice  was  irrelevant,  and  consequently 
inadmissible  as  evidence.^ 

§  794.  Presumption  of  Contents  in  Case  of  Failure  to  Pro- 
duce. — Where  the  party  contumaciously  fails  to  produce  a  doc- 
ument after  notice,  —  or,  having  the  power  to  decline  producing  it, 
elects  to  exercise  this  power,  —  everything  touching  the  contents 
of  the  document  and  its  execution  will  be  presumed  against  him, 
which  the  case  fairly  admits  of,  under  the  operation  of  the 
maxim  contra  spoliatorem  omnia  prcesumuntur ?  This  is  a  branch 
of  the  doctrine  of  presumptions  which  it  is  not  intended  to  go 
into  here  . 

§  795.  Evidence  of  Attempts  to  Destroy  or  Fabricate  Evi- 
dence. —  Evidence  of  attempts,  by  the  opposite  party  or  by  one 
authorized  by  him,  to  destroy,  fabricate,  or  suppress  evidence, 
may  be  shown,  —  such  acts  being  in  the  nature  of  an  admission 
that  the  party  has  no  sufficient  case  unless  aided  by  suppressing 
or  fabricatino;  evidence.^ 

§  796.  Secondary  Evidence  as  to  Incidental  and  Collateral 
Papers.  —  Where  a  paper  relates  to  an  incidental  and  collateral 
matter,  drawn  out  to  test  the  temper  and  credibility  of  the  wit- 
ness, and  in  no  wise  affects  the  merits  of  the  controversy  between 
the  parties,  the  witness  may,  without  error,  be  asked  to  state  its 
substance.^  Thus,  it  was  held  allowable  to  ask  a  witness  of  the 
opponent,  who  had  said  that  he  had  seen  and  copied  a  paper  in 
reference  to  the  expenses  of  the  suit,  subscribed  by  various  per- 

1  Reid  V.  Colcork,  1  Nott  &  Mc.  C.  (111.)  531;  Chicago  City  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
(S.  C.)  604.  Mahou,  103111.  485;  ante,  §  453. 

2  See  Bciijamiii  r.  KlUiiuer,  SO  Ky.  •<  Kleiu  v.  Russell,  19  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
472.  433,  403. 

■'  Lyons    ?■.     Lawrciici',    1:.'   Hrachv. 


Tit.   Ill,   Cll.   XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.      619 

sons,  what  were  the  contents  of  the  paper,  —  the  purpose  of  the 
question  being  to  show  that  the  witnesses  of  the  opponent  were 
in  a  combination  to  defeat  the  phiintiff  and  to  share  the  expenses 
of  the  opponent.  In  such  a  case,  it  is  not  necessar}^  to  lay  a 
foundation,  by  calling  on  the  opponent  to  jiroduce  the  paper. ^ 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  ruled  that  a  party  may  object, 
though  his  witness  does  not,  to  a  question  propounded  to  the  wit- 
ness on  cross-examination,  as  to  whether  the  latter  had  made  cer- 
tain statements  in  an  affidavit  not  produced, — the  reasoning 
being  that  the  affidavit  was  the  best  evidence. - 

/Subdivision  2.  —  /Secondary  Evidence  of  lost  Instruments. 

Section 

799.  Preliminary. 

800.  Secondary  Evidence  of  Lost  lustrumeuts. 

801.  Voluntary  Destruction. 

802.  Foundation  to  let  in  Secondary  Evidence. 

803.  Special  Count  not  Necessary. 

804.  Question  Decided  by  the  Judge. 

805.  Under  what  Rules  of  Evidence. 

806.  His  Decision  not  Reveviewable. 

807.  Person  last  known  to  have  been  in  Possession  must  be  Examined. 

808.  Certainty  of  Evidence  to  Prove  Contents. 

809.  Stringency  of  the  Rule,  when  Relaxed. 

810.  Lost  Depositions. 

§  799  Preliminary.  —  It  is  not  within  the  plan  of  this  work 
to  enter  into  a  full  investigation  of  the  subject  of  lost  documents, 
of  the  methods  of  supplying  them,  and  of  secondary  evidence  of 
their  contents;  but  a  slight  digression  will  be  made  for  the  pur- 
pose of  suggesting  some  outline  views  on  the  subject,  referring 
the  reader  for  fuller  treatment  to  the  standard  works  on  evi- 
dence. 

§  800.  Secondary  Evidence  of  Lost  Instruments.  — A  party 
who  intends  to  use  a  written  instrument  in  evidence  must  pro- 
duce the  original,  if  in  his  possession ;    but  if  it  is  in  the  possession 

i  Klein  v.  Russell,  supra.  2  Xewcomb   v.  Griswold,   24  X.  Y. 

298,  301  (Smith,  J.,  dissenting). 


620  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

of  the  other  party,  who  refuses  to  produce  it  after  notice,  or  if 
the  original  is  lost  or  destroyed,  —  secondary  evidence,  the  same 
beino-  the  best  which  the  nature  of  the  case  allows,  will  be  admit- 
ted. The  party  in  such  a  case  may  read  a  counterpart ;  or  if 
there  is  no  counterpart,  an  examined  copy ;  or  if  there  is  no  such 
copy,  he  may  give  parol  evidence  of  its  contents.  Where  a  writ- 
ing has  been  vohmtarily  destroyed,  for  fraudulent  purposes,  or  to 
create  an  excuse  for  its  non-production,  secondary  evidence  of 
its  contents,  by  the  party  so  destroying  it,  is  not  admissible. 
But  where  the  destruction  or  loss,  although  voluntary,  happens 
through  mistake  or  accident,  such  evidence  will  be  admitted.^ 

§  801.  Voluntary  Destruction.  —  From  the  preceding,  it 
follows  that,  where  the  proof  is  that  the  party  deliberately  and 
voluntarily  burned  the  instrument  sued  on,  and  there  is  nothing 
to  account  or  afford  any  explanation  of  the  act,  consistent  with 
an  honest  or  justifiable  purpose,  he  will  not  be  allowed  to  intro- 
duce secondary  evidence  of  its  contents.^ 

§   802.   Foundation    to    let    in     Secondary    Evidence.  —  A 

party  alleging  the  loss  of  a  material  paper  must,  in  order  to  lay 
a  foundation  for  introducing  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents, 
show  that  he  has,  in  good  faith  and  to  a  reasonable  degree,  ex- 
hausted all  the  sources  of  information  and  means  of  discovery 
which  the  nature  of  the  case  would  suggest,  which  are  accessi- 
ble to  him.  The  person  last  known  to  have  been  in  possession 
of  the  paper  must  be  examined  to  prove  the  loss ;  if  out  of  the 
State,  his  deposition  must  be  procured,  or  some  good  excuse 
must  be  given  for  not  procuring  it.^ 

1  Riggs  V.  Tayloe,  9  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  ■''  Kearney  v.  New  York,  92  N.  Y. 
483;  Jackson  v.  Frier,  16  Johns.  (N.  G17;  Simpson  v.  Dall,  3  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
Y.)  192.  That  secondary  evidence  of  4(J0,  475.  Wrongful  detention  in  an- 
the  contents  of  written  instruments  is  other  State  not  sufficient  to  let  in  evi- 
admissible,  wherever  it  appears  that  deuce  of  contents  of  a  negotiable 
the  original  is  destroyed  or  lost  by  ac-  paper,  under  the  New  York  Statute  re- 
cideut,  without  fault  of  the  party,  was  lating  to  lost  instruments :  Van  Al- 
also  ruled  in  Keuner  v.  Bank  of  Col-  styne  v.  Commercial  Bank,  4  Abb.  Apj). 
umbia,  9  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  581.  Dec.    (N.  Y.)    449.     Contra,  evidence 

2  Blade  v.  Nolaud,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  that  the  possessor  of  the  note  is  out 
173.  of  the  State  lets  in  secondary  evidence 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]    PRODUCTION    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.      621 

§  803.  Special  Count  not  Necessary.  —  Contraiy  to  the 
English  practice,  it  seems  to  be  the  practice  in  this  country,  that 
a  special  count  in  the  declaration  or  complaint  is  not  necessary, 
in  order  to  let  in  proof  that  the  instrument  sued  on  has  been  lost; 
since  this  would  shut  the  door  against  secondary  evidence  in  all 
cases  where  the  instrument  happens  to  become  lost  after  the 
declaration  is  tiled. ^ 

§  804.  Question  decided  by  the  Judge.  —  The  evidence  of 
the  loss  of  a  written  instrument,  adduced  to  lay  the  foundation  for 
introduction  of  secondary  evidence  of  its  execution  and  contents, 
is  addressed  solely  to  the  judge,  who  is  to  determine  it  exclusive- 
ly, without  the  intervention  of  the  jury.'- 

§  805.  Under  what  Rules  of  Evidence.  —  Evidence  ad- 
duced upon  this  question  is  not  governed  by  the  ordinary  rules 
of  evidence.  Thus  where,  under  the  old  law,  a  witness  was  in- 
competent by  reason  of  interest,  he  was  not  incompetent  to  speak 
upon  this  preliminary  question.  For  a  like  reason,  a  party  was 
not  incompetent. "^ 

§  806.  His  Decision  not  Reviewable.  — Whether  a  founda- 
tion has  been  laid,  sufficient  to  let  in  secondary  evidence  of  the 
contents  of  an  instrument  alleged  to  be  lost,  is  a  preliminary 
question  of  fact  for  the  decision  of  the  trial  judge,  the  deter- 
mination of  which  is  not  reviewable  on  error  or  appeal,  unless 
the  evidence  of  loss  was  so  clear  and  conclusive  that  it  was 
error  of  law  to  find  against  it.* 

§  807.  Person  last  known  to  have  been  in  Possession  must 
be  Examined. —  The  person  last  known  to  have  been  in  posses- 
sion of  the  paper  must  be  examined  as  a  witness  to  prove  its 
loss,  even  where  he  is  out  of  the  jurisdiction,  —  in  which  latter 

of  its  contents:  Bronsou  v.  Tuthill,  1  ^  Jackson r.  Frier,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 

Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  20G.  l'J2. 

1  Reuner  v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  9  ■•  Kearney  v.  New  York.  92  N.  Y. 
Wlieat.  (U.  S.)   581,  597.  017,  Gl'O;  a«ie,  §§  318,  324. 

2  .Tacksou     V.     Frier,     10     Johns. 
(N.  Y.)  192. 


622  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

case,  his  deposition  must  be  procured  if  i^racticable,  or  some 
good  excuse  given  for  not  procuring  it.^ 

§   808.   Certainty  of    Evidence    to   prove    Contents. — Parol 

evidence  to  prove  the  contents  of  a  lost  instrument  should  show 
that  it  was  duly  executed  as  required  by  law,  and  should  sub- 
stantially disclose  its  contents.  The  testimony  of  a  witness  who 
has  simply  heard  it  read,  and  who  can  give  but  a  small  portion 
of  its  contents,  is  insufficient.^  In  the  case  of  a  lost  note,  it  is 
not  necessary  that  its  contents  should  be  proved  by  a  notarial 
copy.  All  that  is  required  is  that  it  should  be  proved  by  the 
best  evidence,  which  the  party  has  it  in  his  power  to  produce, 
which  must,  at  all  events,  be  such  as  to  leave  no  reasonable  doubt 
as  to  the  substantial  parts  of  the  paper. ^ 

§  80D.  Stringency  of  the  Rule,  when  Relaxed. — The  strin- 
gency of  the  rule  requiring  search  for  documents  and  proof 
of  their  loss,  before  letting  in  secondary  evidence  of  their  con- 
tents, is  proportioned  to  their  cJiaracter  and  value.  Slight  proof 
of  such  loss  is  sufficient,  where  the  documents,  from  their  nature, 
w^ould  have  only  a  transitory  value,  and  where  no  reasons  exist 
for  preserving  them.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that  a  dep- 
osition will  not  be  rejected  because  the  witness  speaks  of  papers 
not  produced,  if  it  appear  that  they  were  received  a  long  time 
before  the  deposition  was  taken,  and  are  such  as  would  probably 
not  be  preserved  for  so  long,  or  are  not  in  the  power  of  the  wit- 
ness or  the  party.*  It  has  been  so  held  concerningjram27?/  letters 
received  by  the  witness  in  a  foreign  country.^ 

1  Kearney  v.  New  York,  92  N.  Y.  ^  ^n^,  Ljfe  lus.  Co.  v.  Rosenagle,  77 
617,  621;  Deaver  v.  Eice,  2  Ired.  L.  Pa.  St.  507,  513.  The  doctrine  of  this 
(N.  C.)  280;  Dickinson  v.  Breedeu,  25  case  qualities  the  following  doubtful 
111.  186;  Bunch  v.  Hurst,  3  Des.  Eq.  text  of  Greenleaf:  "If  a  witness, 
^S.  C.)  273;  Turner  v.  Yates,  16  How.  being  examined  in  a  foreign  country 
(U.S.)  14;  Parkins  11.  Cobbet,  1  Car.  upon  interrogatories  sent  out  with  a 
&P.  282.  coraraissiou  for  tliat  purpose,  sliould, 

2  Edwards  v.  Noyes,  Qio  N.  Y.  125.  in  one  of  his  answers,  state  the  con- 

3  Kenner  v.  Bank  of  Columbia,  tents  of  a  letter  whicli  is  not  produced, 
9  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  581,  597.  tliat  part    of    the   deposition   will  be 

*  Tilghman  w.  Fisher, 9  Watts  (Pa.),  suppressed,  notwithstanding,  lu-  l)eing 
441.  out   of   the  jurisdiction,  there  may  be 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  USE  OF  books  a\d  papers.  623 

§  810.  Lost  Depositions.  —  Applying  the  rule  stated  in  the 
last  chapter,  that  objections  must  specifically  state  the  ground  of 
objection  relied  on,  we  find  that  it  was  held  that,  where  an  or- 
iginal deposition  regularly  taken,  sealed  up,  transmitted,  opened, 
and  filed  in  the  case,  was  lost,  and  a  copy,  taken  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  clerk  of  the  court  and  sworn  to  as  a  true  copy,  was 
offered  in  evidence  in  its  place,  an  objection  to  the  copy  "  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  not  the  original,"  — was  too  indefinite  to  let 
in  argument  that  the  witness  was  alive,  that  the  lost  deposi- 
tion could  only  be  supplied  by  the  same  witness,  and  that  sec- 
ondary evidence  was  inadmissible  to  prove  the  contents  of  the 
first  deposition.  1  • 


Article  III. — Use  of  Books  and  Papers  at  the  Trial. 

Sectiox 
815.  Party  not  bouud  to  put  iu  Evidence  all  Papers  produced  on  his  Notice., 
81G.  But  they  may  be  put  in  Evidence  by  the  Party  Producing  them. 

817.  [Continued.]     Illustration. 

818.  Tender  of  Documentary  Evidence,  how  made. 

819.  Reading  the  Paper. 

820.  Proof  of  Execution. 

821.  [Continued.]     Illustrations. 

822.  [Continued.]     ^Vhen  Proof  of  Execution  Dispensed  "nith. 

823.  [Continued.]     Admission  of  Document  Carries  with  itProof  of  Signature 

and  Indorsement. 

824.  [Continued.]     Objection  for  want  of  Proof  by  Subscribing  'Wituess. 

825.  [Continued.]     Autlienticatiou  of  Documents  in  a  Deposition. 

826.  [Continued.]     Exhibits,  where  there  are  Different  Sets  of  luterroo-a- 

tories. 

827.  Right  of  Inspection. 

828.  [Continued.]     Illustration. 

829.  [Continued.]     WHiere  Document  is  Produced  on  Notice. 

no  means  of  compelling  liim  to  pro-  We  have  no  power  to  compel  the  wit- 
duce  tlie  letter."  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  88.  ness  to  give  any  evidence  at  all,  buc 
This  statement  of  Greeuleaf  is  based  if  he  does  give  an  answer,  that  an- 
on the  authority  of  an  English  nisi  swer  must  be  taken  in  relation  to  the 
prius  decision  iu  which  Tiudal,  C.  J.,  rules  of  our  law  on  the  subject  of  evi- 
said:  "I  think  it  would  be  a  most  deuce."  Steinkeller  v.  Newton,  9 
inconvenient  and   a  most    dangerous  Carr.  &  P.  313. 

rule  to  hold,  that  it  should  rest  in  the  i  Burton  u.  Driggs,  20  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

option  of  the  party  examined,  whether  125,  133. 
he  will  produce  the  document   or  not. 


G24:  EXAMINATION   OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thouip.  Tl'., 

Section 

830.  Eight  to  Seal  up  Pages  which  are  not  Pertiueut. 

831.  Cross-Examiiiing  as  to  contents  of  Written  Documents. 

(1.)  Document  must  be  produced. 

(2.)  Aliter  where  the  Witness  is  a  Party. 

(3.)  When  the  Document  itself  Evidence. 

(4.)  Witness  asked  whether  Kepresentation  in  Writing  or  Parol. 

832.  Cross-Examiniug  Witness  as  to  tlie  Contents  of  Letter  claimed  to  lia\'e 

been  written  by  him. 

833.  [Continued.]     Illustration  of  a  Violation  of  this  Rule. 

834.  Use  of  Document  for  one  Purpose  does  not  make  it  Evidence  for  all 

Purposes. 

835.  Whole  of  a  Correspondence. 

836.  Assailing  the  Integrity  of  One's  own  Documentary  Evidence. 

837.  Effect  of  putting  in  Evidence  Affidavit  of  Opposing  Party. 

838.  Telegraphic  Dispatches. 

839.  Dispatch  Received  not  Evidence  of  Dispatch  Sent. 

840.  Book  Entries  on  Proof  that  tliey  were  Truly  made. 

841.  Use  of  the  Instrument  whicli  is  the  Foundation  of  the  Action. 

842.  Duplicate  Evidence  of  Indebteduess. 

843.  Objections  to  Documentary  Evidence  must  be  Specific. 

§  815.  Party  not  Bound  to  pvit  in  Evidence  all  Papers  Pro- 
duced on  his  Notice.  — A  party  is  not  bound  to  put  in  evidence 
all  the  papers  produced  in  response  to  his  notice, — especialh' 
where  papers  are  produced  not  named  therein.  This  is  illus- 
trated by  a  ruling  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance.  The 
plaintiffs,  in  order  to  prove  the  death  of  the  insured,  and  a  com- 
pliance with  the  conditions  of  the  policy  as  to  proof  of  loss, 
called  upon  the  defendant  company  to  produce  "  all  proofs  of 
the  death  "  of  the  insured.  The  defendant  produced  a  package 
containing  those  proofs,  which  the  plaintiff  had  furnished  it,  and 
also  several  other  papers.  It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  not 
bound  to  offer  any  evidence  beyond  the  papers  thus  produced, 
but  might  select  only  those  which  he  had  furnished  to  the  de- 
fendant, and  that  it  was  error  to  reject  those  which  he  offered 
because  he  did  not  offer  all.^ 

§  81G.  But  tbey  May  l>e  i>ut  in  Evidence  by  the  Party  pro- 
ducing them. — It  was  ruled  by  Lord  Kenyon  that,  where  a 
notice  has  been  given  to  produce  books,  if  the  party  giving  the 

1  Heaffer  v.  New  Era  Life  Ins.  Co.,  101  Pa.  St.  178. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVL]   USE   of  books  and  papers.  625 

notice  calls  for  them  and  exhibits  them,  this  fact  does  not  make 
them  evidence  for  the  party  whose  books  they  are;  but  it  is  only 
a  matter  of  observation  to  the  jury,  in  behalf  of  such  party,  that 
the  entries  are  in  his  favor ;  ^  but  if  the  party  calling  for  them 
thereafter  declines  to  use  them  in  evidence,  they  may  be  put  in 
evidence  by  the  party  producing  them,  provided  they  are  mate- 
rial and  relevant  to  the  issues,^  and  this,  although  they  were 
called  for  under  a  misapprehension  of  their  contents,  provided 
there  is  no  doubt  as  to  their  identity.  "  A  party  cannot," 
said  Bigelow,  J.,  "  require  his  adversary  to  produce  a  document, 
and,  after  inspecting  it,  insist  on  excluding  it  from  the  case 
altogether.  Such  a  course  of  proceeding  would  give  one  party 
an  unfair  advantage  over  the  other.  He  would  gain  the  priv- 
ilege of  looking  into  the  private  documents  of  the  other  party, 
without  any  corresponding  obligation  or  risk  on  his  own  part.  It 
is,  therefore,  generally  deemed  a  just  and  wise  rule  that,  in  such 
cases,  the  paper  called  for  and  produced,  after  it  has  been  seen 
and  examined  by  the  party  calling  for  it,  becomes  competent  evi- 
dence in  the  case  for  both  parties.^  It  is  manifest  that  this  rule 
would  be  of  little  use,  if  the  paper  can  be  excluded  on  the  allega- 
tion that  the  party  calling  for  it  mistook  the  nature  of  its  con- 
tents. Generally,  the  party  seeking  for  it  acts  on  the  supposition 
that  it  contains  matter  favorable  to  his  side  of  the  case.  He, 
therefore,  assumes  the  risk  of  making  it  evidence;  and  cannot  be 
heard  to  say,  after  he  has  ascertained  its  contents  by  inspection, 
that  he  intended  to  call  for  a  different  paper,  or,  in  other  words, 
that  its  contents  were  not  such  as  he  expected.  If  there  is  no 
doubt  as  to  the  identity  of  the  document,  the  party  who  pro- 
duces it  has  the  right  to  insist  on  its  being  read  to  the  jury;  and 
the  court  cannot,  in  the  exercise  of  their  discretion,  deny  him 
this  privilege."  * 

§817.   [Continued.]      Illustration.  —  During   the    progress   of  a 
cause  before  a  surrogate  in  New  York,  contesting  a  will,  a  subpoena 

1  Sayer  v.  Kitchen,  1  Esp.  210.  3  Citing  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  5(13. 

2  Hoyt  V.  Jackson,  3  Dem.  (X.  Y.)  •*  Clark  r.  Fletcher,  1  Allen  (Mass.), 
388.                                                                         53,  57. 

40 


626  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSKS.        [I   Thomp.  Tl'., 

duces  tecum  was  issued  at  the  request  of  the  contestant,  and  was  served 
on  Mr.  ConkUng,  former  counsel  of  the  contestant,  requiring  him  to 
produce  certain  papers  therein  described.  In  obedience  to  the  sub- 
poena, Mr.  Conkling  attended  in  court,  and  requested  to  be  sworn  as  a 
witness,  and,  on  being  sworn,  produced  to  the  surrogate  the  papers 
described  in  the  subpoena,  and,  taking  the  court's  direction,  delivered 
them  to  the  surrogate.  Before  resting  his  case,  the  contestant's  coun- 
sel moved  that  the  papers  deposited  with  the  court  by  Mr.  Conkling, 
"  be  placed  in  the  custody  of  counsel  for  contestant."  The  court  said : 
"For  the  present,  I  deny  your  motion."  Thereupon  Mr.  Evarts,  of 
counsel  for  proponents,  asked  the  court  to  put  at  their  disposition,  for 
use  as  evidence  in  the  cause,  the  papers  produced  under  the  subpoena 
issued  by  the  other  side.  This  was  resisted  on  the  ground  of  privilege. 
The  court  ruled,  substantially,  that  the  privilege  was  the  privilege  of 
the  party,  and  not  the  privilege  of  his  attorney  ;  that  the  privilege  had 
not  been  waived  by  the  act  of  Mr.  Conkling  in  delivering  the  papers  to 
the  surrogate ;  that  such  of  the  papers,  as  had  not  been  offered  in  evi- 
dence by  the  contestant,  remained  subject  to  his  control ;  and  directed 
the  official  stenographer  to  return  to  Mr.  Conkling  such  of  the  papers, 
produced  by  him,  as  had  not  been  offered  in  evidence. ^ 

§  818.   Tender  of  Documentary  Evidence,  how  made. — It 

has  been  ruled  that,  where  documentary  evidence  is  offered,  each 
piece  should  be  presented  by  itself  to  the  presiding  judge;  ex- 
hibited, if  desired,  to  the  opposing  counsel;  identified  by  the 
court  stenographer  with  suitable  marks;  and,  if  objected  to,  its 
genuineness  established  by  the  testimony.  Where  a  bundle  of 
papers  was  offered  in  evidence,  described  as  "  invoices  of  goods, 
notes  and  drafts  paid,"  and  an  objection  was  raised  to  the  recep- 
tion of  any  bundles,  it  was  held,  on  the  most  obvious  grounds, 
that  it  was  rightly  sustained.^  It  is  said  to  be  ordinarily  proper 
for  a  trial  court  to  permit  documents  to  be  offered  in  evidence 
provisionally,  and  afterwards  to  instymct  the  jury  as  to  their 
effect.^ 

§   819.  Reading  the  Paper.  — Where  a  written  instrument  is 
offered  in  evidence,  it  is  discretionary  with  the  judge  to  read  the 

1  Hoyt  V.   Jackson,  3  Dem.  (N.  Y.)  ^  Virgie  v.  Stetson,  73  Me.  452,  401. 

388.  ^  Smith  v.  Shattuck,  12  Ore.  3fi2. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI. ]    USE  OF  books  and  papers. 


627 


paper  himself,  so  as  to  keep  its  contents  from  the  jury  until  it  is 
admitted,  or  to  direct  counsel  to  read  it.^ 

§  820.  Proof  of  Execution.  —  Where  the  party  offering  a 
written  instrument,  miike^i  oat  a  prima  facie  case  of  its  execution^ 
the  other  party,  it  has  been  held,  should  not  be  allowed  to  intro- 
duce counter  evidence,  before  the  instrument  is  read  to  the  jury.^ 
But  this  ruling  does  not  seem  to  be  sound.  The  established  rule 
seems  to  be  tliat,  when  objection  is  made  to  the  admissibility 
of  a  paper  offered  in  evidence,  upon  a  ground  which  calls  for  the 
testimony  of  witnesses,  it  is  proper  for  the  court,  before  permit- 
ting the  paper  to  be  read  to  the  jury,  to  allow  the  objecting  party 
to  cross-examine  the  witness  producing  it,  and  to  receive  other 
evidence  upon  the  question,  in  order  to  decide  whether  or  not  it 
is  admissible.^     Documents  cannot  be  authenticated  by  the  testi- 


1  Brill  V.  Flagler,  23  Weud.  (N.  Y.) 
354. 

2  Verzan    v.  McGregor,  23  Cal.  339. 

3  Trussell  v.  Scarlet,  18  Ted.  Rep. 
21-i.  lu  a  note  to  this  case,  by  Dr. 
AVharton,  it  is  said  that  this  view  is 
in  harmouy  with  mauy  ruliugs  ou  the 
subject  of  admissibility.  He  said: 
"When  the  adraissil)ility  of  either  a 
witness  or  a  document  is  iu  question, 
the  party  opposing  the  admissibility 
is  entitled,  as  a  preliminary  test,  to 
cross-examine  on  this  specific  issue  the 
witnesses  on  whose  testimony  the 
admissibility  depends.  No  document 
or  witness,  —  such  is  the  fundamental 
principle, —  is  self-proving.  "We  must 
fall  back,  as  a  basis  logically  neces- 
sary in  all  cases,  on  parol  proof;  and 
this  proof  only  is  effective  when  ex- 
posed to  the  criticism  of  cross-exam- 
ination. This  is  illustrated  by  the 
old  practice  of  examination  on  voir 
dire.  When  a  witness,  in  old  times, 
as  to  whose  competency  there  was 
any  question,  was  called,  he  was 
sworn,  not  'to  tell  the  truth, 
the   whole    truth,    and    nothing    but 


the  truth.'  but  'true  answers  to 
make  to  such  questions  as  should  be 
put  to  him.'  These  questions  re- 
lated solely  to  his  competency:  and 
the  burden  of  this  preliminary  exam- 
ination fell  upon  the  party  objecting 
to  competency.  In  fact,  the  old 
practice  was,  that  when  there  was  an 
objection  to  competency,  for  the  ob- 
jecting counsel  to  ask  for  the  admin- 
astering  of  the  voir  dire  oath,  which 
was  granted  as  a  matter  of  course. 
The  objecting  counsel  then  proceeded 
to  inquire  as  to  the  witness'  interest 
in  the  case,  or  other  ground  of  incom- 
petency; the  party  sustaining  the 
admissibility  being  then  entitled  to 
examine  in  reply.  The  same  distinc- 
tion is  taken  with  regard  to  the  proof 
of  lost  documents.  A  witness  called 
to  prove  the  contents  of  a  lost  docu- 
ment, after  his  examination,  by  the 
party  calling  him  on  the  subject  of  the 
loss,  and  of  his  knowledge  of  the  doc- 
ument, is  open  to  cross-examination 
by  the  opposing  counsel;  and  it  is 
not  until  the  Avituess  has  been  thus 
fully  probed,   and  his  knowledge  ou 


628  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

mony  of  witnesses  as  to  their  identity,  unless  the  opposite  party 
has  had  an  opportunity  to  inspect  them  and  to  cross-examine  the 
witnesses.^ 

§  821.  [Continued.]  Illustrations.  — While  one  of  the  plaintiff's 
witnesses  was  on  the  stand,  the  defendants,  during  cross-examination, 
undertook  to  prove  by  him  the  identity  of  certain  documents,  which 
counsel  for  plaintiff  was  not  allowed  to  see,  but  which  were  afterwards 
read  as  having  been  proved.  This  was  held  erroneous.  Campbell,  J., 
said :  "  There  is  no  case  where  a  witness  proving  an  instrument  should 
not  be  subject  to  immediate  cross-examination,  which  could  never  be 
effective  without  the  view  of  the  document  itself,  not  only  to  guard 
against  forgery  or  substitution,  but  also  to  inform  parties  what  issues 
were  likely  to  arise  concerning  genuineness,  or  any  other  fact  which  is 
material.  Our  rules  in  equity  cases  have  done  away  with  proof  of  in- 
struments at  the  hearing,  for  the  reason  that  there  was  always  danger 
of  surprise  and  imposition.  But  there  was  never  any  practice  which 
deprived  parties  of  the  right  to  inspect  and  cross-examine  in  season."  '^ 

§  822.  [Continued.]  When  Proof  of  Execution  Dispensed 
with. — Where  a  verbal  contract  refers  to  a  written  instrument, 
not  as  a  contract,  but  as  containing  some  of  the  terms  of  the 
verbal  contract,  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  admit  the  writing 
in  evidence,  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  the  contract,  to 
prove  its  execution;  it  is  enough  that  it  is  identified.^  So,  one 
writing  may  be  so  acknowledged  by  another,  that  proof  of  the 
latter  will  carry  with  it  the  authentication  of  the  former,  render- 
ing it  unnecessary  to  do  more  than  identify  the  former,  in  order 
to  its  admission  in  evidence.*  The  production  of  a  paper 
under  notice,  by  the  opposite  party,  dispenses  Avith  the  neces- 
sity of  proof  of  the  fact  which  makes  it  operative,  where  it  ap- 
pears that  the  party  producing  it  claims  any  benefit   under  it.^ 

this  specific  issue  drawn  out,  that  tlie  ^  De  Witt  v.  Prescott,  51  Mich.  298, 

document  is  received   in    evidence."  300. 

(Citing  Fisher  v.    Samuda,  1   Camp.  ^  p)e^itti,,  Prescott,51  Mich.  298, 300. 

190,  193;  Clark  v.  Ilougliton,  12  Gray  ^  Smith   v.    New   Yorli  Central    R. 

(Mass.),   38;  Richardsoii  v.  Robbius,  Co.,  4  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.Y.)  262. 

124   Mass.    105;  Coxe  v.  England,  65  ^  Clarinet?.  Mix,  15  Conn.  153. 

Pa.  St.  212;  Rankin  t;.  Crow,   19    III.  «  Pearce  v.    Hooper,    3    Taunt.   60, 

C26).  opinion  by  Lord  Mansfield,  C.  J. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]   USE  OF  books  and  papers.  629 

Thus,  where  a  deed  is  produced  by  the  opposite  party  on  notice, 
it  has  been  held  unnecessary  to  prove  its  delivery.^  Where  the 
instrument  is  the  foundation  of  the  action,  and  its  genuineness  is 
not  denied  on  oath,  statutes  exist  in  many  jurisdictions,  dispens- 
ing with  proof  of  its  execution. ^  The  statutes  rehiting  to  reg- 
istration do  not  contemphite  the  recording  of  the  duplicate  im- 
pression of  seal.  It  is,  therefore,  no  objection  to  the  admission 
in  evidence  of  the  certified  copy  of  a  recorded  deed,  that  a  copy 
of  the  impression  of  the  official  seal  of  the  officer,  who  took  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  grantor,  does  not  appear  on  it,  if  it  be 
stated  in  the  body  of  the  certified  act  of  acknowledgment,  that 
it  w^as  certified  under  such  official  seal.'^ 

§  823.  [Continued.]  Admission  of  Document  carries  with 
it  Proof  of  Signature  and  Indorsement. — So,  where  written 
instruments  are  received  in  evidence  without  objection,  the  sig- 
natures of  all  persons  who  are  properly  parties  thereto,  are  con- 
sidered as  admitted.*  This  is  nothino-but  a  branch  of  the  broader 
rule  that,  w^here  an  instrument  of  writing  is  received  in  evidence 
without  objection,  proof  of  its  execution  is  waived.*  Where  an 
instrument  is  offered  in  evidence  and  not  objected  to,  any  in- 
dorsement upon  it  is  considered  as  proved.^ 

§  824  [Continued.]  Objection  for  AVaut  of  Proof  by  Sub- 
scribing Witnesses. — This  objection  must  be  made  when  the 
paper  is  offered,  or  it  will  be  deemed  waived.'  Where  a  party 
calls  his  adversary,  or  permits  him  to  be  called,  to  prove  the  in- 
strument, this  dispenses  with  proof  by  the  subscribing  witness.^ 

§  825.  [Continued.]  Authentication  of  Documents  in  a 
Deposition.  —  Upon  the  taking  of  a  deposition,  documents  which 
are  merely  produced  and  identified  before  the  commissioner  and 

1  Campbell  v.  Eoberts,  66  Ga.  733.  ^  Tyler  v.  Marcelin,  8  La.  Ann.  312- 

2  Leary  v.  Meyer,  78  lud.  393;  6  Bell  v.  Keefe,  12  La.  Ann.  340; 
Strange  v.  Barrow,  G5  Ga.  23;  Temp-  Maxwell  v.  Kennedy,  10  La.  Ann.  798* 
lin  ■!;.  Rothweiler,  56  la.  259.  '  Rayburu  v.  Mason  Lumber  Co., 

3  Griffin  v.  Sheffield,  38  Miss.    359.       57  Mich.  273. 
*  Maxwell  v.  Keuuedy,  10  La.  Ann.  ^  Hid. 

798. 


630  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoHip.   Tr., 

returned  by  him  as  exhibits  to  his  deposition,  are  not  considered 
as  having  been  proved.  Such  identification  is  not  enough  to  ad- 
mit them  as  evidence  at  the  trial,  but  their  genuineness  must  be 
established  by  witnesses  who  are  subject  to  cross-examination.^ 
The  distinction  between  proving  the  authenticity  of  a  document 
and  merely  identifying  it,  is  one  which  should  be  constantly 
borne  in  mind.  "  If  the  proof  of  authenticity  is  to  be  by  the 
deposing  witness,  there  must  be  opjjortiinity  of  cross-examination 
on  the  point,  and  the  document  be  submitted  to  the  cross-exam- 
ining counsel,  and  annexed  to  the  deposition,  unless  a  case 
excusing  this  is  shown,  and  a  copy  is  supplied.  If  the  paper  is 
merely  to  be  identified,  submission  to  adverse  counsel  is  not 
matter  of  right,  and  annexation  to  the  deposition  not  essential."  ^ 
If  the  witness  is  to  be  examined  as  to  the  genuineness  of  an  in- 
strument, the  original  of  it  must,  of  course,  be  exhibited  to  the 
witness  and  returned,  attached  to  the  interrogatories  by  the  com- 
missioner.^ This  is  a  very  important  rule,  in  order  to  prevent 
deception.  Unless  the  paper  be  particularly  described,  identified 
by  the  commissioner  loith  marks,  and  annexed  to  the  deposition  as 
returned  by  him,  the  deposition,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  paper, 
cannot  be  read  in  evidence.*  A  paper  which  is  pinned  to  a  depo- 
sition, not  referred  to  in  it,  and  which  contains  no  evidence  that 
it  has  been  attached  thereto  by  the  officer  taking  the  deposition, 
is  not  suflSciently  identified  as  an  exhibit  to  be  admitted  in  evi- 
dence.^ But  a  deposition  ought  not  to  be  suppressed,  on  the 
ground  that  the  witness  referred  to  certain  deeds  which  were  not 
set  out  as  exhibits,  when  it  appears  that  the  deeds  are  not  under 
the  control  of  the  witness,  are  not  the  foundation  of  the  action, 
and  that  there  is  no  dispute  as  to  their  contents."  It  has  been 
held  no  objection  to  a  deposition  that  the  bill  of  items  of  the 
plaintiff's  account  annexed  thereto,  and  sworn  to  by  the  depo- 

1  Kelley   v.   Weber,  it    Abb.    N.    C.  *  Petrikiu  v.  Collier,  7  Watts  &  S. 
(N.  Y.)  62.  (Pa.)   392;  Dodge  v.  Israel,  4  Wash. 

2  Note  by  Mr.  Austin  Abbott  in  9  C.  C.    (U.    S.)    323.     See   Swislier   v. 
Abb.  N.  C.  (N.  Y.)  at  page  65;  citing  Swisher,  Wright  (Oh.),  755. 

Weeks  on  Dep.  358-361.  s  Susquehanna  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Quick, 

•i  Weidner    v.    Conner,    9    Pa.     St.       61  Pa.  St.  328,  3;59. 
7S.  *'  Lyon  v.  Barrows,  18  Iowa,  428. 


Tit.   Ill,  Cll.  XXVI.]    USE    OF    BOOKS    AND     PAPERS.  631 

nent,  is  in  the  handwriting  of  the  plaintiff's  attorney;  nor  that 
such  bill  is  described  in  the  deposition  as  "  marked  A,"  when  it 
is  not  so  marked,  —  there  being  no  other  account  annexed.^  It 
seems  that,  where  the  instrument  has  been  identified  by  the  com- 
missioner, by  sufficient  marks,  it  is  not  a  fatal  objection  that  it 
was  not  'physically  attached  to  the  deposition,  provided  it  was 
enclosed  under  seal,  in  the  same  package  with  the  deposition, 
and  thus  returned  by  the  commissioner. ^  INIoreover,  it  has  been 
said  that,  where  papers  alleged  to  have  been  exhibited  to  the 
witness  at  the  giving  of  his  deposition,  are  not  sufficiently  iden- 
tified by  the  officer,  they  may  be  identified  by  parol  evidence.^ 

§  826.  [Continued.]  Exhibits,  where  there  are  Different 
sets  of  Interrogatories.  —  Where  there  are  different  sets  of  in- 
terrogatories, drawn  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  depositions  of 
different  witnesses,  it  is  not,  in  the  nature  of  things,  possible 
that  the  same  exhibit  should  accompany  each.  In  such  a  case, 
it  has  been  held  sufficient  that  it  be  attached  to  one  set  of  the  in- 
terrogatories, and  referred  to  by  proper  descriptions  in  the  oth- 
ers ;  and  it  has  been  held  that,  if  so  referred  to,  and  properly 
indentified  by  the  witness,  and  certified  by  the  commissioner, 
this  will  be  sufficient.* 

§  827.  llig-ht  of  Inspection.  —  There  is  a  confusion  in  the 
judicial  holdings  as  to  whether  the  opposite  party  has  the  right 
to  inspect  a  document  which  is  produced  and  proved,  before  it  is 
formally  offered  in  evidence.  According  to  one  view,  a  party 
has  no  right  to  the  inspection  of  papers  which  are  proved  by  a 
witness  on  the  stand,  unless  they  are  offered  in  evidence, — 
although  the  act  of  producing  the  papers  and  proving  them  may 
be  a  species  of  forensic  thimble-rigging,  devised  to  prejudice  the 
jury.^  Under  this  view,  the  mere  fact  that  the  signature  to  a 
paper    is  verified    by  a  witness  in  court,  does  not    entitle  the 

1  Marviu  v.  Kaygaii,  12  Cush.  ^  Moberly  u.  Leophart,  51  Ala.  587; 
(Mass.)  132.  s.  c.  on  former  appeal,  where  the  same 

2  Humphries  r.  Dawsou,  38  Ala.  199.  point  was  considered  ,  47  Ala.  257. 

3  Dailey  v.  Green,  15  Pa.  St.  118, 127.  ^  Houser  v.  State,  93  Ind.  228. 


632  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

opposite  party  to  inspect  the  paper,  or  to  cross-examine  the 
witness  upon  it,  until  the  paper  has  been  put  in  evidence;  al- 
though it  is  irregular  for  the  counsel  to  ask  a  witness  any  ques- 
tion concerning  the  document  which  he  does  not  intend  to  offer 
in  evidence. 1  Nor  are  the  English  holdings  quite  uniform  on 
this  question.  It  was  ruled  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Erie  at  niH 
priuSf  that  the  mere  fact  that  counsel,  in  cross-examining  a  wit- 
ness, puts  a  document  into  the  witness'  hand,  and  asks  him 
whether  it  is  in  his  handwriting,  does  not  entitle  the  opposite 
counsel  to  see  the  document.^  On  the  contrary,  it  was  ruled  by 
the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  that  when,  on  cross-examination  of 
a  witness  for  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant's  counsel  puts  a  docu- 
ment into  his  hands,  and  proves  out  of  his  mouth  that  it  is  in 
the  plaintiff  ^s  lianchoriting ,  the  plaintiff's  counsel  has  a  right  to 
see  it  at  once,  for  the  purpose  of  identifying  it  and  re-examining 
the  witness  upon  it;^  and  it  was  conceded  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice 
Erie,  in  the  case  first  cited,  that  the  opposite  counsel  has  the  right 
to  inspect  it  before  the  cross-examining  counsel  proceeds  to  found 
any  question  upon  it.*  But,  where  a  witness,  on  cross-examina- 
tion, proves  the  handwriting  of  the  opposite  party  to  a  paper,  the 
counsel  for  the  party  has  no  right  to  see  such  paper,  to  enable 
him  to  found  an  examination  upon  it,  as  to  whether  it  was  really 
the  writing  of  his  client  or  not.^  The  rule,  as  laid  down  by 
Lord  Demnan,  C.  J.,  is  that  if  the  cross-examining  counsel  puts 
a  paper  into  the  witness'  hand  and  questions  him  upon  it,  aud 
anything  comes  of  those  questions^  the  counsel  for  the  opposite 
party  has  the  right  to  see  the  paper,  and  to  re-examine  the  wit- 
ness in  respect  of  it;  but  if  the  cross-examination,  founded  on 
the  paper,  entirely  fails,  and  nothing  comes  of  it,  the  opposite 
counsel  has  no  right  to  see  the  paper .^  Where  a  witness  uses  a 
document  for  the  purpose  of  ref resiling  his  "memory,  it  is  the 

'  Styles  V.  Allen,  5  Alleu   (Mass.),  ■*  Cope  v.   Thames  Dock  Co.,  supra. 

320.  •';  lUissell    V.    Rider,    0    Car.    &    P. 

2  Cope  V.  Thames  Dock  Co.,  2  Car.      41G. 

&  K,    7r)7.  6  Re<;.    V.    Duncombe,    8   Car.  &  P, 

3  Peck  V.  Peck,   21  Law  Times  (x.      SCO. 
s.)  070 ;  s.  c.  18  Week.  Pep.   2'.!.'). 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXVI. J     USE    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.  633 

right  of  the  opposing  counsel  to  inspect  the  document ;  but  this 
right  may  be  limited  to  that  'portion  of  the  document  which  has 
been  thus  used  by  the  witness.  Thus,  it  was  ruled  by  Yice- 
Chancellor  Malins,  that  on  the  cross-examination  of  a  Avitness,  the 
cross-examining  counsel  is  not  entitled  to  inspect  the  whole  of  a 
diary  used  by  the  witness  to  assist  his  memory,  but  only  such 
portions  of  it  as  refer  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit.^ 

§  828.  [Continued.]  Illustration.  — In  a  bastardy  proceecling  the 
prosecuting  attorney  handed  to  the  relatrix,  who  was  testifying  as  a 
witness,  two  letters,  and  asked  her  if  she  knew  the  handwriting.  The 
defendant's  counsel  objected  to  the  question,  and  demanded  an  inspec- 
tion of  the  letters.  The  court  overruled  the  objection,  and  refused  the 
defendant  an  inspection  of  the  letters  at  that  time.  The  relatrix  then 
testified  that  the  letters  were  written  by  the  defendant.  The  prose- 
cuting attorney  then,  in  answer  to  a  question  by  the  court,  stated  that  he 
intended  to  offer  the  letters  in  evidence.  They  were  then,  by  order  of 
the  court,  delivered  to  the  defendant  for  inspection.  Nevertheless,  the 
prosecuting  attorney  did  not  offer  them  in  evidence.  It  was  held  that 
in  this  there  was  no  error  sufficient  to  reverse  a  judgment.  The  court, 
speaking  through  Hammond,  J.,  said:  "In  the  conduct  of  atrial, 
there  are  many  trifling  occurrences,  bearing  favorably  or  unfavorably 
upon  the  one  or  the  other  of  the  parties,  which  are  difficult  for  the  trial 
court,  and  beyond  the  power  of  this  court  to  correct.  Fortunately, 
however,  for  litigants,  the  ingenuity  of  counsel  upon  the  one  side,  is 
usually  counterbalanced  by  the  tact  of  counsel  on  the  other,  so  that 
the  substantial  rights  of  parties  are  generally  preserved.  It  is  only 
where  there  has  been  manifest  injustice  occasioned  by  a  proceeding, 
in  which  the  power  of  the  trial  court  for  correction  has  not  been  prop- 
erly used,  that  this  court  may  intervene  by  reversal."  ^ 

§  829.  [Continued.]  Where  Document  is  Produced  on 
Notice. — A  party  who  gives  notice  to  produce  a  paper  in  evi- 
dence, must  be  supposed  to  know  its  contents.  If  he  does  not, 
he  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  speculate  through  the  forms  of 
law,  and  obtain  from  his  adversary  the  inspection  of  any  paper 
or  document  he  may  choose  to  demand.     It  has  been  reasoned  that 

'  Burgess  r.  Bennett,  20  Week.  Eep.  2  Houser  v.  State,  93  Ind.  228,  230.. 

720;  ante,  §402,  subsec.  2. 


634  EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

notice  to  produce  a  paper  requires  it  to  be  produced  in  evidence, 
and,  when  once  called  for  and  produced,  it  is  in  evidence, 
as  it  could  not  be  called  for  on  an}^  other  terms. ^  This  is  illus- 
trated by  a  case  where  the  defendants  gave  notice  to  the  plaint- 
iffs to  produce  a  letter,  on  the  trial,  which,  when  it  came  on, 
they  refused  to  do,  unless  the  defendants  would  engage  to  read 
it  in  evidence.  This  they  declined  acceding  to,  without  being 
first  permitted  to  inspect  it,  and,  on  this  being  denied,  the  trial 
court  ruled  that  the  inspection  could  not  be  demanded,  except  on 
the  terms  which  the  plaintiff  v/ished  to  impose.  It  was  held  that 
this  rulino;  was  correct.^  Where  a  witness,  in  obedience  to  a 
subpoena  duces  tecum,  attends  in  court,  and,  after  being  sworn, 
produces  papers  which  he  thereupon  places  in  the  custody  of  the 
court,  —  either  party  thereafter  has  the  same  right,  which  he 
had  when  the  witness  was  present,  to  insist  that  the  papers  shall 
be  placed  at  his  disposal  for  use  as  evidence  in  the  cause. ^ 

§  830.   Right  to  Seal  up  Pages  which  are  not  Pertinent.  — 

It  is  said  by  Dr.  Greenleaf:  "Where  books  are  to  be  produced, 
the  defendant  will  have  leave  to  seal  up  and  conceal  all  such  parts 
of  them  as,  according  to  his  affidavit,  previously  made  and  filed, 
do  not  relate  to  the  matters  in  question."  ^  It  is  the  uniform 
practice  of  courts  to  permit  a  party  producing  his  books  to  seal 
up  those  pages  which  do  not  relate  to  the  subject  of  the  litiga- 
tion.^ Upon  a  like  princi{)le,  it  has  been  held  proper  for  the 
court  to  make  an  order  placing  the  books  which  contain  the  ac- 
counts which  are  pertinent  to  the  issue,  in  the  possession  of  the 
clerk  of  the  court,  limiting  the  inspection  to  certain  pages  con- 
taining the  pertinent  accounts,  and  giving  the  defendant  liberty 
to  seal  up  the  remaining  parts;  which  order  further  recited  that, 
it  ai)i)eari ng  that  the  journal  entries  were  so  intermingled  with 
other  matters  as  that  inspection  of  them  would  expose  such  out- 

1  Lawrence  v.  Van  llorue,  1  Caines  ••  3  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  301. 

(N.  Y.),  27G,  285.  ^  pjas  v.  Merle,  1  Paige  (N.  Y.), 

2  Ibid.  494;   Gerard  v.    I'enswick,    1   Swanst. 
'■''  Iloyt  V.  Jackson,  3  Dem.  (N.  Y.)      533;  Pyuclion  v.  Day,  118  111,  9,  15. 

388. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]    USE    OF   BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.  635 

side  matters,  the  defendant  might  present  in  court  a  verbatim 
copy  of  all  the  journal  entries  relating  to  matters  between  the 
parties,  giving  the  page  where  entered,  such  copy  to  be  verified 
by  affidavit  and  the  certificate  of  the  clerk  of  the  court,  upon  an 
actual  examination  and  comparison,  provided  the  plaintiff  should 
so  require.     It  was  held  that  this  was  proper. ^ 

§  831.  Cross-examining  as  to  Contents  of  Written  Docu- 
ments. —  ( 1- )  Document  must  be  j^^'oduced.  —  As  a  general  rule, 
a  witness  cannot,  upon  cross-examination,  even  for  the  purpose 
of  discrediting  him,  be  asked  as  to  the  contents  of  a  written 
paper  which  is  neither  produced,  nor  its  absence  accounted  for.^ 
Thus,  a  witness  cannot  be  cross-examined  as  to  what  he  swore  to  in 
an  affidavit,  unless  the  affidavit  is  produced.^  It  has  been  held  that 
a  witness  cannot  be  asked  on  cross-examination,  he  not  having  been 
interrogated  as  to  the  point  on  direct  examination,  whether  his 
name  was  not  written  in  the  book  of  a  certain  association.*  But 
it  has  been  held  that  a  witness,  on  cross-examination,  may  admit 
not  having  mentioned  a  fact  on  a  former  examination,  although 
that  examination  is  in  writing  and  not  produced.^  So  it  has  been 
ruled  that,  in  order  to  explain  or  contradict  a  statement  made  by 
a  party  as  to  an  alteration  in  a  will  under  which  he  claims,  the 
probate  of  the  will  is  not  sufficient  evidence,  but  the  original 
document  itself  should  be  put  in  the  hands  of  the  witness.^ 

(2.)  AUter  where  the  Witiiess  is  a  Party.  —  But  the  forego- 
ing rule  does  not  apply  where  the  witness  on  cross-examination 
is  the  opposite  party  to  the  action.     Thus,  a  party  may  be  cross- 

1  Pyuchon  v.  Day,  118  111.  9.  that  stage  of  the  cause.     Sideways  v. 

2  MacdouuellT.  Evans,  11  C.  B.  930;  Dyson,  2  Stark.  49;  Graham  v.  Dyster, 
s.  c.  21  L.  J.  C.  P.  141;  s.  c.  16  Jur.      2  Stark.  21. 

103.     It  has  been  ruled  at  nisi  prius,  3  Sainthill  v.  Bound,  4  Esp.  74. 

that    the    defendant    cannot,   in    the  *  Darby  v.  Ouseley,  1  Hurl.  &  X.  1; 

course    of    the  plaintiff's    evidence,  s.  c.  2  Jur.  (n.  s.)  497;  s.  c.  25  L.J. 

cross-examine    tlie     plaintiff's    wit-  Exch.  227. 

nesses  as  to  the  contents   of  written  ^  Eidley  v.  Gyde,  1  Mood.  &  Kob. 

documents,  although  notice  has  been  197. 

given  to  the  pkiiutiff  to  produce  them,  ^  Brown  v.  Hughes,  1  Post.  &  Flu. 

and    he   refuses   to  produce  them  at  299,  per  Channell,  B. 


636  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [1  Thouip.  Tr., 

examined  as  to  the  contents  of  an  affidavit  which  is  not  put  in,  ^ 
or  as  to  whether  he  has  read  a  letter  of  a  certain  date,  and  in  cer- 
tain terms. ^  It  was  also  ruled  by  the  same  learned  judge  ^  that 
the  rules  of  a  society  to  which  the  defendant  belonged,  proved 
by  the  cross-examination  of  one  of  the  witnesses,  are  evidence 
against  him.*  So,  it  has  been  ruled  that  a  party  to  an  action, 
called  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  may  be  asked,  on  cross- 
examination,  as  to  the  contents  of  a  letter  which  he  has  written, 
without  producing  the  letter. 

(.3.)  When  Ihe  Doaiment  itself  Evidence. — When  a  book  is 
put  into  the  hands  of  a  witness  to  refresh  his  recollection^  and 
questions  are  asked  upon  it  on  cross-examination,  the  book  is 
not  thereby  made  evidence^  for  the  party  producing  it,  though 
it  may  be  such  for  the  cross-examining  party.*  Where  a  docu- 
ment is  put  into  the  hands  of  a  witness  for  the  purpose  of  found- 
ing the  cross-examination  upon  it,  it  does  not  thereby  become 
evidence  for  the  party  whose  witness  it  thus  cross-examined.^  A 
o-ood  illustration  of  this  is  found  in  a  case  where  the  defendant's 
counsel,  on  cross-examination  of  the  plaintiff,  read  a  letter  from 
him,  which,  in  eifect,  overthrew  his  case,  and  then  submitted 
that  there  was  no  evidence  for  the  jury;  but  the  court  held  that, 
as  this  letter  was  the  defendant' sand  notthe  plaintiff's  evidence, 
it  could  not  be  looked  to  as  a  part  of  the  plaintiff  's  case  in  de- 
termining this  question.^ 

(4.)  Witness  asked  ivhetlier  Representation  in  Writing  or 
Parol.  —  In  view  of  the  foregoing  rules,  and  in  view  of  the 
further  rule  that  the  contents  of  a  writing  which  can  be  produced 
are  not  provable  by  parol,  when  a  witness  is  asked  on  cross-ex- 
amination whether  he  has  made  representations  of  a  particular 

1  SlacUleu  v.  Sergeant,  1  Fost.  &  ^  Payne  v.  Ibbotsou,  27  L.  J.  Exch. 
Fiu.  322,  341.     See  rui^e,  §  402,  subsec.  4. 

2  Ireland  V.  Stiff,  1  Fost.  &  Fiu.  340.  «  Collier  v.  Nokes,   2   Car.    &  Kir, 

3  Willes,  .J.  1012. 

*  Minus  V.  Smith,   1   Fost.  &  Fiu.  '  Rawlings    v.   Chandler,   9  Exch. 

318.  687. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  USE  OF  books  and  papers.  637 

Bature,  if  he  answers  in  the  affirmative,  he  should  next  be  asked 
whether  he  made  the  representation  by  parol  or  in  writing.^ 

§  832.  Cross-examiniug  Witness  as  to  the  Contents  of  Let- 
ter claimed  to  have  been  written  by  him.  —  It  is  said  by  Prof. 
Greenleaf :  "  The  counsel  will  not  be  permitted  to  represent,  in 
the  statement  of  a  question,  the  contents  of  a  letter,  and  to  ask 
the  witness  whether  he  wrote  a  letter  to  any  person  with  such 
contents,  or  contents  to  the  like  effect,  without  having  first  shown 
to  the  witness  the  letter,  and  having  asked  him  whether  he  wrote 
that  letter,  and  his  admitting  that  he  wrote  it;  for  the  contents 
of  every  written  paper,  according  to  the  ordinary  and  well  es- 
tablished rules  of  evidence,  are  to  be  proved  by  the  paper  itself, 
and  that  alone,  if  in  existence.  But  it  is  not  required  that  the 
wdiole  paper  be  shown  to  the  witness.  Two  or  three  lines  only 
of  a  letter  may  be  exhibited  to  him,  and  he  may  be  asked 
whether  he  wrote  the  part  exhibited.  If  he  denies,  or  does  not 
admit,  that  he  wrote  that  part,  he  cannot  be  examined  as  to  the 
contents  of  such  letter,  for  the  reason  already  given ;  nor  is  the 
opposite  counsel  entitled  in  that  case  to  look  at  the  paper.  And 
if  he  admits  the  letter  to  be  his  writino;,  he  cannot  be  asked 
whether  statements,  such  as  counsel  may  suggest,  are  contained 
in  it ;  but  the  whole  letter  must  be  read  as  the  only  competent 
evidence  of  that  fact."  ^ 

§833.  [Continued.]  Illustration  of  a  Violation  of  this  Rule. — 
In  a  case  in  Iowa,  in  the  course  of  the  cross-examination  of  the  plaintiff, 
her  attention  was  called  to  certain  letters  said  to  have  been  written  and 
signed  by  her.  As  to  one  of  those  letters  she  was  asked:  "Examine 
that  writing  and  signature,  and  see  if  it  is  j-our  writing  or  not. "  There- 
upon her  counsel  requested  "  that  the  witness  have  the  privilege  of  ex- 
amining the  contents  of  the  letter,  before  being  required  to  answer  if 
it  was  her  signature."  This  request  was  refused,  and  the  plaintiff  ex- 
cepted. The  witness  answered  that  she  would  not  be  positive  that  the 
signatures  to  the   letters  were  her   signatures.     She  stated  tliat   she 

^  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Biug.  approval  in  Gleuu  v.  Gleasou,  Gl  la. 
^4,  292.  28,  34. 

«  1  Greeul.    Ev.  §  4(13;   quoted  with 


638  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  ThoUip.   Tr.^ 

thought  at  one  time  that  the  signature  to  one  of  the  letters  was  her 
signature.  Thereupon  counsel  for  defendant  proceeded  to  read  certain 
clauses  of  the  letters,  and  asked  the  witness  if  she  had  written  them. 
Questions  like  the  following  were  put  to  her:  "  Did  you,  in  the  same 
letter,  say  to  him :  '  Do  not  let  them  draw  anything  out  of  you  that  will 
conflict  with  the  statement  I  givej-ou  ;  '  '  No  one  to  love  them,  no  one 
to  caress  them,'  —  Did  you  write  that?  "  The  counsel  for  the  plaintiff 
protested  against  this  mode  of  examining  the  witness,  for  the  reason 
that  the  letters  were  the  best  evidence  of  their  contents,  and  that  the 
witness  should  not  be  compelled  to  give  her  recollection  of  what  she 
had  written  when  the  letters  which  she  had  written  were  in  court.  The 
court  overruled  the  objection  and  permitted  the  counsel  to  proceed,  and 
the  witness  answered  all  the  interrogatories  to  the  effect  that  she  did 
not  remember.  It  was  held  that  in  so  ruling  the  court  erred.  The 
coui'se  of  examination  was  a  plain  violation  of  the  rules  above  drawn 
from  the  text  of  Prof.  Greenleaf.  The  course  pursued  tended  to  em- 
barrass and  confuse  the  witness  and  prejudice  her  in  the  minds  of  the 
jury,  and  the  error  was  not  cured  by  the  fact  that  the  letters  were 
subsequently  read  in  evidence.^ 

§  834.  Use  of  Document  for  one  Purpose  does  not  make  it 
Evidence  for  all  Purposes.  —  The  fact  that  a  party  uses  a  docu- 
ment, e.^.,  an  account  book,  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  the  date, 
does  not  make  it  competent  evidence  against  him  for  all  pur- 
poses.'^ 

§  835.  Whole  of  a  Correspondence.  —  By  analogy  to  a 
rule  already  stated  in  respect  of  conversations,  ^  if  a  portion  of  a 
correspondence  is  given  in  evidence,  the  other  party  is  entitk^d 
to  call  for  the  remaining  portion  of  it.*  The  rule  appears  to  be 
firmly  settled,  both  as  to  a  conversation  or  writing,  that  the  in- 
troduction of  a  part  renders  admissible  so  much  of  the  remain- 
der, as  tends  to  explain  or  qualify  what  has  been  received,  and 
that  is  to  be  deemed  a  qualification  which  rebuts  and  destroys  the 
inference  to  be  derived  from,  or  the  use  to  be  made  of  the  por- 


1  Gleim  V.  Gleasou,  Gl  la.  28,  33.  ^  j^iae^  §  412. 

2  Abbott  V.  Pearson,  130  Mass.  191;  ^  Livermore  v.    St.    John,   4  Rob 
Compare    Shaw   v.    Stone,     1     Cush.  (N.  Y.)  12. 

fMass.)  228. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVI.]  USE  OF  books  and  papers.  639 

tion  put  in  evidence.^  A  party  may  give  in  evidence  against 
his  adversary  any  letter  of  his,  containing  admissions  material  to 
the  issue,  without  putting  in  the  whole  of  the  correspondence  be- 
tween them.  If  the  letter,  which  he  puts  in  evidence,  shows  that 
it  is  in  reply  to  another  letter^  he  may  doubtless  put  that  letter  in 
evidence  also,  as  tending  to  explain  the  former. ^  But  he  is  not 
bound  to  do  so  ;  he  may  leave  it  to  his  adversary,  on  cross-ex- 
amination or  otherwise,  to  offer  any  competent  evidence  of  the 
rest  of  the  correspondence  which  he  desires.'^  In  considering  this 
question  it  was  said  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Gray:  "  When  a  par- 
ticular communication,  which  refers  to  a  previous  one,  is  not  intro- 
duced as  containing  the  terms  of  a  contract,  we  see  no  more  reason 
for  obliging  the  party  offering  it  to  put  in  the  previous  communica- 
tion also,  when  the  communications  are  Avritten,  than  when  they 
are  oral.  In  either  case,  whether  the  communications  are  by 
successive  letters  or  by  distinct  conversations,  the  party  intro- 
ducing the  second  in  evidence  may,  if  he  pleases,  introduce  the 
first  also  ;  and  if  he  does  not,  the  other  party  may.  The  actual 
custody  of  the  papers  does  not  affect  the  question  which  party 
shall  introduce  them,  but  only  the  steps  to  be  taken  to    compel 

1  Grattau   v.  Metroplitau  Life  lus,  2  Trichet  v.  Harailtou  lus.    Co.,  14 

Co.,  92  N.  Y.  27i,  284;  Gildersleeve  v.  Gray  (Mass.),  456. 
London,  73  N.  Y.  G09    (applying  tlie  3  stone  v.  Sanborn,  104  Mass.  319, 

rule  in  tlie construction  of  a  pleading).  324;  Barrymore  v.  Taylor,  1  Esp.  326; 

Compare  Rouse  v.  Whited,   25  N.  Y.  De  Medina  v.  Owen,  3  Car.  &  K.  626. 

170;    The   Queen's   Case,    2  Brod.    &  Contrary  to  the  above,  Pollock,  C.  B., 

Biug.  297,  298;  Prince  v.  Samo,  7  Ad.  ruled  in  AValson  v.  Moore,  1  Car.  &  K. 

&  El.  627.     In  Rouse  v.  Whited,  supra,  626,  that  the  party  offering  the  reply  In 

the  question,  as  it  relates  to  conversa-  evidence  should  put  in  both  letters  or 

tions,  is  examined  at  length,  and  the  neitlier;  but  this  was  supposed  by  Mr. 

conclusion  is  reached  that,  where  one  Chief  Justice  Gray  to  be  nothing  more 

party  puts  apart  of  a  conversation  in  than  an  exercise  of  discretion  as  to  the 

evidence,   this   does   not    entitle    the  order  of  proof.  Stone  u.  Sanborn,  s»pto. 

other  party  to  demand  the  whole  con-  In  Crery  u.  Pollard,   14  Allen  (Mass.), 

versadon,  but  only  so  ranch  of  it  as  is  284,   the    reply  was  held  admissible, 

relevant  to  the  issues:  approving  Prince  as    evidence   of    notice  to   the  party 

V.   Samo,  supra,  and  denying  on  this  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  without 

point  the  Queen's   Case,  supra.     See  producing  the  letter  to  which  it  was  a 

also  Forrest  u.  Forrest,  6  Duer  (N.  Y.),  reply. 
126,  127. 


040  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOmp.   Tl'., 

their  production."  ^  In  another  American  jurisdiction  an  oppos- 
ing view  has  been  expressed,  that  the  party  seeking  to  avail  him- 
self of  the  letter  of  his  adversary  as  evidence,  is  bound  to  call  for 
and  put  in  evidence  the  letter  to  which  it  is  a  reply,  as  a  part  of 
his  own  evidence,  —  the  court  saying:  "  However  ingenious  and 
plausible  the  reason  assigned  in  the  English  authorities,  it  seems 
to  us,  the  general  principle  adopted  by  the  American  authors  on 
evidence,  that  the  whole  admission  must  be  taken  together,  gen- 
erally requires  the  prior  letter  to  be  produced  or  accounted  for, 
before  the  answer  can  be  properly  admitted  in  evidence ;  though 
we  do  not  decide  it  to  be  always  the  rule,  and  without  exception;^ 
for  the  character  of  the  letter  and  the  case  may  make  the  pro- 
duction of  the  first  unnecessary.  The  rule  in  chancery  that  a 
party  against  whom  an  answer  is  produced  may  claim  to  have  the 
whole  bill,  as  well  as  the  answer,  read  as  j^art  of  his  adversary's 
case,  upon  the  same  ground  that  where  one  proves  answers  in 
conversation  against  a  party,  he  may  insist  on  having  the  ques- 
tion to  which  he  made  the  replies,  put  in  evidence,  is,  we  think,  a 
forcible  illustration  and  correct  applic;rtion  of  the  principle."  ^ 

§  836.  Assailing  the  Integrity  of  one's  own  Documentary 
Evidence.  —  After  introducing  a  document  in  evidence,  without 
any  qualification,  the  party  introducing  it  cannot  be  permitted  to 
impeach  its  integrity,  or  assail  the  correctness  of  its  statements.^ 

§  837.  Effect  of  putting  in  Evidence  Affidavit  of  Opposing 
Party. — A  party  is  not  bound  by  all  the  statements  contained 
in  the  affidavit  of  his  opponent,  although  he  himself  puts  it 
in  evidence  for  a  particular  purpose;  but  he  may  contradict 
that  portion  of  it  which  works  against  him.  Such  would  be  the 
rule  if  be  were  to  put  his  opponent  ui)on  the  stand;  ho  woukl  not 
be  estopped  by  his  testimony,  but  would  be  at  liberty  to  show 
the  facts  to  be  contrary  thereto.^     But  a  party  cannot  get  in  his 

1  Stone  V.  Siiiil)orn,  KH  Mass.  319,  ■''  Macliu  v.  lusurauce   Co.,  33  La. 

325.  Ann.  801. 

*  Simmons    v.    Ilaas,    5G   Md.   153,  *  Mather  v.  Parsons,    32   Hun   (N. 

1G2;     citing    1    Greenl.     Ev.,     §201,  Y.),  331),  3-t4.     Compare  Hunt  v.  Fish, 

note  1.  -t  Barl).  (N.  Y.)  324;  ante,  §  515. 


Tit.  Ill,   Ch.   XXVI.]    USE    OF    BOOKS    AND    PAPERS.  641 

own  affidavit,  by  putting  in  evidence  the  affidavit  of  his  oppo- 
nent, in  which  his  own  affidavit  is  referred  to  and  contradicted.^ 

§  838.  Telegraphic  Dispatches. — The  telegraphic  message 
which  is  sent  and  not  the  one  which  is  received  and  transcribed 
at  the  other  end  of  the  line,  is  the  original.  The  latter  is  a  copy, 
and  carries  with  it  none  of  the  qualities  of  primary  evidence.'^ 
Where  it  is  material  to  prove  the  sending  and  delivery  of  a  tele- 
graphic message,  the  usual  course  is  to  show  the  delivery  of  the 
original  message  at  the  office  from  which  it  was  to  be  telegraphed, 
and  then  to  show  that  it  was  transmitted  and  delivered  at  the 
place  of  its  destination.  But  even  where  the  original  is  pro- 
duced, its  authenticity  must  be  established,  either  by  proof  of 
the  handwriting,  or  b}'  other  evidence  of  its  genuineness.  It  has 
been  held  that  proof  of  the  destruction  of  all  the  messages  sent 
from  the  sending  office,  on  the  day  on  which  the  particular  mes- 
sage was  sent,  is  sufficient  foundation  to  let  in  secondary  evi- 
dence of  its  contents.  But  this  secondary  evidence  can  only  be 
admitted,  on  proof  that  the  copy  offered  is  a  correct  transcript 
of  the  message  actually  authorized  by  the  party  sought  to  be  af- 
fected by  its  contents.^ 

§  839.   Dispatch  received  not  Evidence  of  Dispatch  sent. — 

The  fact  that  a  telegraphic  dispatch  was  delivered  to  a  man  on  a 
certain  day  at  a  distant  place,  is  not  proved  by  producing  what 
purports  to  be  a  telegraphic  reply  signed  by  him,  received  at  the 
sending  office,  very  soon  after  on  the  same  day,  and  addressed  to 
the  sender  of  the  former  dispatch;  *  for,  although  men,  in  the 
ordinary  affairs  of  life,  constantly  act  upon  such  evidence,  yet  it 
was  said  that  the  only  way  to  prove  such  a  message  in  a  court  of 
law,  is  to  summon  both  the  intermediate  agents  or  bearers  of  the 
message,  —  that  is,  the  agent  of  the  telegraph  company  receiving 

1  Degraft  v.  Hovey,  16  Abb   Pr.  (N.  ness   of   au   affidavit   used  iu   judicial 

Y.)  120      Iu  tliis  case  it  is  erroneously  proceedings,  see  Maybee  v.  Suiffen,  2 

said  that,  after  putting  in  liis  oppo-  E.  D.  Smitii  (N.  Y.),  1. 

ueut's  affidavit  he  could  not  contradict  ^  Mattesou  v.  Noyes,  25111.  591. 

if,  having  made  it  his  own  testimony.  ^  gmith  v.  Easton,  54  Md.  138,  145. 

See  ante,  §  515.     As  to  tlie  conclusive-  ■•  Howley  v.  Whipple,  48  N.  H.  487. 

41 


642  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  Thonip.   Tl".  , 

and  transmitting  the  message,  and  the  agent  at  the  end  of  the 
transit,  receiving  and  delivering  it,  —  and  by  them  proving  its 
transmission  and  delivery.  Anything  short  of  this  wonld  be  to 
rely  npon  hearsay  evidence  of  the  loosest  character.^ 

§  840.  Book  Entries  on  Proof  that  they  were  truly 
made.  —  Upon  a  princii)le  very  closely  allied  to  that  which  per- 
mits the  use  by  witnesses  of  memoranda  to  refresh  their  memo- 
ries,^  is  a  principle  which  admits  the  contents  of  books  of  ac- 
counts, upon  proof  that  the  books  were  truly  kept  and  the  en- 
tries truly  made,  although  the  witness  so  deposing  cannot  testify, 
by  reason  of  the  lapse  of  time,  to  the  truth  of  the  particular  en- 
tries. Originally,  it  seems,  such  entries  were  only  admissible 
after  the  death  of  the  person  whose  books  they  were.-'^  Other 
circumstances,  such  as  insanity  or  absence  beyond  the  jurisdic- 
tion, have  been  regarded  as  tantamount  to  death. ^  In  such  cases 
the  books  are  admitted  on  proof  of  the  handwriting  of  the  part}^. 
But  where  the  party  is  alive,  produced  as  a  witness,  and  is  not 
able  to  recollect  the  fact  recorded  in  the  books,  independently  of 
the  entry,  after  referring  to  it,  the  principle  has  been  extended 
so  as  to  admit  the  writing  in  evidence,  upon  preliminary  proof  of 
the  single  additional  fact  that  it  was  truly  made.^ 

§  841.  Use  of  the  Instrument  which  is  the  Foundation  of 
the  Action. — While  the  defendant,  in  an  action  brought  upon 
a  written  instrument,  is  entitled  to  crave  oyer  of  it  under  the  com- 
mon-law practice,    or  to  an  inspection  of  it  under  statutes,  he 

1  Howley  w.  Whipple,  SMpj'rt.  IG    Weud.  587;    Bank    of  Monroe    v. 

2  Ante,  §31)8,  et  seq.  Culver,   2  Hill  (N.    Y.),  532;   Cole   v. 

3  Price  V.  Earl  of  Torrinston,  1  Sra.  Jessnp,  10  N.  Y.  9G;  Bunker  v.  Shed, 
L.  Cas.  (6  Am.  ed.)  3'.i0;  Doe  ■».  Tur-  8  Mete.  (Mass.)  150;  Farmers'  &c. 
ford,  3  Barn.  &  Ad.  898;  Pool  v.  Di-  Bank  v.  Boraef,  1  Rawle  (Pa.)  152; 
cas,  1  Bing.  N.  C.  049;  Welsh  v.  Smith  v.  Lane,  12  Serg.  &  R.  84;  Red- 
Barrett,  15  Mass.  380;  Brewster  v.  den  r.  Spruance,  4  Har.  (Del.)  2(!5, 
Doane,  2  Hill  (N.  Y.),  537;  Nicholas  2G9;  Bullard  v.  Wilson, 5  Mart.  (x.  s.) 
V.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  32(1.  (La.)  10(J;  s.  c.  3  Cond.  505;  Spann  t'. 

4  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Ingersoll,  Baltzell,  1  Fla.  302,  321;  Underwood 
65  111.  3!)9.  V.  Parrott,  2  Tex.  1()8,  17G;  Humphreys 

5  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  115,  note  4,  §  120,  v.  Spear,  15  111.  275;  Lawrence  v 
note  2;  Merrill  v.   Ithaca  &c.  R.  Co.,  Stiles,  IG  Bradw.  (III.)  489. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.XXVI.]  USE  OF  books  and  papers.  643 

cannot  claim  tlie  right  to  have  it  delivered  to  him  for  the  pur- 
pose of  being  annexed  to  a  commission  to  take  depositions,  in 
order  that  it  may  be  inspected  by  his  witnesses,  Avho  reside  out 
of  the  State.  There  is  no  precedent  for  thus  placing  the  instru- 
ment Avhich  is  the  foundation  of  the  action,  and  which  belono-s 
to  the  plaintiff,  within  the  power  of  the  defendant.^  Witnesses 
may  be  examined  on  a  commission  as  to  an  original  j^aper,  by 
annexing  a  copy  to  the  interrogatories,  for  the  purpose  of  refer- 
ence, description  and  identification,  and  by  producing  the  orig- 
inal on  the  examination  of  the  witness  for  inspection  and  identi- 
fication. It  is  not  necessary  that  the  original  be  annexed  to 
the  interrogatories.  "A  party  is  never  called  upon  to  risk 
the  loss  of  valuable  original  papers,  by  annexing  them  to  a  com- 
mission to  be  transmitted  to  a  distant  State  or  country  for  exe- 
cution." 2 

§842.  Duplicate  Evidence  of  Indebtedness.  —  It  seems 
that,  where  the  evidence  of  an  indebtedness  is  in  duplicate,  so 
that  an  action  can  be  supported  upon  either  instrument,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  sue  upon  both,  but  an  action  upon  one  will  be  a  bar 
to  an  action  upon  the  other;  and  hence  that,  in  an  action  upon 
one,  it  will  not  be  necessary  to  introduce  the  other  in  evi- 
dence.^ 

§  843.  Objections  to  Documentary  Evidence  must  be  Spe- 
cific. —  It  is  but  a  specification  under  the  rule*  already  stated,  to 
say  that,  when  a  document  is  offered  in  evidence  and  objected 
to,  the  objection  must  distinctly  state  the  grounds  on  which  the 
objector  chooses  to  stand.  The  reason  is  that  the  opposite  party 
may  have  opportunity  of  curing  the  defect,  if  there  be  one.® 

1  Butler  V.  Lee,  19  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  ^  See  Skinuer  v.  Skiuuer,  77  Mo, 
383;  s.  c.  32  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  75.                       U8,  155. 

2  Commercial  Bank  v.  Union  Bank,  *  Ante,  §  693. 

11  N.  Y.  203,  209.  s  Garner  v.    State,  5  Lea    (Tenn.), 

213,  218. 


644  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.       [  1  TllOllip.  Tr., 


CHAPTER     XXVII. 


OF  NATURAL  EVIDENCE. 


Article     I.  — Inspection  of  Persons  and  Things  in  Court:  Trial  by 

Inspection. 
Article    II.  —  View  of  Places  and  Things  out  op  Court. 


Article  I.  — Inspection  of  Persons  and  Things  in  Court:  Trial  by 

Inspection. 
Sectiox 

850.  lu  AVhat  Cases  formerly  Permitted. 

851.  lu  What  Cases  still  commouly  Granted. 

852.  In  Cases  of  Alleged  Pregnancy. 

853.  Inspection  of  the  Body  in  Proceedings  for  Divorce  or  Nullity  of  Marriage. 

854.  Order  for  such  Inspection,  how  Enforced. 

855.  Mode  of  Inspection  in  such  Cases. 

85G.  Inspection  of  the  Child  in  Filiation  Cases. 

857.  On  a  Question  of  Personal  Identity. 

858.  Exhibiting  Injured  Parts  of  the  Human  Body  to  the  Jury. 

859.  Compulsory  Physical  Examination  of  Plamtiff  in  Actions  for  Personal 

Injuries. 

860.  Before  Trial. 

'  861.  Such  Examination,  how  Conducted. 

862.  Compelling  Plaintiff  to  perform  Physical  Acts  before  Jury. 

863.  Instance  Avhere  such  Experiment  was  Properly  Refused. 

864.  Experiments  in  Preparation  for  Trial  or  Hearing. 

865.  Compelling  Inspection  of  Chattels. 

866.  Physical  Examination  of  the  Defendant  in  Criminal  Trials. 

867.  Compulsory  Experiments  by  the  Prisoner,  disclosing  Guilt. 

868.  Obscene  Photographs. 

869.  Photographic  and  Stereoscopic  Views. 

870.  Plans  and  Diagrams. 

871.  Indicia  of  Crime  —  Blood-stained  Clothing,  Burglar's  Tools,  etc. 

872.  When  Court  will  not  assume  Labor  of  Examining  Natural  Evidence. 

§  850.  In  What  Cases  formerly  Permitted. —  Trial  by  in- 
spection or  examination  was  an  ancient  and  well  recognized  mode 
of  determining  collateral  questions  which  arose  in  legal  proceed- 


Tit.    Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]       NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  645 

ings,  and  was  frequently  resorted  to  for  the  purpose  of  deter- 
mining the  chief  issue  in  an  action  at  law  ,  in  which  last  case  the 
inspection  was  by  the  judge  or  judges,  Avho  thereupon  proceeded 
to  give  their  judgment  without  the  intervention  of  a  jury.  This 
mode  of  trial  seems  to  have  been  thus  used  where  the  question 
of  non-age  was  in  dispute,  as  in  the  case  of  a  suit  to  reverse  a 
fine  for  the  non-age  of  the  cognizor.^  It  was  also  resorted  to  to 
determine  questions  of  personal  identily,  —  as  where  it  was 
pleaded  in  abatement  that  the  plaintiff  was  dead  and  that  the 
pretended  phiintiff  was  simulating  a  deceased  person ;  ^  in  cases 
of  idiocy,  where  the  lord  chancellor  determined  the  question  by 
an  inspection  of  the  person  of  the  alleged  idiot ;  ^  on  an  appeal 
of  mayhem,  where  the  issue  joined  was  mayhem  or  no  mayhem, 
in  which  case  the  decision  was  by  the  court  on  inspection;  ^  in 

actions  of  trespass  for  mayhem,^  or  for  an  atrocious  battery,^ 

in  which  cases  the  judges  would,  upon  an  inspection,  increase 
the  damages  at  their  discretion,  —  a  practice  which  has  gone 
wholly  out  of  use  in  modem  times,  though  it  is  common  for 
courts  to  require  a  remittitur  of  damages  as  a  ground  for  refus- 
ing a  new  trial. 

§  851.  Ill  what  Cases  still  Commonly  Granted.  — In  mod- 
ern procedure,  this  mode  of  trial  is  regularly  resorted  to  in  the 
followino;  cases:  — 

1.  In  criminal  trials,  where  the  defendant,  a  female,  having 
been  tried  and  found  guilty,  pleads  her  pregnancy  in  stay  of 
execution.^ 

1  3  Bla.  Com.  332;  9  Co.  Rep.  31.  ch.  51,  §  10;  Bish.  Crim.  Proc,  §  1823.; 

2  3  Bla.  Com.  332;  9  Co.  Rep.  30.  1  Chit.  Crlm.   L.    759,  7(51;  3  lust.  17; 

3  3  Bla.  Com.  332;  9  Co.  Rep.  31.  1  Hale  P.    C.  308;  2   Hale  P.  C.  407, 

4  3  Bla.  Com.  332;  2  Roll.  Abr.  578.  418.  In  receut  times  this  has  been 
It  should  be  added  that  appeals  of  regarded,  it  Trould  seem,  grouud  for 
mayhem  were  abolished  by  statute,  an  application  to  the  home  secretary, 
59  Geo,  III.,  ch.  4(3.  in  England,  for  a  respite  of  the  sen- 

5  3  Bla.  Com.  332;  1  Sid.  108.  teuce:  Reg.  v.  Hunt,  supra.  The  plea 
^  3  Bhi,  Com.  332;  Hardr.  408.  of  pregnancy  merely  operates  to  delay 
^  Reg.  V.  Bayntou,  17  How.  St.  Tr.      sentence;  it  is  not  a  ground  for  a  new 

589,  C3L  Compare  Reg.  v.  Hunt,  2  trial,  since  it  does  not  touch  the  ques- 
Cox  C,    C.  2(;l     See  2   Hawk.  P.  C,      tiou  of  guilt   or   innocence:    Holman 


646 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOlUp.  Tl'., 


2.  In  cases  in  chancery,  where  an  inspection  became  necessary 
in  order  to  determine  whether  an  heir  presumptive  or  a  devisee 
for  life,  in  tail  or  in  fee,  should  be  admitted  to  the  enjoyment  of 
an  estate.^ 

3.  In  proceedings  for  divorce  or  nullity  of  marriage,  on  the 
ground  of  impotency  or  sexual  incapacity.^ 

4.  In  proceedings  to  lay  out  roads  and  to  assess  damages, 
where  land  is  taken  for  public  uses  ;  in  the  former  of  which 
cases  a  jury  of  view  is  ordered  under  statutory  regulations,  and 
in  the  latter  it  is  the  common  practice  for  the  jurors  or  commis- 
sioners to  view  the  locus  in  quo.^ 

5.  In  criminal  or  civil  trials  where,  under  statutory  authority, 
and  sometimes  without  it,  the  court  may  order  a  view  by  the 
jury,  of  the  place  where  the  alleged  crime  was  committed,  or  the 
features  of  which  are  involved  in  the  controversy.* 

6.  In  actions  for  personal  injuries,  where  it  becomes  necessary 


V.  State,  13  Ark.  105,  111.  As  to  the 
meauiug  of  the  term  "  quick  with 
child,"  "which  commonly  arises  iu 
such  cases,  see  Bish.  Stat.  Crim. 
§  45;  Ees  v.  Phillips,  3  Camj).  73,  7G; 
Cora.  V.  Reicl,  1  Pa.  Leg.  Gaz.  Rep.  182; 
Reg.  V.  Wycherley,  8  Carr.  &  P.  262; 
State  V.Cooper,  22  N.  J.  L.  52,  57;  Rex 
V.  Russell,  1  Mood.  C.  C.  356,  360; 
State  V.  Smith,  32  Me.  369;  State  v. 
Emerich,  13  Mo.  App.  492. 

1  1  Bla.  Com.  456;  Lord  Belmore  v. 
Anderson,  4  Bro.  C.  C.  90;  Ex  parte 
Aiscough,2P.  Wms.  591. 

2  2  Bish.  Mar.  &  Div.,  §  590,  et  seq.; 
Devenbagh  v.  Deveubagh,  5  Paige, 
(N.  Y.)  554,  557;  Briggs  v.  Morgan,  3 
Phillimore,  325;  s.  c.  1  Eng.  Ecc. 
408;  2  Hagg.  Con.  324;  Norton  v. 
Setou,  3  Phillimore,  147;  Shafto  v. 
Shafto,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  34;  Brown  v. 
Brown,  1  Hagg.  Ecc.  523 ;  s.  c.  3  Eng. 
Ecc.  229;  Anon.,  Dean  &  S.  333;  Ale- 
son  u.  Alesou,  2  Lee,  576;  Newell  v. 
Newell,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  25-,  Anon.,  35 


Ala.   226;  LeBarrou  v.  LeBarrou,  35 
Vt.    365;     Pollard    v.     Wybourne,    1 
Hagg.    Ecc.    725;    Owen  v.   Owen,   4 
Hagg.    Ecc,   261;  B.  v.    L.,    L.    R.   1 
Prob.  &   Div.   639;  T.    v.  M.,  L.    R.  1 
Prob.  &  Div.  31;  H.  v.  H.,  3  Swab.  & 
Tr.  517,   592;  s.  c.    33  L.  J.   (P.     M.  & 
A.)  159,   and  34  L.  J.  (P.  M.  &  A.)  12 
Harrison  v.  Sparrow,  3  Curt.  Ecc.  1. 
s.  c,  7  Eng.   Ecc.  357;  s.  c,  sub   noni 
Harrison    v.  Harrison,  4  Moore  P.  C 
96;   S.  V.  E.,  3   Swab.  &  Tr.  240;  M.  v 
B.,    3    Swab.  &  Tr.   550;  H.  v.  C,  1 
Swab.  &  Tr.  605;  E.  v.  D.,  4  Swab.  & 
Tr.  86;  T.  v.  D.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  DiVo 
127;  U.  V.   J.,  L.  R.    1  Prob.    &  Div. 
460;  L.  V.  H.,  4  Swab.  &  Tr.  115,  118; 
W.  V.  H.,  2  Swab.  &Tr.  240;  Deane  v. 
Aveling,  1  Rob.  Ecc.  279;  Grimbalde- 
ston  V.  Anderson,  cited  3  Phillimore 
155;  s.  c.  1  Eng.  Ecc.  385. 

3  See  tlie  next  article  iu  this  chap- 
ter. 

*  See  the  next  article  iu  this  chap- 
ter. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.   XXVII.]       NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  647 

to  order  an  examination  of  the  body  of  the  person  injured,  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  the  extent  of  his  injuries. ^ 

7.  In  cases  of  disputed  identity ^^  and  in  other  cases  hereinafter 
exphdned. 

8.  In  addition  to  tliis,  it  is  the  common  practice  in  criminal 
trials  to  produce,  for  the  inspection  of  the  jury,  the  iveajJOii  with 
wliich  the  crime  was  committed,^  any  clothing  or  other  articles 
containing  blood-stains,  *  or,  in  general,  any  material  object, 
capable  of  being  produced  in  the  court-room  and  exhibited  to  the 
jury,  the  physical  characteristics  of  which  speak  in  evidence,  in 
connection  with  the  oral  evidence,  concerning  the  alleged  crime. ^ 

§  852.  In  Cases  of  Alleged  Pregnancy.  —  Where  it  became 
necessary  to  have  an  inspection  of  the  body  in  cases  of  alleged 
pregnancy,  this  inspection,  according  to  the  ancient  and  familiar 
practice,  was  made  by  a  jnrj/  of  matrons,  under  a  writ  denomi- 
nated in  the  ancient  law  de  ventre  inspiciendo.^  This  mode  of 
trying  the  fact  has  been  condemned  by  modern  medical  authority,^ 
on  the  most  unanswerable  grounds,  supported  by  historical  in- 
stances.^ It  is  quite  too  plain  for  argument  that,  in  many  cases, 
a  jury  of  old  women  might  not  be  able  to  distinguish  a  case  of 
pregnancy  from  a  case  of  dropsy,  and  that  their  conclusions  would 
bear  no  comparison  for  accuracy  or  probability  wnth  the  conclus- 
ions of  a  commission  of  expert  surgeons.  Accordingly,  we  find 
that  modern  statutes  have,  in  some  instances,  substituted  for  this 
inadequate  and  insufficient  mode  of  trial,  a  trial  by  a  jury,  com- 
posed, in  whole  or  in  part,  of  medical  men.^ 

1  Post,  §    S69,,  et  seq.  Ex  parte   Aiscough,  2   P.  Wms.  591; 

2  Post,  §  857.  Ex  parte  Bellett,  1  Cox  Chau.  Cas.  297 ; 

3  McDonel  v.  Stare,  90  lud.  327.  Marston  v.  Eoe,  8  Ad.  &  El.  U. 

4  Com.  V.  Twitchell,  1  Brewst.  '  Beck  Med.  Jnr.  203,  205,  et  seq.; 
(Pa.)  501,  5G3.  Taylor's  Med.  Jur.  154,  ct  seq. 

^  See,  for  instance,  Com.  r.  Brown,  *  In  Eeg.  v.  Wycherley,  8  Carr.  &  P. 

121  Mass.  09;  People  v.  Gonzales,  35  2G2,  a  jury  of  matrons   had  the  good 

X.  Y.  49;  Gardner  v.  People,  6  Park.  sense  to  ask  for  the   assistance  of  a 

Cr.  E.  (N.  Y.)  155;   State  v.  Modecai,  surgeon. 

t;8N.  C.  207;   State  v.  Graliam,  74  N.C.  »  2  Eev.  Stat.  N.  Y.,  ch.  G58;  1  Eev. 

G46;  post,  §  870.  Stat.  Mo.  1879,  §  1851.     The  mode  of 

6  1  Beck  Med.  Jur.,  ch.  G ;  Cro.  Eliz.  procedure  in  the  case  of  a  writ  de  ventre 

6GG;  Ex  parte  Wallop,  3  Bro.  C   C.  90;  inspiciendo,  executed  by  a  jury  of  ma- 


648  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.        [1  TllOlllp.  Tl'., 

§  853.  Inspection  of  the  Body  in  Proceeding'  for  Divorce  or 
Nullity  of  Marriage. — Inspections  of  this  kind  are  always  in- 
delicate and  distressing  to  the  feelings  of  the  parties,  and  are, 
therefore,  never  ordered  except  when  clearly  necessary.^  Nev- 
ertheless, it  is  settled  that  the  courts  are  not  at  liberty  to  decline 
to  order  such  an  inspection  on  the  ground  of  indelicacy  alone. 
"  Courts  of  law,"  said  Sir  William  Scott,  "  are  not  invested  with 
the  power  of  selection.  They  must  take  the  law  as  it  is  imposed 
on  them.  Courts  of  the  highest  jurisdiction  must  often  go  into 
cases  of  the  most  odious  nature,  where  the  proceeding  is  only 
for  the  punishment  of  the  offender.  Here  the  claim  is  for  a 
remedy,  and  the  court  cannot  refuse  to  entertain  it  on  any  fas- 
tidious notions  of  its  own."  ■^  But  an  order  for  an  inspection 
will  never  be  granted  unless  the  court  is  satisfied  that  the  com- 
plaint is  preferred  in  good  faith. '^  A  court  will  be  more  reluctant 
to  order  an  inspection  of  the  body  of  an  old  person  than  that  of 
a  young  person;  and,  for  equally  obvious  reasons,  it  will  be  more 
reluctant  to  grant  an  inspection  of  the  body  of  a  luife  than  that 
of  a  husband;  *  though  an  inspection  of  the  wife  is  sometimes 
ordered  where  she  herself  is  the  complainant,  since  the  impedi- 
ment to  the  consummation  of  the  marriage  may  exist  in  her,  and 
since  the  fact  of  her  virginity  may  be  of  itself  evidence  of  his  in- 
capacity.^ By  the  old  law,  an  inspection  would  not  be  granted 
in  a  divorce  proceeding  until  after  a  triennial  coJiahitation ;  ^ 
but  this  doctrine  seems  to  have  no  place  in  modern  divorce 
law.^  It  has  been  doubted,  in  England,  whether  a  decree 
of    nullity  would   be  granted   in  any   case   without  a   physical 

trons,   is   decribed    at  length  in  the  ^  Ibid. 

modern  case  of  Eeg.  v.  Wycheiiey,  8  ^  Ibid.;   Shafto  v.  Shafto,  28  N.  J. 

Carr.  &  P.  2C,2,  A.  D.  1838.     See  also  Eq.  34;  Brown  v.  Brown,  1  Hagg.  Ecc. 

State   V.  Arden,    1  Bay    (S.  C),   487;  523;  s.  c.  3  Eug.  Ecc.  229;  Anon.,  Doau 

Reg.  V.  Bayuton,  17  How    St.  Tr.  598,  &  S.  333. 

G31.  s  1  Coot.  Ecc.  Prac.  307;  Pollard  v. 

1  2   Bishop  :Mar.    and  l)iv.,    §  590;  Wybouru,  1  Hagg.  Ecc.  725;  2  Bishop 

Devenbagh    v.    DevenlKigh,    5    Paige  Mar.  and  Div.,  §  596. 
(N.  Y.),  554,  557.  "  Alesou  v.  Alesou^  2  Lee,  576c 

-  Briggs  V.  Morgan,  3  Pliillimore,  '  See  2  Bishop  Mar.  and  Div  .  §585; 

325,  328;  s.  c.  1  Eug.  Ecc.  490;  2  Hagg.  et  seq. 
Con.  324. 


Tit.   Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]        NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  64^ 

examination  of  the  defendant  by  scientific  men;  but  the  English 
courts  appear  to  have  settled  upon  the  doctrine  that  such 
an  inspection  is  not  required  in  all  cases;  that  the  physical 
incapacity  of  the  defendant  may  be  proved  by  any  attainable 
evidence ;  and  that  all  that  is  required  is  that  such  incapacity  be 
shown  to  exist,  and  that  there  is  clearly  no  collusion  between  the 
parties.^  In  this  country,  the  making  of  such  an  order  has  been 
regarded  as  discretionary,  and  hence  not  revisable  on  appeal. ^ 
While  many  decisions  emphasize  the  uncertain  results  of  such 
inspections,  even  where  the  person  inspected  is  the  wife  and  the 
object  is  to  ascertain  whether  she  is  virgo  intacta  et  apta  viro,'"^ 
and  it  has  been  held  that  a  decree  of  nullity  will  never  be  granted 
upon  the  evidence  furnished  by  such  an  inspection  alone,* — yet 
it  seems  to  have  been  the  opinion  at  one  time  that  a  decree  of 
nullity  would  never  be  pronounced  without  such  an  inspection.^ 
But  this  conclusion  seems  to  have  been  abandoned ;  ^  and  the 
contrary  w^ould  seem  to  be  the  better  conclusion,  as  applicable 
to  such  procedure  in  this  country,  where  the  parties  themselves 
are  allo\ved  to  give  evidence. 

§  854.   Order   for   such  Inspection,   how   Enforced. — If  a 

party  in  such  a  proceeding  refuses  to  undergo  an  inspection  which 
the  court  has  ordered,  he  or  she  may  be  proceeded  against  for 


1  Harrisons.  Harrison,  4  Moore  P.  926;  McClane  v.  Kiddle,  19  Ala.  180: 
C.  96,  103.  Michan  v.  Wyatt,  21  Ala.  813;   Lauier 

2  Anon.,  35  Ala.    226.     This  was  a  v.  Driver,  24  Ala.  149. 

rule  of  the  English  chancery  practice,  *  S.  v.  E.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  240,  243; 

■which  has  been  adopted  in  some  of  M.  «.  H.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  517,  520;  M. 

our  American  divorce  proceedings  by  v.  B.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  550;   H.  v.  C,  1 

analogy.     The  Alabama  court  cite,  in  Swab.  &  Tr.  605;  F.  v.  D.,  4  Swab.  & 

support  of  this  conclusion,  the  follow-  Tr.  86;  T.  v.  D.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  Div. 

ing:  2  Danl.  Ch.  Prac.  1136;  Wood  v.  127;  U.  v.  J.,  L.  R.  1  Prob.  &  Div.  460; 

Mann, 2  Surau-  (U.  S.)  316;  Hammers-  L.  v.  H.,  4  Swab.  &  Tr.  115,  118. 

leyu.  Brown,  2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  428;  ^  Norton  v.  Seton,  3  Phill.  Ecc.  147, 

Moody  V.   Payne,  3  Johns.    Ch.  294;  160;  s.  c.  1  Eug.  Ecc.  384. 

Cummings  v.  Gill,  G  Ala.  562;   Evans  ^  h.  v.  C,  1  Swab.  &  Tr.  605. 

V.  Boiling,  5  Ala.  550;  Bryant  t),  Peters,  «  F.  v.  D.,  4  Swab.  &.   Tr.  86,  92. 

3  Ala.  170;  Wyatt  v.  Magee,  3  Ala.  94;  This  decision  was  afterwards  reversed 

Planters'   &c.  Bank  v.  Walker,  7   Ala.  on  appeal:  34  L.  J.  (P.  &  M.)  66. 


650  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  ThoUll).  Tl'., 

contempt, 1  and  the  court  may  enforce  the  order  by  attaching  the 
body  of  the  contemning  party. "^  In  the  case  of  the  absence  of 
the  defendant,  the  English  Court  of  Divorce  has  sometimes  taken 
the  course  of  suspending  its  decree  of  nullity,  in  order  to  give 
the  petitioner  an  opportunity  of  having  the  defendant  inspected, 
if  he  or  she  should  afterwards  be  found  within  the  jurisdiction.^ 
In  such  a  case,  where  the  absent  defendant  was  the  wife,  an  order 
of  the  court  directed  that  her  alimony  pendente  lite  should  be 
withheld,  incase  she  refused  to  appear  and  submit  to  an  inspec- 
tion; ^  and  in  another  case  it  was  suggested  that  the  court  might 
suppress  the  defendant's  testimony  in  case  of  her  refusal.^  It 
is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  the  complaining  party  will  not 
be  prevented  from  having  a  decree  of  divorce  or  nullity,  through 
the  misconduct  of  the  defendant  in  placing  himself  or  herself 
beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  so  that  an  inspection  cannot 
be  had,  provided  it  clearly  appear  that  there  is  no  collusion.^ 

§  855.  Mode  of  Inspection  in  Such  Cases.  —  Where,  as  in 

some  American  jurisdictions,  divorce  cases  have  been  committed 
to  courts  of  chancery,  a  reference  has  been  ordered  to  a  master, 
directing  him  to  conduct  such  an  examination  and  report  the 
result  thereof.^  An  ex  parte  examination  by  the  party's  own 
physician  will  not  satisfy  the  demands  of  justice,  but  the  defend- 
ant will  be  required  to  submit  to  an  inspection  by  one  or  more 
respectable  gentlemen  of  the  medical  profession,  to  be  named 
for  that  purpose  by  the  comi)lainant  with  the  sanction  of  the 
court. ^  In  another  case  a  commissioner  was  appointed  to  take 
proofs,  to  select  disinterested  physicians,  and  through  them  to 

1  Harrison  v.  Sparrow,  3  Curt.  Ecc.  ^  Newell  v.  Newell,  9  Paige,  25. 
1;  s.  c.  7  Eng.  Ecc.  357;  s.  c.  sub  nom.           *  Anon.,  35  Ala.  2-20,  228. 
Harrison  v.  Harrison,  4  Moore  P.  C.           **  Wybourn  v.    Wybourn,    1    Ilagg. 
96,  Ecc.  725,  729;  s.  c.  3  Eng.  Ecc.  308. 

2  B.    V.   L.,  L.  R.    1  Prob.   &  Uiv.  '  Devenbagh      v.      Devenbagh,      5 
639.  Paige  (N.  Y.),  554,  558. 

3  T.  V.  N.,  L.  E.  1  Prob.  &  Div.  31.  «  Newell  v.   Newell,   9    Paige,   25. 
See  also  H.  v.  H.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  517  See  this  case  at  length  for  the  mode 
and  592;  s.  c.  33  L.  J.    (P.  M.  &  A.)  of  conducting  such  an  examination. 
159,  and  34  L.  J.  (P.  M.  &  A.)  12. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.  J      INSPECTION.  651 

make  such  an  examination.^  In  the  English  Ecclesiastical  Court 
the  examination  was  conducted  by  medical  inspectors,  generally 
two  physicians  and  a  surgeon,  or  two  surgeons  and  a  physician, 
nominated  by  the  complainant,  with  the  privilege  conceded  to 
the  adverse  party  of  naming  one  or  more  of  them.^  They,  of 
course,  take  an  oath,  faithfully  to  perform  the  duty  required  of 
them.^  They  certify  to  the  court  the  result  of  their  examina- 
tion.^ Their  certificate  merely  states  the  result  of  their  inspec- 
tion, in  conformity  with  the  oath  which  they  have  taken,  but 
does  not  give  the  reasons  for  their  conclusions.*'^  In  this  regard 
it  resembles  a  special  verdict.  In  addition  to  requiring  a  written 
certificate,  delivered  under  the  obligation  of  the  oath  which  they 
have  taken,  it  is  the  constant  practice  of  the  English  Ecclesias- 
tical courts  to  examine  them  as  witnesses,  touching  the  result  of 
their  inspection.^ 

§   856.    Inspection  of  the  Child  in  Filiation  Cases.  — In  the 

trial  of  an  action  involving  the  question  of  the  legitimacy  of  a 
child,  who  was  alleged  to  be  of  mixed  African  blood,  it  was  held 
proper  to  allow  the  child  to  be  exhibited  to  the  jury;  since 
"  when  the  question  is  whether  a  certain  object  is  hlack  or  white, 
the  best  evidence  of  color  would  be  the  exhibition  of  the  object 
to  the  jury.  The  eyes  of  the  members  of  the  jury  must  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  as  good  as  those  of  medical  men.  Why  should  a 
jury  be  confined  to  hearing  what  other  men  think  they  have  seen, 

1  Le  BaiTou  v.   Le  Barron,   35   Vt.      Prac.  (4tli  ed.)  (522,  023.     The  form  of 
365,  372.  the  oath  is  given  in  2  Bishop  Mar.  & 

2  Coot.  Ecc.   Prac.   388.     See   also      Div.,  §  598. 

Dean  v.   Aveling,    1    Rob.    Ecc.   279,  •*  Eor  forms  of  such  certificates,  see 

where  the  proceedings  appear  in  full.  L.  v.  H.,  4  Swab.  &  Tr.  115;  W.  v.  H., 

In  more  recent  times  the  practice  has  2  Swab.  &  Tr.  240;  S.  v.  E.,  3  Swab.  & 

been  to  appoint  but  tiKO  medical  or  Tr.  240. 

surgical  inspectors:  S.  v.  E,,  3  Swab.  ^  Pollard  v.  Wybouru,  1  Hagg. Ecc. 

&  Tr.  240;  M.  v.  H.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  517;  725,  727. 

M,  V.  B.,  3  Swab.  &  Tr.  550;  F.  v.  D.,  «  Deane  v.  Aveling,  1  Eob.Ecc.  279; 

4  Swab.  &  Tr,  8(J;  L.  v.  H.,  4  Swab.  &  W.  v.  H.,  2  Swab.  &  Tr.  240,242;  S.  v. 

Tr.  115.  E.,   3   Swab.  &  Tr.   240;  M.  v.  H.,  3 

3  2    Bishop    Mar.    &    Div.,  §   598;  Swab.  &  Tr.  517,  520;  M.  «.  B.,  3  Swab. 
Coot.   Ecc.   Prac.   389 ;    Browne   Div.  &  Tr.  550,  553. 


652  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

and  not  be  allowed  to  think  for  themselves?"  ^  In  a  previous 
case  in  the  same  State,  it  was  held  no  ground  of  new  trial  that 
the  mother  of  the  bastard  ehild  was  put  upon  the  stand  having 
the  child  in  her  arms,  and  that  the  solicitor  called  the  attention 
of  the  jury  to  the  child's  features,  and  afterwards  commented  up- 
on its  appearance  in  his  address  to  the  jury, — the  defendant 
having  taken  no  objection.  The  court  said  that  it  had  long  been 
the  practice  in  that  State,  in  bastardy  cases,  to  exhibit  the  child 
to  the  jury.^  In  a  similar  case  in  another  jurisdiction,  it  was 
held  not  error  to  allow  a  bastard  child  about  hvo  years  old  to  be 
exhibited  to  the  jury,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  them  to  deter- 
mine whether  there  was  a  family  i^esemblance  between  the  child 
and  the  defendant.^  But  in  another  case  in  the  same  court,  it 
was  held  error  to  allow  a  child  three  months  old  to  be  thus  ex- 
hibited.* The  distinction  drawn  by  the  court  between  these  two 
cases  w^as  that,  where  a  child  has  reached  a  considerable  maturity, 
family  resemblances  will  appear;  whereas  all  extremel}''  young 
babies  look  substantially  alike. ^ 

§  857.  On  a  Question  of  Personal  Identity.  —  In  an  En- 
glish revenue  case  a  defendant,  against  whom  an  information  had 
been  filed  for  importing  prohibited  goods,  was,  on  his  own  appli- 
cation, brought,  on  a  particular  day,  by  a  habeas  corpus  ad  testi- 
ficandum.^ into  court,  in  order  that  he  might  be  present  at  the 
trial,  so  as  to  avail  himself  of  the  only  point  of  defense  which  he 
made,  which  w^as  that  the  person  who  had  actually  committed  the 
offense  had  personated  him.®  The  report  does  not  disclose  why 
this    extraordinary  step    was    necessary  —  why    the    defendant 

1  Warlick  v.  White,   76  N.  C.    179.  2  state  v.  Woodruff,  67  N.  C.  89. 

The   court  quoted  the  followiug  pas-  ^  State  v.  Smith  (la.),  6N.  W.  Rep. 

sage  from  Horace: —  153;  s.  c.   22  Alb.  L.  J.  43;  s.  c.  54  la. 

''  Aut  agitur  res   in   scenis,  aut  104. 

acta  ref ertur :  ■*  State  v.  Danforth,  48  la.  43;  .s.   c. 

•'  Segnius    Irritaut    animos  de-  30  Am.  Rep.  387. 
missa  per  aurcm,  *  Note  bytheimnter:  The  judge  who 

"Quamquaisunt  oculis  subjectafidel-  made  this  ruling  must  have  been  an 

ibus,  et  quje  old  bacliclor. 
"  Ipse  sibi  tradit  spectator.  —  Eor.ad  *'  Attorney-General     v.    Eadden,   1 

Fisoncs.  Price,  403. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]       INSPECTION.  653 

would  not  necessarily  be  present  at  the  trial  without  being  so 
brought  up  ;  and  why  a  form  of  the  habeas  corpus  implying  that 
he  was  brought  up  as  a,  witness,  should  have  issued,  when  the  law 
rendered  him  incompetent  to  testify.  The  inference  is  that  he 
was  brought  up  for  the  purpose  of  inspection  merely. 

§  858.  Exhibiting  Injured  Parts  of  the  Human  Body  to  the 
Jury.  —  On  the  trial  of  actions  for  damages  for  a  personal  inju- 
ry, where  there  is  a  question  as  to  the  character  and  extent  of 
the  injury,  it  is  not  error  to  allow  the  injured  person  to  exhibit 
the  injured  portion  of  his  body  to  the  jury,i  unless  this  would 
involve  an  indecent  exposure  of  the  person,  which  ought  not  to 
be  permitted  in  a  judicial  proceeding.'-^  The  objection  that  such 
an  exhibition  has  a  tendency  unduly  to  excite  the  sympathies  of 
the  jurors,  is  not  tenable. 

§  859.  Compulsory  Physical  Examination  of  Plaintiff  in  Ac- 
tions for  Personal  Injuries.  —  In  modern  trials  of  civil  actions 
for  physical  injuries,  the  question  has  frequently  arisen  whether 
the  court  has  power  to  order  an  inspection  of  the  body  of  the 
plaintiff  or  person  injured,  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  injuries.  Some  of  the  courts,  car- 
rying in  their  minds  no  higher  conception  of  a  judicial  trial  than 
the  conception  that  it  is  a  combat,  in  which  each  of  the  gladia- 
tors is  permitted,  within  certain  limits,  to  deceive  and  trick  the 
antagonist  and  the  umpire,  have  denied  the  right  of  the  de- 
fendant to  have  an  order  for  such  inspection.^  Other  courts, 
taking  the  more  enlightened  view  that  the  object  of  a  judicial 

1  Hiller  v.  Sharon  Springs,  28  Hun  point  is  slurred  over  without  discus- 
(N.Y.),  344;  Mulhadov.  Broolilyn  City  siou) ;  Neuraau  v.  Third  Avenue  R. 
R.  Co.,  30N.  Y.  370;  Jordan  v.  Bow-  Co.,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  412;  Roberts  w. 
den,  46  N.  Y.  Super,  355;  Earlier  v.  Ogdtjusburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,  29  Hun 
Perry,  67  la,  146.  (N.  Y.),  154.    In  Texas  it  is  ruled  that 

2  Post,  §  861.  the  court  will  not  compel  a  plaintiff, 

3  Stuart V.  Haven,  17  Neb.  211,  214;  suing  for  personal  injuries,  to  submit 
Sioux  City  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlayson,  16  his  body  to  examination,  unless  it  is 
Neb.  578,  588;  Loyd  w.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  essential  to  the  ends  of  justice.  In- 
515  (overruled  it  seems  by  Shephard  ternational  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Underwood, 
Uo  Mo.  Pac.  R,  Co.,  85 Mo.  629)  ;  Parker  64  Tex.  464. 

V  Euslow,  102  111.  272,  279  (where  the 


654  NATURAL  EVIDENCE,  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

trial  is  to  enable  the  State  to  establish  and  enforce  justice  be- 
tween party  and  party,  have  held  that  it  is  within  the  power  of 
the  trial  court,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  in  proper 
cases,  upon  an  application  seasonably  made,  under  proper  safe- 
guards designed  to  preserve  the  rights  of  both  parties,  to  order 
such  an  inspection,  and  to  com})el  the  plaintiff  or  injured  person 
to  submit  to  it.^  Another  court  has  held  that  where  the  plaintiff 
in  such  an  action  alleges  that  his  injuries  are  of  a  permanent  na- 
ture, the  defendant  is  entitled,  as  a  matter  of  right,  to  have  the 
opinion  of  a  surgeon,  based  upon  a  personal  examination,  unless 
there  is  already  an  abundance  of  expert  evidence,  in  which  case 
the  court,  in  its  discretion,  may  refuse  to  order  an  examination."^ 
Another  court  has  ruled  that  the  trial  court  may  require  the 
plaintiff  in  such  an  action  to  submit  to  a  medical  examination 
and  dismiss  his  action,  if  he  refuses  to  comply  with  the  order, ^ 
This  conclusion  may  be  placed  upon  the  higher  ground  that, 
when  a  person  appeals  to  the  sovereign  for  justice,  he  impliedly 
consents  to  the  doing  of  justice  to  the  other  party,  and  impliedly 
agrees  in  advance  to  make  any  disclosure  which  is  necessary  to 
be  made  in  order  that  justice  may  be  done.  The  conception  of 
the  nature  and  objects  of  a  judicial  trial  which  denies  to  the  de- 
fendant, under  proper  safeguards,  the  right  of  such  an  inspec- 
tion, is  not  higher  than  that  of  the  old  law,  which  w^ould  not 
even  compel  a  party  to  produce  a  deed  or  private  paper,  in  a 
civil  case,  where  it  was  intended  to  be  used  in  evidence  against 
him,*  a  rule  which  the  court  of  chancery  invaded  to  prevent  fail- 
ures of  justice,  and  which  has  almost  entirely  disappeared  from 
modern  civil  jurisprudence.^ 

1  White  V.  Milwaukee  &c.  R.  Co.,  «  Sibley  u.  Smith,  46  Ark.  275;  s.c 

61  Wis.  536;  Walsh  v.  Sayre,  52  How.  55  Am.  Rep.  584. 

Pr.   334;  Shephard  v.   Mo.  P.  R.  Co.,  3  Miami  &c.  Co.w.  Baily,  37  Oh.  St. 

S5   Mo.    629;  s.  c.  55   Am.   Rep.    390;  104. 

Schoeder  v.  Railway  Co.,  47  la.   375;  ^  Haldane  v.  Harvey,  4  Burr.  2489; 

Miami  &c.    R.    Co.    v.   Baily,   37   Oh.  ante,  §  730  et  seq. 

St.  104;  Atchison  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Thul,  ^  The  power  to  compel  a  physical 

29  Kau.  466.     See  Ilatheld  v.  St.  Paul  examiuation  of  the  plaintiff,  in  an  ac- 

&c.  R.  Co.,  18  Am.  &Eng.  R.  R.  Cas.  tion  for  personal  injuries,   has   been 

292,  where  the  authorities  are  collected  likened  to   the  power  to   compel   the 

in  a  note  by  the  learned  editor.  opposite  party   to  produce  books  and 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII. J       INSPECTION.  655 

§  860.  Before  Trial.  —  It  has  been  held  that  the  court  has  power, 
under  the  New  York  statute,  relating  to  the  examination  of  parties  be- 
fore trial  to  compel  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  for  damages  for  a  phy- 
sical injury,  to  submit  to  a  physical  examination  by  medical  experts, 
where  the  defendant,  in  his  application,  makes  the  necessity  of  such  ex- 
amination appear,!  otherwise  not ;  ^  but  in  later  cases  in  the  same  State 
this  has  been  denied.-^ 

§  861.  Such  Examination,  liow  Condiictecl. — It  is  needless 
to  add  that  such  an  exannnation  Avill  not  be  ordered  in  i/ie  pres- 
ence of  the  jury,  where  it  would  require  an  indecent  exposure 
of  the  person;  ^  and  that,  while  the  court  for  obvious  reasons 
will  not  make  an  order  for  such  an  examination  to  be  had  ex 
parle^  or  by  surgeons  selected  by  one  party  alone,  without  an 
opportunity  for  surgeons  selected  by  the  other  party  to  be  pres- 
ent,—  yet  where  the  party  has  been  examined  ex  parte  without 
an  order  of  the  court,  there  is  no  rule  of  evidence  which  will  ex- 
clude the  testimony  of  the  examining  surgeons,^  provided  their 
testimony  does  not  come  within  the  rule  which  excludes  confi- 
dential communications  between  patient  and  physician. 

§  862.  Compelling  Plaintiff  to  Perform  Physical  Acts  before 
Jury.  —  From  analogy  to  some  of  the  preceding  holdings,  it  has 
been  concluded  that  the  trial  court  has  power,  in  a  proper  case 
and  under  proper  circumstances,  to  direct  the  plaintiff  to  do  a 
physical  act  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,  which  will  show  the 
character  of  his  injuries ;  and  it  has  been  supposed  that  there 
may  be  circumstances  where  the  defendant  would  have  a  rio-ht 
to  such  an  order.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  said  that,  "  from  the 
very  nature  of  things,  the  propriety  of  such  an  order  must  usu- 
ally rest  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  and  it  would 

papers.    Walsh  v.  Sayre,  52  How.  Pr.      154:  disapproving  Walsh  r.  Sayre,  52 
(N.  Y.)  334.  How.  Pr.    (N.  Y^  334;    and  Sliaw  v. 

1  Shaw  V.  "Van Rensselaer,  60  How.      Van  Rensselaer,  supra. 

E»r<,  (N.  Y.)  143.  *  Brown  v.  Swiueford,  44  Wis.  282, 

2  Ibid.  285. 

8  Neuman  v.  Third  Avenue  R.  Co.,  ^  Louisville  &c.   R.  Co.   n.  Falvey,. 

50N.  Y.    Super.  412;    Roberts -y.    Og-       104  Iiid.  409,  417. 
deusburgh  &c.  R.  Co.,  21)  Hun  (N.  Y.), 


656  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoni}).  Tl'., 

only  be  in  the  case  of  a  plain  abuse  of  such  discretion  "  that  an 
appellate  court  would  interfere. ^ 

§  863.  Instance  where  such  an  Experiment  was  Properly  Re- 
fused.—  In  an  action  against  a  railway  company  for  damages  it  ap- 
peared that  tlie  plaintiff,  while  leaving  the  defendant's  cars,  fell  or  was 
thrown  from  the  platform  or  steps  of  the  car  upon  the  ground,  injuring 
the  sciatic  or  great  nerve  of  the  thigh.  The  plaintiff,  as  a  witness  in  her 
own  behalf,  testified  that  this  had  caused  her  great  and  constant  pain, 
had  caused  the  thigh  to  shrink,  had  rendered  her  lame,  and  had 
caused  her  to  "  limp  "  in  walking.  The  counsel  for  the  defendant 
thereupon  requested  the  court  to  order  her  to  walk  across  the  court 
room  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,  which  the  court  declined  to  do.  The 
reviewing  court  saw,  under  the  circumstances,  no  abuse  of  discretion  in 
refusing  to  comply  with  the  request.  "  Such  an  act,"  said  the  court, 
"  would  have  furnished  the  jury  little  or  no  aid  in  determining  the  ex- 
tent or  the  character  of  her  injuries.  The  only  fact  it  could,  by  any 
possibility,  have  determined,  was,  whether  or  not  she  was  lame,  or 
'  limped,'  as  she  testified,  in  walking.  But  there  was  already  ample  and 
uncontradicted  evidence  of  this  fact.  Her  own  evidence  on  the  point 
was  fully  corroborated  by  that  of  three  or  four  other  witnesses,  her 
neighbors  or  members  of  her  family,  who  had  seen  her  almost  daily 
since  the  accident."  ^  It  may  be  doubted  whether  this  was  a  sound 
conclusion.  The  fact  that  there  was  considerable  evidence,  from  the 
plaintiff  herself  and  her  neighbors,  to  prove  that  she  limped,  does  not 
make  it  appear  why  the  defendant  was  not  entitled  to  an  exhibition  of 
her  manner  of  walking  before  the  jury,  for  the  purpose,  if  possible,  of 
showing  the  contrary,  or  at  least  of  showing  the  extent  to  which  she 
limped.  It  is  true  that  the  experiment  might,  if  fraudulently  performed 
by  her,  confirm  her  testimony  and  that  of  her  witnesses  on  the  point , 
but  this  would  seem  to  be  no  reason  for  refusing  the  experiment  on  the 
application  of  the  defendant. 

§  8G4.  Experiments  in  Preparation  for  Trial  or  Hearing.  —  A 
suit  was  instituted  to  restrain  proceedings  at  law,  to  recover  for  work 
and  labor  in  constructing  a  sewer,  on  the  ground  of  fraud  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  in  equity,  in  improperly  obtaining  possession  of  an 

1  Ilatfleld  V.  St.   Paul   &c.   R.    Co.  2  Hatfield  v.   St.   Paul   &c,,   R.    Co, 

(MiiinO,   22   N.   W.   Rep.    176;    s.   c.       (Minn.),  22  N.  W.   Rep.   176:    s.  c.  33 
33Miuu.  130.  Miuu.  130. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]       INSPECTION.  657 

estimate  in  writing,  and,  by  a  chemical  process,  removing  the  figures 
indicating  the  price.  The  document  in  question  having  been  deposited 
with  the  clerk  of  the  records,  in  pursuance  of  an  order  of  production, 
the  plaintiff  moved  for  liberty  to  subject  it  to  chewJcal  tests,  for  the 
purpose  of  the  trial  at  law,  upon  an  undertaking  by  the  defendant  to 
produce  it  to  be  stamped  at  the  trial  at  law.  The  vice-chancellor,  upon 
this  undertaking  being  given,  refused  to  make  any  order. i  —  -  -  In  an 
action  against  printers,  for  the  infringement  of  a  patent  for  making  type 
b}^  a  certain  combination  of  metals,  an  application,  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff,  not  merely  for  an  inspection  of  the  type  used  by  the  defendants' 
type-founders,  but  also  to  be  permitted  to  take  specimens  thereof  for 
the  purpose  of  analysis,  was  refused  ;  it  appearing  that  the  defendants 
had  purchased  their  tj'pe,  and  the  only  ground  laid  for  the  application 
being  that,  by  the  analysis  it  would  appear  that  the  composition  was 
similar  to  that  of  the  plaintiff's  type,  and  amounted  to  an  infringement 
of  the  patent.  The  question  was  decided  under  a  statute,'-  and  the 
judges  seemed  to  be  of  opinion  that  circumstances  might  arise  where  the 
power  to  order  such  an  inspection  would  exist.  ^ 

§  865.  Compelling  Inspection  of  Chattels.  —  It  has  been 
held  that,  where  the  plaintiff,  in  an  action  for  personal  injuries, 
has  been  injured  by  a  machine,  the  court  is  without  power  to 
compel  the  defendant  to  allow  the  plaintiff's  attorney  to  inspect 
it,  in  order  to  assist  in  the  cross-examination  of  the  plaintiff  by 
his  attorney,  the  defendant  having  obtained  an  order  for  the 
plaintiff's  examination  before  the  trial  ;^aud  that  a  justice  of  the 
peace  has  no  power,  upon  the  trial  of  an  action  for  the  breach  of 
a  warrant ij  in  the  sale  of  a  chattel,  to  compel  a  party  to  produce 
the  chattel  in  court  for  inspection,  by  means  of  a  subpoena  duces 
tecum,  or  by  any  other  means. ^  In  an  action  for  damages  for 
wrongfully  and  knowingly  keeping  n.  fierce  and  miscliievous  dog, 
which  bit  and  wounded  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held  that  the  dog 
might  be  allowed  to  be  brought  into  court,  and  he  was  brought 

1  Twentymanu.  Barnes,  2  DeGex&  pany  v.  Lloyd,  29  L.  J.  (Exch.)  207. 
Sm.  225.  See  also  Holland  v.  Fox,  3  El.  &  Bl. 

2  The  Patent  Law  Amendment  Act,  977,  decided  under  the  same  statute. 
1852,  §  42;  Stat.  15  &  16  Vict.,  chap.  •*  Cooke  ??.  Lalance  &c.  Co.,  29  Hun 
83,  §  22.  (X.  Y.),  641. 

3  The  Patent  Type-Foundry  Com-  ^  Huuteru.  Allen,  35  Barb.  (N.Y.)  42. 

42 


658  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

into  court  by  his  keeper  led  by  a  chain,  and,  at  the  request  of 
some  of  the  jurors,  was  released  in  their  presence  and  examined 
by  tliem ;  and  they  seemed  to  be  of  opinion  that  he  was  not  of  a 
vicious  disposition,  and  gave  a  verdict  for  the  defendant.^  It 
has  been  culed  that  if,  in  an  action  for  trespass  in  seizing  and 
detaining  a  dog,  the  defendant  refuses  to  produce  the  dog  upon 
notice,  during  the  examination  of  the  plaintiff's  witnesses,  he 
will  not  be  allowed  to  produce  it  afterwards,  for  the  purpose  of 
invalidating  the  testimony  of  those  witnesses  as  to  the  identity 
of  the  dog.^  Tills  is  in  conformity  with  a  principle  already  ex- 
plained, that  a  party  who  refuses  to  produce  a  document  on 
notice,  will  not  be  allowed  afterwards  to  produce  it,  for  the 
purpose  of  rebutting  secondary  evidence  which  the  party  re- 
quiring its  production  has  been  compelled  to  give  of  its  contents.* 

§  8G6.  Physical  Examination  of  the  Defendant  in  Crim- 
inal Trials.  — There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  upon  the  question 
whether  the  physical  examination  of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal 
trial  will  not  be  ordered  against  his  consent.  One  view  is  that 
this  would  violate  a  fundamental  principle  of  Anglo-American 
jurisprudence,*  embodied  in  our  American  constitutions,  that  a 
prisoner  shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself  .& 
Thus,  it  has  been  ruled  that  the  forcible  examination,  under  an 
order  of  the  coroner,  of  a  female  prisoner,  by  physicians,  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  evidence  that  she  had  been  pregnant 
and  had  been  delivered  of  a  child  within  two  or  three  weeks 
previous,  was  a  violation  of  such  a  constitutional  provision.*' 
We  find,  however,  that  authority  on  this  question,  has  not 
been  uniform.  Thus,  on  a  criminal  trial,  the  question  of  the 
identity  of  the  defendant  being  in  issue,  one  of  the  w^itnesses 

1  Line  v.  Taylor,  3  Fost.  &.  Fin.  731;  705;  Eeg.   v.  Mead,  2  Ld.  Raym.  927; 
trial  before  Erie,  C.  J.,  who  said  that  Hex  v.  Shelley,  3  T.  R.  142.  Compare 
he  remembered  a  case  la  which  Lord  Haldane  i\  Harvey,  4  Burr.  2489. 
Campbell  had  permitted  a  similar  in-  *  People  v.   McCoy,  45    How.   Pr. 
spection.  (N.  Y.)  210;  States.  Jacobs,  5  Jones 

2  Lewis  V.  Hartley,  7  Car.  &.  V.  405.  L.  (N.  C.)  200;  ante,  §  292. 

3  Aute,  §  789.  «  People    v.   McCoy,   45  How.  PJ- 
^  Reg.  V.  Worsenham,  1  Ld.  Raym.      (N.  Y.)  21G. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]       INSPECTION.  659 

testified  that  he  knew  the  defendant,  and  knew  that  he  had  tattoo 
marks  (a  female  head  and  bust)  on  his  right  fore-arm.  The 
court,  thereupon,  compelled  the  defendant,  against  his  objec- 
tion, to  exhibit  his  arm,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  show  the 
marks  to  the  jury.  It  was  held  that  this  action  of  the  court  was 
not  a  violation  of  the  provision  of  the  constitution  of  the  State 
that  no  person  shall  be  compelled,  "  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be 
a  witness  against  himself,"  —  and  further,  that  the  action  was 
not  erroneous  or  prejudicial  to  the  defendant  in  a  legal  sense. 
The  court  construed  the  constitutional  provision  as  meaning  that 
no  person  shall  be  compelled  to  testify  as  a  witness  against 
himself.  "To  use  a  common  phrase,"  said  Hawdey,  J.,  "  it 
closes  the  mouth  of  the  prisoner.  A  defendant  in  a  criminal 
case  cannot  be  compelled  to  give  evidence,  under  oath  or  afiirm- 
ation,  or  make  any  statement,  for  the  purpose  of  proving  or 
disproving  any  question  at  issue  before  any  tribunal,  court, 
judge  or  magistrate.  This  is  the  shield  under  which  he  is  pro- 
tected by  the  strong  arm  of  the  law,  and  this  protection  was  given, 
not  for  the  purpose  of  evading  the  truth,  but  for  the  reason  that,  in 
the  sound  judgment  of  the  men  who  framed  the  constitution,  it 
was  thought  that,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  human  nature,  and  the 
various  motives  that  actuate  mankind,  a  defendant  accused  of 
crime  might  be  tempted  to  give  testimony  against  himself  that 
was  not  true."  ^  So,  evidence  of  the  condition  of  the  pris- 
oner's hand,  if  material,  may  be  rehearsed  to  the  jury,  although 
the  evidence  was  obtained  by  compelling  her,  against  her  will,  to 
unwrap  and  exhibit  her  hand  at  the  coroner's  inquest. ^  But  with 
singular  absurdity,  it  was  held,  on  trial  of  an  indictment  against 
the  defendant,  as  a  free  negro,  for  carrying  weapons,  that  it  was 
erroneous  to  allow  the  State  to  offer  the  defendant  to  the 
inspection  of  the  jury,  in  order  that  they  might  see  that  he  was 
a  mulatto  within  the  prohibited  degree.  He  w^as,  it  seems,  to  sit 
during  the  trial,  some  where  in  the  court  room,  where  the  jury 
could  not  see  him.^ 

^  State  V.  Ah  Chuey,  14  Nev.  79,  83.      C.)  259.     Upon  obvious  grounds,  and 

2  State  V.  Garrett,  71  N.  C.  95.  iu  conformity  witli  the  maxim  nemo  se 

3  State  V.   Jacobs,   5  Joues  L.  (N.      ipsum  accusare  tenetur,  the  defendant 


660  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.       [1  Thomp.  Tl*., 

§  867.  Compulsory  Experiments  BY  THE  Prisoner  DISCLOSING  Guilt. — 
In  another  case  a  prisoner,  indicted  for  the  larceny  of  growing  corn, 
was  compelled  by  the  officer  in  charge,  to  put  his  shoe  in  a  track 
found  in  the  field,  for  the  purpose  of  comparison,  and  the  result  of 
this  comparison  was  detailed  by  the  officer,  as  a  witness  on  the  trial. 
It  was  held  that  in  this  there  was  no  error. ^  But  on  a  trial  in  Georgia, 
it  has  been  held  that  a  witness  should  not  be  permitted  to  testif}'  that  he 
forced  the  defendant  to  put  his  foot  into  a  shoe  track  near  the  scene  of 
the  burglary,  and  that  the  shoe  fitted  the  track,  —  it  being  a  violation 
of  the  constitutional  guarantee  that  "  no  person  shall  be  compelled  to 
give  testimony  tending  in  any  manner  to  criminate  himself."  ^  So, 
where,  in  a  case  of  murder  the  prosecution  proved  that  foot-jyrints  were 
found  on  the  premises  where  the  assassination  had  been  perpetrated, 
and  also  that  the  examining  magistrate  had  compelled  the  accused  to 
make  his  foot-prints  in  an  ash-heap,  and  that  the  foot-prints  so  made 
corresponded  with  those  found  on  the  premises  where  the  homicide  was 
committed,  —  it  was  held  that  the  evidence  was  admissible,  and  that  it 
was  no  invasion  of  the  constitutional  guaranty  that  "  one  accused  of 
crime  shall  not  be  compelled  to  give  evidence  against  himself."  ^  But 
where  a  pan  of  soft  mud  was  brought  into  the  court  room  on  the  trial, 
and  the  prisoner  was  asked,  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,  to  put  his  foot 
into  it,  which  he  declined  to  do,  the  conviction  was  reversed,  because 
the  court  was  satisfied  that  the  jury  were  improperlj^  influenced  by  this 
attempt  to  compel  the  prisoner  to  give  evidence  against  himself.* 

§  868.  Obscene  Photographs. —  On  the  trial  of  an  indictment 
for  selling  an  indecent  and  obscene  photograph,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  photograph  itself  is  a  proper  instrument  of  evidence 
for  inspection  by  the  jury.  The  court  say:  "  As  the  statute  has 
given  this  general  definition  of  the  character  of  the  acts  consti- 
tuting  the  offense,  it  must  necessarily  have  been  designed  that 
the  drawing,  picture,  photograph  or  writing  should  be  exhibited 

in  a  criminal  action  cannot  be  com-  may  be  given, — the  defcndaut  not  being 

pelled  to  produce  or  surrender  a  writ-  expected  to   deliver  it  iu  conformity 

ing,  or  other  iustrument  of  evidence,  witli  a  uotice.     Ihid.;  ante,  §  773. 
to  be  used  agaiust  him.     McGiunis  v.  ^  State  v.  Graham,  74  N.  C.  646, 

State,   24  lud.  500.     It  is  upon  this  2  Day  v.  State,  63  Ga.  667. 

ground  that  the  courts  have  held,  as  ^  Walker  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  246, 

already  seen,  that  on  an  indictment  for  265. 

the  larceny  of  an  instrumeut  of  writ-  ^  Stokes  v.  State,  5   Baxt.  (Tenn.) 

ing,  parol  evidence  of  its  character  619;  s.  c.  2  Tex.  Law  Journ.  243. 


Tit.  in,  Ch.  XXVII.]       INSPECTION.  661 

to  and  observed  by  the  jury,  for  them  to  determine,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  in  the  exercise  of  their  good  sense  and  judgment,  whether 
or  not  they  were  obscene  and  indecent."  ^ 

§  869.  Photographic  and  Stereoscopic  Views.  — Next  to  the 
inspection  of  the  object  itself,  a  photograph  becomes  its  most  ac- 
curate and  convenient  representation ;  and  where  an  inspection 
of  the  object  is  proper,  but  impracticable,  a  photograph  of  it 
may  be  exhibited  to  the  witnesses  as  an  aid  in  identification,^  and 
maybe  admitted  in  evidence,^ and,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court, 
examined  by  the  jury  through  a  stereoscope,^  or  other  magnifying 
glass,^  and  taken  by  them  to  their  room.®  Accordingly,  in  an 
action  for  damages  for  an  injury  to  real  property,  a  photograph 
of  the  premises  taken  at  the  time,  is  admissible,  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  injury.^ 

§  870.  Plans  and  Diagrams.  —  Plans  and  diagrams  of  prem- 
ises, which  are  the  scenes  of  transactions  under  investiofation, 
may  be  referred  to  by  witnesses  and  exhibited  to  a  jury,  for  the 
purpose  of  explaining  their  testimony  and  rendering  it  more  intel- 
ligible.    "  They  are  often  formally  admitted  in   evidence,  and 

1  People  V.  Muller,  32Huu  (N.  Y.),  copies  of  a  signature).     Tlie  correct- 

209.    This  was  considered  tlie  proper  uess  of  tlie  photograpli  must  be  verified 

course  to  be  pursued  in  Reg.  v.  Hick-  by  tlie  testimony  of  a  witness,  or  it  is 

lin,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  360.  inadmissible.     Hollenbeck  v.  Rowley, 

-  Ruloff  V.  People,  45  N.  Y.  213;  s.  8  Allen  (Mass.),  47  3.     And  whether  it 

c,  more  fully  reported,  11   Abb.   Pr.  is  sufficiently  verified  is  a  preliminary 

(N.  s.)  (N.  Y.)  245.  question  of  fact,  to  be  decided  by  the 

3 /Z)id.;  Locke    v.    Railway  Co.,  46  trial  judge,  whose  decision  thereon  is 

la.    109    (photographs  of    a    railway  not    subject  to    exception.     Blair    v. 

wreck);  Reddiu  r.  Gates  (ferrotype  of  Pelham,    118  Mass.   420;    ante,   chap, 

the  plaintiff's  back,  taken  after  a  bat-  XIII.     Objection  that  the  photograph 

tery,  showing  his  injuries);  Blair  u.  exhibits  only    a  partial    view   of  the 

Pelham,   118   Mass.  420  (photographs  premises  untenable.     Locke   v.   Rail- 

of  place  of  injury  on  defective  high-  way  Co.,  4C  la.  109,  112, 

way) ;  German  Theological  School  v.  *  Rockford  v.   Russell,    9    Bradw. 

Dubuque,  64  la.  736  (stereoscopic  view  (111-)  '-29. 

of  premises  injured  by  water)  ;  Udder-  ^  Barker    w.  Perry,  67   Iowa,  146. 

zook  V.  Com.,  76  Pa.  St.  340  (photo-  ^  /^i^^. 

graphs  of  the  deceased,  on  a  trial  for  '  Cozzens   v.  Higgins,  1   Abb.  App. 

murder) ;  Marcy  v.   Barnes,    16   Gray  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  451. 
(Mass.),  161  (magnified  photographic 


662  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

are  proper  for  the  consideration  of  the  jury,  so  far  as  tliey  are 
shown  to  be  correct,  not  as  independent  testimony,  but  in  con- 
nection with  otlier  evidence  to  enable  the  jury  to  understand  and 
apply  such  evidence."  ^  In  testifying  as  to  a  disputed  boundary 
line,  a  surve^'or  may  use  a  diagram  to  illustrate  his  evidence  or 
make  it  intelligible  to  the  jury,  although  the  diagram  was  not 
made  by  himself,  and  is  not  shown  to  contain  a  perfectly  accurate 
description  of  the  lines.  Peters,  C.  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  said:  "  A  witness  may  as  well  speak  by  a  diagram  or 
linear  description,  when  the  thing  may  be  so  described,  as  by 
words.  It  is  a  common  and  usual  method  of  pointing  out  locali- 
ties and  lines.  Even  savages  resort  to  it,  in  lieu  of  words,  in  de- 
scribing the  course  of  rivers,  and  the  line  of  the  seashores.  It  is 
enough  if  it  serves  the  purpose  of  the  witness  in  the  explanation 
of  the  lines  and  localities  he  is  seeking  to  exhibit."  '^ 

§  871.  Indicia  of  Crime  —  Blood-Stained  Clothing',  Bur- 
glar's Tools,  etc.  —  As  already  stated,  it  is  common,  on  criminal 
trials,  to  submit  to  the  inspection  of  the  jury  burglar's  tools  and 
other  indicia  of  crime,  found  in  the  possession  of  the  prisoner, 
in  connection  with  evidence  tending  to  show  that  they  were  used 
in  the  commission  of  the  crime. ^  It  has  been  held  not  improper, 
in  a  case  of  murder,  to  allow  the  State  to  exhibit  to  the  jury  the 
bones  of  the  vertebral  column  of  the  deceased,  where  it  serves  to 
show  to  the  jury  the  attitudes  and  relative  positions  of  the  parties 
when  the  fatal  shot  was  fired.  The  court  said:  "  It  was  not  an 
unnecessary  parade  of  the  bones  of  the  dead  man  to  excite  pre- 
judice against  his  slayer,  but  was  legitimate  and  proper  evidence; 
and  a  party  cannot,  upon  the  ground  that  it  may  harrow  up  feel- 
ings of  indignation  against  him  in  the  breasts  of  the  jury,  have 
competent  evidence  excluded  from  consideration."  *  So,  on 
such  a  trial  the  skull  of  the  deceased  may  be  produced  in  court 
and  exhibited  to  an  expert  surgeon,  who  may  testify  whether  the 
fractures  therein  could  have  been  caused  by  blows  from  a  gun, 

1  State  V.  Lawlor,  28  Minu.  210,  218,  3  People  v.  Larued,  7  N.  Y.  445. 
and  cases  cited;  ante,  §  844.  •»  State  v.  Wieuers,  G6   Mo.   14,  29; 

2  Shook  V.  Pate,  50  Ala.  91,  92.  affirraiug  s.  c.  4  Mo.  App.  492. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]       INSPECTION.  663 

as  testified  to  by  other  witnesses.^  So,  the  prosecuting  attorney 
may  exhibit  to  the  jury  the  articles  of  dothing  found  upon  the 
body  of  the  deceased,  as  well  as  articles  of  personal  property 
found  near  the  body.^  So,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for 
homicide,  the  exhibition  to  the  jury  of  blood-stained  clotJiing, 
worn  by  the  deceased  at  the  time  of  his  arrest,  shortly  after  the 
commission  of  the  crime,  has  tlie  sanction  of  immemorial  usage. ^ 
*'  In  short,"  in  the  language  of  Starkie,  "  upon  the  trial  of  a 
charge  of  homicide  or  burglary,  all  circumstances  connected  with 
the  state  of  the  body  found,  or  house  pillaged,  the  tracing  by 
stains,  marks  or  impressions,  the  finding  of  instruments  of  vio- 
lence or  property,  either  on  the  spot  or  elsewhere, —  in  short,  all 
visible  vestigia  are  part  of  the  transaction,  are  admitted  in  evi- 
dence for  the  purpose  of  connecting  the  prisoner  with  the  act. 
Such  facts  and  circumstances  have  not  improperly  been  termed 
inanimate  ivitnesses.^''  * 

§  872.  Wlien  Court  will  not  assume  Labor  of  examining^ 
Natural  Evidence.  —  Where  a  part}^  tenders  material  things  in 
evidence,  there  is  authority  to  the  effect  that  the  court  is  not  ob- 
liged to  assume  the  labor  of  examining  them,  without  the  assist- 
ance of  witnesses.  Thus,  the  delendant  agreed  to  buy  from  the 
plaintiff  a  book  which  should  correspond  with  a  prospectus 
which  was  exhibited  to  him.  In  an  action  for  the  price,  the 
plaintiff  introduced  the  book  in  evidence,  but  put  in  no  other 
evidence  tending  to  show  that  it  complied  with  the  prospectus. 
It  was  held  that   the  plaintiff  had  not  proved  his  case ;  that  he 

1  Gardiner  v.  Teople,  (J  Park.  Cr.  to  crimiuate  himself"  (Ga.  Code,  § 
(N.  Y.)  157.  4998)    does  not  extend  so  far  as  to 

2  Ibid.  prevent  tlie  clothing  or  other  articles, 
"  People  V.  Fernandez,  35  N.  Y.  49,      taken  from  the  person  of  the  accused, 

64.  from  being  given  in  evidence  or  ex- 

4  1    Stark.    Ev.    (9    Am.    ed.)    66,  hibited   to  the  jui-y,  where  the  same 

quoted  with  approval  in  People  v.  Fer-  tend  to  show  his  guilt.     It  means  that, 

nandez,  35  N.  Y.  49,  64.     The  provis-  when  a  person  is  sworn  as  a  witness,  he 

ions  of  the   constitution  of   Georgia  shall  not  be   compelled  to  testify  to 

that  "no  person  sliall  be  compelled  to  facts  that  may  tend  to  crimiuate  him. 

give  testimony  tending  in  any  manner  Drake  v.  State,  75  Ga.  413,  415. 


664  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoilip.  Tl., 

could  not  impose  upon  the  court  the  obligation  of  examining  the 
book  to  see  whether  it  corresponded  to  the  prospectus. ^ 

Article   II. — View  of  TmNGS  out  of  Court. 

Section 

875.  In  Real  and  Mixed  Actions  under  the  Common  Law. 

876.  Under  the  Statute  of  Anne. 

877.  Under  the  Statute  of  Geo.  II. 

878.  Under  the  Statute  of  Geo.  IV. 

879.  In  what  Cases  Granted  under  these  Statutes.  ^ 

880.  Old  Practice  in  Conducting  a  View. 

881.  The  Subject  Regulated  by  Statute  in  America. 

882.  Provisions  of  American  Statutes. 

883.  When  Discretionary. 

884.  In  Equity  Cases. 

885.  In  Criminal  Cases. 

886.  View  that  the  Prisoner  must  Accompany  the  Jury. 

887.  A  Contrary  View. 

888.  Irregular  to  send  out  Witnesses  with  Jury. 

889.  Theory  that  Impressions  Acquired  by  the  View  are  not  Evidence. 

890.  Reasons  Adduced  in  Support  of  this  View. 

891.  Instructions  held  Erroneous  under  this  View. 

892.  Instance  under  this  Theory  of  a  Proper  Instruction  to  a  Jury  before 

sending  them  out. 

893.  Contrary  Opinion  that  Knowledge  Acquired  by  the  View  is  Evidence. 

894.  [Continued.]     The  same  View  taken  by  Chief  Justice  Shaw. 

895.  But  Jurors  not  to  Disregard  other  Evidence. 

896.  Illustration  of  this  View. 

897.  When  Jury  decide  upon  their  Personal  Knowledge. 

898.  Not  Error  to  Exclude  Evidence  of  Pacts  which  the  Jury  have  learned 

from  the  View. 

899.  [Michigan.]     Scope  of  the  Powers  of  the  Jury  in  Condemnation  Pro- 

ceedings. 

900.  Difficulty  of  Reviewing  on  Appeal  the  Finding  of  the  Jury. 

901.  How  Courts  have  Dealt  with  this  Difficulty. 

902.  Observations  on  this  Subject. 

903.  Report  of  Road  Viewers  not  Evidence  on  Appeal. 

904.  Unauthorized  Views. 

905.  Experiments  before  the  Jury  out  of  Court. 

906.  Misconduct  in  making  a  View. 

907.  [Continued.]     Giving  the  Jury  Refreshments. 

908.  View  granted  at  what  Stag<i  of  the  Trial. 

909.  Rule  for  a  View  continues  through  Subsequent  Trials. 

910.  Personal  Notice  in  Condemnation  Proceedings. 

1  Western  Historical  Co.  v.  Schmidt,  56  Wis.  681. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  665 

Section 

911.  Costs  of  the  View. 

912.  Jury  attended  by  the  Proper  Officer. 

913.  [Michigan.]     Office  of  Judge  or  Court  Commissioner  when  Attending. 

914.  Showers  appointed  under  the  old  Practice. 

915.  Obstructing  the  ShoAvers  in  Punning  Lines. 

916.  Competent  to  show  change  in  Premises  after  the  Fact  in  Controversy, 

and  before  the  View. 

§  875.  In  Real  aud  Mixed  Action.s  under  the  Common-Law 
Practice.  —  "In  most  real  and  mixed  actions,  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  identity  of  land  claimed  with  that  in  the  tenant's  possession, 
the  tenant  is  allowed,  after  the  demandant  has  counted,  to  demand 
a  view  of  the  land  in  question,  or,  if  the  subject  of  claim  be  rent, 
or  the  like,  a  view  of  the  land  out  of  which  it  issues."  ^ 

§  876.  Under  the  Statute  of  Anxe.  —  A  statute  passed  in  the  reign 
of  Anne,  "  for  the  amendment  of  the  law,  and  the  better  advancement 
of  justice,"  extended  the  view  seemingl}^  to  all  civil  actions,  b\^  enact- 
ing "  that  from  and  after  the  first  day  of  Trinity  Term,  in  any  actions 
brought  in  any  of  Her  Majesty's  courts  of  record  at  Westminster, 
where  it  shall  appear  to  the  court  in  wliich  such  actions  are  depending, 
that  it  will  be  proper  and  necessary  that  the  jurors  who  are  to  try  the 
issues  in  any  such  action,  should  have  the  view  of  the  messuages,  lands, 
or  place  in  question,  in  order  to  their  better  understanding  the  evidence 
that  will  be  given  upon  the  trials  of  such  issues,  —  in  every  such  case, 
the  respective  courts,  in  which  such  actions  shall  be  depending,  may 
order  special  writs  of  distringas,  or  habeas  corpora  to  issue,  by  which 
the  sheriff,  or  such  other  officer  to  whom  the  said  writs  shall  be  directed, 
shall  be  commanded  to  have  six  out  of  the  twelve  of  the  jurors  named 
in  such  writs,  or  some  greater  number  of  them,  at  the  place  in  question, 
some  convenient  time  before  the  trial,  who,  then  and  there,  shall  have 

1  Bouv.  Law  Diet.  tit.    Fie w;  citing  undenihillmhel.     According  to  Viner's 

Vin.    Abr.,  View;  Com.  Dig.,    View;  Abridgement,  it    was  not  demandable 

Booth,    37;  2    Saund.    ioh.;-!   Reeve  in  such  actions.   Vin.  Abr.,  Fieio,  A.  2. 

Hist.  Eng.   Law,   435.     In  Vin.  Abr.,  There  is  a  well  condensed  and  well 

tit.  View,  the  old  practice  is  set  out  at  written  article  on  this  subject,  in  the 

very  considerable  length;  from  which  Central  Law  Journal  for  May  4,  1888, 

It  appears  that  a  view  could  be  had  by  J.  C.  Thomson,  Esq.,  of  St.  Paul,  to 

only  in  real  and  mixed    actions.     It  which  the  writer  is  indebted  for  cita- 

was  much  questioned  whether  it  was  tions  to    many  authoi'ities  here    ex- 

demaudable    in    the   action    of  dower  amined. 


66&  NATURAL   EVIDENCE.  [1  TllOllip.  Tr., 

the  matte  IS  in  question  shown  to  them  by  two  persons  in  the  said  writs 
named,  to  be  appointed  by  the  court ;  and  the  said  sheriff,  or  other 
officer  who  is  to  execute  the  said  writs,  shall,  by  a  special  return  upon 
the  same,  certify  that  the  view  hath  been  had  according  to  the  command 
of  the  said  writs."  ^ 

§  877.  Under  the  Statute  of  Geo.  II.  —  In  the  reign  of  George  II. 
a  law  was  passed  "  for  the  better  regulation  of  juries,"  which  contains 
the  following  proviso:  "Provided  always  that,  where  a  view  shall  be 
allowed  in  any  cause,  that  in  such  case  six  of  the  jurors  named  in  said 
panel,  or  more,  who  shall  be  mutually  consented  to  by  the  parties  or 
their  agents  on  both  sides,  or,  if  they  cannot  agree,  shall  be  named  by 
the  proper  officers  of  the  respective  courts  of  King's  Bench,  Common 
Pleas,  Exchequer  at  Westminster,  or  Grand  Session  in  Wales,  and  the 
said  Counties  Palatine,  for  the  causes  in  their  respective  courts,  or,  if 
need  be,  by  a  judge  of  the  respective  courts  where  the  cause  is  depend- 
ing, or  by  the  judge  or  judges  before  whom  the  cause  shall  be  brought 
on  to  trial  respectively,  —  shall  have  the  view,  and  shall  be  first  sworn,  or 
such  of  them  as  appear,  upon  the  jury  to  try  the  said  cause,  before  any 
drawing  as  aforesaid,  and  so  many  only  shall  be  drawn  to  be  added  to 
the  viewers  who  appear,  as  shall,  after  all  defaulters  and  challenges 
allowed,  make  up  the  number  of  twelve  to  be  sworn  for  the  trial  of  such 
cause."  - 

§  878.  Under  the  Statute  op  Geo.  IV.  —  In  the  time  of  George  IV. 
these  statutes  were  re-enacted  in  a  modified  form,  in  the  "  act  for  con- 
solidating and  amending  the  laws  relating  to  jurors  and  juries,"  where- 
in it  was  provided  "  that,  where  in  any  case,  either  civil  or  criminal,  or 
on  any  penal  statute,  depending  in  any  of  the  said  courts  of  record  at 
Westminster,  or  in  the  Counties  Palatine,  or  Great  Sessions  in  Wales,  it 
shall  appear  to  any  of  tlie  respective  courts,  or  to  any  judge  thereof  in 
vacation,  that  it  will  be  proper  and  necessary  that  some  of  the  jurors 
who  are  to  try  the  issues  in  such  case,  should  have  the  view  of  the  place 
in  question,  in  order  to  their  better  understanding  the  evidence  that 
may  be  given  upon  the  trial  of  such  issues,  in  every  sucli  case  such 
court,  or  any  judge  thereof  in  vacation,  may  order  a  rule  to  be  drawn  up 
containing  tlie  usual  terms,  and  also  requiring,  if  such  court  or  judge 
shall  so  thinl^rfit,  the  party  applying  for  the  view  to  deposit  in  the  hands 
of  the  under-sheriff  a  sum  of  money  to  be  named  in  the  rule,  for  pay- 

1  Stat.  4  Anue,  chap.  IG,  §  8.  2  gtat.  3  Geo.  II  ,  chap.  25,  §  U. 


Tit,  III,  Ch.  XXYII.]  VIEW.  667 

ment  of  the  expenses  of  the  view,  and  commanding  special  writs  of 
venire  facias,  distringas  and  habeas  corpora,  to  issue,  by  which  the 
sheriff  or  other  minister  to  whom  the  said  writ  shall  be  directed,  shall 
be  commanded  to  have  six  or  more  of  the  jurors  named  in  such  writs, 
or  in  the  panels  thereto  annexed  (wlio  shall  be  mutuallj'-  consented  to 
by  the  parties,  or,  if  they  cannot  agree,  shall  be  nominated  by  the 
sheriff  or  such  other  minister  as  aforesaid),  at  the  place  in  question, 
some  convenient  time  before  the  trial,  who  then  and  there  shall  have  the 
place  in  question  shown  to  them  by  two  persons  in  the  said  writs  named 
to  be  appointed  by  the  court  or  judge;  and  the  said  sheriff  or  other 
minister,  who  is  to  execute  any  such  writ,  shall,  by  a  special  return 
upon  the  same,  certify  that  the  view  hath  been  had  according  to  the 
command  of  the  same,  and  shall  specify  the  names  of  the  viewers. "^ 

§  879.  In  what  Cases  granted  under  these  Statutes.  —  Not- 
withstanding the  unrestrained  terms  of  these  statutes,  the  courts  would 
not,  as  a  rule,  order  a  view,  except  in  actions  of  a  local  nature  such  as 
trespass  quare  clausum  f regit,  nuisance,  and  the  like.  They  would  not 
grant  it  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  for  work  done  by  a  carpenter  or 
bricklayer  upon  a  house ;  -  for  the  judge  had  no  power  to  make  an 
order  for  the  plaintiff,  or  his  witnesses,  to  enter  the  defendant's  prem- 
ises, in  order  to  inspect  the  work  done. 3  Prior  to  the  last  statute 
above  quoted,  they  would  not  grant  it  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  without 
consent,  and  this  was  the  practice  before  the  statute  of  Anne.* 

§  880.  Old  Practice  in  Conducting  a  View. — "Before  we  make 
a  rule  for  a  view,"  said  Ld.  Holt,  C.  J.,  "the  venire  facias  must  be 
returned,  and  then  we  make  a  rule  that  so  many  of  the  panel  shall  view 
the  premises."  ^  A  view  was  never  granted  without  affidavit,  except  in 
actions  of  tvaste;^  nor  without  hearing  both  parties  and  examining  into 
the  propriety  of  it,  unless  the  opposite  party  consented.' 

§   881.   The  subject  Regulated  by  Statute  in  America.  — In 

this  country  the  subject  is  generally  one  of  statutory  regulation. 

1  Stat.  6  Geo.  IV.,  chap.  50,  §  23.  ^  Anou.,   2    Salk.    665.     See     also 

2  Stoues  V.  Meuhem,  2  Esch.  382.  another  case  called  Auon.,  on  same 
So  held  iu  Richmoud  v.  Atkiusou,  58  page,  also  1  Eeeve  Hist.  Eug.  Law, 
Mich.  413;   post,  §  883.  435, 

3  Turquaud  v.  Guardians,  8  Dowl.  6  Com.  Dig.  Vieic,  A. 
P.  C.  201.  7j^,jv?. 

4  Ives   V.  Kedraan,  1   Keuy.  384. 


iSaS  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

It  has  been  held  not  competent  for  the  court  to  order  a  view, 
against  the  objection  of  a  party,  except  in  cases  where  a  view  is 
authorized  by  statute,  the  court  proceeding  upon  the  conception 
that  it  is  more  in  consonance  with  tlie  theory  and  method  of 
judicial  trials,  that  the  jury  should  base  their  findings  solely  upon 
sworn  testimony  taken  in  open  court,  or  upon  depositions  taken 
as  provided  by  law.  ^ 

§  882.  Provisions  of  American  Statutes. — The  provisions 
of  some  of  these  statutes  will  next  be  considered. 

(1.)  California  —  [Civil  Procedure].  —  "  When,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  it  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  the  property  which 
is  the  subject  of  litigation,  or  of  the  place  in  which  any  material  fact 
occurred,  it  may  order  them  to  be  conducted,  in  a  body,  under  the 
chai'ge  of  an  officer,  to  the  place,  which  shall  be  shown  to  them  by  some 
person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose.  While  the  jury  are 
thus  absent,  no  person  other  than  the  person  so  appointed,  shall  speak 
to  them  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial."  ^ 

(2.)  California  —  [Criminal  Procedure]. —  "When,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  it  is  proper  that  the  jury  should  view  the  place  in  which  the 
offense  is  charged  to  have  been  committed,  or  in  which  any  other  material 
fact  occurred,  it  may  order  the  jury  to  be  conducted  in  a  body,  in  the 
custody  of  the  sheriff,  to  the  place,  which  must  be  shown  to  them  by  a 
person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose  ;  and  the  sheriff  must  be 
sworn  to  suffer  no  person  to  speak  or  communicate  to  the  jury,  nor  to  do 
so  himself,  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial,  and  to  return  them 
into  court  without  unnecessary  delay  and  at  the  specified  time."  ^ 

(3.)  Indiana. —  "  Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  it  is  proper 
for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  real  or  personal  property  which  is  the 
subject  of  the  litigation,  or  of  the  place  in  which  any  material  fact 
occurred,  it  may  order  them  to  be  conducted  in  a  body,  under  the 
charge  of  a  sworn  officer,  to  the  place,  which  shall  be  shown  to  them 
by  some  person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose.  While  tlie 
jury  are  thus  absent,  no  person,  other  than  the  person  so  appointed, 
shall  speak  to  them  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial."  ^ 

i-Doud  V.  Guthrie,  13  Bradw.  (111.)  ^  cal.  Code  Civ.  Proc,  §  610. 

653;     Smitli    v.    State,   42    Tex.    Ui;  3  Cal  Code  Crira.  Proc,  §  1119. 

Bosticlj  V.  State,  61  Ga.  635.  *  Rev.  Stat.  Ind.  1881,  §  538, 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  669 

(4.)  Iowa — [Cwil  Procedure]. —  "Whenever,  iu  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  it  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  the  real  property 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  controversy,  or  of  the  place  in  which  any 
material  fact  occurred,  it  may  order  them  to  be  conducted  in  a  body, 
under  the  charge  of  an  officer,  to  the  place,  which  shall  be  shown  to 
them  by  some  person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose.  While 
the  jury  are  thus  absent,  no  person,  other  than  the  person  so  appointed, 
shall  speak  to  them  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial."  i 

(5. )  Kansas  —  [Civil  Procedure]  .  —  "  Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of 
the  court,  it  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  the  property  which 
is  the  subject  of  the  litigation,  or  of  the  place  in  which  any  material 
fact  occurred,  it  nbay  order  them  to  be  conducted,  in  a  body,  under  the 
charge  of  an  officer,  to  the  place,  which  shall  be  shown  to  them  by  some 
person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose.  While  the  jury  are 
thus  absent,  no  person,  other  than  the  person  so  appointed,  shall  speak 
to  them  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial."  2 

(6.)  Kansas —  [Criminal  Procedure].  —  "  Whenever,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  court,  it  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  the  place  in 
which  any  material  fact  occurred,  it  may  order  them  to  be  conducted 
in  a  body,  under  the  charge  of  an  officer,  to  the  place,  which  shall  be 
shown  to  them  by  some  person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose. 
While  the  jury  are  thus  absent,  no  person  other  than  the  officer  and  a 
person  appointed  to  show  them  the  place,  shall  speak  to  them  on  any 
subject  connected  with  the  trial."  ^ 

(7.)  Maine.  — The  statute  of  Maine  merely  provides:  "  In  any  jury 
trial,  the  presiding  justice  may  order  a  view  by  the  jury."  *  And  also: 
"The  court  may  order  a  view  by  any  jury  in  a  criminal  case."  ^ 

(8.)  Massachusetts.  —  "  The  jury  in  a  case  may,  at  the  request  of 
either  party,  be  taken  to  view  the  premises  or  place  in  question,  or 
any  property,  matter,  or  thing  relating  to  the  controversy  between  the 
parties,  when  it  appears  to  the  court  that  such  view  is  necessary  to  a 
just  decision:  provided,  the  party  making  the  motion  advances  a  sum 
sufficient  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  jury,  and  the  officers  who  attend 

1  Miller's  Rev.  Code  la.  1886,  3  Dass.  Comp.  Laws  Kan.  1885,  p. 
§  2790.  759,  §  316. 

2  Dass.  Comp.  Laws  Kau.  1885,  p.  ■*  Rev.  Stat.  Me.  1883,  p.  705,  §  82. 
638,  §  277.  5  75,-(^.^  p.  945^  §  93. 


670  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

them  in  taking  the  view ;  which  expenses  shall  be  afterwards  taxed  like 
other  legal  costs,  if  the  part}-  who  advances  them  prevails  in  the  suit."  ^ 

(9.)  Michigan.  —  "  When  any  court  of  record  in  which  an  issue  of 
fact  is  tried  by  a  jury,  shall  deem  it  necessary  that  the  jury  view  the 
place  or  premises  in  question,  or  any  property  or  thing  relating  to  the 
issue  between  the  parties,  such  court  may,  on  the  application  of  either 
party  and  the  advancement  of  a  sufficient  sum  to  pay  the  expenses  of" 
tlie  jury  and  officers  attending  them  in  taking  such  view,  order  such 
view  to  be  had,  and  direct  the  manner  of  effecting  the  same."  ^ 

(10.)  Minnesota —  [Civil  Procedure].  —  "  Whenever,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  court,  it  is  proper  that  the  jury  should  have  a  view  of  real 
projjerty  which  is  the  subject  of  the  litigation,  or  of  the  place  in  which 
any  material  fact  occurred,  it  may  order  the  jury  to  be  conducted  in  a 
body,  in  the  custody  of  proper  officers,  to  the  place,  which  will  be 
shown  to  them  by  the  judge,  or  by  a  person  appointed  by  the  court  for 
that  purpose.  While  the  jury  are  thus  absent,  no  person,  other  than 
the  judge  or  person  so  appointed,  shall  speak  to  them  on  any  subject 
connected  with  the  trial."  ^ 

(11.)  Nebraska — [Civil  Procedure].  —  "Whenever,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  court,  it  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  property 
which  is  the  subject  of  litigation,  or  of  the  place  in  which  any  ma- 
terial fact  occurred,  it  may  order  them  to  be  conducted  in  a  body,  un- 
der the  charge  of  an  officer,  to  the  place,  wliich  shall  be  shown  to  them 
by  some  person  appointed  by  the  court  for  that  purpose.  While  the 
jury  are  thus  absent,  no  person,  other  than  the  person  so  appointed, 
shall  speak  to  them  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial."  ** 

(12.)  Nebraska — [Criminal  Procedure].  —  "Whenever,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  it  is  proper  for  the  jury  to  have  a  view  of  the  place 
in  which  any  material  fact  occurred,  it  may  order  them  to  be  conducted 
in  a  body,  under  the  charge  of  the  sheriff,  to  the  place,  which  shall  be 
-shown  to  them  by  some  person  appointed  by  the  court.  While  the 
"jury  are  tlius  absent,  no  person  other  than  the  sheriff  having  them  in 
charge,  and  the  person  ai:)poiiited  to  show  them  the  place,  shall  speak 
with  them  on  any  subject  connected  with  the  trial."  ^ 

1  Pub.  Stat.  Mass.  1882,  p.  999,  §  43.  -  Gen.  Stat.  Neb.  1873,  p.  573,  §  284; 

2  2  How.  Mich.  Stat.  1882,  §  7G20.  Id.  1887,  p.  775,  §  284. 

3  Geu.  Stat.  Minn.  1881,  p.  743,  ^  /6id.,p.829,  §  479;  /d.  1887,p.952, 
§  228.  §  479. 


Tit.  Ill,  (^h.  XXVII. ]  VIEW.  671 

(13.)  New  Hampshire. —  "In  the  trial  of  actions  involv-'ngj  ques- 
tions of  right  to  real  estate,  or  in  which  the  examination  of  places  or 
objects  may  aid  the  jury  in  understanding  the  testimony,  the  court,  on 
motion  of  either  party,  may,  in  their  discretion,  direct  a  view  of  the 
premises  by  the  jurj^,  under  such  rules  as  they  may  prescribe. ^  The 
costs  of  such  view  shall  be  subject  to  such  adjudication,  as  to  the  whole 
or  an}'  part  thereof,  as  the  court  may  deem  equitable."  ^ 

(14.)  New  Jersey.  —  "In  action  in  the  Supreme  Court,  or  any  cir- 
cuit court  or  court  of  common  pleas,  where  it  shall  be  proper  or  neces- 
sary that  the  jurors  who  are  to  tr}"  the  issue  should  view  the  messuages, 
lands,  or  place  in  question,  in  order  to  their  better  understanding  the 
evidence  that  will  be  given  on  the  trial,  the  court,  or  a  judge  thereof, 
may  order  a  special  writ  of  venire  facias  to  issue,  by  which  the  sheriff, 
or  other  officers  to  whom  the  same  shall  be  directed,  shall  be  commanded 
to  have  six  or  more  of  the  first  twelve  of  the  jurors,  named  in  the 
panel  to  such  writ  annexed,  at  the  place  in  question,  at  a  day  therein 
named,  prior  to  the  first  day  of  the  court,  who  then  and  there  shall 
have  the  matters  in  question  shown  to  them  by  two  persons  in  the  said 
writ  named,  to  be  appointed  by  the  court,  or  judge ;  and  the  sheriff  or 
other  officer  who  is  to  execute  the  said  writ,  shall,  by  a  special  retui-> 
on  the  same,  certify  under  his  hand  that  the  view  hath  been  had  ac 
cording  to  the  command  of  the  said  writ."  ^ 

(15.)  Rhode  Island.  —  "In  all  cases  relating  to  the  realty,  eithei 
party  may   have  the  jury  to  view  the  place  in  question,  if  tlie    court 

1  Gen.  Laws  N.  H.  1S7S,  chap.  537,  of  taking  the  view.  Then  follows  the 
§  17.  following  section,  drawn  more  in  cou- 

2  Ibid.,  §  IS.  forraity  with  modem  statutes:  "The 

3  Eev.  Stat.  N.  J.  1877,  p.  529,  pi.  court  in  which  any  cause,  of  a  crimiu- 
25.  The  next  section  provides  for  a  al  or  civil  nature,  is  pending,  may,  at 
view  by  a  struck  jury,  in  -nliich  case  any  time  after  the  jury  for  the  trial  of 
twelve  jurors  are  to  attend  at  the  view,  the  same  is  drawn,  or  at  anytime  dur- 
The  next  section  provides  that,  al-  ing  the  trial,  order  that  the  jury  im- 
though  a  view  may  have  been  ordered,  paneled  for  the  trial  thereof,  shall 
the  trial  shall  proceed  if  it  is  not  taken,  view  any  lands  or  place,  if,  in  the 
and  that  no  objection  shall  be  made  by  judgment  of  the  court,  such  view  Is 
either  side  for  want  of  a  view.  The  necessary  to  enable  the  jury  better 
next  section  provides  that  the  expense  to  understand  tlie  evidence  given  in 
of  the  view  shall  be  equally  borne  by  the  cause;  and  such  view  shall  there- 
both  parties,  and  that  no  evidence  upon  be  had  in  such  manner  as  the 
shallbe  given  on  either  side  at  the  time  court  shall  direct."  Z6jd.,p.  530,pl,  29. 


'672  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  TllOllip.  Tr., 

shall  be  of  opinion  that  such  view  is  necessary."  ^  "To  entitle  himself 
to  such  view,  the  party  moving  therefor  shall  advance  such  reasonable 
sum  of  money  to  the  sheriff,  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  jury  on 
such  view,  as  the  court  shall  order  ;  and  the  amount  of  such  expenses 
shall  be  taxed  against  the  adverse  party,  if  he  who  advanced  the  same 
shall  recover  costs  in  the  suit."  ^ 

(16.)  South  Carolina.  —  "The  jury  in  any  case  may,  at  the  request 
of  either  party,  be  taken  to  view  the  place  or  premises  in  question,  or 
any  property,  matter  or  thing,  relating  to  the  controversy  between  the 
parties,  when  it  appears  to  the  court  that  such  view  is  necessary  to  a 
just  decision  ;  provided,  the  party  making  the  motion  advances  a  sum 
sufficient  to  pay  the  actual  expenses  of  the  jury  and  the  officers  who  at- 
tend them  in  taking  the  view,  which  expenses  shall  be  afterwards  taxed 
like  other  legal  costs,  if  the  party  who  advanced  them  prevails  in  the 
suit.  "3 

(17.)  Virginia  and  West  Virginia — [Civil  Cases]. — "The  jury 
may,  in  any  case,  at  the  request  of  either  party,  be  taken  to  view  the 
premises  or  place  in  question,  or  any  property,  matter  or  thing,  relating 
to  the  controversy  between  the  parties,  when  it  shall  appear  to  the  court 
that  such  view  is  necessary  to  a  just  decision  ;  provided  the  party  mak- 
ing the  motion  shall  advance  a  sum  sufficient  to  defray  the  expenses  of 
the  jury  and  the  officers  who  attend  them  in  taking  the  view,  which  ex- 
penses shall  be  afterwards  taxed  like  other  legal  costs."  * 

(18.)  Wisconsin.  —  "  The  jury  ma}^  in  any  case,  at  the  request  of 
either  party,  be  taken  to  view  the  premises  or  place  in  question,  or  any 
property,  matter  or  thing,  relating  to  the  controversy  between  the  par- 
ties, when  it  shall  appear  to  the  court  that  such  a  view  is  necessary  to 
a  just  decision  ;  provided,  the  party  making  the  motion  shall  advance  a 
sum  sufficient  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  jury  and  the  officers  who 
attend  them  in  taking  the  view ;  which  expenses  shall  afterwards  be 
taxed  like  other  legal  costs,  if  the  party  who  advanced  them  shall  prevail 
in  the  action."  ^ 


*  Code  Va.  1887,  §  3167;  Va.  Code 
1849,  p.  629,  §  10;  2  Rev.  Stat.  W.  Va. 
1879,  chap.  109,  §  36. 

6  Kt'v.  Stat.  Wis.  1878,  §2852;  Eev. 
Stat.  Wis.  1858,  cliap.   118,  §  32. 


1  Pub. 

§1. 

2  Ibid. 

Stat.    R.  I.    1882,    chap.  214, 

,§2. 

3  Rev. 

Stat.    So.  Car.  1873,  p.  524, 

§35. 

Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII. ]  VIEW.  673 

§  883.  When  Discretionary. — Under  these  statutes,  it  has 
been  frequently  ruled  that  the  granting  or  refusing  a  view  is 
purely  a  matter  of  discretion  with  the  trial  court,  which  discretion 
is  not  reviewable  on  appeal  except  in  cases  of  manifest  abuse. ^ 
Although  a  view  is  authorized  by  statute,  the  refusing  of  it  will 
not  be  ground  of  reversing  a  judgment,  where  it  does  not  appear 
that  there  was  any  difficulty  in  deciding  the  question  upon  the 
whole  evidence,  or  that  there  was  any  difficulty  which  might  have 
been  removed  by  a  view.  A  mere  contradiction  in  the  evidence, 
without  more,  does  not  enable  an  app'ellate  court  to  see  that  a 
view  was  necessary. ^  In  such  a  case  it  has  been  said:  "  It  would 
be  an  exceedingly  difficult  matter  to  show  that  the  court  had  abused 
its  discretion  in  refusing  to  make  an  order  of  this  kind.  It  appears 
that,  in  this  case,  a  map  was  used  upon  the  trial  [a  proceeding  to 
condemn  land] ,  showing  the  farm  and  the  right  of  way  through 
it,  and  the  witnesses  described  fully  the  situation  of  the  premises, 
and  we  suppose  the  court  was  correct  in  holding  that  a  view  of 
the  farm  was  not  necessary  to  ena})le  the  jury  to  understand  and 
properly  apply  the  evidence  in  this  case,  and  reach  a  just  deter- 
mination of  the  rights  of  the  parties."  ^  In  an  action  for  2V07'k 
and  labor  done  and  materials  furnished  in  repairing  a  house,  a 
view  was  requested  and  denied,  and  it  was  held  that  there  was 
nothing  w^hich  made  it  appear  that  the  discretion  of  the  trial 
court  was  abused,* 

§  884.  In  Equity  Cases.  —  In  equity  cases  the  verdict  of  the 
jury  is  advisory  merely,  and  therefore  a  view  of  the  locus  in  quo 
by  the  jury  is  not  as  important  as  in  cases  where  their  decision, 

1  Pick  V.  Rubicon  &c.  Co.,  27  Wis.  2  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.    v.  Polly,  14 

433,   446;    Boardmau  u.    Westchester  Gratt.  (Va.)  447,  470. 

Fire  Ins.  Co.,   54  Wis.  364;    Smith  u.  ^  Clayton  v.   Chicago    &c.  R.   Co., 

St.  Paul  City  R.   Co.,  32   Minn.    1,7;  swpj-a.  Circumstances  under  which  dis- 

Clayton  «.  Chicago  «fcc.   R.  Co.,  67  la.  cretionary  to  refuse  a  view  under  Kau- 

238;  King  v.  Iowa  Midland  R.  Co.,  34  sas  statute  in  a  proceeding  to  condemn 

la.    458;    Richmond  v.   Atkinson,   58  land  for  a  railway :  Kansas  Central R. 

Mich.  413;  People  v.  Bouncy,  19  Cal.  Co.  v.  Allen,  28  Kan.  285. 

426;  Baltimore  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Polly,  14  *  Riclimoud  v.  Atkinson,  58  Mich. 

Gratt    (Va.)  447,  470.  413;  ««;e,  §  879. 

43 


674  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr.j 

subject  to  the  power  of  the  judge  to  set  it  aside  for  good  cause, 
is  final.  The  difference  between  the  relation  of  the  judge  to  the 
finding  of  the  jury,  in  cases  in  equity  and  in  cases  at  law,  is  this: 
in  cases  in  equity  the  judge,  having  heard  the  evidence,  is  at 
liberty  to  adopt  the  verdict,  if  he  thinks  fit;  in  cases  at  law,  he 
is  at  liberty  to  set  it  aside,  if  he  thinks  fit.  In  either  case,  in 
order  to  enable  him  to  exercise  this  office  discreetly  and  justly, 
he  ought  to  hear  and  see  all  the  evidence  which  the  jury  hear  and 
see.  If  the  jury  make  a  view  of  the  premises  out  of  court, 
the  judge  ought  to  make  the  same  view.  In  point  of 
fact,  however,  he  never  accompanies  them  in  making  the  or- 
dinary statutory  view,  except  under  special  statutory  provis- 
ions, such  as  the  statute  of  Michigan  relating  to  the  condemnation 
of  land  for  public  uses,  hereafter  considered. ^  Nevertheless, 
we  find  that  it  has  been  held  that  where,  in  an  equity  case,  the 
jury  view  the  premises,  the  judge  should  accompany  them;  since 
he  is  not  in  a  position  to  review  and  affirm  or  set  aside  their  ver- 
dict, unless  he  has  the  same  means  of  information  which  they 
had.  In  such  a  case  the  judge,  finding  himself  in  no  position  to 
review  the  verdict  intelligently,  properly,  it  was  held,  granted  a 
new  trial. ^ 

§  885.  In  Criminal  Cases.  —  It  thus  appears  ^  that,  in  crimi- 
nal cases,  we  have  no  warrant  in  the  English  practice  for  sending 
the  jury  out  to  make  a  view,  except  where  such  a  course  is  au- 
thorized by  statute.  Before  the  enacting  of  any  statute  author- 
izing a  view  in  criminal  cases,  a  view  in  such  a  case  was  reluc- 
tantly granted  by  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts. 
The  case  was  a  prosecution  for  murder,  and  a  view  of  the  house, 
where  the  murder  was  alleged  to  have  been  committed,  was  at 
first  refused,  although  moved  for  by  the  prisoner  and  consented  to 
by  the  attorney-general, —  the  court  saying:  "  We  refused  sucii 
a  request  in  another  case,  and  it  does  not  appear  to  us  that  a  view 
is  necessary.     It  is  attended  with  many  inconveniences.      We 

1  Post,  §  911.  -*  Ante,  §879. 

2  Fraedrich  v.  Fliette,  G4  Wis.  184, 
188;  s.  c.  25  N.  AV.  Kcp.  28. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  675 

know  not  what  the  jury  may  hear,  and  what  impressions  may  be 
made   upon    them    while  they  are  talking  the  view.     The  ease 
should  be  decided  by  the  evidence  given  in  court."     Upon  a 
second  trial  of  the  same  case,  the  jury  themselves  requested  that 
they  might  be  permitted  to  see  the  place  of  the  murder,  and  the 
counsel  on  both  sides  expressed  their  desire  that  permission 
should  be  gi-anted.     The   prisoner   likewise  gave  his    consent. 
The  court  granted  the  request,  but  with  hesitation,  because  they 
said  this  course  was  without  precedent,  and  if  it  should  turn  out 
to  be  incorrect,  they  had  doubts  whether  they  could  hold  the 
^  prisoner  to  his  consent.     The  court  directed  that  no  person  should 
go  with  the  jury,  except  the  officers  having  them  in  charge,  and 
that  no  person  should  speak  to  them,  under  penalty  of  a  con- 
tempt.    Plans  were  exhibited  and  explained  to  the  jury  in  court, 
and    they   were   permitted    to    take    them   with   them.i     This 
doubt   was  relieved    by  a  statute  subsequently  enacted,  which 
recited  that    "the    court   may   order   a  view   by  a    jury  im- 
paneled to  try  a  criminal  case."^     With  this  statute  in  force, 
the    court    could,    of    course,  have    no   doubt  of  its  authority 
to  grant  a  view,  if  it  deemed  it  expedient.     Thus,  in  the  cele- 
brated trial  of  Prof.  Webster  for  the  murder  of  Dr.  Parkman, 
the  attorney-general,  after  opening  the  case,  suggested  that  it 
would  be  desirable  that  the  jury  should  be  permitted  to  go  to 
the  medical  college,  and  take  a  view  of  the  premises  wdiere  the 
murder  was  alleged  to  have  been  committed.     The  court  said, 
referring  to  the  above  statute,  that  they  had  no  doubt  of  their 
authority  to  grant  a  view,  if  they  deemed  it  expedient;   and  that 
views  had  been  granted  of  late  in  several  capital  cases  in  that 
county.     "And  the  court  afterwards,  on  adjourning  for  the  day, 
directed  that  the  jury  should  be  permitted  to  take  a  view  of  the 
medical  college  on  the  next  morning,  before  the  coming  in  of  the 
court,  attended  by  two  officers,  and  one  counsel  on  each  side."  ^ 
But  in  Texas,  where  there  was  no  statute  authorizing  a  view  in 

1  Com.   ».  Ivaapp,  9   Pick.  (Mass.)      Geu.  Stats.  Mass.    1860,   ch.  172,  §9. 
496,  515.  See  ante,  §  882,  subsec.  8. 

2  R.    S.  Mass.    18i3,  ch.  137,  §  10;  3  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 

295,  298. 


676  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1   TllOtlip.   Tl"., 

criminal  cases,  it  was  held  that,  for  the  court  to  permit  a  view, 
was  error  for  which  a  conviction  would  be  reversed.  The  case  in 
which  it  was  so  held  was  a  case  of  hog-stealing.  There  was  a  con- 
troversy as  to  the  identify  of  the  animal  alleged  to  have  been  stolen. 
The  jurors  were  permitted  by  t]\e  court  to  leave  the  court  room 
during  the  trial,  and  to  inspect  the  animal  alleged  to  have  been 
stolen,  with  a  view  of  thus  solving,  in  connection  with  the  evi- 
dence detailed  by  the  witnesses,  the  question  of  identity  and 
ownership.  The  court  set  aside  the  verdict  and  ordered  a  new 
trial. ^  So,  in  Georgia,  in  a  case  of  murder,  the  court  asked  the 
defendant's  counsel  whether  he  objected  to  the  jury  making  a 
view  of  the  premises,  and  received  an  answer  that  he  did  not, 
and  thereupon  sent  them  out  in  charge  of  a  bailiff  to  make  such 
a  view.  It  was  held  that  this  was  error  such  as  required  a  reversal 
of  the  conviction.  The  court  said:  "This  extraordinary  pro- 
ceeding on  the  part  of  the  court  was  error.  The  court  had  no 
legal  right  to  require  the  defendant's  counsel  to  say  whether  he 
objected  to  that  extraordinary  proceeding  or  not,  especially  in 
the  presence  of  the  jury,  and  the  fact  that  he  did  not  object 
under  the  circumstances  did  not  legalize  that  extraordinary  pro- 
ceeding.''^ 

§  886.   View  that  the  Prisoner  must  Accompany  the  Jury.  — 

Where  a  view  takes  place  under  the  authority  of  a  statute,  in  a 
criminal  case,  the  prisoner  must,  according  to  several  recent 
holdings,  accompany  the  jury;  since  it  is  reasoned  that,  for  the 
view  to  take  place  in  his  absence,  is  a  violation  of  his  constitu- 
tional privilege  of  meeting  the  witnesses  against  him  face  to 
face,  — the  conception  being  that  no  species  of  evidence  can  be 
communicated  to  the  jury  in  any  way  except  in  his  presence.^ 


1  Smith  V.  State,  42  Tex.  iU.  (Cal.),  10  Pac.  Rep.  1G9;  s.  c.  71  Cal. 

2  Bostock  V.  State,  61  Ga.  635,  639,  602  (overruling  People  v.  Bonuey,  19 
opiniou  by  Warner,  C.  J. ;  a»<e,  §  881.  Cal.     426).     Compare    Eastwood    v. 

3  State  y.  Bertin,  24  La.  Ann.  46;  People,   3  Park    Cr.     (N.   Y.)   25;    3 
Carroll  v.  State,  5  Neb.  32,  35 ;  Benton  v.  Wliart.  Cr,  L.  (7tli  ed.),  §  3160. 
State,  30  Ark.  328,  348;  People  v.  Bush 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVIL]  VIEW.  677 

Some  of  the  cases  ^  also  take  the  view  that  this  supposed  consti- 
tutional  right  of  the  prisoner  cannot  be  icaived  by  him.^ 

§  887.  A  Contrary  View. — There  is  equally  good  authority 
and  reason  in  support  of  the  contrary  view.  In  Massachusetts 
it  was  not  supposed  necessary  in  the  cases  of  Knapp  and 
Webster,^  to  send  the  prisoner  with  the  jury  when  they  made  the 
view.  In  England,  it  has  been  held,  in  the  Court  for  Crown 
Cases  Reserved,  that  no  irregularity  is  committed  in  a  criminal 
case,  by  allowing  a  jury  to  view  the  premises  on  which  the 
alleged  criminal  act  was  committed,  even  after  the  case  has  been 
summed  up  and  the  jury  have  commenced  their  deliberations, 
the  prisoner  not  consenting,  his  counsel  being  absent  at  the 
time,  and  neither  the  prisoner  nor  his  counsel  going  with  the 
jury  to  make  the  inspection.*  The  statute  of  Kansas  is  similar  to 
that  of  Arkansas  and  California;  but,  nevertheless,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Kansas  hold  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  prisoner  to 
accompany  the  jury  in  making  the  view ;  and  that  his  right  so  to 
accompany  them  is  a  right  which  he  may  ivaive,  and  which  he 
does  waive  by  not  demanding  the  privilege.^     So,  in  Oregon, 

1  Notably  the  case  of  People  v.  by  the  witnesses,  and  looked  in  the 
Bush  (Cal.),  10  Pac.  Rep.  169;  s.  c.  71  same  manner  in  which  the  witnesses 
Cal.  602  (overruling  People  v.  Bon-  stated  they  had  looked.  It  was  ob- 
ney,  19  Cal.  426).  served  that  if  these  facts  had   been 

2  This  proposition  is  denied  in  a  found  by  the  court  below,  instead  of 
vigorous  argument  by  Brewer,  J.,  in  being  merely  recited,  a  very  serious 
State  V.  Adams,  20  Kas.  311,  32-1.  question    would    have    arisen,    upon 

3  Ante,  §  885.  which  it  would  have  been  necessary  to 
*  Reg.  V.  Martin,  L,  R.  1  Cr.  Cas.      examine  several  authorities;    but  as 

Ees.  378.     In  this  case  another  very  the  facts  were  not  found,  the  question 

serious     question     was      presented,  was  not  presented  to  the  reviewing 

While  the    jurors  were  making   the  court  for  decision, 
view,  they  asked  the  witnesses,  who  ^  State  v.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311,  324. 

had  testified  in  coiirt,  to  point  out  the  The  reasoning  of  the  court  is  not  as 

precise  spot  where  they,  the  witnesses,  clear  as  its  conclusion.     It  introduces 

had  stood,  and  the  place  aud  the  posi-  the  fiction  that,  although  the  prisoner 

tion    in    which    the    prisoners    were  does  not  accompany  the  jury  in  mak- 

standing,  when  the  witnesses  saw  the  ing  the  view,  he  is,  nevertheless,  with 

prisoners  do  the  alleged  criminal  act;  them,  because  they  are  in  legal  con- 

and  then  the  jurors  placed  themselves  templation  in    the    presence    of    the 

In  the  same  position  as  that  occupied  court.     On    this    point.    Brewer,    J., 


678  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

where,  in  a  case  of  murder,  a  view  was  directed,  and  the  order 
omitted  to  provide  for  the  presence  of  the  defendant  or  his  coun- 
sel thereat,  no  application  having  been  made  therefor  by  them, 
it  was  held  no  error,  since  the  right  to  be  present  was  one  which 
the  accused  might  loaive,  —  the  court  saying:  "  We  consider  the 
better  doctrine  to  be,  that  the  failure  of  the  accused  to  be  pres- 
ent when  the  jury  were  making  their  view,  is  no  ground  of  error. 
We  are  unable  to  see  what  good  his  presence  would  do,  as  he 
could  neither  ask  nor  answer  an}^  question,  nor  in  any  way  inter- 
fere with  the  acts,  observations,  or  conclusions  of  the  jury.  He 
would  only  have  been  a  mute  spectator  while  there."  ^ 

§  888.  Irregular  to  send  out  Witnesses  with  Jury. — For 

the  court  to  send  a  witness  with  the  jury,  on  making  the  view, 
with  directions  to  show  them  the  position  where  the  witness 
stood  during  the  transaction  in  question,  and  where  other  persons 
stood,  is  a  violation  of  the  provision  of  a  statute  against  suf- 
fering persons  to  communicate  with  the  jury,  for  which  a  con- 
viction will  be  reversed. 2 

§  889.  Theory  that  Impressions  acquired  by  the  View  are 
not  Evidence.  —  The  foregoing  theory,^  that  for  tlie  view  to  take 
place  without  the  presence  of  the  accused  is  a  violation  of  his 
constitutional  right  to  have  all  the  evidence  wliich  tlie  jury  re- 
ceive presented  to  them  in  his  presence,  is  reduced  to  nonsense 
by  another  class  of  holdings,  one  of  them  in  the  same  court,  to  the 
effect  that  the  knowledge  acquired  by  the  jurors  in  making  the 

said:  "In  contemplation  of  law,  the  of  the  court.     Though  the  defendant 

place  of  trial  is  not  changed.     The  may  not  go  with  them  into  their  place 

judge,    the    clerk,    the    officers,    the  of  retirement,  he  is  nevertheless  jier- 

records,  the  parties,  and  all  that  go  to  soually  present  during  that  portion, 

make  up  the  organization  of  the  court,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  trial."     This 

remain  in  the  court  room.     The  jury  reminds  one  of  the  fiction  by  which 

retire  to  discharge  one  duty  connected  the  Koman  emperors,  although  sitting 

with  the  trial,  and  yet,  though  absent  at  ease    in  their    capital,  personally 

while  discharging  that  duty,  inasmuch  commanded    in    ))attles  fought  in  the 

as  it  is  done  under  the  direction  of  the  most  distant  parts  of  their  empire, 
court,  and  while  in  charge  of  an  officer  ^  State  v.  Ah  Lee,  8  Ore.  214,  217. 

appointed, by  the  coui't,  they  are,  in  ^  people  v.  Green,  53  CaL  GO. 

legal  contemplation,  in  the   presence  '  Ante,  §  886. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVll.]  VIEW.  679 

view  is  not  evidence  at  all;  that  the  view  is  not  allowed  for  the  pur- 
pose of  furnishing  evidence  upon  which  a  verdict  is  to  be  founded, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  jury  better  to  understand 
and  apply  the  evidence  which  is  given  in  court;  ^  that  it  is  there- 
fore error  to  instruct  them  that,  in  making  it,  they  are  to  take 
into  consideration  in  any  degree  ^  the  knowledge  thus  acquired;  ^ 
and  that,  "though  a  view  has  been  had  and  the  bill  of  exceptions 
discloses  nothing  which  took  place  at  the  view,  it  contains  all  the 
evidence.^ 

§  890.  Reasons  Adduced  in  Support  op  this  View.  —  The  reasons 
adduced  in  the  support  of  this  view  will  appear  from  the  following  quo- 
tations: "  In  authorizing  a  court  to  send  the  jurv  to  view  the  premises 
in  litigation,  it  was  not  the  purpose  of  the  statute  to  convert  the  jurors 
into  silent  witnesses,  acting  on  their  own  inspection  of  the  land,  but 
only  to  enable  them  the  more  clearly  to  understand  and  apply  the  evi- 
dence. If  the  rule  were  otherwise,  the  jury  might  base  its  verdict 
wholly  on  its  own  inspection  of  the  premises,  regardless  of  an  over- 
whelming weight  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  and  the  losing  party  would 
be  without  remedy  by  a  motion  for  a  new  trial.  It  would  be  impos- 
sible to  determine  how  much  weight  was  due  to  the  inspection  by  the 
jury,  as  contrasted  with  the  opposing  evidence,  or  (treating  the  in- 
spection as  in  the  nature  of  evidence),  whether  it  was  sufficient  to  raise 
a  substantial  conflict  in  the  evidence.  The  cause  would  be  determined, 
not  upon  evidence  given  in  court,  to  be  discussed  by  counsel  and  con- 
sidered by  the  court  in  deciding  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  but  upon  the 
opinions  of  the  jurors,  founded  on  a  personal  inspection,  the  value  or 
the  accuracy  of  which  there  would  be  no  method  of  ascertaining.  The 
statute  could  not  have  been  intended  to  produce  such  results  as  these, 

in  authorizing  the  jury  to  view  the  premises."  ^ "The  question 

then  arises  as  to  the  purpose  and  intent  of  this  statute.*^     IL  seems  to 

J  Chute  V.  State,  19  Miun.  271,  281;  609;  Heady  v.  Vay  Tump.  Co.,  52  lud. 

Brakkeu  v.  Miuueapolis  &c.    R.  Co.,  29  117,  124. 

Minn.  41,  43.    That  this  was  tlie  origi-  ^  jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen, 

ual  conception  of  the  office  of  a  view  40  Ind.  545  (overruling  Evansville  &c. 

will  appear  from  the  English  statutes  R.  Co.  v.  Cochran,  10  Ind.  500). 
already  quoted.    Ante,  §§  876,  878.  ^  Wright  v.  Carpenter,  49  Cal.  607, 

2  Close  V.   Samra,  27  la.  503,  507,  609. 

(Wright,  J.,  dissenting).  6  j^ef erring  to    the   Iowa    statute, 

3  Wright  V.  Carpenter,  49  Cal.  607,      ante,  §  882,  subsec.  4. 


680  NATURAL   EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

US  that  it  was  to  enable  the  jury,  by  the  view  of  the  premises  or  place, 
to  better  understand  and  comprehend  the  testimony  of  the  witnesses  re- 
specting the  same,  and  thereby  the  more  intelligently  to  apply  the  tes- 
timony to  the  issues  on  trial  before  them ;  and  not  to  make  them  silent 
witnesses  in  the  case,  burdened  with  testimony  unknown  to  both  parties, 
in  respect  to  which  no  opportunity  for  examination  or  correction  of 
error,  if  any,  could  be  afforded  either  party.  If  they  are. thus  per- 
mitted to  include  their  persoiial  examination,  how  could  a  court  ever 
properly  set  aside  their  verdict  as  being  against  the  evidence,  or  even 
refuse  to  set  it  aside,  without  knowing  the  facts  ascertained  by  such 
personal  examination  by  the  jury?  It  is  a  general  rule,  certainly,  if 
not  universal,  that  a  jury  must  base  their  verdict  upon  the  evidence 
delivered  to  them  in  open  court,  that  they  may  not  take  into  consider- 
ation facts  known  to  them  personally,  but  outside  of  the  evidence  pro- 
duced before  them  in  court.  If  a  party  would  avail  himself  of  the  facts 
known  to  a  juror,  he  must  have  him  sworn  and  examined  as  other  wit- 
nesses." 1 

§891.  Instructions  held  Erroneous  under  this  View. — Under 
this  view  it  has  been  held  error  to  instruct  the  jury  that,  in  estimating 
the  damages,  they  are  to  use  their  own  judgment,  as  well  as  the  judg- 
ment of  the  witnesses.-  Under  the  same  view  it  has  been  held  error  to 
give  the  followhig  instruction:  "You  must  determine  the  question  of 
damages  from  the  evidence  before  you,  giving  the  same  and  each  part 
thereof,  the  weight  you  think  it  entitled  to,  and  no  more  ;  as  a  part  of 
the  evidence  in  the  case,  such  information  as  you  derived  from  the  view 
of  the  premises  through  which  the  road  is  proposed,  and  on  the  line  of 
the  said  proposed  road."     The  court  quoted  and  approved  the  reason- 

1  Close  V.  Samra,  27   la.   503,   507,  the  testimony,'  then,  it  seems  to  me, 

opinion  by  Cole,  J.     From  the  fore-  they  are  possessed  of  facts  unknown 

going  decision  Wright,  J.,  dissented.  to  the  parties;  and  whether  tlie   im- 

lu  the  course  of  his  opinion,  he  said :  pressions  received  and  the  applica- 

"  If  the  only  object  of  the  statute  was  tious  of    the  testimony  are  true  or 

to  enable  thejury  to  better  understand,  false,  can  no  more  be  discovered  than 

and  the  more   intelligently  to  apply,  If  they  have  actually  '  burdened  '  them- 

the  testimony  of  the  witnesses,  then  I  selves    with    testimony.''''      Ibid.   511. 

confess  that  I  do  not  see  why,  upon  The  learned  judge  extended   his   ob- 

this  basis  alone,  they  might  not,   in  servations  at  considerable  length  upon 

determining  the  ultimate    facts,  '  in-  the    question,  with  reference  to   the 

elude  '  or  make  use  of,  this  '  personal  particular  case  before  the  court, 

examination.'     If  they  are  to  use  it  to  ^  Brakken   v.   Minneapolis    &c.   R, 

enable  them  '  to  iiuderstand  and  apply  Co.,  29  Minn.  41,  43. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  681 

ing  of  the  Iowa  court  in  the  ease  next  cited. ^  This  view  has  been 
pushed  to  the  extreme  of  holding  that  an  instruction  which  allows  the 
jur}'  to  base  their  verdict  in  any  degree  upon  their  personal  examina- 
tion of  the  preuiises,  is  error.  It  was  so  held  of  the  following  in- 
struction:  "You  will  determine  from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case, 
and  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  disclosed  on  the  trial,  including 
3'our  personal  examination,  whether  the  water  was,  by  the  act  of  the 
defendant,  backed  up  on  the  premises  of  the  plaintiffs,  to  the  damage 
of  their  water  power,  as  alleged."  - 

§  892.  Instance,  under  this  Theory,  op  a  proper  Instruction  to  a 
Jury  before  sending  them  out.  —  On  the  third  trial  of  an  action  for 
the  recovery  of  land  in  California,  it  became  material  to  determine 
whether  the  land  was  sicamp  and  overfloived  land,  such  as  passed  under 
the  patent  under  which  the  plaintiff  claimed.  The  court,  upon  ordering 
a  view,  instructed  the  jury  as  follows:  "The  jury  will  go  with  the 
sheriff,  examine  the  land,  examine  the  quality  of  the  soil,  of  the  growth 
upon  it;  but  you  are  not  to  have  any  conversation  with  each  other, 
or  any  body  else,  in  relation  to  the  quality  of  the  land.  Avoid  form- 
ing an  opinion  as  to  its  quality  until  you  have  finally  heard  all  the  evi- 
dence, and  retired  to  your  jury  room  to  consider  a  verdict. "  ItM-as 
held  that  this  instruction  was  not  erroneous.  It  did  not  authorize  the 
jury  to  take  into  consideration,  when  they  should  retire  into  the  jury 
room,  the  result  of  their  own  examinations  of  the  land,  as  independ- 
ent evidence  in  the  case.^ 

§  893.  Contrary  Opinion  that  Knowledge  Acquired  by  the 
View  is  Evidence.  — There  is  no  sen.se  in  the  conclusion  that 
the  knowledge  which  the  jurors  acquire  by  the  view  is  not  evi- 
dence in  the  case.  The  conception  that  what  a  body  of  jurors 
see  themselves,  relevant  to  the  issue  to  be  decided  by  them,  is 
not  evidence,  but  something  to  be  considered  by  them  in  weigh- 
ing oral  evidence,  is  nonsense,  "What  they  see  is  evidence  in  a 
primary  sense,  and  what  is  detailed  to  them  concerning  the 
same  subject  matter  by  witnesses,  is  evidence  in  merely  a  second- 
ary sense.     An    objective  lesson  always  impresses  itself   more 

1  Heady  v.  Vevay  &c.  Turup.  Co.,  ^  Wright  v.  Carpenter,  50  Cal.  556; 
52  Ind.  117,  12-1.  s.  c.  ou  former  appeals,  49   Cal.    60a 

2  Close  V.  Samm,   27    la.  503,  507  and  47  Cal.  43G. 
(Wright,  .J.,  dissenting). 


682  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.  Tl*., 

vividly  upon  the  mind  than  an  oral  lesson.  Such  a  conclusion  is 
tantamount  to  saying  that  they  are  to  take  the  trouble  of  going 
in  a  body  to  inspect  land,  or  other  material  object,  out  of  court, 
and  that  when  they  come  to  make  up  their  verdict  they  must 
resolutely  forget  the  impressions  acquired  from  such  inspection. 
The  conception  that  a  body  of  freeholders,  residing  in  the  vicin- 
ity, shall  view  the  land  in  controversy,  in  a  proceeding  to  expro- 
priate it  for  public  use,  and  then  shall  put  out  of  sight,  in  making 
their  estimate  of  damages,  their  own  knowledge  of  the  value  of 
land  in  that  vicinity,  applied  to  the  character  of  the  particular  land 
as  they  have  observed  it,  is  also  nonsense.  Impressed  with  this 
view,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin ,  speaking  through  Lyon,  J. , 
has  said :  "  We  understand  that  the  object  of  a  view  is  to  acquaint 
the  jury  with  the  physical  situation,  condition  and  surround- 
ings of  the  thing  viewed.  What  they  see  they  know  absolutely. 
If  a  witness  testified  to  anything  which  they  know  by  the  evi- 
dence of  their  senses  on  the  view  is  false,  they  are  not  bound  to 
believe,  indeed  cannot  believe,  the  witness,  —  and  they  may  dis- 
reirard  his  testimony,  although  no  other  witness  has  testified  on 
the  stand  to  the  fact  as  the  jury  know  it  to  be.  For  example,  if 
a  witness  testified  that  a  certain  farm  is  hilly  and  rugged,  when 
the  view  has  disclosed  to  the  jury,  and  to  every  juror  alike, 
that  it  is  level  and  smooth,  or  if  a  witness  testify  that  a  given 
buildino;  was  burned  before  the  view,  and  the  view  discloses  that 
it  bad  not  been  burned,  —  no  contrary  testimony  of  witnesses  on 
the  stand  is  required  to  authorize  the  jury  to  find  the  fact  as  it 
is,  in  disregard  of  the  testimony  given  in  court."  That  court 
accordingly  has  held  that  the  knowledge  which  the  jurors  acquire  in 
making  the  view,  is  evidence  to  be  considered  by  them  in  assessing 
damages,  in  a  proceeding  for  the  condemnation  of  land  for  public 
use  ^  upon  wdiich  they  may  act  to  the  exclusion  of  contradictory 
evidence;^  and  similar  views  prevail  in  other  jurisdictions.^ 

1  Washburn  v.   Milwaukee   &c.    R.  Mich   456;  post,  §  899;  Parks  v.  Bos- 
Co.,  59  Wis.  364,  868.  ton,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)   198    (as  seen  in 

2  Neilson  v.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  next  section)  ;    Eemy  v.   Municipality 
Wis.  517;  post,  §  598.  No.  2  (still  stronger  view,  as  seen  in 

3  Toledo  &c.  E.    Co.  ■?-.    Dunlap,  47  §897,  pos^). 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  683 

§  894.  [Continued.]  The  same  View  taken  by  Chief  Jus- 
tice Shaw.  —  Opposed  to  the  foregoing  authorities^  is  a  well  con- 
sichn-cd  case,  in  which  the  opinion  was  written  by  a  judge  no  less 
eminent  than  Chief  Justice  Shaw.  The  proceeding  was  instituted 
for  the  purpose  of  assessing  the  damages  sustained  b}'  a  property 
owner,  by  the  act  of  the  City  of  Boston  in  widening  a  street. 
The  judge  instructed  the  jury^  "that  the}^  having  viewed  the 
land  taken,  and  having  heard  the  testimony  of  witnesses,  and  en- 
lightened their  consciences  as  fully  as  they  could,  must  give  a 
verdict  according  to  their  own  opinion  and  conviction;  that  if 
any  one  of  them  knew  any  fact  of  his  own  knowledge,  which 
bore  upon  the  case,  he  ought  to  disclose  it,  and  testify  to  it  in 
court;  that,  in  making  up  their  verdict,  they  should  take  coun- 
sel of  their  own  experience  and  knowledge  of  like  subjects,  and 
should  consider,  not  only  what  the  witnesses  had  testified,  but 
what  they  themselves  had  seen  in  the  view  Avhich  they  had  taken  ; 
and  that,  if  witnesses  had  sworn  to  matters  of  opinion,  which 
the  jury,  in  the  exercise  of  their  good  sense,  did  not  believe  to 
be  correct,  they  should  disregard  such  testimony."  The  pro- 
priety of  this  instruction  was  challenged.  "It  a[)pears  to  me," 
said  Shaw,  C.  J.,  "  that  the  direction  of  the  court  in  this  respect 
was  singularly  well  guarded,  and  expressed  with  great  accuracy 
and  strictly  comformably  to  law.  The  cases  cited  tend  to 
show  that,  where  a  juror  knows  of  a  fact  material  to  .the  issue, 
he  must  disclose  and  testify  to  it,  in  court;  but  in  the  case  be- 
fore us,  the  jurors  were  referred  to  their  own  experience  and 
knowledge  of  like  subjects,  especiallv  that  acquired  by  the  view, 
to  test  the  accuracy  of  the  witnesses  in  matter  of  opinion.  Were 
this  a  common-law  action,  therefore,  I  should  feel  strongly  inclined 
to  the  opinion  that  this  instruction  was  strictly  and  legally  cor- 
rect; but  what  we  think  puts  it  beyond  any  exception  here  is, 
that  this  was  not  an  action,  but  an  estimate  of  damages,  in  lay- 
ing out  a  highway."  The  learned  judge  then  referred  to  cer- 
tain statutes,  as  showing  that  the  practice  had  been  for  the  jury 
to  go  upon  the  land  and  there  make  the  appraisement  or  estimate, 

1  Those  examined  in  §  889,  et  seq. 


684  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

and  continued  thus:  "  The  locating  committee,  and  the  sheriff's 
jury  are  to  make  an  estimation  upon  view;  and,  speaking  for 
myself,  I  cannot  percieve  why  they  might  not,  in  both  cases, 
have  estimated  the  damages  upon  their  own  experience  and  judg- 
ment, without  any  evidence  aliunde,  though  they  might  be  at 
liberty  to  enlighten  their  own  judgments  by  the  aid  of  testimony. 
And  there  seems  to  be  no  substantial  difference  established  by 
the  mode  of  trial  in  this  city.  The  whole  city  being  within  an  easy 
walk  of  the  court,  it  wasmanifestly  a  wise  and  convenient  provision 
that,  after  having  taken  a  view  of  the  place,  they  should  return 
into  court  and  have  the  cause  there  conducted  before  the  judge, 
and  in  conformity  with  the  usual  forms,  rather  than  elsewhere 
before  the  sheriff.  But  the  object  of  inquiry  is  still  the  same  ; 
it  is  to  estimate  the  plaintiff's  damages,  and  upon  view,  if  either 
party  desire  it.  The  jury  must,  therefore,  I  think,  exercise 
their  own  knowledge  and  experience  fully;  and  perhaps,  in  most 
instances,  with  a  competent  and  intelligcjnt  jury,  such  judgment 
could  not  be  much  aided  by  the  estimates  of  others,  though  un- 
der oath  in  the  form  of  testimony.  It  may  follow  as  a  conse- 
quence, as  suggested  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  complainant, 
that  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  set  aside  a  ver- 
dict in  such  a  case,  on  the  ground  of  being  contrary  to  the 
weight  of  evidence  given  on  the  trial ;  though  probably  the  same 
result  might  be  obtained  by  proving,  by  other  evidence,  such  an 
excessive  over  or  under-valuation  as  to  show  that  the  jury  might 
have  been  misled  by  error  or  prejudice."^ 

§   895.   But  Jurors  not  to  Disregard  other  Evidence.  — But 

the  evidence  which  the  jurors  may  acquire  from  making  the  view 
is  not  to  be  elevated  to  the  character  of  exclusive  or  predomi- 
nating evidence.  They  are  not  to  disregard  other  evidence  in  re- 
gard to  the  character  and  value  of  the  property;  and  an 
instruction  which  conveys  to  them  the  impression  that  they  may 
do  so,  is  erroneous.  It  was  so  held  concerning  instructions  which 
embraced  the  following  sentences:  "You  are  to  determine  it 
[the  compensation]  from  the  whole  evidence  that  has  been  given 

1  Parks  V.  Boston,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)  198,  199,209. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  viEAV.  685 

you  in  the  case  —  from  your  view  — you  to  take  the  view  you 
make  ;  j'ou  take  your  own  knowledge,  3'our  own  judgment,  your 
own  good  sense."  "  If  a  witness,  from  his  manner  and  appear- 
ance upon  the  stand,  from  his  want  of  knowkxlge  of  the  subject- 
matter,  or  from  other  causes  apparent  to  you  and  your  judgment  — 
his  evidence  docs  not  convince  your  mind  that  he  is  right,  you 
should  disregard  it,  because  it  is  not  evidence  in  the  case.  On 
the  other  hand,  if,  from  his  knowledge,  from  his  experience, 
from  his  appearance  and  manner,  he  does  convince  you,  and  your 
judgment,  your  knowledge  acquired  by  your  view,  your  good 
sense,  together  with  all  the  evidence  given  in  the  cause — de- 
termines in  your  mind  that  the  damages  are  so  nnich,  that  should 
be  3^our  verdict, —  more  or  less."  ^  The  court  held  that  these, 
and  other  similar  sentences  in  the  charge,  were  of  a  character  to 
convey  to  the  jurors  the  idea  that  they  might  assess  the  damages 
according  to  the  impressions  which  they  had  acquired  from  the 
view,  disregarding  other  evidence  in  the  case.  The  court,  con- 
tinuing the  language  already  quoted,'-  said:  "  But  if  the  fact  of 
which  the  jury  may  thus  become  cognizant  is  only  one  of  many 
elements  which  must  be  considered,  to  determine  some  other 
fact  which  can  only  be  satisfactorily  determined  by  a  resort  to 
l)rofessional  or  cx})ert  testimony,  the  case  is  very  different. 
Such  are  these  cases.  The  jury  were  to  assess  the  value  of  the 
land  taken  for  the  use  of  the  railway  company,  and  the  damages 
to  the  other  adjacent  lands  of  the  respective  owners  resulting 
from  such  taking.  To  do  this  intelligentl}',  it  became  necessary 
to  determine  the  location,  quality,  and  condition  of  the  land, 
the  uses  to  which  it  was  or  might  be  applied,  its  market  value, 
the  manner  in  which  the  taking  of  a  part  of  the  tract  would  affect 
the  residue,  and  perhaps  other  conditions  affecting  such  value  and 
damages.  Some  of  these  conditions,  and  more  especially  the 
value  of  the  land,  could  not  be  definitely  determined  by  the  view 
alone,  and  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  within  the  common 
knowledge  of  the  jur\'.     The   opinions  of  witnesses  acquainted 

1  It  should  be  observed  iu  passing,      which   accouuts    for    the   defects    of 
that  this  Avas  probably  an  oral  charge,      grammatical  coustructiou. 
takcu  down  by  a  court  stenographer,  2  ^n^e^  §  393, 


686  .  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

with  the  values  of  such  property,  are  essential  to  an  intelligent 
judgment.  At  the  common  law,  a  view  might  have  been  had  in 
a  real  action,  and  by  statute  in  any  action,  to  the  end  that  the 
jury  might  see  the  land,  or  thing  claimed,  to  enable  the  jurors 
better  to  understand  the  evidence  on  the  trial. ^  We  think  such 
is  still  the  office  of  a  view.  Hence,  whatever  the  jury  in  each  of 
these  cases  learned  of  the  lands  in  question  by  the  view,  was 
available  to  enable  them  to  determine  the  weight  of  conflicting 
testimony,  respecting  value  and  damage,  but  no  farther.  *  *  * 
As  to  how  far  jurors  may  make  up  their  verdict  on  their  own 
knowledge,  independently  of  the  testimony,  or  against  the  testi- 
mony, the  true  rule  is  indicated  by  what  has  already  been  said 
concerning  the  view.  A  jury  is  not  bound  to  give,  and  cannot 
give,  any  weight  to  testimony  which,  although  undisputed  by 
witnesses,  is  contrary  to  what  every  person  of  ordinary  intelli- 
gence knows  to  be  true.  To  illustrate,  should  a  witness  testify 
that  at  Boston  on  a  certain  day  the  sun  arose  at  midnight,  or 
that  the  Mississippi  River  empties  into  Lake  Michigan,  or  that 
white  is  black,  the  testimony  would  be  rejected  at  once.  So, 
in  matters  of  mere  opinion,  in  cases  where  the  testimony  of  ex- 
perts is  not  required,  if  the  jury  know  all  the  facts,  they  are  not 
necessarily  controlled  by  the  opinions  of  witnesses,  if  such  opin- 
ions have  been  received.  In  such  cases,  the  jury  are  as  compe- 
tent as  the  witnesses  to  form  an  opinion,  and  the  opinions  of 
witnesses,  if  objected  to,  are  inadmissible.  Bej^ond  this  the  jury 
cannot  properly  go.  To  allow  jurors  to  make  up  their  verdict 
upon  their  individual  knowledge  of  disputed  facts  material  to  the 
case,  not  testified  to  on  oath  in  court,  or  upon  their  private  opin- 
ions, would  be  most  dangerous  and  unjust.  It  would  deprive  the 
losing  party  of  the  right  of  cross-examination,  and  the  benefit  of 
all  the  tests  of  credibility  which  the  law  affords.  Besides,  the 
evidence  of  such  knowledge,  or  of  the  grounds  of  such  opinions, 
could  not  be  preserved  in  a  bill  of  exceptions,  or  questioned  on 
appeal.  It  would  make  each  juror  the  absolute  judge  of  the  ac- 
curacy and  value  of  his  own  knowledge  or  o})inions,  and  compel 
an  appellate  court  to  affirm  judgments  on  the  facts,  when  all  of 

•  Citing  Jacol)  L;nv  Diet.,  tit.  Vieio. 


Tit.  in,  Ch.  XXVII.]  v,E,v.  gg^ 

the  evidence  i,  before  it,  a,„l  there  is  none  whatever  to  ...pport 

e  jndg„,ent.     The  conrt  wonk,  be  obliged  to  presume  th" th 
JU.^ ,  or  some  juror,  had,  or  at  lea.rt  thought  he  had,  some  per- 
sonal knowledge  of  the  facts  outside  the  testimony,  or  oont.' :; 
to  It,   vbK.h   would  sustain  the  judg„,ent.     Such  a   ruling  in  a 
case     he  procedure  in  which  was  governed  by  connnon-h.^rules 

n  oL  of  "d  "",•:;""  "  '"!"'  ="'°^-«  ^■''«'-  '"  "■'■'.  if  the  testi- 
mony of  value  and  damages  is  contlictiug,  the  jury  may  resort  to 

the,r  own  general  knowledge  of  the  ele,„e„ts  wi'ch^.ffec  the 
assessment  m  order  to  dccrn.ine  the  relative  weight  of  co^! 
fi.ct,ngtes,unony;  but  their  assessment  must  be  supported  by 
the  testnnony,  or  it  cannot  stand."  '  '  f  "y 

§  896.  Illustration  of  rn.s  V,ew.  -  Further  to  ilh,strate  this  view 
Ljon  J  gave  tbe  following  supposed  case:  "If  no  witness  b 'd  esu' 
mated  the  compensation,  to  which  a  plaintiffl  was  entitled   a   lesttan 

!l  OOo"  ,"°n  f'""  *'•"'"•'  "'  ^""'"'  ""■  '-^  '^-  «^^»«  or  -0  e  than 
«  ,000,  should  be  set  aside,  because  unsupported  by  ti,e  evidence    ••" 
w  uch  naeans  that  an  estimate  of  values  made  e..el„slvely  upon   ,    'evi- 
dence  furiushed  bv  a  view   is  to  !»  «„t  o.i,i 
stantial  evidence.  '"'"  ''^  ""^"PP°rt«'  by  sub- 

5  807    When  Jury    decide    „„«„   their    Personal    K„owI- 

edge.-In  proceedmgs   for  the  expropriation  of  land  for  public 

uses,  under  the  Ctvil  Code  of  Louisia„a,3  the  court,  pusbin.   1  s 

theory  st.ll  further,  hold  that  the  jurors  are  entitled   o  r    y^u^oa 

lie,r  personal  knowledge  of  the  property  i„  forndugtheh- co^ 

us,on   although  they  may  be  aided,  especially  if  they  re„ue  t 

.,  by  the  op.ntons  of  witnesses.     .^A  jury,"  said  the  court,  '•  a  e 

n  t,u,h  experts;   and  we  suggest  that  a  personal  exa.ninat  .u>  of 

the  premises  by  the  jury  in  a  body,  after  it  is  impaneled,  should 

be  a  featm-e  oi  every  proceeding  ,u„ler  this  article  of  the  code.'- 

J  Washburn   v.   Milwaukee  &c.    E.  4  t?.™^         ,.     ■  •     ,- 

Co     50  "Wis    ^a±  Qr-  /  •       ^  i^emy   v.    Municipal  ty    'No    '>     12 

.:^S:lZ27ll%^^^^^^^^  La   Ann.  500,   503.     a's   to  the  .^t'urf 

^  Washburn  ..    Milwaukee  &c.  R.      ^1^^7:1!::^^'''  T  '^^^"'^' 
Co.,  50  Wis.  3M,  370  f     T  "^   "•    Manning,  1& 

3  n-      r^    ,    ^  La.  Ann.  182. 

Civ.  Code  La.,  art.  2608. 


688  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

§  898.  Not  Error  to  exclude  Evidence  of  Facts  which  the 
Jury  have  learned  from  the  View.  — On  a  similar  theory,  where 
the  jury  have  made  a  view  of  the  premises,  it  has  been  held  not 
error  to  exclude  testimony  of  witnesses,  as  to  matters  concerning 
which  they  could  form  an  opinion  from  the  view  as  intelligently 
as  could  the  witnesses.  "  Opinions  in  such  oases  are  entirely 
outside  the  range  of  authorized  expert  testimony."  ^ 

§  899.  [Michigan.]  —  Scope  of  the  Powers  of  the  Jury  in  Condem- 
nation Proceedings. — It  is  said  in  Michigan  that,  in  such  cases,  the 
constitution  as  well  as  the  principles  of  the  common  law,  makes  the 
jurors  judges  of  the  laio  and  fact.^  ' "  Their  conclusions  are  not  based  en- 
tirely on  testimony.  They  are  expected  to  use  their  own  judgment 
and  knowledge,  from  a  view  of  the  premises,  and  their  experience  as 
freeholders,  quite  as  much  as  the  testimony  of  witnesses  to  matter  of 
opinion.  And  while  an  appellate  court  is  bound  in  such  cases  to  set 
aside  proceedings  which  appear  to  be  based  on  false  principles,  it  can 
not  properly  deal  with  rulings  as  if  they  were  excepted  to  on  a  common- 
law  trial,  or  dispose  of  the  controversy  on  a  merely  technical  motion."  ^ 

§  900.  Difficulty  of  Reviewing'  on  Appeal  the  Finding  of  the 
Jury.  —  The  absurd  conclusion  in  which,  as  already  seen,*  sev- 
eral of  the  courts  have  landed  themselves,  that  what  the  jurors 
see  and  know  in  consequence  of  making  the  view  is  to  be  shut 
out  from  their  minds  as  evidence  —  even  if  this  were  possible  — 
when  they  come  to  make  up  their  verdict,  has  grown  out  of  the 
difficulty  which  appellate  courts  have  had  in  dealing  with  such 
verdicts  when  challenged  as  being  unsupported  by  the  evidence ; 
and  their  conclusion  has  been  that  the  knowledge  which  the 
jurors  acquired  in  making  the  view  is  nut  evidence,  because  it 
cannot  be  got  into  a  bill  of  exceptions  so  as  to  be  conveyed  to 
the  minds  of  the  appellate  judges.  They  have  been  staggered 
by  the  thought  of  the  consequences  which  would  ensue,  in  a  cap- 

1  Ante,  §  893;  Neilsou  v.  Chicago  3  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Duulap, 
&c.  11.  Co.,  58  Wis.  517,  524.  supra,  opiuiou  by  Campbell,  J. 

2  Chambeiiin  v.  Browu,     2   Doug.  ^  Ante,  §  889. 
(Mich.)  120;    Toledo    &c.    R.    Co.  v. 

Duiilap,  47  Mich.  45G,  406. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVri.]  VIEW.  689 

ital  case,  for  instance,  in  dealing  with  a  verdict  thus  challenged, 
Avhere,  in  addition  to  the  oral  testimony  of  witnesses,  the  record 
should  disclose  the  fact  that  the  jurors  had  made  a  view  of  the 
scene  of  the  supposed  crime;  but  they  have  not  stopped  to  re- 
flect that,  to  hold  that,  because  a  species  of  evidence  maybe  pre- 
sented to  the  jury  which  was  not  even  presented  to  the  trial 
judge,  and  which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  could  not  be  presented 
to  the  appellate  judges,  therefore  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  not 
being  evidence  at  all,  and  the  jury  are  to  be  so  instructed,  — 
proves  altogether  too  nuich,  even  for  an  ordinary  criminal  case; 
since,  as  already  seen,^  it  has  been  the  immemorial  practice  in 
criminal  trials  to  exhibit  to  the  jury  burglars'  tools,  blood  stained 
clotliino;,  and  other  indicia  of  crime.  Althouo;h  the  knowledo;e 
acquired  by  the  jurors  from  such  an  inspection  can  never  be  ac- 
curately conveyed  to  the  minds  of  the  appellate  judges  through  a 
bill  of  exceptions,  would  any  court  therefore  fall  into  the  wild 
dream  of  holding  that  the  jurors  should  be  instructed  to  disregard 
the  evidence  thus  acquired? 

§  901.  How  Courts  have  dealt  with  this  Difficulty. — The  dif- 
ficulty of  dealing  with  the  verdicts  of  juries,  when  challenged  on  the 
ground  of  being  unsupported  by  evidence,  where  a  view  has  been 
had,  is  exhibited  in  several  reported  cases.  It  has  been  said  in 
Nebraska  that,  in  a  proceeding  to  condemn  land  for  a  railway, 
where  there  has  been  a  view,  "it  is  difficult  to  review  the  judg- 
ment as  being  against  the  weight  of  evidence,  because  all  the 
evidence  before  the  court  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be 
incorporated  in  the  record;  and  in  these  cases  there  is  no  such 
discrepancy  between  the  evidence  in  the  records  and  the  verdicts, 
as  to  justify  the  court  in  setting  them  aside,  which  the  court 
would  not  do,  unless  it  was  clear  that  the  jury  had  erred."  '^  In 
California,  in  a  contested  election  case,  the  evidence  showed  that 
one  Twist  voted  in  precinct  A.,  and  the  question  was  as  to  the 
location  of  the  boundary  between  that  and  another  precinct,  with 
reference  to  Twist's  residence.     The  trial  court  found  that  he 

1  Ante,  §  871.  (Xeb.),  23  N.  W.  Rep.   34-8,   350;  s.  c. 

^  Omaha    &c.    R.    Co.    v.     Walker      17  Xeb.  432,  opiuioii  by  Maxwell,  J. 

44 


690  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

voted  illegally,  and,  on  appeal,  the  question  was  whether  there 
was  evidence  to  support  the  finding.  The  record  did  not  clearly 
show  the  location  of  the  boundary  line  between  the  precincts ; 
but,  as  it  appeared  that  the  trial  judge  (who  acted  as  trier  of  the 
facts)  visited,  with  the  consent  of  the  parties,  the  locality,  it 
was  held  that  the  finding  should  not  be  disturbed.  The  court 
said:  "As  the  case  is  presented  in  the  transcript  before  us,  we 
cannot  reverse  the  decision  of  the  court  below  upon  this  question. 
The  record  does  not  clearly  show  the  relative  positions  of  the 
natural  objects  referred  to  in  the  testimony,  so  that  we  can  in- 
telligently determine  where  the  line  runs  with  reference  to  the 
house  of  Twist,  or  with  reference  to  his  lands,  or  to  his  en- 
closure, as  the  same  existed  when  the  line  was  established. 
The  judge  below,  with  the  consent  of  the  parties,  visited  the 
locality,  and  certainly  had  better  opportunities  for  determin- 
ing satisfactorily  the  question  in  dispute  than  have  we."  ^ 
In  Indiana  it  was  originally  held  that,  where  the  jury  have  made 
a  view,  their  finding  in  respect  of  value  cannot  be  reviewed  on 
appeal;  because,  although  the  bill  of  exceptions  recites  that  it 
contains  all  the  evidence,  yet  in  point  of  fact  it  shows  that  it 
does  not;  since  it  contains  nothing  relative  to  the  examination  of 
the  premises  which  was  made  by  the  jury,  or  in  regard  to  the 
information  conveyed  to  their  minds  by  such  examination. 
"  Evidence,"  said  Hanna,  J.,  "  is  that  which  produces  conviction 
on  the  mind  as  to  the  existence  of  a  fact.  An  ocular  examina- 
tion of  the  premises  alleged  to  have  been  injured,  might  have 
had  that  effect,  as  well  as  an  oral  detail  of  circumstances,  as  in 
this  instance." '"^  But  in  a  subsequent  case  the  court  receded 
from  this  view,  and  held  that,  although  the  jury  have  made  a 
view,  yet  a  bill  of  exceptions  which  contains  only  the  testimony 
which  was  presented  at  the  trial  in  open  court,  contains  all  the 
evidence^  so  that  an  appellate  court  has  before  it  the  same  means 
of  revising  the  verdict  as  it  would  have  if  no  view  had  taken 
place,  or  as  it  would  have  if  the  appellate  judges  could  have  ac- 


•     1  Preston  v.  Culbertson,  58  Cal.  198,  2  Evausville  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Cochran, 

210.  10  Ind.  500. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  691 

companicd  the  jury  in  making  the  view.^     The   grounds   which 
induced  the  court  to  change  its  view,  were  thus  pressed  upon  the 
attention  of  the  court  by  counsel,   and  thus  rehearsed  by  the 
court  in  its  opinion:    "  It  is  urged  that,  to  follow  that  case  is  to 
say  that  in  no  case  where  a  jury  has  had  a  view  of  the  place  in 
which  any  material  fact  occurred,  as  contemplated  by  the  stat- 
ute,2  can  the  evidence  be  got  into  the  record,  as  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  put  into  the  bill  of  exceptions  the  impressions  made 
upon  the  minds  of  the  jury  by  such  view  ;  and  that  in  this  way 
all  benefit  of  appeal  to  this  court,  so  far  as  any  question  is  con- 
cerned which  depends  upon  all  the  evidence  being  in  the  record, 
would  be  wholly  cut  off.     It  is  further  contended  that,  whether 
the  jury  shall  have  a  view  of  the  place,  etc.,  is  a  matter  entirely 
within  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and  that  the  court  may  thus, 
in  its  discretion,  deprive  a  party  of  the  right  to  have  questions 
depending  on  the  evidence  reviewed  in  this  court,  even  in  cases 
of  the  greatest  moment.     It  is  urged  that,  under  the  rule  in  that 
case,  a  party  might  be  convicted  and  sentenced  to  be  hanged  on 
wholly  insufficient  evidence  ;  yet  if  the  prosecutor  has  got  an  order 
for  the  jury  to  view  the  place,  and  they  have  done  so,  it  would 
be  impossible  to  get  the  judgment  reversed,  no  matter  how  in- 
sufficient the  evidence  might  have  been.     These  reasons  have  so 
much  force  in  them,  that  we  feel  compelled  to  overrule  the  case 
of  Evansville  <&c.  R.  Co.  v.    CocJiran,'^  and  other  cases  which 
have  followed  it,   and  to    hold  that  the  bill  of  exceptions  may 
contain  all  the    evidence,    notwithstanding   the  jury  may  have 
viewed  the  property  which  is  the  subject  of  the  litigation,  or  the 
place  in  which  any  material  fact  occurred,  in  accordance  with  the 
sections  of  the  codes  above  cited."  *     These   holdings  strikino-ly 
illustrate  the  effect  upon  law  which  is  produced  by  the  effort  of 
trained  minds  to  reduce  its  rules  to  scientific  precision,  —  a  thing 

1  So  held  iu  Jeffersonville   &c.    R.      vision  of  the  crimiual  code, — Id.  202, 
Co.  V.  Bowen,  40  lud.  545;  overruling      §  328. 

Evansville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.    Cochran,  su-  3  \q  i^itX.  5(50. 

pra.  ^  Jeffersonville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bovreu, 

2  Referring  to  2    Gav.  &  Hord.  Ind.  40  lud.  545,  548. 
Stat.  p.  427,  §  l(J4,andto  the  like  pro- 


092  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

which,  in  the  nature  of  things,  is  impossible.  In  the  same  juris- 
diction (California),  as  above  seen, a  view  furnishes  evidence  in  a 
criminal  case,  so  that  it  is  a  fatal  error  for  the  accused  not  to  be 
present  when  it  takes  place ;  ^  but  it  does  not  furnish  evidence  in  a 
civil  case,  even  where  the  question  is  whether  the  land  which  the 
jurors  have  inspected  is  dry  land  or  swamp  land ;  ^  and  it  does 
furnish  evidence  in  an  election  case,  so  as  to  preclude  an  appel- 
late court  from  sitting  aside  a  verdict  based  on  it.^  Again,  in 
order  that  it  shall  not  be  evidence,  the  jurors  are  to  be  com- 
manded by  an  instruction  from  the  bench  to  reverse  the  in- 
voluntary mental  processes  by  which  conviction  or  belief  is 
attained. 

§  902.  Observations  on  this  Subject.  — This  is  emphatically 
what  Goethe  called  the  "  nonsense  of  reason."  *  The  true 
solution  of  this  difficulty  is  that  cases  where  there  has  been 
a  view  stand,  on  appeal  or  error,  on  a  special  footing ;  that, 
although  what  the  jurors  have  learned  through  the  view  is 
evidence  to  be  considered  by  them,  — -yet,  on  grounds  of  public 
policy,  having  reference  to  the  known  imperfections  which  at- 
tend the  conclusions  of  jurors,  and  even  of  judges  in  the  haste  of 
nisi  prius  work,  a  reviewing  court  should  set  aside  a  verdict 
based  partly  on  a  view,  unless  it  is  supported  by  substantial  tes- 
timony, delivered  by  sivorn  rvitnesses.  It  is  necessary  to  have  at 
least  the  testimony  of  one  sworn  witness,  although  ignorant,  dis- 
honest, partial  to  the  party  by  whom  he  is  brought  into  court, 
or  otherwise  not  deserving  of  credit,  to  support  the  verdict  of 
twelve  persumably  impartial  men,  not  selected  by  either  party, 

1  A7ite,  §  886.  Or  thus,  accordiug  to  Bayard  Tay- 

2  A7ite,  §§  889,  890,  892.  lor's  trauslatiou : 

3  Preston  v.  Culbertson,  supra.  "All  rights  aud  laws  are  still  trans- 

4  "  Laws,  like  inherited  disease  de-  raitted, 

scend,  Like  an  eternal  sickness  of  the  race, — 

And  slyly   wind   their   way   from  From    generation    unto   generation 

age  to  age,  titted, 

And  glide  almost  unseen  from  place  And  shifted  round  from  place  to  place. 

to  place;  Reason  becomes  a  sham,  beneficence 

Reason  to  nonsense  grows,  a  bless-  a  worry." 

ing  to  a  worry."  Goethe,  Faust,  Scene  IV. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  693 

who  are  sworn  to  decide  according  to  the  evidence,  and  who  de- 
liver a  verdict  based  upon  the  evidence  of  their  senses.^ 

§  903.  The  Report  of  Road  Viewers  not  Evidence  on  Appeal.  — 
Where,  in  a  special  proceeding  to  lay  out  a  road  and  assess  damages 
against  property  holders  whose  property  has  been  taken  for  the  same,  a 
land-owner  appeals  to  the  circuit  court,  the  reports  of  the  "  viewers  and 
reviewers  "  who  acted  in  the  proceeding  below,  are  not  evidence  at  all, 
but  the  cause  is  to  be  tried  de  novo  upon  original  evidence. 2 

§  904.  Unauthorized  View.— Jurors  must  base  their    find- 
ings upon  evidence  ackhiced  in  their  hearing  in  court,  or  upon  a 
view  authorized  by  the  court.     For  a  juror  to  go  out  of  court, 
of  his  own  motion,  and  make  an  inspection  of  the  premises  or 
thing  in  dispute,  will  be  good  ground  of  setting  aside  the  verdict; 
though,  if  the  party  entitled  to  complain  have  knowledoe  of  the 
irregularity  and  remain  silent,  it  will  be  deemed  waiZd.^     But 
it  has  been  held  that  the  bare   fact  of  the  jury  having  visited, 
during  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  burglary,  the  premises  where 
It  was  alleged  that  the  defendant  had  committed  the  crime,  is 
not  a  sufficient  ground  for  discharging  the  jurv;  some  prejudice 
to  the  prisoner  must  appear.^     Thus,  where,  in  a  capital  case, 
after  the  court  had  closed,  and  the  jurors  were,  pursuant  to  leave 
given   by  the  court,  walking  out  for  exercise  in  charge  of  an 
officer,  several  of  them  came  accidentally  upon  the  pla°e  of  the 
homicide  and  inspected   it,  -  it  was  held  that  this  irregularity 
was  ground  for  setting  aside  a  conviction,  on  the  principle  that, 
after  a  cause  is  submitted  to  a  jury,  if  they  receive  any  kind  of 
evidence  which  can  have  the  remotest  kind"  of  bearing  upon  the 
case,  it  will  be  fatal  to  their  verdict.^     The  fact  thlit   certain 
jurors,  in  a  civil  case,  while  passing  into  court,  stopped  and  ex- 
amined the  horse  which  was  the  subject  of  the  injury  sued  for 
in  the  presence  of  the  plaintiff,  who  made  no  objection  thereto,' 
nor  any  objection  to  proceeding  with  the  trial,  afforded  no  ground 

'  ^"^''  §  ^^'^-  "  People  V.  Hope,  fi2  Cal.  291. 

Couyer  v.  Boyd,  55  Ind.  im.  5  Eastwood  v.  People,  3  Park.  C.  R 

•^  Starapofskiw.  Steffens,  79  111.  303.      (N.  Y.)  25,  52. 


694  NATURAL    EVIDENCE.  [1  Tliomp.  Tl'., 

of  new  trial,  —  since  any  objection  grounded  on  such  an  irregu- 
larity was  waived.^ 

§    905.    Experiments    before    Jury    out    of  Court.  —  The 

privilege  of  making  experiments  in  the  presence  of  the  jury  is 
generally  refused,  on  the  ground  that  such  experiments,  in  the 
hands  of  skillful  persons,  are  as  likely  to  deceive  as  to  enlighten 
them.^  Thus,  in  an  action  brought  to  recover  damages  for  per- 
sonal injuries,  alleged  to  have  been  caused  by  a  collision  between 
two  street  railway  cars  of  the  defendant,  on  one  of  which  the 
plaintiff  claimed  to  have  been  a  passenger,  it  was  held  no  error 
for  the  trial  court  to  refuse  an  application  to  allow  the  jury  to 
proceed  to  the  car-house  of  the  defendant  and  witness  experi- 
ments with  those  cars,  as  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  alleged  collision.  "  The  case  was  not  within  the  pro- 
visions of  the  statute  allowing  a  view  by  the  jury,  and,  if  such 
procedure  were  authorized  or  proper  in  any  case,  the  question 
would  be  one  restins;  in  the  discretion  of  the  court."  ^  In  an  ac- 
tion  to  recover  the  value  of  lumber  burned  by  a  tire,  alleged  to 
have  been  caused  by  a  locomotive  operated  upon  the  defendant's 
railroad,  the  jury,  by  consent  of  the  parties  and  the  sanction  of 
the  court,  were  permitted  to  make  an  inspection  of  the  railroad 
and  the  locality  of  the  tire.  While  making  the  inspection,  ex- 
periments were  made  in  their  presence  by  employes  of  the  de- 
fendant, for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  the  defendant's  en- 
gines could  be  run  over  the  section  of  the  defendant's  road 
contiguous  to  the  fire,  without  the  use  of  steam,  and  consequently 
without  the  emission  of  sparks.  The  trial  court  regarded  this 
experiment  as  an  irregularity  sufficient  to  require  the  verdict 
(which  was  for  the  defendant)  to  be  set  aside;  but  the  Supreme 
Court  took  a  different  view,  declined  to  say  that  it  was  not  proper 
and  authorized  by  law,  held  that  in  the  particular  case  it  was  not 
prejudicial,  and  reversed  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  and  re- 
manded the  cause  for   judgment  on  the  verdict.*     Most  of  the 

1  Whitcher     v.     Peacham,    52    Vt.  3  Smith  v.  St  Paul  City  R.  Co.,    32 
242.                                                                    Mimi.  1,  7. 

2  Ante,  §  620.  ^  stockwell  v.  Railway  Co.,  43  la.  470. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  6115 

analogies  would  sustain  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  court,  and  dis- 
affirm that  of  the  reviewing  court  in  this  case.  Experiments 
made  by  the  jury  in  a  criminal  caae,  outside  of  the  court  and  in  the 
absence  of  the  prisoner,  may  afford  ground  for  setting  aside  their 
verdict.  It  was  so  held  where  the  counsel  for  a  defendant  in  a 
criminal  case,  in  the  course  of  his  argument,  told  the  jurors  that 
they  had  a  right  to  try  for  themselves  whether  worn-out  boots, 
like  those  described  by  the  witness  for  the  State,  would  make 
such  (racks  in  the  dust  or  sand  as  they  described,  and  advised 
the  jurors  to  make  the  experiment.  Several  of  them  did  accord- 
ingly make  the  experiment,  out  of  court,  without  the  court's  leave, 
and  in  the  absence  of  the  defendant.  A  fine  sense  of  technical- 
ity held  that,  although  the  prisoner's  counsel  had  led  the  jury 
into  this  irregularity,  it  was  ground  of  setting  aside  the  verdict. ^ 

§906.  Misconduct   in    making-  a  View. — If  the    jury   are 
guilty  of  misconduct  in  making  a  view,  the  party  claiming  to  be 
injured  by  it  must  bring  it  to  the  attention  of  the  trial  court  and 
obtain   a  distinct  ruling  thereon,  which  he  may  embody  in  his 
bill  of  exceptions,  —  otherwise  it  will  not  be  the  subject  of  re- 
vision on  appeal. 2     Upon  principles    more  fully  explained  in  a 
subsequent  part  of  this  work,^  improper  conwiunications  loith  the 
jury  while  making  the  view,  as  where  a  person  presumes  to  re- 
hearse  evidentiary    matters   in   their    hearing,  will  require    the 
granting  of  a  new  trial,  unless  it  clearly  appear  that  no  prejudice 
resulted  ;  since  "  the  court  is  the  place  in  which  causes  are  to  be 
tried,  and  to  suffer  them  to  be  tried  elsewhere,  destroys  confi- 
dence in  the  trial   by  jury,  and    brings   the  administration   of 
justice  into  contempt."  ^     Thus,  where,  in  a  case  of  homicide,  it 
appeared  that,  when  the  jury  arrived  at  the  premises  which  they 
were  sent  to  inspect,  they  there  found  a  person  who  had  never 
been  sworn  as  a  witness  in  the  case,  and  who,  in  response  to  ques- 
tions addressed  to  him  by  members  of  the  jury,  pointed  out  to 
them  all  the  special  features  of  the  premises,  —  for  this  irreo-u- 

1  state  V.  Sanders,  G8  Mo.  202.  3  p^g^^  §2553,  et  seq. 

2  See  Boardmau  U.Westchester  Fire  *  Hay  ward  v.  Knapp,  22  Minn.  5. 
Ins.  Co.,  o-i  Wis.  304,  3G7. 


696  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

larity  a  conviction  was  reversed,  the  court  saying:  "Whether 
his  answers  were  correct  or  incorrect  cannot  be  known.  They 
may  have  been  false  and  extremely  prejudicial  to  the  defendant, 
but  whether  they  were  or  not,  makes  no  difference.  It  cannot 
be  denied  that  the  jury  received  material  and  vitally  important 
evidence  out  of  court  from  a  witness  who  was  not  sworn,  who 
was  not  confronted  with  the  defendant  and  as  to  whom  there  was 
no  opportunity  of  cross-examination."  ^ 

§  907.  [Continued.]  Giving  the  Jury  Refreshments. — On  prin- 
ciples hereafter  stated, ^  any  tampering  with  the  jury,  by  extending 
undue  favors  to  them  in  the  way  of  food,  drink  and  entertainment,  while 
making  the  view  by  or  in  the  interest  of  the  successful  party,  will  de- 
mand the  setting  aside  of  their  verdict ;  but  this  does  not  extend  to 
ordinary  civilities,  such  as  the  act  of  the  deputy  sheriff  in  charge  of 
the  jury  in  furnishing  them  with  a  pitcher  of  cider  at  tlie  house  of  the 
petitioner,  upon  their  request  for  refreshments.-^  And  where,  in  making 
the  view,  tlie  jurors,  with  the  consent  of  the  unsuccessful  party,  were 
treated  several  times  to  liquid  refreshments  at  the  house  of  the  success- 
ful party,  this  was  not  deemed  sufficient  cause  for  setting  aside  the  ver- 
dict. It  was  not  regarded  as  the  result  of  a  sinister  motive,  but  as  the 
result  of  a  motive  of  hospitality  and  kindness,  for  which  the  citizens  of 
Virginia  were  generally  distinguished.  Moreover,  the  consent  of  the 
unsuccessful  party  cured  the  irregularity,  under  the  principle  omnis 
concensus  tollit  erroremJ  So,  in  Rhode  Island,  the  consent  of  the  un- 
successful party  to  such  an  irregularity  was  held  a  ivaiver  of  an  excep- 
tion to  it^  on  the  principle  declared  in  another  case,*^  "that  where  an 
irregularity  has  been  committed,  the  party  who  consents  to  a  proceeding 
which  he  might  have  prevented  by  resisting  on  that  ground,  ivaives 
thereby  all  exceptions  to  such  irregularity.  Where  the  jury  went  eight 
miles  from  the  court  house  to  view  the  locus  in  quo,  the  fact  that  the 
bailiff,  by  order  of  the  sheriff,  procured  and  caused  dinner  to  be  served 
at  the  house  of  the  successful  party,  without  his  solicitation  or  the 
solicitation  of  the  jury, — there  being  no  other  convenient  place  to 
procure  it,  the  bailiff  undertaking  to  pay  for  it,  and  no  improper  com- 

1  State  V.  Lopez,  15  Nev.  407,  *  Coleman  v.  Moody,  4  Hen.  &  M. 
413.  (Va.)  1,  16,21. 

2  Post,  §§  2560,  2564,  2565.  ^  Patton  v.  Hughesdale  Man.   Co., 

3  Tripp  V.  Commissioners,  2  Allen  11  R.  I.  188. 

(Mass.),  556.  "  Tingley  v.  Providence,  9  P.  I.  388. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVIL]  VIEW.  697 

munication  having  been  had  with  the  jurors,  —  furnished  no  cause  for 
setting  aside  their  verdict.^ 

§  90S.  View  granted  at  what  Stage  of  the  Trial.  —  Where 
there  is  a  statute  authorizing  a  view,  without  prescribing  at  whut 
stage  of  the  trial  it  shall  be  made,  this  is  committed  to  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  court. 2  In  Pennsylvania  an  application  for  a 
view  presented  during  the  week  in  which  the  case  is  set  for  trial, 
is  not  in  time.  Such  an  application  will  not  be  granted,  where 
it  would  delay  the  trial  of  the  cause. ^ 

§  909.  Rule  for  a  View  continues  through  subsequent 
Trials.  —Under  the  New  Jersey  statute,^  where  a  rule  for  a  view 
V  a  jury  is  once  entered,  it  continues  in  force  until  the  cause  is 
tried,  or  the  rule  discharged.^ 

§   910.   Personal  Xotice  in  Condemnation    Proceedings. 

It  has  been  thought  unnecessary  to  give  the  defendant  personal 
notice,  in  a  proceeding  to  condemn  land  for  a  railway,  of  the 
time  and  phice  of  the  meeting  of  the  jury,  in  the  absence  of  any 
statute  requiring  notice  to  be  given  in  this  manner.*' 

§  911.  Costs  of  the  View.  —  Courts  of  law  have  the  power 
to  allow  reasonable  expenses  for  surveys  and  views  in  proper 
cases,  and  the  ordinary  fee-bill  does  not  apply  to  the  expenses  of 
such  proceedings.^  In  the  Federal  courts,  under  the  provisions 
of  section  914  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States,  the 
rule  prescribed  by  the  statute  of  the  State  in  which  the  court 
sits,  will  be  adopted  as.  determining  the  assessment  of  the  costs 
of  a  view,  in  civil  suits  other  than  in  equity  or  admiralty.^  The 
plaintiff  in  trespass  quare  clausum,  who  recovered  less  t\vdi\  forty 

1  Johnson  v.  Greim,  17  Neb.  417.  «  Harper  v.  Lexington  &c.  R.  Co.,  2 

2  Galena  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Haslam,  73      Dana  (Ky.),  227. 

lU-  494.  7  stockbridge    Iron    Co.    v.    Cone 

3  Bare     v.    Hoffman,    79     Pa.     St.      Iron  Works,  102  Mass.  80, 89  (hi  which 


71 


case  the  sura  of   $4,800,  was  allowed 
as  t 

8 

L.  344.  345.  732. 


■*  Ante,  §  882,  subsec.  14.  as  the  expenses  of  the  view) . 

■  Houston  V.  WoodAvard,  17  N.  J.  »  Huntress  v.  Epsom,  15  Fed.  Rep. 


'698  NATURAL  EVIDENCE.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

shillings,  was  not  entitled  to  costs  for  increase,  merely  because  a 
view  was  granted  before  trial,  though  upon  the  application  of  the 
defendant.^ 

§  912.  Attended  by  the  proper  Officer. —  It  should  appear 
that  the  jurors  were  attended  by  the  proper  ofScer.^  The  sheriff 
should  accompany  the  jury,  and  keep  them  together  in  a  body 
while  making  the  view.  It  is  irregular  to  tell  the  jurors  that 
such  of  them  may  go  and  view  the  premises  as  choose  to 
do  so.^ 


§913.  [Michigan.] — Office  of  Judge  or  Court  Commissioner 
WHEN  Attending. — The  Michigan  statute  allows  the  judge  to  "at- 
tend said  jury,  to  decide  questions  of  law  and  administer  oaths  to  wit- 
nesses." But  the  same  statute  allows  him  to  designate  a  circuit  court 
commissioner  for  the  same  purpose,  and  also  allows  the  jury  to  proceed 
without  either.  In  view  of  these  provisions,  it  is  held  that  the  func- 
tions of  the  judge,  when  so  attending  the  jury,  are  merely  advisory. 
The  jury,  being,  as  before  seen,^  judges  of  both  the  law  and  the  fact, 
the  judge,  it  seems,  ought  not,  when  attending  them,  to  control  their 
conduct,  to  admit  or  exclude  evidence,  or  to  instruct  them,  as  upon  a 
regular  trial ;  ^  though  the  fact  of  his  having  done  so  will  not  be  ground 
of  setting  aside  their  award,  unless  it  appear  that  the  complaining  party 
was  prejudiced  thereby.^  In  such  a  proceeding  under  the  Michigan 
statute,  the  inquest  may  be  conducted  b}'^  the  jury  without  legal  assist- 
ance, and  a  liberal  practice  in  the  admission  or  rejection  of  evidence  is 
alloivable;  nor  will  the  conclusions  of  the  jury  therein  be  disturbed, 
except  for  rulings  which  were  manifestly  inaccurate  and  contrary  to 
substantial  justice.  The  court  say:  "  Wlien  the  law  provided  how  the 
tribunal  should  be  constituted  for  these  cases,  and  prescribed  the  method 
to  be  observed,  it  obviously  contemplated  that  the  practice  respecting 
the  admission  of  testimony  should  be  as  simple  as  a  due  regard  to  sub- 
stantial justice  would  permit.  It  was  not  intended  to  leave  the  fate  of 
the  determination  had  in  view,  to  any  fine-spun  theories,  or  to  the  re- 
finements which  are  not  uncommon  in  trials  at  the  circuit.     They  were 

1  Flint  V.  Hill,  11  East,.  184.  ^  Ante,  §  899. 

2  Patchiu    V.     Trustees,   2    Weud.  ^  Toledo  &c.  K.  Co.  v.  Dunlap,  47 
(N.  Y.)  377,  384.                                                Mich.  45C,  466. 

^  Brooklyn    v.    Patcheu,    8    Wend.  ^  Ji,i(j, 

<N.  Y.)  47,  84. 


Tit.  Ill,  Ch.  XXVir.]  VIEW.  699 

not  supposed  to  be  necessary  to  the  fundamental  purpose  or  beneficial 
working  of  inquests  of  this  nature,  and  no  provision  was  made  for  the 
certain  attendance  of  any  one  presumptivel}^  qualified  to  deal  with  them. 
The  statute  plainly  assumes  that  the  jury  may  conduct  the  inquiry  with- 
out the  aid  of  any  legal  expert,  and  under  circumstances  in  which  it 
would  be  difficult,  if  not  impracticable,  to  preserve  technical  or  hair- 
drawn  questions  in  a  shape  to  be  reviewed.  And  were  the  niceties  of 
nisiprius  to  be  insisted  on,  the  proceeding  would  speedily  break  down 
under  the  perplexities  and  embarrassments  due  to  its  own  methods. 
The  conclusion  to  which  these  and  other  considerations  lead  is,  that  a 
very  large  discretion  in  admitting  and  rejecting  testimony,  is  left  to  the 
ju7-y,  or  the  attending  officer,  whenever  there  is  one,  and  that,  when  the 
case  is  brought  here  by  ai)peal,  the  award  cannot  be  disturbed  on  ac- 
count of  such  decision,  unless  it  is  fairl}'  evident,  in  view  of  the  facts 
and  circumstances,  that  the  ruling  was  not  only  inaccurate,  but  was  a 
cause  of  substantial  injustice  to  the  appellant  in  the  matter  of  the  re- 
sult."! 

§  914.  Showers  appointed  under  the  Old  Practice. — Per- 
fions  called  showers  were  appointed  under  the  old  practice,  whose 
office  it  was  to  accompany  the  jury  to  the  land  to  be  viewed. ^ 
Under  the  old  New  York  practice,  following  the  English,  where 
au  application  for  a  view  was  demanded  by  either  party,  show- 
ers were  appointed  to  show  the  premises,  under  the  direction  of 
the  sheriff,  ^  and  such  also  was  the  practice  under  theKew  Jersey 
statute.*  The  showers  were  at  liberty  to  show  marks,  bounda- 
ries, etc.,  to  enlighten  the  viewers;  and  might  say  to  them, 
"  these  are  the  places  which,  on  the  trial,  we  shall  adapt  our  evi- 
dence to."  ^  The  practical  directions  given  in  Bagley's  Practice 
for  the  appointment  of  showers  are,  "  that,  if  the  opposite  party 
refuses  to  name  a  shower,  the  attorney  on  the  other  side  is  to 
get  an  appointment  from  the  master  to  name  a  shower ;  that  a 

1  Michigan  Air  Line  Ry.  v.  Barnes,  gestive  of  a  loet  day  for  making  tlie 

44  Mich.  223,  226,  opinion  by  Graves,  view. 
J.                                   '  3  Brooklyn    v.   Patchen,    8  Wend. 

2*806  the   English  statutes  already  (N.  Y.)  47. 
quoted,  §§876,  878.     These  function-  *  See  the  statute,  aJi^e,  §  882,  subsec. 

aries  were  called  in   the  old   books  14;  also  next  section, 
"shewers";    but  I  use   the   modern  ^  Symous   v.     Clark,    Barnes,    457 

spelling,     though      somewhat      sug-  (1790). 


700  NATURAL   EVIDENCE.  [1  ThoUip.  Tl'., 

memorandum  of  the  rule,  with  the  name  and  phice  of  abode  of 
the  one  shower,  and  of  the  shower  nominated  by  the  adverse 
party,  or  by  the  master  on  his  default,  is  to  be  taken  to  theoffice, 
and  tlie  clerk  Avill  draw  up  the  rule."  ^  The  practice  was  thus 
stated  by  Archbold:  '' Draw  up  a  prcecipe  ov  memorandum  of 
the  rule  you  want.  Get  from  the  opposite  attorney  a  memor- 
andum of  the  name  and  place  of  abode  of  his  shower,  and  take  it> 
together  with  a  similar  memorandum  of  your  own  shower,  and 
also  of  the  time  and  place  of  meeting,  etc.,  to  one  of  the  mas- 
ters, and  draw  up  the  rule."  ^ 

§   915.   Obstructing  the  Showers  in  Running  Lines. — In  a 

curious  old  case  in  New  Jersey  (anno  l.S:2;^),  a  special  rule  for  a 
view  for  a  particular  line  was  made,  supported  ])y  an  affidavit  that 
the  land-owner  had  obstructed  a  shower  who  had  a  heady  been  upon 
it,  in  running  a  line.  The  court  said:  "  Tiie  party  is  entitled  to 
the  special  view.  We  can  never  suffer  justice  to  be  defeated  by 
the  obstinacy  of  the  party  in  preventing  a  line  being  run.  In  the 
great  patent  line,  to  the  running  of  which  great  opposition  was 
made,  a  rule  of  this  kind  was  obtained  by  the  late  Mr.  Stockton, 
and  the  power  of  the  county  went  with  him.  In  the  Cumberland 
case,  the  agent  of  the  plaintiff  went  to  run  the  lines,  and  the  per- 
sons in  possession  cut  his  saddle  to  pieces :  the  court  granted  him 
the  power  of  the  county  and  ordered  the  sheriff  to  accompany 
him.  There  is  no  doul)t  of  the  power  of  the  court  to  grant  the 
rule,  and  w-e  think  it  should  be  granted."  ^  The  "  special  rule  " 
established  in  New  Jersey  at  an  early  day,  seems  to  have  author- 
ized the  sheriff  to  take  the  jury  of  view  over  any  Jaiid  which 
might  be  deemed  necessary,  and  to  run  the  lines  which  bounded 
the  premises  in  dispute,  upon  whose  land  soever  the  same  might 
be  ;  but  this  rule  was  not  granted,  on  the  grounds  of  unfairness, 
injustice  and  expense,  unless  there  was  reason  to  believe  that 
the  viewers  would  be  obstructed  in  the  performance  of  their 
duty.^ 

1  j'.ai.'.  Prac.  228.  3  Snyder  v.  \\\\\  Natta,  7N.  J.  L.  25, 

2  Arch.  Prac.  407,  Gtli  Eug.  ed.  "•  Deu  v.  Woodward,  4  M.  J.  L.  122. 


Tit   III.  Ch.  XXVII.]  VIEW.  701 

§  916.  Competent  to  show  Chang-e  in  Premises  after  the 
Fact  in  Controversy,  and  hefore  the  View. —  Where  the  jury  is 
permitted  to  view  the  locus  in  quo,  evidence  is  competent,  tend- 
ing to  show  that,  after  the  fact  out  of  which  the  controversy 
arose,  and  before  the  making  of  the  view,  the  character  of  the 
premises  was  materially  changed.^ 

»  Mortou  V.  Smith,  48  Wis   2G5,  270. 


702  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.    [1  Tbomp.  Tr., 


TITLE   IV. 

AEGUMENT  OF   COUNSEL. 


Chapter  XXVIII.  — Of  the  Right  of  Argument  Generally. 
Chapter     XXIX.  —  Of  the   Right  to  Argue  Questions  op 

Law  to  the  Jury. 
Chapter       XXX.  —  Abuses  of  the  Right  of  Argument. 


CHAPTER     XXVIII. 

OF  THE  RIGHT  OF  ARGUMENT  GENERALLr= 

Section 

920.  Right  of  Parties  to  Arguineut  by  Counsel. 

921.  In  Crimiual  Cases. 

922.  Waiver  of  Riglit  of  Argumeut. 

923.  Limiting  Time  of  Argumeut. 

924.  WliatLimitatious  of  Time  liave  been  aplield. 

925.  What  Limitations  liave  been  held  on  Abuse  of  Discretion. 

926.  Question  how  Presented  for  Review . 

927.  Practice  of  Limiting  the  Time  of  the  Advocates  among  the  Ancients, 

928.  Limiting  Number  of  CouuseL 

929.  Statutory  Rules  prohibiting  such  Limitations. 
930=  Order  of  making  the  Argument. 

'     931.  The  Approved  Order  Suggested. 

932.  Effect  of  Waiver  of  Opening  Statement. 

933.  Scope  of  the  Opening  Statemento 

934.  What  must  be  Stated  in  the  Opening  Argument, 

935.  Limits  of  the  Concluding  Argumeut. 

.  936.  Cutting  off  the  Plaintiff's  Right  to  Reply. 

§  920.   Right  of  Parties  to  Argument  by  Counsel. — It  is 

said  that  every  party  to  a  trial,  civil  or  criminal,  has  the  legal  as 


Tit.  IV,  Cb.  XX  VI 1 1.]       RIGHT    OF    ARGUMENT.  703 

well  as  the  natural  right  to  be  heard  in  his  own  cause,  by  himself 
or  counsel,  and  that  no  rule  of  practice  can  deprive  him  of  this 
right,  if,  at  the  proper  time  and  in  the  proper  way,  he  offers  to 
exercise  it.^  Another  court  has  said  that  a  party  to  a  civil  action 
"has  a  right  to  be  heard,  not  only  in  the  testimony  of  his  wit- 
nesses, but  also  in  the  arguments  of  his  counsel.  It  matters  not 
how  weak  and  inconclusive  his  testimony  maybe;  if  it  is  enouo-h 
to  present  a  disputed  question  of  fact  upon  which  he  is  entitled 
to  the  verdict  of  the  jury,  he  has  a  right  to  present,  in  the  argu- 
ments of  his  counsel,  his  view  of  the  case.  This  is  no  matter  of 
dl'icrelion  on  the  part  of  the  court,  but  an  absolute  right  of  the 
party."  2  But  it  is  conceived  that  a  distinction  must  be  taken 
between  the  right  to  appear  and  defend  by  counsel  and  the 
right  to  be  heard  in  argument  by  counsel.  The  right  to  ap- 
pear and  defend  is  undoubtedly  an  absolute  right,  existing  in  all 
cases,  civil  and  criminal,  of  which  no  court  possesses  the  power 
to  deprive  a  party.  But  the  right  to  be  heard  in  argument  in  a 
particular  case,  is  plainly  not  a  right  of  this  absolute  nature;  it 
does  not  exist  at  all  unless  there  is  something  to  argue  which  is 
fairly  debatable.  The  true  office  of  counsel  is  that  of  aids  or 
helps  to  the  court  and  jury  in  the  administration  of  justice.^ 
Clearly,  it  is  within  the  power  of  the  court,  in  a  civil  case,  to 
dispense  with  this  aid  or  help,  where  it  is  not  necessary.  It  is 
not  error  to  deny  the  right  of  argument  in  such  a  case,  where  the 
evidence  is  all  on  one  side  and  there  is  nothing  to  aro-ue :  nor 
will  a  judgment  in  such  a  case  be  reversed  merely  to  allow  a  law- 
yer to  make  a  speech.*  Nor  is  a  judge,  even  in  a  criminal  case, 
bound  to  hear  argument  upon  a  question  of  law,  in  respect  of 

which  his  opinion  is  so  fixed  as  to  render  discussion  unavailino-.* 

o 

1  Sodousky  v.  McGee,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  5  Howell  v.  Commonwealth,  5  Gratt. 
(Ky.)  271;  post,  §  1010.                                 (Va.)  664,  668.     It  has   been  held  in 

2  Douglas  V.  Hill,  29  Kan.  527.  Georgia,  in  a  criminal  case,  not  error 
'See   Garrison   v,    "Wilcoxson,    11      but  an  j)T«?5fM?ar%,  for  the  trial  court 

Ga.  154,  159,  for  an  eloquent  passage  to  refuse,  under  circumstances,  to  hear 

on  this  subject  by  Xisbet,  J.  argument  in  favor  of  a  motion  to  ar- 

*  Harrison  v.  Park,  1  J.  J.  Marsh,  rest  the    judgment    and    to  grant    a 

(Ky.)  170,  173;  Xeidig  v.  Cole,  13  Xeb.  new  trial.     Long  v.  State,  12  Ga.  295, 

S9.  331. 


704  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  ThoiUp.   Tl'., 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  the  right  of  argument  fnay  be 
waived  in  civil  cases. ^ 

§  921.  In  Criminal  Cases.  —  In  criminal  cases  the  right  of 
accused  persons  to  be  defended  by  counsel  is  a  right  of  a  very 
high  nature,  which  is  guaranteed  by  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States^  and  by  the  constitutions  of  most  of  the  States. 
Under  these  constitutional  guaranties,  it  is  the  unquestioned  right 
of  every  person  tried  upon  a  charge  of  crime  to  be  heard  by  the 
court  and  jury,  upon  the  whole  case,^  through  the  lips  of  coun- 
sel learned  in  the  law.  *' If,"  said  Scott,  J.,  "there  be  any 
point  involved  in  the  issue  before  the  jury,  on  which  their  minds 
may  be  enlightened  or  theii  consciences  satisfied  by  argument, 
the  accused  has  an  undoubted  right  to  all  the  advantage  that  may 
be  derived  from  that  source,  and  this  right  would  be  utterly 
destroyed  if  it  were  allowed  to  the  court  to  prohibit  argument 
merely  because,  ^7^  its  ojnnion,  the  evidence  is  so  clear  that  argu- 
ment cannot  vary  it.  Neither  is  this  the  only  case  in  which  an 
argument  before  the  jury  might  be  of  importance  to  the  accused, 
however  direct  and  uncontradicted  the  evidence  against  him 
might  be."* 

§  922.  Waiver  of  Right  of  Argument.  —  Where,  after  the  submis- 
sion of  a  cause  to  the  court  without  a  jury,  the  court  states  to  defend- 
ant's counsel  that  plaintiff's  counsel  do  not  wish  to  argue  the  case,  and 

1  It  has  been  held  that,  wheu  coun-  Ala.    Ill,  115.     Compare    Prosser   v. 

sel  decline  to  argue  the  case  to  the  Henderson,    11  Ala.  484.     Obviously 

jux'y,  after  the  evidence  is  closed  on  the  refusal  of  the  trial  court  to  allow 

both  sides,  this   is  a  waiver  of  their  counsel  to  address  the  jury  cannot  be 

right  of  argument;  and  that,  when  the  reviewed  on  error,  unless  the  ruliug  is 

right  is  thus  waived,  it  is  not  revived  excepted  to  and  preserved  in  a  bill  of 

by  allowing  either  party  to  read  from  exceptions.     Wilkins  v.  Anderson,   11 

a  record  book  a    piece  of    evidence  Pa.  St.  399. 

which  has,  in  the  course  of  the  trial,  ^  u,   g.   Const.   Amendments,   art. 

l)een   properly  read  to    the  jury,   al-  VI.     This  amendment  extends  only  to 

though   such   second    reading  is  per-  the  Federal  tribunals, 
mittedafterthe  jury  have  been  charged,  ^  Word  v.  Commonwealth,  3  Leigh 

and  have  retired  and  returned   into  (Va.),  743,  759. 
court  and  informed  the  court  that  they  *  Ibid. 

cannot  agree.     Cotton  v.  Rutledge,  33 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXVIII.J       KIGHT   OF   ARGUMENT.  705 

asks  the  defendant's  counsel  whether  they  wish  to  make  an  argument, 
and  tlie}^  make  no  reply,  and  the  court  thereupon  renders  a  decision 
adverse  to  the  defendant,  —  defendant's  counsel  cannot  thereafter  claim 
the  right  of  argument ;  it  has  been  waived.'^ 

§923.  Limiting?  Time  of  Ai'gumeiit.  — ^The  rule,  both  in 
civil  "^  and  in  criminal  ^  cases,  is  that  the  courts  have  power,  in 
the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion,  to  impose  reasonable  limitations 
upon  the  time  which  is  to  be  allowed  to  parties  for  argument  by 
counsel,  which  discretion  will  not  be  revised  on  error  or  appeal 
except  in  cases  of  manifest  abuse.  On  the  one  hand,  a  reason- 
able exercise  of  this  i)ower  is  upheld  as  being  a])solutely  necessary 
to  enable  the  courts  to  dispatch  the  public  business;  on  the  other 
hand,  a  plain  abuse  of  it,  which  has  resulted  in  denying  to  an 
accused  person  the  constitutional  right  of  defense  by  counsel,  or 
of  unreasonably  abridging  this  right,  will  afford  ground  for  set- 
ting aside  the  judgment  in  a  criminal  case  and  granting  a  new 
trial.*  Just  observations  have  been  made  upon  the  impropriety, 
even  in  civil  cases,  of  curtailing  the  time  of  argument,  where  it 
can  be  avoided  without  detriment  to  the  public  business ;  pointing 
out  the  difficulty  of  the  court  undertaking  to  prescribe  in  advance 
the  time  which  may  be  necessary  for  the  proper  presentation  by 
counsel  of  his  client's  cause,  and  dwelling  u})on  the  fact  that 
such  a  restriction  has  a  tendency  to  hamper  the  efforts  of  counsel 
and  to  impair  the  public  confidence  in  the  administration  of  jus- 
tice.^    While  the  rule  which  reposes  this  discretion  in  the  trial 


1  Piatt  V.  Head,  35  Kan.  282.  v.  Colhns,  70  N.  C.  241    (Bynum,  J., 

2  Cory  V.  Silcox,  5  Ind.  370;  Rosser  dissenting) ;  Dille  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St. 
V.  McColly,  9  Ind.  587;  Burson  v.  Ma-  G17;  People  v.  Kelly,  94  N.  Y.  627; 
honey,  6  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  .S04,  307;  Pre-  State  v.  Donnelly,  2  Dutch.  (N.  J.) 
Ugh  V.  Ames,  31  Mo.  253;  Dobbins  v.  4(;3;  Sullivan  v.  State,  46  N.  J.  L.  446; 
Oswalt,  20  Ark.  619,  624;  Musselman  People  v.  Keenan,  13  Cal.  581,  584; 
V.  Pratt,  44  Ind.  126;  Trice  v.  Hannibal  Sullivan  v.  State,  47  N.  J.  L.  151. 

&c.  R.  R.  Co.,  35  Mo.  416.     Contra,  in  ■»  White  v.  People,  90  111.  117;  Dille 

Iowa,  Hallv.  Wolff,  61  Iowa,  559,562.  v.    State,   34   Ohio   St.    617;    Hunt   v. 

3  Brooks  V.  Perry,  23  Ark.  32;  State  State,  49  Ga.  255;  People  v.  Keenan, 
V.  Page,  21  Mo.  257  (Scott,  J.,  dissent-  13  Cal.  581,  584. 

ing) ;    Lynch    v.   State,  9    Ind.    541 ;  ^  Burson     v.     Mahouey,     6     Baxt. 

"Weaver  v.  State,  24  Ohio  St.  584;  State  (Teun.)  304,  307. 

45 


706  ARGUMENT   OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

courts  extends  even  to  capital  cases ;^  yet  it  has  been  suggested 
that  if  such  a  limitation  is  imposed  at  all  in  such  cases,  it 
should  be  done  only  in  very  extraordinary  and  peculiar  circum- 
stances. ^ 

§  924.  What  Limitations  of  Time  Have  Been  Upheld.  —  Applying 
these  principles,  it  was  held  in  Missouri,  in  a  criminal  prosecution  for 
cutting  timber  upon  school  lands,  that  no  abuse  of  discretion  appeared 
in  an  order  of  the  trial  court  limiting  the  time  of  argument  allowed  the 
counsel  for  the  defendant,  to  fifteen  minutes.  Cicero  having  been  al- 
lowed but  half  an  hour  to  defend  Caius  Rabirius  before  the  tribune  of 
the  people  on  a  charge  of  murder,  the  court  concluded  that  "  a  quarter 
of  an  hour  allowed  to  a  modern  orator,  in  a  petty  case  of  cutting  down 
timber  on  school  lands,  cannot  be  considered  an  inhibition  to  be  heard 

in  defense  of   his  client."  ^ In  the  same  State,  where  the  action 

was  for  damages  against  a  railway  company  for  killing  the  plaintiff  's 
hogs,  and  the  defendant  introduced  no  evidence,  the  Supreme  Court 
could  not  say  that  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion  in  limiting  coun- 
sel on  either  side  to  ten  minutes."* Where,  in  a  civil  action  in  Ten- 
nessee, the  trial  court  limited  counsel  to  five  minutes  on  each  side,  the 
Supreme  Court,  after  giving  extended  observations  upon  the  impro- 
priety of  unnecessarily  restricting  the  time  for  argument,  said  that,  in 
a  case  involving  larger  interests,  they  would  have  made  it  a  ground 
for  reversing  the  judgment;  but  as  it  was,  they  allowed  the  judg- 
ment to  stand. 5 Complaint  was  made,  in  a  civil  case  in  Indiana, 

that  the  trial  court  had  limited  the  argument  of  counsel  for  the  plaintiff 
to  ninetv  minutes ;  but  it  appearing  that  the  defendant's  counsel  had 
declined  to  make  any  argument,  the  Supreme  Court  held,  on   plain 

1  State  V.  Collins,  70  N.  C.  241;  be  reasonably  continued.  If  a  court 
People  V.  Keenan,  13  Cal.  581.  can  limit  the  time  of   speaking  to  fif- 

2  People  i;.Keenau,s?«pm.  See  also  teen  minutes,  it  can  take  away  tlie 
Kizer  v.  State,  12  Lea  (Tenn.) ,  564.  riglit  of  making  a  defense ;  for  I  repeat 

3  State  V.  Page,  21  Mo.  257,  259.  It,  that  no  counsel  who  had  any  regard 
Scott,  J.,  strongly  dissented,  taking  for  his  reputation  would  attempt  to 
the  ground  that  no  limitation  of  time  make  a  defense  in  fifteen  minutes,  in 
should  be  attempted  in  advance,  but  a  case  in  which  it  was  really  uecessaiy 
that  this  control  should  be  exercised  to  make  one." 

on   the  circumstances  as  they  should  "*  Trice  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  E.  Co., 

transpire.     He   said:    "  It  is  not  for  35  Mo.  41(). 

man  in  his  weakness  to  declare,  before  ^  Burson     v.     Mahoney,    6     Baxt. 

a  defense  is  begun,  how  long  it  should  (Tenn.)  304,  307. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXVIII.]       RIGHT   OF   ARGUMENT.  707 

grounds,  that  there  was  no  abuse  of  discretion.^ On  less  doubtful 

grounds  the  same  court  upheld  the  limitation  of  an  hour  and  a  half  to 
the  plaintiff  and  an  hour  to  the  defendant  in  a  civil  action  for  slan- 
der.^  -  -  -  -  In  a  criminal  case  in  Ohio,  where  the  subject  was  well 
considered  by  the  Su[)rerae  Court,  two  days  had  been  consumed  in 
taldng  testimony  in  the  trial  court.  The  court  bad  adjourned  over 
Christmas  day,  and  had  also  adjourned  in  order  to  allow  one  of  the 
jurors  to  attend  the  funeral  of  a  relative.  It  was  held  that,  in  limiting 
the  time  of  argument  to  five  hours  on  each  side  and  in  extending  the 
defendant's  time  twenty  minutes  without  interruption,  the  trial  court 
did  not  abuse  its  discretion.^ Nor  did  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ne- 
braska see  an  abuse  of  discretion,  in  a  trial  of  murder,  in  limiting  argu- 
ment to  two  hours  and  a  half  on  each  side,  and  afterwards  extending 
the  defendant's  time  to  three  hours.* On  an  appeal  from  a  con- 
viction under  an  indictment  for  an  assault  with  intent  to  kill,  the  Court 
of  Appeals  of  New  York  went  so  far  as  to  uphold  a  limitation  of  half  an 
hour  to  the  defendant,  it  appearing  that  not  many  witnesses  had  been 
sworn,  that  the  questions  of  fact  were  not  numerous,  and  that  the  evi- 
dence on  both  sides  had  been  submitted  during  the  same  day.^ 

Reasoning  upon  such  a  case,  it  was  conceded  that  a  restriction  to  five 
minutes,  in  a  case  of  felony,  was  one  which  could  rarely  be  sustained 
while  allowing  the  largest  limits  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  if 

the  question  were  properly  presented  for  review.^ In  a  capital  case 

where  the  prisoner  was  defended  by  three  counsel,  and  the  court  limited 
counsel  to  one  hour  and  ten  minutes  on  each  side,  the  reviewing  court 
was  unable  to  say,  on  a  general  exception  merely,  that  the  discretion 
of  the  court  had  been  abused,  though  it  intimated  an  opinion  that  the 
time  had  been  unnecessarily  restricted.'' 

§  925.  What  Limitations  Have  Been  Held  an  Abuse  of  Discre- 
tion. —  On  the  other  hand,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  larceny, 
where  four  witnesses  had  been  examined  in  chief  for  the  prosecution, 
three  for  the  defense  and  two  for  the  prosecution  in  rebuttal,  it  was 
held,  on  obvious  grounds,  an  abuse  of   discretion  to  limit  counsel  on 

either  side  to  five  minutes. ^ On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  bui-- 

glary  and  larceny,  seven  witnesses  were  examined  for  the  State  and 

1  Rosser  v.  McColly,  9  lud.  587.  ♦  Hart  v.  State,  14  Neb.  572. 

2  Musselman  v.  Pratt,  U  Ind.  126.  «  People  v.  Kelly,  94  N.  Y.  527. 

8  Weaver  v.  State,  24  Ohio  St.  584;  6  Williams  «.  Cora.,  82  Ky.  640,  643. 

approved  in  Dille  v.  State,  34  Ohio  St.  ">  Kizer  v.  State,  12  Lea  (Teuu.),  564. 

617.  8  -White  V.  People,  90  111=  117. 


708 


ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [1  TllOmp.  Tr., 


four  for  the  defense.  Half  a  day  was  occupied  in  taking  the  testimony. 
It  was  entirely  circumstantial,  and  there  were  serious  conflicts  in  it.  It 
was  held  by  a  majority  of  the  court,  on  appeal,  that  a  limitation  of 
thirty  minutes  to  the  defendant's  counsel  was  an  abuse    of  discretion 

for  which  there  must  be  a  new  trial. ^ In  Georgia,  on  the  trial  of 

an  indictment  for  an  assault  with  intent  to  murder,  where  the  evidence 
was  conflicting  as  to  whether  the  stabbing  was  done  in  self-defense,  the 
Supreme  Court  held  that,  in  limiting  the  defendant's  counsel,  against  his 
protest,  to  thirty  minutes,  the  trial  court  committed  "a  grave  error," 
which  was  not  cured  by  extending  the  time  to  forty  minutes,  which 
error  had  resulted  in  denying  the  defendant  the  privilege  and  bene- 
fit of  counsel  in  his  defense,  as  contemplated  by  the  constitution. ^ 

§  926.  Question  how  Presented  for  Review. — Although  it 
has  been  held  in  California  that  this  question  may  be  presented  for 
review  in  an  appellate  court  by  affidavits,^  yet  the  better  and  pre- 
vailing rule  of  practice  is  that  the  counsel  complaining  of  the 
limitation  of  time  must  promptly  object  to  it,  and  save  an  ex- 
ception^ which  must  be  shown  to  the  reviewing  court  by  a  bill  of 
exceptions.  There  is  a  further  view  that  the  mere  fact  that  coun- 
sel excepts  to  the  order  of  the  court,  is  not  sufficient  to  brmg 
the  abuse  of  discretion  by  the  court,  if  such  it  be,  to  the  attention 
of  the  reviewing  court;  but  counsel  must  "  ask  for  further  time^ 
or  at  least  in  some  way  inform  the  judge  that,  in  his  opinion,  in- 
justice will  be  done  him  by  the  restriction,  and  not  content  him- 
self with  a  mere  exception."  *  The  fact,  then,  that  a  court  limits 
the  time  of  argument  to  an  extremely  short  period,  will  not 
be  ground  of  new  trial  where  counsel  make  no  claim  at  the  time 
that  the  period  is  too  short.  It  was  so  held  in  a  case  of  felony, 
where  the  court  limited  each  side  to  five  minutes.^ 

§  927.  Practice  of  Limiting  the  Time  of  the  Advocates  Among 
THE  Ancients.  — In  a  case  in  Missouri,''  where  this  question  was  un- 


1  Dille  V.  State,  34  Ohio   St.  617. 

2  Hunt  «.  State,  49  Ga.  255.      , 

3  People  V.  Keenan,  13  Cal.  581,  584. 
See  also  Hall  v.  Wolff,  61  Iowa,  559, 
561 ;  Dbwdellw.  Wilcox,  64  Iowa,  721, 
724;  Turner  v.  State,  68  Tenii.  (4  Lea) 
206;    State  I?.  Comstock,   20  Kau.  650. 


*  Williams  v.  Cora.,  82  Ky.  640; 
Kizer  v.  State,  12  Lea  (Teuu.),  564. 
Compare  Sewell  v.  Com.,  3  Ky.  Law 
Rep.  86. 

5  Williams  v.  Com.,  supra. 

6  State  V.  Page,  21  Mo.  257,  259 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXVIII.]       RIGHT   OF    ARGUMENT.  709 

der  discussion,  Ryland,  J.,  thus  stated  the  practice  among  the  Greeks 
and  Romans,  without  stating  from  what  historical  sources  he  derived 
his  information:  "This  matter  of  limiting  the  time  to  be  occupied  in 
the  prosecution  of  causes  before  courts  of  justice  is  of  very  ancient 
origin.  It  is  found  among  the  Greeks,  and  was  carried  thence  to  Rome. 
Tlie  Greeks  had  their  instruments  by  which  the}^  measured  time  in  the 
halls  of  judicature.  The  clepsydra  was  used.  It  was  an  instrument 
by  which  they  measured  time  by  means  of  the  flowing  of  water 
through  it ;  and  so  frequent  and  common  was  the  practice  of  limiting 
the  time  to  the  speakers  by  water  flowing  through  these  instruments, 
that  the  word  "water"  was  used  metaphorically  for  time.  When  a 
speaker  was  allowed  to  speak  so  long,  tliey  said  he  was  allowed  so  much 
water.  The  Greeks  had  an  officer  in  their  courts  of  justice  whose  duty 
it  was  to  watch  this  measuring  of  time,  and  when  a  certain  amount 
was  allotted  to  a  speaker,  if  there  were  any  documents  to  be  read  dur- 
ing his  speech,  the  time  the  reading  of  such  documents  consumed  was 
not  to  be  estimated  as  any  part  of  what  had  been  allotted  to  him ; 
therefore  this  oflicer,  whose  station  was  near  the  clepsydra,  stopped  the 
water  while  the  documents  were  being  read.  The  orator  did  not  waste 
his  water  in  reading  documents.  Pliny  tells  us  that  he  was  allowed  ten 
large  amphorce  of  water  once,  and  so  important  was  the  cause  in  which 
he  was  engaged  that  the  judges  added  four  more  to  the  amount.  He 
says  he  spoke  five  hours.  He  tells  us  likewise  that  he  himself  used  to 
allow  the  accused  as  much  water  as  he  wanted.  The  tribune  of  the  peo- 
ple, Titus  Sabienus,  only  allowed  half  an  hour  to  Cicero  to  speak  in  de- 
fense of  Caius  Rabirius  when  he  was  prosecuted  for  murder.  This,  too, 
on  an  appeal  from  the  judgment  of  the  Duumviri  to  the  people.  The 
orator  complained  of  being  cramped  by  the  narrow  space  of  time  ;  for 
though  it  would  be  nearly  enough  to  make  the  defense  for  his  client,  it 
would  not  be  enough  for  preferring  the  complaints  he  had  a  right  to 
bring  forward.  '  I  have  spoken  the  time  allowed  me,' he  said,  when 
about  to  conclude ;  and  in  no  part  of  the  monument  erected  by  his  ge- 
nius to  its  own  immortality  will  you  find  a  more  polished  or  more  brill- 
iant gem  than  this  half  hour's  work." 

§  928.  Liimiting  Number  of  Counsel  and  Number  of 
Speeches.^  —  The  principle  which  vests  in  the  trial  courts  the 

1  As  was  done  in  Dille  v.  State,  34  Studt,  12  Mo.  App.  566;  Bradshaw  v. 
Ohio  St.  617.  See  also  Wilkiusy.Au-  State,  22  N.  W.  Rep.  361;  Bullis  v. 
derson,    11   Pa.    St.    399;    Roeder    i\       Drake    (Neb.),    29   N.   W.   Rep.  282; 


710  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

discretionary  poicer  of  limiting  the  time  of  counsel,  must  also 
operate  to  give  them  the  like  power  to  limit  the  nwnber  of 
counsel  who  may  be  heard  in  behalf  of  a  single  party.  It  has 
been  suggested  that  the  constitutional  right  of  being  heard  by 
counsel  is  satisfied  where  the  party  is  allowed  the  privilege  of 
being  heard  by  one  counsel,  and  that  he  cannot  demand,  as  a 
matter  of  right,  that  he  be  allowed  to  be  heard  by  a  greater 
number.^  Where  several  persons  voluntarily yo^7^  as  parties,  so 
that  they  constitute,  in  contemplation  of  law,  but  a  single  party 
to  the  litigation,  they  cannot  of  right  claim  to  be  heard  by  more 
than  one  counsel,  speaking  for  them  collectively.^  But  where 
several  persons  are,  against  their  wills,  yo^»ef7  «*•  defendants  in 
an  action,  whose  interests  are  diverse  and  repugnant  to  each 
other,  and  who  have  an  interest  in  discharging  upon  each  other 
the  burden  which  the  plaintiff  is  endeavoring  to  cast  upon  them 
all, — in  such  a  case  any  one  of  such  parties,  where  not  represented 
by  counsel  appearing  for  the  others,  may  of  right  claim  to  be 
heard  in  his  sesparate  behalf  by  at  least  one  counsel.  But,  as 
was  said  by  Robertson,  C.  J.,  "  wdiile  the  general  right  is  ac- 
knowledged, the  courts  should  be  careful  lest  it  may  be  abused 
and  perverted  to  purposes  of  vexation,  inconvenience  and  injus- 
tice. Before  a  defendant  can  insist  on  such  a  right  he  should  be 
prepared  to  show  very  clearly  that  he  is  justly  entitled  to  the 
enjoyment  of  it.  The  bare  fact  that  he  has  employed  other 
counsel  than  those  who  were  employed  by  his  co-defendants, 
would  not  of  itself  entitle  him  to  be  heard,  after  two  speeches  had 
been  made  by  the  defense.  If  the  interests  of  the  defendants 
seem  to  be  in  unison,  if  the  argument  for  one  includes  or  bene- 
fits the  others,  and  if  they  all  act  in  concert,  the  court  might  re- 
fuse to  permit  more  than  two  of  the  counsel  to  be  heard,  and 
leave  it  to  the  defendants  to  make  the  selection."  '^     It  was  ruled 

Mulcairns  v.  Jauesville  (Wis.).  29  N.  "  Sodousky?;.  McGec,  4  J.  J.  Marsh. 

W.   Eep.  5()5;  McLaiu  v.  State,  24  N.  (Ky.)  2(17. 

W.  Kep.   720,724;  Rudolph  v.  Laud-  2  m^^ 

werlen,  92  Ind.  34,  35;    State  v.  Au-  3  Sodousky  u.  McGee,  4  J.  J.  Marsh, 

dersou,  10  Ore.   448,   457;    Coramou-  (Ky.)  2()7,  271,  where  the  propriety  of 

wealth  V.  Scott,  123  Mass.  231);  State  the  above  conclusious  is  very  forcibly 

r.  Abraius,  11  Ore.  1(59,  172;  State  v.  argued  by  Hobertsou,  C.  J. 
Cavem-ss,  78  N.  C.  484,  489. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXVIII.]       RIGHT   OF    ARGUMENT.  711 

by  Mr.  Justice  Curtis,  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  at  circuit,  that  in  a  capital  case  the  ju) nor  counsel  has  the 
right  to  argue  the  law  aud  the  facts,  but  that  only  one  counsel 
has  the  right  to  close.  In  the  particular  case,  however,  as  all  the 
witnesses  were  government  witnesses,  and  as  none  were  called  for 
the  defendant  except  those  whom  the  government  had  declined, 
to  examine,  two  counsel  were  permitted  to  close  in  full  on  the 
law  and  facts  —  not,  however,  making  a  precedent  for  cases  in 
which  the  prisoner's  counsel  should  call  witnesses  not  examined 
by  the  grand  jury  and  sworn  on  the  part  of  the  defendant. ^  A 
statute  of  Texas  provides  that  "  in  prosecutions  for  felony  the 
court  shall  never  restrict  the  argument  to  a  less  number  than 
two  on  a  side."  ^  It  is  held  that  this  statute  applies  only  to  cases 
where  the  prisoner  has  more  than  one  counsel,  aud  tliat  it  was 
not  intended  to  confer  upon  him  the  benefit  of  having  two 
speeches  where  he  has  but  one  counsel.^ 

§  929.  Statutory  Rules  Prohibiting  such  Limitations.  —  In  North 
Carolina,  about  the  year  1874,  a  circuit  judge,  in  a  criminal  case,  re- 
stricted the  prisoner's  counsel  to  an  hour  and  a  half  in  addressing  the 
jury,  allowing  two  of  his  counsel  to  divide  this  time  between  them.  To 
this  ruling  exceptions  were  taken,  aud,  on  an  appeal  from  a  convic- 
tion, tlie  Supreme  Court,  while  expressing  its  disapprobation  of  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  trial  judge  had  exercised  his  discretion,  nevertheless 
held  that  it  was  a  power  vested  in  him,  the  exercise  of  which  could  not 
be  controlled  b^-  a  reviewing  court."*  The  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Court  was  unsound,  in  that  it  held  that  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court 
was  absolute,  and  not  subject  to  control  by  the  appellate  tribunal  in  a 
case  of  manifest  abuse.  Thereupon  the  legislature  passed  the  follow- 
ing extraordinary  statute:  "Any  counsel  appearing  in  any  civil  or 
criminal  ease,  in  any  of  the  courts  of  this  State,  shall  be  entitled  to  ad- 
dress the  court  or  the  jury  for  such  a  space  of  time  as,  in  his  opinion, 

*  United  States  v.    Mingo,  2  Curt.  would  be  incumbent  upon  the  counsel 

C.  C.  1.  intending  to  make    two   speeclies  to 

2  Texas  Code  Crim.  Pro.,  art.  notify  tlie  court  of  sucli  intent  before 
3051.  tlie  commencemeut  of  his  argument, 

3  Morals  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  494,  failing  in  which  he  would  be  deemed 
499.     It  was  also  reasoned  that,  even  to  have  waived  the  right. 

on  tihe  contrary  view  of  the  statute,  it  ^  state  v.  Collins,  70  N.  C.  241. 


712  ARGUMENT  OF   COUXSEL.  [I  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

may  be  necessary  for  the  proper  development  or  presentation  of  his 
case."  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  statute  begins  by  vesting  this  right 
in  "  any  counsel  appearing  in  any  civil  or  criminal  case."  If,  there- 
fore, the  whole  bar  appear,  as  they  frequently  do  in  the  country 
circuits  in  important  cases,  on  the  one  side  or  the  other,  "aw?/" 
(and  consequently  every)  counsel  so  appearing  may  exercise  the  right 
of  addressing  the  court  or  jury  as  long  as,  in  his  discretion,  it  may  be 
necessary.  The  statute  thus  places  it  within  the  absolute  power  of  a 
combination  of  lawyers,  by  following  each  other  and  "  speaking  against 
time,"  to  protract  trials  until  the  term  lapses  by  operation  of  law,  to 
produce  mistrials,  to  prevent  other  causes  from  being  heard,  and  to- 
tally to  obstruct  and  prevent  the  dispatch  of  the  public  business.  That 
discretionary  control  over  the  conduct  of  causes  in  the  courts  of  nisi 
prius  which  is  absolutely  essential  to  dispatch  litigation  and  prevent  de- 
nials of  justice,  is  taken  away  from  the  judge  and  vested,  not  in  the  bar 
as  an  aggregate  body,  but  in  any  particular  lawyer  or  lawyers  who  may 
presume  to  exercise  it.  "  What  we  suppose  is  meant,"  said  Reed,  J., 
commenting  on  this  remarkable  piece  of  legislation,  "  is  that  it  is  left 
to  the  discretion  of  counsel  instead  of  to  the  discretion  of  the  presiding 
judge,  how  they  shall  address  themselves  to  the  court  and  jury.  It 
must  be  left  either  to  the  judge  or  the  counsel,  and  the  legislature  has 
left  it  with  the  counsel.  It  may  be  that  the  confidence  is  not  mis- 
placed. But  one  instance  is  recorded  i  where  any  counsel  has  felt 
himself  at  liberty  to  abuse  his  privilege  to  the  obstruction  of  the  due 
administration  of  the  law,  and  that  was  before  many  of  the  profession 
had  many  of  the  advantages  which  they  now  possess,  and,  it  may  be, 
before  it  was  fully  known  that  '  we  cannot  do  evil  that  good  may  come 
of  it.'  At  any  rate,  the  law  is  plain,  and  the  experiment  has  to  be  made 
whether  it  is  prudent  to  entrust  the  discretion  in  the  courts  to  the 
counsel  instead  of  to  the  judge.''  ^  Xhe  court  also  ruled  that,  under  a 
proper  interpretation  of  the  statute,  the  trial  court  does  not  possess  the 
power  to  limit  the  number  of  counsel  who  shall  speak ;  in  other  words, 
that  the  trial  court  cannot  limit  the  time  which  the  counsel  for  a  party 
shall   employ  in  arguing  his  cause  b^'^  limiting  the  number  who  shall 

speak. 3 By  statute,  in  Iowa,  "  the  court  may  restrict  the  time  of 

an  attorney  in  any  argument  to  itself,  but  shall  not  do  so  in  any  case 
before  the  jury."  ^     With  this  statute  in  force,  the  judges  in  that  State 

^  He  referred  to  the  iustaiice  stated  2  gtate  v.  Miller,  75  N.  C.  73,  75. 

in   the  dissenting  opinion  iu  State  v.  ^  Ihid. 

Collins,  70  N.  C.  241.  *  Miller  Rev.  Code  la,,  §  2783. 


Tit.  IV,  CIk  XXVIII.]       RIGHT   OF    ARGUMENT.  713 

are  often  driven  to  the  expedient  of  vacating  the  bench  during  an  argu- 
ment to  a  jury  and  engaging  in  the  trial  of  another  cause  in  another 
room.  That  State,  so  far  as  the  writer  knows,  is  the  only  jurisdiction  in 
which  this  abominable  practice  has  been  sanctioned  by  an  appellate  tri- 
bunal. "  In  this  State,"  said  Rothrock,  J,,  "a  nisi  prius  judge  is  not 
permitted  to  limit  counsel  in  their  argument  to  jurors ;  and  it  often  oc- 
curs that,  in  order  to  dispose  of  the  business  of  the  court,  and  keep  court 
expenses  within  some  limit,  by  consent  of  the  parties  and  counsel,  the 
judge  transacts  other  business  during  part  of  the  time  taken  in  argu- 
ments to  juries.  Now,  in  such  a  case,  counsel  are  bound  to  argue  the 
case  made  in  the  record.  If  not  disposed  to  do  so,  it  would  be  an  un- 
just rule  that  would  require  an  opposing  counsel  to  make  objection 
which  is  usually  unavailing,  and  call  upon  the  judge  to  return  to  the 
court-room  and  correct  tlie  error."  And  the  court  hold  that  the  fact 
that  such  prejudicial  remarks  were  made  in  argument,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, may  be  shown  by  affidavit.  ^ Where  there  is  a  statute 

providing  that  the  whole  time  occupied  in  the  argument  of  a  cause  shall 
not  exceed  two  hours  on  either  side,  unless  the  court,  for  special  reasons, 
shall  otherwise  permit,  it  is  not  error  for  the  court,  against  the  objection 
of  a  party,  to  limit  his  argument  to  a  shorter  time.  The'statute  is  mere- 
ly a  limitation  upon  the  power  of  the  court  to  extend  the  time  for  argu- 
ment unless  for  special  reasons,  and  does  not  take  away  its  discretion 
of  making  a  reasonable  curtailment  of  the  time.^ 

§  930.  Order  of  3Iaking  the  Argument.  — This  has  been  al- 
ready much  considered  in  a  former  chapter,"  wherein  it  is  seen 
that,  as  a  general  rule,  the  order  of  argument  is  a  matter  of  right 
and  follows  the  burden  of  proof.  But  there  is  an  extensively 
prevailing  view  that,  "■  in  the  absence  of  any  positive  rules  upon 
the  subject,  the  order  of  argument  to  the  jury  is  matter  of  prac- 
tice, within  the  control  of  the  trial  judge,  and  an  appellate  court 
will  not  interfere,  unless  there  is  a  clear  abuse  of  discretion,  and 
there  is  good  ground  for  believing  that  the  party  complaining 
has  been  injured  by  a  wrong  ruling  as  to  such  matters."  * 

1  Hall  V.  Wolff,  Cl  Iowa  559,  562.  John,  17   Wis.  157;    Savings  Bank  v, 

2  Hurst  t\  Burusicle,  12  Ore.  520, 526.  Shakman,    30    Wis.  333;      Bonnell   v. 

3  ^?t(e,  chap.  IX.  Jacobs,  36  Wis.  59;    Austin    y.  Austin? 

4  Marshall  v.  American  Express  45  Wis.  523;  Kaime  u.  Omro,  49  Wis. 
Co.,  7   Wis.    1;    Central  Bank   v.    St.  371,  378;  ante,  §  226,  n.  4. 


714  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

§  931.  The  Approved  Order  Suggested.  —  The  old  and  ap- 
proved practice  is  said  to  be,  that  each  party  shall  open  his  case 
to  the  jury  just  before  introducing  his  evidence,  and  that,  when 
the  evidence  is  all  in,  the  defendant's  counsel  may  sum  up  to  the 
jury,  and  plaintiff  's  counsel  may  then  close. ^ 

§  932.  Effect  of  Waiver  of  Opening  Statement.  — Where  the 
plaintiff 's  counsel,  after  having  waived  his  right  to  open  his  case 
to  the  jury,  is  not  confined  by  the  trial  court  to  a  strict  reply  to 
the  arguments  of  the  defendant's  counsel,  there  is  no  ground  of 
reversal,  if  it  does  not  appear  that  he  was  permitted  to  wander 
from  ilieisi^ues  in  the  case.^ 

§  933.  Scope  of  the  Opening  Statement.  — The  scope  of  the 
opening  statement  has  been  already  considered  ;^  but  it  may  not  be 
amiss  to  notice  two  or  three  cases  which  have  come  to  the  attention 
of  the  writer  since  those  paragraphs  were  printed.  It  is,  of  course, 
no  objection  in  a  criminal  case  that  the  State's  attorney,  in  his 
opening  statement,  sets  out  fully  what  he  expects  to  prove  against 
the  accused;  but  this  is  rather  a  benefit  to  him,  since  it  notifies 
him  of  the  case  which  he  must  be  prepared  to  meet.^  Where  the 
States'  counsel,  in  opening  the  case  to  the  jury  exhibited  to  them 
a  photograph  of  the  deceased,  a  young  girl,  the  same  having  been 
afterwards  identified  by  a  witness  as  a  photograph  of  her,  it  was 
held  that  no  error  was  presented,  such  as  could  be  reviewed  by 
an  appellate  court,  and  secondly,  the  court  regarded  it  as  not  an 
error  such  as  would  produce  a  reversal ;  since  if  the  jurors  had 
known  the  deceased,  they  would  not  for  that  reason  have  been 
incompetent,  and  if  the  people's  counsel  had  described  her  per- 
sonal appearance  in  argument,  that  would  not  have  been  such  an 
abuse  as  would  have   required   a  new   trial. ^     It  cannot  be  as- 

1  Kairae  v.  Omro,  49  Wis.  371.  court  had  Avas  that,  under  the  Revised 

2  Kaiine  v.  Omro,  49  Wis.  371  Statutes  (2  R.  S.  N.  Y.,  p.  73G,  §  21), 
(qualifying  dicta  in  Brown  v.  Swine-  the  matter  was  not  the  subject  of  ex- 
ford,  44  Wis.  282).  ceptions,  but  addressed  itself  only  to 

3  Ante,  §  201,  et  seq.  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  on  a 
*  Dowda  V.  State,  74  Ga.  12.  motion  for  new  trial,  or  to  the  gover- 
•^  Walsh  V.    People,    88   N.  Y.  458,      nor  on  appeal  for  executive  clemency. 

403.    The  principal  difficulty  which  the      On  this  point  the  court  cite:    People 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXVIII.]     RIGHT  or  argument.  715 

signed  for  error  that  the  judge  directed  counsel  not  to  spend  time 
on  certain  issues  in  their  opening  statement,  where,  though  an 
exception  was  taken  to  the    ruling,  no   suggestion  was  made  at 
the  time  that  anything  had  been  omitted  from  the  statement,  and 
no  evidence  was  afterwards  offered  to  establish  the  issues  as  to 
which  an  opening  statement  had  been  excluded. ^     The  interrup- 
tion by  opposing  counsel  of  the  opening  statement  to  raise  ques- 
tions as  to  its  competency,  or  the  restriction  of  the  opening  by  the 
court,  is  unjustifiable,  except  in  very  clear  cases  of  abuse;   and 
any  question  raised  upon  it  should  be  disposed  of  summarily  and 
without  argument.'-     In  discussing  this  question  in  the  case  first 
cited,  Cooley,  C.  J.,  said:   "Since   the  decision  in  the  case  of 
Scripps  V.  Reilhj,^  an  impression  seems  to  have  prevailed  with 
some  members  of  the  })ar  that  the  opening  statement  of  counsel 
might  be  challenged  step  by  step,  and  questions  of  the  relevancy 
and  materiality  of  evidence  raised  and  considered,  and  even  aro-ued 
at  length,  on  counsel  stating  what  he  proposed  to  prove.     Under 
this  impression ,  the  practice  of  interrupting  counsel  and  demanding 
the  judgment  of  the  court  on  the  competency  of  what  he  proposed 
to  show,  has  in  some  cases  been  carried  to  extraordinary  lengths, 
and  elaborate  arguments  have  been  indulged  in  over  the  question 
whether  counsel  should  be  suffered  to  make  certain  statements 
of  proposed  evidence  to  the  jury.     Any  such  practice  is  a  great 
abuse,  and  in  a  desperate  criminal  case,  might  be  resorted  to  for 
the  purpose  of  defeating  the   ends  of  justice,  by  breaking  the 
force  of  a  connected  statement  of  the  case  to  the  jury,  and  by 
prolonging  the  trial  until  the  trouble  and  expense  should  dis- 
hearten the   authorities,  and  result  in  a  relaxation  of  effort  for 
conviction.     The  cases  must  be  rare  in  which  counsel  would  be 
justified  in  interrupting  the  opening  of  his  antagonist  to  raise 
questions  of  competency  ;  and   when  he  does  so,  the  questions 
ought  to  be  disposed  of  summarily  and  without  argument."  * 

«.  Thompson,  41  N.  Y.  1 :   Gaffney  v.  ^  People  v.    Wilson,    55   Mich.  506, 

People,  50  N.  Y.  41G;  Willis  v.  People,  513;  Porter  v.  Throop,  47  Mich.  313 
32  N,  Y.  715.  3  38  Mich.  10. 

1  Frazier    v.    Jeunison,    42    Mich.  ■•  People   v.  Wilson,   55  Mich.  506 

206.  513. 


716  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  934.  What  must  be  Stated  in  the  Opening  Argument.  — 

Bearing  in  mind,  then,  that  the  State  has,  in  every  case  where  a 
different  rule  is  not  prescribed  by  statute,  the  right  to  make  both 
the  opening  and  the  concluding  argument,  it  becomes  an  import- 
ant inquiry  how  far  the  prosecution  is  required,  in  its  opening 
argument,  to  develop  and  present  its  case,  in  order  not  to  take  the 
accused  at  a  disadvantage.  It  is  the  constant  effort  of  unfair 
and  disingenuous  advocates,  who  represent  the  side  of  the  issue 
which  has  the  right  to  open  and  close,  to  attempt,  by  waiving 
the  opening  argument,  to  put  the  other  party  at  the  disadvantage 
of  making  his  argument  without  knowing  the  argument  which  he 
will  have  to  meet,  the  prosecuting  counsel  thus  acquiring  the  ad- 
vantage of  delivering  his  entire  argument  in  conclusion  without 
giving  to  the  defending  counsel  any  right  of  reply  to  the  positions 
which  he  may  take.  This  practice  ought  never  to  be  tolerated. 
Where  the  prosecution  waives  the  opening  argument  and  throws 
the  burden  of  opening  upon  the  defendant,  the  court  should  allow 
the  defendant  to  close ;  for  it  is  but  just  that  the  defendant 
should  have  a  right  to  reply  to  the  positions  taken  by  the  prose- 
cution, and  a  spirit  of  fair  play  would  dictate  that  the  party 
which  has  the  burden  of  opening  should  have  the  advantage  of 
closino".  To  obviate  such  an  unfair  method  of  argument,  courts 
have  adopted  the  rule  requiring  the  party  possessing  the  right  to 
the  opening  and  closing  arguments  to  deliver  to  the  court  and  to 
the  opposite  counsel  the  points  upon  which  he  means  to  insist,  ^ 
and  to  confine  his  concluding  argument  to  the  points  thus  deliv- 
ered.^ Under  a  statute^  giving  the  State's  counsel  the  right  to 
make  the  concluding  address  to  the  jury  in  all  cases,  it  has  been 
ruled  that  the  presiding  judge  should  require  him  in  his  opening 
speech  fairly  to  develop  his  case,  and  to  present  the  law  on  which 
he  relies ;  and  that  if  he  should  fail  to  do  this  until  his  second 
speech,  the  presiding  judge,  in  his  discretion,  would  be  author- 
ized to  allow  the  defendant's  counsel  again  to  address  the  jury.* 

1  Main  v.  Newson,  3  Jolius.  (N.  Y.)  ^  Wynn  v.  Lee,  supra. 

542;    Schmidt    v.  Uiiiou    lus.    Co.,  1  3  Texas  Code  Crim..Pro.,  art  3050. 

Johns.  (N.  Y.)  63;  Wynn  v.  Lee,  5  Ga.  ■»  Morales  r.  State,  1  Tex.  App.  4!U, 

217.  500.     This  ruling  was  also  made  ^;^\h 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXVIII.]       RIGHT    OF    ARGUMENT.  717 

In  Missouri,  a  statute  prescribing  that  "  unless  the  case  be  sub- 
mitted without  argument,  the  counsel  for  the  prosecution  shall 
make  the  opening  argument,  the  counsel  for  defendant  shall 
follow,  and  the  counsel  for  the  prosecution  shall  conclude  the 
argument,"  ^  is  held  to  be  mandatory.  The  prosecuting  attorney 
must  therefore  make  the  opening  argument,  in  which  he  must 
apprise  the  accused  of  the  theory  of  the  prosecution  and  of  the 
positions  w'hich  it  takes,  in  order  that  the  accused  may  be  able  to 
reply:  and  if  the  State's  counsel  refuses  to  make  such  an  open- 
ing argument,  he  cannot  be  permitted  to  argue  at  all.^  Where 
the  statute  required  the  counsel  for  the  people  to  open  and  close, 
allowed  two  counsel  to  argue  on  each  side,  and  gave  the  court  a 
discretionary  power  to  change  the  order  thus  prescribed,  ^  it  was 
held  that  the  court  committed  no  error  in  denying  the  concluding 
argument  to  the  defendant's  counsel  and  in  allowing  the  counsel 
for  the  prosecution  and  the  accused  to  follow  each  other  alter- 
nately, the  prosecution  opening  and  concluding.^ 

§  935.  Limits  of  the  Coiicludiiij?  Argument.  — In  order  not 
to  be  unfair  to  the  accused,  the  concluding  argument  must,  then, 
be  confined  to  the  grounds  stated  and  points  of  law  announced 
in  the  opening  argument  ;^  and  if  counsel,  in  opening,  refers  to 
authorities  merely,  without  reading  them,  he  is  understood  to 
waive  the  right  of  reading  them ;  and,  unless  they  are  referred  to 
by  the  opposing  counsel  in  his  argument,  the  opening  counsel 
cannot  take  them  up  again  in  his  reply .^  But  if  the  counsel  for 
the  defendant,  in  his  argument,  comments  upon  a  decision  which 
is  handed  to  him  by  counsel  for  the  plaintiff,  this  obviously  will 
give  to  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  the  right  to  comment  upon 
the  decision  in  his  reply.''  It  thus  appears  that  the  concluding 
argument  sustains  an  analogy  to  evidence  in  rebuttal.     Its  proper 

reference    to    another  Texas   statute  ^  Xov.  Stat.  18G1,  chap.  472,  §§  355, 

(a)ife,  §  928),  which  allows  two  argu-  350.    357. 

ments    ou    each   side    iu    a    criminal  ■*  State  v.  Pierce,  8  Nev.  291,  296. 

trial.  '  Wynn  v.  Lee,  5  Ga.  217. 

'  Rev.  Stat.  Mo.  1879,  §  1908.  6  Cutler  v.  Estate   of   Thomas,  24 

2  State     V.     Houig,    78     Mo.    249,  Vt.  G47. 
253.                                                             .     •        ■'   Liusey  i-.  Ramsey,  22  Ga.  G27,  637. 


718  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

limit  is  a  reply  to  what  has  been  brought  out  in  the  defendant's 
argument.  As  the  plaintiff  (or,  in  a  criminal  case,  the  State)  is 
not  allowed  to  establish  its  case  in  chief  by  evidence  introduced 
for  the  first  time  in  rebuttal,  so  the  plaintiff's  counsel  (or  the 
State's  counsel)  ought  not  to  be  allowed,  in  the  concluding  argu- 
ment, to  take  new  grounds,  to  state  new  points  of  law,  or  to 
read  new  authorities  in  support  of  the  positions  which  he  has 
assumed.  But,  as  the  court  possesses  the  power,  in  the  exercise 
of  a  sound  discretion^  of  permitting  evidence  which  should  have 
been  offered  in  chief  to  be  introduced  in  rebuttal,  provided  it  has 
been  inadvertently  overlooked  or  not  availed  of  at  the  proper 
time  by  reason  of  accidental  circumstances,^  so  it  rests  within 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to  permit  counsel,  in  their 
concluding  argument,  to  comment  upon  matters  not  referred  to 
by  the  opposite  counsel,  and  to  which  the  opposite  counsel  are 
afforded  no  opportunity  to  reply,  — which  discretion  will  not  be 
reviewed  by  an  appellate  tribunal  except  in  a  clear  case  of 
prejudice.'^ 

§  936.  Cutting  off  Plaintiff's  Right  to  Reply.  — In  a  civil 
case  in  Michigan  the  somewhat  novel  question  was  discussed 
whether  the  defendant  can,  by  waiving  argument  after  the  open- 
inof  argument  has  been  made,  cut  off  the  rioht  of  the  plaintiff  to 
his  concludino;  argument.  The  conclusion  was  that  the  matter 
addressed  itself  to  the  sound  discretion  oi  the  trial  court ;  but,  at 
the  same  time,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  defendant  has  not  an 
absolute  right  to  produce  such  a  result,  and  that  it  ought  to  be 
prevented  by  the  trial  court.  In  the  course  of  the  o})inion  of 
the  court,  Campbell,  J.,  said:  "Usually  the  plaintiff's  opening 
must  indicate  what  the  defendants  are  expected  to  meet.     They 

1  Rucker   v.   Eddiiiiis,    7    ]Mo.    115;  310;  Farmer.s' Mutual  Fire  lus.  Co.  v. 

Brown  ?;.  Burruss,  8  Mo.  26;   Curreu  Bair,   87   Pa.    St.    124;    Huntsmau    v. 

V.  Connery,  5   Biun.  (Pa.)   488;  Eich-  Nichols,    IK!    Mas.s.    521;    Taylor    v. 

ardson  v.  Lessee  &c.,  4  Biun.  (Pa.)  Shemwell,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  577;  Clayes 

198;  Dozier  v.  Jerman,  30  Mo.  216,  u.  Ferris,  10  Vt.  112;  a«/e,  §  345,  e«  se^. 
220;  Blake  t?.  Powell,  26  Kau.  320,327;  2  Hull  v.  xVlexauder,  26  Iowa,  660. 

Rheinhart    v.     State,    14     Kan.    322;  Compare  Bardeu  ??.  Briscoe,  36  Mich. 

George  v.  Pilcher,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  3*0n,  255,  258. 


Tit.   IV,   Ch.  XXVIII.]       RIGHT    OF    ARGUMENT.  719 

have  a  right  to  know  what  arguments  are  to  be  alleged  against 
them,  and  this  they  can  only  learn  from  the  opening,  inasmuch 
as  they  liave  no  reply.  In  most  cases,  if  they  do  not  think  the 
opening  requires  any  arguments  to  fortify  their  case  against  it, 
they  may  fairly  let  the  case  go  to  the  jury  as  it  stands,  and  no 
reply  is  needed  where  there  is.  nothing  to  be  replied  to.  But 
while  this  is  true  in  theory,  it  is  also  true  that,  when  all  the  testi- 
mony is  in,  the  defendants  know  perfectly  well,  before  the  open- 
ing, what  the  line  of  argument  against  them  must  be,  and  that 
its  effect  upon  the  jury  will  depend  more  or  less  upon  the  skill 
or  force  of  opposing  counsel  in  presenting  the  facts.  As  only 
one  counsel  opens,  and  as,  where  there  are  more  than  one,  the 
ground  is  usually  divided,  and  the  junior  commonly  precedes, 
the  effect  of  cutting  off  a  reply  would  be  to  prevent  the  whole 
case  from  being  thoroughly  presented.  We  cannot  think  that 
there  is  any  absolute  right  in  a  defendant  to  produce  such  a  re- 
sult. Every  court  is  bound  in  fairness  to  prevent  such  abuses. 
But  inasmuch  as  the  propriety  of  interference  must  depend  upon 
circumstances,  we  think  the  matter  comes  within  those  discre- 
tionary rules  which  must,  unless  in  extreme  cases,  leave  the  trial 
judge  to  determine  the  course  of  procedure."  ^ 

J  Barclen  v.  Briscoe,  3G  Mich.  255,  257. 


720  ARGUMENT   OF    COUNSEL.  [1  ThotUp.  Tr., 


CHAPTER     XXIX.     . 

OF  THE  RIGHT  TO  ARGUE  QUESTIONS  OF  LAW  TO  THE  JURY. 

Section 

940.  How  far  Juries  are  Judges  of  the  Law. 

941.  la  Civil  Cases. 

942.  Jurisdictions  in    whicli  Counsel  not  Permitted  to   argvie   Questions  of 

Law  to  the  Jury. 

943.  Contrai-y  Doctriue  that  Counsel  should  be  Permitted  to  argue  Questions 

of  Law  to  the  Jury. 

944.  Arguing  against  the  Law  as  laid  down  by  the  Court.' 

945.  Right  to  read  Books  of  the  Law  to  the  Jury. 

946.  Court  may  Curtail  this  Right  within  Reasonable  Limits. 

947.  Counsel  not  Permitted  to  read  Law  Books  upon  Questions  of  Fact. 

948.  Reading  a  Former  Decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  Same  Case. 

949.  Reading  or  Stating  Good  Law  to  the  Jury. 

950.  Stating  Bad  Law  to  the  Jury. 

951.  [Conclusion.]     Discretion,  Cautious,  Instructions. 

§  940.  How  far  Juries  are  Judges  of  the  Law.  — The  ques- 
tion to  be  discussed  in  this  chapter  is  involved  in  another  ques- 
tion upon  which  a  great  amount  of  usek^ss  judicial  casuistry  has 
been  expended,  —  namely,  in  what  sense  and  to  what  extent  are 
juries  judges  of  the  law  ?  The  question  assumes  practical  shape 
only  in  so  far  as  it  affords  the  key  to  the  answ^ers  to  the  follow- 
ing questions:  1.  To  what  extent  are  counsel  permitted  to  ar- 
gue questions  of  law  to  the  jury?  2.  What  instructions  shall  the 
court  give  to  the  jury  touching  their  authority  as  judges  of  the 
law  ?  It  is  not  proposed  to  consider  this  preliminary  question 
now  ;  it  more  properly  belongs  to  the  next  title,  where  the  whole 
subject  of  the  relative  provinces  of  court  and  jury  is  considered. 

§  941.  In  Civil  Cases.  — The  question  may  be  at  once  laid 
out  of  view,  so  far  as  civil  oases  are  concerned,  by  the  statement 
that  in  no  such  case,  except  according  to  some  early  conceptions 
in  actions  for  damages  for  slander  or  libel,  :ire  the  jury  in  any 
sense   judges  of  the  law.     In  such  cases  the  jury  must    take 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  to  the  jury.      721 

the  Lnv  from  the  court,  and  not  from  the  counsel.  The 
hitter  ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  argue  questions  of  law  to 
the  jury,  or  to  read  them  in  argument  from  books  of  the  law.^ 
It  has  been  doubted  by  one  court  whether  counsel  might  not 
properly  be  permitted  to  read  books  of  the  law  to  the  jury  in 
civil  cases,  for  the  purpose  of  illustration  merely  ;  ^  but  at  a  later 
period  the  same  court  held,  on  fuller  consideration,  that  even 
such  a  practice  is  improper. '^ 

§  942.  Jiirisdictious  in  which  Counsel  are  not  Permitted  to 
argue  Questions  of  Law  to  the  Jury. — In  the  courts  of  the 
United  States,*  and  in  the  courts  of  most  of  the  States,  it  is  settled 
that  counsel  cannot  be  permitted  to  argue  to  the  jury  questions 
of  law  which  have  been  decided  by  the  court. ^  Juries  have  no 
power  to  judge  of  the  constitutionality  of  acts  of  the  legislature, 
and  consequently  counsel  have  no  right  to  argue  such  questions 
to  them.^ 


1  Delaplaue  v.  Crenshaw,  15  Gratt. 
(Va.)  457,481;  Philpot  «.  Taylor,  75 
111.  309;  Chicago  ?;.  McGiveu,  78  111. 
347;  Spragiie  v.  Craig,  61  111.  289; 
Tiiller  V.  Talbot,  23  111.  357;  Heagy  v. 
State  ex  rel.,  85  lud.  2(10.  See  contra., 
for  a  local  and  peculiar  rule  in 
Georgia,  Robinson  v.  Adliins,  19  Ga. 
398;  Eansoue  v.  Christian, 56  Ga.  351, 
355. 

2  Tuller  V.  Talbot,  supra. 

^  Chicago  V.  McGiven,  supra. 

■*  Commonwealth  v.  Zimmerman,  1 
Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  47;  Uuited  States 
V.  Columbus,  5  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.) 
304;  United  States  v.  Riley,  5  Blatchf. 
(U.  S.)  204,  207. 

5  State  V.  Anderson,  44  Cal.  65,  70. 

6  Franlilin  v.  State,  12  Md.  236, 
246,  249;  Callender's  Case,  Whart.  St. 
Tr.  688,  710;  United  States  v.  Riley, 
5  Blatclif.  (U.  S.)  204,  207.  Callender's 
Case,  supra,  was  a  prosecution,  by  in- 
dictment, for  a  seditious  libel,  in  the 
Circuit  Court  of  the  Uuited  States  for 


the  district  of  Virginia,  in  the  year 
1800.  William  Wirt,  in  addressing 
the  jury  on  behalf  of  the  defendant, 
undertook  to  argue  to  them  the  consti- 
tutionality of  an  act  of  the  legislature 
of  Virginia,  but,  after  several  rude  in- 
terruptions by  the  presiding  judge 
(the  Hon.  Samuel  Chase),  was  obliged 
to  take  his  seat.  Mr.  Wirt's  reason- 
ing was  summed  up  in  his  concluding 
sentence :  ''  Since  the  jury  have  a  right 
to  consider  the  law,  and  since  the  con- 
stitution is  the  law,  the  conclusion  is 
certainly  syllogistic  that  the  jury  have 
the  right  to  consider  the  constitution." 
The  conduct  of  Mr.  Justice  Chase  on 
this  trial,  and,  among  other  things, 
this  particular  ruling,  was  made  one  of 
the  grounds  for  his  impeachment  be- 
fore the  Senate  of  the  United  States. 
The  Supreme  .Court  of  Indiana  take 
the  same  view  of  this  question  which 
was  taken  by  Mr.  Wirt,  holding  that 
as  the  constitution  is  a  part  of  the  law, 
it  follows  as  a  necessary  corollary  of 


46 


722  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

§  943.  Contrary  Doctrine  that  Counsel  Should  be  Allowed 
to  Arg-iie  the  Law  to  the  Jury.  —  As  hereafter  seen,^  the  con- 
trary view  prevails  in  Massachusetts,  Maine,  Indiana,  Illinois 
and  other  States,  that  in  criminal  cases  counsel  have  the  right  to 
argue  the  law  to  the  jury.  In  Georgia  the  right  is  extended  even 
to  civil  cases.  But  the  origin  of  the  doctrine  in  that  State  is 
found  in  the  peculiar  provisions  of  the  constitution  of  1777  and 
that  of  1798,  which  need  not  be  further  considered.  The  Geor- 
gia courts,  under  these  provisions,  uphold  the  right  to  argue  the 
law  as  well  as  the  facts  to  the  jury  in  civil  cases,  subject  to  the 
corrective  power  of  the  court  in  charging  the  jury  and  in  grant- 
ing new  trials.^  The  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  in  upholding 
the  right  to  argue  the  law  to  the  jury  in  criminal  cases,  over- 
ruled the  decision  of  a  very  able  criminal  judge. ^  The  court 
place^d  its  conclusion  upon  a  principle  thus  expressed  in  its  opin- 
ion by  Turney,  J. :  "It  is  impossible  to  understand  how  counsel 
can  make  out  a  case  from  facts,  while  he  is  forbidden  to  state  and 
argue  the  law  applicable  to  the  facts.  It  requires  both  facts  and 
law  to  make  a  prosecution  or  defense  in  either  civil  or  criminal 
proceedings.  Without  facts  there  is  no  law  to  operate.  To 
hold  that  the  facts  shall  be  argued,  but  the  law  shall  not  be  pre- 
sented with  these  facts,  is  to  deny  the  benefit  of  counsel.  The 
value  of  facts  depends  upon  the  law,  and  that  governs  them.  No 
lawyer  can  discuss  propositions,  except  in  a  combination  of  facts 
and  law."*  The  leading  case  in  support  of  this  doctrine  is  a 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Judicial  Court  of  Massachusetts^  in  which 
the  subject  was  discussed  in  an  ample  manner  and  with  great 

the  rule,  that  the   jury  are  the  judges  stead  of  arguing  it  to  the  jury.     See 

of  the  coustitution  as   well  as  of  auy  also  ou  this  question,  Coinmouwealth 

other  part  of  the  law,  aud  consequeutly  v.  Murpliy,  10  Gray  (Mass.),  1. 

may  deterraiue  the  constitutionality  of  *  Post,  §2140. 

a  statute.     Lynch  v.  State,  9  lud.  541.  ^  Kobiusou  v.  Adkius,  19   Ga.  398, 

In  United  States  v.  Riley,   5  Blatchf.  401.   But  query?     Post,  p.  1509. 

(U.  S.)    204,  207,  Mr.  District  Judge  »  Judge   Horrigan,  of  the  Criminal 

Shipnian  held  that  it  was  uot  error,  in  Coui't  of  Shelby  County. 

a  criminal  trial,  to  require  counsel  to  "^  Hannah  v.    State,  74    Tenu.    (11 

argue  the  question  of  the    constitu-  Lea)  201. 

tionality  of  the  law  to  the  court,  in-  . 


Tit.  rV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  tg  the  jury.       723 

ability  by  counsel,  and  considered  in  an  important  opinion  of 
Chief  Justice  Shaw.  The  court  upheld  the  right  of  counsel  in 
criminal  cases,  to  argue  the  law  as  well  as  the  facts  to  the  jury, 
both  upon  principle  and  in  view  of  the  practice  which  had  long 
existed  in  that  conlmon wealth.  The  question  was  reasoned  with 
the  massive  force  which  distinguish  the  opinions  of  that  eminent 
judge  upon  important  questions.  The  decision  is  perhaps  the 
leading  American  judgment  upon  the  question  in  what  sense  juries 
are  to  be  deemed  judges  of  the  law.  Omitting  those  portions 
of  the  opinion  which  deal  with  that  question,  and  referring  to 
those  portions  which  deal  with  the  immediate  question  of  the 
right  of  counsel  to  argue  the  law  to  the  jury,  one  or  two  extracts 
will  be  given:  "In  thus  conducting  a  jury  trial  in  a  criminal 
case,  with  a  view  to  the  return  of  a  general  verdict,  it  is  obvious 
that  the  whole  matter,  of  law  as  well  as  of  fact,  must  be  stated 
and  explained  to  the  jury,  so  that  they  may  fully  understand  and 
apply  it  to  the  facts;  because,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  form  of  a 
general  verdict,  they  are  to  declare  the  law  as  well  as  the  fact. 
For  this  purpose  it  must  be  necessary,  and  in  our  State  it  is  the 
usual  practice,  for  the  parties  respectively,  by  their  counsel,  to 
state  the  law  to  the  jury,  in  the  presence  and  subject  to  the  ulti- 
mate direction  of  the  judge,  because,  unless  the  jury  understand 
the  rule  of  law,  with  its  exceptions,  limitations  and  qualifications, 
they  cannot  know  how  to  apply  the  evidence,  and  determine  the 
truth  of  the  material  facts  necessary  to  bring  the  case  of  the  ac- 
cused within  it.  In  thus  presenting  their  respective  views  of  the 
law  to  the  jury  under  the  direction  of  the  court,  for  the  better 
information  of  both  the  judge  and  jury,  great  latitude  has  been 
allowed  in  the  practice  of  this  commonwealth,  and  counsel  have 
been  permitted  to  state  and  enforce  their  views  of  the  law,  es- 
pecially in  capital  cases,  by  definitions  and  cases  from  such  works 
of  established  authority  as  the  court  may  approve.  In  this  great 
latitude  has  been  allowed,  in  tenderness  to  the  accused,  and  a 
liberal  confidence  reposed  in  counsel  called  to  defend  the  accused 
in  the  hour  of  his  trial.  But  such  an  address,  whether  it  be  upon 
the  matter  of  fact  or  matter  of  law,  and  whether  in  fact  it  be 
directed  to  the  court  or  jury,  is,  in  legal  effect  and  actual  oper- 


724  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSELe  [1  Tliomp.  Ti',, 

ation,  an  address  to  both ;  not  because  they  have  not  several  duties 
to  perform  and  distinct  questions  to  pass  ui)on,  but  because  it  is 
one  trial,  carried  on  at  once  before  court  and  jury,  in  which  the 
judge  must  have  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  evidence  conducing 
to  the  jiroof  of  facts,  which  may  or  may  not  reiider  the  accused 
amenable  to  the  law,  in  order  that  he  may  give  such  directions  in 
matter  of  law  as  the  state  of  the  evidence  may  require;  and  the 
jury  must  have  a  clear  comprehension  of  the  rules  of  law,  in  order 
to  determine  whether  the  facts  proved  bring  the  accused  within 
them  ;  and  because  the  minds  of  both  judge  and  jury,  acting 
within  their  respective  departments,  must  result  in  that  general 
verdict  of  acquittal  or  conviction  Avhich  is  the  proper  determi- 
nation of  the  cause.  Considering  the  latitude  which  has  been 
allowed  in  this  commonwealth  by  a  long  course  of  p.actice,  and 
the  difficulty  of  drawing  an  exact  line  of  distinction  between  that 
full  statement  and  exposition  of  his  views  of  the  law,  which  coun- 
sel may  properly  make  in  a  general  address  to  the  court  and 
jury,  upon  the  questions  embraced  in  the  issue  and  involved  in 
the  general  verdict,  and  the  address  to  the  jury  separately  upon 
questions  of  law,  we  are  of  opinion  that  a  l)arty  may,  by  his 
counsel,  address  the  jury  upon  questions  Of  law,  subject  to  the 
superintendence  and  controlling  power  of  the  court  to  decide 
questions  of  law,  by  directions  to  the  jury,  which  it  is  their  dut}-- 
to  follow.  In  ordinary  cases  such  directions  to  the  jury,  upon 
questions  arising  in  the  cause,  are  not  given  until  the  parties,  by 
their  counsel,  have  submitted  their  respective  views  of  the  law 
and  facts  in  an  argument  to  the  court  and  jury.  *  *  *  As 
the  jury  have  a  legitimate  power  to  return  a  general  verdict,  and 
in  that  case  must  pass  upon  the  whole  issue,  this  court  are  of 
opinion  that  the  defendant  has  a  right  by  himself  or  his  counsel, 
to  address  the  jury,  under  the  general  sui)erintcndence  of  the 
court,  upon  all  the  material  questions  involved  in  the  issue,  and, 
to  this  extent  and  in  this  connection,  to  address  the  jury  upon 
such  questions  of  law  as  come  within  the  issue  to  be  tried.  Such 
address  to  the  jur}',  upon  questions  of  law  embraced  in  the 
issue,  by  the  defendant   or   his   counsel,  is    warranted   by   the 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  to  the  jury.      725 


long  practice  of   the  courts  in  this  commonwealth  in  criminal 
cases." ^ 

§  944.  Arguing-  Against  the  Law  as  Laid  Down  by  the 
Court.  —  If  the  court  is  the  official  mouthpiece  of  the  law,  and 
if  the  jury  are  bound  to  receive  and  administer  the  law  as  laid 
down  by  the  court,  it  follows  as  a  conclusion  that  counsel  have 
not  the  right  to  argue  to  the  jury  the  law  contrary  to  the  views 
expressed  by  the  court.  But  if  the  jury  are  the  judges  of  the 
law,  and  if  the  views  of  the  court  upon  questions  of  law  are 
merely  advisory  to  the  jury,  which  they  are  at  liberty  in  their 
discretion  to  disregard,  then  it  would  seem  to  follow  that  counsel 
should  be  allowed  to  argue  the  law  to  the  jury  fully  and  freely, 
and  in  order  to  argue  it  fully  and  freely,  to  argue  it,  if  necessary, 
contrary  to  the  declarations  of  the  court.  Upon  this  question 
there  is  fortunately  not  very  much  controversy.  It  is  held  in 
the  FederaP  and  in  most  of  the  State  jurisdictions^  that  counsel 


^  Comraouwealth  v.  Porter,  10  Mete. 
(Mass.)  2(i3,  283,  287.  What  the 
court  distinctly  ruled  was,  that  the 
trial  court  erred  in  interruptiu!.^  coun- 
sel, and  in  prohibiting  counsel  from 
arguing  to  tlie  jury,  before  tlie  court 
liad  delivered  its  charge  to  them, 
propositions  of  law  which  were  op- 
posed to  views  of  the  law  entertained 
by  the  court.  This  case  is  therefore  a 
distinct  authority,  opposed  to  the 
cases  cited  in  the  preceding  paragraph, 
which  hold  that  counsel  ought  not  to 
be  allowed  to  controvert,  in  argument 
to  the  jury,  the  views  which  the  court 
has  expressed  concerning  the  law. 

-  United  States  v.  Morris,  1  Curt. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  23,  48  (fugitive  slave 
case  —  able  opinion  by  Mr.  .Justice 
Curtis) ;  Comraouwealtli  v.  Zimmer- 
man, 1  Cranch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  47; 
United  States  v.  Columbus,  5  Cranch 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  304.  Compare  United 
States  V.  Watliius,  3  Cranch  C.  C. 
(U.  S.)  443. 

3  Dejaruette  ?;.  Commonwealth,  75 


Va.  867,  882;  Davenport  v.  Common- 
wealth, 1  Leigh  (Va.),  58.5,  597;  Del- 
aplaue  v.  Crenshaw,  15  Gratt.  (Va.) 
457,  481;  Smith  v.  Morrison,  3  A.  K. 
Marsh.  (Ky.)  81;  Harrison  v.  Park,  1 
J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  170,  173;  Edwards 
V.  State,  22  Ark.  253.  Baltimore  &c. 
R.  Co.  V.  Boyd  (Md.),  7  Centr.  Rep. 
435,  438.  See  also  Bell  v.  State,  57 
Md.  120;  Sowerwein  v.  Jones,  7  Gill  & 
J.  (Md.)  335.  Thus,  tlie  court  has  an 
undoubted  right  to  state  to  the  jury 
the  legal  effect  of  evidence  which  has 
been  introduced  and  submitted  to  their 
consideration.  McHenry  v.  Marr,  39 
Md.  522;  Wlieeler  v.  State,  42  Md. 
570;  post,  §  2244.  If  counsel  do  not 
except  to  such  statements,  they  become 
the  law  of  the  case.  Hogan  v.  Hendry, 
18  Md.  128;  Davis  v.  Patton,  19  Md. 
128;  Dent  v.  Hancock,  5  Gill  (Md.), 
127;  and,  being  the  law  of  tiie  case, 
counsel  are  not  at  liberty  to  argue 
against  them.  Bell  v.  State,  57  Md. 
109,  120;  Sowerwein  v.  Jones,  7  Gill  & 
J.  (Md.)  341. 


726  ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Tliomp.  Tl'., 

have  no  right  to  argue  to  the  jury  propositions  of  law  contrary 
to  those  which  have  been  hiid  down  by  the  court.  The  courts 
which  so  hold  proceed  upon  the  view  that  to  permit  this  to  be 
done  would  be  contrary  to  the  respect  which  the  court  owes  to 
itself,  and  that  it  would  be  a  perversion  of  the  law  to  allow  an 
ap[)eal  from  the  court  to  the  jury  for  the  purpose  of  correcting 
the  errors  of  law  committed  by  the  court,  instead  of  correcting 
them  by  an  appeal  to  the  proj^er  appellate  tribunal  provided  by 
the  constitution  and  the  laws  for  that  pur})Ose.  On  the  contrary, 
in  the  most  important  American  judgment  which  is  to  be  found 
upon  the  question  of  the  power  of  juries  to  judge  of  the  law  as 
w^ell  as  of  the  facts,  it  was  distinctly  ruled,  in  an  opinion  given 
by  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  that  the  trial  court  committed  error  ni 
interrupting  the  argument  of  counsel  to  the  jury,  and  in  prevent- 
ing counsel  from  expressing  to  the  jury  views  of  the  law  contrary 
to  those  entertained  by  the  court. ^  In  Indiana,  where  counsel 
have  the  right  to  argue  law  to  the  jury,  where  it  is  sought  to  put 
the  trial  court  in  error,  for  the  reason  that  the  counsel  for  the 
accused  was  prohibited  from  commenting  on  instructions  which 
the  court  had  announced  its  purpose  to  give,  under  the  provisions 
of  a  statute,  it  must  appear  icliat  the  comments  loere  which  the 
counsel  desired  to  make.'^ 

§  945.   Right  to  Read  Books  of  the  Law  to  the  Jury.  —  If 

the  right  exists  to  argue  the  law  of  the  case  to  the  jury,  it  must 
follow  that  the  right  exists  to  read  })()oks  of  the  law  to  them,  as 
authority  and  for  illustration,  in  like  manner  as  counsel  would 
do  in  arguing  the  law  to  the  court.  This  right  has  accordingly 
been  upheld  in  those  jurisdictions  where  the  right  to  argue  the 

1  Commonwealth  w.  Porter,  10  Mete.  See    ahso  Lynch  x\   State,  9  lud.  o41; 

(Mass.)  2(;3,  283,  287.     It  is   not   un-  White  u.  People,  90  111.  117.  In  Kansas, 

derstood  that  counsel  in  this  case  at-  counsel  may  argue  against  the  court's 

tempted  to  argue  to  the  jury  against  instructions,  in  crimiual  prosecutions 

&i\y  previous  ruling  ot  the  judge.     He  for  libel.  State  u.  Verry  (Kau.),  13  Pac. 

argued  against  the  views  of  the  judge.  Rep.  838. 

and  was  Interrupted,  and  it  was  held  ^  Blizzard  v.  Applcgate,  77  Ind.  527, 

that  tlie  judge  luul  uo  right  to  do  this.  572. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  to  the  jury.      727 

law  to  the  jury  exists/  —  those  courts  holding  that  a  substantial 
denial  or  deprivation  of  it  is  error  for  which  a  new  trial  will  be 
granted.^  Another  view  remits  the  question,  almost  entirely  to 
the  discretion  of  the  trial  court. '^ 

§  946.  Court  May  Curtail  this  Right  Within  Reasonable 
Limits.  —  It  seems  to  be  everywhere  agreed  that  the  court  may 
curtail  this  right  within  reasonable  limits.*  Accordingly  the 
trial  court  is  not,oblio;ed  to  allow  the  readins;  of  numerous  au- 
thorities  to  the  jury,  or  the  unnecessary  consumption  of  public 
time  in  discussing  to  the  jury  such  authorities,  especially  where 
the  court  is  familiar  with  them,  and  is  prepared  in  its  charge  to 
announce  to  the  jury  the  propositions  of  law  which  they  contain, 
so  far  as  applicable  to  the  case  on  trial. ^  The  refusal  of  the 
trial  court  to  allow  the  counsel  of  the  accused  to  read  to  the  jury 
the  whole  of  the  statute  upon  one  section  of  which  the  prosecu- 
tion is  founded,  presents  no  question  for  review,  if  it  appear  that 
counsel  was  allowed  to  read  those  parts  of  the  statute  which,  in 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Austin,  7  Gray  of  the  trial  judge,  and  one  which  will 
(Mass.),  51;  Jones  ?7.  State,  (35  Ga.  506;  not  be  revised  on  appeal,  unless  that 
Johnson  v.  State,  59  Ga.  142;  Lynch  v.  discretion  has  been  clearly  abused  to 
State,  9  lud.  541;  Harvey  v.  State,  40  the  prejudice  of  the  appellantc  Smith 
lud.  516;  Stout  v.  State,  96  Ind.  407  «.  State,  21  Tex,  App.  278,307;  Wade 
(overruling  Carter  v.  State,  2  Ind.  617,  v.  De  Witt,  20  Tex.  398;  Dempsey  v. 
and  it  seems  Murphy  v.  State,  6  lud.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  429;  Hinest;.  State, 
490).  A  qualified  rule  exists  in  3  Tex.  App.  483;  Foster  v.  State,  8 
Georgia,  applicable  to  civil  cases,  to  Tex.  App.  249;  Cross  u.  State,  11  Tex. 
the  effect  that  counsel  may  argue  to  App.  84;  Lott  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 
the  jury  their  view  of  the  law,  or  what  627.  As  to  books  of  science,  see  posi, 
they  expect  the  court  to  charge  as  the  §  995. 

law    subject  tc  the  correction  of  the  •*  Commonwealth   v.  Austin,  7  Gray 

court.     Ransone  v.  Christian,  56   Ga.  (Mass.),  51;  Murphy  v.  State,  6  Ind. 

351,  355.  490;     Commonwealth  v.    Murphy,    10 

2  McMath  V.  State,  55  Ga.  304;  308;  Gray  (Mass.),  1;  Mayfleld  v.  Cotton, 
Warmock  r.  State,  56  Ga.  503.  37   Tex.  229,232;  Curtis  v.    State,  36 

3  Thus,  in  Texas  the  rule  is  now  Ark.  284,  292;  Winkler  v.  State,  32 
established  by  repeated  decisions  that  Ark.  539 ;  People  v.  Anderson,  44  Cal. 
the  extent  to  which  counsel  may  read  65,  70. 

ioi\\e\\\vyivombooksofthelai,oandof  ^  Mayfleld  v.  Cotton,  37  Tex.  229, 

science,  as  a  part  of  their  argument,  is  232, 

a,  matter  left  largely  to  the  discretion 


728 


ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 


his  opinion,  affected  the  construction  of  that  section,  and  to 
comment  to  the  jury  upon  the  whole  statute.^  Nor  does  the 
trial  court  commit  any  abuse  of  discretion  in  refusing  to  permit 
counsel  to  read  to  the  jury  legal  authorities  which  have  no  per- 
tinency to  the  facts  of  the  case  on  trial.^  In  Massachusetts, 
where  the  right  to  argue  the  law  to  the  jury  is  upheld,  it  has 
been  held,  that  the  refusal  of  the  presiding  judge  to  allow  the 
counsel  of  the  accused  to  read  to  the  jury  an  adjudication  of  the 
highest  court  of  another  IState,  holding  that  a  statute  similar  to 
the  one  upon  which  the  prosecution  was  founded  was  contrary 
to  the  constitution  of  that  State,  presented  no  ground  of  excep- 
tion. "This,"  said  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  "was  a  purely  local 
decision,  on  a  different  constitution  and  different  statute,  and 
all  merely  local,  of  no  force  here.  Without  laying  down  any 
general  rule  respecting  the  reading  of  books  on  a  trial,  the  court 
are  of  opinion  that  this  was  rightfully  rejected."  ^ 

§  947.  Counsel  not  Permitted  to  Read  Law  Books  upon 
Questions  of  Fact.  —  Counsel  have  no  right,  in  argument,  to  in- 
troduce any  evidentiary  matters  to  the  jury  which  have  not  been 
regularly  offered  and  admitted  in  evidence,  in  presenting  the 
evidence  in  support  of  the  action  of  the  defense.*     The  toleration 


1  Comraouwealth  v.  Austin,  7  Gray 
(Mass.),  51. 

^  Curtis  V.  State,  36  Ark.  284;  292; 
Winkler  v.  State,  32  Ark.  539. 

3  Commonwealth  v.  Murphy,'  10 
Gray  (Mass.),  1. 

*  State  V.  Lee,  06  Mo.  165;  State  v. 
Kring,  64  Mo.  591;  Yoe  v.  People,  49 
111.410,412;  Kennies  r.  Vogel  (111.), 
7  Cent.  L.  J.  18;  s.  c.  87  111.  242;  State 
V.  Smith,  75  N.  C.  306;  Mitchum  v. 
State,  11  Ga.  G15,  633;  Tucker  ?;.  Ilen- 
niker,  41  N.  II.  317;  Hatch  v.  State,  8 
Tex.  App.  41(!,  423;  Brown  v.  Swine- 
ford,  44  Wis.  282,  293;  Berry  v.  State, 
10  Ga.  511,  522;  Thompson  v.  State,  43 
Tex.  268,  274;  Fe.stner  w.  Omalia  &c. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  Neb.  280;  Rolfe  v.  Rum- 


ford,  66  Me.  564;  Union  Central  Life 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Cheever,  36  Ohio  St.  201, 
208;  s.  c.  38  Am.  Rep.  573;  Walker  v. 
State,  6  Blackf.  (lud.)  2;  Hoxie  v. 
Home  Ins.  Co.,  33  Conn.  471;  Bulloch 
V.  Smith,  15  Ga.  395;  Dickersou  v. 
Burke,  25  Ga.  225;  Doster  v.  Brown, 
25  Ga.  24;  Cook  v.  Ritter,  4  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y.),  254;  Loyd  v.  Hannibal 
&c.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  509;  Bankard  v. 
Baltimore  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  34  Md.  197; 
Saunders  v.  Baxter,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
369;  Bill  v.  People,  14  III.  432;  Jenkins 
V.  North  Carolina  Ore  Dressing  Co., 
65  N.  C.  563;  State  v.  Williams,  65  N. 
C.  505;  Devrles  v.  Haywood,  63  N.  C. 
53;  Gould  v.  Moore,  40  N.  Y.  Super. 
(8  Jones  &,  S.)  387,  395;    Northingtou 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  to  the  jury.      729 

of  such  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  prosecuting  counsel  in  a  crim- 
inal trial  has  been  justly  regarded  as  a  substantial  invasion  of  the 
right  of  trial  by  jury,  which  is  guaranteed  to  accused  persons  by 
American  constitutions.^  Applying  these  principles,  it  is  held, 
even  in  those  jurisdictions  where  counsel  are  permitted  to  argue 
the  law  to  the  jury,  that  they  cannot  be  allowed,  under  pretense 
of  reading  legal  authorities  to  the  jury,  to  read  passages  from 
such  books  which  bear  upon  questions  of  fact  which  are  before 
the  jury  for  consideration,  thus  introducing  to  the  minds  of  the 
jurors  evidentiary  matters  which  have  not  been  regularly  ad- 
mitted by  the  presiding  judge. '^  Thus,  where  the  question  of 
fact  for  decision  was  whether  a  ih^aft  was  presented  for  payment 
within  a  rea-sonable  time,  it  was  held  error  to  allow  counsel  to 
read  to  the  jury  and  to  comment  upon  cases  found  in  the  books 
of  reports  upon  this  subject.-^  So,  where  the  case  was  a  civil 
action  against  a  municipal  corporation,  for  negligence  in  allow- 
ing an  obstruction  in  its  highway,  whereby  the  plaintiff  had  been 
injured,  it  was  error  to  allow  the  plaintiff's  counsel,  against  the 
objection  of  the  defendant,  to  read  extracts  from  reported  cases 
in  which  larije  damao;es  had  been  held  not  excessive.^ 

§  948.  Reading  a  Former  Decision  of  the  Supreme  Court 
in  the  Same  Case.  —  It  has  been  held  upon  the  clearest  grounds, 
that  counsel  have  no  right,  in  arguing  the  cause  to  the  jury,  to 
read  to  them  a  previous  decisjon  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  same 
case,^  —  the  conclusion  being  that  the  court  may,  in  its  discre- 
tion, reserve  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  for  its  own  guid- 


V.  State,  78  Temi.  (U  Lea)  424;  Flint  414;    Baldwin's   Appeal,  44   Couu.  .37. 

V.  Commonwealth,  81    Ky.  18(1;    SuUi-  Compare   Warren    v.  Wallis,  42   Tex. 

van  V.    State,  66   Ala.   48;  Grosse  v.  472. 

State,  11  Tex.  App.  364,  367;  Brown  v.  ^  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  11  Mich. 

State,  60  Ga.  210,  212;  Buliner  v.  Peo-  501,  512. 

pie,  95  111.  396.  <  Evansville  v.  Wilter,  86  Ind.  414. 

1  Tnckeru.  Henniker,  41  N.  H.  317,  s  Good  v.  Mylin,  13  Pa.  St.  538 
324;  Mitchnra  ?;.  State,  11  Ga.  615,  633..  (overruling  Noble    v.    McClintock,  6 

2  Dempsey  v.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  58)  :  Dempsey  u.  State, 
429;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Allen,  11  Mich.  3  Tex.  App.  429.  Compare  Warren  u. 
501,  512;  Evansville  v.  Wilter,  86  Ind.  Wallis,  42  Tex.  472. 


730  ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Thoill}).  Tl'., 

ance  in  instructing  the  jury.  But  in  a  State  where  the  right  to 
argue  questions  of  hiw  to  the  jury  is  uphekl,  on  the  ground  that 
the  jury  are  judges  of  the  hiw  as  well  as  of  the  facts,  it  has  been 
held  no  ground  for  a  new  trial  that  the  prosecuting  attorney,  in 
a  criminal  case,  in  his  closing  argument  to  the  jury,  read  to  them 
a  previous  decision  of  the  Su})reme  Court. ^ 

§  949.  Reading-  or  Stating  Good  Law  to  the  Jury.  — Under 
any  theory  of  this  question,  it  is  obvious  that,  if  the  court  allow 
counsel  to  argue  the  law  to  the  jury,  and  to  read  to  them  from 
books  of  the  law,  there  will  be  no  ground  for  a  new  trial  if  the 
passages  which  the  counsel  read  are  good  law,  applicable  to  the 
case  before  the  jury,  and  contain  no  matter  having  a  tendency  to 
prejudice  their  minds  in  the  decision  of  the  case.  Thus,  in  a 
criminal  trial  in  Georgia,  the  counsel  for  the  State  read  to  the 
jury  from  a  book  of  the  law  the  following  passage:  ^^ Alibi,  as  a 
defense,  involves  the  impossibility  of  the  prisoner's  presence  at 
the  scene  of  the  offense  at  the  time  of  its  commission;  and  the 
range  of  the  evidence,  in  respect  to  time  and  place,  nmst  be  such 
as  to  reasonably  exclude  the  possibility  of  such  presence."  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Georgia  had  previously  held  that  this  was  the 
law, 2  and  the  trial  court  so  charged  the  jury.  It  was  held  that 
no  ground  was  presented  for  a  new  trial. -^ 

§  950.  Stating  Bad  Law  to  the  Jury.  —  On  a  criminal  trial, 
in  a  State  where  the  instructions  of  the  court  precede  the  argu- 
ment of  counsel,  where  the  court  failed  to  instruct  the  jury  upon 
a  material  point,  and  the  prosecuting  attorney,  in  his  closing 
argument,  took  it  upon  himself  to  sui)ply  the  omission,  and,  in 
so  doing,  stated  the  law  in  a  manner  prejudicial  to  the  prisoner, 
it  was  held  that  the  judgment  must  be  reversed.*  So,  where,  in 
his  closing  argument  to  the  jury,  the  prosecuting  attorney  told 
them  that,  where  the  charge  was  murder  in  the  first  dcirree,  the 
defense  of  insanity  admitted  that  the  charge  was  proved,  and  the 
court  refused,  on  tlie  defendant's  motion,  to  require  him  to  with- 

1  Stout  V.  state,  Of)  Iiid.  407.  »  .Toliuson  v.  State,  TjO  Ga.  142. 

2  Wade  V.  State,  <;5  Ga.  rr.O,  7.59.  ♦  State  v.  Keed,  71  Mo.  200. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  to  the  jury.      731 

draw  the  remark,  it  was  held  that  this  was  error  for  which  the 
judgment  must  be  reversed.^  But  it  was  not  error  to  refuse  a 
new  trial,  in  a  criminal  case,  because  the  prosecuting  attorney 
stated  to  the  jury,  in  argument, a  proposition  of  law  which,  though 
erroneous,  could  have  no  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  guilt 
or  innocence  of  the  accused,  and  hence  no  effect  on  their  verdict. ^ 

§  951.    [Conclusiou.]     Discretion,  Cautions,  Instructions. — 

A  just  conclusion  seems  to  be  that,  in  those  jurisdictions  where 
the  practice  of  the  English  courts  of  law  is  followed,  under 
which  counsel  make  their  arguments  to  the  jur}^  before  the 
charge  of  the  court  is  given,  counsel  must  be  permitted,  within 
reasonable  limits,  to  state  and  to  argue  their  views  and  theories 
of  the  law  applicable  to  the  case  ;  that  in  every  such  argument  it 
is  necessary  to  the  full  presentation  of  the  view  upon  which  the 
prosecution  or  the  defense  rests,  that  a  state  of  the  law  applica- 
ble to  the  facts  should  be  assumed  to  exist,  for  which  reason 
counsel  must  be  permitted,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  to  ad- 
dress the  jury  upon  the  whole  case,  both  upon  the  law  and  the 
facts.  But  while  this  is  so,  counsel  ought  not  to  be  permitted 
to  argue  to  the  jur}^  against  ^propositions  of  law  which  have  been 
decided  by  the  court  in  the  particular  case,  thus  presenting  the 
unseemly  and  indecent  spectacle  of  an  attempt  to  appeal  from 
the  judge,  who  is  learned  in  the  law  and  who  is  the  official  mouth- 
piece of  the  law,  to  the  jury,  who  are  unlearned  in  the  law,  and 
who  are  not  judges  of  the  law  except  in  the  limited  sense  hereafter 
stated.^  It  seems  reasonably  to  follow  that,  in  order  to  allow  the 
proper  freedom  of  argument,  the  court  should  not  interrupt  or 
check  counsel — especially  the  counsel  for  the  prisoner  —  in 
stating  or  enforcing  propositions  or  conclusions  of  law  which 
may  be  contrary  to  the  views  of  the  court j  unless  the  conduct 
of  counsel  involves  a  flagrant  and  willful  attempt  to  misstate  the 
essential  law  of  the  case  and  to  mislead  the  minds  of  the  jury  in 
respect  of  it,  and  unless  counsel  should  deliberately  assail  or 
impugn  propositions  of  law  which  the  court  has  already  decided 

»  state  V.  Erb,  9  Mo.  App.  588.  3  post,  §  2132,  et  seg. 

2  State  V.  Dibble,  C.  Mo.  App.  584. 


732  ARGU3IENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [I  Tliomp.  Tl'., 

in  the  case ;  ^  but  that  the  court  should,  iu  ordinary  cases,  reserve 
the  correction  of  erroneous  statements  of  the  hiw  made  by  coun- 
sel to  the  jury,  to  be  made  in  its  general  charge.  In  those  juris- 
dictions where  the  charge  of  the  court  precedes  the  argument  of 
counsel,  the  counsel  should  be  confined,  in  their  argument  from 
legal  premises,  to  the  propositions  of  law  embodied  in  the  court's 
instructions,  and  the  practice  of  reading  books  of  the  law  to  the 
jury  ought  not  to  be  tolerated,  especially  where  the  attempt  in- 
volves an  effort  to  induce  the  jury  to  disregard  the  court's 
instructions,  or  to  take  the  law  of  the  case  from  the  books  rather 
than  from  the  court.-'  If,  in  reading  from  books  of  the  law  to 
the  jury,  counsel  read  passages  which  are  evidentiary  in  their 
nature,  the  court  should,  so  far  as  possible,  correct  the  error  and 
remove  the  prejudice,  by  instructing  the  jury  that  such  passages 
are  not  to  be  regarded  as  evidence  in  the  case.^  The  court  ought 
further,  in  instructing  the  jury,  to  disabuse  their  minds  of  any 
notion  which  they  may  have  received  from  the  argument  of 
counsel,  that,  in  their  olEce  of  judges  of  the  law,  they  have  a  right 
to  set  aside  the  law,  or  to  refuse  to  apply  the  law  as  expounded 
to  them  by  the   court. ^     Finally,  it  may  be  doubted  whether 

1  People  V.  Anclersou,  44  Cal.  Go,  from  works  of  romance."  Jones  v. 
70.  State,  65  Ga.  506. 

2  People  V.  Anderson,  supra;  State  ■*  On  this  point,  the  charge  of  Mr. 
V.  Reed,  71  Mo.  200;  State  v.  Erb,  9  Jnstice  Baldwin,  in  United  States  v. 
Mo.  App.  588.  Wilson,  Bald.  (U.  S.)  78,  108;  that  of 

2  Harvey    v.    State,    40    lud.    515.  Mr.   Chief  Justice  Jay,   in    State    of 

Contrary  to  this  view,  it  was  held,  in  Georgia  v.  Braisford,  3  Dallas  (U.  S.), 

a  criminal  trial  in  Georgia,  where  conn-  1,4;  that  of  Mr.  President  Addison, 

sel  for  the  defendant  had  read  to  tlie  in  Pennsylvania  v.   Bell,  Add.    (Pa.) 

jury  in  his  argument,  passages  from  156,  160;  that  of  Mr.  Justice  Story,  in 

Phillipps'  Remarliuble  Cases  of   Cir-  United   States    u.   Batti.><te,  2    Suran. 

cumstautial    Evidence,     that    if    the  (U.  S.)  240,  243,  may  be  referred  to  as 

judge  had  reason  to  believe  that  the  fair  models  of  cautionary  instructions, 

jury  were  likely,  from  any  cause,  to  be  See    also  and    compai'e   Hamilton  v. 

misled  thereby,  it  would  have  been  his  People,  29  Mich.  173,189;  Warren  v. 

duty  to  state  to  them  what  evidence  State,  4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  150;  Townsend 

was  to  influence  them   in  arriving  at  v.  State,  2  Blackf.  (Ind.)  151;  State  v. 

their  verdict;  but  that  it  was  error  to  Snow,  18  Me.  346,  348;  Lynch  v.  State, 

instruct  them  that  they  "  must  not  l)e  9  Ind.  541  (where  the  court  approved 

influenced,  guided  by  or  accept  as  law  tlie  instructions  given  on  this  point  in 

iu  this  case,  any  imaginary  cases  taken  Stocking    v.    State,     7   Ind.   326,   and 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXIX.]     QUESTIONS  of  law  to  the  jury.      733 

there  is  any  sounder  view  of  the  question  of  the  right  to  argue 
the  law  to  the  jury  and  to  read  to  them  passages  from  books  of 
the  law,  than  that  which  commits  the  whole  subject  to  the  sound 
discretion  of  the  trial  court,  subject  to  the  corrective  power  of 
the  appellate  courts  in  cases  of  abuse. ^ 

doubted  whether  the  instructiou  iu  v.  Cotton,  37  Tex.  229,  232;  Common- 
Carter  V.  State,  2  lud.  617,  could  be  wealth  v.  Austin,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  51; 
sustained).  Murphy  v.  State,  6  Ind.  490;  Good  v. 

1  Curtis  V.  State,  36  Ark.  284,  292;  Mylin,  13  Pa.  St.  538. 
Winkler  i).  State,  32  Ark.  539 ;  Maytield 


734  ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Thoiup.  Tl*. 


CHAPTEE   XXX. 

ABUSES  OF  THE  RIGHT  OF  ARGUMENT. 

Section 

955.  Duty  of  Judge  to  Prevent  Abuses  of  the  Right. 

956.  To  Correct  Misrepresentations  of  Counsel. 

957.  Duty  of  Counsel  to  Object  to  Improper  Argument. 

958.  Duty  of  Presiding  Judge  to  Rebuke  Misconduct. 

959.  [Illustration.]     Checking  Appeals  to  the  Sympathy  of  the  Jurors. 

960.  What  will  Cure  the  Prejudice. 

961.  [Illustration.]     Correcting  the  Prejudicial  Remarks  by  an  Instruction. 

962.  Question  how  Saved  for  Review. 

963.  Stating  to  the  Jury  Prejudicial  Facts  which  are  not  in  Evidence. 

964.  Limits  within  which  the  Rulings  of  the  Trial  Court  will  be  Controlled. 

965.  Observations  on  the  Limit  allowed  to  Argument. 

966.  Instances  of  reversals  under  the  Last  Preceding  Rule. 

967.  [Continued.]     Doctrine  as  restated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Alabama. 

968.  [Continued.]     Doctrine  restated  in  Texas. 

969.  Commenting  on  Evidence  which  has  been  Excluded. 

970.  Commenting  on  the  Defendant's  Character,  Evidence  as  to  which  has 

been  Excluded. 

971.  Comments  not  Supported  by  Evidence,  on  the  Character  and  Credibility 

of  Witnesses. 

972.  Expressing  Belief  in  Guilt  or  Innocence. 

973.  Alluding  to  former  Trials  of  same  Case. 

974.  Appealing  to  Local  Prejudices. 

975.  Appealing  to  Religious  Prejudices. 

976.  A  Catalogue  of  Prejudicial  Statements. 

977.  Referring  to  Recent  Crimes,  Lax  Administration  of  Law,  etc. 

978.  Indulgence   Extended  to  Extravagant  Declamation,  Exaggeration,  Er- 

roneous Statements  of  the  Evidence. 

979.  Illustrations. 

980.  And  to  the  Use  of  Epithets. 

981.  Appeals  to  Sympathy  —  the  Widow  in  Tears. 

982.  Tricks  of  Advocacy,  Sidebar  Remarks,  etc. 

983.  Bad  Logic  and  Bad  Law. 

984.  Other  Statements  which  have  been  Excused  rather  than  Justified. 

985.  Transgressions  in   Criminal  Cases   wliich   have    been  Overlooked. 

986.  Prejudice  not  Cured  by  similar  Misconduct  in  the  Opposing  Counsel. 

987.  Illegitimate  Argument  first  Introduced  by  Opposing  Counsel. 

988.  Illustration. 

989.  Matters  which  have  been  held  fair  Subjects  of  Comment. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         735 

Section 

990.  Reading  Documentary  Evidence  to  tlie  Jury. 

991.  Reading  fromtlie  Notes  of  tlie  Official  Stenographer. 

992.  Use  of  Papers,  Maps,  Diagrams,  etc.,  whicliare  not  in  Evidence. 

993.  Referring  to  Failure  of  the  Opposite  Party  in  a  Civil  Case  to  Testify. 

994.  Reading  Newspapers  to  the  Jury. 

995.  Reading  Books  of  Science  to  the  Jury. 
99i5.  That  such  Books  are  not  Evidence. 

997.  Instances  Affirming  and  Disaffirming  the  foregoing  Rule. 

998.  Whether  such  Books  may  be  read  for  Purposes  of  Argument  or  Illus- 

tration. 

999.  Instructing  the  Jury  that  such  Books  are  not  Evidence. 

1000.  Illustrations. 

1001.  Referring  to  the  Failure  of  Prisoner  to  Testify  in  his  own  Behalf. 

1002.  Instances  under  the  foregoing  Rule. 

1003.  Comments  by  the  Author  on  the  foregoing  Rule. 

1004.  Commenting  on  Failure  to  call  Prisoner's  Wife  as  a  Witness. 

1005.  Prisoner's  Counsel  may  Enlarge  on  the  Prisoner's  Right  to  be  Silent. 
1001).  Illustration  of  the  Foregoing. 

1007.  Commenting  on  the  Difference  between  Original  and  Amended  Pleadings. 

1008.  Suffering  the  Audience  to  App  laud  the  State's  Counsel. 

1009.  Civil  Responsibility  for  Words  Spoken  in  Forensic  Debate. 

1010.  Who  entitled  to  be  heard  as  Counsel. 

§   955.   Duty  of  Judge  to  Prevent  Abuses  of  this  Right.  — 

The  right  of  argument,  as  seen  in  a  former  chapter,^  is  a  vakiable 
right,  secured  to  every  suitor  by  the  principles  of  Anglo-Ameri- 
can law,  which  are  embodied  in  American  constitutions.  But 
the  right  has  its  limits.  The  judge  has  power  to  see  that  it  is 
not  abused,  and  may,  to  this  end,  exercise  a  reasonable  control 
over  the  course  of  the  argument. ^  To  this  end  it  is  his  duty  to 
remain  on  the  bench  during  the  argument  to  the  jury;  and  if  he 
vacate  the  bench,  and,  while  he  is  absent,  counsel,  in  arguing  their 
client's  cause  to  the  jury,  overstep  the  limits  of  privilege  accorded 
to  advocacy,  to  the  manifest  prejudice  of  the  opposite  party,  a 
new  trial  will  be  ordered  by  an  appellate  court,  in  the  exercise  of 
a  proper  superintendence.-^  The  presiding  judge  is  not  a  mere 
nose  of  wax;   nor  is  he  a  mere  umpire  in  a  gladiatorial  contest; 

1  jK^e,  ch.  XXVIII.  Iowa  as  already  seen    (an«e,  §  829),  a 

2  Word  V.  Commonwealth,  3  Leigh  statute  prohibiting  the  curtailment  of 
(Va.),  743,  760.  the  firae  of   argument  to  the  jury  has 

3  Browulee  v.  Hewitt,   1  ]Mo.  App.  enforced  a  change  of  rule  in  this  re- 
360;  State   v.   Claudius,   Id.   551.     In  spect.      In  Connecticut   it    has   beeu 


736  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

nor  is  it  merely  his  office  to  keep  the  peace  in  the  court-room 
while  the  advocates  and  the  jurors  try  the  case.  He  not  only 
checks  abuses  of  the  privilege  of  argument,  but  he  decides,  in  cases 
of  dispute,  what  evidence  has  been  admitted.^  In  those  jurisdic- 
tions where  the  instructions  precede  the  argument,  it  is  his  duty  to 
interpose  and  restrain  counsel  who  is  indulging  in  arguments  and 
illustrations  before  the  jury,  which  are  unwarranted  by  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  court,  and  which  will,  if  unrestrained,  be  likely  to  mis- 
lead the  jury;  and  it  has  been  well  said  that  "  no  duty  incumbent 
upon  the  judge  of  a  trial  court  is  more  imperative,  nor  more  im- 
portant to  the  fair  and  orderly  administration  of  justice,  than 
that  of  interposing  to  restrain  everything  in  the  course  of  the 
trial  that  tends  to  mislead  the  jury,  and  to  divert  their  minds 
from  the  strict  line  of  inquiry  with  which  they  are  charged."  ^ 

§  956.  To  Correct  Misrepresentations  of  Counsel  as  to  the 
Facts.  — It  has  been  said  in  Georgia:  "  Itis  certainly  the  business  of 
the  court,  when  practicable,  to  correct  the  misrepresentations  of  the  tes- 
timony by  counsel,  particularly  when  that  counsel  is  in  conclusion. 
And  it  is  practicable,  when  the  witness  whose  evidence  is  charged  to  be 
misrepresented,  is  in  court.  He  ought  to  be  called  to  say  what  he  did 
testify.  And  it  is  practicable  in  cases  in  which,  like  this,  the  law  requires 
the  testimony  to  be  taken  down,  by  reference  to  the  brief.  We  differ 
with  the  judge  in  his  opinion  that  the  brief  of  the  testimony  taken  down, 
incases  of  felony,  is  but  a  memorandum  for  his  private  use.  It  is  taken 
for  the  use  of  the  reprieving  and  pardoning  power,  primarily  no  doubt ; 
and  we  see  no  objection,  where  the  witness  is  not  at  hand,  to  its  be- 
ing used  to  correct  a  misrepresentation  on  the  argument.  Its  verity  is 
presumed,  because  it  is  taken  under  as  serious  sanctions  as  any  act  is 
done  by  the  court  or  its  authority  in  tlie  progress  of  the  trial.     It  is 

ruled  that,  while  it  is  the  duty  of  the  maiued  all  the  time  where  he  could  hear 

judge,  presiding  at  a  crimiual  trial,  to  what  was  said,  the  door  beiug  appar- 

be  present  duriug  the  whole  of  the  ar-  eutly  opeu,  so  that  he  could  also  see 

guraent,  so  that  he  can  see  and  hear  all  what  was   done.     State  v.   Smith,  49 

that  is  done  and  said,  yet  it  has  been  Conn.  37fi,  383. 

held  not  such  au  irregularity  as  would  i  Davis  v.  Ilill,   75  N.  C.  224,  228; 

require  a  uew  trial,  that,  for  a  few  mo-  Long  v.  State,  12  Ga.  205,  330. 
meuts  during  the  argumeut  of  such  a  '^  Baltimore   &  Oh.  li.   Co.  v.  Boyd 

case,  he  went   into  the  retiring  room  (Md.),  10  Atl.  Rep.  315;  s.  c.  7  Cent. 

Immediately  behind  the  bench,  but  re-  Rep.  435. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         737 

made  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  take  or  cause  it  to  be  taken  down,  and  in 
the  event  of  a  conviction  and  sentence,  it  is  required  to  be  approved  by 
the  court  and  recorded,  and  upon  application  for  reprieve  or  pardon,  a 
certified  copy  of  it  must  accompany  the  application."  The  court  con- 
cluded that  the  refusal  of  the  trial  court  to  have  the  testimony  of  a 
particular  witness  set  right,  either  by  calling  the  witness  again  or  by  re- 
ferring to  the  brief,  though  not  error,  was  an  irregularity.^  In  another 
case  it  is  said :  "  The  jury  can  consider  the  weight  and  effect  of  that  ev- 
idence only,  which  has  been  allowed  by  the  court  to  go  to  them.  In 
cases  where  the  court  is  not  distinct  in  his  recollection  of  the  testi- 
mony, he  may,  and  it  is  generally  advisable,  to  refer  it  to  the  jury  for 
their  better  recollection.  If  they  have  doubts  as  to  the  precise  terms 
of  the  testimony,  the  court  will,  at  their  suggestion,  have  the  witness  re- 
called and  re-examined  on  the  doubtful  point."  ^ 

§  957.  Duty  of  Counsel  to  Object  to  Improper  Argu- 
ment.—  In  the  discharge  of  this  office,  as  of  every  other,  the 
})residing  judge  is  entitled  to  reasonable  aid  from  the  counsel  in 
the  case  on  trial,  or  from  the  parties  themselves,  where  they  ap- 
})ear  in  proper  person.  Where  counsel,  in  arguing  to  the  jury, 
exceed  the  limits  allowed  to  advocacy,  the  way  to  correct  the 
prejudicial  effect  of  the  argument  is  either  to  object  to  it  at  the 
time,  to  answer  it  by  counter  argument,  or  to  ask  suitable  in- 
structions to  the  jury  with  reference  to  it.^  After  verdict  it 
comes  too  late ;  ^  and  whether  the  objection  is  saved  for  review 
by  affidavit,  or  by  a  recital  in  a  bill  of  exceptions  (according  to 
the  practice  in  the  particular  jurisdiction  ),  it  is  equally  necessary 
that  the  record  should  show  that  the  objection  was  made  at  the 
time  of  the  misconduct.'^     Where  such  an  objection   is   thus  sea- 

1  Long  V.  State,  12  Ga.  295,  330,  3(!8;  Learned  v.  Hall,  supra;  Dowdell 
opinion  by  Nisbet,  J.  v.  Wilcox,  64  Iowa,  721,   724;  States. 

2  Davis   V.  Hill,  75  N.  C.  224,  228.  Degonia,  69  Mo.  486;  Barbour  v.  Mc- 

3  Learned  v.  Hall,  133  Ma.'^.s.  417,  Kee,  7  Mo.  App.  587;  State  v.  Forsythe 
419;  Turner  v.  State,  68Tenn.  (4  Lea)  (Mo.),  6  "West.  Rep.  488.  It  is  scarcely 
L'06;  Roeder  v.  Studt,  12  Mo.  App.  necessary  to  add  that  such  objections 
5116;  Rudolphs.  Laudwerleu,  92  Ind.  Avill  not  be  available  when  made  for 
;'>4,  37;  Earll  v.  People,  99  111.  123;  the  first  time  in  an  appellate  court. 
.Jackson  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  586;  State  r.  Pollard,  14  Mo.  App.  583. 
infra,  §  961.  ^  Dowdell  v.  Wilcox,  siq)ra. 

■*  Powers  V.  Mitchell,    77  Me     361, 


738 


ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thoilip.  Tr.y 


sonably  made,  if  counsel  at  once  desist  from  the  improper  line 
of  argument,  there  is,  as  a  general  rule,  no  available  error;  nor 
can  error  be  predicated  upon  the  silence  of  the  court,  where  there 
is  no  request  for  an  admonition  to  the  jiiry  not  to  be  intiuenced 
by  the  statement.^ 


1  Worleyw.  Moore,  97  Ind.  15;  re- 
affirmed and  applied  in  Carter  v.  Car- 
ter, 101  lud.  451.  To  the  foregoing 
rule  of  procedure  au  exception  must  be 
noted  in  Texas.  Tlie  rules  prescribed 
in  tliat  State  for  tlie  goverument  of 
procedure  in  tlie  District  Court  recite 
that  "  counsel  shall  be  required  to 
confine  argument  strictly  to  the  evi- 
dence and  to  the  argument  of  opposing 
counsel,"  and  tliat  "the  court  will 
not  be  required  to  wait  for  objections 
to  be  made  when  the  rules  as  to  argu- 
ment are  violated;  but  should  they 
not  be  noticed  and  corrected  by  the 
court,  opposing  counsel  may  ask  leave 
of  the  court  to  rise  and  present  his 
point  of  objection."  Tex.  Rules,  39, 
41.  By  another  rule  it  is  provided 
that  any  supposed  violation  of  the 
rules,  to  the  prejudice  of  a  party,  may 
be  saved  by  bill  of  exceptions,  pre- 
sented as  ground  for  a  new  trial,  and 
assigned  as  error  by  the  party  who 
may  have  conceived  himself  aggrieved 
by  such  supposed  violation.  Id.,  Rule 
121.  "  Under  these  rules,"  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Texas  say,  "the  duty 
devolves  affirmatively,  first,  upon  the 
counsel,  to  confine  the  argument 
strictly  to  the  evidence  and  to  the  ar- 
gument of  opposing  counsel;  second, 
upon  the  court,  upon  its  own  mo- 
tion, to  confine  counsel  to  this  line 
of  argument.  If  botli  the  counsel 
who  is  making  the  argumeut  and 
the  court  shall  fail  in  the  discharge 
of  this  duty,  then  the  rules  give 
to  opposing  counsel  the  privilege, 
but  do  not  make  it  his  duty,  to  then 
present  his   point  of  objection.    This 


discretion  given  to  counsel,  as  to 
whether  he  will  make  objection  at  the 
time,  was  doubtless  based  upon  the 
well  known  embarrassments  and  often 
prejudice  which  generally  attend  the 
interruption  of  the  argument  of  one 
counsel  by  another;  and  was  intended 
to  place  that  as  a  duty  where  it  prop- 
erly belongs — upon  the  presiding 
judge.  Whether  counsel,  under  such 
circumstances,  remain  silent  or  object, 
may  be  alike  prejudicial  to  his  cause. 
Silence  maybe  construed  into  acquies- 
cence; objection  may  call  forth  a 
damaging  repartee."  Willis  v.  Mc- 
Neill, 57  Tex.  465,  474,  475.  In  an 
important  case  in  Georgia  it  was  ruled, 
according  to  the  official  syllabus, 
drawn,  it  is  understood,  by  the  judge 
who  wrote  the  opinion,  that  for  coun- 
sel to  attempt  surreptitiously  to  get 
before  the  jury  facts,  by  way  of  sup- 
position, which  have  not  been  proved, 
is  highly  reprehensible;  and  that  the 
attempt  should  be  instantly  repressed 
by  the  court,  without  waiting  to  be 
called  upon  by  the  opposite  party. 
The  statement,  however,  is  to  be  re- 
garded rather  as  a  dictum  of  the  judge 
than  as  a  decision  of  the  court;  since, 
although  the  State's  counsel  was  guilty 
of  the  misconduct,  the  prisoner  was 
not  for  that  rea>on  allowed  a  new  trial. 
In  glviug  the  opinion  of  the  court  on 
this  point,  Lumpkin,  J.,  said:  "That 
the  practice  complained  of  is  highly 
reprehensible,  no  one  can  doubt.  It 
ought  in  every  instance  to  be  promptly 
repressed.  For  counsel  to  undertake 
by  a  side  wind  to  get  that  in  as  proof 
which  is  merely  conjecture,  and  thus 


Tit.  iV^,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         739 

§  958.  Duty  of  Presiding-  Judge  to  Rebuke  tlie  Miscon- 
duct. —  All  courts  agree  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  presiding 
judge,  either  of  his  own  motion  ^  or  upon  the  request  of  the  op- 
posing party  or  his  counsel,^  to  interpose  and  check  the  party  or 
his  counsel  in  an  improper  and  prejudicial  line  of  argument.^  It 
is  the  duty  of  the  trial  judge  thus  to  interpose  for  the  purpose  of 
repressing  needless  scandal  and  gratuitous  attacks  upon  private 
character.  This  duty  is  a  very  plain  one,  and  good  care  should 
be  taken  to  discharge  it  fully  and  faithfully.^  It  is  equally  the 
duty  of  the  court,  when  thus  appealed  to,  to  prevent  counsel  in 
argument  from  misstating  the  testimony  of  a  witness ;  but  where, 
in  consequence  of  a  disagreement  as  to  his  testimony,  the  witness 
has  been  recalled  and  has  restated  it,  and  his  restatement  has 
been  written  down,  the  judge  may  properly  refuse  to  allow  coun- 
sel to  argue  to  the  jury  that  the  witness,  when  thus  recalled, 
made  a  different  statement  from  that  read  to  the  jury  by  the 
court. ^  Here,  as  in  other  matters  relating  to  the  conduct  of 
trials,  a  very  large  discretion  is  conceded  to  the  presiding  judge.^ 

to  work  a  prejudice  in  the  mind  of  the  ^  jjoxie  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  33  Conn, 

jury,  cannot  l)e  tolerated.     Nor  ought  471;  Fry  i\  Bennett,  3  Bosw.  (N.  Y.) 

the  presiding  judge  to  wait  until  he  is  200,  2i2. 

called  upon  to  Interpose.  For  it  is  ^  Tucker  v.  Henniker,  41  N.  H.  317; 
usually  better  to  trust  to  the  discrira-  Bulloch  «.  Smith,  15  Ga.  395;  Mitchum 
inatiou  of  the  jury  as  to  what  is  and  v.  State,  11  Ga.  615;  Dickerson  v. 
what  is  not  in  evidence,  than  for  the  Burke,  25  Ga.  225;  Read  v.  State,  2 
opposite  counsel  to  move  in  the  matter.  Ind.  438;  Forsyth  v.  Cothran,  61  Ga. 
For  what  practitioner  has  not  re-  278;  Davis  v.  Hill,  75  N.  C.  224; 
gretted  his  untoward  interference,  State  v.  Caveness,  78  N.  C.  484,  488 ; 
when  counsel,  thus  interrupted,  re-  Clark  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  180. 
sumes,  '  Yes,  gentlemen,  I  have  It  is  said  that  '^  it  is  within  the  prov- 
touched  a  tender  spot;  the  galled  jade  iuce,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
will  wince.  You  see  where  the  shoe  disentangle  the  case  from  any  mistakes 
pinches.'  "  Berry  v.  State,  10  Ga.  made  by  counsel  in  the  statement  of 
511,  522.  These  observations  were  testimony,  and  for  this  purpose  to  re- 
quoted,  and  the  rule  therein  expressed  state  and  comment  upon  the  testi- 
approved  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  mony,"  Read  i\  State,  2  Ind.  438; 
Texas,  in  Willis  v.  NcNeill,  supra.  citing  Swan  Prac.  910. 

1  Berry  v.  State,  10  Ga.  511;  For-  •»  Rickabus  v.  Gott,  51  Mich.  227. 

syth  V.  Cothran,  61  Ga.  278;  Willis  v.  ^  Davis  v.  Hill,  75  N.  C.  224. 

McXeill,   57   Tex.   465,   474;  Earll  v.  ^  j^    j^^s    been     held    that    where 

People,  99   111.  123;  Brown  v.  Swine-  counsel   properly  interrupt  the  argu- 

ford,  44  Wis.  282.  raent  of   the  opposing  counsel  to  cor- 


740  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

It  has  been  held  that  it  is  within  the  limits  of  this  discretion  for 
the  judo:e  to  determine  whether  he  will  stop  counsel  at  the  time, 
or  wait  and  correct  the  error  in  his  charge  to  the  jury;  although 
where  the  abuse  of  privilege  by  the  counsel  has  been  gross  and 
manifestly  prejudicial,  the  failure  of  the  trial  court  to  stop  him 
then  and  there  will  afford  just  ground  for  a  new  Irial.^  Although 
the  court  may  not,  in  general,  be  bound  thus  to  interfere  unless 
appealed  to,  yet,  when  appealed  to,  the  duty  to  interfere  in  some 
way  is  imperative,  either  by  stopping  counsel  or  by  correcting 
the  abuse  in  the  court's  instructions;  since,  if  this  is  not  done, 
the  jury  are,  in  effect,  given  to  understand  that  the  court  is  of 
opinion  that  they  are  allowed  to  take  into  consideration  the 
erroneous  or  prejudicial  statement  thus  made.^  On  the  other 
hand,  unless  the  trial  judge,  on  being  thus  appealed  to,  fails  or 
refuses  to  interfere  and  to  administer  the  proper  rebuke  or  cor- 
rection, no  ground  is  afforded  for  a  new  trial ;  ^  though  it  is  not 
error  for  the  court  to  grant  a  new  trial  of  its  own  motion  be- 
cause of  such  abuse,  even  though  a  seasonable  objection  may  not 
have  been  interposed  by  the  opposing  counsel.  The  granting  of 
a  new  trial  for  such  a  cause  will  be  within  the  limits  of  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  trial  court.* 


rect  an  erroneous  statement  of  fact,  ^  Jenkinson  v.  North  Carolina  Ore 

and  a  paper,  not  at  hand,  is  needed  to  Dressing  Co.,  65  N.  C.  563. 
settle  the  point  in  dispute,  the  court  is  ^  Hoxie  v.  Home  lus.  Co.,  33  Conn, 

not  bound  to  allow  time  to  search  for  471. 

the  disputed  paper;  and  where  coun-  ^  states.  Lee,  66  Mo.  165;  State  v. 

sel  having  the  floor  exclaimed,  upon  Degouia,  69  Mo.  486;  States.  Schorn, 

such  an  interruption  (in  a  way  too  f  re-  12   Mo.  App.  590;  States.  Emory,  12 

quently  practiced),  '•  The  shoe  pinch-  Mo.   App.  593;  s.  c.  affirmed,  79  Mo. 

es!"     and  the    interrupting    counsel  461;    State  v.   Dickson,  78   Mo.   438; 

complained  of  this  as  improper,  and  State  v.  Zumbunsou,  cited   in   79  Mo. 

subsequently  showed,    by   producing  463;    State  ex    rel.   v.  Stark,    10  Mo. 

the  lost    paper,    that    the    statement  App.    5i»l;    Goldman   v.  AVolff,  6  I\Io. 

which  gave  occasion  to  the  interrnp-  App.   491;    Klosterman  v.    Germauia 

tion  was  in  fact    erroneous  —  it  was  Life   Ins.   Co.,   6    Mo.   App.  582;  St. 

held  no  ground  of  error  that  the  court  Louis   &c.    K.    Co.   «.  Myrtle,  51   Ind. 

answered,  "  Well,  you  have  now  stated  56(i,  576.     Compare  State  v.  Kring,  64 

it  in  your  way;  he  has  passed  from  it.  Mo.  591,  595. 

let  the  argument  go  on."     McLeudou  *  Kinuaman  v.  Kiunamau,  71  Ind. 

V.  Frost,  57  Ga.  449.  417,  420. 


Tit.   IV,  Cb.  XXX.  ]       ABUSES    OF    UW.HT   OF   ARGUMENT.  741 

§  959.  [Illustration.]  Checivin;.  Appeals  to  the  Syjipathies  of 
THE  Jurors.  —  Where,  in  a  case  of  arson,  counsel  for  the  prisoners,  in 
argument,  pressed  upon  the  jury  the  consideration  that  the  conseqnence 
of  (heir  verdict,  if  guilty,  would  be  that  the  prisoners  would  be  hanged, 
and  the  court  cliecked  the  counsel  and  admonished  the  jury  that  they  had 
nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  conseqences  of  their  verdict,  but  that 
their  sole  duty  was  to  determine  whetlier  the  prisoners  were  guilty  or  not 
guilty,  —it  was  held  that  no  error  was  committed.  "This,"  said 
the  court,  "  is  quite  common  in  cases  of  this  character,  and  we  cannot  say 
that  It  IS  improper."  The  court  did  not  regard  it  as  a  deprivation  of  the 
right  of  the  jury  to  consider  anything  but  the  naked  fact  of  the  burniug.i 

§   960.   AVhat  will  Cure  the  Prejudice.  —  An  objection  by  tbe 
opposing  counsel,   promptly  interposed,   followed  by  a  rebuke 
from  the  bench  and  an  admonition  from  the  presiding  judge  to 
the  jury  to  disregard  the  prejudicial  statements,    is  genemlly, 
though  not  always,  held  sufficient  to  cure  the  prejudice.^     The 
same  result  would,  in  most  cases,  follow  a  prompt  and  ample 
apology  by  the  offending  counsel ;    but  it  has  been  held  in  differ- 
ent jurisdictions  that  such  a  prejudice  is  not  cured  by  the  churlish 
form    of   apology    which    is  involved   in    the   expression    that 
counsel  will  "  take  it  back.'"3     other  courts  have  conceived  that 
the  prejudice  is  sufficiently  cured  where  the  presiding  judo-e  waits 
until  he  comes  to  charge  the  jury,  and  then  admonishes Ihem  to 
disregard  such  considerations  as  those  which  have  been  improp- 
erly pressed  upon  their  minds  by  the  counsel  in  the  argument  * 
The  rule  that  the  effect  of  a  prejudicial  line  of  argument  may  be 
cured  m  this  way  has  been  applied  in  a  flagrant  case,  where  the 
argument  was  unprofessional  and  where  the  prejudice  must  have 
been  serious.^     Another  court  has  gone  so  far  as  to  suppose  that 
the    practice  of   curing  the  prejudice  by  an  admonition  in  the 
charge  of  the  judge  is  -  perhaps  the  most  proper  way,"  «_a  con- 

^^  >  state  V.  Dodsoii,  U  So.  Car.  453,      324;  State  v.  O'Neal,  7  Ired.  (N.  C.)  L. 

\"^.  ^        „■        „  -51;  Melviuy.  Easley,  IJoiies  (N.  C), 

-  btate  y.  Braswell,  82  N.  C.  693.  L.  38(1 

UH.  Wnf^  "   \r'"-""'  ,'''  ^''-  ''''  '  ^'^  ''''''  '''^''''''  *«  '«  'Stated  in 

148 ;  Wolffe  v.  Mnuiis,  74  Ala.  38(;.  the  next  section. 

ooo   ^n  ';.^'""'"'  i''""^'-  ^''-  ^^-^         '  «*^^^  "•  O'^^-^-^l'  -  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 
200,210,   243;   s.  c.  affirmed,  2S  N.  Y.      251. 


742  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

elusion  from  which  the  experience  of  most  judges  and  practition- 
ers will  cause  dissent.  This  conclusion  has  been  denied  in  a  case 
in  Wisconsin,  where  this  subject  is  ably  reasoned.  The  court, 
speaking  through  Eyan,  C.  J.,  said:  "  Verdicts  are  too  often 
found  ao-ainst  evidence  and  without  evidence,  to  warrant  so  great 
a  reliance  on  the  discrimination  of  juries;  and  without  notes  of 
the  evidence,  it  will  be  often  difficult  for  juries  to  discriminate 
ao"ainst  statements  of  facts  within  the  evidence  and  outside  of  it. 
It  is  sufficient  that  the  extra-professional  statements  of  counsel 
may  gravely  prejudice  the  jury  and  affect  the  verdict."  ^  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  trial  judge  neglected  to  rebuke  the 
impropriety  will,  in  the  view  of  many  courts,  be  no  ground  of  new 
trial,  if  the  case  was  otherwise  well  tried,  and  it  appears  that, 
under  the  law  and  the  evidence,  no  other  result  than  a  conviction 
was  possible  without  a  misbehavior  of  the  jury.^ 

§  961.  [Illustration.]  Correcting  the  Prejudicial  Remarks  by 
AN  Instruction.  — The  view  that  the  prejudicial  remarks  may  be  suf- 
ficiently corrected  by  an  admonition  from  the  judge  in  his  general  in- 
structions finds  support  in  a  celebrated  case  in  New  York,  which  was  an 
action  for  libel  against  James  Gordon  Bennett,  the  proprietor  of  the  New 
York  Herald.  Counsel  for  plaintiff,  in  his  concluding  argument  to  the 
jury,  among  other  things,  said:  "  The  Herald  by-and-by  began  to  find 
that  it  could  not  live  with6ut  doing  something  to  attract  public  atten- 
tion ;  and,  about  the  days  of  Ellen  Jevvett,  it  came  out  as  one  of  the  most 
infamous  sheets  that  ever  existed  since  man  was  allowed  by  the  Almighty 
to  handle  a  pen."  The  counsel  for  the  defendant  thereupon  objected, 
on  the  ground  that  no  evidence  had  been  given  in  relation  to  this  mat- 
ter. The  court  replied :  "  He  is  drawing  upon  his  imagination."  The 
plaintiff's  counsel  then  said:  "  My  learned  friend  does  not  discriminate 
as  to  what  we  are  at  liberty  to  take  notice  of.  I  should  like  to  know  if 
we  are  bound  to  prove  everything  we  talk  about?  Then  I  should  be  in 
danger  for  saying  that  it  is  daylight  now.  I  am  speaking  of  the  public 
history  of  the  time,  as  I  would  of  the  Mexican  war,  or  the  reign  of  Vic- 
toria ;  and  if  it  became  necessary  to  talk  about  it,  it  would  be  perfectly 
ridiculous  to  prove  the  reign  of  James  I.     It  is  a  thing  received  by  all 

1  Browu  V.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  282,  2  state  v.  Zumbimsoii,  7  ]\Io.   App. 

292.  52G;  s.  c.  affirmed,  St;  Mo.  111. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         743 

mankind,  and  that  portion  which  comes  within  the  range  of  the  fact  I 
have  a  right  to  talk  about.  I  suppose  the  gentleman  knows  that  I  have 
aright  to  talk  about  Bennett  still  publishing  the  Herald,,  without  having 
proved  it  by  evidence  ;  or  of  other  papers,  such  as  the  Courier  or  En- 
quirer ox  Evening  Post.  Now,  Bennett  comes  up  ;  I  do  not  ask  j^ou  to 
notice  a  single  fact  in  relation  to  that  paper,  otherwise  than  as  a  part  of 
the  general  history  of  the  country ;  and  so  far  as  I  know,  the  court  will 
agree  with  me  so  far  as  this,  that  that  which  constitutes  a  part  of  the 
public  histor\^  of  the  country  is  what  we  are  at  liberty  to  take  notice  of." 
The  counsel  for  the  defendant  responded :  "  The  learned  counsel  claims, 
as  matter  of  law,  that,  he  has  a  right  to  refer  to  the  articles  in  the 
Herald  as  part  of  the  history  of  the  country.  I  desire  the  court  to  say 
that  it  is  not  so."  The  court  responded :  "I  will  say  to  the  jury  what- 
ever is  proper  to  be  said  at  the  end  of  the  matter."  Counsel  for  the 
defendant  replied:  "  I  except  to  the  refusal  of  the  court  now  to  stop 
the  counsel."  It  did  not  appear  that  the  plaintiff's  counsel  subsequently 
made  any  remarks  in  which  he  should  not  have  been  permitted  to  indulge. 
The  court,  in  charging  the  jury,  used  the  followinglanguage:  "  Taking 
all  these  things  into  view,  if  you  find  for  the  plaintiff  in  this  matter,  you 
will  assess  these  damages,  taking  constantly  into  view  the  application  of 
this  principle,  and  leaving  out  of  view  anything  growing  out  of  what  has 
been  said  as  to  the  character  of  his  newspaper,  about  which  there  is  no 
evidence  before  us  any  more  than  that  the  paper  forms  the  libel,  and 
divesting  yourselves  of  all  feeling  of  that  kind,  then  say,  in  the  exercise 
of  a  sound  discretion,  what  damages  ought  to  be  assessed."  It  was 
held  that  the  above  ruling  presented  no  reason  for  granting  a  new  trial.i 

§  962,  Question,  How  Saved  for  Review. — There  is  a  con- 
fusion, not  very  creditable  to  the  courts,  upon  the  question  how 
the  error  of  allowing  a  prejudicial  line  of  argument  is  to  be 
saved  for  review  in  an  appellate  tribunal.  A  class  of  decisions 
is  met  with  to  the  effect  that  the  error  may  be  — 

(1.)  8hmvn  by  Affidavits  submitted  to  the  Court  on  Motion 
for  Neio  Trial?  —  But  the  sound  view  is  that,  this  being  a  matter 

1  Fry  V.  Beuuett,  3  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  20G.  In  Iowa,  where,  as  already  seen, 
200,  241,  242;  s.  c.  affirmed,  28  N.  Y.  the  judge  is  allowed  by  the  rules  of 
324.  procedure,  to  quit  the  beucli  during 

2  Hall  y.  "Wolff,  61  Iowa,  559,  5(51;  the  argument  aud  proceed  with  other 
Dowdell  V.  Wilcox,  04  Iowa,  721,  724;  busiuess  of  the  term  iu  another  room, 
Turuer  v.    State,    (J8   Teuu.    (4   Lea)  it   becomes  necessary   to    adopt    the 


744 


ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [I  TllOmp.  Tr., 


occurring  in  open  court,  in  the  presence  of  the  presiding  judge,  his 
attention  should  be  called  to  it  by  a  seasonable  objectio^i,  which, 
if  overruled,  should  be  followed  by  an  exception,  which  exception 
should  be  noted  and  incorporated  in  the  general  bill  of  excep- 
tions,^— from  which  the  conclusion  follows  that  such  an  irregu- 
larity cannot  be  presented  for  appellate  review  by  affidavits. - 
Where  the  practice  of  the  particular  jurisdiction  allows  the  question 
to  be  raised  on  motion  for  new  trial  by  affidavits,  and  these  affidavits 
are  conflicting,  the  appellate  court  will  resolve  the  doubt  in  favor 
of  the  ruling  of  the  trial  court ,^  It  seems  that  the  affidavits  of 
jurors,  in  oppostion  to  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  upon  this  ground, 
in  which  the  jurors  attempt  to  show  that  the  improper  remarks 
had  no  influence  upon  them  in  making  up  their  verdict,  are  not 
to  be  considered;  since,  though  the  jurors  might  conscientiously 
believe  this,  few  men  are  able  to  take  exact  cognizance  of  the 
operations  of  their  own  minds  and  of  the  influences  which  bear 
upon  them,  and  they  might  be  mistaken.^ 


rule  that  the  miscouduct  may  be 
shown  iu  this  way.  In  that  State  it 
seems  to  be  the  practice  to  bring  such 
an  objection  to  tlie  attention  of  tlie 
trial  court  by  affidavit  on  a  motion  for 
new  trial,  and  to  save  it  for  review  by 
incorporating  the  affidavit  into  the  bill 
of  exceptions  —  at  least  this  is  the  in- 
ference which  the  writer  draws  from 
one  case.  Dowdell  v.  Wilcox,  64  Ipwa, 
721,  724.  In  Tennessee,  where  such 
misconduct  was  shown  by  affidavits 
of  members  of  the  bar  wljo  were  coun- 
sel for  the  defendant,  which  affidavits 
were  embodied  in  the  bill  of  exceptions 
withoiit  any  comments  by  the  presid- 
ing judge,  the  statements  contained  in 
them  were  taken  to  be  true  by  the  ap- 
pellate court,  on  the  ground  that  the 
judge  had  made  the  affidavits  a  part  of 
the  bill  of  exceptions  without  ques- 
tioning iu  any  manner  the  correctness 
of  their  statements.  Turner  v.  State, 
m  Tenn.  (4  Lea)  20(;. 


1  Turner  v.  State,  68  Tenn.  (4  Lea) 
206;  Roederw.  Studt,  12  Mo.  App.  oCC; 
Rudolph  V.  Landwerlen,  92  Ind.  34, 
37. 

2  So  held  in  the  cases  cited  in  the 
preceding  note.  It  seems  at  one  time 
to  have  been  the  practice  in  Missouri 
to  raise  this  question  by  affidavits; 
for  in  some  cases  the  courts  have  re- 
fused to  reverse  a  judgment  for  this 
cause  because  the  affidavits  were  con- 
flicting. State  V.  Baber,  11  Mo.  App. 
586;  State  v.  Johnson,  76  Mo.  121. 

3  State  V.  Baber,  supra;  State  v. 
Johnson,  supra;  State  v.  Comstock, 
20  Kan.  650.  And  if  the  portion  of  the 
remarks  which  appear  clearly  to  have 
been  made  were  not  prejudicial,  the 
conviction  will  not  he  reversed. 

*  Kinuaman  v.  Kinnaman,  71  Ind. 
417,  419.  Especially  the  affidavits  of 
six  jurors  to  this  effect  Avill  not  pre- 
vail, since  they  are  notable  to  answer 
for  the  other  six.    lb. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]       ABUSES    OF   RIGHT   OF   ARGUMENT.  745 

(2.)  By  Objections^  Exceptions  and  a  Bill  of  Exceptions. — 
The  other  and  more  correct  view  is  that  such  an  irregularity  can 
only  be  saved  for  appellate  review  by  an  objection  seasonably 
made,  an  exception  properly  taken  if  it  is  overruled,  which  ex- 
ception is  incorporated  in  a  bill  of  exceptions,  signed  and  sealed 
by  the  presiding  judge. ^  Confusing  ideas  are  met  with  even  in 
this  connection;  for,  while  it  is  held  in  one  jurisdiction  that  such 
an  irregularity  cannot  be  made  available  on  appeal  unless  pointed 
out  to  the  lower  court  and  the  ground  of  objection  specifically 
stated,  3^et  another  decision  of  the  same  tribunal  is  to  the  effect 
that  an  exception  taken  at  the  time  is  not  in  all  cases  necessary; 
since  the  trial  court  may,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  see  fit 
to  wait  until  its  charge  is  given  to  the  jury,  to  cure  the  prejudice  ; 
and  that  an  exception  to  the  refusal  to  grant  a  new  trial  upon 
this  ground  sufficiently  saves  the  question  for  review,  where  the 
irregularity  is  shown  to  have  been  such  as  prevented  a  fair  trial. - 
The  correct  rule  of  procedure  in  such  cases  is  believed  to  be  that 
laid  down  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Nebraska,  speaking  through 
Reese,  J.,  in  the  following  language:  "  The  Supreme  Court,  in 
the  exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction  in  cases  of  this  kind,  is 
limited  to  the  correction  of  the  error  of  the  District  Court. 
Before  a  case  can  be  reversed  and  a  new  trial  ordered,  it  must 
appear  that  the  court  before  whom  the  accused  was  tried  erred, 
and  that  such  error  was  prejudicial  to  the  party  on  trial.  The 
practice  in  this  State  is  now  settled  in  this  respect,  and  before 
this  court  can  review  questions  of  this -kind,  the  attention  of  the 
trial  court  must  be  challenged  by  a  proper  objection  to  the  lan- 
guage and  a  ruling  upon  tlie  objection.  If  the  language  is  ap- 
proved by  the  court,  and  the  attorney  is  allawed  to  pursue  the 
objectionable  line  of  argument,  an  exception  to  the  decision  can 

1  Bradshaw  v.  State  (Xeb.),  22  N.  Andersou,   10  Ore.  448,  457;   State  v. 

W.  Rep.  3(;i;  s.  c.  17  Neb.  147  (distiu-  Abrams,   11  Ore.    1()9,   172;  Commou- 

guishiugClevelaudPaperCo.v.  Banks,  wealth  v.  Scott,  123  Mass.  239;  Earll 
15  Neb.  20;  s.  c.  16  N.  W.  Rep.  833)  ;  '    v.  People,  99  111.  123;  Jacksou  v.  State, 

McLaiu  V.  State,  24  N.  W.  Rep.  720,  18  Tex.  App.  58r>;  Maclean  v.  Scripps, 

724;  Bullis  v.  Drake  (Neb.),  29  N.  W.  52  Mich.  215,  222. 
Rep.     292;     Miilcairns    v.    Jauesville  -  Rudolph   v.  Landwerleu,  92  Ind- 

(Wis.),  29  N.  W.  Rep.   5G5;   State  v.  34,39. 


746  4RGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

be  noted.  By  a  bill  of  exceptions,  showing  the  language  used, 
the  objection,  ruling  of  the  court  and  exception  to  the  ruling  can 
be  presented  to  this  court  for  decision.  If  the  court  sustains 
the  objection,  and  thus  condemns  the  language,  and  requires  the 
attorney  to  desist  and  confine  himself  to  the  evidence  in  the  case, 
no  injury  is  suffer<3d  by  the  accused."^  This  ruling  has  been 
re-affirmed  by  the  same  court  in  a  more  recent  case.^  It  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  an  exception  of  this  nature,  in 
order  to  be  available  on  error  or  appeal,  should  specify  loliai  was 
said;  otherwise  tbe  reviewing  court  cannot  see  whether  any 
2")rejudice  resulted  from  the  matter  complained  of.'' 

§  963.  Stating  to  the  Jury  Prejudicial  Facts  Which  are  not 
in  Evidence.  — It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  suggest  that,  in  every 
judicial  trial,  a  party  must  present  his  evidence  either  by  the  tes- 
timony of  witnesses  who  are  under  oath,  by  the  exhibition  of 
documents  which  are  competent  under  the  rules  of  evidence,  or 
by  the  exhibition  of  such  material  objects  as  are  connected  with 
the  res  gestce  and  speak  with  reference  to  the  issues  on  trial.  He 
cannot  be  permitted  to  present  his  evidence  in  the  form  of  the 
argument  of  his  counsel  to  the  jury,  who  is  not  sworn  to  speak 
the  truth  as  a  witness  in  the  particular  case.  All  courts,  there- 
fore, unite  upon  the  conclusion  that  where  counsel,  in  their  argu- 
ment to  the  jury,  make  statements  of  prejudicial  matters  which 
are  not  in  evidence,  it  will  afford  ground  for  a  new  trial,  unless 
the  error  is  cured  before  the  cause  is  finally  submitted  to  the 

"1  Bradshaw  ^;.  State,  supra.  entirely  out  of  the  line  with  the  au- 

2  McLaiu  t;   State,  (Neb.)  24  N.  W.  thorities,  but  cannot  be  defended  upon 

Eep.  720,  724.  principle.     If    the    only    remedy    for 

■'  State  V.  Oaveuness,  78  N.  C.  484.  abuse  of  the  privilege  of  argument  lies 

An  old  case  In  Illinois  is  to  the  effect  in  a  request  to  the  court  to  instruct 

that  the  reo ding  of  au  improper  paper  the  jury  to  disregard  the  prejudicial 

by  counsel  in  argument  cannot  be  as-  statement,  then  disingenuous  counsel 

signed  f'<r  error, — the  remedy  of  the  will  beat  lil)erty  to  till  the  minds  of 

opposite  party   being  to  reciuest  the  the  jurors  with  prejudicial   matters, 

court  to  instruct  the  jury  that  nothing  and  the  other  side  will  have  no  better 

which    b:is  been  so  read  is' evidence  remedy  than  the  meagre  chance  of  the 

before  them.     Kenyon  v.  Sutherland,  effect  being  obliterated  by  au  admoni- 

8  111    yi).     This   decision   is  not  only  tion  from  the  bench. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         747 

jury,  in  the  manner  stated  in  the  preceding  paragraphs. ^  It  is  a 
necessary  part  of  this  rule  that  the  matters  thus  improperly 
stated  by  counsel  to  the  jury  in  argument  should,  in  view  of  the 
issues  on  trial,  the  status  of  the  parties,  their  attitude  toward 
each  other,  and  the  like  considerations,  be,  in  their  nature,  of  a 
tendency  to  iwejudice  the  cause  of  the  opposing  party  in  the 
minds  of  the  jurors.  Where  such  statements,  though  of  matters 
not  in  evidence  and  hence  improperly  made,  are  immaterial  ov  at 
least  not  prejudicial,  they  will  afford  no  ground  for  a  new  trial. ''^ 


1  State  V.  Lee,  66  Mo.  165;  State  v. 
Kriug,  64  Mo.  591  (modifying  tlie  re- 
marks of  tlie  same  court  iu  Loyd  v. 
Hanuibal  &c.  R.  R.  Co.,  53  Mo.  509, 
51-4) ;  s.  c.  in  intermediate  appellate 
court,  1  Mo.  App.  438;  Yoe  v.  People, 
49  111.  410,  412;  Kennies  v.  Yogel,  87 
111.  242;  s.  c.  7  Cent.  L.  J.  18;  State  v. 
Smith,  75  N.  C.  307;  Mitchura  v.  State, 
II  Ga.  615,  633;  Tucker  v.  Henuiker, 
41  K.  H.  317,  324;  Hatch  v.  State,  8 
Tex.  App.  416,  423;  Brown  v.  Swine- 
ford,  44  Wis.  282,  293;  Berry  v.  State, 
10  Ga.  511,  522;  Tliompsou  v.  State,  43 
Tex.  268,  274;  Festuer  v.  Omaha  &c. 
R.  R.  Co.,  17  Neb.  280;  Cleveland  Pa- 
per Co.  V.  Banks,  15  Neb.  22;  Rolfe  v. 
Ruraford,  66  Me.  564;  Union  Central 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cheever,  36  Ohio  St. 
201,  208;  s.  c.  38  Am.  Rep.  573;  Walker 
V.  State,  6  Blackf.  (lud.)  2;  Hoxie  v. 
Home  Ins.  Co.,  33  Conn.  471;  Bulloch 
V.  Smith,  15  Ga.  395;  Dickersou  v. 
Burke,  25  Ga.  225;  Gould  v.  Moore,  49 
N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  (8  J.  &  S.)  387,  395; 
Iveolges  V.  Guardian  Life  Ins.  Co.,  57 
N.  Y.  638;  Craudall  v.  People,  2  Lans. 
(N.  Y.)  212;  Northiugton  v.  State,  78 
Tenu.  (14  Lea)  424;  Flint  v.  Common- 
wealth, 81  Ky.  186;  Sullivan  v.  State, 
66  Ala.  48;  McxVdory  v.  State,  62  Ala. 
154;  Grosse  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  364, 
377;  Brown  v.  State,  60  Ga.  210,  212; 
Bulliner  v.  People,  95  111.  396.  Such 
conduct  has  been  deemed,  iu  a  sense, 


a  deprivation  of  the  riglit  of  trial  l)y 
jury.  See  Mitchum  v.  State,  II  Ga. 
615,  633,  where  this  view  is  enforced 
at  length  iu  glowing  language  by 
Nisl)et,  J.  Also  Tucker  v.  Henuiker, 
41  N.  H.  317,  324,  where  the  language 
of  Nisbet,  J.,  iu  the  preceding  case, 
is  plagiarized,  with  some  slight  omis- 
sions and  rhetorical  improvements. 
Consult,  on  this  su1)ject,  the  following 
authorities :  Hopt  v.  People,  7  Sup.  Ct. 
Rep.  614;  Bullard  v.  Boston  &c.  Co. 
(N.  H.),  5  Atl.  Rep.  16;  People  v.  Carr 
(Mich.),  31  N.  W.  Rep.  591;  Gallinger 
t>.  Lake  Shore  Traffic  Co.  (Wis.),  30 
N.  W.  Rep.  790;  Heury  v.  Sioux  City 
&  P.R.  R.  Co.  (Iowa),  Id.  630  and 
note;  Manning  v.  Bresnahau  (Mich.), 
Id.  189;  Palmer  v.  Utah  &  N.  R.  R.  Co. 
(Idaho),  13  Pac.  Rep.  425;  Moore  v. 
State  (Tex.),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  887;  Ilucks- 
hold  i\  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  R.  Co. 
(Mo.),  Id.  794;  Stone  v.  State  (Tex.)^ 
Id.  585;  Little  Rock  &c.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cavenesse  (Ark.)  Id.  505  and  note; 
Brenuau  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (Mo.), 
Id.  481;  Willis  v.  Lowry  (Tex.),  2  S. 
W.  Rep.  449;  States.  Forsythe  (Mo.), 
1  S.  W.  Rep.  834 ;  s.  c.  89  Mo.  667 ;  State 
V.  Robertson  (S.  C),  I  S.  E.  Rep.  443. 
2  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Fruin,  9  Mo. 
App.  590;  Uuiou  Savings  Assn.  v. 
Claytou,  6  ]\Io.  App.  587;  State  v. 
Lewis,  6  Mo.  App.  584;  Davis  v.  State, 
33  Ga.  98.     The  following  remarks  of 


748  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1   TllOmp.   Tl'.,- 

The  words  spoken  must  have  been  of  such  a  character  as  may 
reasonably  be  supposed  to  have  influenced  the  jury  to  the  preju- 
dice of  the  party  complaining. ^  The  rule  has  been  held  to  have 
no  just  application  to  erroneous  statements  of  counsel  in  argument, 
in  respect  of  the  testimony  which  has  been  heard  on  the  trial,- 
the  reason  of  the  rule  apparently  being  that  it  is  admissible  for 
counsel  to  state  the  evidence  in  the  most  favorable  light  for  his 
own  client,  and  that  deductions  or  inferences  in  respect  of  what 
the  evidence  tends  to  prove  are  always  a  fair  subject  of  comment 
to  the  jury.  Where  there  is  a  conflict  of  testimony,  the  counsel 
will  not  be  stopped  by  the  court  as  misrepresenting  the  testi- 
mony, merely  because  he  assumes  that  the  facts  testified  to  by 
his  own  witnesses  were  proved ;  ^  and  the  view  of  the  courts  is 
that  it  is  so  important  that  the  just  privilege  of  counsel  in  argu- 
ment should  not  be  unduly  restrained,  that  it  has  been  regarded 
as  not  sufiicient  ground  for  a  new  trial  that  counsel,  in  the  clos- 
ing address  to  the  jury,  rather  overstates  the  facts  which  there  is 
some  evidence  tending  to  prove.*  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add 
that  the  rule  does  not  apply  to  statements  made  by  an  attorney 
while  testifying  as  a  witness.^  An  exception  to  the  rule  has  also 
been  admitted  where  counsel  have  inadvertently  omitted  to  intro- 
duce in  evidence  a  document  essential  to  his  client's  cause,  such 
as  an  exemplification  of  the  plaintiff's  act  of  incorporation. 
Here  the  question  is  governed  by  the  rule  that  the  order  in  which 

Cassoday,  J.,  iu  a  recent  bastardy  case  into  the  bill  of  exceptions.     Counsel 

in  Wisconsin,  are  quoted  by  the  au-  necessarily   have   a    broad   latitude." 

thor  with  some  reserve:  "  Of  course,  Baker  v.  State  (Wis.),  33  N.  W.  Rep. 

the  remarks  of  counsel  are  to  be  re-  52,  55. 

stricted  to  matters  in  the  case  on  trial.  i  Festner  v.  Omaha  &c.  R.  Co.,  17 

But  this    is    not  always  conllned   to  Neb.  280. 

such  evidence  as  is  pertinent  to  the  2  people  v.  Barnhart,  59  Cal.  402; 
.  issue  on  trial.  Other  evidence  fre-  People  v.  Lee  Ah  Yute,  GO  Cal,  95. 
quently  gets  into  a  case  by  consent  of  Especially  where,  as  in  the  latter  case, 
parties  or  without  objection.  So  tlie  court  orders  the  improper  re- 
there  may  be,  and  frequently  is,  some  marks  to  be  stricken  out. 
fact  or  circumstances  occurring  iipon  ^  Hatcher  v.  State,  18  Ga.  4G0. 
the  trial  which  is  properly  open  to  the  •*  McKnabb  v.  Thomas,  18  Ga.  495, 
comment  of  counsel,  and  yet  never  be-  507. 

comes  a  part  of  the  record  in  the  ap-  •''  Baker  v.   Madison,  G2  Wis.    137, 

pellate   court   by   being    incorporated  14G. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  or  right  of  argument.         749 

the  evidence  is  presented  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial 
judge,  and  that  the  mere  fact  that  evidence  is  })resented  out  of 
its  order  is  not  ground  of  new  trial  unless  prejudice  appears.' 

§  964.  Limits  Within  Which  the  Rulings  of  the  Trial  Court 
Will  be  Controlled.  —  Recurring  to  what  has  already  been  said, 
and  especially  to  the  view  that  the  control  of  argument,  like 
other  matters  relating  to  the  conduct  of  trials,  must  necessarily 
be  committed  largely  to  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  the  con- 
clusion follows  that  it  is  onl}^  in  cases  where  the  court  has  refused 
to  exercise  its  powers,  or  where  its  discretion  has  been  mani- 
festh/  abused  by  permitting  i)rejudicial  matters  to  be  rehearsed 
to  the  jury  in  argument,  that  appellate  courts  will  interfere. ^ 
They  will,  as  already  seen,  defer  to  the  conclusion  of  the  trial 
court,  whose  presiding  judge  was  in  a  much  better  position  to 
know  whether  prejudice  really  accrued  to  the  unsuccessful  part}' 
than  the  appellate  court  is,'^  especially  where  the  evidence  as  to 
the  nature  of  the  remarks  is  conflicting.*  And,  on  a  similar  prin- 
ciple, they  will  not  control  the  trial  judge,  who  has  heard  the  evi- 
dence and  tried  the  cause,  in  his  decision  upon  the  question  how 
far  the  remarks  were  warranted  by  the  evidence,  when  it  is 
not  made  clearly  to  appear  that  they  were  unwarranted.^ 
What  abuses  of  the  right  of  argument  will  warrant  the  inter- 
ference of  appellate  courts,  when  thus  clearly  shown,  will  now 
be  stated. 

1  Bauk  of  Charleston  v.  Emerich,  2  trial  court  its  discretion,  it  should  be 
Sandf.  (N.  Y.)  718,  Oakley,  C.  J.,  say-  made  to  appear  affirmatively,  by  iu- 
iug:  "  It  is  surely  not  worth  while  to  corporatiug  the  essential  facts  and 
send  this  cause  back  for  anotlier  trial,  circumstances  showing  it  in  the  rec- 
merely  to  have  this  document,  upon  ord.  Baker  r.  State  (Wis.),  33  N.  W. 
which  no  question  arises,  given  in  Rep.  52,  55;  Santry  v.  State,  67  Wis. 
evidence."     Ante,  §  344,  et  seq.  67;  s.  c.  30  N.  W.  Rep.  226. 

2  It  is  said  that,  the  trial  judge  ^  gee  the  remarks  upon  this  point 
being  necessarily  familiar  with  all  the  in  Loyd  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  53 
facts  and  circumstances,  as  well  as  Mo.  509,  514,  and  in  Cavauali  v.  State, 
the  suades  of  the  evidence,  must  nee-  56  Miss.  299,  309. 

essarily    have    a    broad  discretion  in  ^  State  v.  Comstock,   20   Kan.  650; 

such  matters,  and  that  error  is  not  to  State  v.  Baber,  11  Mo.  App.  586;  State 

be  presumed  in  such  a  case;  but  that  v.  Johnson,  76  Mo.   121. 
if  counsel  abuse  their  privilege  or  the  ^  Cobb  v.  State,  27  Ga.  649. 


750  ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [I  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  965.  Observations  on  the  Limits  Allowed  to  Argument.  —  On 
this  subject  it  was  said  by  Fowler,  J.,  in  what  lias  come  to  be  regarded 
as  a  leading  case:  "  The  counsel  represents  and  is  a  substitute  for  his 
client ;  whatever,  therefore,  the  client  may  do  in  the  management  of  his 
cause  may  be  done  by  his  counsel.  The  largest  and  most  liberal  free- 
dom of  speech  is  allowed,  and  the  law  protects  him  in  it.  The  right  of 
discussing  the  merits  of  the  cause,  both  as  to  the  law  and  the  facts,  is 
unabridged.  Tlie  rangeof  discussion  is  wide.  He  may  be  heard  in  ar- 
gument upon  every  question  of  law.  In  his  address  to  the  jury  it  is 
his  privilege  to  descant  upon  the  facts  proved  or  admitted  in  the  plead- 
ings ;  to  arraign  the  conduct  of  the  parties;  to  impugn,  excuse,  justify 
or  condemn  motives,  so  far  as  they  are  developed  in  evidence,  assail 
the  credibility  of  witnesses  when  it  is  impeached  by  direct  evidence  or 
by  the  inconsistency  or  incoherence  of  their  testimony,  their  manner  of 
testifying,  their  appearance  upon  the  stand  or  by  circumstances.  His 
illustrations  may  be  as  various  as  the  resources  of  his  genius ;  his  argu- 
mentation as  full  and  profound  as  learning  can  make  it ;  and  he  may,  if 
he  will,  give  play  to  his  wit,  or  wings  to  his  imagination.  To  this  free- 
dom of  speech,  however,  there  are  some  limitations.  His  manner  must 
be  decorous.  All  courts  have  power  to  protect  themselves  from  con- 
tempt, and  indecency  in  words  or  sentences  is  contempt.  This  is  a 
matter  of  course  in  the  courts  of  civilized  communities,  but  not  of  form 
merely.  No  court  can  command  from  an  enlightened  public  that  re- 
spect necessary  to  an  even  administration  of  the  law  without  maintain- 
ing in  its  business  proceedings  that  courtesy,  dignity  and  purity  which 
characterize  the  intercourse  of  gentlemen  in  private  life.  So,  too,  what 
a  counsel  does  or  says  in  the  argument  of  a  cause  must  be  pertinent  to 
the  matter  on  trial  before  the  jury,  and  he  takes  the  hazard  of  its  not 
being  so.  Now,  statements  of  facts  not  proved  and  comments  thereon 
are  outside  of  the  cause.  They  stand  legally  irrelevant  to  the  matter 
in  question,  and  are  therefore  not  pertinent.     If  not  pertinent,  they  are 

not  within  the  privilege  of  counsel."  ^ In  1878  this  question  came 

for  the  first  time  before  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  and  it  was 
said  by  Chief  Justice  Ryan  in  delivering  the  opinion  of  the  court,  that 
it  was  to  the  honor  of  the  bar  that  this  was  the  case.  The  counsel 
who  had  transcended  tlie  bounds  of  professional  propriety,  by  comment- 

1  Tucker  v.  Hi-nniki'r,  41  N.  II,  317,  Texas  in  Hatch  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
323.  This  laugiiage  was  quoted  with  41(i,  423.  See  also  Cavanah  v.  State;, 
approval  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of     56  Miss.  2y'j,  309. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argu3ient.         751 

ing  upon  a  supposed  state  of  facts  not  in  evidence,  was  eminent  at  the 
bar  and  of  liigli  character;  and  the  observations  of  the  court,  wliile  not 
implying  personal  censure,  give  for  this  reason  greater  emphasis  to  the 
rule  which  it  laid  down.     The  following  view  was  delivered  from  the 
bench,  in  respect  of  the  limits  of  professional  propriety  in  arguing  facts 
to  juries :   "  The  profession  of  the  law  is  instituted  for  tiie  administration 
of  justice.     The  duties  of  the  bench  and  bar  differ  in  kind,  not  in  pur- 
pose.    The  duty  of  both  alike  is  to  establish  the  truth  and  to  apply  the 
law  to  it.     It  is  essential  to  the  proper  administration  of  justice,  frail 
and  uncertain  at   best,  that  all  that  can  be  said  for  each  party,  in  the 
determination  of  fact  and  law,  should  be  heard.     Forensic  strife  is  but 
the  method,  and  a  mighty  one,  to  ascertain  the  truth  and  the  law  gov- 
erning the  truth.     It  is  the  duty  of  counsel   to  make  the  most  of  the 
case  which  his  client  is  able  to  give  him ;  but  counsel  is  out  of  his  duty 
and  the  right,  and  outside  of  the   principal   object  of  his   profession, 
when  he  travels  out  of  his  client's  case  and  assumes  to  supply  its  defi- 
ciencies.    Therefore,  it  is  that  the  nice  sense  of  the  profession  regards 
with  such  distrust  and  aversion  the  testimony  of  a  lawyer  in  favor  of 
his  client.     It  is  the  duty  and  right  of  counsel  to  indulge  in  all  fair  ar- 
gument in  favor  of  the  right  of  his  client;  but  he  is  outside  of  his  duty 
and  his  right  when  he  appeals  to  prejudice  irrelevant  to  the  case.     Prop- 
erly, prejudice   has  no  more  sanction  at  the  bar  than  on  the  bench. 
But  an  advocate  may  make  himself  the  alter  ego  of  his  client,  and  in- 
dulge in  prejudice  in  his  favor.     He  may  even  share  his  client's  preju- 
dices against  his  adversary,  as  far  as  they  rest  on  the  facts  in  his  case. 
But  he  has  neither  duty  nor  right  to  appeal  to  the  prejudice,  just  or  un- 
just, against  his  adversary,  and  dehors  the  very  case  he  is  to  try.     The 
very  fullest  freedom  of  speech,  within  the  duty  of  his  profession,  should 
be  acconled  to  counsel ;  but  it  is  license,  not  freedom  of  speech,  to 
travel  out  of  the  record,  basing  his  argument  on  facts  not  appearing, 
and  appealing  to  prejudices  irrelevant  to  the  case  and  outside  of  the 
proof.     It  may  sometimes  be  a  very  difficult  and  delicate  duty  to  con- 
fine counsel  to  a  legitimate  cour,se  of  argument.     But,  like  other  difli- 
cult  and  delicate  duties,  it  must  be  performed  by  those  upon  whom  the 
law  imposes  it.     It  is  the  duty  of  the  circuit  courts,  in  jury  trials,  to 
interfere  in  all  proper  cases,  of  their  own  motion.     This  is  due  to  truth 
and  justice.     And  if  counsel  persevere  in  arguing  upon  pertinent  facts 
not  before  the  jury,  or  appealing  to  prejudices  foreign  to  the  case  in 
evidence,  exception  may  be  taken  by  the  other  side,  wliich  may  be  good 


752  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

ground  for  a  new  trial,  or  for  a  reversal  in  this  court."  ^  -  -  -  -  In  the 
case  just  quoted  from  Georgia,  Judge  Lumpkin  delivering  the  opinion 
of  the  court,  thus  eloquently  denounced  the  practice  under  considera- 
tion: "  Is  it,  I  ask,  worthy  of  the  noblest  of  professions  thus  to  sport 
with  the  life,  liberty  and  fortune  of  the  citizen?  A  profession  which  is 
the  great  repository  of  the  first  talents  of  the  countr3%  and  to  whose 
standard  the  most  gifted  flock,  as  offering  the  highest  inducement  of 
reputation,  wealth,  influence,  authority  and  power  which  the  commun- 
ity can  bestow?  I  would  be  the  last  man  living  to  seek  to  abridge 
freedom  of  speech,  and  no  one  witnesses  with  more  unfeigned  pride 
and  pleasure  than  myself  the  effusions  of  forensic  eloquence  dailj^  ex- 
hibited in  our  courts  of  justice.  For  the  display  of  intellectual  power, 
our  bar  speeches  are  equaled  by  few,  surpassed  by  none.  Wliy  then 
resort  to  such  a  subterfuge?  Does  not  history,  ancient  and  modern, 
nature, 'art,  science  and  philosophy,  the  moral,  political,  financial,  com- 
mercial and  legal,  —  all  open  to  counsel  their  rich  and  inexhaustible 
treasures  for  illustration?  Why,  under  the  fullest  inspirations  of  ex- 
cited genius,  they  ma}'  give  vent  to  their  glowing  conceptions  in  thoughts 
that  breathe  and  words  that  burn.  Nay,  more,  giving  reins  to  their 
imagination,  they  may  permit  the  spirit  of  their  heated  enthusiasm  to 
swing  and  sweep  beyond  the  flaming  bounds  of  space  and  time  — extra 
flammantia  moenia  mundi.  But  let  nothing  tempt  them  to  pervert  the 
testimony,  or  surreptitiously  array  before  the  jury  facts  which,  whether 
true  or  not,  have  not  been  proven."-  After  all  this  eloquence  the  court 
refused  to  grant  the  prisoner  a  new  trial.  -  -  -  -  So,  in  a  case  in 
Texas  the  practice  was  tluis  denounced  by  Mr.  Justice  Moore :  "  Zeal  in 
behalf  of  their  clients  or  desire  for  success  should  never  induce  counsel 
in  civil  cases,  much  less  those  representing  the  State  in  criminal  cases,  to 
permit  themselves  to  endeavor  to  obtain  a  verdict  by  arguments  based 
upon  any  other  than  tlie  facts  in  the  case  and  the  conclusions  legitimately 
deducible  from  the  law  applicable  to  them."  ^ 

§  966.  Instances  OF  Reversals  Undcu  the  Last  Preceding  Rule.  — 
In  his  opening  speech  to  the  jurj',  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  said  "  that 
in  the  former  trial  of  the  case  the  defendants  had  suborned  their  little  son 

1  Brown  v.  Swineford,  44  Wis.  282,  2  gerry  v.  State,  10  Ga.  511,  522. 

293.     This  language  was  also   quoted  »  Thompson  v.  State,  43  Tex.  268, 

with   approval   by  the  Texas  Court  of      274. 
Appeals  iu  Hutch  v.  State,  8  Tex.  App. 
HE   41:1. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         753 

to  commit  perjui\v,  *  *  *  and  that  the  appellant  had  committed  per- 
jury in  liis  affidavit  for  a  change  of  venue."  ^ In  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion for  forgery,  the  State's  counsel,  in  addressing  the  jury,  was  allowed 
by  the  court,  the  defendant's  counsel  not  objecting  at  the  time,  to  use 
the  following  language:  "  The  defendant  was  such  a  scoundrel  that  he 
was  compelled  to  move  his  trial  from  Jones  County  to  a  county  where 
he  was  not  known."  And  again:  "  The  bold,  brazen-faced  rascal  had 
the  impudence  to  write  to  me  a  note  yesterday,  begging  me  not  to  prose- 
cute him,  and  threatening  me  that  if  I  did  he  would  get  the  legislature 

to  impeach  me." On  the  trial  of  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  life 

insurance,  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  read  to  the  jur3'  and  commented 
thereon,  against  the  objection  of  the  defendant,  a  pamphlet  prepared  by 
the   secretary   of    the  defendant  company  for  use  among  its  agents, 

which  had  been  offered  in  evidence  and,  upon  objection, withdrawn.^ 

In  a  suit  on  a  policy  of  insurance  on  a  vessel,  the  plaintiff  offered  in  ev- 
idence a  protest  which  had  been  filed  bj'  the  master  of  the  vessel,  after 
it  had  sustained  injury  at  sea,  with  a  consul  of  the  United  States. 
The  protest  was  excluded  by  the  court  on  the  objection  of  the  defend- 
ants. Nevertheless,  in  his  closing  argument  to  the  jur}',  the  plaintiff's 
counsel  attempted  to  state  some  of  its  contents,  and,  on  objection,  was 
allowed  by  tlie  court  to  proceed,  on  the  ground  that  such  protests  usu- 
ally set  forth  the  particulars  of  such  a  casualty,  and  that,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  any  fair  inference  from  the 
general  character  of  the  paper  and  the  refusal  of  the  defendant  to  have 
it  read.^ On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  larceny,  the  State's  attor- 
ney, against  the  objection  of  the  defendant's  counsel,  stated,  in  his  clos- 
ing argument  to  the  jury,  that  "  he  lieard,  while  out  on  the  street  in 
New  Braunfels,  a  citizen  remark  that  it  was  a  great  shame  that  the  de- 
fendant sliould  have  taken  the  money  of  the  old  man  Wucherer,  near 

seventy-one  years  old,  and  all  the  rnone}^  he  had  in  the  world."  ^ The 

defendant,  on  his  trial  for  murder,  identified  three  letters  by  a  witness, 
and  then  handed  them  to  the  judge  to  be  marked  and  preserved  until 

1  Henuies  v.   Vogel,  7  Cent.  L.   J.  2  Smith  v.  State,  75  N.  C.  30C,. 

IS;  s.   c.  87  111.  242.     It  was  said  by  »  Union  Central  Ins.  Co.  u.  Cheever, 

Dickey,  J.,  iu  giving  the  opinion  of  the  30  Ohio  St.  301,  208;  s.  c.  38  Am.  Rep. 

court:  "Were  this   true,  it  would  iu  573. 

f :vct  be  good  cause  for  reversing  the  ^  Hoxie  v.  Home  lus.  Co.,  33  Conn, 

judgment.     But,  on  an  examination  of  471. 

the  record,    tlie  i-ourt   tiud    that  the  ^  Grosse  i?.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  304, 

charge  tliat  sucli   language  had  been  377. 
used  was  not  sustained." 

48 


754  ARGUMENT  OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Thoiiip,  Tr., 

they  should  be  used,  but  aftewards  offered  in  evidence  only  two  of  them. 
]Severtheless,   the  State's  attorney,  in  his  closing  argument,  alluded  to 

the  third  letter,  expressing  curiosity  as  to  what  it  contained. ^ 

The  State's  counsel,  in  his  argument  to  the  jury  was  permitted,  against 
the  objection  of  the  accused,  to  detail  at  length  the  facts  of  a  similar 

case,  which  had  been  tried  in  another  part  of  the  State.- ^Yhere,  in  a 

prosecution  for  selling  intoxicating  liquors  to  a  person  when  in  a  state 
of  intoxication,  the  prosecuting  attorney,  in  addressing  the  jury, 
stated,  among  other  remarks  of  doubtful  propriety,  that  "  he  knew  per- 
sonally the  saloon  keeper  in  this  case,  and  that  he  was  guilty  of  this, 
and,  he  was  sure,  of  other  crimes,"  —  and  the  court  failed,  upon  re- 
quest to  instruct  the  jury  to  disregyrd  these  remarks,  and  counsel 
saved  an  exception. ^ In  his  argument  in  a  case  of  larceny,  the  pros- 
ecuting attorney  asserted  that  "  he  knew  that  the  defendant  was  the 
man  who  took  the  money,"  and,  notwithstanding  a  strong  objection, 
the  court  failed  to  caution  the  jury  to  disregard  this  statement,  —  and 

an  exception  was  saved.  ^ In  all  the  foregoing  cases,  with  the 

quahfications  stated  in  the  notes,  it  was  held  that  the  remarks 
afforded  ground  for  reversing  the  judgment  and  ordering  a  new 
trial. 

§  967.  [Continued.]  Doctrine  as  Restated  by  Supreme  Court  of 
Alabama.  —  The  Supreme  Court  of  Alabama,  to  avoid  misunderstand- 
ing, have  restated  its  views  upon  this  question,  thus:  "There  must 
be  objection  in  the  court  below,  the  objection  overruled,  and  an  excep- 
tion reserved.  The  statement  must  be  as  of  fact ;  the  fact  stated  must 
be  unsupi)orted  by  any  evidence,  must  be  pertinent  to  the  issue,  or  its 
natural  tendency  must  be  to  influence  the  finding  of  the  jury ;  or  the 
case  is  not  brought  within  the  influence  of  this  rule.  To  come  within 
the  last  clause  above,  namely,  where  the  natural  tendency  is  to  influ- 
ence the  finding  of  the  jury,  the  case  must  be  clear  and  strong.  We 
would  not  embarrass  free  discussion,  or  regard  the  many  hasty  or  ex- 
aggerated statements  counsel  often  make  in  tlie  heat  of  debate,  which 
cannot,  and  are  not  expected  to  become  factors  in  the  formation  of 
their  verdict.  Such  statements  are  usually  valued  at  their  true  worth, 
and  have  no  tendency  to  mislead.     It  is  only  wlien  the  statement  is  of 

1  Bullner  v.  People,  95  III.  394.  The  ception  taken,  it  would  not  be  ground 

ruling   here  was    that,  although   this  for  reversing  the  judgment, 
conduct  was  irregular  and  should  not  ^  Cross  v.  State,  G8  Ala.  476. 

have  been  allowed,  yet,  as  uo  object-  ^  Brow  v.  State,  103  Ind.  133. 

ion  was  made  at  the  time  and  uo  ex-  ■*  People  v.  Dane,  59  Mich.  5.50. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         755 

a  substantive,  outside  fact — stated  as  a  fact  —  and  wliicli  manifestly 
bears  on  a  material  inquiry  before  the  jurj'^,  that  the  court  can  inter- 
fere and  arrest  discussion."  ^ 

§  968.  [Continued.]  Doctrine  Restated  in  Texas. — In  a  recent 
criminal  case  in  Texas  the  court,  speaking  through  Willson,  J.,  say: 
"It  has  become  quite  common  to  except  to  the  remarks  of  counsel  for 
the  State  in  their  address  to  the  jury.  We  find  such  exceptions  in  the 
majority  of  contested  cases  that  come  before  us.  If  we  had  sustained 
all  these  exceptions,  the  effect  would  have  been  to  have  virtually  closed 
the  mouths  of  prosecuting  attorneys.  While  argument  should  be  re- 
stricted legitimately,  it  should  not  be  so  unreasonably  limited  as  to 
render  it  ineffectual.  The  State  has  rights  in  this  respect  as  well  as 
defendants.  And  in  view  of  the  frequency  of  exceptions  of  this  char- 
acter, we  will  take  occasion  here  to  say  that,  before  we  will  reverse  a 
conviction  because  of  remarks  of  prosecuting  counsel,  it  must  appear  to 
us:  (1)  that  the  remarks  were  improper;  and  (2)  that  they  were  of  a 
material  character  and  such  as,  under  the  circumstances,  were  calcu- 
lated to  injuriously  affect  the  defendant's  rights."  ^ 

\ 

§  969.  Coiuinentiiig  on  Evidence  which  has  been  Ex- 
cliided.  —  An  aggravated  foriii  of  the  abuse  of  the  privilege  of 
argument,  which  is  inchided  in  the  rule  stated  and  illustrated  in 
the  two  preceding  paragraphs,  is  presented  where  counsel,  in 
arguing  to  the  jury,  are  guilty  of  the  highly  unprofessional  con- 
duct of  stating  or  commenting  upon  evidence  which  has  been 
offered  and  excluded.  This  attempt  to  appeal  from  the  judge  to 
the  jury,  as  to  what  is  admissible  as  evidence  in  the  case,  is  not 
only,  within  the  limits  stated  in  the  preceding  paragraphs,  ground 
for  a  new  trial, ^  but  the  w^riter  has  no  hesitation  in  saying  that 
the  presiding  judge  would  be  justified  in  treating  and  punishing 
it  as  contempt  of  court.     Scarcely  less  unprofessional  and  per- 

1  Cross  V.  State,  68  Ala.  476,  484.  pare   Koelges  v.   Guardian  Life   Ins. 

2  Pierson  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  G38;  Craudall  u.  People, 
524,  564;  reaffirmed  in  House  v.  State,  2  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  212;  Flint  v.  Common- 
19  Tex.  App.  227.  wealth,  81  Ky.  18(i;   Sullivan  v.  State 

*  Hoxie  V.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  33  Conn.  66  Ala.  48;  McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala. 
471 ;  Gould  v.  Moore,  40  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  154;  Stephens  v.  State,  20  Tex.  App. 
(8  J.  &  S.)  387,  395  (with  which  com-      255,  271). 


756  ARGU.MtNT  OF  COUNSEL.  [1  Tlioiiip.  Tr., 

nicious  is  the  practice  of  counsel  of  presuming  to  state  in  argu- 
ment what  they  ivoidd  have  'proved  had  they  been  permitted  under 
the  rules  of  evidence.^ 

§  970.  Commenting  on  the  Defendant's  Character,  Evidence  as 
TO  WHICH  HAS  BEEN  EXCLUDED.  — Where,  In  a  criminal  trial,  the  charac- 
ter of  the  defendant  was  not  put  in  evidence,  and  the  court  had  excluded 
evidence  tending  to  show  that  he  had  been  at  one  time  arrested  for  a 
robbery,  it  was  held  an  abuse  of  privilege  for  the  State's  counsel  to 
comment  upon  his  general  character ;  and  that,  in  view  of  these  impro- 
prieties, the  court,  in  order  to  prevent  as  far  as  possible  any  prejudice 
to  the  defendant  by  reason  of  them,  should  have  given  to  the  jury  the 
following  special  instruction,  requested  by  the  defendant :  "You  are 
charged  that  the  law  presumes  that  the  defendant  has  a  good  character, 
and  you  cannot  presume  against  it  because  the  defendant  failed  to  in- 
troduce evidence  of  a  good  character,  and  every  presumption  in  favor 
of  his  innocence  is  indulged  by  the  law,"  —  and  the  appellate  court, 
being  of  opinion  that  the  defendant  had  not  had  a  perfectly  fair  trial, 
the  judgment  was  reversed.- 

§  971.  Coininents,  not  Supported  by  Evidence,  on  the  Char- 
ncter  and  Credibility  of  Witnesses.  —  It  has  been  held  error  to 
make  statements  and  comments  respecting  the  character  and  cred- 
ibility of  witnesses  for  which  the  evidence  affords  no  basis  or 
justification.  In  so  holding  the  Supreme  Court  of  Georgia, 
speaking  through  Nisbet,  J.,  said:  "  I  know  of  no  rule  of  law 
which  authorizes  the  credibility  of  witnesses  to  be  impeached  or 
fortified  thus.  The  manner  of  attacking  or  defending  the  char- 
acter  of  the  witness  is  fixed  by  law,  and  fixed  among  other  things 
that  he  may  not  be  subject  to  irregular  and  irresponsible  assaults 
upon  his  veracity  and  fairness.  He,  as  well  as  parties  and  coun- 
sel, has  rights  which  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  protect.  It 
were,  cruel  injustice  to  permit  his  character  to  be  driven  to  and 
fro  like  the  shuttlecock  by  the  outside  statements  of  counsel. 
Where  shall  the  license  stop?  If  allowed  against  the  credibility 
of  a  witness,  then  with  equal  reason   they  are  to  be  allowed  as 

J  Fcstner  v.  Omaha  &c.  K.  Co.,  17  2  sicphi'iis   v.  State,  20  Tex.    App. 

X:b.  280.  2.>j,  271. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         757 

touching  the  merits  of  the  issue.  If  crimination  is  granted,  re- 
crimination cannot  be  refused.  If  statements  on  one  side  are 
permitted,  counter-statements  on  the  other  cannot  be  denied. 
If  allowed  to  men  of  the  highest  honor,  they  cannot  be  denied 
to  those  few  to  be  found  in  all  professions  destitute  of  all  hon- 
orable principle.  The  concession,  carried  out  in  its  legitimate 
consequences,  would  convert  the  stern  inflexible  law  and  order 
of  a  court  of  justice  into  confusion,  uncertainty  and  injustice. 
All  these  objections  apply  alike  to  criminal  trials  and  civil 
actions —  to  the  prosecuting  otBcer  and  to  counsel."  ^ 

§  972.  Expressing  Belief  in  Guilt  or  Innocence.  —  "No  lawj-er," 
says  Dr.  Bishop,  "  ought  to  undertake  to  be  a  witness  for  his  client, 
except  when  he  testifies  under  oath,  and  subjects  himself  to  cross-exam- 
ination, and  speaks  of  what  he  personally  knows.  Therefore,  the  prac- 
tice, which  seems  to  be  tolerated  in  many  courts,  of  counsel  for 
defendants  protesting  in  their  address  to  the  jury  that  they  believe  their 
clients  to  be  innocent,  should  be  frowned  down  and  put  down,  and  never 
be  permitted  to  show  itself  more."  ^  The  Court  of  Appeals  of  Texas 
quote  this  language  with  approval,  and  hold  that  it  applies  equally  to 
counsel  for  the  prosecution.  "They  should  not  intrude  «/<e«r  belief 
in  the  guilt  of  the  accused,  upon  the  jury."  Where,  however,  such 
remarks  were  objected  to,  and  the  trial  judge  promptly  told  the  jury 
that  the  remarks  were  beside  the  evidence,  foreign  to  the  issue  in  the 
case,  and  that  they  were  to  pay  no  attention  to  them,  the  appellate 
court  thought  it  "  not  probable  that  th%  jury  would  determine  a  case 
upon  the  belief  of  counsel,  and  especially  when  instructed  by  the  court 
to  disregard  such  remarks,"  and  l^hey  accordingly  held  them  no  ground 
for  a  new  trial. ^ 

§  973.  Allltung  to  Former  Trials  of  the  same  Case.  —  A  statute  of 
Texas  enacts  that  "  the  effect  of  a  new  trial  is  to  place  the  case  in  the 
same  position  in  which  it  was  before  the  trial  had  taken  place,"  and 
that  "  the  former  conviction  shall  be  regarded  as  no  conviction  of  guilt, 
nor  shall  it  be  alluded  to  in  the  argument. "^    A  statute  of  Utah,  regulat- 


635 


^  Mitchum    V.    State,    U  Ga.  CU,  <  Pasc.  Dig.    Tex.   Stat.,  art.  3139; 


Rev.  Stat.  Tex.,  Code  Crira.   Pro.,  art 
783,     For  a  similar  statute,  set 
Dig.  Tex.  Stat.,  art.    321(j;    Rev, 
5'!3.  Tex.,  Code.  Crim.  Pro.,  art.  876 


Bish.  Crira,  Proc,  §  311.  783.     For  a  similar  statute,  see  Paso. 

3  Piersou  u.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  524,      Dig.  Tex.  Stat.,  art.    3216;    Rev.   Stat. 


758  ARGUMENT  OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Tiiomi).  Tr., 

ing  proceedings  in  criminal  cases,  declares  that  the  granting  of  a  new 
trial  places  the  parties  in  the  same  position  as  if  no  trial  had  been  had," 
and  that  "  all  the  testimony  must  be  produced  anew,  and  the  former 
verdict  cannot  be  used  or  referred  to  either  in  evidence  or  in  argu- 
ment." 1  These  statutes  express  a  general  principle  of  procedure,  which 
obtains  with  equal  force  wliere  there  is  no  such  statutory  enactment. 
Allusions,  by  counsel  in  argument,  to  the  result  of  a  former  trial  in  the 
same  case,  favorable  to  tlie  party  for  whom  he  is  contending, ^  whether 
made  directly  or  by  the  artifice  of  handing  up  to  the  court  the  opinion 
of  the  appellate  court  reversing  the  former  judgment,  accompanied  by 
observations  on  the  same  in  the  hearing  of  the  jury, ^  especially  if  ac- 
companied with  severe  denunciation  of  the  action  of  the  appellate  tri- 
bunal,* will,  generally,  though  not  always,'^  afford  ground  for  new  trial. 
It  is  an  equal  irregularity'  to  permit  counsel,  in  arguing  to  the  jury,  to 
read  minutes  of  the  evidence  taken  at  a  former  trial  between  the  part- 
ies, which  minutes  have  not  been  put  in  evidence  at  the  present 
trial,  and  chiefly  for  the  reason  stated  in  the  preceding  paragraph,*' that 
counsel  are  not  to  be  permitted,  in  arguing  to  the  jury,  to  state  evident- 
ial matters  which  have  not  been  regularly  admitted  in  evidence  in  the 
case."  The  statute  of  Utah,  above  quoted,  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to 
require  the  granting  of  a  new  trial,  merely  because  the  counsel  for  the 
government,  in  his  final  argument  to  the  jury,  alluded  to  the  fact  that 
the  case  had  been  many  times  before  the  tribunals.  It  was  said:  "If 
allusion  to  previous  trials,  such  as  were  here  made,  were  to  vitiate  a 
subsequent  trial,  a  new  element  of  uncertainty  would  be  introduced 
into  the  administration  of  justice  in  criminal  cases."  '^ 

§  974.  Appealing  to  Local  Prejudices. — Appealing  to  local  preju- 
dices,—  as,  in  an  action  brought  by  a  citizen  of  the  county  in  which  the 
trial  was  had,  to  which  the  venue  had  been  changed,  against  a  board  of 
school  directors  in  another  county,  saving  to  the  jury:  "Stand  by  your 
own  citizen;"  and  also,  against  the  objection  of  defendant's  counsel 
and  the  admonition  of  the  court,  telling  the  jury  that  "the  school  di- 

1  Laws  of  Utah  1878,  p.  li'C,  §  P.17.  ^  ChicaiiO  &c.  li.  Vo.  v.  Braiionior, 

2  Crahau  v.  Bahner's  Exr.,    7  Mo.      i<upi-a. 

App.  585.  ^  Ante,  §  !>(33. 

3  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bragouier,  '  IMartin  •;;.  Orudorff,  22  Iowa,  504. 
13  Bradw.   (111.)  407.                                    Compare  Morrison  v.  Myers,  11  Iowa, 

t  Hatch  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  416;  538;  Samuels  v.  Gridlth,  13  Iowa,  103, 
Moore  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  GG6;  post,  »  Hopt  v.  Utali,   120  U.    S.  431,  442, 

§  !J7(;.  opinion  l)y  Field,  J. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.  759 

rectors,  people  and  citizens  of  Fulton  county  are  trying  to  disgrace  and 
oppress  a  citizen  of  Marshall  county,"  ^  —  affords  ground  of  new  trial. 

§  975.  Appealing  to  Religious  Prejudices.  —  Thus,  in  an  action  for 
damages  for  an  assault  and  battery,  for  the  plaintiff's  counsel  to  say,  in 
his  closing  argument:  "  It  is  in  evidence  that  this  defendant  is  a  Cath- 
olic priest,  and  all  of  his  witnesses  are  members  of  his  church,  and  it 
is  a  strange  coincidence  that  they  track  the  evidence  of  defendant  with 
that  minuteness  and  precision  in  the  use  of  words  and  language  that 
cannot  be  accounted  for  except  as  shown  by  the  evidence.  They  heard 
the  defendant,  from  the  pulpit,  detail  his  version  of  the  case,  and  they 
can  come  here  and  swear  to  his  version  of  the  case,  and  the  defendant 
can  absolve  them  from  the  sin.  If  it  is  one  of  the  doctrines  of  the 
Catholic  church  that  one  of  the  members  may  swear  falsely  as  a  witness, 
and  the  priest  can  forgive  him  his  sin  for  such  false  swearing,  so  as  to 
absolve  him  from  all  moral  guilt,  it  is  the  privilege  and  duty  of  the  jury 
to  take  this  fact,  in  determining  the  credibility  of  such  witnesses." 
And,  after  protest,  saying:  "  The  defendant  is  here,  and  if  it  is  not  the 
doctrine  of  the  Catholic  church,  let  him  stand  up  and  deny  it,  and  that 
shall  be  the  end  of  it."     It  was  held  that  a  new  trial  must  be  had.- 

§  976.  A  Catalogue  of  Prejudicial  Statements. — The  following 
abuses  of  the  right  of  argument  have  been  held,  under  various  circum- 
stances, ground  for  reversing  judgments  and  awarding  new  trials.  For 
counsel,  in  arguing  for  the  State  in  a  criminal  trial,  when  his  language 
is  excepted  to,  to  retort,  facing  the  jury,  in  the  following  strain  :  "  Yes, 
take  3^our  bill ;  and  as  often  as  this  case  is  taken  to  the  Court  of  Ap- 
peals and  there  reversed  on  some  foolishness  or  technicality,  I  will,  as 
often  as  I  can  get  the  case  before  twelve  honest  men,  convict  him  again 
and  again."  To  repeat  the  language  excepted  to  and  to  add:  *'  Take 
bill  and  repeat  them,"  and  then  to  proceed  to  harangue  the  jury  thus: 
'  •  I  mean  to  deal  with  these  fellows  [meaning  men  who  had  been  in- 
dicted for  complicity  in  land  frauds],  and  commence  with  this  one 
[meaning  the  defendant  Hatch]  ;  that  when  they  know  themselves  to  be 
guilty,  and  wlien  tliey,  as  has  this  defendant,  been  once  convicted  by 
twelve  honest  men,  and  by  a  dodge  and  technicality  have  had  the  case 
reversed,  and  now  represented  by  an  able  counsel  watching  for  an  error, 
I  will  teach  them, —  I  will  teach  them  to  throw  themselves  on  the  mercy 

1  Schooltowuof  ]{ochester».  Shaw,  2  Rudolph  v.  Lamlwerleu,  02   Ind. 

lOOInd.  2G8.  34.  30. 


7G0  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

of  the  jury  and  the  court,  and  not  make  defenses  to  cost  the  State 
thousands.  I  demand  of  the  jury,  in  the  event  you  find  the  defendant 
guilty,  that  he  be  punished  by  the  maximum  of  years  allowed  by  law. 
He  is  defending  and  procuring  the  reversal  of  this  case  that,  in  the 
progress  of  time,  witnesses  may  be  scattered,  and  that,  too,  when  he 
knows  that  he  is  guilty  as  hell  itself.  A  taste  should  be  put  in  his 
mouth  in  the  shape  of  ten  3^ears'  punishment,  and  then  the  next  land 
thief  who  is  tried  will  plead  guilty  and  throw  himself  on  the  mercy  of  the 
court  and  jur}-."  ^ The  following  passage  in  the  concluding  argu- 
ment of  the  State's  attorney  reversed  a  conviction  under  an  indictment 
for  an  assault  with  intent  to  commit  rape:  "  Gentlemen  of  the  jur}'^,  a 
good  jury  of  your  county  convicted  the  defendant  of  tlie  offense  with 
which  he  is  now  charged,  upon  a  former  and  a  previous  indictment,  and 
his  attorney  appealed  it  to  the  Court  of  Appeals  upon  a  trifling  tech- 
nicality in  drawing  the  indictment;  and  that  court  reversed  the  case, 
and,  by  taking  advantage  of  this  trifling  technicality,  without  merit,  he 
has  caused  your  county  great  expense,  which  comes  out  of  the  pocket 
of  every  good  taxpaj^er,  yourselves  among  the  rest ;  and  now,  in  view  of 
these  facts,  I  ask  you  to  give  him  such  a  term  in  the  penitentiary  that  will 
make  up  for  this  great  expense  he  has  caused  upon  a  mere  technicali- 
t3^"  In  the  course  of  its  opinion,  the  court  said:  "In  many  decisions 
this  court  has  urged  upon  counsel,  whose  duty  it  is  to  prosecute  the 
pleas  of  the  State,  to  refrain  from  injecting  into  the  trial  of  cases  of 
this  kind,  any  matter  calculated  to  inflame  the  minds  or  excite  the  preju- 
dices of  the  jury.  If  we  could  add  anything  to  what  has  been  said,  or 
could  use  any  language  calculated  to  reaeh  the  minds  and  consciences 
of  tliose  to  whom  such  admonitions  are  addressed,  we  would  avail  our- 
selves of  the  present  occasion  to  do  so.  As  we  cannot,  we  can  only  reverse 
and  remand  the  case,  in  the  hope  that  the  accused  may  secure  a  fair  and 
impartial  trial,  according  to  law,  and  according  to  those  methods,  alike 
ancient  and  honorable,  which  still  obtain  in  all  enlightened  courts.    It  is 

so  ordered."  '^ For  the  State's  counsel,  in  a  criminal  trial,  to  read, 

against  the  protest  of  the  accused,  the  proceedings  which  have  taken  place 
on  an  application  for  a  change  of  venue  which  has  been  granted."  3  .  .  .  - 
For  the  court  to  permit  the  State's  counsel,  against  the  objection  of  the 
defendant  and  without  hinderance  or  rebuke,  to  use  the  following  lan- 
guage in  the  closing  aigument  to  the  jury:   "  And  that  is  the  character 

•  Hatch  V.  State,  8  Tex.  App.41fi.  »  State    v.    Phillips,    24    Mo,    475, 

2  Huraphi'ey  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App,      483. 
<\GG,  (i(;8,  opluiou  by  Hum,  J. 


Tit  IV,   Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  eight  of  argument.         761 

of  the  man,  and  that  is  the  character  of  the  place  they  were  going  into  — 
actually  taking  their  lives  in  their  hands  —  and  there  is  no  man  on  this 
jury  who  would  have  more  bravely  faced  what  those  two  men  faced.  I 
just  ask  you,  however  lion-hearted  you  may  be,  to  put  yourselves  in 
their  places  —  walking  in  there  into  a  saloon  in  that  part  of  the  city,  in 
the  dead  of  night,  face  to  face  with  two  of  the  most  terrible  desperadoes 
of  the  city,  to  arrest  them  for  highway  robbery."  i  The  defendant 
on  trial  was  one  of  the  two  persons  thus  called  "  terrible  despera- 
does."   For  the  State's  counsel  to  indulge  in  gross  denunciation, 

diatribe  and  abuse  against  the  defendant  on  trial ;  as,  in  a  prosecution 
against  a  negro  for  larceny,  to  say  in  his  closing  argument,  turning  to- 
ward defendant:  "  You  black  thief!  You  are  a  thief — as  black  as  hell 
itself."  Then,  turning  to  the  jur}',  to  say  :  "  Gentlemen,  if  you  do  not 
convict  this  man  you  had  better  throw  open  the  jail  doors,  tear  down 
our  court-houses  and  burn  up  our  law  books  ;  because  if  you  acquit 
such  men,  and  that  is  to  be  the  law  in  Waller  county,  people  will  flock 
to  Waller  county  from  north  and  south  Texas  to  become  thieves.  All 
good  men  in  Waller  county  know  that  this  man  ought  to  be  convicted, 
and  it  is  your  duty  to  do  so.  I  feel  an  interest  in  this  case  and  want  to 
see  this  man  convicted  ;" —  the  court  declining  to  take  othernotice  of  this 
language,  upon  objection,  than  to  say  to  counsel  for  the  defendant :    "I 

will  give  you  a  bill  of  exception."  2 For  the  defendant's  counsel 

in  a  civil  case  to  slate,  in  his  argument  to  the  jury,  the  presiding  judge 
not  being  present,  that  plaintiff  was  only  a  cat's  paw  to  lend  the  cloak 
of  respectability  to  the  case,  meaning  that  he  was  a  cat's  paw  for  one 

of  his  own  witnesses. ^ For  the  State's  attorney,  in  a  criminal  trial, 

tc  allude  to  the  failure  of  the  defendant  to  introduce  evidence  to  sustain 
his  character,  no  attempt  to  impeach  his  character  as  a  witness  having 

been  made.'* For  the  State's  attorney,  in  a  criminal  trial,  to  comment 

to  the  juiy  upon  the  failure  of  the  defendant  to  avail  himself  of  the 
privilege  guaranteed  to  him  by  the  statute  of  calling  his  wife  as  a  witness 

in  his  own  behalf.^ For  the  counsel  for  a  party  in  a  civil  action  to 

comment  upon  the  fact  that  a  witness  of  the  opposing  party  had 
claimed  exemption  from  answering  a  question  on  the  ground  of  privilege, 

1  State  V.  Foley,  12  Mo.  App.  431;  13t;  State  v.  Uphara,  38  Me.  261. 
following  State  v.  Lee,  6(3  Mo.  ICo.  Compare   Walker  v.  State,  6  Blackf. 

2  Crawford  u.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  (lud.)  1;  State  y.  McAllister,  24  Me. 
501.  139;  Ackley  v.  People,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
■     3  Hall     „.     Wolff,     Gl     Iowa,    559,  509. 

5''1-  ^  Knowle.s  v.  People,    15  Mich.  409,. 

^  Fletcher    r.     State,  49   lud.    124,       413. 


762  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

which  claim  had  been  allowed  by  the  court  as  well  founded.^  -  .  -.  For 
the  prosecuting  counsel  in  a  criminal  trial,  to  say:  "'They  have  suf- 
fered, and  Conn  is  put  to  trial,  and  you  are  told  that  he  is  only  a 
hired  man.  They  hope  thus  to  clear  this  man,  and  then  he  is  to 
swear  his  confederate  clear.  I  tell  you  this  is  the  trick."  For  such 
counsel  to  continue,  after  a  request  made  by  defendant's  counsel  to 
the  court  to  stop  him  from  using  such  remarks,  which  the  court  re- 
fused to  do,  to  say  to  the  jury:  "Good  men  in  this  county,  and  best 
citizens  of  Gonzalez  county,  desire  '  je  conviction  of  this  man  and  his 
partner  ;"  the  court  overruling  this  objection  to  this  language  with  the 
remark:  "He  speaks  at  his  peril.  I  will  sign  your  bill  of  excep- 
tions."  For  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  in  a  civil  trial  to  eulogize 

in  extravagant  language  the  chai-acter  of  his  client,  calling  him  a 
"  large-hearted,  great-souled,  confiding,  trusting  man,"  of  which  facts 
there  was  no  evidence,  and  then,  upon  objection,  saying:  "  O,  well, 
I  will  take  it  back."  3.  ,  _  .  For  the  counsel  for  the  plaintiff,  in  an 
action  for  maliciously  suing  out  an  attachment,  in  his  closing  argu- 
ment, to  discuss  tlie  wealth  of  the  defendants  (plaintiffs  in  the 
attachment  suit),  and  to  insist  that  the  wealthier  they  were  the 
greater   the    amount   of   damages  which   should   be   assessed   against 

them.* For  the   counsel  for    the  plaintiff,  in   an  action  against 

an  officer  in  a  railway  company,  for  a  tort  which  might  be  the 
subject  of  exemplary  damages,  to  comment  to  the  jury  in  the 
concluding  argument,  upon  the  defendant's  connection  with  the 
railway  compan}^  upon  the  wealth  and  power  of  the  com- 
pan)'-,  and  upon  the  defendant's  ability,  from  these  circumstances, 
to  pay  any  judgment  wliich  might  be  rendered  against  him, 
although  no  evidence  has  l)een  given  of  his  pecuniary  ability.^  -  -  . . 
For  counsel,  in  the  closing  address  in  a  civil  case,  to  read  to 
the  jury  prejudicial  matter  not  contained  in  the  record,  the  evidence 
or  the  instructions  given, "^  and  to  refer  to    or  comment  upon  the  in- 

1  Carue  r.  Litchfield,  2  Mich.  3t0.  dcfeudaut   is  admissil^le,  as  speaking 

2  Couu  r.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  391,  upou  liis  al)ility  to  pay  sucli  damages. 
390.  Burchard  v.  Booth,  4  Wis.  G7;  Barnes 

3  Wolffe  V.  Miuuis,  7-1  Ala.  38(5.  v.  Martin,  15  Wis.  240;  Bucliley  v. 
Compare  Sullivan  v.  State,  (JG  Ala.  48;  Knapp,  48  Mo.  1(52;  Trimble  v.  Foster, 
Cross  V.  State,  G8  Ala.  470.  87  Mo.  49. 

4  Willisu.  McNeill,  57  Tex.  4(55,  474.  "  Tlie  courts  of   procedure  in  the 
s  Brown  v.  Swiueford,  44  Wis.  282,      State  where  this  ruling  was  ,made  re.- 

291.  It  seems  that  iu  an  action  for  a  quires  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  iu 
tort  for  whicli  exeinplary  damages  may  writing  before  counsel  malie  their  ar- 
be  given,  evidence  of  tlie  wealth  of  the      gumeut. 


Tit.   IV,   Cb.   XXX.]       ABUSES    OF    RIGHT    OF    ARGUMENT. 


703 


structions  offered  b}'  the  opposite  party  and  refused.^ For  the 

State's  counsel  to  abude  to  the  fact  that  the  judge  did  not  direct  an 
acquittal,  b^'  saj'ing:  "  If  the  judge  did  bebeve  that  the  defendant  bad 
made  out  a  fair  claim  to  the  property,  bis  Honor  wouki  have  directed 
an  acquittal  without  their  leaving  the  box ;  but  as  be  did  not  so  say, 
the  judge  must  not  have  believed  that  a  fair  claim  of  propert}'  bad  been 

shown  by  the  defendant."  '^ Where  the  counsel  for  tlie  State,  in  a 

criminal  trial  has,  under  the  provisions  of  a  statute,  admitted  that  an 
absent  witness  for  the  defendant  would,  if  present,  testify  to  a  given 
state  of  facts,  which  admission  is  made  in  order  to  avoid  a  continuance, — 
for  bim,  in  his  concluding  argument,  to  say  that  the  statement  con- 
tained in  the  admission  '"  was  not  the  statement  of  sworn  witnesses," 
but  a  statement  "deftly  prepared  by  counsel  for  defendant;  that  it 
was  all  a  tissue  of  lies ;  that  it  contained  nothing  but  lies,  except  a 
few  immaterial  things  ;  that  the  persons  named  bad  never  seen  it,  and 
would  not  have  so  sworn  if  they  bad  been  present ;"  but  that  "  the  State 
had  proven  her  case  b}'  living  witnesses,  who  bad  flesh  and  bone  and 
blood,  and  bad  proven  this  statement  to  be  lies,  and  nothing  but 
lies."  ^ In  a   criminal    case   the    district   attorney  in  his  opening 


1  State  ex  rel.  v  Claudius,  1  Mo. 
App.  552. 

2  State  V.  Cavenuess,  78  N.  C.  484, 
490.  Corapar(4^tate  v.  Johnson,  1  Ired. 
L.  (N.  C.)  354;  Powell  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  G8  N.  C.  395;  State  v.  Dick,  2 
Winst.  ex.  C.)  45. 

»  State  V.  Barliam,  82  Mo.  G7,  70. 
See  also  State  v.  Roark,  23  Kau.  147; 
State  V.  Hickman,  75  Mo.  41G.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Mis- 
souri statute,  under  which  the  admis- 
sion was  made  in  order  to  avoid  the 
continuance,  places  the  statement  of 
facts  set  forth  in  the  affidavit  for  a 
continuance  on  precisely  the  same 
footing,  to  all  Intents  and  purposes, 
as  though  the  absent  witnesses  had 
been  personally  present  and  had  so 
testified.  It  is  only  upon  this  ground 
that  the  validity  of  such  a  statute, 
depriving,  as  it  does,  the  defendant  of 
compulsory  process  for  the  attendance 
of  his  witnesses,  can  be  upheld.    State 


V.  Underwood,  75  JIo.  234;  State  v. 
Jennings,  81  Mo.  185.  It  should  be 
added  that  the  decision  of  the  Mis- 
souri court  was  placed  on  the  ground 
that  the  prosecuting  counsel  was  per- 
mitted to  argue  to  the  jury,  against 
his  own  admission,  that  the  witnesses 
would  not  so  testify  if  present.  So 
much  of  his  argument  as  was  to  the 
effect  that,  although  they  would  so 
testify,  their  testimony  would  be  false, 
was  within  the  line  of  legitimate  argu- 
ment; since  it  is  permissible  for  the 
State's  counsel  so  to  argue  iu  the  case 
of  any  witness,  nor  would  the  court 
grant  a  new  trial  because  he  may  have 
done  so  iu  strong  and  extravagant 
language.  On  the  other  hand,  in  an 
early  case  iu  Kansas,  whei'e  the  record 
showed  that  comments  had  been  made 
upon  an  affidavit  made  by  the  opposite 
party  to  procui'e  a  continuance,  but  it 
did  not  appear  what  comments  were 
made  or  under  what  circumstances, 


764  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

speech  said  to  the  jury:  "  Gentlemen  of  the  jury,  the  witnesses  for  the 
defense  have  sworn  lies,  and  have  come  here  for  that  purpose.  I  will 
show  it  by  the  testimony.  They  know  that  they  have  sworn  lies,  and  if 
it  was  not  so,  they  would  not  allow  me  to  say  it,  but  would  make  mince 
meat  out  of  me  when  I  charge  them  with  having  done  so."  The  Court 
of  Appeals,  speaking  through  Hurt,  J.,  said:  "  We  deem  it  proper, — 
yea,  an  imperative  duty  on  our  part,  —  to  sternly  and  emphaticallj' 
condemn  such  conduct.  Such  bullying  and  defiant  conduct  was  highly 
calculated  to  provoke  the  most  serious  results,  and  that,  too,  in  the 
very  temple  of  justice  ;  a  place  in  which  the  highest  order  and  decorum 
should  be  preserved.  The  district  attorney  was  not  content  to  brand 
the  witnesses  as  perjured  liars,  but  calls  the  jury  to  witness  that  he 
proves  the  charge.  How?  Because  they  will  not  resent  the  terrible  in- 
sult by  at  least  an  aggravated  assault  and  battery  —  thus  subjecting 
themselves  to  fine  and  imprisonment.  Such  conduct  should  not  be 
tolerated  for  a  moment,  and  if  the  court  had  knowingly  permitted  the 
same,  we  would  feel  it  our  duty  to  reverse  the  judgment  because  of 
this  matter.  However,  the  court's  attention  was  not  called  to  this 
matter  at  the  time,  and  when  this  was  done,  the  court  reproved  the 
attorney  by  stating  that  such  remarks  were  highly  improper.  We 
think  from  the  circumstances  and  nature  of  the  remarks  that  the 
court  should  have  gone  further,  by  instructing  the  jury  that  the  credi- 
bility of  the  witnesses  could  not  be  tested  in  any  such  manner ;  but  as 
this  matter  will    not  arise  upon  another  trial,  we  deem  it  unnecessary 

to  determine  whether  or  not  it  is  reversible  error."  ^ In  all  the 

foregoing  cases,  subject  to  the  qualifications  stated,  it  was  held  that 
the  limits  of  the  privilege  of  advocacy  had  been  exceeded,  and  new  trials 
were  ordered. 

§  977.  Keferrixg  to  Recent  Crimes,  Lax  Administration  of  Law, 
ETC.  — In  his  closing  ai'gument  in  a  prosecution  for  larceny,  the  prose- 
cuting attorney  referred  to  the  riots  at  Cincinnati  (then  recent)  and 

the  reviewing  court  declined  to  regard  duty  of   the  trial    court    to   restrain 

it    as  ground  for  a  new  trial.     For  counsel  witliin  proper  limits;  and,  as 

aught  that  appeared,  the  counsel  for  the  record  did  not  disclose  the  con- 

the  party  mal<iug  the  alHdavit  might  trary,  it  was  held  that  the  proper  dis- 

have  first  commented  upon  it;  nor  did  chargeof  this  duty  would  be  presumed, 

anything  appear  in  the  I'ecord  to  show  Perliius  v.  Ermel,  2  Kan.  325,  331. 
that  such  comments  were  prejudicial  ^  Kicks  v.  State,  1!)  Tex.  App.  308,- 

to    the    party  complaining.     If    they  319. 
were    so,    it   would  have   been    the 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  kight  of  argument.         7G5 

alleged,  as  a  cause  for  the  prevalence  of  mob  violence,  the  lax  adminis- 
tration of  criminal  justice  in  that  city.  The  appellant  objected  to  this 
line  of  argument,  but  the  court  overruled  the  objection.  It  was  held 
that  this  was  not  error.  "  The  remarks  alluded  to  above,  had  refer- 
ence to  an  historical  fact  concerning  which  the  jury  were  supposed  to  be 
familiar,  both  in  respect  to  its  occurrence  and  the  causes  to  which  it  was 
attributed."  As  there  was  no  allusion  made  to  the  defendant  in  tliat 
connection,  or  to  his  being  in  any  manner  concerned  in  the  riots, 
the  court  could    not  say  that   the  privilege  of  fair  debate  had  been 

transcended.! So,  it  has  been  held,   in    Missouri,  that  remarks 

of  the  prosecuting  attorney  in  his  argument,  in  which  he  states,  in 
substance,  that  tliere  is  no  security  for  the  lives  or  property  of 
citizens,  if  juries  fail  to  do  their  duty,  while  crime  is  so  greatly  on 
the  increase,  contained  nothing  which  could  be  deemed  prejudicial  to 
the  defendant.  It  was  but  a  declaration  of  the  duty  of  juries,  every- 
where recognized,  and  the  statement  of  the  fact  that  crime  was  on  the 
increase  could  certainly  have  been  no  inducement  to  the  jury  to  con- 
vict the  defendant,  if  the  evidence  did  not  warrant  his  conviction. - 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  for  the  State's  counsel,  in  a 
criminal  trial,  to  comment  on  the  frequent  occurrence  of  murder  in  the 
community  and  the  formation  of  vigilance  committees  and  mobs,  argu- 
ing that  the  same  are  caused  by  the  laxity  of  the  administration  of  the 
laws,  and  stating  to  the  jury  that  they  should  make  an  example  of  the 
defendant,  the  defendant's  counsel  objecting,  and  the  court  overruling 
the  objection  and  remarking,  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,  that  such 
things  were  proper  subjects  of  comment,  has  been  held  ground  of  new 
trial. 3 The  State's  counsel,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  lar- 
ceny, used  language  to  the  effect  that  there  was  a  regular  band  of 
thieves  in  tlie  neighborhood  where  this  crime  was  committed  ;  that  the 
defendant  was  one  of  them  (naming  a  number  of  others  whose  names 
were  known  to  the  jury  as  persons  who  had  Ijeen  recently  convicted  of 
crimes),  and  that  unless  the  jury  should  convict  the  defendant  he 
(counsel)  would  not  blame  the  people  for  taking  the  law  into  their  own 
hands,  the  defendant's  counsel  remonstrating  and  the  court  declining  to 
interfere.  This  was  held  ground  of  reversal.''  In  another  case  in  the 
same  State,  on  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  a  felonious  homicide,  the 
State's  counsel,  in  his  argument  to  the  jnry,  remarked  that  "  if  the  juries 

1  Heyl  V,  State,  109  lucl.  589,  594.  ^  Turner  w.  State,  C8  Tenu.  (4  Lea) 

2  State  V.  Mallon,  75  Mo.  355,  358.         20G. 

3  Ferguson  v.  State,  49  lud.  33. 


7()6  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

do  not  punish  crime,  the  people  will  rise  up,  and  should  vise  up,  and  pun- 
ish it."  These  remarks,  the  Supreme  Court  said,  "•  were  very  repre- 
hensible, and  the  court  ought  to  have  rebuked  hira  in  the  presence  of  the 
jury,"  but  under  the  circumstances  of  the  case  it  was  not  deemed  a  suf- 
ficient ground  for  a  new  trial. ^ On  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for 

murder  in  Illinois,  where  the  record  showed  that  counsel,  both  for  the 
defendants  and  the  people,  referred  to  the  prevalence  of  crime  and  com- 
mented upon  it,  but  not  in  a  manner  which  was  regarded  by  the  Supreme 
Court  as  prejudicial  to  tlie  defendants,  this  court,  speaking  through 
Scolfield,  J.,  among  other  things,  said:  "The  trial  judge  should  always 
see  that  the  line  of  argument  is  kept  within  reasonable  bounds,  and  not 
allow  the  defendant  to  be  convicted  or  prejudiced  on  account  of  real  or 
imaginary  crimes  for  which  he  is  not  upon  trial.  And,  unless  for  a  pal- 
pable abuse  of  discretion  in  this  regard,  manifestly  tending  to  an  im- 
proper conviction,  there  should  be  no  reversal."  ^ 

§  978.  Indulgence  Extended  to  Extravagant  Declamation, 
Exaggeration,  Erroneous  Statements  of  the  Evidence.  —  The 

courts  extend  considerable  indulgence  to  extravagant  declama- 
tion and  exaggeration.  They  obviously  will  not  reverse  judo^ments 
because  counsel  in  argument  have  stated  erroneous  conclusions  as 
to  what  the  evidence  proves.^  The  privilege  of  argument  extends 
to  a  statement  of  the  testimony  as  the  counsel  understands  it, 
and  therefore  an  erroneous  statement  of  it,  if  not  conceived  in  a 
spirit  of  unfairness  or  fraud,  will  be  no  ground  of  awarding  a 
new  trial.* 

§  979.  Illustrations.  —  So,  where,  in  his  argument  on  the  trial  of 
an  indictment  for  resisting  an  officer,  the  prosecuting  attorney  said : 
"  Malice  may  bud  and  bloom  in  a  man's  heart  almost  in  a  moment  or 
in  a  short  time,"  the  court  saw  notliing  in  this  which  could  have  oper- 
ated to  the  injury  of  the  defendant.^ So,  an  interruption  by  counsel, 

of  the  opposing  party  in  his  argument,  charging  him  with  "  dodging  the 

main  issue,"  has  been  held  to  afford  no  ground  for  a  new  trial. "^ 

So,  where,  in  an  action  for  damages  against  a  railway  company,  the 

'  Scott  V.   State,  71    Tt'iiu.  (7   Lea)  ^  Teople  v.  Barnhardt,  59  Cal.  402. 

232.  *  State  v.  Estes,  70  Mo.  428. 

2  Biilliuer  V.  Tcopk-,  95  111.  394,  405.  «  Overcash  v.  Kitchie,  89  N.  C.  384, 

3  State  V.  Mallou,  75  Mo.  355.  389. 


Tit.  IV,  Cll.  XXX.]       ABUSES    OF    RIGHT   OF    ARGUMENT.  767 

couasel  for  the  plaintiff,  in  discussing  the  question  of  punitive  dam- 
ages, said:  "You  can  and  3'ou  should,  out  of  the  abundance  of  this 
compam',  take  enough  to  keep  this  woman  and  her  children  from  want 
all  the  daj^s  of  their  lives ;  "  and  the  couit,  upon  objection,  merely  said : 
"  Let  it  pass,"  —  no  ground  was  perceived  for  a  new  trial. ^  -  -  -  -  A 
statement  by  the  prosecuting  attorney  that  "  the  defendant  has  been 
guilty  of  one  penitentiary  offense,  and  would  be  guilty  of  a  greater 
offense  to  cover  the  other  up,"  —  has  been  held  not  sufficient  ground 
of  reversing  a  conviction  on  appeal,  where  it  did  not  appear  in  what 
connection  the  statement  was  made.^ It  is  the  duty  of  a  prose- 
cuting attorney,  if  he  thinks  the  evidence  establishes  the  guilt  of  the 
defendant,  to  demand  his  conviction  ;  and  where,  in  a  trial  for  murder, 
the  State's  attorney  demanded  a  conviction,  "  in  the  name  of  the  State, 
in  the  name  of  the  law,  justice  and  right,  in  the  name  of  society,  in  the 
name  of  the  widow  and  children  of  the  deceased," — the  appellate  court 
saw  nothing  wrong  in  this.  "  If  the  defendant  committed  the  murder, 
he  had  acted  against  the  peace  and  dignity  of  the  State ;  he  had  out- 
raged law,  justice,  right  and  society  ;  he  had  clothed  the  wife  in 
widow's  weeds,  and  had  made  fatherless  the  children  of  the  deceased  ; 
and  each  and  all  of  these  consequences  of  his  crime  demanded  his  con- 
viction and  punishment."  ^ 

§  980.  And  to  the  Use  of  Epithets.  —  "•  Epithets  and  invec- 
tive in  which  counsel  sometimes  indulge  are  frequently  matters 
of  taste,  and  cases  sometimes  occur  in  which  severe  animadver- 
sion is  deserved  and  merited.  But,  after  all,  it  is  for  the  court, 
in  the  i^resence  of  which  the  trial  is  had,  to  determine  whether 
counsel  transcends  the  limits  of  professional  duty  and  propriety, 
and  that  determination  cannot,  in  any  appellate  tribunal,  be  as- 
signed for  error."  ^  Thus,  it  has  been  held  no  ground  of  new 
trial  that  the  prosecuting  attorney  called  him  a  murderer  in  his 
argument  to  the  jury,  where  the  indictment  was  for  murder  and 
the  whole  effort  of  the  State  was  to  prove  him  to  be  sueh.^  So, 
where  it  appeared  in  evidence  that,  after  the  prisoner  had  com- 
mitted the  assault  charged  in  the  indictment,  he  had  gone  to  the 

1  East  Tfuii.  &c.  R.  Co.  i'.  Gur-  ^  pie,.sou  r.  State,  18  Tex.  App.  524, 
lej',  Til  TenUc  -K!,  5-t.                                         5(J4. 

2  State  17.  MoCool,  34  Kau.  G13.  •»  State  v.  Hamilton,  '>■)  Mo.  520,  522; 

5  State  i;.  Gritliu,  «7  Mo.  G08,  615. 


768  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.  [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

Indian  Territory,  the  court  refused  to  grant  a  new  trial  because 
the  prosecuting  attorney,  in  his  argument  to  the  jury,  said  that 
"the  defendant  had  gone  to  the  Indian  Territory,  where  all 
rascals  go."  ^  It  is  said,  in  a  late  case  in  Texas,  that  "  to  make 
vituperation  and  abuse  grounds  for  reversing  the  judgment, 
it  must  appear  that  the  remarks  indulged  in  were  grossly  un- 
warranted and  improper;  that  they  were  of  a  material  charac- 
ter, and  calculated  injuriously  to  affect  the  defendant's  rights."  ^ 
And,  in  general,  comments  on  the  argument  delivered  by  op- 
posing counsel  ought  not  to  be  restrained,  where  they  do  not 
amount  to  comments  upon  matters  not  in  evidence.^ 

§   981.  Appeals    to     Sympathy — The    Widow  in  Tears. — 

So,  it  is  said:  "Great  latitude  is  allowed  in  appealing  to  the 
sympathy  of  the  jury,  in  the  arguments  of  counsel.  That,  and 
the  widow  in  tears,  are  a  kind  of  stage  performance  which  courts 
cannot  very  well,  perhaps  ought  not  to  attempt  to  control." 
And,  proceeding  upon  this  view,  no  ground  for  a  new  trial  was 
perceived  in  the  conduct  of  counsel,  in  a  civil  action,  in  appeal- 
ing to  the  sympathies  of  the  jury  in  behalf  of  his  client  because 
she  was  a  widow,  and  in  denouncing  the  opposing  parties  as 
leeches  and  oppressors  of  poor  women  and  widows  —  the  widow, 


1  State  V.  Stark,  72  Mo.  37.  said  to  the  jury  that,  if  the  plaintiff's 

2  McCoimell  v.  State  (Tex.),  3  S.  intestate  were  alive,  there  would  be  uo 
\V.  Rep.  61)9,  702,  citing  Piersou  v.  difliculty  about  it,  and  that  he  would 
State,  18  Tex.  App.  524.  bcAvilling  to  leave  it  to  him.     In  reply, 

3  In  Chambers  v.  Greenwood,  G8  the  plaintiff's  counsel  said:  "  Well,  if 
N.  C.  274,  the  action  was  upon  a  note  that  is  so,  why  do  you  object  to  my 
payable  to  the  plaintiff's  intestate,  ])roving  what  he  said?"  Thereupon 
which  note  the  defendant  alleged  was  the  defendant's  counsel  asked  the 
embraced  in  a  settlement  of  accounts  court  to  stop  the  plaintiff's  counsel, 
between  him  and  the  plaintiff's  intes-  because  he  was  commenting  upon  evi- 
tate,  in  his  lifetime,  and  which,  as  he  dence  which  had  been  ruled  out.  This 
alleged,  had  thus  been  settled,  but  was  the  court  declined  to  do,  saying:  "  lie 
not  delivered  up  because  mislaid.  is  not  commenting  on  the  testimony 
The  plaintiff  liad  offered  to  prove  what  Avhich  w;vs  ruled  out,  but  he  is  com- 
his  intestate  had  said  about  the  note,  menting  on  your  argument."  It  was 
but  this  evidence  was  ruled  out,  on  the  held  that,  in  thus  refusing  to  stop 
objection  of  defendant's  counsel.  In  counsel,  no  ground  was  presented  for 
his  argument  the  defendant's  counsel  a  new  trial. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]       ABUSES    OF    RIGHT    OF   ARGUMENT.  709 

at  tlie  same  time,  facing  the  jury  aud  weeping,  or  pretending  to 
weep.^  Haranguing  the  jury  on  irrelevant  matters  not  neces- 
sarily prejudicial,  such  as  the  fact  that  the  defendant  had  a 
wo^/zer  only  fifteen  miles  away,  that  she  had  abandoned  him,  that 
she  was  not  at  the  trial  to  share  his  troubles,  — has  been  held  no 
ground  of  new  trial. ^  So,  where,  in  response  to  an  objection  to 
testimon}^  which  the  counsel  was  seeking  to  introduce,  he  said: 
"  I  am  careful  not  to  get  error  into  the  case.  If  my  client  was 
a  rich  man  I  should  like  to  litigate  this  matter  for  the  next 
twenty-five  years,  and  I  think  it  would  give  me  a  good  support; 
but  my  client  is  poor,  and  we  live  in  Minneapolis,  aud  every  time 
we  come  down  here  it  costs  him  $100,"  —  it  was  held  there  was 
uo  ground  for  a  new  trial. -^ 

§   982.   Tricks  of  Advocacy,   Sidebar  Remtirks,  etc.  — Nor 

are  mere  tricks  of  advocacy,  devised  to  arrest  the  attention  of 
the  jury  at  certain  points  in  the  evidence,  ground  for  anew  trial.* 
Thus,  where  a  witness  was  being  examined  in  a  criminal  ca.se, 
and  the  prosecuting  attorney,  at  a  point  in  the  evidence,  remarked 
to  his  associate,  "  Put  that  down,"  an  objection  to  this  language 
was  held  frivolous.^  Nor  will  a  judgment  be  reversed,  even  in  a 
capital  case,  because  of  indiscreet  side  remarks  by  the  prosecut- 
ing attorney,  unless  the  court  can  see  that  a  jury  of  ordinarily 
intelligent  men  would  be  misled  or  prejudiced  by  them.® 

§  983.  Bad  Logic  and  Bad  Law. — Nor  is  it  ground  for  a 
new  trial,  in  a  criminal  case,  that  the  prosecuting  counsel  has 
made  an  illogical  argument,  or  has  misstated  the  law  in  his  ad- 
dress to  the  jury.'  If  the  error  is  of  logic  —  if  illogical  conclu- 
sions are  drawn  or  illicit  inferences  are  made  —  the  courts  cannot 
correct  them  by  directing  counsel  to  reason  logically.  If,  how- 
ever, counsel   state   the   law  incorrectly  in  their  address  to  the 

1  Dowdell  r.  Wilcox,  G4  Iowa,  721,  •*  Haderleiu  v.  St.  Louis  K.  Co.,  3 
72i.                                                                      Mo.  App.  001. 

2  State  V.  Griffin,  87  Mo.  608.  s  State  v.  Hopper,  71  Mo.  425,  433, 
s  Baiier  v.   Madison,   62    Wis.   137,  «  State  v.  Guy,  G'J  Mo.  430. 

l-i7,  ■  .Morrison  v.  State,  76  lud.  335. 

4'.> 


770 


ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thomp.   Tl',, 


jury,  the  adverse  party  can  secure  a  correction.  The  correction 
is  not  to  be  obtained  by  objecting  to  the  statements  of  counsel 
during  the  argument,  but  by  asking  the  court  to  give  the  kiw  to 
the  jury  in  its  instructions.^ 

§  084.  Other  Statements  Which  Have  Been  Excused  Rather 
than  Justified. — Tlie  alhision  by  counsel  in  argument  to  the 
absence  of  the  defendant  from  the  trial  of  a  civil  case,  has  been 
held  a  question  of  taste  and  propriety  rather  than  misconduct^ 
even  where  the  plaintiff's  counsel  had  charged  him  with  fabri- 
cating evidence  and  said:  "  He  did  not  want  to  be  here,  and  it 
is  well  that  he  is  not  here,  after  making  such  an  exhibition  of 
himself."  ^  It  is  unquestionably  a  sound  rule  that  historical 
facts,  of  which  courts  take  judicial  notice,  may  be  alluded  to  in 
argument  for  the  purposes  of  illustration,  and  this  rule  has  been 
extended,  on  doubtful  grounds,  so  far  as  to  justify  a  State's 
counsel,  in  a  criminal  trial,  in  alluding  to  other'  liistoi'ical  cases^ 
similar  to  the  case  at  bar.^     Nor,  in  a  capital  case,  where  coun- 


'  Proctor  V.  De  Camp,  83  Ind.  559, 
opiniou  by  Elliott,  J.  This  rule  would 
not  be  applicable  in  Missouri,  where 
the  charge  of,  the  judge  is  delivered 
before  counsel  make  their  argument. 
Under  the  system  In  that  State  an  un- 
fair statement  of  law  by  counsel  to  the 
jury  ought  to  be  corrected  by  the  court 
when  the  objection  is  made. 

2  Carter  v.  Carter,  101  Ind.  450,  454. 

3  Thus,  on  the  trial  of  a  statutory 
felony,  the  State's  attorney,  in  his 
closing  argument,  on  the  question  of 
insanity,  alluded  to  the  facts  of  the 
Lawless  case  and  the  Guiteau  case, 
and  said  that  the  case  at  bar  did  not 
show  one-half  or  even  the  hundredth 
part  of  the  eccentricities  which  those 
cases  showed;  that  Guiteau's  whole 
life  was  one  of  oddities  and  eccen- 
tricities ;  that  experts  were  called  from 
the  whole  nation,  but  nevertheless  he 
was  convicted  by  a  jury,  was  allowed 


his  appeal,  and  was  finally  hanged; 
that  Tom  Buford  killed  Judge  Elliott 
and  never  went  to  the  asylum.  When 
the  State's  counsel  commenced  speak- 
ing of  these  matters,  the  defendant's 
counsel  objected;  but  the  court  said 
these  matters  were  merely  in  the  na- 
ture of  argument,  and  refused  to  stop 
him,  and  the  defendant  saved  an  ex- 
ception. The  Supreme  Court  over- 
ruled the  exception,  Freeman,  J.,  in 
giving  its  opinion,  saying:  "While  it 
was  not  pertinent  to  the  issues  in  this 
case  to  cite  the  facts,  or  supposed  facts, 
in  the  cases  of  Guiteau  and  Buford, 
still  such  reference,  byway  of  illustra- 
tion, we  do  not  think  sufficient  grouiid 
of  reversal  of  the  verdict  of  a  jury. 
The  true  basis  of  the  argument  is 
always  the  facts  presented  in  the  tes- 
timony, but  we  cannot  see  that  sui!i 
allusions  as  are  Here  found  could  have 
materially  affected  the  conclusions  of 


Tit.  IV,  Cb.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         771 

sel  for  the  defendant  has  allowed  improper  evidence  to  go  to  the 
jury  without  o})jection,  can  a  new  trial  be  claimed  on  the  ground 
that  the  prosecuting  attorney  commented  on  such  evidence  in 
his  argument  to  the  jury.^  Although,  as  elsewhere  seen,-^  coun- 
sel are  not  permitted  in  argument  to  refer  to  supposed  facts  not 
in  evidence,  yet  it  has  been  held  not  clearly  error  to  permit 
counsel  for  the  State,  in  a  bastardy  proceeding,  to  refer  to  the 
resemblance  between  the  child  (presumably  in  the  court-room) 
and  the  respondent ;  since  this,  if  a  fact,  was  a  fact  which  the 
jury  could  not  well  be  prevented  from  noticing,  and  "  some  ex- 
travagance in  cases  involving  sensational  elements"  cannot  Avell 
be  restrained.^  So,  in  the  absence  of  specific  objection,  or  of  a 
request  for  an  instruction,  the  reading,  by  counsel  for  the  de- 
fendant, of  the  complaint  in  the  case,  verified  by  aflidavit.  has 
been  held  no  ground  for  a  new  trial,  the  reading  having  appar- 
ently been  done  for  the  purpose  of  showing  what  allegations  were 
not  denied  and  hence  admitted.* 

§  985.  [Illustrations.]  Transgressions  in  Criminal  Cases  which 
HAVE  BEEN  OVERLOOKED.  — In  a  case  of  larceny,  counsel,  in  closing  for 
the  defendant,  by  way  of  illustrating  the  value  of  certain  testimony 
given  on  behalf  of  the  State  to  sustain  the  reputation  of  a  witness,  said, 
in  substance,  that  the  witnesses  did  not  profess  to  have  any  knowledge 
of  the  reputation  of  the  witness  whose  testimony  they  were  called  to 
sustain,  and  that,  from  the  same  standpoint,  he  could  personally  sus- 
tain the  reputation  of  the  defendant.  These  observations  were  made 
the  basis  upon  which  the  prosecutor  said,  in  his  argument,  that  he  had 
personal  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the  defendant  was  reputed  to  be  a 
hotel  thief,  and  that  he  -had  been  published  and  portrayed  in  the  Police 
Gazette  as  such.     The  reviewing  court  censured  this  transgression   of 

the  jury;  besides,  they  are  not  withiu  State,    78    Teuu.    (14   Lea)     424,  428, 

the  principle  established  by  our  cases.  431. 

They  are  not  facts    detailed   by  the  ^  State  v.  Banks,  10  Mo.  App.  Ill, 

attorney-general,  not  in  proof  in  refer-  115. 

ence  to  the  prisoner  or  his  conduct  or  ^  Ante,  §  963. 

relations,  but  only  matters  of  current  s  People  v.     White,  53   Mich.  537, 

history,  used  byway  of  enforcing  an  539;  ante,  §  856. 

argument.     This  objection  is  not  suffi-  •*  Crartield  r.  Knight's    Ferry  AVater 

cieut   for   reversal."     Northiugton    v.  Co.,  14  Cal.  35. 


772  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.  [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

the  prosecuting  attorney,  but  finding  "  a  bare  shadow"  of  excuse  for 
it,  and  the  verdict  being  well  sustained  by  the  evidence,  concluded  not 

to  reverse  the  conviction.  ^ On  the  trial  of  an  Indictment  of  a 

supervisor  for  unlawfully  withholding  a  record  from  the  proper  custo- 
dian, the  State's  attorney,  in  his  closing  remarks  to  the  jury,  charged 
the  defendant  with  stealing  an  affidavit  made  by  him  at  a  previous  term 
of  court  for  a  continuance,  and  reiterated  the  same  after  objection  by 
defendant  and  after  being  warned  by  the  court  that  it  was  improper ;  and 
stated  that  the  defense  was  all  a  sham,  and  that  defendant  had  fled 
from  justice  and  never  surrendered  himself  until  he  found  a  witness 
was  dead,  and  then  hatched  up  his  rotten  defense.  There  was  no  evi- 
dence upon  which  to  base  such  remarks,  and  they  were  reiterated  after 
being  informed  by  the  court  that  they  were  improper.  The  reviewing 
court  characterized  these  arguments  as  clearl}'  improper  and  a  mani- 
fest breach  of  both  professional  and  official  duty ;  yet,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, the  court  did  not  regard  them  as  of  so  gross  a  character  as 

to  warrant  a  reversal  of  the  judgment.'- On  a  trial  for  murder  the 

prosecuting  attorney,  in  addressing  the  jury,  said:  "The  defendant  in 
this  case  has  stooped  so  low  as  to  drag  before  you,  on  the  trial  of  this 
cause,  the  infidelity  of  his  dead  wife,  and  publish  her  before  the  court- 
house as  a  prostitute."     The  court  could  not  deny  that  this  remark  was 

"  unfair,"  but  refused  a  new  trial.  ^ On  a  recent  prosecution  in 

Indiana  for  a  murder  by  poison,  one  of  the  attorneys  for  the  State,  in 
his  closing  argument,  delivered  to  the  jury,  notwithstanding  repeated 
objections  from  the  counsel  of  the  accused,  such  paragraphs  as  the  fol- 
lowing: "  Why,  a  man  was  hung  at  Ft.  Wayne,  in  an  adjoining  county, 
on  circumstantial  evidence  not  a  hundredth  part  as  strong  as  the  evi- 
dence in  this  case  against  Mrs.  Epps."  After  an  interruption  and  an 
admonition  from  the  court  to  confine  himself  to  the  case,  he  replied : 
"  I  know  what  I  am  saying,  and  I  do  not  want  to  be  interrupted  in  my 
argument.  It  throws  me  off  my  line  of  argument."  Commenting  on 
certain  evidence,  he  also  delivered  the  following  expressions,  some  of 
which  were  grossly  unwarranted  by  the  evideuce:  "This  woman 
[pointing  to  the  accused]  took  poison  from  Clinton  Orndorff  in 
Weaver's  store  and  said:  '  I  know  what  it  is  ;  I  know  it's  poison  ;  I've 
handled  it  before ;  I  have  buried  two  husbands  and  children.'"  The 
evidence  to  which  this  referred  was  merely  that  the  accused  had  given 

1  Heyl  V.  State,  109  Intl.  590,  .594.  s  McConnclI  v.  State  (Tex.),  3S.  W. 

2  Baysinger   v.  rcople,  115  111.  420,      Eep.  G99. 
42G. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.   XXX.]       ABUSES    OF    RIGHT    OF   ARGUMENT  773 

the  witness  five  cents  to  buy  some  arsenic  to  poison  rats,  and,  on  re- 
ceiving it  slie  said  she  had  handled  it  before.  On  being  again  inter- 
rupted by  counsel  for  the  accused  and  admonished  by  the  court,  the 
State's  counsel  kept  on  thus:  "I  don't  mean  tliat  she  [the  accused] 
said  it  all  in  Weaver's  store ;  I  mean  to  say  that  she  said  in  Weaver's 
store  that  she  knew  it  was  poison  and  had  handled  it  before,  and  that 
it  was  a  fact  that  she  had  buried  two  husbands  and  children  ;  but  I  dis- 
claim any  intention  to  say  that  she  testified  to  [these  facts]  all  in  the 
same  connection  in  the  store."  Further  on  in  his  argument,  he  said: 
"  Oh,  gentlemen  of  the  jury,  if  1  could  tell  you  what  that  good  old 
man,  Edward  jMise  [pointing  to  him],  told  me  he  knows  about  other 
dark  things  concerning  this  case,  it  would  clear  away  much  of  the  mys- 
tery about  it,  about  which  counsel  for  defendant  talked  so  much." 
Because  the  verdict  was  right  on  the  merits,  the  reviewing  court  over- 
looked these  shameful  abuses  of  the  right  of  argument,^  for  which  the 

counsel  committing  them  ought  to  have  been  punished. Objection 

was  made  in  one  case  to  the  statement  of  the  district  attorney,  in  his 
argument  to  the  jury,  that  the  plea  of  insanity  in  criminal  cases  is  gen- 
erally a  "  sham  "  and  a  "  device  "  resorted  to  by  defendants  who  have 
no  defense,  —  illustrating  his  remarks  by  a  reference  to  the  Guiteau 
case.  It  was  claimed  that  this  was  unwarranted  and  of  a  prejudicial 
character ;  but  tiie  court  nevertheless  affirmed  the  conviction  and  sen- 
tence of  death. '2 

§  986.  Prejudice  not  Cured  by  Similar  Misconduct  in  the 
Opposing  Counsel.  —  Similar  misconduct  on  the  part  of  the  op- 
posing counsel  does  not  justify  such  a  course,  although  it  may 
justify  the  counsel  in  endeavoring  to  remove  the  prejudice  which 
nuiy  have  been  produced  by  the  misconduct  of  the  opposite 
counsel.'^ 

§987.  Illegitimate  Argument  first  Introduced  by  Opposing 
Counsel.  —  We  have  had  occasion  to  examine  a  rule  of  evidence 
under  which  a  party  who  opens  up,  by  his  own  witnesses,  an  im- 
proper line  of  inquiry,  cannot  complain  that  the  other  party  was 
allowed  to  introduce  evidence  rebutting  the  same  facts,  or  to 
follow  up  the  same  inquiry.*     Some  courts  admit  a  correspond- 

1  Epps  u.  State,  102  Ind.  540,  550.  629;    Tucker  y.    Ileuuiker,   41   N.    H. 

2  Poliu  V.  State,  14  Neb.  540,  548,  317,  322. 

2  Mitchum  V.    S^ate,    11    Ga.    615,  ■»  Ante,  §§  423,  i'>'.K),  70C. 


774  ARGUMENT   OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Tlioiup.  Tr., 

ing  rule  in  respect  of  forensic  argument  ;  so  that,  where  the 
counsel  of  the  accused  in  a  criminal  trial  enters  upon  a  line  of 
argument  outside  the  record,  the  accused  cannot  complain  that 
the  State's  attorney  was  allowed  too  free  scope  in  reply uig  to  tJie 
same}  At  least,  where  counsel  on  one  side  transcend  their 
jn'ivilege  by  alluding  to  impro})er  matter,  the  counsel  on  the 
other  side  may,  without  prejudicing  their  case,  follow  them,  and 
indulge  in  proper  comments  upon  the  same  matter. ^ 

§  988.  Illustration.  — This  is  well  illustrated  by  a  case  of  murder, 
where  counsel  for  the  accused,  among  other  irrelevant  matters,  ap- 
pealed to  the  jur^'^  to  look  into  the  defendant's  face,  "  for  evidence  of 
courage  and  consequent  incapacity  to  commit  such  a  crime."  "The 
prosecuting  attorney , "  said  the  court,  '  in  a  masterly  manner,  took  up 
the  gauntlet  thus  thrown  down,  and  ably,  eloquently,  and  with  telling 
force,  presented  the  State's  side  of  the  collateral  issues  thus  forced  up- 
on the  prosecution.  We  are  not  prepared  to  say  that  his  remarks  were 
not  entirely  legitimate,  independent  of  the  provocation  and  invitation 
thus  given  by  the  defense.  If  the  defendant  wishes  to  invoke  the  rule 
of  confinement  to  the  record,  they  themselves  must  keep  within  the 
record.  When  they  voluntarily  go  outside,  they  at  least  invite,  if  tliey 
do  not  render  it  necessary,  that  the  prosecution  should  follow.  Appel- 
lant's counsel  characterized  the  deed  as  a  most  dastardly  and  cowardly 
murder,  and  requested  tlie  jury  to  look  into  defendant's  face  for  evi- 
dence of  courage  and  incapacity  to  commit  such  a  crime.  Answering 
this  argument,  the  reply  was:  'Whoever  saw  that  face  [pointing  at 
defendant]  that  could  ever  forget  it?  No,  gentlemen,  no.  As  the  pis- 
tol flashed,  there  was  a  circle  of  light  in  his  front,  and  through  it 
gleamed  the  eyes  of  the  assassin  sitting  tiiere  [pointing  at  defendant] 
in  this  court  room.'  This  reply  was  called  for,  and  was  legitimate. 
As  stated  above,  if  the  remarks  excepted  to  were  not  legitimate  pri- 
marily, they  were  most  clearl}'  so,  and  entirely  within  the  bounds,  as 
answers  to  the  above  argument  of  defendant's  counsel,"  "^ 

§  089.  3Iatters  Which  have  been  Fair  Subjects  of  Com- 
ment.—  The  subornation  of  evidence  by  the  o})posing  i)arty,  or 
his   fadure   to  j)roduce    important  evidence    within  his  reach,  is 

'   I'iorsoii  r.  state,  lM  Tex.  Ap|i.  ].-.,       L'l;  \.    \X .    Kcp.    lU);    I'.aUrr    r.    Slate 

"  IIoEfiuau  r.  State,  (J.J  Wis.  ir. ;  >•.  c.  J  Piursou  v.  State,  21  Tex.  xVpp,  1,:;,G0. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  akgu.ment.         775 

always  a  fair  subject  of  comment  in  argument  to  the  jury,'  —  as 
where  the  opposing  party  fails  to  call  an  important  witness  whom 
he  might  have  called,^  or  to  road  the  depositions  of  witnesses 
which  he  has  taken  to  be  used  in  the  casc,'^  or  to  introduce  im- 
portant papers  in  his  possession.^  So,  the  apparent  interest  of 
the  witness  is  always  the  subject  of  fair  comment  in  argument,^ 
and  in  most  jurisdictions  may  properly  form  the  subject  of  cau- 
tionary instructions  to  the  jury.  Contractual  relationf^,  sus- 
tained by  a  witness  to  a  party  may,  as  already  seen,  be  shown  in 
evidence,  on  cross-examination,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the 
credibility  of  the  witness  in  the  opinion  of  the  jury.^  Upon  the 
like  principle,  the  fact  of  such  relationship  is  the  subject  of  fair 
comment  in  argument.  "  Even  though  introduced  by  the  party 
thus  commenting,  it  is  legitimate  to  call  attention  to  the  bias,  in 
order  to  give  more  force  to  what  the  employe  may  swear  against 
his  master, — just  as  a  brother  swearing  against  a  party  in  that 
relation  to  him  mi<iht  just  as  well  be  considered  as  entitled  to 
great  credit,  and  when  for  him,  to  less.  Not  that  either  could 
be  impeached  by  the  party  calling  him,  but  the  fact  of  relation- 
ship or  obligation  or  service  may  be  properly  evoked  by  counsel, 
with  a  view  to  strengthen  or  weaken  the  force  of  what  is  testi- 
fied —  the  natural  heiijhtening  or  softening^  the  colors  of  the 
story,  without  impeaching  the  integrity  of  the  witness."^  So, 
if  the  accused  takes  the  stand  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  his 
testimony  is  the  subject  of  fair  comment  by  the  State's  attorney, 
the  same  as  the  testimony  of  any  other  witness ;  ^  though  if  he 

1  See  Kuowles  v.    People,    1,1  Mich,  *>  Ante,  §  450. 

412;  Audersou   v.    Ku.ssell,   34    Mich.  '  Central  R.  Co.  w.  Mitchell,  (J3  Ga. 

110;  ante,  §§  453,  794,  7'J5.  173,  180. 

2.-Gavigan   v.  Scott,  51    Mich.    373;  »  Held   v.  State,  20   Neb.   493,500. 

State  V.  Joues,   77  N.  C.  520;  Gray  t?.  Compare   Comstock  v.   State,  14  Neb. 

Bark,  19  Tex.  228;  Peebles  v.  Hortou,  205,  ^vhere  the  accused  having  elected 

54  N.  C.  374.  to  take   the  yrituess  stand  and  failed 

3  Learned  v.  Hall,  133  Mass.  417.  to    controvert    the  testimony   of  the 

••  Chambers  v.  Greenwood,  08  N.  C.  State's    witnesses,   it    was    reasoned 

274;  Tobin   v.  Shaw,  45  Me.  331;  Lo-  that  this   was  tantamount   to  an   ad- 

gan  V.  Monroe,  20  Me.   25'.).     See  also  mission  that  such  testimony  was  true. 

Devries  v.  Phillips,  (i3  N.  0.  53.  See  ante,  §  G4(j. 

'"  Morehouse  v.  Heath, 99  lud  509, 518 


77(5  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOlllp.   Tl"., 

does  not  take  the  stand,  the  circunii^tance  cannot  be  alluded  to.^ 
Where  the  prisoner  had  taken  the  stand  as  a  witness,  and,  being 
pressed  Avith  a  particuLir  question,  had  declined  to  aiisicer  it  on 
the  ground  of  privilege^  and  the  prosecuting  attorney  had  aUuded 
to  the  fact  in  argument, —  it  was  observed  that  it  would  have  been 
more  proper  to  have  abstained  from  so  doing,  but  that  the  remark 
afforded  no  sufficient  ground  for  disturbins»:  the  verdict.^  As  the 
argument  of  the  opposing  counsel  is  a  fair  subject  of  comment, 
so  may  be  his  mode  of  framing  the  questions  which  he  puts  to 
hisowm  witnesses  ;  and  accordingly  it  is  not  error  to  i^ermit  coun- 
sel to  make  comments  on  the  cross-interrogatories  proposed  by 
the  adverse  party  to  a  witness  w'ho  testifies  by  deposition, 
and  to  argue  therefrom  that  the  evidence  of  that  party,  as  given 
at  the  trial,  was  incorrect.  "  If,"  said  Bigelow,  J.,  "  a  witness 
should  be  examined  on  the  stand,  the  mode  in  which  questions 
were  framed  and  put  would  certainly  be  open  to  observation. 
The  same  rule  is  applicable  wdiere  the  interrogatories  are  in  writ- 
ing." ^  Matters  which  form  a  part  of  the  record  are  gen- 
erally regarded  as  subjects  of  fair  comment.  Thus,  it  has 
been  held  that  a  written  motion  for  a  continuance,  being  a  part 
of  the  record,  may  be  commented  upon  by  the  opposite  counsel 
in  their  argument,  without  the  formality  of  having  it  offered  in 
evidence.*  So  it  is  legitimate  for  counsel,  in  argument,  in  a 
criminal  trial,  to  allude  to  what  has  transpired  in  the  case  from 
the  time  it  was  called,  through  its  entire  progress;  and  the  con- 
duct of  the  accused  or  his  counsel  in  connection  with  his  trial  is 
a  proper  subject  of  argument.  Such  mutters,  it  is  reasoned,  are 
necessarily  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  which  discre- 
tion will  not  be  controlled  except  in  cases  of  flagrant  abuse;  it 
must  a[)pear  that  the  accused  has  received  some  positive  injury, 
or  been  denied  some  material  right. ^  So,  it  has  been  held  that 
the  privilege  of  argument  is  not  abused  in  a  criminal  case,  by  the 
statement  by  the  prosecuting  counsel  that  "  the  defendant  stood 

1  Pnst,  §§  1001,  1002.  •■'  Smiley  u.  Burpco,  5  Allen  (Mass  ), 

2  I'eople   V.  Wilsou,    .">  Mich.  oOC,       5(;8. 

515.  ■•  Cross  V,  Garrett,  35  Iowa,  480 

^  Iiiiuau  V.  State,  72  Ga,  2G'J   274. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]       ABUSES    OF    RIGHT    OF    ARGUMEXT.  777 

mute,  and  said  nothing  when  accused  of  this  crime  by  the  pros- 
ecuting witness  in  the  presence  of  the  officers  of  the  hiw,"  — 
this  being  a  fact  shown  by  evidence. ^  In  a  criminal  trial,  coun- 
sel for  the  defendant  objected  to  the  solicitor-general  stating,  in 
his  concludino;  aro-ument  to  the  jury,  that  counsel  for  the  defend- 
ant  had  "  dilly-dallied'"  with  (his  case;  that  they  had  moved  for 
a  continuance  at  the  last  term  of  the  court  upon  the  absence  of  a 
witness  [naming  him] ,  and,  at  the  present  term  upon  the  same 
ground ;  that  the  court  had  sent  for  the  witness  and  had  brought 
him. into  court,  and  yet  counsel  for  the  defendant  had  not  intro- 
duced him.  It  was  held  that  these  facts  were  subjects  of  fair 
comment.^  In  a  case  of  murder,  the  prisoner  had  testified  to 
admissions  which  his  wife  had  made  to  him  respecting  her  char- 
acter for  chastity.  The  wife  was  offered  as  a  witness  to  contra- 
dict this,  and,  in  arguing  the  question  of  her  competency,  the 
State's  attorney  narrated  the  statements  made  by  the  husband 
which  he  proposed  to  disprove  by  her,  charging  that  they  were 
"  false"  and  stated  that  he  "  denied  them."  It  was  said  that 
this  was  not  outside  the  legitimate  scope  of  argument.-^ 

§   990.   Reading  Documentary  Evidence  to  the  Jury.  — It 

is  scarcely  necessary  to  say  that  counsel,  in  arguing  to  the  jury, 
are  entitled  to  read  to  them  any  instrument  which  has  been  of- 
fered and  admitted,  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  their  minds  in 
respect  to  the  same  and  of  directing  their  attention  to  the  view 
entertained  by  counsel  as  to  its  bearings.  Nor  is  it  necessary 
that  the  portion  of  the  document  which  the  counsel  proposes  to 
read,  was  read  to  them  when  offered  and  admitted  as  evidence. 
Accordingly,  Avhere  a  paper  is  put  in  evidence  by  a  party  for  a 
peculiar  purpose,  and  not  read  to  the  jury,  but  read  to  them  in 
part  only,  it  is  generally  the  right  of  the  opposing  party  to  have 
the  whole  of  it  considered  as  evidence,  and  to  read  to  them  such 
portions  of  it  as  he  may  desire.* 

1  Leonard  v.    State,  20    Tex.    App.  ••  Hassler   v.  Schumacher,    10  Wis. 
442.  419;      Uuited    States    v.    Craudcll,    4 

2  Inmau  v.  State,  72  Ga.  2G9.  Crauch  C.  C.  (U.  S.)  683.    See  ante,  §§ 

3  Poliu  V.  State,    14   Neb.  540,  548.  412,  701,835. 


778  ARGUMENT   OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thoiup.  Tl"., 

§  991.  Reading  from  the  Notes  of  the  Official  Stenog- 
rapher.—  It  is  not  an  irregularity  for  the  State's  counsel,  in  a 
criminal  trial,  in  reviewing  the  evidence  in  his  argument  to  the 
jury,  to  read  from  the  notes  of  a  stenographic  reporter  of  the 
court;  since,  his  right  to  state  the  evidence  being  clear,  it  can 
make  no  difference  whether  he  states  it  from  recollection,  or  reads 
it  from  the  reporter's  abstract,  provided  he  states  it  correctly. 
"  In  most  cases,"  said  the  court,  "  it  is  quite  probable  that  a  more 
exact  statement  of  what  the  testimony  was,  will  be  given  from 
the  stenographer's  report  than  from  memory;  but  of  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  statement,  and  what  the  testimony  actually  was, 
the  jury  will  ultimately  determine.  In  either  case,  it  devolves 
on  the  court  to  see  to  it  that  the  jury  are  not  imposed  upon  by 
any  misstatement  of  the  evidence  given  in  the  case."  ^ 

§  993.  Use  of  Papers,  Maps,  Diagranis,  etc.,  which  are  not 
in  Evidence.  —  It  seems  to  be  a  sound  conclusion  that  it  is  the 
right  of  a  party,  in  arguing  to  a  jury,  to  use  a  map  or  plan  which 
is  not  strictly  evidence  in  the  case,  for  the  purpose  of  illustrat- 
ing his  argument  and  explaining  to  the  jury  the  position  which 
he  assumes — just  as  the  teacher  makes  use  of  the  figures  on  a 
blackboard  for  the  purposes  of  illustration. ^  On  the  contrary,  it 
has  been  held  that  trial  courts  should  not  permit  counsel,  in  ar- 
guing a  case  to  the  jury,  to  induce  the  jurors  to  take  down  with 
pencil  and  ])aper  the  counseVs  calculation  of  amounts,  nor  should 
the  jurors  be  permitted  to  take  such  memoranda  to  the  jury- 
room,  to  be  used  in  making  up  their  verdict.      "  It  may  be," 

1  State  V.  McCool,  M  Kau,  013,  filG^      correctly,  as   near  as  he   could   see.'' 

2  Thus,  in  a  controversy  between  It  was  held  proper  for  the  court  toal- 
two    coterminous   owners    as    to     a      low  the  plaintiff  to  use  this  plan  for 

-boundary,  a  plan  of  two  lots,  the  loca-  the  purpose  of  explaining  to  the  jury 

tion  of  the  division  line  of  which  was  what  his  claim  was  in  relation  to  the 

the  subject  of  the  controversy,  was  location  of  the   lots,  and  where,  ac- 

raade  by  the  plaintiff's   attorney,  he  cording  to  his  claim,  the  division  line 

not  being  a  surveyor,  and  the  plan liot  was,  the  charge   of  the  court  having 

having  been  made  prior  to  the  survey  limited   his   use   of   it  strictly  to  his 

of    tlie  lauds.     The   plaintiff  testilied,  ])urpose.     Hale   v.    Rich,   48   Vt.  217, 

■without  contradiction,  that   the  plan  '12\.     See  also  Woodv.  Willard,  3G  Vt, 

was  all   rigiit  ami  located    the  land  82;  mite,  §870 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         779 

say  the  court,  "  that  a  juror,  if  he  desire  it,  may  make,  od  his 
own  motion,  memoranda  of  evidence,  or  even  of  the  points  of 
argument  of  counsel,  but  it  should  only  be  done  on  the  motion 
of  juror,  and  not  by  counsel."  ^  But  tliere  seems  to  be  no  good 
sense  in  placing  jurors  under  such  restrictions.  If  they  are  fit 
for  the  discharge  of  their  duties  at  all,  they  are  competent  to 
discharge  them  in  a  sensible  and  proper  manner,  just  as  the 
judge  would  discharge  the  same  duties  if  he  were  sitting  as  the 
trier  of  the  facts.  But  the  line  of  propriety  is  clearly  crossed 
when  counsel,  in  argument,  against  the  objection  of  the  opposite 
party,  hand  to  the  jury  a  paper,  in  order  that  they  may  deter- 
mine the  question  of  a  disputed  signature  by  a  comparison  of 
Jiandwrilinrj ?  This  mode  of  proving  handwriting  by  a  compari- 
son made  by  the  jurors  is  not  competent  under  the  rules  of  evi- 
dence,^ and  therefore  such  an  act  is  an  act  of  the  same  quality  as 
the  act  of  getting  before  the  jury,  in  argument,  any  other  inad- 
missible, evidentiary  matters.* 

§  993.  Referring-  to  the  Failure  of  the  Opposite  Party  in  a 
Civil  Case  to  Testify. — The  omission  of  the  opposite  party  in 
a  civil  case  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  for  the  purpose  of  ex- 
plaining matters  which,  from  their  nature,  lie  within  his  own 
knowledge,  unless  a  sufiicient  explanation  is  otherwise  afforded 
by  his  evidence,  is  a  fair  subject  of  comment.^  The  contrary 
conclusion  has  been  reached  in  North  Carolina,  but  upon  reason- 
ing wdiich  does  not  commend  itself  to  favorable  consideration. "^ 
In  one  case  that  court  say:  "  Th.e  fact  that  a  party  does  or  does 
not  offer  himself  as  a  witness,  standing  alone,  does  not  allow  the 
jury  to  presume  anything  for  or  against  him,  and  can  on\j  be 
the  subject  of  comment  as  to  its  propriety  or  necessity,  in  any 
given  case,  according  to  the  circumstances,  as  the  introduction 
of  any  other  witnesses  may  be  commented  upon."  ^     In  another 

1  Indianapolis   «Sbc.    R.  Co.    v.    Mil-  •»  Ante,  §  063. 

Icr,  71  111.  4()4,  472.  s  Lynch  v.  Peabody,    137  Mass.  92. 

2  Sliorb  V.  Kinzie,  100  Iml.  429.  ^  Dewies  v.    Pliillips,  (JS   N.  C.  53; 

3  Bcrryliill  v.  Kirclmer,  tX!  Pa.  St.  Chambers  v.  Gret^nvood,  08  N.  C.  274, 
480-  Benedict  v.  Flanigau,  18  S.  C.  288;  Gragg  v.  Wag-ncr,  77  N.  C.  24G. 
506-  s   c.  44  Am.  Rep.  583.  "  Devries  i\  Phillips,  63  N.  C.  53. 


780  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.     [1  Thomp.  Tl"., 

case  the  court  reasoned  that  it  is  the  privilege^  and  not  the  dutyy 
of  a  party  to  a  civil  action  to  offer  himself  as  a  witness.  "  The 
fact,"  the  court  say,  "  is  not  the  subject  of  comment  at  all  — 
certainly  not  unless  under  very  peculiar  circumstances,  which 
must  necessarily  be  passed  upon  by  the  judge  presiding  at  the 
trial,  as  a  matter  of  sound  discretion."  ^  The  sound  rule  is  the 
reverse  of  that  suggested  in  the  language  above  quoted.  In 
many  cases  the  fact  that  a  party  does  not  offer  himself  as  a  wit- 
ness, standing  alone,  will  raise  a  fair  inference  that  he  is  sup- 
pressing the  truth,  and  this  manifestly  ought  to  be  the  subject  of 
fair  comment  to  the  jury,  —  as  much  so  as  his  failure  to  call  any 
other  credible  witness  within  his  reach,  who  knows  the  facts  in 
controversy.  Rules  which  hamper  counsel  in  freely  presenting 
their  client's  cause  to  the  jury  are  not  conducive  to -the  proper 
administration  of  justice.  Modern  statutes  rendering  parties 
competent  to  testify,  and  providing  for  the  examination  of  par- 
ties, having  taken  the  last  vestige  out  of  the  old  common-law 
rule  which  shielded  a  party  to  a  civil  action  from  producing 
evidence  against  himself,  there  is  no  reason  in  the  nature  of 
things  why  the  failure  of  a  party  to  a  civil  action  to  take  the 
stand  as  his  Own  witness  should  not  be  the  subject  of  fair  com- 
ment to  the  jury,  in  like  manner  as  his  failure  to  produce  any 
other  witness  who  presumptively  knows  the  material  facts. ^ 

§  994.  Reading  Newspapers  to  the  Jury. — Whether  the 
reading  to  the  jury,  during  argument,  of  paragraphs  from  a 
newspaper,  will  be  ground  fox  a  new  trial  must,  of  course, 
depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  matter  read.  If  it  is 
evidentiary  in  its  nature,  or  whether  evidentiary  or  not,  of 
a  tendency  to  excite  prejudice  against  the  losing  party,  it 
will  be  ground  for  a  new  trial.  It  was  so  held  where,  in  a 
suit  brought  against  a  railway  company  for  a  personal  injury  to 
an  employe,  the  plaintiff's  counsel  read  to  the  jury  a  newspaper 
article  intended  to  cast  a  stigma  upon  all  railway  comjianies  on 
account  of  their  recklessness  in  caring  for  the  lives  of  their  em- 

^  Grags  V.  Wagner,  77  N.  C.  246.  ^  p^sty  §§  1001-1003. 


Tit.  lY,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  OF  right  of  argument.         781 

ployes.^  "  It  is  not  proper,  however,  to  permit  counsel  to  read 
newspaper  comments  upon  the  case  on  trial,  nor  upon  facts  con- 
nected with  it,  nor  upon  like  matters.  In  short,  extracts  can 
only  be  used  for  the  mere  purposes  of  illustration,  and  never  as 
statements  of  facts  or  expressions  of  opinion ;  nor  can  they  be 
used  under  the  cover  of  illustrations,  when  they  contain  state- 
ments of  facts  or  expressions  of  opinion,  concerning  the  par- 
ticular case  in  hearing,  or  cases  of  like  character."  ^  But  it  is  a 
rule  in  this  connection  that  prejudice  from  such  a  course  of  con- 
duct on  the  part  of  counsel  will  not  be  presumed,  but  must 
appear,  in  order  to  warrant  a  reviewing  court  in  granting  a  new 
trial  on  this  ground.  Thus,  where  it  appeared  from  the  bill  of 
exceptions  that  the  counsel  of  the  successful  party  read,  as  a  part 
of  his  argument  and  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  it,  a  slip  cut 
from  a  newspaper  containing  the  form  of  a  prom'issory  note  call- 
ing for  $10,  and  then,  by  folding  it  in  a  peculiar  manner,  showed 
that  it  assumed  the  form  of  a  note  for  $279  ;  and  the  bill  of  excep- 
tions showed  that  the  counsel  commented  upon  the  note  read 
from  the  slip,  ))ut  did  not  state  what  his  comments  were,  —  the 
Supreme  Court  could  not  see  any  prejudicial  error,  but  presumed 
that  the  comments  were  such  as  were  proper  for  the  counsel  to 
make.  "If,"  said  Elliott,  J.,  "the  counsel  had  written  the 
paper  which  he  used  for  the  purpose  of  illustration,  it  would 
scarcely  be  contended  that  it  was  improper  for  him  to  make  use 
of  it  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  the  manner  in  which  a  man 
not  used  to  business  might  be  imposed  upon  and  induced  to  be- 
lieve he  was  signing  one  instrument,  when  in  fact  he  was  actually 
signino;  one  of  an  altojjether  different  character."  ^ 

§   995.    Reading  Books   of   Science  to  the  Jviry.  — In  the 

former  chapter  the  circumstances  under  which  books  of  the  Jaio 
inay  be  read  to  the  jury  in  argument  were  considered,  from  which 

i  Chicago   &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Bragouier,  Ins.  Co.  r.  Cheever,  3G  Ohio  St.  201 ; 

13  Bradw.  (111.)  467.  s.  c.  38  Am.  Hep.  573. 

-  Baldwin  v.  Bricker,  86   Ind.  221,  ^  Baldwin  v.  Briciier,  86  lud.    221, 

opinion  by  Elliott,  J.,  citing  Thomp.  &  223. 
M.  on  Juries,  §  351  and  authorities; 


782  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOmp.   Tl'.^ 

it  will  appear  that  the  reading  of  books  of  the  law  stands  on  this 
peculiar  footing:  that  whereas,  juries  are  in  criminal  trials  and 
in  actions  for  libel,  judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  of  the  fact,  it 
necessarily  follows  that  counsel  have  the  right  to  argue  the  law  to 
them,  so  that  they  do  not  commit  the  indecency  of  arguing 
against  the  law  as  laid  down  by  the  court;  in  the  making  of  which 
argument  they  nuist  necessarily  have  the  right  to  read  to  the 
jury  extracts  from  books  of  the  law.  This,  at  least,  is  the 
limit  of  the  right,  as  laid  down  by  those  courts  which  uphold  to 
the  fullest  extent  the  doctiine  that,  in  criminal  trials  and  in  ac- 
tions for  libel,  juries  are  judges  of  the  law  as  well  as  of  the  facts. 
But  the  reading  of  other  books,  and  notably  books  of  science,  to 
the  jury  rests  upon  a  different  footing,  which  will  now  be  consid- 
ered.    And  first  it  must  be  observed, — 

§  996.  That  Such  Books  are  not  Evidence. — The  rule  is 
that  i)rofessional  books,  books  of  science  — e.  g,  medical  books  — 
are  not  admissible  in  evidence,  though  experts  may  be  asked 
their  judgment  and  the  grounds  of  it,  which  may  be  founded  on 
books,  as  a  part  of  their  general  knowledge.^  The  reason  of  the 
rule  is,  obviously,  that  if  the  authors  were  present  they  could  not 
be  examined  without  being  sworn  and  exposed  to  a  cross-exam- 
ination. Their  declarations  or  statements,  whether  merely  ver- 
bal, or  written,  or  printed  and  published  in  books,  are  not 
admissible."  ^  While  it  is  said  that  a  general  historij  may  be  read 
from,  yet  this  is  only  to  refresh  the  memory  of  the  court  as  to 
something  which  it  is  supposed  to  know  ;  that  is  of  which  it  takes 
judicial  notice.-^  Ai)plying  this  rule  it  is  held  that  quotations 
from  medical  books  are  nxjt  admissible  as  evidence,  when  offered 
independently,  or  when  read  by  witnesses.  So,  in  those 
jurisdictions  where  it  is  conceded  that,  under  appropriate 
restrictions,  domestic  law  books  may  be  read  to  the  jury, 
yet    the    reason  assigned  for    allowing   this   is   that  the  court, 

Ok'lvitiu.  Easley,  1  Jones  L.(N.  C.)  2  Battle,  J.,  iu    Melvin  v.    Easley, 

38();  Collier  u.  Simp.sou,  aCaiT.  &.P.  73;  supra;  Stilling  o.  Thorp,  supra. 
Ktillinu;  v.  Tliorp,  54  Wis.  528;  North-  ^  Northiugtou  v.  State,  supra. 

iugton  V   State,  78  Teuu.  (U  Lea)  424. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX. J     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         7ii3 

being  the  judge  of  the  law,  may  correct  the  counsel  as 
to  the  law  so  read,  or  as  to  the  application  of  it.  Nay,  the  court 
may  prohibit  counsel  from  reading  to  juries  extracts  from  books 
of  law  ^vhich  have  no  pertinency  to  the  issues  on  trial.  But  the 
opinions  of  medical  experts  are  in  the  nature  of  facts,  and  as 
such  must,  like  all  other  facts  of  which  judicial  notice  is  not  tak- 
en, be  established  by  the  testimony  of  living  witnesses.  They 
cannot  be  proved  by  writings  which  are  in  the  nature  of  hearsay 
declarations,  which  come  from  persons  who  are  not  present  testi- 
fying as  witnesses,  and  who  are  not  even  shown  to  be  competent 
to  express  scientitic  opinions.^  In  so  ruling  in  a  criminal  case, 
Baron  Alderson  said  to  counsel:  "I  should  not  allow  you  to 
read  a  work  on  foreign  law.  Any  person  who  was  properly 
conversant  with  it  might  be  examined;  but  then  he  adds  his  own 
personal  knowledge  and  experience  to  the  information  he  may 
have  derived  from  books.  We  must  have  the  evidence  of  indi- 
viduals, not  their  written  opinions.  We  should  be  inundated 
with  books,  if  we  were  to  hold  otherwise."^  The  doctrine  has 
been  reaffirmed  in  many  cases. ^ 

§  997.   Instauces  Affirming  and  Disaffirnnng"  tlie  foregoing 

Rule.  — Thus,  where  it  is  a  material  question,  upon  a  trial  be- 
fore a  jury,  whether  a  party  has  been  treated  by  a  medical 
practitioner  in  a  proper  and  skillful  manner,  it  is  error  to  permit 
counsel,  in  arguing  to  the  jury,  to  read  an  extract  from  a  medical 
work,  giving  the  opinion  of  the  writer  as  to  the  pro})er  mode  of 
treatment  to  be  followed  in  such  a  case.* On  the  contrary, 

1  People  V.  Wheeler,    60  Cal.    580,  Legg  v.  Drake,    1  Ohio  St.  286;  Wade 

584;  s.  c.    44  Am.    Rep.  70    (deuyiug  ?;.  De  Witt,  20  Tex.  401 ;  Ripou  u.  Bittel, 

Bowman  v.  Woods,  1   Greene   (Iowa),  30  Wis.  619;  State  v.  Sartou,  2  Strobh. 

441,445).  L.   (S.    C.)  60;  Collier  v.  Simpsou,  5 

-  Reg.  V.  Crouch,  1  Cox  C.  C.  94.  Carr.   &   P.    73;    Carter     v.    State,    2 

3  Reg.  r.  Taylor,  13  Cox  C.  C.   77;  lud.   617;    Attoruey-Geueral   v.  Plate 

State   V.    O'Brieu,  7   R.  I.   338;  Ash-  Glass    Co.,  1    Austr.    39;    Liming   v. 

worth  V.  Kittridge,   12  Cush.  (Mass.)  State,  1  Chaud.    (Wis.)    178;  Green  w. 

193 •,  Commonwealth  v.  Wilson,  1  Gray  Cornell,  1  City  Hall  Rec.  (N.  Y.)  14. 

(Mass.)  338;    Washburn  v.   Cuddihy,  ^  Gale  v.  Rector,  5  Bradw.  (111.)  481, 

8  Gray  (Mass.),  431;  Commonwealth  484. 

V    Brown,    121    Mass.    81.     Compare 


784  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOllip.  Tr., 

where,  in  a  criminal  trial,  the  prosecuting  attorney  first  proved 
by  the  testimony  of  a  practicing  physician  that  a  certain  medical 
work  was  a  book  "  recognized  by  the  medical  profession  as  good 
authority  on  all  subjects  therein  treated  of,"  it  was  held  com- 
petent to   allow  him  to  read    extracts   from  it.^ In  a  case 

of  murder,  where  the  homicide  grew  out  of  a  difficulty  between 
two  "  gentlemen"  one  of  whom,  after  having  vainly  endeavored 
to  obtain  satisfaction  according  to  the  "  code,"  proceeded  to 
"  post"  the  other  as  a  coward,  it  was  held  not  such  an  irregu- 
larity as  required  a  new  trial,  that  counsel  for  the  State,  in  his 
opening  argument,  read  extracts  from  a  standard  work  on  duel- 
ling and  also  from  an  essay  on  the  same  subject  written  by  him- 
self, which  laid  down  the  rules  obtaining  "  among  gentlemen  " 
as  to  blows,  insults  and  apologies,  the  "lie  direct,"  the  "  amende 
honorable,'''  etc.,  and  which  gave  an  account  of  the  unhappy 
life  of  one  who  had  killed  his  adversary  in  a  duel.  The  court 
could  not  say  that  this  was  entirel^Mmpertinent  to  the  case  under 
consideration,  or  beyond  the  scope  of  the  limits  allowed  to  ad- 
vocacy.^ 

§  998.  AVhetlier  such  Books  may  be  Read  for  Purposes  of 
Argviment  or  Illustration.  — Upon  this  question  there  is  a  dif- 
ference of  opinion,  involving  what  might  be  called  a  strict  and 
liberal  construction  of  a  well-settled  and  obvious  rule.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  is  held  that,  such  books  not  being  admissible  as  evi- 
dence, it  is  not  permissible  for  counsel  to  read  to  the  jury  extracts 
from  them  by  way  of  argument  or  illustration  ;  since  this  would 
have  the  effect  of  enabling  counsel  to  get  before  the  jury  a  species 
of  evidence  which  the  law  rejects  as  incompetent.^  It  has  even 
been  held  that  an  expert  should  not  be  allowed,  in  giving  his 
testimony,  to  read  from  a  work  on  medical  jurisprudence.*     On 

1  Merkle  v.  State,  37  Ahi.  13i)  (fol-  Ashworth     v.     Kittridse,      12     Cush. 
lowing  Staiuleumier  r.  AVilliaiiisou,  29  (Maiss.)   193;    People   v.  Wheeler,  GO 
Ala.  5G6;  Acct.  Bowiuau  v.  Woods,  1  Cal.  581;  s.  c.  H  Am,  Rep.  70. 
Greene  (Iowa),  445).  *  Commomvcalth  v.  Sturtivant,  117 

2  Cavauah  v.  State,  56  Miss.  300,  Mass.  139.  Compare  Yoe  v.  People, 
308.  49  111.  410,  412. 

3  Reg.   V.  Taylor,  13  Cox  C.  C.  77; 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]       ABUSES    OF    RIGHT    OF    ARGUMENT.  785 

the  other  liand,  it  has  been  held  that  counsel  may  properly  be 
allowed,  by  way  of  argument  or  illustration,  to  read  a  pertinent 
quotation  or  extract  from  a  work  of  science  or  art,  as  well  as  a 
classical,  historical  or  other  like  publication,  because  it  would 
make  no  difference  whether  repeated  by  counsel  from  recollection 
or  read  from  a  book;   though  it  would  be  an  abuse  of  privileoe 
for  counsel  to  make  the  right  to  read  such  matter  the  means  of 
getting  improper  matter  before  the  jury.i     But  the  followino- 
quahfication  has  been  made  to  this  rule:    "The  matter  read  or 
stated  should  be  pertinent  to  the  subject  of  inquiry,  and  so  far 
calculated  to  elucidate  it  as  to  aid  the  jury  in  a  better  under- 
standing of  the  evidence   produced  at  the  trial." '^     So    in   an 
English  criminal  case,  it  was  held  that  counsel  had  the  rio-ht  'to 
read  to  the  jury  the  general  observations  of  a  learned  Jud-e 
made  in  a  case  tried  some  years  before,  on  the  nature  and  effect 
of  circumstantial  evidence,  if  he  adopted  them  as  his  own  opin- 
ions and  made  them  a  part  of  his  address  to  the  jury.^     It  is  also 
conceded  that  the  trial  court  may,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound 
discretion,  determine  how  far  the  public  time  shall  be  taken  up 
m  this  way.4     Other  courts  have  settled  upon  the  broader  rule 
that  the  extent  to  which  counsel  in  criminal  trials  mav  read  books 
to  the  jury  is  a  matter  confided   to  the  discretion  of  the  trial 
court,  which  discretion  will  not  be  reviewed  unless  in  clear  cases 
of  abuse  ;^  from  which  it  follows  quite  clearly  that  where  the 
trial  court  refuses  to  permit  counsel  to  read  from  a  book  not  in- 
troduced in  evidence  to  the  jury,  this  will  be  no  ground  of  re- 
versal except  in  very  clear  cases. ^ 

§  999.  Instructing  the  Jury  that  Such  Books  are  not  Evi- 
dence.—Where  this  practice  has  been  permitted,  it  is  the  clear 
duty  of  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  extracts  from  the 

1  Legg  V.  Drake,   1   Ohio  St.  287;  3  K^g.  v.  Courvoisier,  9  Carr.  &  P 

reaffirmed  in  Union  Central  Life  Ins.  3G--> 

Co.  -•  Cheever,  36  Oliio  St.  201,  209;  *  Legg  ..  Drake,  1  Ohio  St.  287. 

..  c.  38  Am.  Rep.  573.  .  j.empsey   ..    State,    3   Tex.  App. 

Union   Central   LifP   Ins.    Co.    v.  429;    Ilines  ^^.  State,  3  Tex.  App.  483 
Cheever,  supra.  e  ^Vade  ..  De  Witt,  20  Tex.  |l8       ' 


50 


786  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.         [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

books  which  have  been  read  to  them  are  not  evidence,  but  simply 
the  theories  of  medical  men.^  But  whether  such  an  instruction 
will  cure  the  error  and  prejudice  is  quite  another  question.  In 
Indiana,  where  a  book  purporting  to  be  a  medical  work  had  been 
read  by  counsel  to  the  jury,  and  the  court  afterwards  instructed 
them  that  the  extract  w^as  to  be  regarded  not  in  anywise  as  evi- 
dence, it  was  held  that  no  reversible  error  had  been  committed.^ 
The  Supreme  Court  of  California,  on  the  contrary,  in  an  elab- 
orate judgment  on  this  subject,  regard  the  Indiana  case  as  not 
having  been  well  decided.^  The  question  comes  back  to  the  con- 
flict of  opinion  which  obtains  on  the  question  whether  the  preju- 
dice which  flows  from  the  admission  of  incompetent  evidence  is 
cured  by  the  action  of  the  court  in  subsequently  instructing  the 
jury  to  disregard  it.* 

§  1000.  Illustrations. — Where  the  court  allowed  the  counsel  for 
the  State  to  read  to  the  jury,  against  the  objection  of  the  prisoner,  the 
evidence  of  Charles  H.  Porter,  who,  as  professor  of  chemistry,  had 
given  testimony  in  a  criminal  trial  in  another  State,  counsel  reading 
from  the  published  report  of  the  trial  of  People  v.  Hartung.,^  it  was 
held  that  the  ruling  was  erroneous,  and  the  court,  speaking  through 
Breese,  C.  J.,  said :  "If  the  State's  attorney,  in  such  a  case  or  in  any 
case,  read  from  medical  books  in  his  argument  to  the  jury,  the  court 
should  instruct  them  that  such  books  are  not  evidence,  but  theories 
simply  of  medical  men.  To  permit  testimony  given  in  another  State 
to  be  used  as  evidence  against  a  prisoner  on  trial  in  this  State,  was 
the  height  of  injustice,  as  the  prisoner  had  no  opportunity  to  cross- 
examine  the  witness  or  to  meet  his  testimony  by  other  evidence."  ^  In 
a  civil  action  for  damages  for  overflowing  the  plaintiff's  land  and  in- 
juring the  plaintiff's  machinery  by  backwater  from  the  defendant's  mill- 
dam,  the  plaintiff  was  allowed  to  read  extracts  from  a  book  called 
"Evans'  Millwright's  Guide,"  in  his  closing  argument  to  the  jury, 
although  the  defendant  objected.  The  court  instructed  the  jury  that 
■  extracts  read  from  a  scientific  work  were  not  even  a  prima  facie  author- 
ity, but,  like  the  argument  of  counsel,  or  other  thing  adduced  in   illus- 

1  Yoe  V.  People,  49111.410,412.  *  Ilopt  v.  People,  7  U.  S.  Sup.  Ct. 

2  Harvey  v.  State,  40  lud.  51G.  Rep.  (JH;  21  Am.  Law  Rev.  459. 

3  People  V.  Wheeler,    GO  Cal.   581;  -'''  4  Park.  Cr.  (N.  Y.)  297. 

s.  c.  44  Am.  Rep.  70.  .        ^  Yoe  v.  People,  49  111.  410,  412. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         787 

tration,  might  be  satisf actor}'  to  the  jury,  or  might  not.  It  was  held 
that  in  view  of  the  admonition  of  the  court,  no  ground  for  new  trial  was 
presented.  Hovey,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
said :  "  Reason  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  reason  because  it  happens 
to  be  read  from  a  book ;  and  we  think  we  would  be  adopting  a  very 
difficult  rule  to  enforce  if  we  should  attempt  to  compel  counsel  to  use 
their  own  arguments  for  every  position  they  might  assume."  ^ 

§  lOOl.  Referring  to  the  Failure  of  the  Prisoner  to  Testify  in 
His  Own  Behalf.  —  Since  the  passage  of  statutes  in  most  Amer- 
ican jurisdictions  enabling  the  accused  person,  in  a  criminal  case, 
to  testify  in  his  own  behalf,  it  has  become  an  important  question 
whether,  in  case  the  accused  does  not  avail  himself  of  this  priv- 
ilege, the  State's  attorney  may  be  permitted  to  comment  upon 
the  fact  in  his  argument  to  the  jury.  In  some  of  the  States  the 
statutes  ^vhich  thus  enable  an  accused  person  to  testify  contain 
the  provision  that  his  neglect  or  refusal  to  do  so  shall  not  raise 
an}"  presumption  of  guilt,  nor  shall  the  circumstance  be  referred 
to  by  the  State's  attorney.'*  The  courts,  whether  following  the 
express  language  of  statutes  or  attempting  to  carry  out  the 
analogies  of  the  old  law,  generally  hold  that  the  failure  of  the 
accused  person,  in  a  criminal  trial,  to  testify  in  his  own  behalf, 
cannot  be  referred  to  by  the  State's  counsel  in  their  argument  to 
the  jury,  and  that  to  permit  a  reference  to  it  is  error  for  which 
a  conviction  will  be  reversed;  -^  though  if  he  does  take  the  witness 

1  Cory  V.  Silcox,  6  Ind.  30.  Knight  v.  State,  70  Ind.  375;  Morrison 

2  Kansas  Laws  1871,  ch.  118,  §1;  v.  State,  7(5  lud.  335,  338;  State  v.  Banks 
MissouriRev.  Stat.,  §  1919.  The  Maine  (Me.),  3  New  Eng.  Rep.  240;  Corn- 
statute  recites  that  the  fact  that  the  de-  monwealth  v.  Harlow,  110  Mass.  411. 
fendant  in  a  criminal  prosecution  does  Contra,  Stover  v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  315 ; 
not  testify  in  his  own  behalf  shall  not  •  Price  v.  Com.,  77  Va.  393;  State  v. 
be  evidence  of  his  guilt.  Maine  Rev.  Martin,  7-t  Mo.  547;  State  v.  Banks,  3 
Stat.,  ch.  134,  §  19.  New  Eng.   Rep.  240;  s.  c.    78  Me.   490 

3  States.  Browntield,  15  Mo.  App.  (superseding  the  contrary  rule  in  State 
593;  Crandall  v.  People,  2  Lans.  v.  Bartlett,  55  Me.  200,220;  States. 
(N.  y.)  309;  Showalter  v.  State,  84  Lawrence,  57  Me.  574,  and  Stale  v. 
Ind.  563;  State  v.  Mosley,  31  Kan.  Cleaves,  59  Me.  298).  For  further  ob- 
355;  State  u.  Graham,  17.  N.  "W.  Rep.  servations  on  the  policy  of  statutes 
192;  Long  u.  State,  5G  Ind.  182;  Cora-  admitting  prisoners  to  testify,  see 
monwealth  v.    Scott,    123  Mass.  239;  Peoples.  Jones,  31  Cal.  573;  People  u. 


788 


ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 


stand,  his  testimony  becomes  the  subject  of  fair  comment,  like 
that  of  any  other  witness.^ 

§  1002.  Instances  under  the  foregoing  Rule.  —  In  Ohio  and  Kansas, 
it  seems  to  be  conceded  that  the  incidental  allusion  by  the  prosecuting 
attorney  (not  in  argument  to  the  jury)  to  the  failure  of  the  accused  to 
take  the  stand  in  his  own  behalf  may  not,  under  particular  circumstances, 
require  the  granting  of  a  new  trial. '^  In  Missouri,  the  statement  of 
the  prosecuting  attorney,  in  his  argument  to  the  jury  in  a  case  of  lar- 
ceny, "  that  no  attempt  had  been  made  by  the  defendant  to  explain  his 
possession  of  the  property,"  was  not  regarded  by  the  reviewing  court 
as  referring  to  the  fact  that  the  defendant  himself  might  have  been  ex- 
amined as  a  witness  if  he  had  so   chosen,  and  was  therefore  held  not  a 

ground  for  a  new  trial. -^ In  one  jurisdiction  the  rule  is  that,  if  any 

objectionable  comments  are  made  by  the  State's  counsel,  upon  the  fail- 
ure of  the  accused  to  take  the  witness   stand    in  his  own  behalf,  his 


Farrell,  31  Cal.  583.  In  a  recent  case 
in  Maine,  State  v.  Banks,  supra,  the 
history  of  the  practice  iu  that  State  ou 
tliis  subject  is  thus  given  in  the  opin- 
ion of  tlie  court  delivered  by  Virgin, 
J.:  "In  18<!4r,  for  the  first  time,  a 
person  charged  with  commission  of  a 
•criminal  offense  was  made, '  at  his  own 
request,  and  not  otherwise,  a  com- 
petent witness.'  Stat.  1804,  ch.  280. 
After  this  statute  took  effect,  county 
attorneys,  where  the  accused  did  not 
elect  to  testify,  were  allowed,  in  argu- 
ment to  comment  ou  tlie  fact  to  the 
jury.  State  v.  Bartlett,  55  Me.  220; 
State  V.  Lawrence,  57  Me.  574;  State 
V.  Cleaves,  59  Me,  298.  This  practice 
continued  for  fifteen  years,  and  while 
it  operated  favorably  for  innocent  per- 
sons, it  resulted  disastrously  to  the 
guilty  who  would  not  add  i)erjury  to 
the  crime  charged.  Thereupon  the 
Legislature,  believing  that  the  consti- 
tutional provision  which  declares  that 
'  the  accused  shall  not  be  compelled 
to  furnish  or  give  evidence  against 
himself    (Decl.  Rights,  §  5),  like  the 


rain  descending  upon  the  innocent  and 
guilty  alike,  and  looking  to  a  more 
careful  protection  of  this  right,  enacted 
that  '  the  fact  that  the  defendant  iu  a 
criminal  prosecution  does  not  testify 
in  his  own  behalf  shall  not  be  evidence 
of  his  guilt.'  Stat.  1879,  ch.  92,  §  1; 
Rev.  Stat.,  ch.  134,  §  19.  AYe  think 
the  intent  of  the  statute  is  that  the 
jury,  in  determining  their  verdict, 
shall  entirely  exclude  from  their  con- 
sideration the  fact  that  the  defendant 
did  not  elect  to  testify,  substantially 
as  if  the  law  d[id  not  allow  him  to  be  a 
wituess.  Commonwealth  v.  Harlow, 
110  Mass.  411;  Commonwealth  v. 
Scott,  123  Mass.  241,"  It  has  been 
supposed  that  the  fact  that  a  party 
does  not  testify  is  not  a  circumstance 
against  him,  unless  there  is  sufficient 
evidence  to  justify  a  finding  against 
him.  Ilorton  v.  Parsons  (N.  Y.  Sup 
Ct.),  24  Week.  Dig.  234. 

^  Ante,  §§  64(;,  989. 

^  Calkins  v.  State,  18  Ohio  St.  306; 
State  V.  Mosley,  31  Kan.  355. 

3  State  V.  Preston,  77  Mo.  294. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         789 

remedy  is  to  object  to  them  at  the  time,  and  to  ask  the  judge  to  in- 
struct the  jury  that  they  should  not  be  considered  by  them  to  his 
prejudice;  that,  in  such  a  case,  the  judge  is  not  required  to  treat  the 
whole  trial  as  a  nullity  because  of  such  remarks,  and  withdraw  the  case 

from  the  jury.i But  another  court  goes  to  the  length  of  holding 

ihat,  where  counsel  for  the  State,  in  their  argument,  are  guilty  of  the 
highly  improper  and  unprofessional  conduct  of  referring  to  the  fact  of 
the  failure  of  the  accused  to  take  the  witness  stand  in  his  own  behalf, 
such  refei-ence  being  prohibited  by  statute,  a  conviction  will  be  reversed, 
although  the  court  may  have  interposed  and  rebuked  the  impropriety ; 
since  in  such  a  case  it  cannot  be  known  how  far  the  remark  may  have 
prejudiced  the  rights  of  the  accused. ^  Nor  will  an  instruction  admon- 
ishing the  jury  to  pay  no  attention  to  the  remark,  cure  the  prejudice. ^ 

§  1003.  Comments  by  the  Author  on  the  Foregoing  Rule. — The 
foregoing  rule  is  a  striking  illustration  of  the  extent  to  which  old  ideas, 
however  foolish,  when  constantly  reiterated  by  grave  and  earnest  men, 
will  pass  unchallenged  as  the  very  essence  of  wisdom, —  a  thing  which  is 
every  day  illustrated  in  the  idiotic  religious  creeds  which  take  hold  of 
the  beliefs  of  the  most  learned  men.  It  is  an  attempt  to  invest  accused 
persons  with  this  privilege  and  at  the  same  time  to  throw  around  them 
the  shield  of  the  ancient  maxim  nemo  seipsum  accnsare  teiietiir,  thus 
keeping  alive  the  maxim  after  the  state  of  things  which  called  it  into 
existence  has  wholly  passed  away.  The  maxim  had  its  origin  in  times 
when  it  was  the  practice  to  put  accused  persons  to  the  torture,  for  the 
purpose  of  compelling  them  to  disclose  the  guilt  of  themselves  and  their 
accomplices,  and  its  original  meaning  was  that  no  one  should  be  com- 
pelled, by  torture^  or  by  any  other  compulsory  means,  to  accuse  himself. 
If  we  adhere  to  the  maxim  in  its  original  meaning,  we  proceed  upon  a 
foundation  of  common  sense  and  of  obvious  justice.  But  there  is  no 
sound  reason  why  a  prisoner  should  not  be  interrogated,  as  is  done  in 
continental  countries,  in  respect  of  the  circumstances  surroundino-  the 
alleged  crime,  his  answers  and  his  manner  of  sustaining  the  examina- 
tion being  fair  subjects  of  consideration  by  the  jury.  Far  less  reason 
is  there  for  the  conclusion  that  he  may  avail  himself  of  the  privilege 
of  becoming  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  and  yet  the  triers  of  the  facts 
are  so  far  to  stultify  their  own  understanding  as  not  to  draw  any  unfavor- 

^  Com.  V.  Worcester,  U-t  Mass.  58,  3  state  v.  Balch,  31  Kau.  405;  s.  c, 

Gl.  2Pac.  Rep.  GOO. 

2  Augelo  V.  People,  96  111.  209. 


790  ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOllip.  Tl',, 

able  inference  against  him  if  lie  declines  the  privilege.     In  every  other 
situation   the  rule  of  reason  has  its  sway.     Co)itra  spoliatorem  omnia 
prcesumimtur ;  and,  as  already  seen,  where  a  party  in  a  civil  trial  fails  to 
produce  material  witnesses,  depositions  or  documents  within  his  reach, 
the  fact  creates  a  presumption  against  him  and  becomes  a  subject  of 
fair  comment  in  argument  to  the  jury.i     But  here  the  tenderness  of  the 
law  toward  the  criminal  classes  is  so  great,  that  the  ordinary  methods 
by   which  men   reason  in   arriving  at  truth  are  to   be  put  aside.     A 
hardened  counterfeiter  or  thief  sits  in  the  prisoner's  seat,  and  he  above 
all  others  could  if  he  would,  and  would  if  he  could,  explain  the  incul 
patory  circumstances  shown  in  the  evidence  against  him ;  but  it  is  his 
privilege  to  say  not  one  word  ;   and,  lest  the  jury  should  draw  from  his 
silence  that  inference  which  the  experience  of  men  draws  in  every  like 
situation  from  the  failure  of  him  to  explain  who  best  can  explain,  the 
prosecuting  attorney  is  not  to  allude  to  the  circumstances  in  argument, 
but  is  to  assist,   by  silence,  in  concealing  from  the  jury,  if  possible,  the 
fact  that  the  law  allows  the  prisoner  to  take  the  witness  stand  and  ex- 
plain, if  he  can.     Such  efforts   are  not  only  ineffective,  but  they   are 
puerile.     As  the  intelligence  of  the  community  constantly  rises,  juries 
will  seldom  be  assembled   to  try  criminal  cases  who  do  not  know  that 
the  law  extends  to  ever}^  accused  person  the  privilege  of  being  a  witness 
for  himself.     They  justly  regard  it  as  a  privilege  which  was  intended  to 
be  the  shield  of  the  innocent  and  not  the  shield  of  the  guilty.     They 
know  that  an  innocent  man,  who  can  explain,  will  always  attempt  do  so. 
They  bring  to  the  discharge  of  their  duties  the  processes  of   reasoning 
upon  which  men  proceed  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life.     They  cannot  be 
trained,  for  the  purposes  of  a  single  trial,  to  stultifying  common  sense, 
in  order  that  guilt  may  be  screened   and  crime  go  unpunished.     An}' 
attempt   to   reach  such  a  result,  by  withholding  from   their  minds  a 
knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  law  on  the  subject,  must  be  as  fantastic 
as  the  attempt  of   the  old   hen  which  has  hatched  a  litter  of  ducks,  to 
keep  them  from  running  into  the  water.     There  is  especially  less  reason 
for  this  rule  under  modern  holdings  which  limit  the  cross-examination 
of  the  accused  to   the  matters  touched  upon  in  his  direct  examination, 
and  which  prohibit  the  putting  of  disparaging  questions  to  him  touching 
the  circumstances  of  his  past  life.-     The  privilege  of  withholding  eoi- 
dence  and  concealing  the  truth  is  an  abomination  which  must  be  rooted 
out  of  the  law. 

1  Ante,  §§  453,  704,  705,  089.  2  ^^te,  §§  (;52,  G53. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         791 

§  1004,  Comnientiug  on  Failure  to  call  Prisoner's  Wife 
as  a  Witness.  — The  privilege  of  the  defendant  in  this  regard 
should,  by  analogy,  be  extended  also  to  him  in  respect  of  his 
wife,  where  the  statute  allows  him  to  call  her  as  a  witness  but 
prohibits  the  State  from  doing  it.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  in 
a  jurisdiction  where  there  is  a  statute  enabling  a  husband  or  wife 
to  testify  for  each  other,  that  it  is  an  irregularity,  for  which  a 
conviction  will  be  reversed,  that  the  State's  attorney,  in  his  ar- 
gument to  the  jury,  commented  upon  the  fact  that  the  wife  of 
the  accused  was  not  called  in  the  particular  case;  since,  if  either 
marital  partner  were  obliged  to  call  the  other,  the  failure  to  do  so 
would  become  evidence,  and  the  sanctities  of  the  marital  relation 
would  be  thereby  broken  up,  and  the  policy  of  the  statute  de- 
feated.^  But  in  Texas,  where  the  most  extreme  views  are 
generally  taken  in  favor  of  the  rights  of  defendants  in  criminal 
cases,  it  has  been  held  not  error  to  allow  the  prosecuting  attorney, 
in  his  closing  argument,  to  comment  on  the  failure  of  the  de- 
fendant's wife  to  appear  and  testify  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf, 
the  nature  of  the  case  being  such  as  to  make  her  an  appropriate 
witness.^ 

§  1005.  Prisoner's  Counsel  may  enlarge  on  the  Prisoner's 
Right  to  be  silent.  —  Moreover,  it  has  been  ruled  that,  "  as  there 
is  danger  that  the  jury,  knowing  that  the  law  now  permits  a  de- 
fendant to  testify,  may  draw  inferences  against  him  from  his 
omission  so  to  do,  his  counsel  may  properly,  in  addressing  the 
jury,  insist  and  enlarge  upon  his  constitutional  and  legal  right  in 
this  respect,"  without  the  danger  of  the  matter  being  made  the 
subject  of  unfavorable  comment  by  the  State's  counsel.^ 

§  1006.  Illustration  of  the  Foregoing. — On  the  trial  of  a  joint 
indictment  against  two  persons  for  breaking  and  entering  a  dwelHng 
house  in  the  night  time  for  burglary,  neither  of  them  testified.  Their 
counsel  in  his  closing  argument  alluded  to  this  fact,  and  to  the  reasons 

1  Johnson  v.  State,  63  Miss,  313,  editing  attorney  from  referring  to  the 

2  Mercer  V.  State,  17  Tex.  App.  4(;3,  faihire  of  a  wife  to  testify  on  behalf  of 
467.     The  Kansas  statute  (Kan.  Laws      her  husband, 

1871,  cli.  118,  §  1),  prohibits  the  pros-  "  Com.  v.  Scott,  123  Mass,  239 


792  ARGUMENT  OF   COUNSEL.  [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

for  it,  and  stated  that  the  fact  they  did  not  testify  should  not  raise  any 
presum[)tion  against  them,  and  made  the  following  remarks:  ""What 
good  would  the  testimony  of  these  people  be  in  proving  their  inno- 
cence? If  guilty,  would  they  confess  it?  If  innocent,  they  are  to  be 
proved  so  by  other  lips  than  thei.rs.  I  have  been  endeavoring  to  dis- 
cover the  real  facts  in  this  case,  and  have  never  asked  Scott  or 
Dunlap  or  Mrs.  Scott  about  it,  and  have  never  spoken  to  these  men,  nor 
heard  their  voices  except  as  they  were  challenging  the  jury.  They 
could  add  by  their  word  nothing  for  me,  either  for  or  against  them. 
I  tell  you,  gentlemen,  I  never  yet  called  a  prisoner  to  the  stand. 
I  never  have  been  through  the  farce,  and  I  could  not  be  here  to 
ask  that  these  men  might  have  their  shackles  taken  off  and  go 
upon  the  stand  and  declare  their  innocence  to  3'ou,  Their  testimony 
would  be  utterly  worthless.  When  Professor  Webster  was  tried 
for  the  murder  of  Dr.  Parkman,  his  two  daughters  went  upon  the 
stand,  and  delivered  important  testimony.  The  lawyers  for  the  gov- 
ernment asked  no  questions,  but  bowed  them  graciously  from  the 
stand,  because  they  knew  that,  from  the  lips  of  those  daughters,  plead- 
ing for  the  life  of  their  father,  no  testimony  could  come  that  would 
weigh  with  the  jurors.  And  so,  gentlemen,  as  I  said  before,  I  could 
not  have  these  men  unshackled  to  protest  their  innocence  to  you.  If 
they  went  on  the  witness  stand,  what  could  they  do  but  deny  the  testi- 
mony of  Edson,  that  he  met  them  on  Lexington  avenue  and  Fiftieth 
street,  or  Madison  avenue  at  Red  Leary's  and  Fort  Hamilton,  or  that 
they  came  here,"  The  prosecuting  attorney,  in  his  closing  argument, 
was  proceeding  to  discuss  these  reasons,  and  to  argue  that  other  reasons 
than  those  suggested  were  the  real  reasons  for  not  calling  the  defend- 
ants and  Mrs.  Scott  as  witnesses,  when  the  counsel  for  defendants 
interrupted,  and  asked  the  judge  to  rule  that  the  fact  that  the  de- 
fendants did  not  testify  could  not  be  commented  on  by  the  govern- 
ment. But  the  judge,  having  first  stated  the  law,  that  the  fact  that  the 
defendants  did  not  testify  did  not  create  any  presumption  against  them, 
ruled  that,  inasmuch  as  the  matter  had  been  referred  to  by  the  defend- 
ants' counsel,  the  prosecuting  attorney  had  the  right  to  comment  on  the 
reasons  which  the  defendants'  attorney  gave  for  their  not  going  upon  the 
stand  and  testifying  in  their  own  belialf,  and  also  to  give  the  reasons 
which,  the  government  contended,  really  existed  for  their  not  testifying, 
and  permitted  the  prosecuting  attorney  to  proceed  in  his  comments.  The 
defendants  having  been  convicted,  on  exceptions  it  was  held  that  this  was 
error.  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Gray,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court,  said: 
"As  there  is  danger  that  the  jury,  knowing  that  the  law  now  permits  a 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  eight  of  argument.         793 

defendant  to  testify,  may  draw  inferences  against  him  from  his  omission 
so  to  do,  his  counsel  may  properly,  in  addressing  the  jury,  insist  and 
enlarge  upon  his  constitutional  and  legal  right  in  this  respect.  When 
counsel  for  the  defendants  in  the  present  case  went  farther,  and  re- 
ferred to  his  own  opinion  and  practice  upon  the  subject,  and  to  what  he 
supposed  to  have  taken  place  in  other  cases,  he  might  well  have  been 
checked  by  the  court.  But  the  absolute  exemption  secured  to  the  de- 
fendants by  the  constitution  and  laws,  from  being  compelled  to  testif}', 
and  from  having  their  omission  to  do  so  used  in  any  way  to  their  detri- 
ment, could  not  be  affected  by  superfluous  and  irregular  suggestions 
of  their  counsel  in  the  heat  of  argument.  That  exemption  could  only 
be  waived  by  each  defendant's  own  election  to  avail  himself  of  the 
statute,  and  to  go  upon  the  stand  as  a  witness.  The  course  of  the 
closing  argument  for  the  prosecution  tended  to  persuade  the  jury  that 
the  omission  of  the  defendants  to  testify  implied  an  admission  or  a 
consciousness  of  the  crime  charged,  and  the  presiding  judge,  in  per- 
mitting such  a  course  of  argument,  against  the  objection  of  the  defend- 
ants, and  in  ruling  that  the  prosecuting  attorney  had  a  right  to  com- 
ment on  the  reasons  which  the  defendants'  counsel  gave  for  their  not 
going  upon  the  stand  and  testifying  in  their  own  behalf,  and  also 
to  give  the  reasons  which  the  government  contended  really  existed 
for  their  not  testifying,  —  committed  an  error  which  was  manifestly 
prejudicial  to  the  defendants,  and  which  obliges  this  court  to  set  aside 
the  verdict  and  order  anew  trial."  ^ 

§  1007.  Coniiuenting  ou  the  Difference  between  Original 
and  Amended  Pleadings.  — Difficulty  has  been  found  in  dealing 
with  the  question  whether,  where  a  pleading  has  been  amended, 
the  original  pleading  can  be  put  in  evidence  as  an  admission  of 
the  party  whose  pleading  it  is.^     It  is  too  obvious  for  discussion 

1  Com,  V.  Scott,  123  Mass.  239.  ball,  13  Alien  (Mass.),  4G0;  Phillips  v. 

2  lu  Massachusetts  discarded  or  Smith,  110  Mass.  61  (under  a  stat- 
abandoned  pleadings  cannot  be  thus  ute).  la  Missouri  it  has  been  held 
referred  to.  They  are  treated  as  hav-  that  an  abandoned  pleading  cannot  be 
ing  been  drawn  by  the  counsel  for  the  read  in  evidence  as  an  admission 
purpose  of  laying  the  merits  before  the  against  the  party,  ou  the  trial  of  the 
court,  and  as  being  hardly  the  act  of  same  case  in  whicli  the  pleading  was 
the  party,  and  also  as  being  in  some  originally  filed.  Corley  v.  McKeag,  9 
sense  in  the  nature  of  privileged  com-  Mo.  App.  38,  41;  Owens  Co.  v.  Pierce, 
munications.  Baldwin  v.  Gregg,  13  5  Mo.  App.  57i3;  Breckenkamp  v. 
Mete.    (Mass.)  253;  Walcott   i?.  Kim-  Kces,  3  Mo.  App.  585.     But  these  de- 


794  ARGUMENT   OF    COUNSEL.  [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

that  it  cannot  properly  be  used  in  final  argument,  for  the  purpose 
of  reaching  the  same  result,  where  it  has  not  been  put  in  evi- 
dence.^ 

§  1008.  Suffering  the  Audience  to  Applaud  the  State's 
Counsel.  — In  a  case  of  murder,  the  following  scene  took  place: 
Upon  the  conclusion  of  the  argument  of  the  counsel  who  had 
opened  the  case  for  the  State,  the  audience,  which  was  composed 
of  some  four  hundred  people,  cheered  and  applauded  the  speaker. 
This  was  late  at  night,  and  further  argument  was  postponed  un- 
til the  next  morning.  The  court  did  not  restrain  the  audience, 
or  in  any  way  express  its  disapprobation  of  the  improper  demon- 
stration, nor  was  the  jury  cautioned  against  suffering  this  con- 
duct of  the  audience  to  influence  their  minds  in  the  consideration 
of  the  case.  On  the  next  morning,  counsel  for  the  defendant 
were  permitted,  in  their  addresses  to  the  jury,  to  comment  upon 
and  condemn  without  restriction  the  occurrence  of  the  night  be- 
fore. In  reply  to  them,  counsel  for  the  State,  in  the  concluding 
argument,  characterized  the  demonstration  as  a  "  spontaneous 
outburst  of  approval,  by  the  audience,  of  this  cause,  after  they 
had  heard  it  truthfully  represented  by  the  State."  This  remark 
was  not  reproved  by  the  court,  nor  was  the  jury  admonished  to 
guard  themselves  against  being  influenced  by  the  popular  demon- 
stration. As  the  conviction  was  reversed  on  other  grounds,  the 
reviewing  court  deemed  it  unnecessary  to  say  whether  or  not  they 
would  have  suffered  the  conviction  to  stand,  if  this  irregularity 
had  presented  the  only  ground  of  reversal.  But  they  took  occa- 
sion to  say  that  the  trial  court  should  have  taken  prompt  and  de- 
cided action  on  the  occasion,  and  should  have  endeavored,  by  its 
condemnation  of  the  proceeding,  and  its  admonitions  to  the  jur}^ 
to  prevent  any  prejudice  to  the  defendant  by  such  reprehensible 

cisions  are  overruled  iu  the   later  case  Compare  Priest  v.  Way,  87  Mo.  16,  27, 

of  Auderson  v.   McPike,  86  Mo.  293,  32;  Taussig  v.  Shields,  26  Mo.  App. 

301.     It  may  always  be  read  on  the  318,  32('.,327. 

trial  of  another  case.     Murphy  v.    St.  ^  Taft  v.  Fislie,  140  Mass.  250;  s.  c. 

Louis  Type    Foundry,    21)    Mo.    App.  54  Am.  Rep.  459;  Walcott  d.    Kimball, 

541;  Dowzelotv.  Kawliugs,  58  Mo.  75;  13    Alien    (Mass.),    460;    Phillips    v. 

Turner   v.  Baker,    64    Mo.    •22s,   245.  Smith,  110  Mass.  61. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         795 

conduct;  and  that,  in  this  effort,  the  counsel  for  the  State  should 
have  united.^ 

§  1009.  Civil  Responsibility  for  Words  Spoken  in  Forensic 
Debate.  — The  limits  of  this  chapter  do  not  permit  an  extended 
discussion  on  this  most  interesting  topic.  The  general  rule,  upon 
which  modern  cases  unite,  is  that  words  spoken  in  debate,  or 
written  in  the  regular  course  of  a  judicial  proceeding,  or  before 
a  quasi-judicial  tribunal,  by  a  party  or  his  counsel,  which  are 
pertinent  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  inquiry,  are  absolutely 
privileged,  and  wholly  without  reference  to  the  motives  which 
may  have  prompted  them.^  An  idea  formerly  lingered  in  the 
books  that,  in  order  to  make  the  words  privileged  they  must  have 
been  pertinent  to  the  issues,  and  not  spoken  ex  malitid  ;'^  but  the 
modern  doctrine  is  that,  if  the  words  are  material  to  the  issues, 
the  question  of  malice  or  motive  is  an  immaterial  inquiry.*  The 
rule,  carried  to  this  extent,  is  deemed  absolutely  necessary  to 
uphold  that  freedom  of  forensic  debate  which  is  so  essential  to 
the  due  administration  of  justice.  Where,  however,  a  party  or  his 
counsel  wanders  from  the  issues,  whether  in  writing  or  in  speak- 
ing, maliciously,  to  asperse  and  villify  another,  the  case  is  not 
within  the  privilege.^ 

1  Cartwright  v.   State,  16  Tex.  App.  22  Weud.  (X.  Y.)  410;  Gilbert  v.  Peo- 

47;^,  489;  s.  c.  49  Am.  Rep.  826.  pie,    1   Deuio    (N.    Y.),   41;    Hoar    v. 

■   1  Hawk.  P.  C,  ch.  28,  §  8;  Cooley's  Wood,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  193;  Mower  v. 

Coust.  Lini.  443;  Hodgsou  v.  Scarlett,  Watsou,  11  Vt.  536;  Jeuuiugs  v.  Paine, 

1  Baru.  &  Aid.  232,  239;  s.  c.  1  Holt  N.  4  Wis.  358. 

P.  621;  Mackey  v.  Ford,  5  Hurl.  &  N.  ^  Hodgson   v.    Scarlett,  1    Baru.   & 

792;  Cutler  v.  Dixon,  4  Coke,  146;  s.  c.  Aid.  232;  s.  c.  1  Holt  N.  p.  621. 

Dyer,  285;  "Weston  v.  Dobiuiet,  Cro.  *  Marsh  v.  Ellsworth,  50  N.  Y.  309; 

.Tac.   432;    Astley  r.  Youuge,  2  Burr.  Gilberts.  People,  1  Deuio  (N.  Y.),41; 

807,  per  Lord  Mansfield,  C.J. ;  Brooke  Hastings  v.  Lusk,  22  AVeud.    (N.  Y.) 

r.  Montague,  Cro.  ,Tac.  90;  McMillan  410;  King  v.  Wlieeler,  7  Cow.  (X.  Y.) 

V.  Birch,  1  Binn.  (Pa.)    178;  Newfleld  725. 

('    Coppermau,   15   Abb.   Pr.    (N.   Y.)  ^  Gill)ert  ».  People,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.), 

(x.  s.)    360;  Marsh   v.  Ellsworth,   36  41.     Compare  Padmore  v.  Lawrence, 

How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  532;  s.  c.  1  Sweeny  11  Ad.  &  E.  380;  Broraage  v.  Prosser, 

(X.  Y.),   152;   50  N.  Y.  309;   Garr  v.  4  Baru.  &  C.  247;  Remington  v.  Coug- 

Seldeu,  4  N.  Y.  91;  Ring  v.  Wheeler,  duu,  2  IMck.  (Mass.)  210. 
7  Cow.  (X.  Y.)  72.);  Hastings  r.  Lusk, 


796  ARGUMENT  OF  COUNSEL.  [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  1010.  Who  entitled  to  be  Heard.  —  Parties  are  entitled  to 
appear  in  pr'opria  persona,  and  conduct  their  own  causes,  if  they 
are  fooHsh  enough  to  do  so;  ^  but  a  person  Avho  is  not  an  enrolled 
attorney  or  counselor  has  no  right  to  appear  as  such  for  a  party. - 
The  loife  of  a  party  has  no  right  to  a^ipear  and  conduct  his 
cause  at  nisi  prius.^  A  party  conducting  his  own  cause  ma}^ 
rightfully  address  the  jury  as  his  own  advocate,  without  waiving 
his  right  to  give  evidence  as  a  vjitness  in  his  own  behalf.*  But 
a  party  not  enrolled  as  a  counselor  of  the  court  cannot  claim  the 
right  to  conduct  his  cause  in  part  by  himself  and  in  part  by 
counsel:  if  he  examines  his  own  witnesses,  counsel  will  not  be 
heard  in  his  behalf  on  points  of  law.^  According  to  a  review  of  the 
authorities  by  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Gray,®  they  seem  to  indicate  that 
counsel  for  a  deceased  parti/ nvdy  he  heard  as  amicus  curioe  before 
the  full  court,  "  where  the  exceptions  sought  to  be  established 
have  been  allowed  and  entered  in  his  client's  lifetime,  because 
the  delay  in  disposing  of  them  would  be  the  act  of  the  court;  ^ 
or  if  the  exceptions  had  been  taken  by  the  party  in  his  lifetime, 
though  not  allowed  or  entered  until  after  his  death,  because  they 
would  be  his  own  exceptions,  seasonably  alleged  and  tendered  by 
himself,  and  the  subsequent  allowance  and  entry  of  them  might 
be  treated  as  mere  forms  to  put  them  in  order  for  hearing;  ^  or 
if  the  ruling  below  had  been  in  his  favor,  and  the  questions  of 
law  reserved  on  the  motion  of  the  other  party ;  ^  or  if  the  ques- 
tions of  law  had  been  reserved  by  the  judge  himself  at  the  trial 
or  hearing,  and  brought  before  the  full  court  by  his  report,  or 
by  motion  pursuant  to  leave  so  to  reserve."  ^^     But  an  amicns 

^  Hightower      v.       Hawthorn,       I  '  Citing  Martin  r.  Tapley,  116  Mass. 

Herapst.    (U.  S.)  42;  Henck   v.  Tod-  275;  Bridges  r.  Smyth,  8  Biug.  20;  s.  c. 

hunter,  7  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  275.  1  Moore  &  S.  93;  Miles  v.  Williams,  8 

2  ji,ife^  §  209.  Q.  B.  U7. 

3  Col)bett  V.  Hudson,  15  Ad.  &  El.  «  Kelley  v.  Riley,  10(5  Mass.  339. 
(X.  s.)  988;  s.  c.  14  Jur.  982.                              »  Currier  u.  Lowell,  16  Pick.  (Mass.) 

4  Cobbett  V.  Hudson,  1  El.  &  Bl.  11 ;  170. 

s.  c.  17  Jur,  488;  22  L.  J.  (Q.  B.)  11.  '»  Springfield  v.  Worcester,  2  Cnsh. 

*  Mosoati   V.   Lawson,    1   Mood=   &  (Mass.)  52,  62;  Freeman  u.  Kosher,  13 

Rob.  454.  Ad.  &  El.  (n.  s.)  780. 

6  Martinu,Tapley,ll!tMass.ll(;,119. 


Tit.  IV,  Ch.  XXX.]     ABUSES  of  right  of  argument.         797 

ciirice  cannot  take  a  case  up,  by  a  bill  of  exceptions  or  otherwise, 
although  he  may  have  been  counsel  for  the  deceased  party,  and 
his  authority  may  have  been  revoked  by  the  death  of  his  client. 
"An  amicus  ciirice,''  said  Gray,  C.  J.,  "  is  heard  only  by  the 
leave  and  for  the  assistance  of  the  court,  and  upon  a  case  already 
before  it.  He  has  no  control  over  the  suit,  and  no  right  to  in- 
stitute any  proceeding  therein,  or  to  bring  the  case  from  one 
court  to  another,  or  from  a  single  judge  to  the  full  court,  by 
exception,  appeal  or  writ  of  error."  ^  Where  competent  counsel 
are  retained  in  a  cause  and  are  present  in  court,  prepared  to 
argue  it,  the  court  commits  no  error  in  declining  to  hear  coun- 
sel not  retained  in  such  cause,  or  in  any  other  pending  cause  in 
which  a  similar  question  would  arise,  but  who  merely  expect  to 
have  a  similar  cause  thereafter?  There  is  no  rule  of  law  which 
prohibits  an  attorney  of  record,  who  is  a  witness  in  a  cause,  from 
summing  up  the  case  before  the  court  or  jury.  It  seems  that 
there  was,  however,  a  rule  in  California  which  prohibited  it  from 
being  done  without  permission  of  the  court ;  but  where  the  court 
gave  such  permission,  no  question  was  presented  for  review. "^ 
In  Missouri  it  is  held  that  it  is  not  ground  of  new  trial  that  an 
attorney',  who  had  assisted  the  prosecuting  attorney  by  taking 
the  testimony,  was  allowed  to  make  the  opening  argument  to  the 
jury  with  a  fifteen  minutes  speech.  The  court  said:  "It  is 
wholly  immaterial  whether  the  permission  was  made  matter  of 
record  or  not,  nor  does  it  make  any  difference  whether  he  was 
employed  in  the  case,  or  gratuitously  assisted  the  prosecuting  at- 
torney. An  attorney  emploj-ed  in  the  case  may  even  make  the 
statement  of  the  case  to  the  jury.  The  fifth  subdivision  of  sec- 
tion 1908  ^  cannot  be  construed  so  as  to  require  the  prosecuting 
attorney,  instead  of  other  counsel  engaged  in  the  cause,  to  make 
the  opening  statement."  ^    The  employment  of  special  counsel  by 

1  Martin  v.   Tapley,   supra;   citiug  ^  Branson   v.  Carruthers,    49     Cal. 
Yearb.,   4  H.  VI.  16,   pi.  KJ;    Isley's      375. 

Case,  1  Leon.  187;  Knight  v.  Lovr,  15  ^  Rgy.  Stat.  Mo.  (ed.  1879.) 

Ind.  374;  Minor's  Abr.,  Amicus  Curice.  »  state  v.  Rob,   90   Mo.  31,  36;  fol- 

2  Nauer     v.     Thomas,      13     Alleu  lowing  State  i;.  Stark,  72  Mo.  38. 
(Mass.),  572. 


798 


ARGUMENT    OF    COUNSEL.  [1  Thomp.  Tr 


private  prosecutors,  to  assist  the  district  attorney,  is  not  inhibited 
by  the  hiws  of  Texas.  The  State's  attorney  should,  however,  re- 
tain the  direction  of  the  prosecution,  and  not  resign  the  same  to 
assistant  counsel.^ 


1  Burkhart  v.  State,  18  Tex.  App. 
699.  The  court  say:  "This  practice 
has  beeu  known  to  all  the  legislatures 
that  have  assembled  in  the  State,  and 
if  it  be  an  illegal  and  improper  prac- 
tice, as  contended  by  counsel  for  de- 
fendant, it  is  indeed  strange  that  it 
has  been  so  long  and  so  universally 
tolerated  by  the  law-making  power  and 
sanctioned  by  the  courts.  It  seems 
that,  in  some  States,  this  practice  is 
not  allowed ;  but  in  most  of  the  States 


it  is  sanctioned.  It  is,  however,  the 
duty  of  the  district  or  county  attorney 
to  reserve  to  himself  the  direction  of 
the  case.  This  he  should  never  sur- 
render to  assistant  counsel.  Whart. 
PI.  &  Pr.,  §  555,  and  cases  there  cited; 
1  Bish.  Cr.  Pr.,  §  281.  The  court  did 
not  err  in  overruling  the  defendant's 
objection  to  permitting  the  district  at- 
torney to  avail  himself  of  assistant 
counsel  in  the  prosecution,  both  in  the 
conduct  and  arguing  of  the  case." 


Tit.   V,  Cil.   XXXI.  J        GENERAL    RULES. 


799 


TITLE   V. 

PROYI^CE  OF  COURT  A^D  JURY :  QUESTI0:N'S 
OF  LAW  AND  OF  FACT. 


Chapter 

XXXI. 

Chapter 

XXXII. 

Chapter 

XXXIII. 

Chapter 

XXXIV. 

Chapter 

XXXV. 

Chapter 

XXXVI. 

Chapter 

XXXVIL 

Chapter  '. 

XXXVIIL 

Chapter 

XXXIX. 

Chapter 

XL. 

Chapter 

XLI. 

Chapter 

XLII. 

Chapter 

XLIII. 

Chapter 

XLIV. 

Chapter 

XLV. 

Chapter 

XLVL 

Chapter 

XLVII. 

Chapter 

XLVIII. 

Chapter 

\T,IX. 

Chapter 

L. 

Chapter 

LI. 

Chapter 

LII. 

Chapter 

LIII. 

Chapter 

LIV. 

Chapter 

LV. 

Chapter 

LVL 

Chapter 

LVII. 

Chapter 

LVIII. 

Chapter 

LIX. 

Chapter 

LX. 

Chapter 

LXI. 

Chapter 

LXII. 

Chapter 

LXIIL 

General  Rules. 

Existence    and    Interpretation    of    Laws,    Ordi- 
nances, Rules  and  Customs. 

■  Interpretation  of  Private  Writings. 
Verbal  Speech  :  Oral  Contracts. 
Existence  and  Terms  of  Express  Contracts. 
Implied  Promises. 

•  Sales  of  Personal  Property. 
Warranties  in  Sales  of  Chattels. 
Negotiable  Instruments. 
Payment:  Accord  and  Satisfaction. 

•Statute  of  Limitations;  Bankruptcy:  New  Prom- 
ise AND  Part  Payment  to  Revive  Barred  Debt. 
-  Insurance. 

■  Intent. 

•Authority:  Agency:  Ratification. 

•  Alteration  of  Written  Instruments. 
-Possession. 

■Waiver:  Abandonment:  Laches:  Acquiescence, 

■  Identity:  Resemblance. 

-Place:  Boundary:  Identity  of  Land. 
-Notice. 

•  Description,  Quality,  Characterization. 

•  Reasonableness. 
■Malicious  Prosecution. 
•Negligence. 

Cakkiers  of  Goods  and  other  Bailees. 

Nuisance  and  Obstruction. 

Fraud.  * 

Slander  and  Libel. 

Measure  of  Damages. 

Of  the  Power  of  Juries  as  Judges  of  the  Law. 

Matters  OF  Crime. 

Of  Nonsuits. 

Directing  the  Verdict. 


^00  PROVIIsCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   Thomp.  Tf., 


CHAPTEK    XXXI. 

GENERAL  RULES. 

Article    I.  —  Questions  of  Law  for  the  Court. 
Article  II.  —  Questions  of  P'act  for  the  Jury. 


Article  I.  —  Questions  of  Law  for  the  Court. 

Section 

1015.  The  Ends  of  Judicial  Adraiuistratiou. 

1016.  Facts  Ascertained,  Judge  pronouuces  Conclusion. 

1017.  Judge  must  declare  the  Law,  and  not  leave  it  to  Jury. 

1018.  But  Error  not  Reviewed  unless  Excepted  to. 

1019.  Nor  unless  Prejudicial. 

1020.  Nor  where  Jury  decide  Question  of  Law  rightly. 

1021.  Judge  decides  all  Questions  on  an  Agreed  Case. 

1022.  But  Question  reserved  should  present  a  Pure  Question  of  Law. 

1023.  Judge  Passes  upon  the  Admissibility  of  Evidence. 

1024.  Decides  as  to  the  Competency  of  Witnesses. 

1025.  Whether  he  may  submit  the  Question  to  the  Jury. 

1026.  Not  bound  to   hear  Objections  to  Competency  and  Sufflcieucy  at  the 
same  Time. 

1027.  Construes  the  Pleadings. 

1028.  Decides  whether  there  is  a  Variance  between  the  Pleadings  and  Proof. 

1029.  Decides  Facts  shown  by  the  Records  of  the  Court. 

1030.  Essential  Facts  Admitted  or  Undisputed. 

1031.  Wliatis  meant  by  a  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and  Fact. 

§  1015.  The  Ends  of  Judicial  Administration. — All  effort 
in  judicial  administration  expends  itself  in  two  directions:  1.  In 
ascertaining  the  ultimate  or  constitutive  facts  upon  which  the 
rights  of  the  parties  depend.  2.  In  applying  the  law  to  such 
facts.  In  cases  at  law  the  jury  ascertain  the  facts,  and  the  judge 
applies  the  conclusion  of  law  to  them.  The  conclusion  of  law 
applied  to  the  a.scertained  facts  becomes  the  judgment  of  the 
court,  not  its  onZer  or  co7nmand,  the  fiction  being  that  the  court 
pronounces  the  law,  and  that  it  moves  forward,  by  its  inherent 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXI.]         GENERAL    RULES.  801 

vigor,  to  the  result.  This  fiction  is  expressed  in  the  conckiding 
words  of  every  judgment  at  law,  —  Consideratum  est  per  cur- 
iam: it  is  considered  by  the  court,  that  the  plaintiff  recover  of  the 
defendant,  or  that  the  defendant  go  hence,  etc. 

§  1016.  Facts  Ascertained,  Judge  pronounces  Conclu- 
sion.—  In  either  case,  therefore,  where  the  facts  are  ascertained 
beforehand,  the  judge  pronounces  the  conclusion  of  the  law 
thereupon.  Logically  the  facts  would  be  ascertained  first,  and 
then  the  conclusion  of  the  law  would  be  pronounced  by  the 
judge.  This  is  the  case  where  special  verdicts  are  found,  and  also 
where  the  controversy  is  submitted  upon  an  agreed  state  of  facts. 
But  where  a  jury  return  a  general  verdict,  this  embodies  a 
mixed  conclusion  of  law  and  fact.  In  such  cases  the  judge  pro- 
nounces the  law  to  the  jury  upon  all  the  hypotheses  of  fact  which 
the  evidence  substantially  tends  to  prove,  — leaving  them  to  de- 
termine what  hypothesis  has  been  proved,  and  to  apply  to  it  the 
law  thus  stated.  It  must  strike  the  thoughtful  mind  at  once, 
that  the  ofiiee  of  deciding  difficult  questions  of  fact  and  api)ly- 
ing  conclusions  of  law  announced  from  the  bench  to  the  facts 
so  decided,  is  a  difficult  one,  especially  for  a  body  of  untrained 
persons  acting  in  a  situation  entirely  new  and  strange  to  them ; 
and  so,  it  is  confidently  stated,  it  results  in  actual  practice. 

§  1017.  Judge  must  declare  tlie  Law,  and  not  leave  it  to 
Jury.  —  The  judge  decides  questions  of  law;  the  jury,  questions 
of  fact.^  It  is  obviously  the  right  of  every  suitor  to  have  the 
opinion  of  the  judge  upon  questions  of  law,  material  to  the  proper 
determination  of  his  case.  The  jury  are  not  qualified  to  deter- 
mine such  questions,  and  they  are  calculated  to  confuse,  embar- 
rass and  mislead  them.  The  general  rule,  therefore,  is  that  it  is 
error  for  the  judge  to  submit  questions  of  law  to  the  determina- 
tion of  the  jury.^ 

1  Co.  Litt.  155,  156;  Fost.  Cr.  L.  United  States  v.  Carlton,  1  Gall.  (U. 
255,256.  S.)    400;  Thomas   v.    Thomas,    15  B. 

2  Hickeyv.  Ryan,  15  Mo.  G3,  G7;  Mon.  (Ky.)  178;  Ragau  w.  Gaither,  11 
Fugate   V.    Carter,    6   Mo.    2(;7,    273;  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  ^72. 


802  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    -JURY.       [1   TllOllll).   Tl'., 

§1018.  BcT  Erkok  not  Reviewed  unless  Excepted  to. — But  it  is 
no  giouiul  for  a  new  trial  that  the  judge  left  to  the  jury,  as  a  question 
of  fact,  that  which  he  himself  should  have  decided  as  a  question  of  law, 
unless  the  error  was  objected  to  at  the  time.^ 

§  1019.  Nou  Unless  Prejudicial. — Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  an 
instruction,  leaving  it  to  the  jury  to  determine  tiie  question  whether  the 
instrument  sued  on  is  a  promissory  note,  or  not,  is  bad  ;  but  where  the 
instruction  was  immaterial  and  technical,  it  was  cured  by  the  statute  of 
jeofails.-  And  sometimes,  where  the  judge  has  submitted  to  the  jury 
a  question  which  involves  a  conclusion  of  law,  he  may  cure  the  error 
by  an  additional  explanation.  Thus,  in  an  action  against  a  railway 
company  for  killing  hogs,  which  had  stra3'ed  upon  its  track,  the  judge 
was  asked  to  instruct  the  jury  that,  in  order  to  find  for  the  plaintiff, 
they  must  find  that  the  hogs  strayed  upon  the  track  at  a  point  where 
the  defendant  was  bound  by  law  to  fence  its  track.  It  was  said  that 
the  judge  could  not  properly  have  given  this  instruction  to  the  jury, 
without,  at  the  same  time,  telling  them  at  what  points  of  its  track 
a  railroad  company  is  bound  by  law  to  have  its  track  fenced.  With 
such  a  correction,  there  would  be  no  question  of  law  left  for  the  jury 
to  decide."' 

§   1020.   Nor  where  Jury  decide  Qiiestioii  of  Law  rightly. — 

If  the  judge  submits  a  question  of  law  to  the  jury  and  they  de- 
cide it  rightly,  there  is  no  ground  of  exception;  since  it  would  be 
absurd  to  reverse  a  judgment  in  order  that  the  judge  might  decide 
what  the  jury  rightly  decided.* 

§   1021.   Judge  decides  all  Questions  on  an  Agreed  Case. — 

On  an  agreed  case,  stated  to  the  court  in  writing  for  its  decision, 
the  court  necessarily  draws  all  inferences,  both  of  law  and  of 
fact,  from  the  facts  agreed  upon,  which  may  be  necessary  to  its 
judgment.  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that,  whether  the  relation  of 
landlord  and  tenant  existed  between  tlie  parties,  and  whether  the 

1  Strickland  r.  Stricklaiul,  8   C.   B.  HI;     .loiios   v.    rullou,  Cf)    Ala.    SOC : 

724.  Gk'un  v.  Charlotte  &c.  R.  Co.,  63   N. 

"  Lee  ?■.  Duulap,  '>'>  Mo.  454.  C.  510;  State    v.    Craton,  6    Ired.    L. 

3  Hudsou   V.  St.  Louis   &c.  R.  Co.,  (N.   C)    1<;4;  Thorubnrnh  v.  Maston, 

63  Mo.  525,  530.  1)3  N.  C.  258,  2(14;   Woodbury  v.  Tay- 

*  Bemsteiu  v.  Humes,  78  Ala.  134,  lor,  3  .Jouos  L.  (N.C.)  504. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.   XXXI.]         GENERAL    RULES.  803 

tenancy  of  the  defendant  was  such  as  to  make  a  notice  to  quity 
or  a  demand  of  possession  requisite  to  entitle  a  phiintiff  in 
ejectment  to  maintain  his  action,  was  a  question  to  be  determined 
by  the  court,  upon  the  consideration  of  an  agreed  state  of 
facts.^ 

§  1022.  But  Question  Reserved  should  present  a  Pure  Ques- 
tion of  Law. —  But,  as  appellate  judges  cannot,  in  jury  cases,  draw 
the  conclusions  of  fact  from  the  evidence,  a  question  reserved  for 
the  decision  of  an  appellate  court  must  be  a  pure  question  of  law. 
It  cannot  be  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  for  that  would  nec- 
essarily draw  to  the  court  that  which  properly  belongs  to  the 
jury. 2  If  a  point  of  law  is  to  be  reserved,  it  must  be  done  by 
stating  on  the  record  the  facts  on  which  it  arises,  otherwise  the 
point  thus  reserved  is  a  mere  abstraction.^  And  these  facts  must 
be  either  admitted  on  the  record  or  found  by  the  jury ;  since 
the  court  cannot  withdraw  the  decision  of  the  facts  from  the 
jury,  by  reserving  as  a  point,  whether,  under  all  the  evidence  in 
the  case,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  recover.  Without  this,  judg- 
ment cannot  be  entered  non  obstante  veredicto.^  There  is  only 
one  exception  to  this  rule,  and  that  is  said  to  be  a  seeming  one 
merely,  —  where  the  question  is  whether  any  ewcZence  has  been 
given  of  some  fact  essential  to  the  plaintiff's  case  or  the  defend- 
ant's defense.* 

§  1023.   Judge  Passes  vipon  the  Admissibility  of  Evidence. — 

"Within  limits  already  stated  ^  the  judge  passes  upon  the  admissi- 
bility of  evidence,  although  his  decision  involves  questions  of 
fact,  which  may  even  reach  to  the  decision  of  the  main  issue. ^ 


'  Howard   v.  Carpeuter   22  Md.  10,  Pa.  St.    43!i;    Campboll   v.  O'Nicll,    64 

23.  Pa.  St.  290. 

2  Com.  V.  McDowell,  86  Pa.  St.  377,  ^  Wilde  v.  Traiuer,   avpra;    Camp- 
37!).  bell  V.  O'Niell,  supra. 

3  Irwin   V.  Wickersham,  25  Pa.  St.  *»  Ante,  §  318,  et  seq. 

316.  '  See  the  observations   of   Lowry, 

•»  Wilson  V.  Steamboat  Tuscarora,  C.  J.,  as  to  this  function  of  the  Judge 

25  Pa.  St.  317;  Winchester  v.  IkiuK-tt,  in  De  France  v.  De  France,  34  Pa.  St. 

54  Pa.  St.    510;  Wilde    v.   Trainer,   59  385,  390-92. 


804  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOllll).   Tl'., 

§  1024.   Decides  as  to  the  Competency  of  AVitiiesscs.  —  The 

question  whether  a  witness  is  competent  to  testify  concerning  the 
matters  in  issue  is,  in  all  cases,  a  question  of  law  for  the  court. ^ 
And  this  is  so,  although  the  inquiry  involves  questions  which  are 
purely  questions  of  fact.^  Thus,  the  question  whether  a  person 
who  is  offered  as  a  witness  is  insane ;  "^  or  whether  one  whose  ad- 
missions were  offered  in  evidence  was  a  jpartner  of  the  defend- 
ant; ■*  or  whether  an  offered  witness  was  incompetent  by  reason 
of  having  a  certain  amount  of  negro  blood  in  his  veins ;  ^  or 
whether  he  was  interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit;  ^  —  these  and 
all  other  like  questions  are  decided  by  the  judge,  and  are  not  re- 
ferred to  the  jury.  This  being  so,  it  is  error  for  the  judge, 
after  permitting  the  testimony  of  a  witness  to  go  to  the  jury,  to 
instruct  them  to  disregard  it,  if  they  should  find  that  the  wit- 
ness was  interested.^  So,  where  the  competency  of  a  witness  is 
attacked  on  the  ground  of  insanity,  if  the  court  has  decided  in 
favor  of  his  sanity,  the  evidence  adduced  to  the  court  cannot  be 
submitted  to  the  jury  to  affect  his  credibility.^  Nor  will  a  court 
of  error  revise  the  decision  of  the  trial  judge  on  the  competency 
of  a  witness,  on  the  ground  that  his  decision  might  have  been 
influenced  by  evidence  which  he  ought  not  to  have  considered. 
The  appellate  court  will  not  presume  that  the  judge  was  influenced 
by  such  evidence.^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  question 
whether  a  witness,  sane  at  the  time  he  testifies,  was  insane  at  the 
time  of  the  transaction  concerning  which  he  testifies,  is  a  question 
for  the  jury,  since  it  goes  to  his  credibility,  and  not  to  his  com- 
petency, and  the  opposing  party  may  adduce  such  testimony 
with  his  other  evidence. '**     In  fact,  the  jury  are  often  required,  in 

1  Chouteau   v.  Searcy,  8   Mo.  7;3:3;  ■*  Harris  v.  Wilsou,  7  Weud.  75. 
Reynolds  ?J.  Louusbury,  G  Hill  (N.  Y.),           *  Nave's  Aclmr.  v.  Williams,  22  lud. 
534 ;  Nave's  Adinr.  v.  Williams,  22  lud.       3C8. 

308;  Cook  V.  Mix,  II  Couu.  432;  ante,  "  Cook  v.  Mix,  11  Couu.  432, 

§  323.  '  Chouteau  v.  Searcy,  8  Mo.  733. 

2  Ante,  §  318.  »  Campbell    v.   State,    23   Ala.    45, 

3  Holcomb  V.   Holcomb,   28   Couu.  75. 

177;  Kei,nua  v.  Hill,  2  Dcu.  C.  C.  25;);  '■'  Jbid. 

s.  c.  5  Cox  C.  C.  470;  20  L.J.  Kep.  "  Holcomb   v.    Holcomb,   28  Coun. 

(X.  s.)  M.  C.  222 ;  5  Eui;.  L.  &  Eq.  547  :  177. 

(.'ampbell  v.  State,  23  Ala.  44. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XXXr.J         GENERAL    RULES.  805 

estimating  the  credibility  of  a  witness,  to  pass  on  the  same  evidence 
which  was  heard  by  the  judge  on  the  question  of  his  competency.^ 

§  1025.  Whether  he  may  siibiuit  the  Question  to  the  Jury. — 

It  is  said  that  there  are  cases  where  the  question  involves  com- 
plicated  facts ,  which  may  be  submitted  to  the  jury.  Thus,  where 
it  became  a  question  whether  the  statements  of  a  witness,  who 
had  been  an  attorney  of  one  of  the  parties,  was  to  be  excluded 
on  the  ground  that  tliey  were  privileged  comnumications,  it  was 
held  that  it  was  not  improper  to  leave  to  the  jury  the  ques- 
tion whether,  at  the  time  the  statements  in  question  were  made, 
the  relation  of  attorney  and  client  subsisted  between  the  witness 
and  the  party;  though,  in  the  particular  case,  too  large  a  range 
of  exclusion  was  left  to  them.^  It  is  not,  however,  to  be  inferred 
from  this,  that  there  are  any  cases  in  which  the  judge  is  bound 
to  take  the  opinion  of  a  jury  as  to  the  competency  of  a  witness. 
The  doctrine  is  that  he  may  do  it;  and,  where  the  point  depends 
upon  the  decision  of  an  intricate  question  of  fact,  this  is  some- 
times done."^  In  Pennsylvania,  it  was  held  that,  where  one,  of- 
fered as  a  witness,  is  objected  to  on  the  ground  of  interest^  and 
parol  evidence  is  given  to  the  court  to  sustain  the  objection,  if 
the  interest  is  in  the  least  degree  doubtful,  the  judge  may  per- 
mit the  witness  to  testify,  and  refer  the  question  of  his  interest 
to  the  jury.^  On  grounds  already  stated,"''  we  may  venture  to 
question  the  soundness  of  these  views  Experience  proves  that 
juries  are  scarcely  capable  of  deciding  properly  those  questions 
which  the  law  has  clearly  committed  to  them.  It  will  still  more 
embarrass  them  to  compel  them  to  shoulder  a  part  of  the  bur- 
den which  properly  belongs  to  the  judge. 

§  1026.   Not  bound  to  hear  Objections  to  Competency  and 
Sufficiency  at  the    same   Time.  —  "It   is   undoubtedly   true," 

1  Shipton  r.  Thornton,  9  Ad.  &  El.  §§    49,  425;    Spencer   v.   Trafford,    42 
314,  per  Lord  Deuman,  C.  J.  Md.  1. 

2  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.    v.  Key-  ■*  Hart  v.    Ileiluer,  3  Rawle  (Pa.), 
nolds,  36  Mich.  502.  407;  Gordon  v.  Bowers,  10  Ta.  St.  226; 

3  1   Phil,  on    Ev.  (8th  od.  by  Amos  Ilayues  v.  Ilunsicker,  20  Pa.  St.  58. 
&  Phillips),  p.  2,  note;  1  Greeul.  ou  Ev.  ^  Anlr,   §  ;!18,  <t  seq. 


bOG  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TilOIlip.  Tl., 

says  Marshall, C.  J.,  "  that  questions  respecting  the  admissibility 
of  evidence  are  entirely  distinct  from  those  which  respect  its 
sufficiency  or  effect.  They  arise  in  different  stages  of  the  trial, 
and  cannot  with  strict  propriety  be  propounded  at  the  same 
time."»  When,  therefore,  the  counsel  for  the  defendant  prayed 
the  opinion  and  direction  of  the  court  to  the  jury,  that  the  evi- 
dence offered  by  the  plaintiff  was  not  admissible,  competent  and 
sufficient  to  be  left  to  the  jury  as  proof  of  the  plaintiff's  title  to 
recover,  it  was  held  that  the  judge  might  properly  have  refused 
to  give  them ;  for  the  blending  of  an  objection  to  the  admis- 
sibility of  evidence,  in  the  same  application  which  questions 
its  sufficiency,  is  not  only  unusual,  but  it  confounds  propositions 
distinct  in  themselves,  and  is  calculated  to  embarrass  the  court 
and  the  question  to  be  decided.^ 

§  1027.  Construes  the  Pleadings.  — The  construction  of 
the  pleadings  is,  of  course,  always  a  question  for  the  court. ^  It 
is  the  province  of  the  court  to  determine,  from  the  pleadings, 
what  allegations  are  admitted,  and  what  denied.^  It  is,  therefore, 
the  duty  of  the  court  to  state  the  issues  to  the  jury,  without  re- 
ferring them  to  the  pleadings  to  ascertain  what  the  issues  are.* 
For  like  reasons,  the  judge  should  not  tell  the  jury  that  all  the 
allegations  in  the  petition,  not  si)ecitical]y  denied  in  the  answer, 
are  to  be  taken  as  true;  for  this  refers  them  to  the  pleadings, 
to  determine  what  the  allegations  are  which  are  not  denied.  He 
should  inform  them  specifically  what  the  issues  arc.®  It  is  error 
to  leave  the  jury  to  construe  and  determine  the  effect  of  the 
pleadings.^ 

§  1028.  Decides  whether  tliere  is  a  Variance  between  the 
Pleadings  and  Proof. — AMiether  there  is  a  variance  between 
the  pleadings  and  proof,  is  likewise  a  question  of  law  for  the  ex- 

1  Columbiau  Ins.  Co.  r.  Lavvreuce,  ••  Dasslcr  v.  Wisley,  32  Mo.  498. 

2  Pet.  (U.  S.)  25,  44.  •'•  Missouri  Coal  &  Oil  Co.  v   Ilaunl- 

2  Breckenkamp  v.  Rees,  3  Mo.  App.      bal  &c.  11.  Co.,  35  IMo.  84. 

585.  *=  Hall  V.  Keufro,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  51. 

3  Potter  w.  Wooster,    10  Iowa,  334; 
McKiiiiicy  i'.  Ilartnian,  4  luwa,  l.'J4. 


Tit.   V,   Cb.  XXXI.]         GENERAL    RULES.  807 

elusive  determination  of  the  court. ^  Thus,  in  an  action  for  sla7i- 
der,  it  is  for  the  court,  and  not  for  the  jury,  to  determine 
whether  there  is  such  an  identity  between  the  words  laid  in  the 
declaration  and  those  which  have  been  proved,  as  will  support 
the  action.  The  jury  ascertain  what  words  were  spoken,  and, 
if  there  is  a  variance  between  them  and  those  contained  in  the 
declaration,  they  will  look  to  the  opinion  of  the  court,  in  order 
to  be  informed  whether  it  is  of  such  a  nature  as  will  defeat  the 
action.  2 

§  1029.   Decides  Facts  shown  by  the  Records  of  the  Covirt.  — 

These  are  ascertained  by  the  judge  upon  an  inspection  of  the 
records  of  the  court,  and  are  not  submitted  to  the  jury  for  their 
decision.  The  apparent  reason  is  that  the  court  must,  in  the 
nature  6f  things,  be  more  familiar  with  its  records  and  more  com- 
petent to  judge  of  their  meaning  than  the  jury  can  be.  A 
familiar  illustration  of  this  statement  is  shown  in  the  rule  that  a 
plea  of  nul  tiel  record  is  always  tried  by  the  court,  and  not  by 
the  jury.^  Thus,  in  charging  the  jury,  dates  fixed  by  the  records 
of  the  court  may  be  stated  to  them  as  facts.*  So,  where  the 
law  authorizes  a  tender  to  be  made  by  laying  money  into  coui^t^ 
the  court  will  inform  itself  whether  the  money  has  been  paid  in, 
and  need  not  submit  the  question  to  the  jury.^  So,  upon  the 
hearing  of  a  motion  to  enter  an  order  nujic  j^ro  tunc,  the  court  is 
to  decide  whether  the  order  was  in  fact  made,  thouoh  not  entered 
of  locord  at  the  time  claimed,  and  is  not  to  submit  the  question 
to  a  jury.  ^ 

§  1030.  Essential  Facts  Admitted  or  Undisputed.  —  Obvi- 
ouslv,  whenever  the  facts  are  all  admitted  in  writing,  it  is  un- 
necessary  for  the  jury  to  pass  upon  them.^  "  Where  the  facts 
are  undisputed  or  clear,  the  court  should  apply  the  law  and  de- 

1  Birch  V.  Beuton,  26  Mo,  153,  Ifil;  i  Andrews  v.  Graves,  1  Dillon  C.  C. 
Berry  v.  Drydeu,  7  Mo.  324.  (U.  S.)  108. 

2  Ibid.  *  Newton  v.  Allis,  16  Wis.  197. 

3  Kidley  v.  Buchanan,  2  Swan  6  Lewis  v.  Armstrong,  64  Ga.  645. 
(Tenn.) ,  555.  '  Howard  r.Carpeuter,  22  Md.  10,  23. 


808  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  TllOmp.   Tu., 

termine  the  case."^  Thus,  the  facts  being  conceded,  whether  a 
given  act  is  within  the  scope  of  a  servant's  employment  has  been 
held  a  question  of  law  for  the  court  .^ 

§  1031.  What  is  Meant  by  a  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and 
Fact.  —  The  courts  frequently  speak  of  mixed  questions  of  law 
and  fact,  and,  in  order  to  avoid  confusion,  it  is  necessary  to 
understand  precisely  what  they  mean  when  they  use  this  ex- 
pression. It  is  often  said  that,  in  the  case  of  a  mixed  question 
of  law  and  fact,  the  jury  are  to  find  the  facts,  and  the  court  is  to 
pronounce  the  law  upon  the  facts  as  they  may  be  so  found. ^  This 
is  done  in  two  ways:  either  by  a  special  verdict,  in  which  case, 
the  jury  tirst  iind  the  facts,  and  afterwards  the  judge,  in  render- 
ing judgment,  pronounces  the  law  upon  them  ;  or,  in  the  form  of 
hypothetical  instructions  given  by  the  judge  to  the  jury,  —  he 
telling  them  that,  if  they  find  from  the  evidence  a  given  state 
of  facts,  the  law  is  for  the  plaintiff,  or  for  the  defendant,  as  the 
case  may  be.  The  latter  practice  is  now  most  in  vogue  in  Amer- 
ican State  jurisdictions.*  Accordingly,  where  the  evidence  is 
conflicting,  the  court,  in  instructing  the  jury,  declares  the  law 
upon  the  alternate  hypotheses  of  fact  presented  by  the  opposing 
testimony.^  Therefore,  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that,  in  the 
submission  to  a  jury  of  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  the 
jury,  in  any  civil  case,  is  to  determine  what  the  law  is,  ex- 
cept as  it  receives  it  from  the  court.  Many  issues  are  neces- 
sarily so  made  up  as  to  involve  matters  of  law  as  well  as 
of  fact,  and  the  whole  matter  is  then  properly  submitted  to 
the  jury  as  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact;  but,  in  disposing 
of  the  issue,  the  jury  is  bound  to  act  upon  the  law  as  given  to  it 
by  the  court,  and  to  apply  it  to  the  facts,  as  found,  under  the 
ofuidance  of  the  court. ^ 


1  Powell    V.   Powell,   23  Mo.  App.  *  Fourth    National    Bank  v.    Heu- 
365,  373,  opinion  by  Philips,  P.  ,1.  schen,  supra. 

2  Snyder  V.  Hannibal  &c.  K.  Co.,  60,  ^  Marshall    v.    Schricker,    63    Mo. 
Mo.  413.                                   •  308. 

*  Fourth  National  Bank  u.Heuschen,  ^  gt,  Louis  National  Stock  Yards  v. 

62 Mo.  207,  209.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  102  111.  514. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXI.]         GENERAL   RULES.  809 

Article  II. —  Questions  of  Fact  for  the  Jury. 

Section 

1035.  What  Evidence  was  iu  fact  Given, 

1036.  Knowledge  of  a  Witness. 

1037.  Weight,  Probative  Effect,  SutHciency  of  Evidence. 

1038.  Credibility  of  Witnesses. 

1039.  Inferences  of  Fact  from  otlier  Facts  in  Evidence. 

1040.  Particular  Questions  or  Points  of  Fact. 

1041.  Effect  of  Contradictory  Admissions  previously  made. 

1042.  Whether  a  Witness  an  Accomplice. 

1043.  Sufficiency  of  Cori'oboratiug  Testimony. 

1044.  Sufficiency  of  Impeaching  Testimony. 

1045.  Inference  from  Failure  to  Produce  Evidence. 

1046.  Deductions  from  the  Appearance  of  Witnesses. 

§  1035.  What  Evidence  was  in  Fact  Given. — Where  coun- 
sel cannot  agree  as  to  the  evidence,  or  misstate  it  in  argument  to 
the  jury,  it  is  the  province  of  the  jury,  and  not  the  court,  to  de- 
termine what  evidence  was  actually  given. ^  Where  there  is  no 
official  stenographer  present  to  take  down  the  exact  words  used 
by  a  witness,  and  the  judge  has  made  no  minutes  of  his  testi- 
mony, if  counsel  disagree  as  to  what  the  witness  has  said  on  a 
material  matter,  the  court  must  submit  the  question  to  the  jury, 
even  in  the  face  of  a  motion  for  a  nonsuit  on  the  ground  of  va- 
riance. "  What  the  witness  says  in  his  testimony  on  the  trial  of 
a  cause,  when  the  exacts  words  have  not  been  taken  down  as 
uttered,  is  a  question  for  the  jury;  and  emphatically  so,  the  sense 
in  which  they  are  used."  ^ 

§  1036.  Knowledge  of  a  Witness.  —  Where  a  witness  swears 
positively  to  a  certain  fact,  it  is  not  for  the  court  to  reject  his 
deposition  on  the  ground  that,  from  the  terms  in  which  the  wit- 
ness states  the  fact,  the  witness  had  no  knowledge  of  it.  Whether 
or  not  the  witness  has  knowledge  of  the  fact,  is  an  inference  for 
the  jury  and  not  for  the  court. ^     Where  a  witness,  in  testifying 

1  Strauss  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  K.  Co.,  ^  porter  v.  Piatt,  57  Vt.  533,  536. 

86  Mo.  421,  432;  State  v.  Zumbunson,  ^  Dickinson  u.   Lovell,   35  N.  H.  9,. 

86  Mo.  Ill;  affirming  s.  c.  7  Mo.  App.      17. 
526. 


810  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief,  refers  to  matters  which, 
in  a  previous  answer,  were  sc  stated  as  to  indicate  personal  knowl- 
edge, it  is  for  the  jury  rather  than  for  the  court,  to  determine 
whether  he  is  speaking  from  personal  knowledge.^ 

§  1037.  AVeight,  Probative  Effect,  Sufficiency  of  Evidence.  — 

In  all  cases,  after  the  judge  has  determined  the  preliminary  ques- 
tion in  favor  of  the  admissibility  of  the  evidence,  the  weight  and 
[)robative  effect  of  it  become  a  question  for  the  jury.^  This  rule 
is  most  commonly  expressed  by  the  bare  statement  that,  where 
theevidenceis  conflicting,  the  weigJit  of  it  is  to  be  determined  by 
the  jury."^  Another  expression  of  the  same  legal  conception  is 
that,  where  there  is  evidence  tending  to  prove  a  proposition  of 
fact,  whether  it  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  fact  is  a  question  for 
the  jury.*  To  illustrate:  the  circumstance  that  the  evidence  is 
all  on  one  side  does  not,  it  has  been  held,  authorize  the  court  to 
direct  the  jury  that  it  proves  a  fact  in  controversy  ;  \is  sufficiency 
is  for  them.^  The  jury  have  the  power  to  refuse  their  credit  to 
parol  testimony,  and  no  action  of  the  court,  it  has  been  held, 
should  control  the  exercise  of  their  admitted  right  to  weifjh  its 
credibility.^  A  consequence  of  this  rule  is,  that  a  judgment  will 
not  be  reversed  on  error  or  appeal  because  the  evidence  is  conjlict- 
ingJ  This  rule  is  subject  to  the  power  of  the  judge  to  limit  the 
effect  of  the  evidence  by  instructions^  where  it  is  admitted  for  a 
particular  and  limited  purpose,  as  hereafter  pointed  out.** 

§  1038.  Credibility  of  Witnesses. — The  weight  of  evidence 
always  involves  the  consideration  of  the  credit  to  be  given  to  the 
opposing  witnesses ;    and  it  is  accordingly  a  rule  that  this  is  a 


1  Toulmau  v.  Swaiu,  47  Mich.  82.  *  Hudson  ?'.  Weir,  29  Ala.  294. 

2  Welstcad  I'.  Levy,  1  Mood.  &  Kob.  ^  Ciiarleston   lu.s.    Co.  v.  Corner,  2 
138,  per  Paik,  ,J.  (iill  (Md.),  411. 

8  Cape  Girardeau  &c.  Co.  v.  Brulld,  «  Ilnd. 

51   Mo.  144;  Moore  •».  Pieper,  51  Mo.  '  Stater.  Kiuney,  81  Mo.  101. 

157;  Covey  v.  Hannibal  &c.  R.  Co.,  8f)  ^  ^„^e^  §§  351^  793;  post,  §  2416. 
Mo.  (i.35;  Browu  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R. 
Co  ,13  Mo.  App.  462. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXI.]         GENERAL    RULES.  811 

question  within  the  exclusive  province  of  the  juiy.^  The  rule 
is  the  same  in  criminal  as  in  civil  cases,  and  judgments  in  crim- 
inal cases  will  not  be  reversed  on  error  or  appeal  merely  because 
the  evidence  is  conflicting. ^  The  court  cannot,  on  a  motion  for 
a  nonsuit  or  a  peremptory  direction,  invade  the  province  of  the 
jury,  by  attempting  to  pass  upon  the  credibility  of  witnesses, 
to  reconcile  conflicting  statements,  or  to  determine  what  weight 
is  to  be  given  to  the  evidence  of  the  respective  witnesses.^  If 
their  testimony  presents  a  conflict  or  discrepancies,  it  is  the 
province  of  the  jury  to  reconcile  them  if  possible,  and  if  not, 
they  may  give  credence  to  the  witnesses  who,  in  their  opinion, 
are  best  entitled  to  it.*  Thus,  the  relative  value  of  contradictory 
statements  made  by  one  when  drunk  and  when  sober,  presents  a 
question  for  the  jury.^  In  equitable  actions  of  ejectment  in 
Pennsylvania,  all  controverted  questions  of  fact  are  for  the  jury.® 

§  1039.   Inferences  of  Fact  from  other  Facts  in  Evidence.  — 

What  inferences  are  to  be  drawn  from  the  facts  in  evidence  is, 
within  reasona])le  limits,  a  question  for  the  jury.^  This  is  well 
illustrated  by  what  will  be  hereafter  stated  touching  the  question 
of  negligence ,  which  is  often  an  inference  of  fact  from  other 
facts  in  evidence.®  A  limitation  of  this  rule  is  that,  in  certain 
cases,  the  fact  being  established,  the  law  conclusively  draws  the 
inference,  or  annexes  the  conclusion.  The  inference  or  con- 
clusion which  the  law  thus  pronounces  from  the  established  fact 
is  often  called  a  presrimj)tion  of  law.  Of  these,  familiar  instances 
are   the   presumption  of  malice,  which   the  law  draws  from  the 

1  Moore  v.  Pieper,  51  Mo.  157;  Hill  ^  state  v.  Kiuney,  81  Mo.  101;  Seal 

V.  Sutton,  8  Mo.  App.  353;  Hitchler  v.  v.  State,  28  Tex.  491. 
Voelker,  8  Mo.  App.  492;  Greeuvvood  ^  Coudy  v.    Iron  Mountaiu  ^^c.    K. 

v.  Harris,  8  Mo.  App.  603;  Mecliauics'  Co.,  85  Mo,  79,  85. 
Savings  Institution  v.  Pottlioff,  9  Mo.  ■»  Seal  v.  State,  28  Tex.  491. 

App.  574;  Meyers  v.  Union  Trust  Co.,  ^  Fhieli  v.  State,  81  Ala.  41,  47,  50. 

82  Mo.  237;  Rosecraus  v.  Wabash  iScC.  e  Curry  v.  Curry,  114  Pa.  St.  3(17. 

E.    Co.,   83  Mo.  678;    Coudy   v.    Iron  '  Howard  v.  Carpenter,  22  Ind.  10, 

Mountain  &c.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  79,   85;  23;  Eoss  v.  Citizens  Ins.  Co.,  7  Mo. 

Tallon  V.  Grand  Portage  Mining  Co.,  App.  575. 
55  Midi.  147;  Curry  v.  Curry,  114  Pa.  «  Tost,  §  1G63,  et  seq. 

St.  367. 


812  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  TllOUip.   Tr.j 

making  of  an  assault  with  a  deadJy  weapon ;  ^  the  presumption 
of  guilt  from  the  recent  unexplained  jwssesston  of  stolen  goods;  "^ 
the  presumption  of  malice  from  making  a /a^sff  accw5a<^ow  against 
a  person,  imputing  the  commission  of  an  indictable  offense.^ 
Accordingly,  as  already  seen,*  it  is  a  general  rule,  subject  to  ex- 
ceptions, that  the  conclusions  or  opinions  of  witnesses  are  not 
admissible  in  evidence;^  otherwise  the  witnesses  would  usurp 
either  the  function  of  the  court  of  declaring  tiie  law,  or  that  of 
the  jury  of  deciding  the  facts.  It  has  been  said  that  "in  gen- 
eral, whenever  an  inference  is  to  be  drawn  by  a  jury,  from  the 
proof  of  certain  facts,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  state  to  the 
jury,  in  a  case  calling  for  it,  not  only  what  facts  were  not  suffi- 
cient legally  to  authorize  the  presumption,  but  what  facts,  if 
proved,  will  justify  it."  ^ 

§  1040.  Particular  Questions  or  Points  of  Fact.  — It  is  nec- 
essarily a  part  of  the  foregoing  rule  that,  where  a  particular 
question  or  point  of  fact  is  disputed,  whether  it  reaches  to  the 

■  merits  of  the  whole  controversy  or  not,  it  must,  in  general,  be 
decided  by  the  judge.  Thus,  where  a  witness  was  interrogated 
respecting  a  conversation,  which  the  witness  believed  to  have 
taken  place  in  the  presence  of  a  party,  and  gave  certain  reasons, 
grounded  on  distances  and  tone  of  voice,  for  believing  that  the 
party  did  not  hear  the  converss^ioQ?  —  it  was  held  that  the  court 
erred  in  deciding  that  the  party  did  not  hear  the  conversation, 
and  in  excluding  the  testimony  as  to  what  the  conversation  was. 
"  It  was  not  for  the  witness  nor  the  court,  but  for  the  jury,  to 
determine  from  all  the  circumstances,"  Avhethcr  the  party  heard 
what  occurred  in  his  presence.^  So,  where  a  remark,  made  by 
the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff,  was  material  evidence,  if  made 
before  the  delivery  of  a  deed,  but  the  evidence  was  conflicting  as 

'  to  whether  it  was  made  before  or  after,  it  was  held  that  all  the 

1  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  18.  ^  Wheeler  v.  Schrocder,  4  R.  I.  383, 

''■  1  Grceiil.  Ev.,  §  34.  392  (ciling  Lecraw  v.  Boston,  17  Mow. 

3  1  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  18;  2  Id.,  §  418.  (U.  S.)  42*;,  43(1). 

■•  ylu«e,  §§  377,  378.  'Wilson    v.    Irish,    02    Iowa,    2(;0,. 

5  People  V.  Wilson,  3  Paii<.  Cr.  (N.  2(54. 
Y.)  200,  20G. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXI.]         GENERAL    RULES.  813 

evidence  concerning  the  remark  should  have  gone  to  the  jury, 
and  that  it  was  for  them  to  determine  whether  it  was  made  before 
or  after  the  delivery. ^ 

§  1041.  Effect  of  Contradictory  Admissions  previously 
Made.  —  So,  whether  or  not  certain  admissions,  previously  made 
by  the  prosecuting  witness  in  a  criminal  trial,  contradictory  to 
his  testimony,  will  have  the  effect  to  impair  his  credit  as  a  wit- 
ness, is  necessarily  a  question  for  the  jury.- 

§  1042,  Whether  a  Witness  an  Accomplice. — Whether  a 
witness  is  an  accomplice  in  the  commission  of  a  crime  for  which 
the  defendant  is  on  trial,  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  that  his 
testimony  must  be  corroborated  in  order  to  furnish  ground  for 
a  conviction,  is  a  question  for  the  jury,  and  not  for  the  court. -^ 

§   1043.   Sufficiency    of    Corroborating-    Testimony.  —  It    is 

equally  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  such  a  witness  has  been 
corroborated.  Thus,  wiiere,  independently  of  the  evidence  of  an 
accomplice,  there  is  evidence  tending  to  connect  the  defendant 
with  the  commission  of  the  offense,  the  question  of  its  sufficiency 
is  for  the  jury.* 

§  1044.   Sufficiency    of    Impeaching*    Testimony.  —  In    like 

manner,  as  hereafter  explained,  the  sufficiency  of  impeaching  tes- 
timony—  whether  a  witness  has  been  successfully  impeached  — 
is  always  a  question  for  the  jury.^ 

§   1045.   Inference  from  Failure  to  Produce  Evidence. — As 

already  soen,^  the  failure  or  refusal  to  produce  evidence  which 
is  within  the  power  of  the  party,   affords  ground  for  an  infer- 


1  Ihid.  V.  Elliott  (N.  Y.),  12  N.  E.   Rep.   602, 

2  State  V.  Johnageu,  53  lovAa,  250.  aud  note.     As  to  who  is au accomplice 

3  State  V.  Lawlor,  28  INIiuu.  217.  Avitliia  the   rule,   see   Smith   v.  State 

4  People   V.   Kimz    (Cal.),    14   Pac.  (Tex.),  5  S.  W.  Rep.  219,  aud  uote. 
Rep.  836.     Respect iuij;  the  sufliciency  ^  Post,  §  2426. 

of  accomplice  testimony,  see  People  <^  Ante,  §§  453,  794,  795,  989. 


814  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [iTllOllip.   Tv.y 

ence  unfavorable  to  him ;  and  where  he  has  purposely  destroyed 
instruments  of  evidence,  the  law  warrants  the  makins:  of  what- 
ever  deductions  against  him  the  case  fairly  admits  of,  in  conform- 
ity with  the  maxim  contra  spoliatorem  omnia  pra^sumuntur. 
"Without  stopping  to  consider  the  extent  of  this  presumption,  it 
will  be  here  said  that,  in  cases  tried  before  juries,  it  is  for  them 
to  say  what  inference  is  to  be  drawn  from  the  failure  of  a  party 
to  produce  evidence  which  is  accessible  to  him.^  Upon  this 
question  it  has  been  held  proper,  under  circumstances,  for  the 
judge  to  decline  to  rule  that  it  was  incumbent  on  the  plaintiff  to 
produce  certain  evidence,  and  that  the  absence  of  such  evidence 
was  to  be  weighed  as  discrediting  the  testimony  of  a  particular 
witness;  and  on  the  other  hand,  to  instruct  that,  where  a  party 
knows  that  evidence  is  likely  to  be  introduced  at  a  trial  incon- 
sistent with  his  own  claim,  and  if  his  claim  is  w^ell  founded,  it  is 
in  his  power  to  produce  other  evidence  which  will  control  that 
brought  against  him,  his  failure  to  produce  such  other  evidence 
should  be  considered  as  a  circumstance  against  him,  —  leaving  it 
to  them  to  say  whether  this  principle  applies  to  the  conduct  of 
either  party. ^ 

§   1046.  Deductions  from  the  Appearance  of  Witnesses.  — 

It  has  been  held  that  a  jury  may  properly  be  permitted  to  find,  from 
the  appearance  of  a  young  man,  without  other  evidence,  that  he 
is  not  twenty-one  years  of  age.^  On  like  grounds,  where  it  was 
a  question,  whether  a  railway  company,  having  the  duty  of  mak- 
ing a  proper  inspection  of  cars  coming  upon  its  road  from  other 
lines,  employed  a  competent  person  to  perform  this  duty,  it  might 
be  judged  of  by  the  jury  from  the  appearance  of  the  person  so 
employed  when  testifying  as  a  witness  in  the  case,  in  addition  to 
evidence  that  the  car  which  was  the  source  of  the  injury  was  de- 
fective, and  in  connection  with  the  general  testimony  of  the  in- 
spector.*    On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  ruled  in  the  same  court, 

M^ldridge   v.    Hawiey,    ll.j  Mass.  ''  Com.  v.  Emmons,  98  Mass.  6. 

410.  *  Keith    v.  New  llaveii  ikc.  K.  Co.,. 

2  Sturtevant  v.  Wallack,  Ul  Mass.      140  Mass.  175. 
119. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXL]      general  rules.  815 

that  the  fact  that  the  juiyj  in  most  cases  where  a  vieio  takes 
place,  acquire  a  certain  amount  of  information  which  they  may 
properly  treat  as  evidence,  presents  no  suitable  obstacle  to  the 
granting  of  a  new  trial,  on  the  frround  that  the  verdict  is  against 
the  weight  of  the  evidence.^ 


1  Tully    V.    Fitchburg   R.  Co.,    134      this  question,  see  ante,  §  889,  et  seq,; 
Mass.  499,  503-     For  a  controversy  on      especially  §§  900,  901. 


816  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  ThOUip.  Tr., 


CHAPTER     XXXII. 

EXISTENCE  AND  INTERPRETATION    OF  LAWS,  ORDINANCES,  RULES 

AND  CUSTOMS. 

Section 

1050.  Judge  interprets  Written  Laws. 

1051.  Illustration  of  an  Application  of  this  Rule. 

1052.  Meaning  of  Words  in  Statutes. 

1053.  [Continued.]     Whether  a  Pretended  Act  of  the   Legislature  was   duly 

Passed. 

1054.  Foreign  Laws. 

1055.  Existence  of  Municipal  Ordinances. 

1056.  Interpretation  of  Municipal  Ordinances. 

1057.  Validity  of  Rules,  By-Laws,  Regulations,  etc.,  of  Corporations. 
'    1058.  Existence  of  Particular  Usages  or  Customs. 

1059.  Mining  Laws  and  Customs  not  enacted  by  the  Legislature. 

1060.  Constitution  and  By-Laws  of  a  Private  Society. 

1061.  The  Law  of  the  Particular  Case. 

1050.  Judge  Interprets  Written  Laws.  —  The  interpretation 
of  statutes,  constitutional  ordinances,  municipal  ordinances  and 
by-laws,  and  all  other  written  laws,  is  for  the  court,  and  not  for 
the  jury.i  It  has  been  held  that  juries  are  not  judges  of  the  law 
in  criminal  cases,  in  the  sense  which  entitles  them  to  interpret 
the  meaning  of  words  employed  in  criminal  statutes,  and  that  it 
is  error  for  the  court  in  its  charge  to  submit  the  meaning  of  such 
words  to  them;  ^  but  this  subject  will  be  considered  hereafter.^ 

§  1051.  Illustration  of  an  Application  of  this  Rule.  —  Thus,  it  is 
a  question  of  law,  who  is  "  a  mill  owner,  within  the  meaning  of  the  law 
relating  to  mills  and  mill-dams  "  in  Wisconsin,  and  this  is   to  be  ex- 

1  Barnes  v.    Mayor  of   Mobile,    19  Denver  &c,  R.  Co.   v.    Olsen,  4   Colo. 

Ala.  707;  Fairbanks   v.    Woodhouse,  293;  Large  u.  Orvis,  20  Wis.  696, 
6Cal.  433;  Peoria  v.  Calhoun,  29   111.  2  cm-pcHter     v.     People,     8     Barb- 

317;  Maltus   v.  Shields,   2  Met.    (Ivy.)  (N.  Y.)  603,  610. 
553;  Carleton  v.  People,  10  Mich.  2.50;  '■^  Post,  §  2132,  et  seq. 

Supervisors  v.  Heeuau,  2   Minn.  330; 


Tit.   V,  Ch.   XXXII.]       INTEKPRETATIOX    OF    LAWS,    ETC.  817 

plained  to  the  jury,  and  not  left  to  them  to  discuss  and  settle  for 
themselves.  Therefore,  an  instruction  that,  in  order  to  maintain  a  de- 
fense in  an  action  under  a  statute  called  the  Mill-Dam  Act,  for  flow- 
ing the  plaintiff's  land  and  obstructing  the  wheel  of  her  mill,  on  the 
ground  of  a  prior  right  as  a  lower  mill-owner  on  the  same  stream,  the 
defendant  •'  must  have  shown  himself  to  be  a  mill-owner  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  law  relating  to  mills  and  mill-dams,"  was  properly  refused.^ 

1052.  Meaning-  of  Words  in  Statutes.  —  It  is  error  for  the 
court  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  meaning  of  a  material  word  in  a 
statute.  Thus,  in  an  indictment  for  unlawfully  selling  stray  an- 
imals, it  became  a  question  whether  the  sale  was  attended  by 
three  adult  bidders  besides  the  members  of  the  family  of  the  de- 
fendant, who  had  taken  up  the  estray,  which  was  made  by  the 
statute,^  a  prerequisite  to  the  validity  of  the  sale.  The  court  de- 
clined a  requested  instruction  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  word 
'■'■  family  "  in  the  statute,  but  told  the  jury  that  they  could  put 
their  own  construction  on  it,  it  being  a  matter  of  proof.  It  was 
held  that  this  was  error,  the  court  saying:  "  What  is  intended  in 
the  statute  by  the  words  '  the  family  of  the  taker  up,'  is,  when 
applied  to  a  particular  state  of  facts,  a  mixed  question  of  law  and 
fact.  So  far  as  the  fact  is  governed  by  law,  it  belongs  to  the 
judge  to  declare  the  law ;  and  so  far  as  the  fact  was  one  of  proof, 
it  was  a  matter  to  be  ascertained  from  the  evidence,  and  one  not 
to  be  left  to  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  jury."^ 

§  1053.  [Continued.]  Wliether  a  Pretended  Act  of  the 
Legislature  was  duly  Passed.  —  Whether  what  purports  to  be 
an  act  of  the  legislature  of  a  State  was  duly  passed,  with  the 
concurrence  of  the  requisite  majority  of  the  members  of 
both  houses,  as  is  required  by  the  constitution  of  the  State, 
so  as   to  become    a    valid    law,    is    a   question  of    law   for   the 

'i  Large  v.  Orvis,  20  Wis.  G'JiJ.  agemeut."     See  as  to  the  raeauing  of 

2  Kev.  Stat.  Tex.,  art.  4.583.  the  word;  Tyson  v.    Reynolds,  52  la. 

3  Goode  V.  State,  16  Tex.  App.  411;  431;  Arnold  v.  Waltz,  53  l\x.  70(5;  s.  c. 
citing  Green  v.  Hill,  2  Tex.  4(J5,  The  3(5  Am.  Rep.  248,  and  note;  AVilson  v. 
court  defined  the  word  '■'■  family  "  to  Cochran,  31  Tex.  G77;  Howard  v. 
mean,  "  the  collective  body  of  persons  Marshall,  48  Tex.  471,  478;  Raco  v. 
in  one  house  under  one  head  or  man-  Green,  50  Tex.  483. 


818  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  TllOllip.   Tr., 

court,  aird  not  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^  In  a  sub- 
sequent case,  one  of  the  questions  which  was  regarded  as 
settled  in  the  case  just  cited  was  thus  stated:  "  Whether  a  seem- 
ing act  of  the  legishiture  is  or  is  not  a  hiw,  is  a  judicial  question, 
to  be  determined  by  the  court,  and  not  a  question  of  fact  to  be 
tried  by  a  jury  ;  "  and  this  doctrine  was  reaffirmed.^  This  is  in 
conformity  with  what  was  said  in  an  early  case  in  the  same  court: 
"  Whenever  a  question  arises  in  a  court  of  law,  of  the  existence 
of  a  statute,  or  of  the  time  when  a  statute  took  effect,  or  of  the 
precise  terms  of  a  statute,  the  judges  who  are  called  upon  to 
decide  it  have  a  right  to  resort  to  any  source  of  information 
which  in  its  nature  is  capable  of  conveying  to  the  judicial  mind 
a  clear  and  satisfactory  answer  to  such  question ;  alwa^^s  seeking 
first  for  that  which  in  its  nature  is  most  appropriate,  unless  the 
positive  law  has  enacted  a  different  rule. "  ^  In  the  case  first  cited 
it  was  said:  "  There  can  be  no  estoppel  in  the  way  of  ascertaining 
the  existence  of  a  law.  That  which  purports  to  be  a  law  of  a 
State,  is*a  law,  or  it  is  not  a  law,  according  as  the  truth  of  the  fact 
may  be,  and  not  according  to  the  shifting  circumstances  of  parties. 
It  would  be  an  intolerable  state  of  things  if  a  document  purport- 
ino"  to  be  an  act  of  the  legislature  could  thus  be  a  law  in  one  case 
and  for  one  party,  and  not  a  law  in  another  case  and  for  another 
party;  a  law  to-day,  and  not  a  law  to-morrow;  a  laAV  in  one 
place,  and  not  a  law  in  another  in  the  same  State.  And  whether 
it  be  a  law,  or  not  a  law,  is  a  judicial  question,  to  be  settled  and 
determined  by  the  courts  and  judges."  Further  on  in  the  same 
opinion  it  is  said:  "  Of  course,  any  particular  State  may,  by  its 
constitution  and  laws,  prescribe  what  shall  be  conclusive  evidence 
of  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  a  statute;  but  the  question 
of  such  existence  or  non-existence,  being  a  judicial  one  in  its 
nature,  the  mode  of  ascertaining  and  using  that  evidence  must 
rest  in  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court  on  which  the  duty  in  aUy 
particular  case  is  imposed."  ^     In  determining  this  question,  it 

1  South  Ottawa  v.  Perkius,  94  U.  S.  »  Gardner  v.  Collector,  G  Wall.  (U. 

260.  S.)  499,  511. 

*  Post    V.   Supervisors,    105   U.   S.  *  South   Ottawa  v.  Perkins,  94  U 

667,  S.  2G0,  2C7,  209,  opinon  by  Bradley,  J. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXII.]       INTERPRETATIOX    OF    LAWS,    ETC.  819 

is  competent  for  the  judges,  npon  whom  the  duty  of  deciding  it 
IS  miposed,  to  resort  to  the  written  records  of  the  tegislature%o 
far  as  they  disclose  the  steps  which  took  phice  in  the  passao-e  of 
the  statute  in  question.^  ° 

§  1054.  Foreign  Laws.  —Unless  there  are  statutes  enablin'- 
courts  to  take  judicial  notice  of  foreign  laws,  or  to  ascertain 
their  existence  from  foreign  law  books,^  the  existence  of  a  for- 
eign law  is  proved  as  a  fact,  just  as  any  other  fact  is  proved. 
\et  when  the  existence  of  the  law  is  thus  established,  it  is  for 
the  court  to  determine  its  meaning,  just  as  it  is  to  determine  the 
meaning  of  a  domestic  law.^  In  New  Hampshire  it  is  said  that 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  a  foreign  law  is  to  be  addressed  to 
the  court,  and  not  to  the  jury.*  And  this  is  the  view  of  Mr 
Justice  Story  ,^  adopted  by  Prof.  Greenleaf,«  and  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Maryland.^  But  in  Missouri  and  North  Carolina  it  has 
been  held  that  the  existence  of  a  foreign  law  is  a  question  of  fact 
for  the  jury ;  «  and  it  is  so  held  in  Massachusetts,  with  the  addition 
that  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  as  a  fact,  what  construction 
has  been  put  upon  the  particular  foreign  law  by  the  courts  of 

S  ^'  IT^^^  "-^  Collector,  (5  Wall.  (U.  3  Cecil  Bank  ..  Barry,  20  Md.  287, 

S.)  499,  510;  Purely  v.  People,  4  Hill       295;  Consequa  ^^  Willings   1  Pet  C  C 

^^^' Jm^V^?'o^?^'^''-^'''P^'''  ^'"  (^'  ^-^  2^^'   Charlotte  ..ChoutJuu*,  83 

i/r  o^;     ;^'     '   ^P^"Sler  V.  Jacob,  14  Mo.  194;  ..  c.  25  Mo.  4C5;  Liviu^stou 

111.   297;  Young  v.   Thomson,  14   111.  v.  Maryland  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cranch  (^!  S  ) 

380;  Speer  «.  Plank   Road  Co.,  22  Pa.  280;  Bowditch  v.  Soltyk,  99  Mass.'l36- 

St.   37G;  Matter  of  Welman,   20   Vt.  Klines.  Baker,  99  Mass.  253;  Cobb  i; 

653;   Supervisors  ..  Heenan,   2  Minn.  Griffith  &c.  Co.,  87  Mo.  90,  94;  Hooper 

330;  Fowler    v.    Pierce,  2    Cal.    165;  v.  Moore,  5  Jones  L.  (N.  C  )  130 
Post  V.    Supervisors,  105  U.    S.  668;  "  Ferguson  v.  Clifford,  37  N   H   86 

People    V.     Campbell,      8    111.     466;  "  Story  on  Confl.  Laws,  §  638    ' 

Prescott     V.    Trustees,    19     111.   324;  «  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  486 

Happel    V.    Brethauer,    70    111.     166;  MVilson  ^.  Carson,  12  Md    54    75- 

Watkins   V.   Holman,  16  Pet.  (U.  S.)  Bank  v.  Barry,  20  Md.  287    29-,-'  Do 

25,    55,56;    Bryan    v.    Forsyth,    19  Sobry  i7.  De  Laistre,  2  Harr.  &  J  rku 

How.  (U.  S.)  334;  Gregg   v.  Forsyth,  192. 

l\  f^r.'J^'J'?.    ^'^'  ^■'''''  ""•  ^•^"'^''  '  Charlottes.  Chouteau,  33  Mo.  194; 

68  111.  160;  Miller  v.  Goodwin,  70  111.       Moore  v.  Gwynn,  5  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 

^^l\     .     ^  187;  Cobb  V.  Griffith  &c.  Co.,  87  Mo. 

As  m  Connecticut.     Lockwood  v.      90,  94;   Hooper  v.  Moore,  5  Jones  L 
Crawford,  18  Conn.  3(_;i.  (X.  C.)  130. 


820  PROVINCE  OF  coLirr  AND  JURY.      [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

the  particular  country.^  Outside  Of  the  rule,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  as  to  its  meaning,  and  it  is  error 
to  refer  the  whole  question  to  them  without  such  instructions.^ 
Statutes  of  sister  States  of  the  American  Union  are  foreiern  laws 
within  the  meaning  of  this  rule ;  and  where  the  statute  of  a  sister 
State  is  given  in  evidence,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  expound 
it  to  the  jury,  and  it  is  proper  to  refuse  instructions  which  com- 
mit its  exposition  of  it  to  them.'^ 

§  1055.  Existence  of  Municipal  Ordinances.  —  A  city  ordi- 
nance, it  has  been  hold,  is  to  be  yroved  by  evidence  addressed  to 
the  court,  and  not  to  the  jury.^ 

§  1056.  Interpretation  of  Municipal  Ordinances.  — The  in- 
terpretation of  a  municipal  ordinance  stands  on  the  same  footing 
as.  that  of  a  statute ;  it  must  be  made  by  the  court,  and  an  in- 
struction wdiich  submits  its  meaning  or  legal  effect,  or  its  appli- 
cability under  given  circumstances,  to  the  jury,  is  erroneous.* 
As  hereafter  seen,^  the  reasonableness  of  municipal  ordinances  is 
a  question  for  the  decision  of  the  court.  But  it  has  been  ruled,  on 
doubtful  grounds,  that,  whether  the  cutting  down  of  the  sidewalk 
adjacent  to  the  plaintiff's  lot  to  the  level  of  the  street,  15  feet 
below,  was  a  construction  of  the  highway  within  the  meaning  of 
the  constitutional  provision,  was  a  question  of  fact  for  the  decision 
of  the  jury ;  and  that  the  court  erred  in  instructing  them  that 
the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover,  if  his  property  was  injured, 
without  regard  to  the  circumstances  or  character  of  the  altera- 
tion.' 

§  1057.  Validity  of  Rules,  By-laws,  Regulations,  etc.,  of 
Corporations.  —  Whether  a  certain  rule  of  a  railway  c()r})oration 

1  Holraan  v.  Kiug,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  <  Roulo  v.  Valcour,  58  N.  H.   347 ; 
384.     See  Mostyu  v.  Fabri-;as,  Cowp.  Hall  v.  Coslello,  48  N.  H.  17fi,  179. 
1C4;  Miller  V.  Heiurick,  4  Camp.   155;  ^  pemisylvaiiia    Co.    v.    Frana,    13 
Haven  v.  Foster,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  130.  Bradw.  (HI.)  91. 

2  Hooper     v.    Moore,    5    Jones   L.  ^  Fust,  §  1057;   §  15G8,  et  seq. 

(N.  C.)  130.  '  Montsoraery  v.  Towusend  (Ala.), 

^  Cobb  V.  Griffith   &c.  Co.,  87  Mo.      2  Sonth.  Kep.  155. 
90, 94. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXII.]        INTEHPRETATION    OF    LAWS,    ETC. 


821 


be  reasonable  and  therefore  valid  is  a  question  of  law  for  the 
court,  — the  general  rule  being  that  the  reasonableness  of  the  by- 
laws, rules  and  regulations  of  corporations,  whether  private  or 
municipal,  is  to  be  decided  as  a  question  of  law,  and  that  such  a 
by-law,  rule  or  regulation,  if  unreasonable,  is  to  be  held  void  as 
matter  of  law ;  ^  and  it  is  improper  to  submit  the  question  of  the 
reasonableness  of  such  a  by-law,  ordinance  or  regulation  to  the 
decision  of  a  jury.^  But  whether  a  given,  rule  of  a  railroad  cor- 
poration is  adequate  for  the  safe  management  of  its  trains,  is  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury.-^ 

§  1058.   Existence     of    Particular    Usages    or    Customs. — 

Where  a  usage  is  set  up  to  vary  the  terms  of  a  contract,  there  are 
generally  two  questions  for  the  jury:  1.  Whether  the  usage  or 
custom  has  been  proved.  2.  Whether  the  parties  contracted 
with  reference  to  it.*  The  existence  of  a  local  custom  or  usage 
which  is  not  of  a  character  so  general  as  to  be  matter  of  common 
knowledge,  and  therefore  the  subject  of  judicial  notice, is  a  ques- 
tion oi  fact  for  ajuri/;^  but  whether  a  given  custom  he  valid  or 


1  Merzv.  Mo.  Pa.  R.Co.,  UMo.  App. 
t59;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Weber,  44  Mo. 
547;  City  of  St.  Louis  v.  St.  Louis  R. 
Co.,  14  Mo.  App.  221;  pout,  §§  109(J, 
105t7,  1138,  1139, 

2  Neier  v.  Mo.  Pa.  R.  Co.,  12  Mo. 
App.  20. 

^  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McLallen, 
84  111.  109. 

*  Burroughs  v.  Langley,  10  Md. 
248;  Powell  v.  Bradlee,  9  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  220,  247,  277;  Foley  v.  Masou,  6 
Md.  37;  Dorsey  v.  Eagle,  7  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  321. 

5  Steamboat  Sultana  v.  Chapman, 
5  "Wis.  454,  46(»;  Chesapeake  Bauli  v. 
Swaia,  29  Md.  483;  Kuhtmanw.  Brown, 
4  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  479,  481;  Parker  v. 
Ibbetson,  4  C.  B.  (x.  s.)  34n;  Steam- 
boat V.  Hopkins,  30  Miss.  703;  Bur- 
roughs V.  Langley,  10  Md.  248;  Brig 
Cadmus    v.  Matthews,   2  Paine  C.  C. 


229 ;  Grave  v.  Brien,  1  Md.  438 ;  Chicago 
Packing  &c.  Co.  v.  Tilton,  87  111.. 547. 
In  an  action  against  a  railroad  com- 
pany for  damages  on  the  ground  of 
negligence,  it  was  held  not  incumbent 
on  tlie  plaintiff,  in  opening  his  case,  to 
show  that,  by  the  laws  of  railroad  com- 
Xiauies,  the  defendants  were  guilty  of 
want  of  ordinary  care.  "  If  he  saw 
fit  to  trust  that  question  to  the  good 
sense  of  the  jury,  he  might.  It  is  not 
one  of  those  mere  scientific  subjects 
whose  laws,  like  that  of  botany, 
geology,  or  medicine  or  surgery,  are 
matters  of  settled  principle  or  accurate 
knowledge.  If  the  defendants  desired 
the  benefit  of  the  rules  of  engineering 
for  their  exculpation,  they  might  show 
the  custom,  and,  if  not  unreasonable, 
of  wliiclithe  jury  must  judge,  it  would 
avail  them."  Quimby  v.  Vermont 
Central  R.  Co.,  23  Vt.  387,  394. 


S22  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

invalid,  is  always  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  and  should  not 
be  left  to  a  juiy.^  The  extent  of  the  custom  —  whether  it  is  or 
is  not  universally  recognized  in  a  particular  locality,  is  also  a 
question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^  The  inference  of  fact  as  to  whether 
a  party  had  authority  to  act  in  a  particular  way  from  another, 
is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  where  it  depends  upon  a  course 
of  dealing  between  the  parties,  — as  whether  a  person  has  been 
accustomed  to  draw  on  a  banker,  although  he  had  no  cash  credit 
in  the  hands  of  the  banker.'^ 

§  1030.  Milling  Laws  and  Customs  not  enacted  by  the  J^eg- 
islature.  — At  an  early  day  in  California  the  persons  engaged  in 
mining  the  precious  metals  established  certain  laws  or  rules,  in 
order  to  prevent  conflicts  among  themselves  and  to  settle  disputed 
questions  of  right.  It  has  been  held,  in  a  case  depending  upon 
these  rules,  that  they  are  to  be  proved  as  facts,  and  that  the  ques- 
tion of  their  existence  is  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury  ;  but  that  it 
is  for  the  court,  upon  their  being  so  proved,  to  instruct  the  jury 
as  to  their  proper  meaning  and  application.  * 

§   1060.   Constitution  and  By-Laws  of  a  Private  Society.  — 

So,  the  by-laws  of  a  corporation  or  other  voluntary  association 
or  private  society,  when  proved,  are  to  be  interpreted  by  the 
court,  the  same  as  a  public  law,  and  it  is  error  to  submit  the 
interpretation  of  them  to  the  jury.^     This  is  illustrated  by  a 

1  Chicago  Packing  &c.  Co.  v.Tilton,  iugs,  liad  against  tlie  decedent  during 
87  111.  oil.  his  life  time,  were  iu  accordance  with 

2  Ibid.  the  constitution  and  by-laws  of   the 

3  Cummingw.  Shand,  SHurl.  &'N.  05.      society.     The  court  said:   "Whether 
*  Coleman  v.  Clements,  23  Cal.  245,      any,  and  if  any,  what  proceedings  took 

248.     This,  it  will  remembered,  is  in  place,  were   proper  inquiries  for  the 

confoi-mity  with  the  rule  which  relates  jury;   but  whether  they  were   in  ac- 

to  foreign  laws.  coi'dance   with   the    constitution  and 

5  In  an  action  by  the  adrainistra-  by-laws   of   the  society  or  tribe,  was 

tors    of    a    deceased    member     of    a  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  and 

benevolent  societt/  for  the  benefit  alleged  not  one  of  fact  for  the  jury."  Osceola 

to  be  due  from  the  society  on  account  Tribe  v.  Rost,  15  Md.  295.     The  court 

of  his  death,  it  was  held  that  the  court  cite:  Emery  v.  Owings,  6   Gill  (Md.), 

properly  refused  to  submit  to  tlie  jury  101,    190;  Clark  v.   Marriott,    9    Gill 

the  question  whether  certain  proceed-  (Md.),  331,  337. 


.    Tit.  V,  Ch.   XXXII.]       INTERPRETATION    OF    LAWS,    ETC.  823 

case  where  the  indes  of  a  hoard  of  t7\ide  were  a  part  of  the  con- 
tract sued  on,  and  authorized  the  phiintiff ,  who  Avas  a  member  of 
the  board,  and  who,  as  a  commission  merchant,  had  bought  pro- 
duce for  future  delivery  on  account  of  the  defendant,  to  offset 
and  settle  such  trade  by  other  trades  made  by  the  defendant,  and 
to  substitute  some  other  person  for  the  one  from  whom  he  pur- 
chased the  property, —  thus,  in  the  slang  of  such  institutions, 
"  ringing  out  the  deal."  Acting  under  this  rule,  the  plaintiff 
released  the  seller  from  his  contracts,  and,  having  many  similar 
transactions  in  his  business,  proposed  to  himself  to  substitute,  in 
place  of  the  contract  with  the  seller,  the  agreement  of  such  other 
contractor  as  might  be  available  for  the  purpose  at  the  time  of 
settlement,  but  designated  no  particular  contractor  or  contract. 
It  was  held  that  it  was  a  question  of  law  for  the  court  whether 
this  was  a  substitution  within  the  meanino;  of  the  rule ;  since  it 
involved  merely  an  interpretation  ot  the  rule,  which  was  within 
the  province  of  the  court. ^ 

§  1061.  The  Law  of  the  Particular  Case.  — Where,  upon  a 
given  state  of  facts,  the  law  has  been  pronounced  by  an  appellate 
tribunal  and  the  cause  remanded  for  a  new  trial,  the  trial  court 
will,  if  the  same  state  of  facts  is  again  presented  by  the  evidence, 
declare  the  law  thereupon  according  to  the  opinion  of  the  appel- 
late court.  Thus,  it  is  was  ruled  in  Missouri  that,  where  the 
Supreme  Court  had  declared  a  sale  void,  upon  an  appeal 
presenting  a  certain  state  of  facts,  and,  on  trial  anew,  the  facts 
presented  by  the  evidence  were  substantially  the  same,  the  trial 
court  should  have  held  the  sale  void  as  a  question  of  law.^ 

1  Higgins    V     McCrea,    IIG    U.    S.  2  Vail  v.   Jacob,  7    Mo."  App.    571 

671.  (not  i-eported  in  full) . 


824  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 


CHAPTER     XXXIII. 


INTERPRETATION  OF  PRIVATE  WRITINGS. 

Section 

1065.  General  Rule  as  to  the  Interpretation  of  Writings. 

1066.  Reason  of  the  Rule, 

1067.  What  Instruments  the  Rule  Embraces. 

1068.  Error  to  submit  such  a  Question  to  the  Jury. 

1069.  Characterization,  Interpretation  and  Effect  of  Wills. 

1070.  Interpretation  of  Public  Records. 

1071.  Interpretation  of  Judicial  Records. 

1072.  Interpretation  of  Contracts  by  Correspondence, 

1073.  [Continued.]     Observations  on  the  Above  Rule. 

1074.  [Continued.]     An  Exception  to  the  Above  Rule. 

1075.  Meaning  of  Ordinary  Words  and  Phrases, 

1076.  Meaning  of  Words  not  used  in  their  Ordinary  Sense, 

1077.  Instances  under  this  Rule, 

1078.  [Further  Illustration.]     Promise  to  pay  in  ''  Cash  Notes." 

1079.  View  that  the  Jury  must  Declare  the  Meaning  of  the  Word,  and  the 

Court  Expound  the  Contract, 

1080.  Technical  Terras  known  only  to  Experts, 

1081.  The  Meaning  which  the  Parties  themselves  have  placed  upon  their  Con- 

tract. 

1082.  [Continued.]     Court  to  Instruct  Jury  as  to  Inferences, 

1083.  Rule  where  Parol  Evidence  is  Required  to  Explain  Ambiguities, 

1084.  [Illustration,]     Where  Parol  Evidence  is  admitted  to  Explain  a  Will. 

1085.  [Contiuued.]     How  the  Jury  Instructed  in  such  a  Case, 

1086.  Contract  partly  in  Writing  and  partly  in  Parol. 

1087.  Receipts  for  .Aloncy  Paid. 

1C88,  Meaning  of  Words  varied  by  Evidence  of  Usage. 

1089,  Mercantile  Contracts  explained  by  the  Usages  of  Trade. 

1000.  Instance  of  an  Instruction  Erroneous  within  this  Rule. 

1091,  The  Correct  Reading  of  Written  Instruments. 

1092.  Blanks  in  Written  Instruments. 

1093.  [Continued.]     Cases  where  the  Meaning  has  been  submitted  to  the  Jury. 

1094,  [Continued.]     Blanks  in  the  Descriptive  Calls  of  a  Deed. 

1095,  Whether  an  Instrument  is  Sealed  or  Unsealed, 

1096.  Validity  of  Written  Instruments. 

1097,  V/hether  a  Contract  is  against  Public  Policy. 

1098.  Inferences  from  Writuigs  j)ut  in  Evidence  to  show  Extrinsic  Facts. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXIIl.]    INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    825 

1065.   General  Rule  as  to  the  Interpretation  of  Writings. — 

As  a  general  rule,  the  interpretation  or  construction  of  written 
instruments,  which  are  drawn  in  language  so  plain  as  not  to  re- 
quire the  aid  of  extrinsic  evidence,  is  a  question  for  the  court, 
and  it  is  -error  to  submit  such  a  question  to  the  jury.^  An 
instruction  to  the  jury,  as  to  the  legal  effect  of  a  written  in_ 
strument,  is  not  subject  to  objection  as  being  an  instruction 
upon  a  question  of  fact.^  The  rule  is  said  to  be  that  written  in- 
struments should  be  construed  and  interpreted  by  the  court  upon 
inspectio7i  only^  unless  terms  of  art  or  other  unusual  language 
be  employed,  or  unless  words  are  employed  not  in  their  ordinary 


1  Parker  u.  Ibbetsou,  4  C.  B.  (x.  s.) 
345;  State  V.  Lefaivre,  53  Mo.  470; 
Edwards  v.  Smith,  G3  Mo.  119;  Blake- 
ley  v.  Benuecke,  59  Mo.  193;  Burress 
V.  Blair,  61  Mo.  133;  State?;.  Doimelly, 
9  Mo.  App.  520;  Brecheisen  v.  Coffey, 
loMo.  App.  80;  Michael  w.  St.  Louis 
Mutual  Fire  lus.  Co.,  17  Mo.  App.  23; 
Fruin  V.  Crystal  Ry.  Co.,  89  Mo.  397, 
404 ;  Falls  Wire  Man.  Co.  v.  Broder- 
ick,  12  Mo.  App.  378;  Spaldiug  v. 
Taylor,  1  Mo.  App.  34;  Goddard  v. 
Foster,  17  Wall.  (U.  S.)  123;  Lapeer 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Doyle,  30  Mich.  159; 
Eyser  v.  Weissgerber,  2  Iowa,  4(13; 
Levy  V.  Gadsl)y,  3Crauch  (U.  S.),  180; 
Str'^eter  u.  Streeter,  43  111.  155;  Drew 
V.  Towle,  30  N.  H.  531;  Shepherd  v. 
White,  11  Tex.  34G;  Thomas  v.  Thom- 
as, 15  B.  Mon.  178;  Smith  w.  Faulk- 
ner, 12  Gray,  251 ;  Warren  v.  Jones,  51 
Me.  146;  Cocheco  Bank  v.  Berry,  52 
Me.  293;  Williams  v.  Waters,  36  Ga. 
454;  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Cassell, 
17  111.  389;  Nash».  Drisco,51  Me.  417; 
Perth  Amboy  Man.  Co.  v.  Condit,  21 
N.  J.  L.  659;  Rogers  v.  Colt,  21  N.  J. 
L.  704;  Brown  v.  Hatton,  9  Ired.  (N. 
C.)  319;  Roth  v.  Miller,  15  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  100;  Vincent  v.  Huff,  8  Serg.  &  R. 
(Pa.)  381;  Moore  v.  Miller,  4  Serg.  & 
R.  (Pa.)  279;  Wasou  v.    Rowe,  16  Vt. 


525;  Collins  v.  Benbury,  5  Ired.  (N. 
C.)  118;  Bedford  v.  Flowers,  11 
Humph.  (Tenu.)  242;  Gregory  v. 
Underhill,  6  Lea  (Tenn.),  207,  211; 
Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  McKenna,  13 
Lea  (Tenn.),  280,  288;  Holman  v. 
Crane,  16  Ala.  570,  580;  Welsh  v.  Dus- 
ar,  3  Binn.  (Pa.)  329,  337;  Fowle  u. 
Bigelow,  10  Mass.  379  384;  Woodman 
r.  Chesley,  39  Me.  45;  Harris  v.  Doe, 
4  Blackf.  (Ind.)  369;  Leviston  v. 
Junction  R.  Co.,  7  Ind.  597;  Emery  v. 
Owiugs,  6  Gill  (Md.),  260;  Kidd  v. 
Cromwell,  17  Ala.  648;  Walker  v. 
Bank  of  Washington,  3  How.  (U.  S.) 
62;  Higgins  v.  McCrea,  116  U.  S.  671, 
682;  Eddy  v.  Chase,  140  Mass.  471; 
Friend  v.  Friend,  64  Md.  321 ;  Warner 
V.  Thompson,  35  Kan.  27;  Russell  v. 
Arthur,  17  S.  C.  477;  Union  Bank  v. 
Heyward,  15  S.  C.  296;  Mowry  u.  Stog- 
ner,3  S.  C.  251,  253;  Burke  v.  Lee,  76 
Va.  386;  Dixon  v.  Duke,  85  Ind.  434; 
Butler  V.  State,  5  Gill  &  J.  (:Md.)  511, 
619;  Sellars  v.  Johnson,  65  N.  C.  104; 
Luckhart  v.  Ogden,  30  Cal.  547,  556 ; 
Dunn  V.  Rothernell,  112  Pa.  St.  272; 
Van  Eman  v.  Stauchfleld,  8  Minn.  518, 
522;  Grady  v.  Cassidy,  104  N.  Y.  147. 
2  Lucas  V.  Snyder,  2  G.  Greene 
(Iowa),  499;  San  Antonio  v.  Lewis,  & 
Tex.  69,  71. 


^26  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

signification,  and  which  hence  require  explanation  by  extrinsic 
evidence.^  "  The  construction  of  all  written  instruments,"  said 
Baron  Parke,  "  belongs  to  the  court  alone,  whose  duty  it  is 
to  construe  all  such  instruments  as  soon  as  the  true  meanino-  of 
the  words  in  which  they  are  couched,  and  the  surrounding  cir- 
cumstances, if  any,  have  been  ascertained  as  facts  by  the  jury; 
and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  take  the  construction  from  the 
court,  either  absolutely-,  if  there  be  no  words  which  are  to  be 
construed  as  words  of  art,  or  phrases  used  in  commerce,  and  no 
surrounding  circumstances  to  be  ascertained;  or  conditionally, 
when  those  words  or  circumstances  are  necessarily  referred  to 
them.  Unless  this  were  so,  there  would  be  no  certainty  in  the 
law;  for  a  misconstruction  by  the  court  is  the  proper  subject,  by 
means  of  a  bill  of  exceptions,  of  redress  in  a  court  of  error;  but 
a  misconstruction  by  the  jury  cannot  be  set  right  at  all,  effect- 
ually."^^ 

§  1066.  Reason  of  the  Rule. — "This,"  said  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Pennsylvania,  "  is  a  matter  of  very  great  importance. 
The  security  of  property  depends  upon  it ;  for  there  is  no  appeal 
from  the  decision  of  a  jury.  The  injured  party  may  indeed 
move  for  a  new  trial,  but  the  court  may  grant  or  refuse,  at  its 
discretion.  It  is  the  right,  therefore,  of  every  suitor,  to  have 
the  opinion  of  the  court  on  such  matters  as,  by  the  law  of  the 
land,  the  court  is  bound  to  decide ;  and  one  of  these  matters  is  the 
construction  of  w^ritten  contracts.  There  may  be  cases  in  which 
extrinsic  circumstances  are  so  connected  with  a  writing  as  to  ren- 
der it  necessary  to  leave  the  whole  to  the  jury."  ^  "It  is,"  said 
Le  Grand,  C.  J.,  "  exclusively  the  province  of  the  court  to  in- 
terpret all  written  instruments,  and  to  determine  the  materiality 
and  force  of  each  and  all  the  facts  contained  in  them.  Were  the 
jury  permitted  to  do  this,  there  would  be  no  certain  legal  signifi- 
cance assignable  to  any  paper ;   for  it  would  depend  upon  the 

1  Van  Email  v.  Stanchflcld,  8  Minn.  ford,  8  Mees.  &  W.  823.  See  also  Mor- 
518,  522.  ell  v.  Frith,  3  Mees.  &  W.  406. 

2  Baron  Parke   in   Xeilson  v.    liar-  3  Donison   v.    Wertz,   7  Serg.  &  R 

"a.)  372,  376. 


Tit.   V,  Cll.   XXXIIL]    INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    AVRITINGS.    827 

peculiar  notions  of  each  particular  jury,  under  whose  supervision 
it  mio;ht  be  brouo;ht ;  and  thus  a  recital  in  a  case  like  the  one  be- 
fore  us  might  be  deemed  material  by  one  jury,  and  by  another, 
as  wholly  immaterial  and  unimportant."  *  "It  is,"  said  Mr. 
Justice  Cooley,  "  for  the  court  to  interpret  the  written  contracts 
of  parties  ;  for  when  they  have  assented  to  definite  terms  and 
stipulations,  and  incorporated  them  in  formal  documents,  the  mean- 
ing of  these,  it  is  supposed,  can  always  be  discovered  on  inspec- 
tion ;  nothing  which  is  within  the  purview  of  the  contract  is  left 
in  doubt,  and  there  is  of  course  nothing  to  submit  to  the  jury."  ^ 

§  10G7.  What  Instruments  the  Rule  embraces. — The  ob- 
ligation of  the  court  to  expound  the  meaning  of  written  instru- 
ments to  the  jury,  and  not  to  submit  such  questions  to  them, 
embraces  every  species  of  writings:  contracts, "^  records,*  deeds,^ 
wills, ^  and  all  others.'     So,  where  a  disputed  question  turns  up- 


1  Cook's  Lessee  v.  Carroll,  ti  Md. 
104,111. 

2  McKenzie  v.  Sykes,  47  Mich.  294, 
295.  See  also  Thompsou  v.  Richards, 
14  Mich.  172. 

3  Cases,  ante,  §  1065;  jyost,  §  1068. 
■*  Adams    v.    Betz,  1   Watts    (Pa.), 

425. 

5  McCutcheu  v.  McCutchen,  9  Port. 
(Ala.)  650;  Seaward  v.  Malotte,  15 
Cal.  304 ;  Bonney  tj.  Morrill,  52  Me.  252 ; 
Veuable  I'  McDonald,  4  Dana  (Ky.), 
336;  Hodges  v.  Strong,  10  Vt.  247; 
Whittlesey  v.  Kellogg,  28  Mo.  404; 
Hurley  v.  Morgan,  1  Dev.  &  Batt.  425; 
Morse  v.  Weymouth,  28  Vt.  824;  Ad- 
dingtou  V.  Etheridge,  12  Gratt.  (Va.) 
436;  Poage  v.  Bell,  3  Rand.  586;  Smith 
V.  Clayton,  29  N.  J.  L.  357;  Brown  v. 
Huger,21  How.  (U.  S.)  305;  American 
Bank  v.  luloes,  7  Md.  380;  Whiteford  v. 
Munroe,  17  Md.  135;  Deanr.  Erskiue, 
18  N.  H.  81;  Stark  V.  Barrett,  15  Cal. 
361;  Montagu.  Linn,  23 111.  551;  Harris 
V.  Doe,  4  Blackf.  (Ind  )  369;  Symmes  v. 
Brown,  13  Ind.  318;  Millerr.  Sluickle- 


ford,  4  Dana,  264;  St.  .John  v.  Bump- 
stead,  17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)100;  Stevens  «. 
Hollister,  18  Vt.  294;  Cox  ?j.  Freedley, 
33  Pa.  St.  124;  Price  v.  Mazauge,  31 
Ala.  701,  709. 

•5  Magee  v.  McNeil,  41  Miss.  17; 
Downing  v.  Bain,  24  Ga.  372;  Sartor 
V.  Sartor,  39  Miss.  760;  Willson  v. 
Whitefleld,  38  Ga.  269.  So,  whether 
or  not  a  will  has  been  executed  with 
the  proper  formalities  is,  of  course,  a 
question  of  law.  Roe  v.  Tyler,  45  111. 
485;  Riley  v.  Riley,  36  Ala.  496:  Sulli- 
van V.  Honacker,  6  Fla.  372 

7  Kidd  V.  Cromwell,  17  Ala.  648; 
Earbee  v.  Craig,  1  Ala.  607;  Carpentier 
V.  Thirston,  24  Cal.  268;  Richmond 
&c.  Co.  V.  Farquar,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
89;  Leviston  u.  Junction  R.  Co.,  7  Ind. 
597;  Pickerell  v.  Carson,  8  Iowa,  544; 
Caldwell  v.  Dicksou,  26  Mo.  60;  Hol- 
man  u.  Crane,  16  Ala.  570;Cahoonv. 
Ring,  1  Cliff.  (C.  C.)  592;  Turner  v. 
Yates,  16  How.  14;  Moore  v.  Leseur, 
18  Ala.  606;  Long  v.  Rodgers,  19  Ala, 
321. 


828  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  ThoHip.  Tl'., 

on  the  construction  of  two  or  more  written  instruments  which  are 
to  be  construed  together,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  construe 
them  and  to  dechire  their  meaning  to  the  jury,  and  to  direct  a 
verdict,  if,  in  the  state  of  the  case,  a  due  construction  of  the  in- 
struments determines  the  controversy.^  Instances  under  the 
rule  could  be  multiplied  almost  without  number.  Thus,  the  force 
and  effect,  as  well  as  the  interpretation  and  construction,  of  a 
writing,  upon  the  question  whether  it  is  a  lease  or  not,  is  for  the 
determination  of  the  court  and  not  of  the  jury.^  So,  whether 
an  agreement  between  parties  amounts  to  an  extension  of  time 
for  the  performance  of  a  prior  contract  between  them,  and  if 
so,  what  time,  are  questions  of  law  for  the  court,  and  not  ques- 
tions of  fact  for  the  jury .^  So,  it  was  held  error  to  submit  to  the 
jury  the  question  whether  the  terms  of  a  written  contract  ex- 
cluded a  general  custom  of  trade,  the  existence  of  which  had  been 
proved  before  then.'* 

§  10G8.   Error  to  submit  such  a  Question  to  the  Jury. — 

An  instruction  which  submits  to  the  jury  the  interpretation  of  a 
written  contract,  which  is  so  plain  in  its  terms  that  extrinsic 
evidence  is  not  needed  to  explain  its  meaning,  is  erroneous ;  ^  if 
the  jury  construe  it  wrongly,  the  judgment  will  be  reversed; 
but  if  they  construe  it  rightly,  the  error  will  be  immaterial.^ 

§  1069.  Characterization,  Interpretation  and  Effect  of 
Wills. — This  doctrine  applies  to  wills,  and  all  questions  touch- 
ing the  operation,  construction  and  effect  of  testamentary  ivrit- 
ings,  are  for  the  court,  with  the  single  exception  that  where 
there    is    a    latent   ambiguity    parol    evidence    may    be    heard. ^ 

1  Helraholz  v.  Everiugham,  24  Wis.  Spalding   v.  Tayloi*,  1    Mo.    App.   34; 

266.  Willard  v.  Suraner,  7  Mo.  App.   577; 

-  Dilim  V.    Kothermcl,   112    Pa.  St.  Brooks  v.  Standard  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  11 

272.  Mo.    App.  350;   Miller  v.  Duniap,   22 

•"  Luckhart  v.  Ogdtni,  30  Cal.  548,  Mo.  Apj).  97;  other  cases, a«fe,  §  1065. 
556.  6  Brooks  v.  Standard  Fire  Ins.  Co., 

•»  Parker  v.  Ibbetson,  4   C.    B.    (..x  11  Mo.  App.  350;  Mai'tineau  v.  Steele, 

s.)   345.  14  Wis.  273;  ante,  §  1020. 

^  State    V.    Lefaivre,    53    Mo.    470;  '  Burke  v.  Lee,  76  Va.  386, 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXllI.]   INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    829 

Whether  a  will  has  been  executed  with  all  the  jjroper  formalities, 
is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  and  is  not  to  be  submitted  to 
the  jury.^  Whether  a  paper  tendered  in  evidence  is  testamentary 
in  its  character,  to  take  effect  on  the  death  of  the  maker,  and 
whether,  as  such,  it  should  be  admitted  for  probate,  is  peculiarly 
a  question  for  the  court.  But,  on  being  so  admitted,  the  ques- 
tions as  to  the  testamentary  capacity  and  free  volition  of  the 
testator  is  for  the  jury.^  There  is  always  a  presumption,  it  is 
said,  against  an  imperfect  testamentary  paper ;  and  where  it  is 
doubtful  whether  it  was  intended  to  operate  as  a  deed  or  as  a  luill, 
it  is  for  the  jury  to  decide,  on  the  facts  touching  its  execution 
and  deliveiy,  the  declarations  of  the  maker  and  other  circum- 
stances, which  ^vay  it  was  intended  to  operate.^  Although  the 
interpretation  of  wills  is  generally  a  question  of  law  for  the 
court,  yet  where  the  question  depends  upon  i\\Q  form  of  attesta- 
tion, which  may  have  been  the  result  of  ignorance  on  the  part  of 
the  testator  (the  law  requiring  a  different  attestation  in  case  of 
a  disposition  of  real  property  from  that  required  in  case  of  a 
disposition  of  personal  property),  it  has  been  held,  in  a  contest 
touching  personal  property  alleged  to  have  been  passed  by  the 
will,  that  the  question  whether  the  testator  intended  that  the 
paper  should  operate  as  to  t/ie personal,  properly  unless  it  could  take 
effect  as  to  the  real  property,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.* 

§   1070.   Interpretation  of  Public  Records.  — Whether  a  cer- 
tain instrument,   for  the  alteration  of  which  a  person  has  been 

1  Roe  V.  Taylor,  45  111.  485.     There  ^  Ferguson  v.   Ferguson,    27  Tex. 

Is  a  ruling  in  one  jurisdiction  to  the  339,    344.      Compare     Herrington    v. 

effect  that,   -nhether  a    testamentary  Bradford,  Walker  (Miss.),  520;  Jones 

instrument  was   signed   and  attested  v.    Kea,   4     Dev.    (N.    C.)  301;  Lyles 

as  required  by  law  are  questions  of  v.  Lyles,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)    531 ; 

fact  for  the  jury.    Watford  ^.Eorester,  Wigle  f .  "Wigle,   6  Watts  (Pa.),  522; 

06  Ga.  738.     If  tliis  means  anything  Wareham  v.  Sellers,  9  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 

more  than  that  the  question  whetlier  98;    Witherspoon  v.   Withcrspoon,   2 

tlie  will  was  in  fact  executed  by  the  McCord  (S.  C),  520;  King's  Proctor 

person  by  whom  it  purported  to  be  v.  Dairas,  3  Hagg.  218. 

executed,   it  is    an  obvious    judicial  ■*  Fatheree  v.   Lawrence,  33  Miss, 

aberration.  585,   G28.     See    also   Jones  v.    Kea,  4 

■■'  Watford  i'.  Forester,  Gfi  Ga.  738.  Dev.  (X.  C.)  301. 


830  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

indicted  and  put  upon  trial,  is  a  public  record,  is  a  question  of 
law  for  the  court. ^  Thus,  it  is  the  province  and  duty  of  the 
court  to  settle,  as  a  question  of  law,  the  meaning  of  the  speci- 
ficatlon.  of  a  patent ;  and,  if  it  cannot  be  ascertained  satisfactor- 
ily from  an  inspection  of  the  patent,  it  is  to  be  declared  void 
for  ambiguity.  Accordingly,  where,  in  an  action  on  the  case  for 
an  infringement  of  letters-patent,  it  was  objected,  upon  the  face 
of  the  specification  of  the  patent,  which  was  for  improvements 
in  the  mode  of  propelling  vessels,  that  it  was  uncertain  whether 
the  patentee  claimed  a  wheel  constructed  spirally  or  only  spiral 
paddles  attached  to  a  wheel,  and  the  court  instructed  the  jury 
that  the  question  whether  the  specification  was  ambiguous  in  the 
particular  charged  was  one  compounded  of  law  and  fact,  and 
that,  if  the  jury  should  find  that  a  spiral  wheel  and  a  spiral  pro- 
peller were  the  same  thing  in  ordinary  acceptation,  then  the 
specification  was  sufliciently  certain  in  that  respect,  —  it  was 
held  that  the  instruction  was  erroneous.^ 

§  1071.  Interpretation  of  Judicial  Records.  —  The  mean- 
ing of  a  judicial  record,  including  the  question  of  its  validity, 
is  always  a  matter  to  be  expounded  by  the  court,  —  as  whether 
an  order  granting  letters  of  admimstration  is  valid  or  invalid.^ 
As  already  stated,*  this  rule  applies  with  peculiar  force  to  the 
records  of  the  particular  court.  So,  it  has  been  held  that,  where 
there  is  a  question  as  to  the  meaning  of  an  order  of  sale  of  per- 
sonal property  made  by  an  Orphans'  Court,  it  is  not  competent 
to  introduce  the  order  book  and  to  show  similar  orders  made 
by  the  court  in  the  matter  of  other  estates, — the  construction 
of  the  particular  order  being  for  the  court.^  So,  where  in  an 
action  on  a  contract,  the  defendant  pleads  a  decree  of  a  chancery 
court,  to  show  a  release  by  the  plaintiff  of  his  cause  of  action, 
it  is  for  the  court  to  construe  the  decree  and  determine  from  its 
face,  whether   it  was  intended  to  operate  as  a  release;   and  a 

1  State  V.  Anderson,  30  La.  Ann.  ^  Sims  v.  Boynton,  32  Ala.  352, 
Pt.  1,557.                                                            3C0, 

2  Emerson  v.  Hogg,  2  Blatchf.  (U.  ''  Ante,  §  1020. 

S.)     1,    G.     Compare     Washburn     v.  ^  Wyatt  v.  Steele,   2(;  Ala.  G3<),  (;49. 

Gould,  3  Story  (U.  S.),  122. 


Tit.   V,  Cll.   XXXIII.]   INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    831 

charge  which  submits  this  question  to  the  jury  is  erroneous. ^ 
So,  also,  the  interpretation  of  an  award  made  by  arbitrators  is 
for  the  court;  although  it  has  been  said  that,  in  construing 
either  the  terms  of  the  submission  or  the  language  of  the  award, 
reference  may  be  had  to  all  the  surrounding  facts  of  the 
case.'- 

§  1072.  Interpretation  of  Contracts  by  Correspondence. — 

Where  the  evidence  adduced  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  contract 
consists  wholly  of  letters  which  have  passed  between  the  parties, 
it  is  the  oflfice  of  the  court,  upon  an  inspection  of  the  letters,  if 
they  are  capable  of  being  understood  without  extrinsic  evidence, 
to  declare,  as  matter  of  law,  whether  the>'  amount  to  a  proposal 
and  to  an  unconditional  acceptance,  so  as  to  constitute  a  contract,^ 
and,  if  so,  to  say  what  the  contract  is  ;  ^  and  it  is  error  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  jury.^  This  must,  on  principle,  be  qualified  with 
the  statement  that,  where  the  question  of  contract  or  no  contract  is 
to  be  determined  from  the  acts  as  well  as  the  writino-s,  in  or- 
der  that  the  court  shall  determine  it,  the  act  must  be  established 
by  uncontroverted  evidence,  and  must  be  of  an  unetjuivocal 
character.  If  they  admit  of  different  inferences  as  to  the  in- 
tent, the  question  is,  on  principle,  one  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 

1  Shook  V.  Blouut,  07  Ala.  301.  -whether  their  award   conforms  to  the 

2  The  award  of  arbitrators  is  cou-  direction  and  powers  giveu  them  by 
elusive  upon  the  parties,  only  iu  the  subraissiou,  must  of  course  be  de- 
respect  of  those  matters  which  have  termined  by  the  court  as  a  questiou 
been  submitted  to  them  for  ai'bitra-  of  law,  upon  a  consideration  of  the 
tion.  If  they  assume  to  act  on  ques-  terms  of  the  submission.  Squires  r. 
tions  not  submitted  to  them,  or  fail  to  Anderson,  supra;  Kanousein  Kauouse, 
follow  the  directions  of  the  submis-  SO  111.  4.3!). 

sion  iu  a  material  point,  their  award  ^  Falls  Wire  Man.  Co.  v.  Broderick, 

iu  respect  of  those  matters  will  not  be  12   j\Io.    App.    378,   385;  Luckhart   v. 

binding,    whether   the     questious    be  Ogdeu,  30  Cal.  547,  55(1;  Macbeath   v. 

questions  of  law  or  questious  of  fact.  Haldimand,  1  T.  R.  172,  180. 

Squires  r.  Anderson,  54  Mo.  193.   Cou-  •»  y.^   Valkeuburg    v.   Rogers,    18 

suit  also  Pratt  v.  Hackett,   G   Johns.  Mich.  180 

(N.  Y.)   13;   Allen  t7.    Galpin,  9  Barb.  *  Lea  v.  Henry,  56  la.  662;  Russell  i?. 

(N.  y.)  246.     Whether  the  arbitrators  Arthur,  17  S.  C.  477;  Rauney   y.  Hig- 

had  authority  to  act  in  reference  to  by,  5  Wis.  62. 

any      particular     subject-matter,     or  •'  Post,  §  1083. 


832  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Tliomp.  Tl'., 

§  1073.  [Continued.]  Observations  on  the  above  Rule. — In  the 
leading  case  upon  this  rule,  the  question  was  whether  the  defendant 
had  contracted  as  agent  for  the  government  or  for  himself,  and  it  was 
objected  that,  whether  he  had  made  himself  liable  or  not  was  a  ques- 
tion which  ought  to  have  been  left  to  the  jury  to  decide.  "  But,"  said 
Lord  Mansfield,  "there  was  no  evidence  which  was  proper  for  their 
consideration ;  for  the  evidence,  consisting  altogether  of  written  docu- 
ments and  letters  which  were  not  denied,  the  import  of  them  was  mat- 
ter of  law,  and  not  of  fact."  Willes,  J.,  said  on  the  same  point: 
"There  was  no  other  evidence  but  letters,  which  were  before  the  jury, 
and  the  judge  had  a  right  to  give  his  opinion  upon  them.  The  con- 
struction of  deeds  is  a  matter  of  law,  but  that  of  letters  is  proper  for 
the  consideration  of  the  jury."  Buller,  J.,  said:  "I  do  not  agree 
with  my  brother  Willes  as  to  the  construction  of  letters.  If  they  are 
written  in  so  dubious  a  manner  as  to  be  capable  of  different  construc- 
tions, and  can  be  explained  by  other  transactions,  the  whole  evidence 
must  be  left  to  the  jury  to  decide  upon,  for  they  are  to  judge  of  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  such  collateral  facts  which  may  vary  the  sense  of  the 
letters  themselves.  But  if  they  are  not  explained  by  any  other  circum- 
stances, then,  like  deeds  or  other  written  agreements,  the  construction  of 
them  is  a  mere  matter  of  law."  ^  This  case  must  therefore  be  taken  as 
deciding  that  the  construction  of  letters,  not  in  themselves  ambiguous 
so  as  to  require  the  aid  of  extrinsic  evidence  in  their  explanation,  is  for 
the  court  and  not  for  the  jury. 

§  1074.  [Continued.]  An  Exception  to  the  Above  Rule. — To 
this  rule  an  exception  was  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio,  in  a 
case  where  F.  sued  the  Franklin  Insurance  Company  upon  a  policy  of 
insurance.  The  answer  alleged  that  the  loss  occurred  after  the  policy 
had  become  void  because  the  premium  note  was  not  paid  when  due. 
The  reply  charged  that  the  company  sent  the  note  after  the  default  to 
T.  for  collection  ;  that  T.  directed  the  defendant  to  continue  tlie  insur- 
ance and  guaranteed  the  i)ayment  of  the  premium,  to  which  the  defend- 
ant assented.  On  the  trial  of  this  issue,  the  plaintiff  gave  in  evidence 
T.'s  letter  to  the  defendant,  reading,  "  Continue  the  policy  in  force  and 
we  will  guarantee  the  payment  of  tlie  note."  The  plaintiff  also  gave 
evidence  showing  the  course  of  dealing  and  correspondence  between  T. 
and  the  defendant.  This  showed  that  the  defendant  made  no  reply  to 
the  letter,  but  wrote  him  several  letters  on  other  matters  during  the 

1  Macbeath   v.  Ilaldiimiml,  1    T.  K.  172,  ISO,  181,  182. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XXXIII.]   INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    833 

interval  prior  to  the  loss.  Upon  this  evidence  the  court,  on  motion  of 
the  defendant,  took  the  issue  from  tlie  jury.  It  was  held  that  this  was 
error.  The  letter  of  T.  did  not  in  terms  or  by  necessary  implication 
under  all  the  circumstances,  call  for  a  reply  if  the  defendant  assented 
thereto.  The  court  should  have  submitted,  under  suitable  instruction,  to 
the  jury,  the  question :   "  Did  the  defendant  assent  to  T. 's  proposal?  "  i 

§  1075.  Meaning  of  Ordinary  Words  and  Phrases. — The 

meaning  of  ordinary  words  and  phrases  in  written  instruments 
is  to  be  interpreted  by  the  court,  and  not  by  the  jury.^  Thus, 
the  question  what  is  meant  by  the  words  of  a  written  contract 
sued  on,  "when  the  walls  shall  be  completed,"  being  a  question 
involving  the  construction  of  a  contract,  has  been  held  a  question 
of  law  for  the  court. ^  So,  it  has  been  held  error  for  the  judge 
to  submit  to  the  jury  whether  the  words  used  in  a  loarranty  of 
facts  upon  which  a  policy  of  insurance  was  obtained  asserted  an 
existing  factor  merely  gave  an  opinion, — the  warranty  being 
wholly  in  writing.'*  So,  it  is  said,  that  what  is  meant  by  the  use 
of  the  words  '•^  insupportable^^  and  ^'■outrageous,'"  in  a  statute 
relating  to  divorces,  is  a  question  of  law ;  but  that  the  existence 
and  truth  of  the  facts  which  amount  to  such  outrages  are  for  the 
jury.^  So,  in  an  action  for  slander,  where  there  is  no  averment 
that  any  of  the  words  used  had  a  local  or  provincial  meaning,  the 
jury  should  be  left  to  judge,  from  the  speaking  of  the  words  and 
the  attending  circumstances,  of  the  meaning  intended  to  be  con- 
veyed by  the  use  of  them.  Accordingly,  it  is  error  in  such  a 
trial,  to  allow  witnesses  to  give  their  opinions  as  to  the  meaning 
of  such  Avords.^ 

§  1076.  Meaning  of  Words  not  used  in  their  Ordinary 
Sense. — In  the  interpretation  of  written  instruments  the  words 
employed  are  to  be  understood  in  their  ordinary  sense  unless  it 
appears  doubtful  whether  they  were  intended  to  be  understood 

1  Fry  V.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  40  Oh.  *  Bennett  v.  Agricultural  Insurance 
St.  108.  Co.,  51  Coun.  504. 

2  Brady  V.  Cassidy,  104 N.Y.  147, 153.  ^  Byrne  v.  Byrne,  3  Tex.  33G. 

3  Worcester  Medical  Institution  v.  ^  Justice  v.  Kirlin,  17  Ind.  588. 
Harding,  11  Gush.  (Mass.)  285,  289. 


834  PROVINCE   OF   COUU'I    AND   JURY.       [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

in  that  sense,  in  which  case  the  court  may  receive  extrinsic  evi- 
dence for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  construction/  and  may 
refer  the  question  of  tlie  meaning  of  the  words  to  the  jurv/^ 
The  rule  has  been  stated  thus:  "  Ordinarily,  the  construction  of 
written  instruments  is  for  the  court,  and  not  for  the  jury ;  but 
where  a  writing  contains  technical  (other  than  legal)  terms^ 
mercantile  abbreviations  en-  phrases,  or  obscure  expressions,  the 
meaning  of  such  terms  or  expressions  is  to  be  ascertained  by  the 
jury."  '^  It  has  been  also  said  that  ordinarily,  "  the  meaning  of 
words  and  the  grammatical  construction  of  the  English  language, 
so  far  as  they  are  established  by  the  rules  and  usages  of  the  lan- 
guage, are  'prima  facie  matter  of  law,  to  be  construed  and  passed 
upon  by  the  court.  But  language  may  be  ambiguous,  and  used 
in  different  senses;  or  general  words  in  particular  trades  vlw^ 
branches  of  business  —  as  among  merchants,  for  instance  —  may 
be  used  in  a  new,  peculiar  or  technical  sense;  and  therefore,  in 
a  few  instances,  evidence  may  be  received  from  those  who  are 
conversant  with  such  branches  of  business  and  such  technical  or 
peculiar  use  of  language,  to  explain  and  illustrate  it."*  It  is 
also  said  that  if  the  question  arises  from  the  obscurity  of  the 
writing  itself,  it  is  determined  by  the  court  alone ;  but  questions 
of  custom,  usage,  and  the  actual  intention  and  meaning  derived 
therefrom,  are  for  the  jury.  ^  "  This,"  said  jMr.  Justice  Story, 
"  is  especially  applicable  to  cases  of  commercial  correspondence, 
where  the  real  objects  and  intentions  and  agreements  of  the 
parties  are  often  to  be  arrived  at  only  by  allusions  to  circum- 
stances wliich  are  but  imperfectly  developed."  ^  This  principle 
has  been  frequently  recognized  and  acted  upon/ 

1  Hutchinson  v.  Bowker,  5  Mees.  &  ^  Brown  v.  Brown,  8  Mete.  (Mass.) 
W.  535;  Weil  v.  Scliwartz,21  Mo.  .\pp.  573,  570;  Prather  v.  Koss,  17  Ind.  4!io, 
372,  380.  499. 

2  Bunce  v.  Beck,  43  Mo.  266,  280;  »  2  Phil.  Ev.  (Cow.  &  Hill's  Notes), 
Simpson  v.  Hargitson,   35  Leg.    Obs.  §  734. 

172;  Weil  v.  Scliwartz,  21   Mo.  App.  "  Brown  v.  McGrau,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.^ 

372,  881;  Edwards   v.  Smith,  03  Mo.  479,493. 

119,  127;  Fagin  u.  Counoly,  25  Mo.  94;  ^  See  for  instance,  Fagin  v.  Con- 

McNichol  V.  Paciflc  Express  Co.,  12  noly,  25  Mo.  94,  where  this  was  the 

Mo.  App.  401,  407.  only  question  in  tlie  case. 

3  McNichols  y.  Pac.  Ex.  Co.,  supra. 


Tit.   V,  Cll.  XXXIII.]   INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    865 

§  1077.  Instances  under  this  Rule. —  Thus,  the  meaning  of  ihe  ex- 
pression, in  a  mercantile  letter,  "  Please  to  give  them  credit  in  exchange 
when  the  bills  are  duly  honored,"  was  held  by  Gibbs,  C.  J.,  to  be,  "  a 
question  singularly  fit  for  a  jury,  and  one  on  which  they  were  likely  to 
arrive  at  a  sounder  conclusion  than  the  court,  because  their  knowledge 
of  it  arises  from  daily  experience."  And  in  this  view  the  other  three 
judges  of  the  common  pleas  concurred. i  -  -  -  -  So,  where  a  letter  re- 
mitting a  bill  contained  a  request,  "  which  please  to  honor,"  and  the 
reply  was,  "Your  bill  of  Z.  100,  to  W.Johnson  &  Co.,  shall  have 
attention," — it  was  left  to  a  jury  to  say  whether  the  words  "  shall  have 

attention  "  amounted  to  an  acceptance  of   the  bill.^ So,  where  a 

factor  was  directed  to  sell  a  consignment  of  flour  "  after  the  receipt  of 
the  Atlantic's  news,"  and  there  had  been  other  correspondence  relat- 
ing to  the  sale  of  the  flour,  it  was  properly  left  to  the  judge,  sitting  as  a 
jury,  to  determine,  as  a  question  of  fact,  whether  the  factor  had  sold  the 
flour  in  conformity  witli  the  instructions.-^ So,  where  one  mer- 
chant instructed  another  to  purchase  for  him  two  cargoes  of  coal 
"  afloat,"  and  there  was  some  dispute  as  to  what  was  meant  by  the 
word  "  afloat,"  and  testimony  was  given  as  to  its  meaning  among  mer- 
chants, it  was  held  that  the  court  properly  submitted  the  question  of 

its  meaning  to  the  jury.  "^ So,  where  the  question  concerned  the 

meaning  of  the  abbreviation  "CO.  D.,"  it  was  held  proper  to  submit  it 

to  the  jury. 5 It  has  been  held  that  the  words  "  in  liquidation," 

written  after  the  signature  to  a  note  executed  in  the  name  of  a  partner- 
ship, if  proved  to  have  been  written  when  the  note  was  made,  and  if 
according  to  mercantile  usage  they  import  a  firm  dissolved,  furnish  a 
circumstance  from  which  the  jury  may  infer  that  the  payee  of  the  note 

had  notice  of  the  dissolution  of  the  firm.** So,  it  has  been  held, 

where  the  question  related  to  the  identity  of  certain  wood  which  had 
been  levied  upon  by  an  oflicer  and  which  was  described  in  his  return  as 
"  sixt}'  cords  of  soft  cord  ivood,  more  or  less,"  that  the  term  "  soft  wood," 
not  being  one  to  which  the  law  has  attached  a  specific  meaning,  the 
court  cannot  expound  it,  but  that  it  is  properly  left  to  the  jury  to  say 
what  was  intended  to  be  embraced  in  the  language  used.''' So,  it 

1  Lucas  V.  Grouing,  7  Taunt.  164.  *  Law  v.  Cross,   1  Black    (U.  S.), 

2  Rees  V.  Warwick,  2   Barn.  &  Aid.       533,  538. 

113.     See  also  Story  on  Agency,  §  75.  ^  McNichol  u.  Pac.  Ex.  Co.,  12  Mo. 

See  also   Macbeath  v.   Haldemand,    1  App.  401. 

T.  R.  172;  Morrell  v.  Frith,  3  Mees.  &  «  Bnrru.  Williams,  20  Ark.  172,  188. 

W.  402.  7  Darling  v.  Dodge,  36  Me.  370. 

3  Fagin  v.  Conuoly,  25  Mo.  94.  » 


836  PROVINCE  OF  couuT  AND  JUKY.     [I  Tliomp.  Tr., 

has  been  held  that  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  explain  what  the  par- 
ties meant  in  a  written  instrument  by  the  phrase  "-waste  ground," 
when  used  in  reference  to  railroad  building.^ 

§1078.  [Further  Illustration.]  Promise  to  pay  in  "Cash 
Notes."  —  AVhere  a  promissory  note  agreed  to  pay  a  stipulated  amount 
of  money  "  in  cash  notes  due  since  the  first  day  of  January,  1845,"  it 
was  held,  in  an  action  on  the  note,  a  question  for  the  jury,  to  determine 
what  the  parties  meant  by  the  use  of  the  words  "cash  notes."  In 
giving  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Lipscombe,  J.,  said:  "The  use  of  the 
words  '  cash  notes  '  creates  the  presumption  that  the  parties  intended 
to  give  some  effect  to  them  and  to  designate  a  payment  different  from, 
and  more  favorable  to  the  party  promising,  than  the  payment  of  money. 
We  believe,  at  all  events,  that  it  should  have  been  left  to  the  jury  to 
decide  what  was  meant  by  the  use  of  the  terms,  and  also  to  say,  if  they 
meant  some  other  thing,  and  the  value  of  such  thing.  I  recollect  read- 
ing, in  an  opinion  of  Judge  Cowan,  on  the  vexed  question  of  latent  and 
patent  ambiguities,  that  he  puts  a  case  that  once  occurred  befoi'e  him, 
of  a  suit  being  brought  on  a  promise  in  writing  to  pay  so  much  money 
in  deal.  The  judge  said  that  he  was  totally  at  a  loss  as  to  what  mean- 
ing should  be  attached  to  the  word  deal,  but,  by  leaving  it  to  the  jury 
on  proof,  it  was  rendered  perfectly  intelligible.  It  was  to  be  paid  in 
work  in  the  maker's  trade  —  that  is  to  say,  in  blacksmith's  work,  the 
maker  being  a  smith.  No  rule  of  evidence  would  have  been  violated ; 
it  would  not  have  been  altering  a  written  contract  by  parol ;  it  would 
have  been  only  showing  what  the  parties  really  meant.  "We  do  not 
know  how  much  injustice  would  be  done  by  undertaking  to  say,  that 
all  such  promises  were  absolute  for  the  payment  of  so  much  money. 
The  parties  may  have  intended  something  else,  and  if  so,  such  in- 
tention should  not  be  defeated  by  an  arbitrary  rule  of  construction 
that  would  render  it  senseless  and  of  no  effect.  It  is  likely  that  a  man 
would  often  be  willing  to  give  a  much  higher  price  for  property,  payable 
in  notes  due  to  him,  tlian  he  would  be  willing  to  pay  in  money.  And 
if  so  contracted,  neither  the  law,  nor  reason,  would  hold  him  liable  to 
pay  the  amount  in  cash.  The  difference  between  payments  in  cash 
notes  and  cash  can  only  be  ascertained  by  a  jury."  ^ 

§  1079.   View  that  Jury  must  declare  Meaning  of  Word,  and 
Court  expound  Contract.  —  There  is  a  moditied  view,  that  in  such 

1  Prather  v.  Ross,  17  Ind.  495,  4ti9.        ^  ^y-ird  v.  Lattimer,  2  Tex.  245,  248. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIII.]    INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.     837 

a  case,  after  the  jiiiy  have  declared  the  meaning  of  the  doubtful  or 
technical  word,  the  court  must  proceed  to  interpret  the  instru- 
ment with  reference  to  the  meaning  so  declared,  and  must 
expound  its  effect  to  the  Jury.^  This  view  has  been  thus  formu- 
lated in  an  English  case :  "  The  construction  of  all  written  instru- 
ments belongs  to  the  courts  alone,  whose  duty  it  is  to  construe  all 
such  instruments  as  soon  as  the  true  meaning:  of  the  words  in  which 
they  are  couched,  and  the  surrounding  circumstances,  if  any, 
have  been  ascertained  as  facts  by  the  jury.^  Another  court 
has  thus  stated  the  rule:  "If  words  of  doubtful  meaning:  are 
employed,  or  such  as  have  more  than  one  meaning,  the  question 
whether  their  technical  sense  is  different  from  their  ordinary 
meaning,  may  be  left  to  a  jury;  but,  in  the  end,  the  court  must 
determine  the  interpretation  of  the  contract,  with  such  light  as 
the  verdict  may  afford  on  the  question  submitted  to  the  jury."  ^ 
Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  that,  in  an  agreement  reserving 
the  privilege  of  using  all  the  water  of  a  spring,  "  the  same  as  it 
has  been  formerly  conveyed^''''  for  the  use  of  a  certain  paper 
mill,  the  word  "  conveyed  "  refers  to  the  manner  of  taking  the 
water,  and  not  to  the  conveyance  of  the  right;  and  that  the 
meaning  of  the  word  in  such  a  case,  was  rightly  decided  by  the 
court,  and  not  submitted  to  the  jury.*  It  is  submitted,  however, 
that  this  rule  cannot  be  conveniently  employed  in  those  jurisdic- 
tions where  special  verdicts  are  not  in  use;  though  even  there, 
its  application  is  not  necessarily  impracticable,  since  the  court 
might,  by  h3'pothetical  instructions,  direct  the  jury  as  to  the 
various  meanings  of  the  instrument,  according  to  the  various 
meanings  which  they  might  give  to  the  disputed  word  or  phrase. 

§  1080.  Technical  Terms  known  only  to  Experts. — There 
is  a  similar  view  that,  where  a  contract  embraces  technical  terms 
known  only  to  experts  in  a  particular  art  or  science,  it  will  be 

1  Hutchinson  v.  Bowker,  5  Mees.  laying  clown  the  correct  doctrine. 
&  AV.  535;  Edelman  v.  Yeakel,  27  Pa.  Fruiu  w.  Crystal  Ry.  Co.,  89  Mo.  397, 
St.  26.  401. 

2  Neilson  v.  Harford,  8  Mees.  &  W.  3  Edwards  v.  Smith,  G3  Mo.  119, 
806,    823.     This    laui^iuage    has    been  127,  opinion  by  Napton,  J. 

quoted  in  a  recent  case  in  Missouri  as  •♦  Edeluiau  v.  Yeakel,   27  Pa.  St.  26. 


838  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thouip.  Tr., 

proper  to  receive  the  evidence  of  persons  skilled  in  such  art  or 
science,  to  enable  the  court  to  determine  the  meaning  of  the  con- 
tract.^  In  such  a  case,  it  has  been  said  that  the  testimony  of 
experts  is  admissible  in  proper  cases  to  aid  the  court  in  such 
interpretation, —  as  where  the  instrument  contains  technical  terms 
which  are  peculiar  to  a  certain  art,  trade  or  business  and  which 
are  not  subjects  of  common  knowledge, —  such  as  the  words 
'■'•slow  up'"  in  railway  management.'-^ 

§  1081.  The  Meaning  which  the  Parties  themselves  have 
Placed  upon  tlicir  Contract.  —  It  has  been  well  observed: 
*'  The  rights  of  parties  to  put  an  interpretation  upon  their  own 
contracts,  even  to  the  extent  of  doing  away,  practically,  with  the 
ordinary  and  plain  meaning  of  terms,  cannot  well  be  denied,  so 
long  as  their  interpretation  does  not  result  in  a  contract  which, 
for  some  reason,  is  in  itself  unlawful;  and  the  cases  are  nu- 
merous and  consistent,  which  permit  a  resort  to  the  proof  of  the 
circumstances  or  situation  of  the  parties,  when  their  contract  was 
made,  and  of  their  transactions  under  it,  when  its  terms  are  of 
doubtful  or  ambiguous  meaning,  for  the  purpose  of  arriving  at 
the  true  intention,  and,  when  this  is  done,  the  question  must  be 
left  to  the  decision  of  the  jury."  ^ 

§1082.  [Continued.]  Court  to  Instruct  Jury  as  to  Inferences. — 
On  what  the  writer  conceives  to  be  an  erroneous  view,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Rhode  Island  hold  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court,  in  a  case 
calling  for  it,  to  instruct  the  jury  what  inferences  may  be  legally  drawn 

1  McAvoy  1?.  Loug,  18  111.147,150.  Sandf.    (S.    C.)    202;    Williamson    v. 

2  Louisville  &c.  R.  Co.  w.  McKeuua,  McClure,  37  Pa.  St.  402;  Pratlier  v. 
13  Lea  (Teuu.),  280,  288.  Ros.s,  17   Ind.  495;  EatOQ  v.  Smith,  20 

3  Ileissner  v.  Oxley,  80  Ind.  580,  Pick.  (Mass.)  150;  Ettiiig  ■?;,  President, 
584,  opinion  by  Woods,  J.  The  learned  11  Wheat.  (U.S.)  59;  School  District 
judge  cited  the  following  authorities  v.  Lynch,  33  Conn.  330;  Watson  v. 
"  as  more  or  less  in  point:"  Bates  t?.  Blaine,  12  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  131;  Har- 
Dehaven,  10  Ind.  319;  Symraes  v.  per  ?;.  Kean,  11  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  280; 
Brown,  13  Ind.  318;  Bell  t).  Golding,  Frederick  v.  Campl)ell,  14  Serg.  &  R. 
27^  Ind.  173;  Conwell  v.  Puinpiirey,  9  (Pa.)  293;  See  also  2  Pars.  Contr. 
Ind.     135;     Wilcoxen     v.    Bowles,     1  (Olh  ed.)  493. 

La.    Ann.  230;  Lowber    v.  Le    Roy,  2 


Tit.    V,  Ch.  XXXIII. J   INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    839 

from  the  words  of  a  written  contract,  or  from  tlie  words  of  receipts, 
coupled  with  the  conduct  of  the  parties  in  relation  thereto.  The  court 
say:  "  The  legal  force  and  effect  of  the  words  in  written  business  doc- 
uments and  of  the  conduct  of  the  parties  in  exposition  of  them,  are  so 
purely  matters  of  law,  that  a  judge  would,  in  our  opinion,  fail  in  his 
duty,  if  he  neglected  to  give  it  in  charge  to  the  jury,  so  far  as  was 
necessary  for  the  proper  decision  of  the  case  before  them."  ^  This 
language  must  be  taken  with  two  qualifications:  1.  The  words  in  busi- 
ness documents  may  have  a  technical  meaning  among  merchants, 
such  as  will  call  in  parol  explanation  or  evidence  of  usage  in  their 
interpretation, — in  which  case  their  meaning  is  for  the  jury. 2  2.  If 
the  acts  of  the  parties,  done  in  respect  of  writings  which  have  passed 
between  them,  are  equivocal  or  susceptible  of  different  interpreta- 
tions, the  judge  manifestly  cannot  declare  the  meaning  of  such  acts  to 
the  jury. 

§  1083.  Rule  Where  Parol  Evidence  is  required  to  explain 
Ambiguities.  —  AVhere  the  meuning  and  effect  of  written  in- 
struments depend,  not  merely  on  their  construction  and  language, 
but  on  collateral  facts  in  pais  or  extrinsic  circumstances,  the  in- 
ferences of  fact  to  be  drawn  from  them  should  be  left  to  the 
jury.  "  An  admixture  of  parol  with  written  evidence  draws  the 
wliole  to  the  jury."  ^  This  happens  where  a  contract  is  so  am- 
biguous as  to  require  the  aid  of  parol  evidence  to  ascertain  its 
meaning,  in  which  case  tlie  question  of  its  meaning  is  necessarily 
left  to  the  jury,^  and  the  court  must  not,  in  instructing  them, 
assume  to  interpret  it.^  But  it  is  said  that  the  court  may  give 
such  instructions  upon  the  legal  effect  of  the  instrument  as  will 
meet  the  various  phases  presented  by  the   extrinsic  evidence.^ 

1  Wheeler  v.  Schroeder,  i  K.  I.  383,  v.  Bank  of  United  States,  11  Wheat. 
392.  (U.  S.)  59;  Jeuuings  v.  Sherwood,  8 

2  Ante,  §  107G.  Conn.  122;  Foster  v.  Berg,  104  Pa.  St. 

3  Holmau  v.  Crane,  16  Ala.  570,  580;  324;  Vernor  v.  Henry,  3  Watts  (Pa.), 
Sewall  V.  Henry,  9  Ala.  24;   Overton  v.  385,  392. 

Tracey,    14  Serg.    &  R.   311,330;  Wat-  *  Bedard  v.  Bouville,  57  Wis.  270, 

.son  V.  Blaine,  12  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  131,  275;     Ganson    v.    Madigan,    15    Wis. 

13(J;  McKean  v.  Wagenblast,  2  Grant  144,  .154,    155   (meaning   of  the   word 

Cas.  (Pa.)  4G2,  46G;  Turner  v.  Yates,  "team.") 

l(iHow.(U.S.)  14;  First  National  Bank  ^  Philibert  v.  Burch,    4    Mo.   App. 

V.  Dana,  79  N.  Y.  108,  IKi;  Gardner  v.  470. 

Clark,  17  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  538,  551 ;  Ettius  «  Taylor  v.  McXutt,  58  Tex.  71. 


840  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   Thomp.  Tl'., 

For  perhaps  stronger  reasons,  where  a  question  arises  as  to  the 
nature  of  a  contract  which  subsists  between  parties,  and  its  solu- 
tion depends,  not  only  upon  the  construction  of  several  2vritten 
instruments^  but  also  upon  oral  evidence,  it  has  been  held  proper 
to  submit  the  whole  question  to  a  jury.  So  held,  where  the 
question  was  whether  a  contract  between  several  parties  was  a 
joint  contract  and  created  a  joint  liability.^ 

§  1084.  [Illustration.]  Where  Parol  Evidence  is  admitted  to 
EXPLAIN  A  Will.  —  It  was  said  of  a  will,  where  such  evidence  had  been 
introduced  to  aid  its  interpretation :  "  The  ascertainment  of  intention 
from  the  will  itself  falls  within  the  province  of  the  court ;  and  where  the 
sense  is  incomplete,  the  deficiency  cannot  be  supplied  by  extrinsic  evi- 
dence; a  latent  ambiguity  occurs,  and  the  bequest  is  void.  But  a  dis- 
crepance, or  an  accordance,  between  the  whole  or  particular  parts  of 
the  description,  may  be  shown  by  evidence  dehors,  to  create,  or  to  de 
stroy  an  ambiguity  which  is  said  to  be  latent,  because  it  is  concealed 
by  the  will,  and  disclosed  but  by  extrinsic  circumstances.  A  legatee 
is  designated  by  7iame  or  by  description,  according  to  his  condition  or 
the  relation  he  bears  to  persons  or  things ;  or  by  both.  Where  the 
designation  is  by  a  name  common  to  two  or  more,  and  without  refer- 
ence to  circumstances  of  description,  the  question  of  identity  is  one 
purely  of  fact.  Where,  however,  a  description  or  an  addition  is  inap- 
plicable, not  only  to  the  party  named,  but  every  one  else,  its  falsity  is 
insufficient  to  invalidate  the  designation  by  the  name,  the  maxim  being 
that  Veritas  nominis  toUit  errorem  demonstrationist  and  Lord  Bacon  has 
some  curious  observations  on  this  head  to  show  that,  next  to  the  actual 
presence  of  the  donee,  a  designation  of  him  by  name  is  the  more  wortliy 
in  certainty;  whence  a  legal  presumption  of  fact,  in  case  of  a  discrep- 
ance, that  the  falsity  is  in  tlie  description  and  not  in  the  name."  -  Ap- 
plying this  principle,  where  the  will  read,  "•  I  give  and  bequeath  to 
my  nephew,  James  Vernor  Henry,  son  of  my  deceased  sister,  Elizabeth, 
his  heirs  or  assigns,"  etc.,  and  James-  Vernor  Henry  was  not  the 
nephew,  but  the  grand  nephew  of  the  testator,  and  not  the  son,  but  the 
grandson  of  his  sister  named  Elizabeth,  but  the  testator  had  a  nephew 
named  Robert  R.  Henry,  who  made  pretension  to  be  the  person  named 
in  the  bequest,  it  was   held   a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  which  was 

» 

1  Bradford  V.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  2  cjting     Bacou's     Maxims,    Reg 

7  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  201,  214.  XXV, 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XXXIII.]    INTERPRETATIOX    PKIVATE    WRITINGS.    841 

the  person  named. i  The  court  applied  the  principle  that,  in  the  case 
of  latent  ambiguity  in  a  will,  explanatory  declarations  made  by  a  testa- 
tor at  the  time  of  its  execution  are  admissible  in  evidence.  So  also 
are  previous  professions  of  the  testator,  indicating  a  design  to  give  his 
property  in  a  particular  wa}'.^ 

§  1085.  [Continued.]  How  the  Jury  instructed  in  such  a  Case. — 
From  the  points  which  were  ruled  upon  in  the  case  above  cited,  the  fol- 
lowing charge  to  the  jury  may  be  constructed,  so  far  as  the  same  applies 
to  the  general  principles  of  law  applicable  in  such  a  case:  "The  jury 
are  instructed  that,  the  description  of  the  person  named  in  the  bequest 
failing  to  apply  to  the  plaintiff  in  every  particular  but  the  Christian 
name,  and  there  being  a  person  claiming  this  legacy  who  was  in  being 
when  the  will  was  made,  and  known  to  the  testator,  who  answers  thi? 
description  a(;cording  to  its  very  letter,  a  latent  ambiguity  or  uncertainty 
as  to  the  person  intended  by  the  testator  to  take  the  legacy  is  pre- 
sented." "  If  the  evidence  be  such  as  satisfies  the  jury  that  the  per^ 
son  bearing  the  name  mentioned  in  this  clause  of  the  will,  and  who  is 
the  plaintiff  in  this  suit,  was  intended  by  the  testator,  the  inconsistent 
description  will  not  prevent  his  recovery.  The  evidence,  by  parol  or 
word  of  mouth,  which  the  plaintiff  has  been  allowed  to  give  for  the  pur' 
pose  of  dispelling  or  removing  the  uncertainty  as  to  the  person  intendec'' 
by  the  testator,  need  not  be  conclusive,  or  such  as  to  remove  the  am- 
biguity beyond  every  doubt,  nor  is  it  necessary  that  it  afford  a  high  de- 
gree of  probability  that  tlie  plaintiff  was  the  person  intended  by  the  tes- 
tator; but  it  will  be  sufficient  if  it  satisfies  the  minds  of  the  jury  that 
such  was  the  fact."  -^ 

§  1086.   Contract  partly  in  Writing  and  partly  in  Parol. — 

Where  a  contract  is  partly  in  writing  and  partly  in  parol,  and  the 
parol  evidence  is  conflicting,  or  such  as  to  leave  the  intention  oi 
the  parties  obscure,  it  is  proper  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  decis- 
ion of  the  question  what  the  contract  was.^ 

§  1087.  Receipts  for  Money  Paid.  —  A  written  receipt 
for  the  payment   of   money  is  an  admission   only,  and,  though 

1  Vernor  v.  Henry,  3  Watts  (Pa.),  flen,  2  Ves.  Juu.  589;  Dare  v.  Geary, 
385,  392.  cited  Arab,  375. 

2  Compare  Harris  v.  Bishop  of  Lin-  ^  Vernor  v.  Henry,3  Watts(Pa.),385. 
coin,  2  P.  Wras.  137;  Tliomas  v.  ^  Edwards  w.  Goldsmitli,  Ki  Pa.  St. 
Thomas,  (J  T.  R.  G71;  Standenv.  Stan-  43,  48;  post,  §  1113. 


842  PROVIA'CE    OF    COURT    AXD    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.  Tu., 

evidence  against  the  person  who  made  it  and  those  chdraing  under 
him,  is  not  conclusive  evidence,  except  as  to  a  person  who  may 
have  been  induced  by  it  to  alter  his  condition.^  It  may  there- 
fore be  contradicted  or  explained ;  and  it  will  be  for  a  jury  or  other 
trier  of  the  facts  to  say,  upon  such  contradictory  or  explanatory 
evidence,  what  the  fact  was.^  But  an  instrument  in  writing  which 
acknowledges  the  receipt  of  a  sum  of  money,  in  full  for  damages 
sustained  by  the  signer  in  consequence  of  an  injury  received 
from  the  person  paying  the  money,  is  not  a  simple  receipt  which 
can  be  explained  or  varied  by  parol  evidence,  but  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  release,  and  is  a  contract  which  bars  an  action  for  the  injury, 
unless  shown  to  have  been  obtained  by  fraud.  It  cannot  be 
explained  by  parol  evidence,  but  its  meaning  and  conclusive 
effect  must  be  pronounced  by  the  court. ^ 

§   1088.   Meaning  of  Words  Varied  by  Evidence  of  Usag-e. — 

Words  used  in  a  particular  relation  may  have  a  different  mean- 
ino-  from  that  which  attaches  to  them  in  their  ordinary  use. 
Hence,  it  is  that  evidence  of  usage  is  sometimes  admissible  to 
show  that  ordinary  words,  when  used  with  reference  to  a  partic- 
ular subject,  have  a  peculiar  meaning  ;  and  in  such  a  case,  whether 
the  words  have  such  peculiar  meaning  is,  of  course,  a  question 
for  a  jury.  Thus,  in  one  case  it  w^as  held  that,  in  an  action  on  a 
lease  of  an  estate  which  included  a  rabbit  warren,  evidence  of 
usao"e  w^as  admissible  to  show  that  the  words  "  thousand  of  rab- 
bits"  were  understood  to  mean  one  hundred  dozen,  that  is 
twelve  hundred.  The  decision  was  based  on  the  ground  that  the 
words  "  hundred,  "  "thousand,"  and  the  like,  w^ere  not  under- 
stood, when  applied  to  particular  subjects,  to  mean  that  number 
of  units;  tliat  the  definition  was  not  fixed  by  law,  and  was  there- 
fore open  to  such  proof  of  usage. ^  Commenting  u})on  this  case, 
it  was  said  by  Chief  Justice  Shaw:  "  Though  it  is  exceedingly 
difficult  to  draw  the  precise  line  of  distinction,  yet  it  is  manifest 

1  Stratoa  u.  Rastall,  2    T.    R.    36(i ;      pare     Eglestou  v.     Kuickerbocker,   6 
Wyatt  V.  Hertford,  3  East.  147.  Barb.     (N.   Y.)    458;    and   "White     v. 

2  Graves  v.  Key,  3   Barn.  &  Ad.  313,      Parker,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  48. 

318.  ■*  Smith  V.  Wilsou,  3    Baru.  &   Ad. 

3  Coou  V.  Kuapp,  8  N.  Y.  402.    Com-       728. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XXXIII.]    INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    MKITINGS.    843 

that  such  evidence  can  be  admitted  only  in  a  few  cases  like  thei 
above.  Were  it  otherwise,  written  instruments,  instead  of  im- 
porting certainty  and  verity,  as  being  the  sole  repository  of  the 
will,  intent  and  purposes  of  the  parties,  to  be  construed  by  the 
rules  of  law,  might  be  made  to  speak  a  very  different  language, 
by  the  aid  of  parol  evidence."  ^  Accordingly,  where  a  town  had 
conveyed  a  beach,  reserving  the  right  to  enter  and  take  away 
*' gravel  and  sand  *  *  *  for  the  making  and  repairing  of 
their  highways,"  it  was  held  that  evidence  was  admissible  to 
prove  what  species  of  material  had  been  used  as  gravel  by  the 
town  for  repairing  its  highways  before  the  making  of  the  deed, 
since  this  nmst  be  presumed  to  have  been  within  the  contempla- 
tion of  the  parties;  but  such  evidence  was  not  admissible  to  prove 
the  meaning  of  the  words  "  sand  and  gravel,"  as  generally  and 
usually  understood  at  that  town.^ 

§  1089.  Mercantile  Contracts  explained  by  the  Usages  of 
Trade.  — ^This  introduces  another  exception  to  the  general  rule 
above  stated,-^  which  is  that,  in  the  case  of  a  mercantile  con- 
tract, if  "  the  instrument  be  not  clear  and  unequivocal,  evidence 
of  the  usage  or  course  of  trade  which  is  to  be  carried  into  effect, 
is  admissible  to  explain  the  meaning  and  remove  the  doubt."  *  It 
is  also  reasoned  that  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  the  ex- 
istence of  a  custom  of  trade  or  business,  within  the  purview  of 
which  the  contract  was  made,  provided  such  custom  was  of  such 
universal  practice  as  to  justifj'  the  conclusion  that  it  became,  by 
implication,  a  part  of  the  contract;  and  the  existence  and  extent 
of  such  a  custom  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury,^  except  in  the 
case  of  customs  of  such  universality  that  the  courts  will  notice 
their  existence  judicially.''     "  The  principle  applicable  to  such  a 

1  Brown  v.  Browu,  8  Mete,  (Mass.)  ^  Branch  v.  Palmer,  (!5  Ga.  210. 
673, 577.  6  In     an     action     on    a    contract 

2  Brown  v.  Brown,  supra.  whereby  a  defendant  undertook  toiin- 
2  Ante,  §  10(35.  part  to  a  competent  person  the  Infor- 
•*  2  Kent  Com.  556:  Salmon  Falls  mation  necessary  to  enable  him  to  op- 
Man.  Co.  V.  Goddard,  14  How.  (U.  S.)  erate  a  sugar  factory,  it  was  held  a 
4-16,  454;  Browu  v.  Brown,  8  Mete.  question  for  the  jury,  under  the  evi- 
(Mass.)  573,  570;  Prather  u.  Ross,  17  deuce,  whether  such  competent  per- 
Ind.  495,  499.  sou  should  be  au  expert  in  the  general 


844  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl., 

case  is,  that  the  evidence  of  usage,  and  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances, in  explanation  and  illustration,  are  for  the  consideration 
of  the  jury,  — the  province  of  the  court  being  to  instruct  them, 
conditionally  or  hypothetically,  what  should  be  the  proper  con- 
struction or  interpretation  of  the  written  instrument,  as  they 
may  find  the  evidence  either  to  support  or  not  to  sustain  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  has  been  offered."  ^  "  When  a  new  and  unu- 
sual word  is  used  in  a  contract,  or  when  a  word  is  used  in  a  tech- 
nical or  peculiar  sense,  as  applicable  to  any  trade  or  branch  of 
business,  or  to  any  particular  class  of  people,  it  is  proper  to  re- 
ceive evidence  of  usage,  to  explain  and  illustrate  it,  and  that  evi- 
dence is  to  be  considered  by  the  jury;  and  the  province  of  the 
court  will  then  be,  to  instruct  the  jury  what  will  be  the  legal 
effect  of  the  contract  or  instrument,  as  they  shall  find  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word,  modified  or  explained  by  the  usage."  ^ 

§  1090.  Instance  op  an  Instruction  Erroneous  within  this  Rule. — 
An  instruction  was  granted,  to  the  effect  that  a  certain  entry  is  a  suffi- 
cient memorandum  in  writing  of  a  contract  to  bind  the  defendant,  pro- 
vided the  jury  find  that  it  "either  expressly,  or  according  to  tlie 
sense  and  signification  of  its  language  and  figures,  under  the  estabhshed 
custom  and  usage  of  merchants  in  the  city  of  Baltimore,  at  the  time," 
etc.,  "  represented  truly  and  fully  the  terms  of  and  parties  to  the  con- 
tract of  sale."  It  was  held  that  this  instruction  was  erroneous  un- 
der the  above  rule,  because  it  authorized  the  jury  to  construe  the  entry 
or  memorandum,  without  any  absolute  or  conditional  construction  there- 
of by  the  court. ^ 

§  1091.  The  correct  Reading  of  Written  Instruments  — 
Identity  of  Words  —  Legibility.  —  There  is  a  conflict  of  authority 
on  the  question  whether  the  deciphering  of  illegible  writings  is  for 

bnsiuess  of  making   sugar,   and  also  150,  15(1;  Neilson  tj.  Harford,  8  Mees. 

whether  a   competent  person,   within  &  W.  823. 

the  meaning  of  the  contract,  had  been  ^  Eaton  u.  Smith,  20  Pick.    (]V>ass.) 

designated  by  the  defendant  to  receive  150,  15G,  opinion  of  the  court  by  J'haw, 

the  information  bargained  for.    Tan-  C.  J. 

sill  u.  Briukmau,  l(i  Mo.  App.  557.  3  Williams  v.  Woods,  16  MtJ    i-'-'U, 

1  Williams  v.  Woods,   IG  Md.    220,  253. 
251;  Eaton  v.  Smith,  20  Pick.  (Mass.) 


Tit.   V,  Ch.   XXXIII.]   INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    845 

the  court  or  the  jury.  According  to  one  view,  the  proper  read- 
ing of  an  illegible  writing  is  for  the  court,  and  not  for  the  juiy, — 
as  for  instance,  whether  a  Christian  name  in  an  indictment  should 
read  David  or  Daniel. ^  So,  whether  the  letters  *'o/cc"  in  a 
policy  of  insurance  meant  "  stx,"  which  would  make  sense,  or 
"  oix  "  which  would  make  nonsense,  was  erroneously  submitted 
to  the  jury.-  But  we  find  the  same  court  deciding  in  a  subse- 
quent case  that,  while  the  construction  of  written  instruments  is 
for  the  court,  yet  the  identity  of  a  word  in  such  an  instrument,  — 
as,  for  instance,  where  it  is  so  written  that  it  may  be  read  either 
fifty  or  sixty,  — presents  a  question  of  fact  for  a  juiy.^  Again, 
in  one  court  we  find  it  decided  that  it  is  for  the  court  to  decide 
what  are  the  letters  and  figures  used  in  an  instrument  which  is 
offered  in  evidence  and  the  meanino;  which  is  to  be  attached  to 
them;  and,  if  it  be  the  instrument  sued  on,  whether  it  varies 
from  the  one  which  is  described  in  the  declaration.*  In  another 
court,  where  there  was  an  objection  to  the  admission  of  a  promis- 
sory note  in  evidence,  upon  the  ground  of  an  alleged  variance 
between  the  date  of  the  indorsement  of  the  note  and  that  of  the 
copy  of  the  note  set  out  in  the  petition,  and  the  court  was  unable 
to  determine,  because  of  the  peculiar  manner  in  which  the  figures 
were  made,  whether  there  was  a  variance  or  not, — it  was  held 
that  it  was  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  submit  the  question 
of  the  variance  to  the  jury,  under  proper  instructions.^  Swing- 
ing back  with  the  pendulum,  we  find  that  where,  on  the  trial  of 
an  indictment  for  perjury,  it  became  a  question  whether  a  word  in 
a  record  which  had  been  produced,  which  was  written  above  an 
erasure,  was  the  word  "  meeting  "  or  the  word  "mutiny,"  Lord 
Ellenborough,  C.  J.,  ruled  that  it  was  not  a  question  for  the 
jury,  but  that  it  was  a  question  within  the  peculiar  province  of 
the  court. ^     But  we  apprehend  that  this  last  decision  is  unsound 

1  Com.  V.  Riggs,  U  Gray  (Mass.),  *  Riley  v.  Dickens,  19  111.  29. 

377.     See  also  Com.  v.  Davis,  11  Gray  5  Partridge  v.  Patterson,  6  la.  514. 

(Mass.),  4.  See  also  Jefferson  County  v.  Savory.  2 

2  Lapeer  Ins.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  30  Mich.  G.  Greene  (la.),  238;  Converse  v.  War- 
159.  ren,  4  la.  158. 

3  Paine  v.  Eingold,  43  Mich.  341.  «  Rex  v.  Hacks,  1  Stark.  N.  P.  521. 


846  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

ill  principle;  for  the  reading  of  a  word  in  a  writinij:;  is  nuitter  of 
fact,  and  not  matter  of  law;  and  although  it  may  properly  be 
committed  to  the  judge  in  civil  cases,  yet  in  a  criminal  case, 
where  the  essential  question  of  criminal  intent  may  depend  upon 
it,  and  consequently  where  the  whole  question  of  guilt  or  inno- 
cence may  turn  upon  it,  it  is  manifestly  an  invasion  of  the 
province  of  the  jury  for  the  judge  to  withdraw  its  decision  from 
them.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that,  on  the  trial  of  an  in- 
dictment for  i\\Q  forgery  of  a  particular  instrument,  the  question 
whether  it  was  forged  or  not,  being  the  essential  question  in  the 
case,  is  exclusively  for  the  determination  of  the  jury;  and  hence 
that  it  is  not  necessary  that  this  question  should  be  determined 
prior  to  the  admission  of  the  instrument  itself  in  evidence.^ 

§  1092.  Blanks  in  Written  Instruments. — The  same  con- 
trariety of  holding  exists  in  respect  of  the  meaning  of  written 
instruments,  where  blanks  have  been  left  unfilled  through  cleri- 
cal misprision.  According  to  one  view,  it  frequently  presents 
a  case  of  what  is  called  "patent  ambiguity ,  which  is  not  explaina- 
ble by  parol,  but  in  which  case  the  court  must  declare  the  mean- 
ing if  it  can  be  done,  and  if  not,  to  declare  the  instrument  to  be 
void  for  uncertainty.  Many  cases  are  found  where  essential 
words  have  been  omitted  from  such  instruments,  and  where  their 
meaning  has  been  declared  as  matter  of  law.  Thus,  where  a 
paper,  given  to  the  plaintiff  by  the  defendant,  promised  to  pay 

the  plaintiff  one  hundred    and  twenty-three  and  6-100, 

on  demand,  and  interest,  it  was  held  that  it  was  a  promis- 
sory note,  payable  in  money  and  for  a  certain  sum,  and  that  the 
statute  of  limitations  did  not  ap})ly,^  It  well  might  be;  for 
there  were  prefixed  on  the  upper  left-hand  margin,  as  is  usual 
in  the  case  of  })roniissory  notes,  the  figures  $123.06,  i)lainly 
showing  the  amount  intended.  So,  where,  in  the  bond  of  a  sheriff 
as  tax  collector,  the  undertaking  was  to  pay  "  to  the  treasurer 
of  the  district  of  Tennessee,"  and  the  sheriff  was  collector  for  a 
county  within  the  collection  district  of  West  Tennessee,  and  the 

'  Mosier  v.  State,  14  lud.  2(;i.  -  Coolbroth  v.  Puriiituu,-'9Me.  4(J9. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIIL]  ixterpretatiox  private  writings.   847 

law  required  the  sheriffs  within  that  district  to  pay  the  moneys 
collected  to  the  treasurer  of  West  Tennessee,  it  was  held  that  the 
court  vv'ould  supply  the  word  "West"  before  the  word  "  Ten- 
nessee," so  as  to  give  effect  to  the  instrument.^  So,  in  an  old 
case,  where  the  obligation  read,  *'I,  Phillip  Goole,  do  stand 
bound  [without  stating  to  whom]  in  the  sum  of  sixteen  pounds, 
and  is  to  be  paid  to  the  said  John  Games  the  elder's  executors," 
the  court  supplied,  after  the  words  "  do  stand  bound"  the  words 
"  to  the  executors  of  John  Games,"  that  beins  the  manifest 
sense  of  the  instrument. ^     So,  where  a  note  was  made  payable 

"  six after  date,"  it  was  queried,  but  it  should  not  have  been, 

whether  the  meaning  of  the  parties  was  a  question  for  the  court 
or  for  the  jury.  It  was  a  case  Avhere  the  judge  sat  as  trier  of  the 
facts,  and,  the  note  having  been  given  tcf  an  insurance  company 
for  a  policy,  and  six  months  being  the  usual  term  of  credit,  it 
was  ruled  that,  if  there  be  nothing  in  the  note  to  indicate  ii  dif- 
ferent time,  the  law  would  regard  it  as  payable  six  months  after 
date.  The  rule  applied  was  that  the  ambiguity  was  patent,  and 
hence  not  explainable  by  parol  testimony  ;  but  that  the  actual 
intention  of  the  parties  might  be  inferred  from  the  paper  itself, 
in  the  lisiht  of  the  circumstances  in  which  it  wasffiven.'^ 

§  1093.  [Continued.]  Cases  where  the  meaning  has  been  sub- 
mitted TO  the  Jury.  — In  an  early  case  in  Mississippi  the  declaration 
in  an  action  of  assicmjJsit  described  the  note  sued  on  as  paj-able  twenty- 
four  months  after  date ;  but  the  note  itself,  when  offered  in  evidence, 

appeared  to  read  "  twenty- four after  date."     It  was  held  that 

the  note  was  admissible  in  evidence  without  parol  explanation,  the  fury 
being  the  judges  of  the  fact  of  the  time  of  payment  intended  to  be  stip- 
ulated by  the  parties  to  the  instrument.^ So,  in  an  early  case  in 

New  York  the  instrument  sued  on  read:  "Six  months  after  date,  I 

promise  to  pay  to  the  order  of  Phillip  Brotherton  eight ,  for  value 

.  received,"  etc.,  and,  after  it  had  been  transferred,  the  words  "  hundred 
dollars  "  were  inserted  in  the  blank  without  obtaininsj  the  indorser's 


1  Kincannon     v.    Carroll,   0    Yerg.  ^  Nichols   v.   Frotlimgham,  45  Me. 
(Teun.)  11.                                                        220. 

2  Langdouv.  Goole,  3  Lev.  21.  ♦  Conner  v.  Routh,  7  How.  (Miss.) 

176< 


848  PROVINCE   OF   COUKT   AND   JURY.       [1  Tboiiip.  Tr., 

assent,  and  parol  evidence  was  given  to  sliow  that  it  was  intended  that 
tlie  amount  of  the  note  should  be  for  eight  hundred  dollars,  and  that 
the  words  "  hundred  dollars  "  were  omitted  by  mistake.  It  was  held 
that  the  presiding  judge  properly  left  it  to  the  jury  to  say  whether  it 
was  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  give  and  receive  a  note  for  eight 
hundred  dollars.^ 

§  1094.  [Continued.]  Blanks  in  the  Descriptive  Calls  of  a 
Deed.  — The  meaning  of  a  clerical  imperfection  in  the  descrip- 
tive calls  of  a  deed,  as  where  a  word  is  accidently  omitted, 
may  be  submitted  to  a  jury  as  a  question  of  fact.  It  was  so 
held  where  the  word  "  white,"  with  a  blank  following  it,  was  the 
call  for  a  certain  corner,  and  evidence  was  given  to  show  that  a 
white  oak  tree  stood  nearly  in  the  course  indicated  in  the  deed  ; 
in  which  case  it  was  held  proper  to  leave  it  to  the  jury  to  say 
whether  the  white  oak  tree  was  the  corner  intended. ^  This 
seems  to  be  no  more  than  an  application  of  the  rule  that,  where 
the  description  in  a  deed  is  indefinite  and  doubtful,  and  suscept- 
ible of  more  than  one  application,  thus  constituting  what  is 
known  as  a  latent  ambiguity, — the  court,  to  remove  such  ambi- 
guity, may  resort  to  extrinsic  evidence,  and  thus  restrain,  con- 
fine and  apply  the  description  to  a  single  object.  In  such  a  case 
it  is  said  that,  "  if  the  court  cannot,  by  a  fair  and  legitimate  con- 
struction or  use  of  either  description,  or  by  all  united,  locate 
with  sufficient  certainty  the  land  conveyed  in  the  several  deeds, 
then  the  court  will  resort  to  extrinsic  or  parol  testimony,  and 
to  the  aid  of  a  jury,  to  ascertain  the  true  intent  of  the  par- 
ties, and  to  locate  the  lands."  ^ 

§     1095.     Whether    Instrument    Sealed    or     Unsealed. — 

"Whether  an  instrument  is  scaled  or  not  is  a  question  of  law  for 
the  court;  *  but  whether  the  seal  is  that  of  a  particular  party, — 
as  for  instance  a  corporation,  —  must,  in  case  of  dispute,  be  sub- 

1  Boyd    V.   Brothersou,    10    Weud.  3  Bell  v.  Woodward,  40  N.   H.  315, 

(N.Y.)  93.  332. 

'  DoVjson    V.    Fiuley,    8  Jones    L.  *  Scliwarz    v,    llcrrenkind,   2G     111. 

<N.  C.)  41)5,  499.  208. 


Tit.   V,  Cll.   XXXIII.]    INTERPRETATION    PRIVATE    WRITINGS.    849 

mitted  to  the  jury.^  So,  where  the  issue  is  presented  whether  an 
instrument  has  been  altered  or  not,  and  if  so,  wlienand  by  whom, 
by  the  addition  of  a  seal,  this  may  well  be  submitted  to  a  jury.- 

§  109G.  Validity  of  Written  Instruments.  —  Enlarging  the 
same  view,  where  all  the  evidence  concerning  the  assignment  of  a 
patent-right  was  in  writing  and  uncontradicted,  it  was  held  the 
duty  of  the  court  to  determine  the  validity  of  such  an  assignment, 
and  error  to  submit  the  question  to  the  jury.^  But  where  the 
validity  of  the  instrument  depends  upon  unextrinsic  fact  which  is 
doubtful  or  disputed, —  as  whether  the  obligee  was  so  intoxicated 
at  the  time  of  making  it,  as  to  be  entitled  to  rescind  it  after  be- 
coming sober,  —  this  must,  of  course,  be  submitted  to  the  jury.* 
So,  it  has  been  held  that,  whethera  contract  made  on  Sunday  was 
a  work  of  necessity  or  cliarity,  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute,  is 
a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 

§  1097.   Whether  a  Contract  is  against  Public  Policy.  — But 

where  the  true  moaning  of  a  contract  is  thus  ascertained,  the 
question  whether  or  not  it  is  against  public  policy,  is  a  question 
for  the  court,  which  it  is  error  to  submit  to  the  jury.^  The 
reason  is  that,  otherwise  there  would  be  no  settled  rule  by  which 
the  validity  of  contracts  could  be  determined,  and  they  would 
be  determined,  not  according  to  settled  principles  of  law,  but 
according  to  the  uncertain  and  fluctuating  conceptions  of  juries 
as  to  the  proper  standard  of  morality  and  private  and  public 
rights. 

§  1098.  Inferences  from  Writings  put  in  Evidence  to  show 
Extrinsic  Facts.  —  Where  a  writing  thus  put  in  evidence  is  not 
a  dispositive  instrument,  but  is  merely  offered  for  the  purpose 

1  Grossman  v.  HilltOTvn  Turnpike  ^  Hooper  v.  Edwards,  18  Ala.  280. 
Co.,  3  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  225.                             e  Tallis  v.  Tallis,  1  El.  &  Bl.  391; 

2  Schwarz  V.  Herreukiud,  swpra.  s.  c.  22  L.J.  (Q.  B.)   185;   18  Eng.  L. 

3  Snyder  ?;.  Kui-tz,  61  Iowa,  593.  Eq.   151;  Pierce  v.  Randolph,  12  Tex. 
^  Cummiugs  V.  Henery,  10  lud.  109;      290,   295,  where  the  question  is  rea- 

Reynolds  u.    Dechaums,  24  Tex.    174;      soned  at  considerable  length  by  Hemp- 

Hanna  v.  Phillips,  1  Grant  Cas.    (Pa.)       hill,  C.  J. 

253. 

54 


850  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  Thom[).  Tf., 

showing  an  extrinsic  fact,  it  will  be  for  the  jury  to  say  what  in- 
ference of  fact  is  to  be  drawn  from  it.^  The  reason  is  that  the 
question  which  arises  in  such  a  ease  is  not  the  proper  interpretation 
of  a  writing  which  disposes  of  the  rights  of  the  parties,  but  what 
effect  the  writing  shall  have  as  evidence  of  a  collateral  fact, — 
as  for  instance,  where  the  question  under  inquiry  is  whether 
payment  of  an  obligation  has  been  made,  and  a  writing  (not  a 
receipt)  is  introduced  as  evidence,  tending  to  show  that  payment 
had  been  made.'^  "  The  most  authentic  documents,"  said  Scott, 
J.,  "  when  offered  for  such  a  purpose,  become  no  more  than 
mere  letters  or  a  written  correspondence,  which,  when  offered  in 
evidence  to  prove  a  fact,  are  always  to  be  interpreted  by  the 
jury."  ^  It  is  added  that  "  when  documents  are  offered  for  such 
a  purpose,  they,  like  written  correspondence,  may  be  interpreted 
by  extrinsic  evidence.^  Accordingly,  where  the  effect  of  a  writ- 
ten instrument,  collaterally  introduced  as  evidence,  depends  not 
merely  upon  the  construction  and  meaning  of  the  instrument,  but 
upon  extrinsic  evidence  and.  circumstances,  the  inferences  of  fact 
to  be  drawn  from  it  must  be  left  to  the  jury.^ 

^  Primm  v.  Haren,  27  Mo.  205,  211;  2  Reynolds  v.  Eichards,  14  Pa.  St. 

Wilson  V.  Board  of  Edncation,  63  Mo.  205. 

137,  142;  McNichol  v.  Pacific  Ex.  Co.,  ^  primm  v.  Haren,  27  Mo.  205,  211. 

12   Mo.   App.   401,   407;    Reynolds   v.  'i  Primm  u.  Haren,  supra. 

Richards,  14  Pa.  St.  205;   McKean  v.  ^  B^rreda  v.    Silsbee,  21  How.  (U. 

Wao-enblast,  2  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  462,  S.)  147,  168. 
466. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIV.]     VERBAL  speech.  851 


CHAPTER     XXXIV. 

VERBAL  SPEECH:    ORAL   CONTRACTS. 

Section 

1105.  Meaning  of  the  Speakers  a  Question  for  the  Jury. 

1106.  Meaning  Ascertained,  Court  to  declare  tlie  Legal  Effect. 

1107.  [Continued.]     Where  there  is  Doubtas  to  the  Meaning  of  the  Language 

Used. 

1108.  Rule  Restated  as  to  Parol  Contracts. 

1109.  Illustrations  of  the  Foregoing. 

§   1103.   Cleaning  of  the  Speakers  a  Question  for  the  Jury. — 

Where  there  is  a  controversy  as  to  what  the  parties  to  a  con- 
versation intended,  the  question  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the 
jury.^  The  rule  has  been  stated,  with  some  variation,  as  foUoAvs: 
"  The  interpretation  of  Avritten  contracts  is  for  the  court;  but 
where  the  matter  rests  in  words,  and  the  intention  of  the  parties 
is  to  be  ascertained  from  what  they  have  said  and  done,  it  is  a 
question  for  the  jury."  ^  "  When  the  words  are  written,  the 
general  rule  is  that  the  court  shall  interpret  them ;  but  when 
they  are  merely  spoken,  the  sense  and  meaning  intended  are  for 
the  jury."  ^  "  The  rule  is  undoubted  that  the  meaning  of 
words  used  in  a  conversation,  and  what  the  parties  intended  to 
express  by  them,  is  exclusively  for  the  jury  to  determine."  *  *'  It 
often  happens,  in  conversation  and  in  parol  contracts,  that  the 
meaning  of  the  parties  may  be  understood,  and  is  in  fact  intended 
to  be,  very  different  from  the  literal  import  of  the  words  em- 
ployed.    What  may  have  be^n  said  before  or  after,  the  use  of 

1  Folsom  V.  Plumer,  43  N.  H.  469,  474;  Fowle  v.  Bigelow,  10  Mass.  379. 
472;  Demiug  v.  Foster,  42  N.  H.  165;  *  Warnick  v.  Grosholz,  3  Grant  Cas. 
Murphy  v.  Bedford,  18  Mo.  App.  279.  (Pa.)  235,  per  Woodward,  J. 

2  Halbert  v.  Halbort,  21  Mo.  277,  *  Brubaker  v.  Okeson,  36  Pa.  St. 
284;  Festerman  v.  Parker,  10  Ired.  L.  519,  per  Strong,  J. 


852  PKOVixcE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

figurative  expressions,  emphasis    upon  particular  words  or  sen- 
tences, reference  to  other  matters,  not  fully  expressed,  bat  well 
understood  by  all  in  hearing,    and  many  other  circumstances, 
are  material  elements,  and  often  have  a  controlling  influence,  in 
ascertaining  the  intention  of  those  whose  language  is  reported. 
Important  contracts  are  made  verbally,  in  terms  not  well  suited 
to  express  the  design  of  the  parties,  if  they  were  used  in  a  writ- 
ten instrument,  but  are  understood  by  them  and  others  with  the 
utmost   precision.     Actions   of     slander    are    maintained   upon 
words,  which,  taken  literally,  indicate  no  unworthy  motive  or  con- 
duct.    In  cases,  where  such    evidence  is    adduced  in  support  of 
the  affirmative  or  negative  of   any  proposition  presented  to   a 
jury,  it  is  their  province  to  determine  its  meaning.    To  find  what 
the    language  was,   is  nothing  more  than  to  find   the  evidence, 
which  they  adjudge  to  be  true;   the  result  of   that  as  a  fact,  it  is 
their  duty  to  find,  and  the  court  cannot  direct  what  it  shall  be; 
and  if  the  jury  omit  to  find  the  fact  which  is  involved  in  the  issue, 
the  court  have  no  power  to  infer  it."  ^ 

§  1106.  Meaning  ascertained,  Court  to  declare  the  Legal 
Effect. — Where  the  sense  in  which  the  parties  understood  the 
lano-uage  is  thus  ascertained  by  the  jury,  it  is  for  the  court  to 
declare  its  legal  effect.^  When,  therefore,  a  contract  is  proved 
by  parol  evidence,  and  its  terms,  as  thus  established,  are  distinct 
and  explicit,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  construe  it,  and  not  to 
submit  its  meaning  to  the  jury.-^  The  rule,  as  stated  by  Profes- 
sor Parsons  and  judicially  approved,  is  this:  "  What  a  contract 
means,  is  a  question  of  law.  It  is  the  court  therefore  that  deter- 
mines the  construction  of  a  contract.     They  do  not  state  the  rules 

1  Copeland  v.  Hall,  29  Me.  93,  95,  Ridcler  v.  McKuight,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
perTeuuey,  J.  294;  Sraalley  v.  Hendrickson,  29  N.  J. 

2  Waruick  u.  Grosholz,  3GrautCas.  L.  871;  Short  ■?;.  Woodward,  13  Gray 
(Pa.)  235;  Brubaker  v.  Okesou,  3G  (Mass.),  86;  Festerniau  v.  Parker,  10 
Pa.  St.  519;  Folsom  u.  Pluraer,  43  N.  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  477;  Khodes  v.  Ches- 
11.  4G9,  472;  Codding  v.  Wood,  112  Pa.  sou,  Busbee  (N.  C),  336. 

St.   371,   377;  Demiug  v.  Foster,  42  N.  3  Dicfeiiback  v.  Stark,  56  Wis,  462. 

H.    165;  Islay    r.  Stewart,  4    Dev.    &  See  also  Kaiiuey  ?;.  Illgby,  5  Wis.  62; 

Batt.  (N.  C.)  160;  Beltr.  Goodc,.'?l  Mo.  Mowry  ?;.    Wood,   12  Wis.    413;  Mar- 

128;  Judge  v.  Leclaire,  31  Mo.  127;  I)e  tiaeau  v.  Steele,  14  Wis.  272. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIV.]     VERBAL  srEECH.  853 

or  principles  of  law  by  which  the  jury  are  to  V)e  bound  in  construing 
the  language  which  the  parties  have  used,  and  then  direct  the  jury 
to  apply  them  at  their  discretion,  to  the  question  of  construction  ; 
nor  do  they  refer  to  these  rules  unless  they  think  [)roper  to  do  so, 
for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  and  explaining  their  own  decision. 
But  they  give  to  the  jury,  as  matter  of  law,  what  the  legal  con- 
struction of  the  contract  is,  and  this  the  jury  are  bound,  absolutely, 
to  take."  "  Unless  this  were  so,  there  would  be  no  certainty  in 
the  law ;  for  a  misconstruction  by  the  court  is  the  proper  subject, 
by  means  of  a  bill  of  exceptions,  of  redress  in  a  court  of  error, 
but  a  misconstruction  by  the  jury  cannot  be  set  right  at  all 
effectually."  ^  Thus,  where,  in  an  action  upon  an  open  account, 
the  answer  alleged  that  the  account  had  been  settled,  and  that 
the  plaintiff  had  executed  his  promissory  note  to  the  defendant 
for  a  balance  found  due  on  settlement,  it  was  error  to  instruct 
the  jury  to  determine  the  legal  effect  of  the  note,  that  being  a 
question  of  law  for  the  court. ^ 

§  1107.  [Continued.]  Where  there  is  Uoubt  as  to  the  Meaning 
OF  Language  used.  —It  has  been  ruled  that,  where  a  doubt  arises  upon 
the  meaning,  force  and  construction  of  language  used  in  oral  speech,  the 
language  must  be  interpreted  by  the  court ;  but  where  the  doubt  arises 
upon  the  question  whether  the  words  used  are  to  be  deemed  the  words 
of  the  speaker  in  his  own  behalf,  or  words  which  the  speaker  is  using 
as  an  agent  in  behalf  of  his  principal,  this  question  of  fact  depends  not 
so  much  on  the  meaning  of  the  words,  as  on  a  just  consideration  of  all 
the  facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence,  bearing  upon  the  question  of 
the  agency  and  the  intention  and  understanding  of  the  parties  as  to 
what  took  place  between  them,  and  that  the  meaning  of  the  language 
in  such  a  case  is  for  the  jury.*^ 

§  1108.  Rule  restated  as  to  Parol  Contracts.  —  Where  the 
terms  of  a  contract  are  to  be  gathered  from  the  conversations 
and  conduct  of  the  j^arties,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  what 

1  2  Pars.    Cont.  (6th   ed.)  492;   Id.  2  Terry  v.  Shively,  6i  Ind.  106. 

(7th  ed.)  624.     Quoted  with  approval  ^  AVnituey  v.  Swett,   22  N.  H.  10, 

in  Estes  v.  Boothe,  20  Ark.  523,  590.  14. 


854 


PROVIXCE    OF    COURT    AXD    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 


their  understanding  was.^     The  rule  is  said  to  be  that  the  jury 
have  the  right  to    determine  the   existence  of  a  parol  contract, 


1  Tallou  V.  Grand  Portage  Copper 
Milling  Co.,  55  Mich.  147;  Sines  v.  Su- 
perintendents of  Poor,  55  Mich.  383; 
Kingsbury  v.  Buchanan,  1 1  la.  388,  398 ; 
Dennis  v.  Croolis,  23  I\Io.  App.  532; 
Carl  V.  Knott,  16  la.  379,  384;  Codding 
V.  Wood,  112  Pa.  St.  371,  377;  Hough- 
ton V.  Houghton,  37  Me.  72;  Copeland 
V.  Hall,  29  Me.  93;  Tobiu  v.  Gregg,  34 
Pa.  St.  446.  See  also  Strong  v.  Saun- 
ders, 15  Mich.  339;  Maas  r.  AVliite,  37 
:\Iich.  126;  Estate  of  Young,  39  Mich. 
429;  Engle  v.  Campbell,  42  Mich.  565; 
Colgan  V.  Aymar,  Lalor  Supp.  (X.  Y.) 
27;  Rhea  v.  Riner,  21  111.  526;  Bartlett 
V.  Tarbell,  12  Allen  (Mass.),  123.  As 
to  when  the  plaintiff  is  to  be  nonsuited 
under  the  operation  of  this  rule,  tliere 
is  an  interesting  case  in  the  New  York 
Court  of  Coniraou  Pleas,  where  the 
judges  were  divided  in  opinion.  It  was 
laid  down  by  the  majority  that  it  is 
not  a  sound  proposition  that,  upon 
proof  of  a  contract,  whether  in  writing 
or  by  parol,  the  terms  of  which  are 
not  varied  by  extrinsic  evidence,  it  be- 
comes necessary  to  submit  the  con- 
tract to  the  jury  for  interpretation  as 
to  the  intentiou  of  the  parties.  It  was 
held  that  if  there  is  no  dispute  about 
the  terms  of  the  contract,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  court  to  pass  upon  its  va- 
lidity and  effect.  Whether,  under  such 
proof,  the  plaintiff  has,  or  lias  not 
made  out  a  cause  of  action,  is  for  the 
court  to  decide;  and  if  the  uncontra- 
dicted evidence  of  the  terms  of  tlie 
contract  is  not  sufficient  to  show  tlie 
plaintiff's  riglit  to  recover,  the  case 
cannot  be  strengthened  by  submitting 
the  evidence  to  the  jury  to  ascertain 
the  intentions  of  the  parties  making 
It.  But  the  court  were  also  of  opinion 
that,  where  the  evidence  leaves  the 
terms   of    the    contract  or  aiiv   other 


fact  in  doubt,  then  the  facts  may  be 
found  by  the  jury;  but  the  court  did 
not  understand  this  rule  to  extend  to  a 
case  where  the  construction  of  a  con- 
tract is  difficult,  if  there  is  no  conflict 
in  the  evidence.  From  this  conclu- 
sion Charles  F.  Daly,  J.,  dissented. 
Among  other  things  he  said:  "But  I 
think  the  court  below  erred  in  grant- 
ing him  a  nonsuit.  Before  a  nonsuit 
can  be  directed,  there  must  be  no 
doubt  In  respect  to  what  is  proved  by 
the  evidence.  The  evidence  must  not 
only  be  taken  to  be  true,  but  it  must 
be  so  clear  and  conclusive,  in  respect 
to  the  facts  upon  which  the  conclu- 
sions of  law  are  based,  that  it  is  in  the 
power  of  the  court  to  draw  every  in- 
ference which  a  jury  might  draw. 
Smyth  V.  Craig,  3  Watts  &  Serg.  (Pa.) 
18.  If  it  is  uot  of  that  character,  the 
case  must  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  un- 
der proper  instructions  f i"om  the  court 
in  respect  to  the  law.  This  is  espec- 
ially so  where  no  written  agreement  or 
contract  is  entered  into,  and  a  ques- 
tion arises  as  to  the  inteut  of  tlie  part- 
ies, to  be  gathered  from  their  acts 
and  declarations.  Where  the  intent 
follows  as  the  legal  and  logical  con- 
clusion from  their  acts,  it  may  be 
passed  upon  by  the  court;  but  where, 
upon  the  evidence,  it  is  so  uncertain 
or  doubtful  as  to  justify  a  jury  In  find- 
ing either  way,  then  it  is  not  in  the 
province  of  the  court  to  pass  upou  the 
question,  but  the  case  must  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury."  Chapin  v.  Potter, 
1  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  366,  370.  State  of  evi- 
dence on  which  it  was  held  error 
to  submit  to  the  jury,  as  a  ques- 
tion of  fact,  whether  there  was  an 
agreement  to  discharge  an  indorser: 
East  River  Bank  v.  Kennedy,  9  Bosw. 
(X.  Y.)   543. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIV.]     VERBAL  speech.  •  855 

its  extent  and  limitations.  They  are  to  find  not  only  what  lan- 
guage was  used,  but  its  purport  and  meaning.  In  cases  of  writ- 
ten contracts,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  define  the  meaning 
of  the  language  used  in  them,  but  in  verbal  contracts  such  dut}^ 
is  confined  to  the  jury.  They  are  not  barely  to  ascertain  the 
words  and  forms  of  expression,  but  to  interpret  their  sense 
and  meaning,^  This  question,  it  has  been  well  said,  "  is  single^ 
and  cannot  be  separated  so  as  to  refer  one  part  to  the  jury, 
find  another  2)art  io  ihe  judge;  but  in  its  entirety  the  question 
is  one  of  fact."  '^  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  this 
question  is  to  be  determined  from  the  evidence  of  what  the 
parties  said  and  did,  and  not  from  the  understanding  of  one 
of  the  parties  of  Avhat  he  said  or  did.-^ 

§  1109.  Illustrations  of  the  Foregoing. — Applying  this  rule,  it 
has  been  held  that  it  is  not  for  the  trial  court  to  rule,  as  matter  of  law, 
that  certain  words  uttered  in  conversation  amounted  to  an  estopi^el  in 

pais.^ So,  where  the  action  was  assumpsit  to  recover  the  price  of  a 

cotton  gin,  and  the  defense  was  the  statute  of  frauds^  and  there  was 
neither  the  paA^mentof  earnest  money,  nor  an  acceptance  of  the  article, 
nor  a  written  contract,  —  the  court  held  that  the  plaintiffs  could  not 
recover,  unless  work  and  labor  were  to  be  bestowed  on  the  article  which 
was  the  subject  of  the  contract ;  and,  as  the  evidence  on  this  point  was 
very  inconclusive,  a  nonsuit  was  set  aside,  in  order  that  a  jury  might  an- 
swer, on  another  trial,  whether  the  parties  understood  that  the  contract 
was  for  the  sale  of  a  gin  merely,  or  for  the  sale  of  a  gin  on  which  work 

and  labor  were  to  be  bestowed  before  delivery.^ In  an  action  by 

an  executrix  to  recover  for  2'>rofessional  services  rendered  by  her  testa- 
tor, as  a  general  attorney  of  an  estate  of  which  the  defendants  were  the 
representatives,  after  the  testimony  of  several  witnesses  had  been  re- 
ceived, going  to  establish  that  the  plaintiff's  testator  had  for  several 
years  acted  at  the  instance  of  the  defendants  as  attorney  of  the  estate, 
and  placing  estimates  upon  those  services,  it  was  testified  by  a  witness 
for  the  defendants,  that  the  i)laintiff  had  admitted  that  her  testator  was 

I  Herberts.  Ford,  33  Me.  1)0;  Cope-  <  Brubaker   r.    Okesou,    36  Pa.  St. 

laud  V,  Hail,  29  Me.  93.  519. 

*  McKeuzie  v.  Sykes,  47  Mich.  294,  ^  Wiuship  v.  Buzzard,  9  Rich.  L. 
296.  CS,  C.)  103, 

*  Farley  v,    Pettes,  5  JIo.  App.  202, 


85G  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  TllOllip.  Tl., 

employed  to  collect  money  due  to  the  estate  represented  by  the  de- 
fendants on  a  considerable  number  of  notes  which  were  placed  in  his 
hands,  and  that  one  of  the  defendants  agreed  to  give  him  ten  per  cent, 
on  all  mone3'S  collected.  In  this  state  of  case,  it  was  held  that  it 
should  have  been  left  to  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  agreement 
did  not  embrace  all  the  notes  which  the  plaintiff's  testator  had  in 
his  possession  belonging  to  the  estate,  whether  collected  by  means  of 

suit  or  otherwise.! So,  in  replevin  for  a  horse  which  had  been 

loaned  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant,  to  be  returned  at  a  subsequent 
date,  the  controversy  turned  upon  a  conversation  between  the  parties,  in 
which  the  plaintiff  had  said  to  the  defendant:  "  Well,  sell  him  and  pay 
me  ;"  or,  "  pay  me  and  you  can  sell  the  horse  ;"  or,  "  you  can  sell  the 
horse,  pay  me,  and  I  guess  there  will  be  no  trouble."  The  court  in- 
structed the  jury  that  it  was  for  them  to  determine  what  language  and 
words  were  used  by  the  plaintiff ;  that  the  words,  "  pay  me  and  sell  the 
horse,"  would  not  imply  an  authority  to  sell  the  horse  ;  but  if  the  words 
were,  "sell  the  horse  and  pay  me,"  that  they  would  authorize  the  de- 
fendant to  sell  the  horse;  that  if  the  words  were,  "sell  the  horse, 
and  there  will  be  no  trouble,"  they  amounted  to  an  authority  to  sell 
the  horse ;  and  that  the  last  clause,  "  and  there  will  be  no  trouble,"  did 
not  alter  the  sense  and  made  no  difference  in  the  effect  of  the  words. 
It  was  held  that,  in  giving  these  instructions,  the  court  erred ;  since  the 
jury  ought  to  have  been  allowed  to  find,  not  only  what  language  was 
used,  but  also  the  meaning  of  the  language,  in  view  of  all  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case. 2 In  like  manner,  in  an  action  of  assumpsit  on 

2l  promise  to  pay  the  bond  of  another,  the  following  "  point  "  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  trial  court  by  the  defendant:  "  That  if  the  evidence  in 
this  case  proves  a  promise,  or  has  a  tendency  to  prove  a  promise  of  any 
kind,  it  is  a  promise  to  pay  both  debts  of  $400  each,  secured  by  the 
two  judgment  bonds  and  the  two  judgments  entered  on  the  same  in 
consideration  of  total  forbearance ;  and,  plaintiff's  having  issued  exe- 
cution on  one  of  the  judgments  and  sold  all  the  real  estate  of  Isaac  E. 
Kemp,  and  purchased  the  same  themselves,  cannot  recover  upon  such 
promise."  The  answer  of  the  trial  court  was :  "  It  is  not  for  us  to  say 
that  the  evidence  proves  or  has  a  tendency  to  prove  a  promise  as  stated 
on  this  point;  whether  it  does  so  is  for  the  jury  to  say.  If  it  does, 
however,  the  law  is  correctly  stated  in  the  i)oint  presented."  In  this 
the  Supreme  Court  saw  "  no  error,  but  only  a  careful  demarcation  of 

1  Broward  v.  Doggett,  2  Tla.  49.  ^  Copelaiid  v.  Hall,  2'J  Me.  93,  95. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIV.]     VERBAL  speech.  857 

the  line  between  the  provinces  of  tlie  judge  and  the  jury."  ^ So, 

it  has  been  held  proper  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  question  whether  the 
defendant  has  contracted  as  a  common  carrier  or  as  a  mere  hirer  for 
the  particular  job,  after  telling  them  that  "a  common  carrier  is  one 
who  holds  himself  forth  to  the  public  to  carry  for  hire  from  place  to 
place,"  and  that,  "  though  the  number  of  instances  employed  in  carry- 
ing may  be  evidence  of  the  character  of  a  common  carrier,  it  is  not  the 
rule  which  constitutes  it.  The  law  has  fixed  no  number  of  instances 
which  shall  stamp  him  with  the  character.  If  he  holds  himself  forth  to 
the  public  to  carry  for  hire,  he  is  a  common  carrier,  as  much  in  his  first 
trip  as  in  his  second,  third  or  fourth.  Did  the  defendant  undertake  as 
a  common  carrier?  *  *  *  This  you  will  decide  on  all  the  evidence. 
If  satisfied  the  defendant  was  a  common  carrier,  the  next  question  to 
be  determined  In^  the  jury  is,  whether  the  contract  in  this  case  was  one 
of  affreightment  as  a  carrier,  or  whether  the  defendant  merely  chartered 
and  hired  his  boat,  his  hands,  and  himself,  to  the  plaintiffs,  placing  all 
in  their  control,  they  running  the  boat  on  their  own  account,  and  only 
paying  him  wages  for  the  hire  of  the  boat,  himself  and  hands."  ^ 

1  Kuii's  Executor  v.  Young,  34  Pa.  2  duller  v.  Bradley,   25  Pa.  St.  120. 

St.  60. 


858  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  TilOmp.  Tl*. , 


CHAPTER     XXXy. 


EXISTENCE  AND  TERMS  OF  EXPRESS  CONTRACTS. 

Section  • 

1112.  Existence  of  Contracts. 

1113.  Partly  iu  ^V"riting  aud  Partly  in  Parol. 

1111.  Observations  on  the  Rule  that  the  Existence  of  a  Contract  is  a  Question 

of  Law. 
1115.  Illustrations. 
IIK).  ]\Iistakes  in  the  Terms  of  a  Contract. 

1117.  Illustration. 

1118.  Whether  a  Contract  is  Verbal  or  in  Writing. 

111!).  AVhether  an  obligation  is  Independent  or  Dependent. 

1120.  Contract  Entire  or  Divisible. 

1121.  Original  or  Collateral. 

1122.  Quantum  Meruit  —  Value  of  Work  done  or  Materials  Furnished. 

1123.  Collateral  Purpose  for  which  a  Contract  was  made. 

1124.  Whether  a  bill  of  Sale  was  intended  as  a  Mortgage. 

1125.  Penalty  or  Liquidated  Damages. 

1126.  Gratification  of  a  Contract. 

1127.  Whether  there  has  been  a  Novation. 

1128.  Delivery  of  a  Deed. 

1129.  Acceptance  of  a  Deed  by  the  Grantee. 

1130.  Date  of  the  Delivery  of  a  Deed  or  of  the  Taking  Effect  of  a  Contract. 

1131.  Whether  Delivered  as  an  Escrow. 

1132.  Existence  of  a  Partnership.  ' 

1133.  Instructions  on  which  this  Question  has  been  submitted  to  Juries. 

1134.  Genuineness  of  Signature. 

1135.  How  Proved. 

113(J.  Consideration  of  a  Contract. 

1137.  Whether  a  Forbearance  was   the  Acceptance  of  a  Promise  to  pay  the 

Debt  of  Another. 

1138.  Whether  a  Written  Promise  was  Founded  upon  an  Illegal  Consider- 

ation. 

1139.  Whether  the  Contract  is   Real  or   Colorable   to   Cover  up  a   Gambling 

Transaction. 
lUO.  Whether  a  Market  was  "  Manipulated  "  or  Fictitious. 

1141.  Performance  or  Waiver  of  Performance. 

1142.  Place  where  a  Contract  is  to  be  Performed. 

1143.  Whether  or  not  a  Contract  is  Usurious. 

1144.  Further  of  this  Subject. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  859 

§  1112.  Existence  of  Contracts. —  It  will  appear  from  the  fore- 
going that,  in  every  case  where  the  existence  of  a  contract  is  in 
issue,  whether  it  is  sought  to  prove  its  existence  by  parol  or  by 
a  writing,  there  will  be  a  preliminary  question  of  fact  for  the 
jury.  If  the  contract  is  in  writing,  and  is  the  instrument  suedon, 
the  signature  thereto  is  adinitled^  unless  it  is  denied  on  oath, 
under  a  statutory  rule  existing  in  several  jurisdictions.  In  cases 
outside  the  operation  of  this  rule,  it  is  necessary  to  prove  first  the 
execution  (which  includes  signature)  and  secondly,  the  delivery 
of  the  instrument, — both  of  which  are  questions  of  fact.  If 
it  is  sought  to  prove  the  contract  by  parol,  it  is  also  for  the  jury, 
as  already  seen,^  to  ascertain  what  the  understanding  of  the  par 
ties  was.  Where  the  execution  and  delivery  of  the  writing  are 
proved  or  admitted,  then,  upon  principles  already  stated,^  it  is 
for  the  court  to  say,  upon  an  inspection  of  the  instrument, 
whether  or  not  it  constitutes  a  contract.  Where  an  oral  conver- 
sation is  proved,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say  in  what  sense  the  lan- 
guage was  used  and  understood,  and,  this  being  ascertained,  it  is 
for  the  court  to  decide, —  generally  upon  hypothetical  instructions 
to  the  jury, — whether  or  not  it  constitutes  a  contract.^  These 
questions,  in  their  general  bearings,  will  be  considered  in  this 
chapter.  In  relation  to  contracts  of  sale  ^  and  to  certain  other 
contracts,^  they  will  be  reserved  for  separate  treatment. 

§  1113.  Partly    in  Writing  and    Partly  in   Parol.  —  In  like 

manner  where  an  action  is  brought  upon  a  contract  which  is  partly 
oral,  and  conflicting  evidence  is  introduced  in  regard  to  the  con- 
versations which  are  alleged  to  have  resulted  in  a  completed  con- 
tract, the  questions  whether  a  contract  was  in  fact  made  and,  if 
so,  what  were  its  terms  are  questions  for  the  jury  ;  ^  and  in  such 
a  case  the  legal  effect  of  the  contract  may  properly  be  submitted 
to  the  jury  as  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact, —  the}'  finding 
the  facts,  and  the  court  directing  them  as  to  the  legal  results  which 

1  Ante,  §§  1105,  1108;  Waltheim  v.           *  Post,  §  ll&l,  etseq. 

Artz,  70  Iowa,  609.  *  Post,  §§  1195, 1215,  1280,  et  passim. 

^  Ante,^  \0(^5,et  seq.  ^  Bolckow    v.    Seymour,    17   C.  B. 

3  Ante,  §  HOG.  (x.  s.)  107. 


860  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

follow.^  For  perhaps  stronger  reasons,  where  the  contract  rests 
partly  in  correspondence,  and  partly  in  oral  communications,  it 
is  held  that,  whether  or  not  there  is  a  contract,  is  a  question 
for  the  jury.'^ 

§  1114.  Observations  on  the  Rule  that  the  existence  of  a 
contract  is  a  Question  of  Fact.  —  Loose  expressions  are  fre- 
quently found  in  judicial  decisions  to  the  effect  that,  whether  a 
contract  exists  is  always  a  question  for  the  jury.  It  is  obvious 
that  it  will  or  will  not  be  a  question  for  the  jury,  according  to 
circumstances.  Where  the  question  rests  wholly  in  parol  evi- 
dence, or,  as  in  the  cases  above  stated,  partly  in  writing  and 
partly  in  parol,  and  there  is  the  further  condition  that  the  evi- 
dence is  conflicting,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury.  So, 
where  the  question  depends  entirely  upon  parol  evidence,  adduced 
by  the  party  sustaining  the  burden  of  proof,  and  there  is  no  con- 
flict in  the  evidence,  it  may  still  be  a  question  for  the  jury,  since 
it  will  be  for  them  to  say  whether  they  will  believe  the  witnesses. 
So,  where  the  question  depends  upon  a  written  instrument,  the 

1  Ante,  §  1086;  Farwell  v.  Tillsou,  determined  by  the  jury,  under  proper 
76  Me.  227;  Horaaus  v.  Lambard,21  instructions  from  the  court.  It  is  not 
Me.  308;  Smith  v.  Faulkner,  12  Gray  necessarily  true,  that  where,  in  the 
(Mass.),  256;  Haney  v.  Caldwell,  35  attempt  to  establish  what  were  the 
Ark.  156,  164.  In  a  recent  case  in  terras  of  an  agreement  by  extrinsic 
Illinois,  where  the  question  touched  proofs,  there  is  no  conflict  in  the  tes- 
the  peculiar  jurisdiction  of  the  Su-  timouy,  the  question  becomes  purely 
preme  Court  in  cases  which  have  one  of  law.  Evidence  tending  to 
reached  it  through  the  intermediate  establish  a  contract  may  be  all  on  one 
appellate  court,  it  was  ruled  that  side,  and  yet  may  be  of  such  a  char- 
where  the  terms  of  the  contract  are  acter  as  to  leave  the  question  as  to 
specifically  determined,  then  the  mean-  whether  a  legal  contract  was  in  fact 
ing  or  legal  effect  of  the  contract  made  or  not,  in  extreme  doubt;  and  in 
presents  a  pure  question  of  law,  such  case  the  question  as  to  the  mak- 
and  the  court  alone  is  permitted  to  ing  of  the  contract,  and  the  purport 
construe  it.  But  where  not  only  the  of  its  terms,  together  with  its  legal 
legal  effect  of  the  agreement  upon  the  effect,  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and 
controversy  in  hand,  is  to  be  deter-  fact.  St.  Louis  National  Stock  Yards 
mined,  but  also  the  terms  of  the  agree-  v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  102  111.  514. 
ment  itself  are  to  be  ascertained  from  ^  Goddard  v.  Foster,  17  Wall, 
extrinsic  proofs,  there  is  presented  a  (U.  S.)  123, 142. 
mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  to  be 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  861 

execution  of  which  is  denied,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury 
whether  the  instrument  was  executed  by  the  party  sought  to  be 
charged  as  obligee  therein.^  But  where  the  execution  of  the  in- 
strument which  is  offered  as  evidence  of  the  contract,  is  either 
proAcd  or  admitted,  then  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
determine  from  an  inspection  of  it,  and  to  inform  the  jury 
whether  it  is  or  is  not  a  contract — whether  it  is  or  is  not  that 
which  fixes  the  liability  sought  to  be  fastened  upon  the  obligee 
therein."^  This  is  no  doubt  all  that  is  meant  by  the  general  ex- 
pressions found  in  judicial  opinions  that  the  jury  are  to  find 
whether  the  contract  was  in  fact  made  out,  while  the  interpreta- 
tion of  it  is  for  the  court. ^  So,  where  the  question  is  not  whether 
the  instrument  has  been  executed  at  all,  but  whether,  in  a  case 
requiring  technical  formality,  it  has  been  properly  executed,  the 
decision  will  be  pronounced  by  the  judge,  upon  an  inspection  of 
the  instrument.  Thus,  the  question  whether  a  deed  or  mortgage 
has  been  properly  executed  and  acknowledged,  is  a  question  of 
law,  to  be  passed  upon  by  the  court,  and  it  is  error  to  leave  such 
a  question  to  the  jury.*  So,  where  a  jwoposal  for  a  contract  is 
in  writing,  it  is  for  the  court  to  construe  it ;  if  the  accejytance 
which  is  alleged  is  verbal,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether 
the  offer  has  been  accepted  or  not,  but  they  cannot  decide  that 
it  was  without  evidence.^ 


1  May  V.  Burk,  80  Mo.  675,  680.  In  a  case  in  Tennessee  the  evidence 

2  Eyser  v.  Weissgerber,  2  la.  463,  tended  to  show  that  a  parol  contract 
479.  had  been  agreed  upon  in  the  first  iu- 

'  Stokes  V.  Burrell,  3  Grant  Cases  stance,  and  afterwards  a  written  con- 
(Pa.),  241.  That  tlie  jury  are  to  find  tract  had  been  signed,  and  it  was  held 
whether  the  contract  was  in  fact  made,  that  the  plaintiff  had  the  right  to  have 
but  the  intent  and  the  obligations  of  the  question  whether  the  written  con- 
it  they  must  find  under  the  directions  tract  embraced  all  the  terms  of  the 
of  the  court,  and  any  mistake  in  such  previous  parol  agreement,  submitted 
instructions  will  be  reviewed  on  error,  to  the  jury.  Cobb  v.  Wallace,  5 
see  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cassell,  17  111.  Coldw.  (Tenn.)  539.  But  this  was 
389,  394.  See  also  Cunningham  v.  probably  a  misapplication  of  the  rule; 
Cambridge  Savings  Bank,  138  Mass.  for  the  rule  whicli  is  generally  applied 
4«0.  in  such  cases  is  that  the  subsequent 

■*  Bullock  V.  Narrott,  49  III.  65.  writing  merges  the  preceding  parol 

*  Wagner  v.  Egleston,  49  Mich.  218.  negotiations. 


862  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  1115.  Illustrations.  — This  is  well  illustrated  in  a  case  in  Texas, 
where  an  action  was  brought  on  the  following  instrument  of  writing, 
signed  by  the  defendant:  "  There  is  a  balance  due  the  bearer,  $475.00. 
C.  R.  Hopson  to  H.  L.  Kinney,  August  15,  1852."  It  was  held  that 
this  writing  imported  that  the  sum  mentioned  therein  was  due  from  the 
maker  to  the  bearer,  and  that  the  law  would  imply  a  promise  by  him  to 
pay  such  sura.  But  if  tlie  instrument  was  arl(b'essed  to  a  third  person, 
it  was  to  be  regarded  merely  as  a  memorandum  of  a  fact,  or  as  convey- 
ing information  of  a  fact,  without  legal  significance  until  explained,  and 
was  not,  of  itself,  a  contract  for  the  payment  of  money;  and  it  was 
for  a  jury  to  say  what  the  fact  was,  of  which  the  writing  was  a  memo- 
randum, or  of  which  the  writing  was  intended  to  convey  information, 
or  of  which  it  was  an  acknowledgment,  as  the  case  might  be.  It  was 
accordingly  held  that  the  court  erred  in  refusing  to  instruct  the  jury  as 
requested  by  the  defendant,  "  that  if  they  believed,  from  the  evidence, 
that  the  plaintiff  was  employed  by  H.  L.  Kinne}^,  or  liis  agent,  to  work 
for  him,  and  the  writing  sued  on  was  a  mere  memorandum,  inform- 
ing  Kinney    of    the  amount  due  by  him    on   such  hiring,  then   they 

should  find  for  the  defendant."  ^ A.  and  B.  enter  into  a  verbal 

contract  by  which  A.  undertakes  to  sell  and  deliver  to  B.,  at  a  certain 
time  and  place,  fifty  bales  of  cotton,  for  which  B.  is  to  pay  A.  at  the 
rate  of  tencents  a  pound.  About  the  time  fixed  for  the  perform- 
ance of  the  contract,  the  parties  agree  that  the  time  for  its  perform- 
ance shall  be  postponed  to  another  named  day,  and  that  it  shall  be 
reduced  to  writing, —  which,  however  is  never  done.  On  the  day  last 
appointed,  B.  and  the  agent  of  A.  meet  at  the  place  designated  for  the 
delivery  of  the  goods,  and  B.  takes  the  agent  of  A.  aside  and  says  to 
him  that  A.  ought  to  release  B.  from  the  contract.  But  the  agent  of 
A.  proceeds  nevertheless  to  tender  to  B.  the  cotton,  which  B.  refuses 
to  accept  and  pay  for.  Here,  there  is  question  of  fact  for  a  jury, 
whether  the  parties  intended  by  the  second  agreement  that  the  original 
contract  sliould  be  no  longer  binding  unless  reduced  to  loriting,  or  whether 
they   intended   merely   that  it   should  be  reduced  to  writing,  with  the 

view  of  having  more  certain  evidence  of  what  the  contract  was.^ 

It  has  been  held  a  questi  m  of  fact,  to  be  determined  from  all  the  evi- 
dence bearing  upon  the  case  and  the  conduct  of  the  parties,  whether  a 
subscription  to  the  capital  stock  of  a  railway  company,  was  made 
under   the  provision    of  the    charter   of   the    company,  granted   by  a 

1  Hopson  V.  Brunwaukel,  24   Tex.  2  Adams  r.  Davis,  16  Ala.  748. 

607. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  coxtracts.  863 

special  act  of  the  legislature,  or  under  a  provision  of  the  general  law  of 

the  State  relating  to  railway  companies. ^ In  an  action  by  a  railway 

company  upon  a  contract  of  subscription  to  its  capital  stock,  it  appeared 
that  the  contract  provided  that  the  money  so  subscribed  should  be 
expended  in  the  construction  of  the  road  from  St.  Johnsbury  to 
"Derby  Line,"  and  also  that  it  should  not  be  binding  until  the  whole 
road  from  St.  Johnsbury  to  Derby  Line  should  be  put  under  contract 
for  grading.  The  defendant  having  given  evidence  tending  to  show 
that  the  words  "  Derby  Line  "  meant,  in  common  usage,  a  village  of  that 
name  in  the  town  of  Derb}^  it  was  held  that  it  became  a  question  of 
fact,  for  the  jury  to  decide,  whether  the  use  of  this  term  in  the  contract 
meant  the  north  line  of  the  town  (or  township)  of  Derby,  or  the  vil- 
lage named  Derby  Line.  The  court  said:  "  The  more  full  and  perfect 
the  proof,  the  greater  the  probabiUty  of  satisfying  the  jury  and  obtaining 
a  verdict ;  but  no  amount  of  testimony  on  a  point  of  this  character  could 
have  the  effect  to  change  this  question  of  fact  to  one  of  law,  so  as  to 
wai-rant  the  court  in  taking  it  from  the  jury  and  deciding  it  as  a  matter 
of  law.  Indeed,  all  the  evidence  as  to  the  general  understanding  of 
the  meaning  of  this  expression  in  the  vicinity,  has  no  direct  application 
on  the  real  question  in  issue.  It  bears  only  on  the  pro  babilities  of  the 
case ;  and  if  it  had  been  proved,  bej'ond  all  question,  that,  prior  to  the 
making  of  this  contract,  this  expression  had  never  been  used  with  refer- 
ence to  the  town  line,  it  would  not  have  been  conclusive.  The  expression 
being  a  proper  one  to  use  in  that  connection,  the  parties  may  have  used 
it  in  that  sense  in  this  contract  for  the  first  time.  The  question  would 
still  be  open  for  the  jury  to  say  in  what  sense  the  parties  in  fact  used 

it."  2 It  has  been  held,  in  the  case  of  a  written  contract  which  was 

the  subject  of  parol  explanation,  that,  whether  it  was  an  absolute  pur- 
chase of  a  half  interest  in  a  mortgage,  or  an  assignment  pro  tanto  of 
the  legal  right,  in  consideration  of  a  part  payment,  such  as  would  toll 
the  statute  of  limitations,  should  be  left  to  the  jury  upon  all  the  evi- 
dence.^ 

§  1116.  Mistakes  in  the  terms  of  a  Contract.  — Whether  a 
clause  in  a  written  contract  was  inserted  by  a  mutual  mistake  of 
the  parties,  is  a  question  which   cannot  generally  arise  in  an 

>  Mastln  V.  Pacific   E.  Co.,  83  Mo.  ^  Bi^ir  v.  Lynch  (N.  Y.),  11  North 

634.  East.  Rep.  947;  reversing  s.c.  35  Hun, 

2  Connecticut  &c.  R.Co.  v.  Baxter,  (iUS. 
32  Vt.  805,  812. 


864  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoinp.  Tl'., 

action  at  law ;  since  the  reformation  of  mistakes  in  contracts  is 
one  of  the  peculiar  heads  of  equity  jurisdiction.^  But  in  cases 
where  public  policy  is  concerned  in  relieving  against  the  hard 
features  of  certain  classes  of  contracts,  the  question  goes  to  the 
jury.  This,  it  is  assumed,  is  the  case  in  regard  to  onerous  pro- 
visions in  contracts  of  insurance.,  and  it  has  been  held  to  be  the 
rule  in  the  case  of  clauses  in  contracts  made  with  -puhlic  carriers 
wdiich  limit  the  liability  of  the  latter. ^ 

§  1117.  Illustration. — Thus,  in  an  action  by  a  shipper  against  a 
carrier  for  damages  to  goods  in  transit,  it  has  been  held  competent  to 
submit  to  the  decision  of  the  jury  the  question  whether  a  clause  in  the 
bill  of  lading,  limiting  the  responsibility  of  the  carrier  was  not  inserted 
by  a  mistake,  —  the  court  no  doubt  meaning  mutual  mistake.  The 
court  below  submitted  the  question  to  the  jury  upon  an  instruction 
which  told  them  that  the  burden  of  showing  the  mistake  was  on  the 
plaintiffs  ;  that  they  must  satisfy  the  jury  of  the  mistake  ;  and  instruct- 
ing them  as  to  the  difference  between  the  liability  of  the  defendant  in 
case  they  should  find  that  no  mistake  had  been  made  in  the  bill  of  lading, 
and  in  case  they  should  find  that  the  words  were  inserted  through  mistake. 
This  judgment  was  affirmed,  the  Supreme  Court,  in  an  opinion  given  by 
Jeremiah  Black,  C.  J.,  saying,  among  other  things :  "  It  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  the  commerce  of  the  country  that  carriers  should  be  held 
to  strict  accountability.  Gross  wrongs  would  be  practiced  every  day 
if  the  laws  on  this  subject  were  relaxed.  Slight  evidence  ought  to  be 
sufficient  to  set  aside  any  special  provision  in  the  bill  of  lading,  which 
is  intended  to  relieve  the  carrier  from  his  ordinary  legal  responsibility. 
And  this  not  only  because  public  policy  requires  that  carriers  should 
have  the  strongest  interest  in  the  performance  of  their  duties,  but  also 
on  account  of  the  manner  in  which  such  stipulations  are  generally  made. 
Goods  are  commonly  sent  by  the  owner  to  the  carrier's  place  of  busi- 

1  Gray  v.  Ilornbeck,  31  Mo.  400.     It  jury  on  siibmission  of  the  jury  issues; 

was  said  iu  a  case  iu  New  York  that,  and  if  in  such  a  case  a  trial  occurs 

where  an  issue  is  raised  by  an  answer  upon  all  the  issues  made,   it  is  not 

in  ejectment  upon  the  question  whether  error  for  the  judiie  to  refuse  to  submit 

a  deed  should  be  reformed  (no  issues  the  question  of  the  reformation  of  the 

having  been  settled  with  direction  to  deed  to  the  jury,  under  the  evidence 

■try  by  jury),  it  should  either  be  tried  upon  that  issue.     Olendorf  v.  Cook,  1 

by  the  court  prior  to  the  trial  of  the  Lans.  (N.  Y.)  37. 

prmcipal  issue,  or  reserved  from  the  ^  Po>>t,  §  1803. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  865 

ness,  where  they  are  received,  and  the  bill  of  lading  made  out  by  the 
carrier  or  his  clerk.  It  is  often  not  seen  by  the  owner  until  it  is  too 
late  to  insist  on  a  change  in  the  terms.  It  can  hardly  be  called  a  con- 
tract, for  a  contract  requires  the  assent  of  both  parties.  The  better 
rule  perhaps  would  be,  to  treat  all  provisions  of  this  kind  as  void, 
unless  inserted  by  the  express  consent  of  the  employer."  ^ 

§  1118.   Whether  a  contract  was  verbal  or  in  Writing.  —  It 

has  been  held  that,  where  the  whole  evidence  in  a  case  presents 
a  disputed  question  of  fact,  whether  the  contract  by  which  the 
rights  of  the  parties  are  governed,  was  in  parol  or  in  writino-, 
evidence  may  be  given  by  them,  both  as  to  the  precise  question, 
and  as  to  the  verbal  declarations  and  acts  of  the  parties,  which 
are  claimed  to  have  constituted  the  alleged  parol  contract,  and 
also  as  to  the  contents  of  the  alleged  written  instrument ;  and 
that  it  may  then  be  left  to  the  jury  to  say  whether  the  contract 
was  in  writing  or  in  parol,  with  instructions  that,  if  they  first 
find  that  it  was  reduced  to  writing,  they  must  afterward,  in  de- 
termining the  terms  of  the  contract,  consider  only  that  part  of 
the  evidence  Avhich  tends  to  show  the  contents  of  such  writino-. 2 

o 

§  1119.  Whether  an  Obligation  is  Independent  or  Depend- 
ent. —  It  has  been  held,  in  an  action  to  enforce  the  specific  per- 
formance of  a  contract  to  convey  land,  that  the  obligation  upon 
which  the  action  is  i)redicated  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence  to 
be  dependent  upon  the  payment  of  a  note  given  for  the  purchase- 
money,  although  the  bond  makes  no  reference  to  the  note,  nor 
the  note  to  the  bond.  But  the  facts  which  show  the  interde- 
pendency  of  the  two  obligations  must  be  both  averred  and 
proved;  and  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  they  were 
dependent,  and  the  court  ought  not  to  assume  that  they  were  so 
as  a  fact.-^ 

§  1120.  Contract  Entire  or  Divisible. — Whether  a  contract  by 
which  an  attorney  engaged  to  prosecute  a  petition  for  divorce  was  en- 

i  Clioteaux  v.  Leech,  IS  Pa.  St.  22i,  Younger   v.   Welch;  22   Tex.  417, 

232.  425. 

2  Jenness  V.  Berry,  17  N.  H.  549.  555. 


866  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  ThODip.  Tl'., 

tire,  and  whether  he  was  to  be  paid  for  his  services  before  or  after  the 
contract  was  fully  performed,  have  been  held,  under  circumstances,  to 
be  questions  of  fact.^ 

§  1121.  Original  or  Collateral.  — If  an  undertaking  to  answer 
for  the  debt,  miscarriage  or  default  of  another  is  not  in  writing, 
it  is  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  unless  it  assume  the  char- 
acter of  an  original  undertaking.  Thus,  if  A.  is  unable  to  get 
credit  from  a  merchant,  and  B.  goes  to  the  merchant  and  says, 
"  Credit  A.  for  what  goods  he  wants,  and  I  will  pay  for  them, 
if  A.  does  not,"  this  is  a  collateral  undertaking  to  answer  for  the 
default  of  A.,  and  is  void  unless  in  writing.  But  if  B.  says  to 
the  merchant,  "  Sell  and  deliver  to  A.  such  and  such  goods,  and 
charge  the  same  to  me,  and  I  will  pay  for  them,"  this  is  an  original 
undertaking,  and  B.  is  answerable  for  it,  although  not  in  writing. 
Whether  an  agreement  is  original  or  collateral,  also  arises  in  re- 
spect of  the  discharge  of  sureties.  Thus,  if  A.  is  indebted  on  a 
promissory  note  which  is  past  due,  upon  which  the  liability  of  B. 
as  an  indorser  has  become  iixecl,  and  C.  says  to  the  payee,  "  Ex- 
tend the  time  of  payment  to  A.,  and  I  will  pay  the  note  if  A. 
does  not,"  this  undertaking  is  void  under  the  statute  of  frauds, 
unless  in  waiting,  and  does  not  operate  to  discharge  the  indorser, 
because  it  is  not  binding  upon  the  maker ;  it  leaves  him  at  liberty 
to  sue  upon  the  note  at  any  time.  But  if  C.  enters  into  an  ar- 
rangement with  the  holder  of  the  note  to  pay  it,  in  consideration 
of  his  giving  time  to  A.,  this  engagement  will  be  an  original  un- 
dertaking, and  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  and  the  agreement 
of  forbearance  will  furnish  a  good  consideration  for  it;  and 
therefore  such  an  agreement  for  extension  will  prevent  the  holder 
from  suing  upon  the  note  before  the  expiration  of  the  time  so 
agreed  upon,  and,  if  made  without  the  consent  of  the  indorser, 
will  discharge  him.  In  these  and  like  cases,  it  may  be  a  question 
whether  the  contract  is  original  or  collateral,  and  also  whether 
the  question  is  to  be  decided  by  the  court  or  by  the  jury.  Pro- 
fessor Parsons  seems  to  have  obscured  the  question,  or  rather 
straddled  it,  by  stating:  "  Whether  a  contract  is  collateral  or  or- 

^  Dodge  V.  Jauvriu,  5!)  N.  H.  16. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  867 

igiiical'may  be  a  question  of  construction,  and  then  it  is  for  the 
court;  but  it  is  often  regarded  as  a  question  of  fact,  and  then  it  is 
for  the  jury."  ^  Of  course,  if  it  is  a  question  of  construction,  it 
is  for  the  court,  and  if  it  is  a  question  of  fact,  it  is  for  the  jury. 
In  a  case  in  Texas,  although  the  promises  were  in  writing,  3'et  it 
was  held,  that  the  proper  construction  of  the  contract  would  be 
a  question  for  the  jury,  unless  the  terms  of  the  several  promises 
in  writing  relied  upon  were  such  as  to  allow  of  a  liability  on  the 
part  of  the  defendants  as  either  collateral  or  original  undertak- 
ings on  their  part,  accordingly  as  the  facts  which  attended  and 
formed  a  part  of  the  contract  would  show  them  to  be  the  one  or 
the  other.  The  court  reasoned  that  the  written  terms  which 
were  used,  being  in  thenxselves  doubtful,  suggested  that  there 
might  be  something  in  the  transaction  which  gave  rise  to  them, 
which  would  explain  and  render  clear  their  meaning,  and  thus 
afford  light  for  the  interpretation  of  the  contract  as  it  was  really 
intended.  In  this  view,  parol  evidence  would  be  admissible  to 
explain  it,  and  of  course  this  would  carry  the  question  of  its 
meaning  to  the  jury.^  Another  court  has  held  that,  where  a  writ- 
ten instrument  is  so  ambiguous  in  its  terms  that  it  may  be  con- 
sidered either  as  a  guaranty  or  as  a  direct  undertaking ,  accordipo; 
to  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  given,  and  the  testimony 
as  to  those  circumstances  is  conflicting,  it  is  error  to  give  instruc- 
tions based  upon  the  assumption  that  it  was  a  direct  undertaking; 
but  the  question  whether  it  was  a  direct  undertaking  or  a  guar- 
anty should  be  submitted  to  the  jury  under  proper  instruc- 
tions.^ 

§  1122.  Quantum  Meruit — Value  of  Work  done  or  Materi- 
als furnished.  —  In  an  action  for  what  is  termed  a  quantum 
meruit,  or  quantum  valebat,  that  is,  for  the  reasonable  value  of 
work  done  or  goods  furnished  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant, 

^  2  Pars.  Contr.  (5th  ed.),  p.  11.  payable  uiuety  clays   from   Jau.  13th, 

2  Hueske  v.  Broussard,  55  Tex.  201.  1870,  with  interest  at  teu  per  ceut.  per 

The  eugagemeutconceruiug  which  this  annum."    Ibid. 

was  held  was  an  indorsement  on  the  ^  Philibert  v.   Bui'ch,  4    Mo.  App. 

backof  auoteof  thewords;  * 'Accepted,  470. 


868  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

at  the  request  of  the  latter,  the  question  what  is  the  reasonable 
value  of  the  services  or  the  goods,  is,  of  course,  a  question  for  the 
jury.^  In  such  a  case  the  true  question  for  the  decision  of  the 
jury  is,  what  was  the  ordinary  price  iov  such  work  and  materials, 
charged  by  other  persons  in  the  same  business.  In  such  an  ac- 
tion, it  is  therefore  erroneous  to  charge  the  jury:  "It  is  not 
your  province  to  say  how  much  profit  ought  to  be  charged  by 
the  plaintiffs."  But  the  court  should  content  itself  with- say- 
ing: "  You  are  not  to,  set  yourselves  up  as  judges  of  what  loco- 
motive engine  builders  ought  to  charge  as  profits,  but  simply 
whether  the  charges  in  the  plaintiff's  bill  are  the  usual  charges 
in  the  trade."  ^ 

§  1123.  Collateral  Purpose  for  which  a  Contract  was 
made. — A  branch  of  the  doctrine  that  ^;M?'/)05e  and  intent  are 
questions  of  fact,^  is  found  in  a  ruling  to  the  effect  that,  while 
the  interpretation  of  a  deed  of  conveyance  is  a  question  for  the 
court,  yet  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  given, — as  in  the  case 
of  an  ordinary  quit-claim  deed,  — may  be  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  jury,  in  the  determination  of  which,  parol  evidence,  not  con- 
tradicting or  varying  the  terms  of  the  deed,  may  be  heard.* 

§  1124.  Whether  a  Bill  of  Sale  was  Intended  as  a  Mort- 
gage. —  The  rule  is  now  believed  to  be  settled  in  all  English  and 
American  jurisdictions,  that,  in  a  suit  in  equity,  the  object  of 
which  is  to  have  a  bill  of  sale  of  chattels  or  a  deed  of  land, 
absolute  on  its  face,  declared  to  be  a  mortgage  merely,  and  to 
let  in  the  right  of  the  vendor  or  grantor  to  redeem,  it  may  be 
shown  that  the  intention  of  the  parties,  notwithstanding  the  con- 
versance is  couched  in  absolute  language,  was  merely  that  it 
should  stand  as  a  security  for  money  lent.  Within  the  meaning 
of  this  rule,  the  intention  of  the  parties  to  the  instrument,  out- 
side of  the  language  of  the  instrument  itself,  becomes  a  question 


1  Becker  v.  Hecker,  9  Ind.  497.  "  Post,  §  1333. 

2  Baumgarduer  v.  Buruliam,  93  Pa.  ■»  Iluth  v.   Caroudelet  &c.   Co.,   56 
St.  88.                                                                  Mo.  202. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  869 

of  fact  to  be  decided  by  the  chancellor  upon  extrinsic  evidence  ;  ^ 
and  in  many  cases  the  question  will  arise  in  actions  at  law,  in 
which  cases  the  real  intent  of  the  parties  to  the  instrument  will 
be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^  In  those  jurisdictions  where 
legal  and  equitable  remedies  are  blended,  it  should  seem  that  this 
should  be  regarded  merely  as  a  rule  of  evidence^  and  not  as  a 
rule  of  procedure  depending  upon  the  form  of  the  action.^  Ac- 
cordingly, w^e  find  that  it  has  been  held,  in  an  action  brought  to 
recover  the  possession  of  a  slave,  which  the  defendant  held  under 
an  instrment  of  writing  purporting  to  be  an  absolute  bill  of  sale, 
that  the  plaintiff  might  show  that  the  instrument  was  a  morto^ao-e 
merely,  and  that  this  question  might  be  submitted  to  the  jury. 
The  court  said:  "  This  question  was  to  be  decided  by  the  jury, 
upon  the  evidence,  independently  of  the  form  of  the  instrument, 
or  the  phase  sought  to  be  put  upon  the  transaction,  by  represen- 
tations and  admissions  of  the  parties."  ^  In  determining  whether 
a  bill  of  sale,  given  in  consideration  of  a  pre-existing  debt,  is  a 
mortgage,  the  question  to  be  settled  is  whether  the  intention  of 
the  parties  was  to  cancel  the  pre-existing  debt,  or  to  secure  its 
payment;  and  this  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury  in  all  cases, 
depending  upon  the  negotiations  had  at  the  time  and  the  subse- 
quent acts  of  the  parties.^  In  Pennsylvania  a  mortgage,  though 
in  the  form  of  a  conveyance  of  title,  is  in  reality  not  only  in 
equity  but  also  at  law,  only  a  security  for  the  payment  of  money 
or  for  the  performance  of  other  collateral  contract.     It  is  none 


1  Parish  v.  Gates,  29  Ala.  254,  2G1;  Cook  v.  Fire  Ids.  Co.,  fi7  Cal.  369,  371; 
Englisli  V.  Laue,  1  Porter  (Ala.),  328;  Wilson  v.  Shoenberger,  31  Pa.  St.  295; 
Keunedy  v.  Kennedy,  2  Ala.  571,  589;  McCoy  v.  Lassiter,  95  N.  C.  88;  Wood 
Eilaud  V.  Kadford,  7  Ala.  724;  Bishop  v.  Matthews,  73  Mo,  477,  481. 

V.   Bishop,     13   Ala.   475;    Sledge    v.  ^  Quick,  u.  Turner,  20  Mo.  App.  29; 

Clopton,   6    Ala.   589;    Turuipseed  v.  Bassett  y.   Glover,  No.  3895,  St.  Louis 

Cuuuingham,    16   Ala.    501;  Locke  v.  Ct.  of  App. 

Palmer,  26  Ala   312;  Brantley  w.  West,  *  Horuew.  Puckett,  12  Tex.  201,  205. 

27  Ala.  542;  West  v.  Hendrix,  28  Ala.  See  also  Simpson  t'.  McKay,  12  Ired.  L. 

226;  McCarron  v.    Cassiday,    18   Ark.  (N.    C.)   144;   Stamper   ??.  Johnson,    3 

34,  49;  Johnson  v.  Clark,  5  Ark.  321;  Tex.  1;    Luckettw.  Townsend,  3  Tex. 

Scott  ?7.  Henry,  13  Ark.    119;   Bishop  119;  Stephens  w.  Sherrod,  6  Tex.  294. 

V.  Williams,  18  111.  101.  s  Cook  v.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  67  Cal.  369, 

2  Bemis    v.    Phelps,    41    Vt.    1,  4;  371. 


870  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

the  less  so,  because  the  defeasance,  instead  of  appearing  in  the 
original  deed,  is  contained  in  a  contemporaneous  or  subsequently 
executed  instrument.  If  an  absolute  deed,  if  other  instruments 
operating  as  a  defeasance  be  simultaneously  executed,  it  is  a  con- 
clusion of  law  that  they  constitute  together  a. mortgage,  and  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  court  to  declare  that  such  is  their  legal  effect. 
But  if  the  alleged  defeasance  be  executed  subsequently,  it  is  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  where  the  action  is  an  action  at 
law,  whether  the  transaction  was  intended  as  a  sale  or  merely  as 
a  security  for  money  loaned.^ 

§  1125.  Penalty  or  Liquidated  Damages. — The  Supreme 
Court  of  Pennsylvania,  after  reviewing  several  decisions,^  con- 
cluded that  the  question  whether  the  amount  stated  in  a  conditional 
bond  or  contract  is  to  be  taken  as  a  penalty,  or  as  a  liquidation 
of  damao;es  arisino;  from  a  breach  of  the  condition,  is  to  be 
determined  by  the  intention  of  the  parties,  drawn  from  the 
words  of  the  whole  contract,  examined  in  the  light  of  its  subject- 
matter  and  its  surroundings;  and  that,  in  this  examination,  the 
court  must  consider  the  relation  which  the  sum  stipulated  bears 
to  the  extent  of  the  injury  wdiich  may  be  caused  by  the  several 
breaches  provided  against,  the  ease  or  difficulty  of  measuring  a 
breach  in  damages,  and  such  other  matters  as  are  legally  or  nec- 
essarily inherent  in  the  transaction.  The  concurrent  declara- 
tions of  the  parties  are  inadmissible,  except  to  show  mistake  or 
fraud.  Evidence,  outside  the  contract,  may  in  some  cases  be 
required  to  explain  the  subject-matter  and  exhibit  the  surround- 
ino*s,  and,  in  the  investiijation  of  the  transaction  in  its  various 
phases,  the  testimony  of   witnesses  may  be  admitted  for    other 

1  Wilson  V.  Shoenberger,  31  Pa.  St.  weeks  later.    See  also  Jaquesv.  Weeks» 

295.     lu  Reitenbaugh  r.  Liulwick,  31  7  Watts  (Pa.),  2G1 ;  Kerru.  Gilmore.  0 

Pa.  St.  131,  tfie   question  whether  a  Watts  (Pa.), 405;  Raukiuw.  Mortimere, 

conveyance,  absolute  on  its  face,  was  7  Watts  (Pa.),  372. 

intended  as  a  deed  of   sale  or  as   a  ^  Tayloe    v.  Sandiford,   7     Wheat 

security  for  money,  was  submitted  to  (U.S.)     13;    Robeson  v.    Whitesides, 

the  jury  as  a  question  of  fact,  because  IG  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  320;  Bun  v.  Todd, 

the  defeasance  was  not  executed   at  41Pa.  St.  212;  Streeper  v.   Wii'.iams, 

the  same  time  with  the  deed,  but  a  few  48  Pa.  St.  450:  Shreve  v.  Brereton.  51 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]      EXPRESS   CONTRACTS.  871 

purposes,  affecting  the  enquiries  already  stated.  The  truth  of 
the  facts  thus  shown  is  for  the  jury,  but  their  legal  effect  is  for 
the  court. ^ 

§  1126.  Gratification  of  a  Contract. —While  the  meanino- 
of  a  written  contract  is  thus  to  be  determined  by  the  court,  whal 
IS  sometimes  termed  its  gratification,  is  matter  for  the  jury. 
This,  as  hereafter  seen,^  i,  most  frequently  illustrated  in  apply- 
ing a  deed  of  conveyance  to  the  land  itself.  Whether  a  o-iven 
monument  was  intended  by  the  deed,  is,  for  instance,  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury.  It  is  further  illustrated  in  controversies  in 
respect  of  tl^^identity  of  things  which  are  the  subjects  of  written 
contracts,  where,  upon  ascertained  facts,  the  question  may 
become  one  of  interpretation,  and  hence  for  the  court.  Thus  it 
has  been  laid  down  that,  whether  certain  property,  appurtenant 
to  the  engine  and  machinery  of  a  mill,  passed  to  a  mortgagee  as 
after-acquired  property  under  the  terms  of  the  mortgage^v.-^.^  a 
question  of  law  for  the  court  on  the  facts  proved.^  Extendino- 
the  same  idea,  where  a  contract  was  accepted  conditionally,  to  be 
paid  upon  the  happening  of  a  contingency,  whether  the  contin- 
gency had  happened  was  deemed  a  question  for  the  court.* 

§  1127.  Whether  there  has  been  a  Novation.  —Closely  allied 
to  the  proposition  that  the  existence  of  a  contract  is  a  question  of 
fact  for  the  jury,  is  another  proposition,  which  is,  that  whether 
there  has  been,  by  the  act  of  the  parties  to  a  contract,  a  release 
of  the  obligor  therein  and  an  assumption  by  a  third  person  of  the 
obligation  of  performing  it,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jurv,  under 
proper  instructions.^  -The  existence  of  such  agreement,  like 
any  other  fact  of  kindred  import,  may  not  be  susceptible  of 
direct  proof,  but  it  is  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  from  all  the 
facts  and  circumstances  in  evidence."  " 

Pa.  St.  175;  Bagley  v.  Peddie,  5  Sandf.  2  p^^^^  §  ud    et  seq 

LwsWPr-^Mf '   """"'   "    ""'"'  '  '  "'""'""'^  '■  ''"''^y'^-^^^  66  Mo.  672. 

1  M       u         .,?•,  '  ^^^S^*^  '-■  I^o™"-'  8  Cal.  353,  358. 

335   Ml         '■  ^"'^°''-^^'  ^^^  ^*-    St.  ^  Brown  v.  Kirk,  20  Mo.  App.  524. 

"  '       ■  *  ^^'t^-  529,  opinion  by  Pliilips,  P.  J. 


872  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY,      [I  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  1128.  Delivery  of  a  Deed.  —  A  deed  is  not  operative  until 
it  is  delivered.  When,  therefore,  a  deed  is  offered  as  evidence  of 
a  contract,  the  question  whether  or  not  the  contract  exists  will 
depend  upon  the  fact  whether  the  deed  has  been  delivered.  This, 
where  all  the  facts  arc  undisputed,  has  been  he]d  a  question  of  law 
for  the  court. 1  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  ruled  that  whether, 
upon  a  given  state  of  facts,  it  was  the  intentioyi  of  a  party  who 
had  executed  a  deed  to  deliver  the  deed,  is  a  question  of  fact  for 
a  jury.^  On  the  same  subject  another  court  has  said  :  "  The  de- 
livery of  a  deed  is  a  question  of  fact.  The  law  has  prescribed 
no  particular  form  in  which  it  shall  be  made.  "When  the  question 
rests  upon  the  attendant  circumstances  and  the  intention  of  the 
parties,  the  facts  of  their  existence  and  their  effect  are  peculiarly 
within  the  province  of  the  jury.  It  is  error,  then,  for  a  judge 
to  tell  the  jury  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  delivery,  when  any  cir- 
cumstances are  proved  from  which  it  may  be  inferred,  no  matter 
how  slight  or  inconclusive  they  may  be.  The  party  relying  upon 
them  has  a  right  to  have  them  submitted  to  the  jury  for  their 
consideration."  ^  A  third  view  is. that,  what  constitutes  the  de- 
livery of  a  deed  is  a  mixed  question  ofJaiu  and  fact. ^  In  another 
court  this  view  has  been  elaborated  thus  :  "  What  constitutes  a 
delivery  of  a  deed  is  often  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact.  An 
arbitrary  rule  ought  not  to  be  laid  down.  Each  case  must  stand 
more  or  less  on  its  peculiar  facts.  The  intent  to  convey  is  evi- 
denced by  the  act  of  making  out  and  didy  executing  and  ac- 
knowledging a  deed.  The  delivery  may  be  evidenced  by  any  act 
of  the  grantor,  by  which  the  control  or  dominion  or  use  of  the 
deed  is  made  available  to  the  grantee.  It  is  not  necessary  it 
should  be  handed  over  actually  to  the  grantee,  or  to  any  other 
person  for  him.  It  may  be  delivered  under  certain  circum- 
stances, though  it  remain  in  the  possession  of  the  maker.  Where, 
however,  there  is  not  an  actual  transfer  from  the  grantor  to  the 
grantee,  it  should  affirmatively  appear  from  the  circumstances, 

i  Rogers  v.  Carey,  47  Mo.  232.  3  pioyd  v.   Taylor,  12  Ircd.  L.  (N. 

2  Grain  v.  Wright,  3G  Hun  (N.  Y  ),      C.)  47,  opinion  by  Nash,  J. 
74,  77.  .        ■*  Jackson  v.  Thipps,  12  Johns.  (N. 

Y.)  418,421. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  873 

acts  or  words  of  the  parties,  that  the  intention  to  pass  a  title  really 
existed."^  In  a  case  in  New  York,  Spencer,  J.,  used  the  fol- 
lowing striking  language:  "It  is  requisite  in  every  well  made 
deed  that  there  be  a  delivery  of  it.  This  delivery  must  be  either 
actual,  by  doing  something  and  saying  nothing,  or  else  verbal,  by 
saying  something  and  doing  nothing  ;  or  it  may  be  both.  But  by 
one  or  both  of  these  it  must  be  made;  for  otherwise,  though  it 
be  never  so  well  sealed  and  written,  ^'■et  is  the  deed  of  no  force."  ^ 
In  another  case,  the  only  infallible  test  was  said  to  be,  has  the 
orrantor  divested  himself  of  all  dominion  and  control  over  the 
conveyance  ?  ^  But  it  is  obvious  that  this  is  not  the  only  infalli- 
ble test ;  for  in  many  cases  where  there  is  plain  evidence  of  an 
intent  that  the  deed  shall  become  presently  operative,  although 
remaining  in  the  custody  of  the  grantor,  a  delivery  may  be  found 
to  have  taken  place.  Thus,  it  has  been  ruled,  "  that,  when  a  deed 
to  a  minor  child  is  absolute  in  form  and  beneficial  in  effect,  and 
the  father  (and  grantor)  voluntarily  causes  the  same  to  be  re- 
corded, acceptance  by  the  grantee  will  be  presumed,  and  such 
facts  constitute,  prima  facie,  a  delivery,  and  afford  reasonable 
presumption  that  the  grantor  intended  to  part  with  the  title,  and 
clear  proof  should  be  made  that  a  person  who,  under  such 
circumstances,  has  executed  and  acknowledged  and  caused  a  deed 
to  be  recorded,  before  the  court  would  be  warranted  in  declaring 
that  he  did  not  intend  to  part  with  his  title."  *  Another  court 
has  held  that  the  act  of  taking  the  deed  to  the  recorder  of  deeds, 
for  the  purpose  of  having  it  recorded,  may,  under  circumstances, 
be  a  sufficient  delivery,  although  the  deed  be  not  in  fact  recorded.^ 
Another  court  has  stated  what  seems  to  be  the  better  rule  under 
this  head,  that,  while  the  recording  oi  a  deed  is  not  in  itself  a  de- 

'  Burke  v.  Adams,  80  Mo.  504,  512.  »  fi^ey  v.  Huey,  G5  Mo.  089,  694. 

2  Jackson  v.  Phipps,  12  Johns.  (N.  *  Tobin  v.  Bass,  85  Mo.  654,  658. 

Y.)  418,  421.     This  language  has  been  The  cases    cited   in  support  of  this 

four  times  quoted  with  approval  by  the  dic'um  were:  Cecil  v.  Beaver,   28  la. 

Supreme  Court  of  Missouri.     Huey  u.  242;  Robinson  v.   Gould,   26   la.    89; 

Huey,  65  Mo.  689,  693;  Turner  v.  Car-  Masterson  v.   Cheek,   23  111.   72;  aud 

peuter,  83  Mo.  333,  336;  Miller  w.  Lull-  Mitchell  v.  Ryan,  3  Oh.   St.  377. 
man.  81  Mo.  311,  316;  Burke  v.  Adams,  ^  Burt  v.  Cassety,  12  Ala.  734. 

80  Mo.  504,  512. 


^74  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

livery  of  the  deed,  yet  it  is  evidence  from  which  a  delivery  may 
be  found,  and  is  therefore  an  assurance  by  the  grantor  of  the  title  in 
the  grantee .  ^  From  the  foregoing,  it  would  appear  that  the  delivery 
of  a  deed  may  be  established  by  circumstances,  as  well  as  by  direct 
proof,  and  that,  when  it  is  sought  to  be  proved  by  circumstantial 
evidence,  the  court  should  submit  the  circumstances,  with  proper 
instructions,  to  the  jury  for  their  finding  upon  the  question. ^ 

§  1129.  Acceptance  of  tlie  Deed  by  the  Grantee. — In  the 

case  of  a  deed  poll,  conveying  land  to  a  grantee  for  a  considera- 
tion recited  to  have  been  paid,  an  acceptance  by  the  grantee  will 
generally  be  presinned,  since  an  acceptance  is  manifestly  for  the 
interest  of  the  grantee.  But  there  are  cases  where  the  question 
has  been  submitted  to  juries.  Thus,  it  has  been  held,  under 
circumstances,  that  the  facts  should  have  gone  to  the  jury,  for 
them  to  say  whether  the  grantee  had  knowledge  of  a  deed  of 
bargain  and  sale  made  to  him,  and  whether  he  gave  his  assent 
thereto,  directly  or  otherwise;  and  that  the  court  did  not  err  in 
refusing  to  rule  that  the  deed  had  never  been  delivered,  nor  in 
instructing  the  jury,  at  the  instance  of  the  plaintiff,  that,  assum- 
ing the  facts  which  the  evidence  tended  to  prove,  there  was  no 
delivery  of  the  deed.^  In  another  case  it  has  been  ruled  that, 
whether  a  deed  of  conveyance  of  real  estate  has  been  accepted 
by  he  grantee,  so  as  to  pass  the  title  and  oblige  him  to  seek  his 
remedy,  if  any  he  has,  for  a  failure  of  title,  on  the  covenants  in 
the  deed,  or  go  without  any,  if  those  covenants  were  without 
authority  and  void,  —  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  to  be 
settled  by  the  jury,  under  the  advice  of  the  court.* 

§  1130.  Date  of  the  Delivery  of  a  Deed  or  of  the  taking 
Effect  of  a  Contract.  —  In  the  absence  of  any  evidence  as  to  the 
date  of  the  delivery  of  a  deed,  the  pi^esumptioii  is  that  it  was 

i  Blight  V.  Scheuck,  10  Pa.  St.  289.  2  Vau   Hook    v.    Walton,  28    Tex. 

Compare   Miller  v.  LuUinau,    81   Mo.  5i). 

311;  atlirming  s.  c.  11  Mo.  App.  41'.);  ^  Bensley  v.  Atwill,    12    Cal.    231, 

(^Tregory  v.    Walker,    38  Ala.   2G,   33;  23G. 

McLurei;.  Colclough,  17  Ala.  96;  Mor-  ■»  Earle  v.  Earle,  20  N.  J.  Law    348, 

ris  '  .  ^'avuer,  32  Ala.  4'J'J.  3G3. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  875 

executed  and  delivered  at  the  time  when  it  bears  date.^  This  prin- 
ciple is  held  to  apply,  both  in  respect  of  the  question  of  the  date 
of  the  execution,  and  the  date  of  the  delivery  of  the  deed.^  But 
this  is  not  a  conclusive  presumption.  It  is  what  Mr.  Best  calls 
2i  prima  facie  presumption,  and  it  has  been  said  that,  even  w^here 
the  evidence  is  free  from  doubt  in  the  mind  of  the  court,  the 
question  of  the  date  at  which  a  deed  was  delivered  is  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury.^  But  where  the  indorsement  on  a  deed  was 
all  the  evidence  offered  as  to  the  time  when  it  had  been  admitted 
to  record,  it  was  said  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  refusinof 
to  submit  that  question  to  the  jury;  though,  if  countervailing 
proof  had  been  offered,  the  jury  would  have  been  the  proper 
tribunal  for  its  determination.*  But  this  presumption  does  not 
hold  in  relation  to  deeds  in  fee,  unattested  and  unacknowledg-ed.^ 
Whether  such  a  deed  was  actually  executed  and  delivered  at  the 
time  it  bears  date,  or  not,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury, 
which  must  ahvays  be  submitted  to  them  where  the  evidence  is 
conflicting."  The  question  which  of  two  instruments  was  first 
executed,  they  not  referring  to  each  other,  and  one  of  them  being 
undated,  is  a  question  of  fact.^ 

§  1131.  Whether  delivered  as  an  Escrow.  —  A  deed  or 
other  written  obligation  is  said  to  be  delivered  as  an  escrow, 
when  it  is  delivered  to  a  third  person,  upon  condition  that  it  shall 
not  take  effect  until  a  future  date,  or  the  happening  of  a  future 
event.  Whether  a  deed  was  so  delivered,  must  generally  be  a 
question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^     Thus,  where  a  contract  in  duplicate 

'  Best  ou  Presuraptious,  181.  ^  Genter  v.  Morrisou,  supra. 

2  Smith  V.  Batteus,  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  '  Coons  v.  Chambers,  1  Abb.  App. 
341 ;  Stoue  v.  Grubbam,  1  Kolle  Rep.      Dec.  (N.  Y.)  439. 

3,  pi.  5;  Ofley  v.  Hicks,  Cro.  Jac.  2G3;  ^  VVliere,  upon  the  trial  of  a  cause, 

Barry  v.  Hoffman,  G  Md.  79,  80.  it    is   doubtful,  upon    the    evidence, 

3  Barry  v.  Hoffman,  supra.  whether  a    written    contract   for  tlie 

4  Budd  V.  Brooive,  3  Gill  (Md.),198,  sale  of  goods  signed  by  the  vendor, 
221.  See  also  Trasher  v.  Everhart,  3  and  delivered  to  tlie  purchaser,  was 
Gill  &  J=  (Md.)  234.  delivered  absolutely  or  conditionally, 

5  Elsey  V.  Metcalf,  1  Deuio  (N.  Y.),  the  question  must  be  submitted  to  the 
323:  Genter  v-  Morrison,  31  Barb.  jury.  Scott?;.  Peutz,  5  Sandf.  S.  C. 
(N.  Y.)  155.  (N.  Y.)  572. 


876  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOmil.   Tl'.,. 

was  left  by  the  parties  with  a  third  person,  and  the  evidence  as 
to  the  arrangements  for  its  subsequent  delivery  and  the  terms 
upon  which  it  was  to  become  operative  was  conflicting,  —  it 
was  held  that  the  question  of  the  terms  and  conditions  upon 
which  it  was  to  become  operative  was  one  of  fact  for  a  jury, 
depending  upon  the  intention  of  the  parties,  to  be  gathered  from 
the  luhole  transaction,  and  that  the  court  was  right  in  refusing 
to  instruct  the  jury  that  delivery  in  a  particular  mode  was  essen- 
tial.^ A  party  who  purports  to  be  bound  by  a  written  instru- 
ment, —  as  for  instance,  a  .promissory  note,  may  show  by  parol 
that  it  w^as  delivered  as  an  escroiv,  or  that  it  was  delivered  to  be 
held  upon  a  condition  to  be  performed  before  the  rights  of  the 
holder  could  attach.^  But  upon  this  subject  it  has  been  said: 
"  A  deed  can  only  be  delivered  as  an  escrow  to  a  third  person. 
If  it  be  intended  that  it  shall  not  take  effect  until  some  subsequent 
condition  shall  be  performed,  or  some  subsequent  event  shall  hap- 
pen, such  condition  must  be  inserted  in  the  deed  itself,  or  else  it 
must  not  be  delivered  to  the  o;rantee.  Whether  a  deed  has  been 
delivered  or  not,  is  a  question  of  fact,  upon  which,  from  the 
very  nature  of  the  case,  parol  evidence  is  admissible.  But 
whether  a  deed  when  delivered,  shall  take  effect  absolutely,  or 
only  upon  the  performance  of  some  condition  not  expressed 
therein,  cannot  be  determined  by  parol  evidence.  To  allow  a 
deed,  absolute  on  its  face,  to  be  avoided  by  such  evidence,  would 
be  a  dangerous  violation  of  a  cardinal  rule  of  evidence."  ^ 

§1132.  Existence  of  a  Partnership. — It  is  frequently  said 
that  the  question  whether  a  partnership  exists  is  a  question  of 
fact.*     But  this  is  an  example  of  the   inconsiderate  manner  in 


1  Jaquith  v.  Hudson,  5  Mich.  123.  v.  C'atliu,  2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  248,  per 
-  Kicketts  v.  Pendleton,  UMd.  321,  Phitt,  J.,  arguendo. 
329;  Bell  v.  In<?estre,  fi-t  Eng.  C.  L.  *  McDonald?;.  Matucy,  82  ]\Io.  358, 
317;  s.  c.  12  Ad.  &  El.  (x.  s.)  317.  .3(13;  McMullan  v.  MacKenzie,  2  G. 
3  Lawton  v.  Sager,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  Greene  (la.),  3<i8;  Doggett  v.  Jordan, 
349,  351,  opinion  by  Karris,  J.;  citing  2  Fla.  541,  549.  Accordingly,  it  -was 
Gilbert  v.  North  American  Fire  Ins.  ruled  that  a  finding  by  a  judge,  sitting 
Co.,  23  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  43;  Ward  v.  as  a  jury,  that  there -^vas  no  partner- 
Lewis,  4  Pick.  (Mass.)  518;   Jackson  ship  between  the  plaintiff  and  the  de- 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]       EXPKESS    CONTRACTS.  877 

which  legal  propositions  are  frequently  stated  by  the  courts 
^\hat  constitutes  a  partnership,  that  is,  what  amounts  to  a  part- 
nership m  contemplation  of  law,  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court  • ' 
whether  a  partnership  exists  in  a  particular  case,  will  be  a  ques- 
tion for  the  decision  of  the  judge  or  of  the  jury,  accordingly  as  the 
facts  are  established  or  in  dispute.  If  they  are  established,  the 
judge  will  declare  their  legal  effect  and  will  determine  whether 
or  not  they  show  the  existence  of  a  partnership ;  if  uot,  the  con- 
clusion will  be  for  the  jury,  under  the  instructions  of  the  court 
Therefore,  where  an  issue  is  raised  as  to  whether  a  partnership 
exists,  and  the  evidence  is  conflicting,  or  the  inferences  to  be 
drawn  from  the  facts  in  evidence  are  not  clear,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  judge  to  explain  to  the  jury  what  will  constitute  a  partner- 
ship, and  leave  it  to  them  to  say  whether  the  testimony  adduced 
is  sufficient  to  establish  the  facts  necessary  to  the  existence  of  a 
partnershijD.^ 

§  1133.  Instructions  on  which  this  Question  has  been  submitted 
TO  Juries.  —  "  If  the  jury  find  that  the  defendants  were  jointly  inter- 
ested in  the  business,  in  which  the  work  and  labor  charged  in  the  com- 
plaint were  performed,  sharing  the  profits  and  losses  between  them,  that 
constitutes  the  defendants  copartners,  and  renders  them  liable  as  such 
for  habilities  incurred  on  account  of  such  business."  3 ^^  consti- 
tute a  partnership  there  must  be  an  agreement  between  the  parties,  both 
consenting  thereto,  that  they  will,  from  a  certain  day  or  time,  share  the 
profits  and  be  responsible  for  debts  and  losses  and  carry  on  the  busi- 
ness for  their  mutual  benefit;  and  there  must  be  an  entering  upon  or 
conducting  or  doing  business  under  such  agreement,  or  some  business 
preparatory  thereto,  to  make  them  or  either  of  them  liable  to   third 

parties  as  partners.* "If  the  defendants,  Cole  and  Damson,  on 

or  about  the  middle  of  October,  1860,  and  before  the  date  of  the  note 
sued  on,  entered  into  an  agreement  to  seU  goods  in  copartnership  at 
Indian  Point,  and  after  said  agreement  was  made,  the  defendant.  Cole, 

fendauts,  was  uot  a  conclusion  of  law,  ^  Dulany  v.    Elford,   22  S.  C    304 

bat  of  fact.    Kahn  v.  Ceutral  Smelting  308.                                               "      '         ' 

Co.,  2  Utah,  371 ;  Bormau,  J.,  dissent-  ^  Approved  in  AVarner  r.  Mvrick    16 

i^S-  Minu.  9i. 

1  Cumpston   v.    McNair,    1    Wend.  4  Approved  in    Lucas   v.   Cole     57 

(N.  Y.)  457,  4G3.  Mo.  145. 


878  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thoiiip.  Tr., 

represented  to  plaintiffs  tliat  tliey  were  in  copartnership,  and  bought 
goods  and  gave  a  note  in  the  joint  names  of  both  defendants,  the  court 
will  find  the  issue  for  the  plaintiffs,  even  though  the  court  may  believe 
from  the  evidence,  that  no  invoice  was  taken,  and  that  thie  said  co- 
partnership was  dissolved  soon    after   tlic  27th   October,  i860  J 

"  If  the  jury  find  that  the  defendants  had  any  arrangement  for  ship- 
ping cattle  from  Stoutsville,  by  which  it  was  agreed  that  either  of  them 
might  buy  the  stock  on  his  own  responsibility,  and,  upon  its  delivery 
for  shipment  at  said  place,  the  others  might  take  an  interest  in  any 
stock  so  purchased  and  delivered,  if,  upon  examination  of  it,  they 
thought  it  suitable  to  ship,  or  not  purchased  too  high ;  or  by  which,  if 
they  purchased  stock  when  all  together,  it  was  to  be  shipped  on  joint 
account;  or  if,  after  looking  at  or  agreeing  to  take  an  interest  in  stock 
purchased  by  any  one  of  them  before  delivered  at  said  place,  it  was  to 
be  shipped  on  joint  account,  and  the  parties  to  share  in  the  profits  and 
losses,  such  facts  or  agreements  did  not  constitute  them  general  part- 
ners, but  only  partners  in  each  transaction.- 

§  llSl.  Genuineness  of  Signature.  —  The  genuineness  of  a 
signature,  when  disputed,  is,  of  course,  a  question  of  fact  for  a 
iury.=* 

§  1135.  How  Proved.  — A  signature  may  be  proved  by  the  evidence 
of  a  witness  who  has  seen  the.  person  write.  "  It  is  held  suflficientfor 
this  purpose  that  the  witness  has  seen  him  write  but  once,  and  then 
only  his  name.  The  proof  in  such  case  must  be  very  light,  but  the 
jury  will  be  permitted  to  weigh  it."^  Such  evidence  will  take  the 
question  to  the  jury.^  So,  a  witness  who  has  seen  a  party  make  his 
signature  by  a  mark  on  several  occasions,  has  been  held  competent  to 
testify  as  to  the  genuineness  of  his  signature.*^     Where,  however,  the 

1  Ibid.  4  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  577. 

2  Approved  in  Valentine  v.  Hickle,  ^  Garrells  v.  Alexander,  4  Esp.  37; 
39  Ohio  St.  23,  24;  citing  Bank  v.  Magee  v.  Osborn,  32  N.  Y.  6G9,  682; 
Sawyer,  38  Ohio  St.  339;  Peterson  Eagleton  u.  Kingston,  8  Ves.  464,  473; 
V.  Roach,  32  Ohio  St.  374;  Bevan  v.  Powell  v.  Ford,  2  Stark.  164;  Lewis  v. 
Lewis,  3  Eng.  Ch.  377;  Harvey  v.  Sapio,  1  Mood.  &  Malk.  39;  Com.  v. 
Childs,  28  Ohio  St.  319;  Saville  Levy,  2  Wheel.  Cr.  Ca.  246;  Utica  Ins. 
V.  Robertson,  4  T.  R.  720;  McGar  v.  Co.  v.  Badger,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  102; 
Drake,  5  Reptr.  347  (Teuu.)  ;  Wall  v.  Mudd  v.  Snckermore,  5  Ad.  &  El.  730. 
Eife,  37  Pa.  St.  394.                                           6  George  v.  Surrey,  1  Mood.  &  Malk. 

3  Magee  v.  Osborn,  32  N.  Y.  669.  516. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  879 

knowledge  of  the  handwriting  has  been  obtained  by  the  witness  from 
seeing  the  party  write  his  name, /or  that  purpose,  after  the  commence- 
ment of  the  suit,  the  evidence  has  been  held  inadmissible.^  In  an  ac- 
tion on  a  promissory  note,  the  defendant  having  denied  the  genuine- 
ness of  his  signature,  called  his  son  as  a  witness,  who  testified  that  cer- 
tain words  in  another  note,  which  his  father  had  actually  given,  were 
written  by  the  witness  himself.  On  cross-examination,  the  witness  was 
required  to  tvrite  the  same  words  in  the  presence  of  the  jury,  for  their  in- 
spection and  comparison  with  the  note  in  controversy.  It  was  held  that 
this  was  competent  evidence  and  proper  on  cross-examination.-^  In  re- 
spect of  the  proof  of  handwriting  by  comparison,  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Missouri  have  adopted  the  rule  stated  by  Prof.  Greenleaf,  which  is 
this :  That  the  general  rule  is  that  handwriting  cannot  be  proved  by  a 
comparison  of  the  disputed  signature  with  signatures  admitted  to  be 
genuine;  but  that  this  rule  has  been  relaxed  in  two  cases:  1.  When 
the  writings  are  of  such  antiquity  that  living  witnesses  cannot  be  had, 
and  yet  are  not  so  old  as  to  prove  themselves.  2.  When  other  writings, 
admitted  to  he  genuine,  are  already  in  the  case.  Here,  the  comparison 
may  be  made  by  the  jury,  with  or  without  the  aid  of  experts.^  The  rea- 
son assigned  for  the  second  exception  to  the  rule  is  that,  as  the  jury 
are  entitled  to  look  at  the  writings  for  one  purpose,  it  is  better  to  per- 
mit them,  under  the  advice  and  direction  of  the  court,  to  examine  them 
for  all  purposes,  than  to  embarrass  them  with  impracticable  distinctions 
to  the  peril  of  the  cause*  In  Rose  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,^  the  rule  was  re- 
examined, and  held  to  apply  in  the  case  of  the  cross-examination  of  a 
witness,  as  in  the  case  of  his  direct  examination  ;  and  accordingly  it  was 
held  error  to  introduce  certain  fictitious  signatures  on  the  cross-examina- 
tion of  an  expert  witness,  for  the  purpose  of  testing  his  knowledge  as  to 
the  handwriting  of  the  plaintiff.  According  to  Wagner,  J.:  "The 
strongest  and  best  reason  in  support  of  the  rule  for  rejecting  evidence 
founded  on  comparison  of  handwritings  in  ordinary  cases,  is  that  the 
writings,  intended  as  specimens  to  be  compared  with  the  disputed  paper, 
would  be  brought  together  by  a  party  to  the  suit,  who  is  interested  to  select 

1  Stranger    v.    Searle,    1    Esp.   14.  -  Huff   v.  Nims,  11   Neb.  304;  ante, 

Compare  Muckl  v-  ^uckermore,  1  Nev.  §  620. 

&   P.  32,  56;  s.  c   o  Ad.  &  El.  703;  Tit-  ^  state  u.  Clinton,  67  Mo.  380,  383; 

ford  V.  Knott,  2  Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  State  v.  Scott,  45  Mo.  302,  305. 
211;  Com.  v.  Hammond,  2   Maine,  33;  ^  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  sec.  578;   State  v, 

Cuuniugham  v.  Hudson  Eiver  Bank,  Scott,  supra. 
21    Wend.     (N.  Y.)  557:  Williams   v.  5  91  Mo.  399. 

Davis,  1  Penu.  (N.  ,T.)   177;    Handy  t\ 
State,  7  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  42. 


880  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    A*ND   JURY.        [1  Thouip.  Tl'., 

such  writings  only  as  may  best  subserve  his  purpose  ;  and  that  tliey  are 
not  likely,  therefore,  to  exhibit  a  fair  specimen  of  the  general  character 
of  handwriting. "  1  Another  reason  is  that,  to  permit  the  introduction 
of  such  papers,  would  embarrass  the  case  by  the  trial  of  an  indefinite 
number  of  collateral  issues.- 

§  1136.  Consideration  of  a  Contract. —  It  is  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  say  that,  where  the  want  of  consideration  of  a  promissory 
note,  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  actions,  is  pleaded,  or  where, 
under  the  practice  in  some  jurisdictions,  notice  is  given  that  proof 
of  consideration  will  be  required  at  the  trial,  and  there  is  con- 
flicting evidence  on  the  question,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the 
jury  to  determine  whether  a  consideration  has  been  satisfactorily 
proved.^ 

§  1137.  Whether  a  Forbearance  was  the  Acceptance  of  a 
Promise  to  Pay  the  Debt  of  another.  —  It  has  been  held  that  a 
promise  to  pay  the  debt  of  another  cannot  be  rendered  binding 
by  proof  that  it  was  in  consideration  of  forbearance,  unless  there 
be  something  to  show,  not  only  that  it  was  made  for  the  purpose 
of  obtaining  time,  and  that  time  was  actually  given,  but  that  the 
indulgence  thus  accorded  was  in  pursuance  of  the  request  implied 
by  the  promise;  and  that  the  question  is  one  of  fact,  which  can 
not  be  found  affirmatively  in  the  absence  of  proof.*  By  parity 
of  reasoning,  it  is  held  that,  whether  actual  forbearance,  follow- 
ing a  promise  to  pay  interest  upon  interest  for  the  forbearance, 
is  evidence  of  an  acceptance  of  the  promise,  is  a  question  offact.^ 
Upon  this  subject,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Illinois  have  said:  "  If, 
under  all  the  circumstances  in  evidence  throwing  light  upon  the 
question,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  the  part}^  acted  upon  the  faith 
of,  and  pursuant  to  the  promise,  a  jury  would  be  justified  in 
finding  that  he  so  acted ;  otherwise  not.  But  it  is  a  mere  matter 
of  reasoning  about  human  affairs,  in  which  the  individual  knowl- 

1  State  V.  Scott,  s?<pra.  305;    Cobb  v.   Page,  17    Pa.    St.   469; 

2  State  V.  Scott,  swpra;  Rose  w.  First  Shupe  v.  Galbraith,  32  Pa.  St.  10; 
Nat.  Bank,  supra.  Yomig  v.  Hill,  G7  N.  Y.  KIT. 

3  Swain  v.  Ettling,  32  Pa.  St.  486.  ^  Edgertou  v.   Weaver,  105  111.  43, 

4  Edgerton  v.   Weaver,  105  111.  43,  47. 
46;    Snyder  v    Leibeugood,  4   Pa.  St. 


tit.   V,   Ch.  XXXV.]       EXPRESS    CONTRACTS.  ggl 

edge  and  experience  of  the  reasoner  as  to  the  motives  of  human 
action  become  a  factor.     It  is  finding  a  fact  from  circumstantial 
evKlence,  or,  as  is  said  by  some  writers  on  evidence,  a  principle 
fact  from  subordmate  evidentiary  facts.     If  the  question  were, 
whether  there  was  an  express  acceptance  by  words,  there  could 
be  no  difficulty  in  perceiving  the  question  to  be  purely  one  of 
fact ;  yet  the  only  difference  between  that  and  the  present  ques- 
tion IS  that  between  direct  and  circumstantial  evidence.     There 
the  proof  IS  direct,  and    it  is  only  to  determine  whether  it  shall 
be  believed;  here  it  is  indirect,  and  requires  reasoning  as  well  as 
perception  and  memory.     But  the  conclusion  is  all  the  time  one 
ot  tact,  —in  the  one  case,  from  evidence  directly  to  the  point- 
m  the  other  case,  from  evidence  more  remote,  but,  it  may  be' 
equally  convinciuo-."  1  -^       ' 

§  1138.   Whetlier  a  Written  Promise  was  founded  upon  an 
Illegal  Consideration. -The  rule  seems  to  be  that,  in  an  action 
upon  a  written  promise,  where  the  defense  is  that  it  was  aiven 
for  a  wagering  consiaeration,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court   if  the 
writmg  contains  evidence  of  its  invalidity  upon  its  face,' to  ex- 
elude  It  from  the  jury;  but  if  there  is  not  sufiicient  upon  its  face 
to  render  it  void,  extrinsic  evidence  should  be  admitted  to  show 
the  rea    nature  of  the  agreement  and  the  consideration  u,3on 
which  the  promise  was  executed  ;  and  it  should  be  left  to  the 
jury  to  determine  the  question  of  the  legality  of  the  considera- 
tion, under  an  instruction  that,  if  they  find  it  was  given  upon  a 
wager,  or  that  the  whole  or  any  part  of  the  consideration  was 
tor  money  or  property  laid  or  staked  upon  a  bet  or  waa-er   the 
promise  is  absolutely  void,  even   in  the  hands  of  an  innocent 
purchaser.^     Where  the  facts  speaking  upon  this  question  are  un- 
.disputed,  obviously  it  is  for  the  court  to  say  whether  the  instru- 
ment was  valid  or  not,  and  in  such  case  the  court  may  direct  the 
verdict;  3  but  obviously  where  the  facts  which  are  oifered  in 

^  Edgerton  v.  Weaver,  105  III.  43,  3  porter  ..  Haveus,  37  Barb.  (^  Y  ) 

47,  opinion  by  Scholfiekl,  J.  343.  -K-^-i..) 

2  Craig  V.  Andrews,  7  Iowa,  17,  22; 
Danforth  v.  Evans,  IG  Vt.  538. 


5G 


882  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thooip.  Tr., 

evidence  to  impeach  the  instrument  -are  disputed,  the  question 
must  go  to  the  jury,  upon  proper  instructions  as  to  the  conclusions 
of  law  upon  the  facts,  as  the  jury  may  find  them.  Thus,  it  has 
been  held,  in  a  case  where  the  evidence  was  conflicting  and 
doubtful  as  to  the  consideration  of  a  note  which  promised  to  pay 
$100.00,  with  10  per  cent,  interest,  "on  and  after  the  election  of 
James  Buchanan  to  the  presidency,"  — that  the  question  whether 
it  was  given  upon  a  wager,  or  whether  the  whole  or  any  part  of 
the  consideration  was  for  money  or  property  laid  or  staked  upon 
a  bet  or  wager,  should  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  with  the  in- 
struction that,  if  it  was  so  given,  it  was  absolutely  void,  and  no 
recovery  could  be  had  upon  it  against  the  maker,  even  in  the 
hands  of  an  innocent  purchaser.^ 

§  1139.  Whether  the  Contract  is  Real  or  Colorable  to  cover 
lip  a  Gambling  Transaction.  —  What  are  called  "  option  deals ^^' 
that  is,  contracts,  usually  made  upon  the  floor  of  merchants'  ex- 
changes, and  in  smaller  establishments  of  the  same  kind  called 
"bucket  shops,"  are,  it  is  well  known,  void  as  against  public 
policy,  where  no  delivery  of  the  article  ostensibly  contracted  for 
is  contemplated,  but  where  the  intention  of  both  parties  is  merely 
to  bet  upon  the  future  state  of  the  market,  and  to  settle,  or  to 
"  ring  out  the  deal"  (to  use  the  slang  of  this  species  of  gambling) 
by  the  payment  of  "  differences,"  — are  void  as  against  public 
policy.'^  These  contracts  are  generally  evidenced  by  a  written 
memorandum,  and  are  valid  in  form,  and  presumptively  so  in 
law.  It  is,  therefore,  held  that  the  burden  is  upon  the  party 
assailing  the  validity  of  such  a  contract,  to  show  that  actual 

1  Craig  V.  Andrews,  7  la.  17.  52  "Wis.  593;  Tenney  v.  Foot,  4  Bradw. 

2  ^Vatermau  v.  Bucklaud,  1  Mo.  (III.)  594;  s.  c.  affirmed,  95  111.  99; 
App.  45;  Kent  v.  Milteuberger,  13  Mo.  Hibblewhite  v.  McMorine,  5  Mees.  & 
App.  503;  Williams  v.  Tiedemann,  G  W.  462.  Many  of  the  foregoing  cases 
Mo.  App.  269;  Fareira  v.  Gabell,  89  hold  the  sales  under  consideration 
Pa.  St.  89;  Smith  v.  Bouvier,  70  Pa.  St.  valid;  and,  although  they  are  not  har- 
325;  Bruas's  Appeal,  55  Pa.  St.  294;  monious,  several  of  them  lay  down 
Lehman  v.  Strassbnrger,  2  Woods  clear  distinctions  between  valid  sales 
(U.  S.),  554;  Sawyer  v.  Taggart,  14  for  future  delivery  and  mere  wagering 
Bush  (Ky .) ,  729 ;  Barnard  v.  Backhaus,  contracts. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  883 

delivery  was  not  intended  h\  the  parties  to  it,  but  that  it  was  a 
mere  cloak  to  cover  up  a  gambling  transaction.  This  may,  of 
course,  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence;  and  whether  the  evidence 
adduced  is  sufficient  to  establish  the  fact  will,  in  many  cases,  be 
a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 

§  1140.  Whether  a  Market  was  '*  Manipulated  »♦  or  Ficti- 
tious. —  In  dealing  with  a  case  of  this  kind,  where  there  was  a 
by-law  of  the  exchange  regulating  sales  for  future  delivery  and 
providing  that  nothing  therein  should  be  construed  "  as  author- 
izing unjust  or  unreasonable  claims  based  upon  manipulated  or 
fictitious  markets,"  it  was  held  that  the  court  could  not  deter- 
mine, as  matter  of  law,  that  prices  produced  by  speculation  in 
articles  of  trade  were  unreal  or  fictitious  prices,  but  that  the 
question  as  to  whether  the  prices,  at  which  the  settlement  of 
such  a  contract  was  required  to  be  made  on  a  given  day,  were 
fictitious,  as  based  upon  a  manipulated  market,  or  were  the  true 
values  for  the  purpose  of  consumi^tion  or  manufacture,  —  was  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury ;  and  that  the  finding  of  the  jury  on 
this  question  would  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal,  where  there  was 
any  substantial  evidence  to  support  it.^ 

§  1141,  Performance  or  Waiver  of  Performance.  — Whether 
a  contract  has  been  performed^  or  its  performance  waived,  will 
be  in  most  cases  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.  The  court  in  in- 
structing the  jury  will  tell  them  whether  specific  acts  which  the 
evidence  tends  to  show  do  or  do  not  amount  to  a  performance  or 
a  waiver.^ 

§  1142.  Place  where  a  Contract  is  to  be  Performed.  — It  is 

said  to  be  a  principle  of  universal  law  that,  in  every  forum,  a 
contract  is  governed  bv  the  law  with  a  view  to  which  it  was 
made.^     It  is  well  settled  that  the  validity  of  a  contract  is  to  be 

1  Ream  v.  Hamilton,  15  ]\Io.  App.  '  Spauldiug  r.  HoUenbeck,  39  Barb. 
577.  (X.  Y.)  SO,  8-t;  x>f>^t,  §  12r)0,  et  scq. 

2  Kent  V.  Miltenberger,  15  Mo.  App.  ■*  Waymau  i'.  Southard,  10  Wheat. 
480,489,491.     The  question  is  reasoned  (U.S.)   1,  48,  per  Marshall,  C.  J. 

at  considerable  leuirth. 


884  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thoinp,  Tr., 

determined  by  the  law  of  the  place  of  performance.  Suppose, 
in  the  case  of  a  written  contract,  it  is  so  framed  that  the  place  of 
performance  is  left  in  doubt:  Shall  the  court  decide,  as  a  matter 
of  law,  Avhere  it  was  to  be  performed,  or  submit  the  question  to 
a  jury?  In  one  case  it  was  held  that  the  question,  being  one  of 
intent,  should  be  submitted  to  a  jury.  The  action  was  upon  a 
promissory  note  made  by  a  husband  and  wife,  who  resided  in 
Indiana,  to  a  payee,  who  resided  in  Ohio.  The  husband  being 
indebted  to  the  payde,  it  was  agreed  that  a  note  should  be  given 
for  the  amount  due,  signed  by  him  and  his  wife,  and  that  the  lat- 
ter should  charge  her  separate  e>-tate  with  its  payment.  The 
note  in  suit  was  accordingly  given,  and  a  clause  so  binding  the 
property  of  the  wife  was  inserted.  The  note  was  made  and  de- 
livered in  Indiana,  but  dated  in  Ohio,  and  the  place  of  payment 
was  left  in  blank.  By  the  laws  of  Indiana  such  a  note  was  not 
binding  on  the  wife,  but  by  the  laws  of  Ohio  it  was.  It  was 
held  that  the  plaintiff  was  entitled  to  have  the  question  submitted 
to  the  jury,  as  to  the  place  where  the  parties  intended  that  the 
contract  should  be  performed,  and  whether  they  contracted  with 
reference  to  the  law  of  Indiana,  or  the  law  of  Oliio.^ 

§  1143.  Whether  or  not  a  Contract  is  Usurious.  — Whether 
or  not  a  contract  is  usurious  has  been  held  a  question  of  Jaw ;  ^, 
and,  upon  hypothetical  or  established  facts,  the  court  is  to  say, 
in  instructing  the  jury,  whether  it  is  usurious  or  not.  But  this 
is  true  only  where  the  question  is  one  of  interpretation,  arising 
on  the  terms  of  a  written  instrument,  or  upon  a  state  of  con- 
ceded facts.  In  most  cases  it  will  be  a  mere  question  of  intent, 
whether  the  amount  reserved  or  agreed  to  be  paid  in  excess  of 
the  legal  rate  of  interest  was  widersfood  by  the  parties  to  be  a 
compensation  for  forbearance  or  for  the  use  of  money,  or  whether 
it  was  intended  as  a  compensation  for  some  other  service.^  It  is, 
therefore,  2H  most  cases,  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^     "  The 

1  Shillito     V.    Reinekiug,    30    Ilim  ^  Andrews  v.  Pond,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
(N.  Y.),345.  77;  Mix   v.  Madisou  lus.  Co.,  11  lud. 

2  Belden  v.  Gray,  5  Fla,  504;  s.  <■.  117,  120;  Williams  v.  Reyuolds,  10 
3  ria.  110.  Md.  57;  Duraut  v.  Banta,  27  N.  J.  L. 

3  Ante,  §§  1105,  1108;  post,  §  1333.  (i25,  (;37;  Cuyler  v.  Sauford,  8   Barb. 


Tit.  V,  Cll.  XXXV.]       EXPRESS    CONTRACTS.  885 

taking  of  usury,"  says  Monell,  J.,  "  must  be  in  pursuance  of  a 
corrupt  agreement,  express  or  implied ;  and  it  is  difficult  to  con- 
ceive of  a  case,  tried  before  a  jury,  where  the  judge  would  be 
justified  in  depriving  a  party  of  the  right  of  having  it  passed  upon 
by  them,  whether  theie  was  such  corrupt  agreement,  especially 
when  it  is  to  be  made  out  from  circumstances,  and  must  be  de- 
termined in  a  great  degree  by  the  intent  of  the  parties."  ^  It  is 
scarcely  necessary  to  add  that,  in  order  to  warrant  the  court  in 
submitting  the  question  whether  a  particular  transaction  was  a 
device  to  evade  the  statute  against  usury,  there  must  always  be 
some  evidence  pi-ima  facie  raising  such  inference."^  But  such 
evidence  may  be  wholly  circumstantial.  Thus,  where  there  was 
no  direct  evidence  that  an  usurious  agreement  was  made  at  the 
time  of  the  loan,  but  it  was  proved  that,  twenty-two  days  there- 
after, the  borrower  paid  and  the  lender  received,  for  the  use  of 
the  money  from  the  time  of  the  loan  to  that  date,  a  sum  equal  to 
the  interest  at  a  rate  much  greater  than  the  lawful  rate,  — it  was 
held  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  or  not  the  loan  was  made 
upon  an  usurious  agreement.  This  holding  was  under  a  rule  that 
a  note  given  upon  an  usurious  consideration  is  void.^ 

§  1144.  Further  of  this  Subject. — It  is  said  to  be  quite 
immaterial  in  what  manner  or  form,  or  under  what  pretense,  an 
usurious  contract  is  cloaked;  if  the  intention  is  to  receive  a 
greater  rate  of  interest  than  the  law  allows  for  the  use  of  money, 
this  will  taint  the  contract  with  usury ;  ^  and  whether  the  trans- 

(N.  Y.)    225,    232;  Tucker  v.    Wila-  ».  Swift,  74  Ga.  595;  Cockle  v.  Flack, 

mouicz,  8  Ark.  157.  93  U.  S.  344. 

1  Chatham  Bank  v.  Betts,  9  Bosw.  -  Williams  v.  Reynolds,  10  Md.  57, 

(N.  Y.)    552,  557.     To  the  same  con-  67;  Ayrault  v.  Chamberlain,  33  Barb, 

elusion  Is  Eobbins  v.  Dillaye,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  229,  230;  White  v.  Stillman,  25 

(N.  Y.)   77,  80;   Ayrault  v.  Chaml)er-  N.  Y.  541. 

lain,   33  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  229.     Compare  3  Catlin  v.  Gunter,  11  N.  Y.  368. 

Whiter.  Stillman,  25  N.  Y.  541.  Thus,  ■*  "In    order  to   constitute  usury, 

it  was  properly  left  to  the  jury  to  de-  there  must  be  a  corrupt  intent  to  take 

cide,  on  all  the  facts,  whether  a  com-  more  than  the  legal  rate  for  the  use  of 

mission     charged    for     the    sale    of  money  loaned."    Tyler  on  Usury,  98, 

produce  in  connection  with  a  loan  of  103,  108.     See  Bush  v.  Buckingham,  2 

money,  was  a  cover  for  usury.    Mollis  Ventr.  83;  Xevison  v.  Whitley,  Cro. 


bS6 


PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOlUp.   Tl"., 


action  is  so  intended,  when  valid  on  its  face,  is  a  question  of  fact 
for  a  Jury.^  Where,  however,  the  question  depends  merely  upon 
the  interpretation  of  a  written  instrument,  it  may  be  a  question 
for  the  court. ^  It  is  said  that  whether  the  lender  intended  to 
take  more  than  the  legal  rate  of  interest  is  a  question  of  fact, 
and  if  it  be  found  that  he  did,  the  law  annexes  to  the  intention 
the  element  of  corruption;  for  ignorance  of  the  law  will  not 
excuse  in  such  cases  any  more  than  in  others.^  The  distinction 
is  well  stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Story  thus:  "In  construing  the 
usury  laws,  the  uniform  construction  in  England  has  been  (and 
it  is  equally  applicable  here),  that,  to  constitute  usury  within 
the  prohibitions  of  the  law,  there  nuist  be  an  intention,  not  only 
to  contract  for,  but  to  take  usurious  interest ;  for  if  neither  party 
intended  it,  but  acted  bona  fide  and  innocently,  the  law  will  not 
infer  a  corrupt  agreement.     Where,  indeed,  the   contract  upon 


Car.  501;  Buckley  v.  Guildbauk,  Cro. 
Jac.  678;  New  York  &c.  lus.  Co.  v. 
Sturges,  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  6(54,  667; 
Murray  v.  Harding,  2  Wm.  Bl.  859, 
865;  ISTourse  v.  Prime,  7  Johns.  Cli. 
(N.  Y.)  77 ;  Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Waggener, 
9  Pet.  (U.  S.)  378,  399;  Button  v. 
Downham,  Cro.  Eliz.  643 ;  Bedingfield 
V.  Ashley,  Cro.  Eliz.  741;  Roberts  v. 
Trenayne,  Cro.  Jac.  507;  Floyer  v. 
Edwards,  Cowp.  112;  Hammett«.  Yea, 
1  Bos.  &  Pul.  144;  Doe  v.  Gooch,  3 
Barn.  &  Aid.  664;  Solarte  v.  Melville,  7 
Barn.  &  Cres.  431;  Lloyd  v.  Scott,  4 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  205,  224;  Condit  v.  Bald- 
win, 21  N.  Y.  219;  De  Forrest  v. 
Strong,  8  Conn.  513,  519;  Beckwith  v. 
Windsor  Manf.  Co.,  14  Conn.  594,  606; 
Belden  v.  Lamb,  17  Conn.  441,  453; 
Trotter  v.  Curtis,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
161;  Doak  v.  Suapp,  1  Coldw.  (Tenn.) 
180,  185;  Judy  v.  Gerard,  4  McLean 
(U.  S.),  360;  Marvineu.  Hymcrs,  12  N. 
Y.  223,  231,  236;  N.  Y.  Fireman's  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Ely,  2  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  678;  Archi- 
bald V.  Thomas,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  289; 
Heath 'u.  Cook,   7  Allen    (Mass.),  59; 


Childers  v.  Dean,  4  Eand.  (Va  )  406; 
Stockett  V.  EUicott,  3  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 
123;  Gibson  v.  Stearns,  3  N.  H.  185, 
187;  Busbee  v.  Finn,  1  Oh.  St.  409; 
Otto  V.  Dnrege,  14  Wis.  574;  Fay  r?. 
Lovejoy,  20  Wis.  407;  Hayward  v.  Le 
Baron,  4  Fla.  404;  Horton  v.  Moot,  60 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  27. 

^Andrews  v.  Pond,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
72,  76;  Mitchell  v.  Napier,  22  Tex. 
120,  128;  Fleming  v.  Mulligan,  2 
McCord  (S.  C),  1"3;  Cran  v.  Hen- 
dricks, 7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  569,  635; 
Beckwith  v.  Windsor  Manf.  Co.,  14 
Conn.  594,  606;  Belden  v.  Lamb,  17 
Conn.  441,  453;  Seymour  v.  Marvin, 
11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  80,  83;  s.  c.  allirmed, 
sub  nom.  Smith  v.  Marvin,  27  N.  Y. 
137;  Thurston  v.  Cornell,  38  N.  Y.  281, 
283;  Barretto  v.  Boughton,  5  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  181;  Bobbins  v.  Dillaye,  33 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  77,  80;  Horton  v.  Moot, 
60  Barb.  27;  Tyler  on  Usury,  98. 

-  Levy  i\  Gadsby,  3  Crauch  (U.  S.), 
180. 

3  Maine  Bank  v.  Butts,  9  Mass.  49. 


Tit.  y,  Ch.  XXXV.]     EXPRESS  contracts.  887 

its  face  imports  usury,  as  by  an  express  reservation  of  more  than 
legal  interest,  there  is  no  room  for  presumption,  if  the  intention 
is  apparent;  res  ipsa  loquitur.  But  where  the  contract  on  its 
face  is  for  legal  interest  only,  then  it  must  be  proved  that  there 
was  some  corrupt  agreement,  or  device,  or  shift,  to  cover  usury, 
and  that  it  was  in  the  full  contemplatiou  of  the  parties.  *  *  * 
The  quo  ammo  is,  therefore,  an  essential  ingredient  in  all  cases  of 
this  sort."i  It  is  true,  that  here,  as  in  cases  of  negligence, 
and  indeed  in  other  cases,  the  court  will  be  able  to  say,  in  cer- 
tain states  of  the  evidence,  that  there  is  no  evidence  tending  to 
show  usury. 2  On  the  other  hand,  in  many  cases,  where  the  evi- 
dence is  undisputed,  or  where  the  case  depends  upon  the  con- 
struction of  an  instrument  of  writing,  the  court  will  be  able  to 
say  that  the  transaction  was  usurious  per  se.^ 

1  Bank  of  U.  S.  v.  Wagsener,  9  Pet.  2    stockett  v.  Ellicott,  3   Gill   &  J. 

(U  S.)  378,  399;  quoted  with  approval      (Md.)   123. 
in  Condit  v.  Baldwin,  21  N.  Y.  219,  221.  3  ^ntg^  §  H42. 


888  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 


CHAPTER    XXXVI. 


IMPLIED   PROMISES. 

Section 

1147.  Three  General  Propositions  Stated. 

1148.  Proposition  1 :  That  a  Coutract-willnotbe  Implied  Contrary  to  the  Real 

Understanding  of  the  Parties. 

1149.  Exception  No.  1. 

1150.  Exception  No.  2. 

1151.  Commentary  on  the  Foregoing  Proposition. 

1152.  Proposition  2 :  That  a  Moral  O  bligation  -uill  not  of  Itself  support  an 

Implied  Promise. 

1153.  Illustrations. 

1154.  Proposition  3:  That  a    Request    is    Necessary    to    raise    an  Implied 

Promise. 

1155.  Observations  on  this  Proposition. 

1156.  Further  Observations. 

1157.  Question  of  Law  or  Fact. 

1158.  Instructions  as  to  Implied  Contract  between  Members  of   Family  to 
Pay  for  Board,  etc. 

§  1147.  Three  General  Propositions  Stated.  —  The  following 
propositions  are  often  met  with  in  the  books,  either  stated  in 
terms  or  assumed  as  the  basis  of  decision:  1.  That  a  promise 
will  not  be  implied  contrary  to  the  real  understanding  of  the  par- 
ties.^    2.  That  a  7noral  obligation  will  not  support  an  implied 

»  Page   V.    Marsh,    36    N.    H.    305;  Y.)  208;  Olney  v.   Myers,    3  111.  311; 

Maltby  v.  Harwood,  12  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  Robinson  v.   Cushman,   2  Denio  (N. 

473;  Harney  t'.  Owen,  4  Blackf,  (In d.)  Y.),    149;    Guild    v.    Guild,    15  Pick. 

337;  Fitch  v.   Peckham,   16   Vt.    150;  (Mass.)  129;    Andrews  v.   Foster,  17 

Griffin  v.  Potter,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  209 ;  Vt.  556 ;  Swires  v.  Parsons,  5  Watts  & 

Livingstone.  Ackeston,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  S.  (Pa.)  357;  Guenther  v.  Birkicht,  22 

531;  Urie  V.  Johnston,  3  Pa.  (Penr.  &  Mo.  439;  Gillett  v.  Camp,  27  Mo.  541; 

W.)  212;    Alfred  V.  Fitzjames,  3  Esp.  Coleman  v.  Roberts,  1  Mo.  97;  Morris 

3;    Williams  -y.   Hutchinson,   3  N.  Y.  u.  Barnes,  35 Mo.  412. 
312;  Williams  v.   Finch,  2  Barb.  (N. 


Tit.  V,  Ch,  XXXVI.]       IMPLIED    PROMISES. 


889 


promise,^  and  perhcaps  not  an  express  promise. ^  3.  That  a  re- 
quest is  necessary  to  raise  an  implied  promise.^  It  is  proposed  to 
consider  what  these  propositions  mean  and  how  far  they  are  true. 

§  1148.  Proposition  1 :   Tliat  a  Coutract  will  not  be  implied 
contrary  to  the  Real  Understanding-  of  the  Parties.  —  I  shall 


i  Atkins  V.  Banwell,  2  East,  505; 
Edwards  v.  Davis,  16  Jolms.  (N.  Y.) 
281;  Bartholomew  v.  Jacksou,  20 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  28;  Dunbar  v.  Will- 
iams, .10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  28;  Dunbar 
V.  Williams,  10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  2J:9; 
Rensselaer  Glass  Factory  v.  Reed,  5 
Cow.  (N.  Y.;  587,  602,  per  Golden, 
Senator;  Ibid.  C20,  per  Spencer,  Sen- 
ator; Wennall  v.  Adney,  3  Bos.  &  P. 
247;  Newby  v.  Wiltshire,  2  Esp.  739; 
Brooks  V.  Read,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  380; 
Everts  v.  Adams,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
351;  Mumford  v.  Brown,  6  Gow.  (N. 
Y.)  475;  Doaue  v.  Badger,  12  Mass. 
65;  Loring  v.  Bacon,  4  Mass.  575; 
Erear  v.  Hardenburg,  5  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
272. 

2  It  should  seem  that,  upon  a  ques- 
tion so  elementary  and  so  necessary  to 
be  understood  by  all  men,  the  law 
ought  to  be  well  settled ;  but  there  is 
an  irreconcilable  conflict  of  opinion 
among  the  highest  courts  and  the 
al)lest  judges,  whether  a  moral  or  a 
conscientious  obligation  is  of  itself  a 
sufficient  consideration  to  support  an 
express  promise.  In  favor  of  the 
proposition  that  it  is,  we  find  the  dis- 
tinct opinions  of  Lord  Mansfield  (Lee 
V.  Muggeridge,  5  Taunt.  36,  4G),  Lord 
Ellenborough  (Atkins  v.  Banwell,  2 
East,  505),  and  Chief  Justice  Kent. 
Stewart  v.  Eden,  2  Gaines  (N.  Y.),  150. 
These  opinions  are  supported  by  con- 
siderable dicta  and  perhaps  by  some  ex- 
press decisions.  Adkins  v.  Hill,  Gowp. 
288;  Hawkes  v.  Saunders,  Id.  200: 
Truemau  v.  Teuton,  Id.  544 ;  Scott  v. 


Nelson,  1  Esp.  N.  P.  95;  Watson  v. 
Turner,  Bull.  N.  P.  147;  Doty  v.  Wil- 
son, 14  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  378;  McMorris  v. 
Herudon,  2  Bail.  Law  (S.  C.),  56;  s.  c. 
21  Am.  Dec.  515;  Cardwell  ■?;.  Strother, 
Lit.  Sel.  Gas.  (Ky.)  (S.  C.)  429;  12  Am. 
Dec.  326.  Contrary  conclusions  are  to 
be  drawn  from  the  following  cases : 
Bret  V.  J.  S.,  Gro.  Eliz.  755;  Harford  r. 
Gardener,  2  Leon.  30;  Ehle  v.  Judson, 
24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  97 ;  Smith  v.  Ware,  13 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  257 ;  Hunt  v.  Bate,  Dyer, 
272 ;  Frear  r.  Hardenburg,  5  Johns.  (N. 
Y).  272;  Barnes  v.  Hedley,  2  Taunt. 
184;  Thome  v.  Deas,  4  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
84;  Kelbourn  v.  Bradley,  3  Day 
(Conn.),  356 ;s.c.  3Am.Dec.  237;  Cook 
V.  Bradley,  7  Conn.  57;  s.  c.  18  Am.  Dec. 
79;  Nixon  v.  Vanhise,  2  South.  (N.  J.) 
491;  s.  c.  8  Am.  Dec.  618;  Greenbaum 
V.  Elliott,  60  Mo.  25.  The  inquirer 
who  curiously  pursues  the  subject  will 
find  it  either  elucidated  or  confounded 
by  a  comparison  of  the  following  de- 
cisions :  Bessich  v.  Goggill,  Palmer 
(K.  B.),  559;  Butcher  v.  Andrews, 
Garthew,  446 ;  Church  v.  Church,  cited 
in  Sir  T.  Raym.  260 ;  Hayes  v.  Warren, 
2  Strange,  933;  Style  v.  Smith,  cited 
in  2  Leon.  Ill;  Barber  v.  Fox,  2 
Saund.  136;  Hunt  v.  Swain,  1  Lev, 
165;  s.  c.  Sir  T.  Raym.  127;  1  Sid. 
248;  Loydv.  Lee,  1  Strange,  94;  Cock- 
shott  V.  Bennett,  2  T.  R.  763. 

*  Infra,  sec.  4;  Schmidt  v.  Smith, 
57  Mo.  135;  Price  v.  St.  Louis  Life 
Insurance  Co.,  3  Mo.  App.  262;  Sloan 
V.  St.  Louis  &c.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  220. 


890  PROVINCE    OF    COUKT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

show:  1.  That  this  proposition  however  understood,  is  not  uni- 
versally true.  2.  That  it  is  not  true  in  any  case  in  the  full  sense 
which  the  words  in  which  it  is  couched  import.  (1.)  Whether 
this  proposition  is  understood  in  a  strict  sense  according  to  the 
import  of  the  words  in  which  it  is  couched,  or  in  the  loose  sense 
which  I  shall  hereafter  point  out,  it  is  not  universally  true.  Two 
exceptions  cut  in  upon  it  so  extensively  as  almost  to  destroy  its 
character  as  a  rule.  The  first  exception  is,  that  it  does  not  apply 
where  the  act  out  of  which  the  promise  is  implied  is  in  itself  a 
tort.  The  second  is,  that  it  does  not  apply  in  the  case  of  build- 
ing contracts. 

§  1149.  Exception  No.  1. — The  first  of  these  exceptions  in- 
troduces the  well-known  princi})le  that  where  A.  unjustly,  by 
force  or  by  fraud, ^  gets  from  B.  that  which  belongs  to  B. ,  B.  may 
either  sue  A.  for  the  tort  and  recover  the  damages  which  he  may 
have  suffered,  including  special  or  consequential  damages  where 
such  damages  are  pleaded  and  proved,  and,  in  aggravated  cases, 
exemplary  damages  given  by  way  of  punishment  and  example ; 
or  he  may  ivaive  the  tort  and  recover,  as  upon  a  contract,  in 
some  cases,  the  money  which  A.  has  received  for  the  thing  taken, 
and  in  other  cases  its  reasonable  value.  Thus,  if  a  man  wrong- 
fully takes  my  goods  and  chattels  and  converts  them  into  money, 
albeit  through  a  larceny,'^  I  can  waive  the  tort,  sue  him  on  an 
implied  promise  and  recover  the  money. ^     A  man  forcibl}^  ab- 

1  Magoffin  V.  Muldrow,  12  Mo.  512;  v.  Smith,  Id.  536;  Balch  v.  Patten,  45 
Walker  I'.  Davis,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  500;  Me.  41;  Shaw  v.  Coffin,  58  Id.  254; 
Boston  R.  Co.  v.  Dana,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  Howe  v.  Claucey,  53  Id.  130;  Lord  v. 
«?;  Howe  V.  Clancey,  53  Me.  130.  French,  61  Id.  420;  Rand  v.  Nesraith, 

2  Howe  V.  Clancey,  53  ]\Ie.  130;  Id.  Ill;  Pearsoll  v.  Chapin,  44  Pa.  St. 
Boston  R.  Co.  v.  Dana,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  9 ;  Goodenow  v.  Snyder,  3  Greene  (la.) , 
83.  5!);) ;  Moses  v.  Arnold,  43  la.  187 ;  Fratt 

,  3  ilambley   v.    Trott,    Cowp.    373;  v.  Clarii,  12  Cal.  89;  Halleck  v.  Mixer, 

Gilmore  v.  Wilbur,   12  Pick.  (Mass.)  10  Id.  574;  Crow  v.  Boyd,  17  Ahi.  51; 

120;  s.  c.  22  Am.  Dec.  410;  Curamin^s  Pike  v.   Bright,  21   Id.  332;  Sl.iat  v. 

V.  Noyes,  70  Mass.  483;  Glass  Co.  v.  Evans,  35  111.  455;    Center  Turnpike 

Walcott,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  227;  Boston  Co.   v.  Smith,  12  Vt.  212;  Stearns  v. 

&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Dana,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  Dillingliain,22  Vt.  624;  Randolph  Iron 

83;    Mann    v.   Locke,    12   N.    H.   246;  Co.  r.  Elliott,  37  N.  J.  L.  184;  Budd  t'. 

White  V.  Brooks,  43  N.  II.  402;   Smith  Ililer,  27  Id.  43;  Ilutton  v.  Wetherald, 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XXXVI.  ]       IMPLIED    PROMISES. 


891 


ducts,  or  entices  away,  or  knowingly  harbors  and  conceals  my 
child  (the  same  being  my  servant)  or  my  apprentice;  I  can 
maintain  an  action  for  the  tort^  and  recover,  not  only  direct 
compensatory  damages,  but  also  indirect  or  consequential  damages 
where  the  same  are  laid  and  proved,^  and  also  exemplary  damages 


5  Harr.  (Del.)  38;  Watsou  v.  Stever, 

25  Mich.  38(1;  Nordeu  v.  Joues,  33  Wis. 
600;  Stockett  v.  Watkins,  2  Gill  &  J. 
(Md.)  326;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Dec.  428.  The 
doctrine  seems  to  be  iu  great  con- 
fusion, as  will  appear  by  a  learned 
note  of  Mr.  Freeman  in  31  Am.  Dec. 
242,  et  seq.  The  incongruity  of  the 
common  law  is  such  that  if  a  man 
tortiously  gets  possession  of  my  house, 
and  holds  it  adversely  to  me,  I  cannot 
waive  the  tort  and  recover  on  an  im- 
plied promise  for  use  and  occupation. 
Lloyd  V.  Hough,  1  How.  (U.  S.)  160; 
Stockett  V.  AYatkins,  2  Gill  &  J.  (Md.) 
326;  s.  c.  20  Am.  Dec.  438;  Smith  v. 
Stewart,  6  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  46;  s.  c.  5 
Am.  Dec.  iSo;  Fitzgeralfl  v.  Beebe,  7 
Ark.  305;  s.  c.  46  Am.  Dec.  285;  Hen- 
wood  V.  Cheeseman,  3  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
500;  Hayes  v.  Acre,  Cam.  &  M.  19; 
Stuart  V.  Fitch,  2  Vroom  (N.  J.),  17; 
Hallu.  Southmayd,  15  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  32; 
Moore  v.  Hai-vey,  50  Vt.  297;  Osgood 
V.  Dewey,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  2iO;  Gunn 
V.  Scovil,  4  Day  (Conn.).  228;  Couch 
V.  Briles,  7  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  257; 
Estep  V.  Estep,  23  Ind.  114;  Nance  v. 
Alexander,  48  Id.  516;  Dalton  v.  Lan- 
dahn,  30  Mich.  349;  Edmoudson  v. 
Kite,  43  Mo.  176;  Sylvester  v.  Rawls- 
ton,  31  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  286;  Newby  v. 
Vestal,  6  Ind,  412;  Redden  v.  Barker, 
4  Harr.  (Del.)  179;  Williams  v.  Hollis, 
19  Ga.  313;  Dudding  v.  Hill,  15  HI.  61 ; 
NcNair  v.  Schwartz,  16  Id.  24;  Dixon 
V.  Haley,  Id.  145;  Boston  v.  Binuey,  11 
Pick.  (Mass.)  1;   Scales  v.  Anderson, 

26  Miss.  94;  Cohen  v.  Kyler,  27  Mo. 
122;  Brewer  v.  Craig,  18  N.  J.  L.  214; 


Stewart  v.  Fitch,  31  Id.  17;  Hurd  v. 
Miller,  2  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  540;  Campbell 
V.  Reuwick,  2  Bradf.  (N.  Y.)  80;  Coit 
V.  Planer,  4  Abb.  Pr.  (x.  s.)  (N.  Y.) 
140;  LaForge  v.  Park,  1  Edm.  Sel.  Cas. 
(N.  Y.)  223;  Pierce  v.  Pierce,  25  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  243;  Espy  v.  Fenton,  5  Ore, 
423;  Langford  v.  Green,  52  Ala.  108; 
Folsom  V.  Carli,  6  Miuu.  420;  Ryan  v. 
Marsh,  2  Nott  &  M.  (S.  C.)  156;  Wig- 
gins V.  Wiggins,  6  N.  H,  298;  Richey 
V.  Hinde,  6  Ohio,  371 ;  Howe  v.  Russell, 
41  Me.  446;  Sampson  v.  Shaeffer,  3 
Cal.  196;  O'Connor  v.  Corbitt,  Id.  370; 
Cincinnati  v.  Walls,-!  Ohio  St.  222; 
Wiiarton  v.  Fitz  Gerald,  3  Dall.  (U.  S.) 
503;  Byrd  v.  Chase,  10  Ark.  G02;  East- 
man V.  Haward,  30  Me.  58;  Curtis  v. 
Treat,  21  Id.  525;  Croswell  v.  Crane, 
7  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  191 ;  Watson  v.  Brain- 
ard,  33  Vt.  88 ;  Ramirez  v.  Murrey,  5 
Cal.  222, 

1  Gilbert  v.  Schwenck,  14  Mees,  & 
W.  488;  Magee  v.  Holland,  27  N,  J,  L. 
86 ;  Plummer  v.  Webb,  4  Mason  (U.  S.) , 
380;  Steele  v.  Thatcher,  1  Ware  (U. 
S.),  91  ; Evans  v.  Walton,  L.  R.  2  C,  P. 
615;  s,  c,  36  L.J.  (C.  P.)  307;  Stowe  y. 
Haywood,  7  Allen  (Mass.),  118;  Wood 
V.  Coggeshall,  2  Met.  (Mass.)  89; 
Caughey  v.  Smith,  47  N.  Y.  244;  Blake 
V.  Lanyon,  6  T.  R.  221 ;  Sykes  v.  Dixon, 
9  Ad.  &  El.  693;  Pilkington  v.  Scott, 
15  Mees.  &  W.  657;  Hartley  v.  Cum- 
mings,  5  C.  B.  248. 

2  Gunter  v.  Astor,  4  J.  B.  Moore, 
12;  Flemington  v.  Sraithers,  2  Car.  & 
P.  292 ;  Wilt  V.  Vickers,  8  Watts  (Pa.), 
227;  Magee  v.  Holland,  27  X.  J.  L.  86. 


892  PEOViNCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

given  as  a  punishment  and  for  mental  suffering ;  ^  or  I  can  waive 
the  tort  and  sue  as  upon  a  contract  for  the  vahie  of  the  services 
of  the  child  or  apprentice  while  so  kept  away.^  In  all  these 
cases  the  law  raises  the  implication  of  a  contract,  although  no 
contract  was  intended  by  either  party.  It  raises  it  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  an  estoppel.  It  allows  the  plaintiff  to  assert  it,  and  pro- 
hibits the  defendant  from  denying  it,  although  it  is  not  true.  It 
will  not  permit  the  defendant  to  deny  it,  because  it  will  not  per- 
mit him  to  avoid  a  right  of  action  founded  in  plain  iustice,  by 
proving  his  own  wrong. ^ 

§  1150.  Exception  Xo.  2. — The  second  exception,  that  which 
arises  in  the  case  of  building  contracts^  is  equally  marked.  A. 
contracts  with  B.  to  build  a  house  upon  the  land  of  the  latter, 
according  to  certain  plans  and  specifications.  A.,  endeavoring 
in  good  faith  to  complete  the  contract,  fails  to  complete  it,  or 
fails  to  complete  it  according  to  the  specifications,  or  fails  to 
complete  it  within  the  time  agreed  upon.  Nevertheless,  as  B. 
has  received  benefit  from  the  labor  and  materials  of  A.,  the  law 
implies  a  neio  promifie  on  his  part  to  pay  to  A.  what  they  are 
reasonably  worth,*  less  the  damage  which  B.  may  have  sustained 

1  Magee  v.  Holland,  27  N.  J.  L.  8G;  ard,  109  Mass.  192;  Moulton  v.  Mc- 
Stowe  V.  Haywood,  7  Allen  (Mass.),  Owen,  103  Mass.  587;  Bragg  u.  Town 
118.  of  Bradford,  33  Vt.  35;  Dyer  v.  Jones, 

2  Lightly  V.  Clanston,  1  Taunt.  112.  8  Vt.  205;  Brackett  v.  Morse,  23  Vt. 

3  Lightly  t?.  Claustou,  1  Taunt.  112.      354;  Morrison   v.  Curamiugs,   26  Vt. 
^  Hayward     v.    Leonard,    7    Pick.      48G;  Hubbard  «.   Belden,    27  Vt.  645; 

(Mass.)   181;    s.  c.    19  Am.   Dec.  268;  Barker  v.  Troy  &c.  K.    Co.,   Id.  780; 

Smith  V.  First  Congregational  Meet-  Swift  v.  Harriman,  30  Vt.  607;  Kettle 

ing  House,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  178 ;  Jewell  v.  Harvey,  21  Vt.  301 ;  Corwin  v.  Wai- 

V.    Schroeppel,  4   Cow.   (N.   Y.)   5(14;  lace,  17  la.    378;  Tait  v.  Sherman,  10 

Hayden   v.  Madison,  7  Me.  78;  Lee  v.  La.    60;  Phelps  v.  Sheldon,    13  Pick. 

Ashbrook,  14   Mo.  378;   s.  c.  55  Am.  (Mass.)    50;  s.  c.   23  Am.   Dec.  659; 

Dec.  110;  Marsh    v.  Pilchards,  29  Mo.  Norris   v.  School  District    No.   1,    12 

105;    Lowe  V.   Sinclair,  27    Mo.    310;  Me.   293;  s.    c.  28  Am.  Dec.  182;  Mcr- 

Lamb  v.  Brolaski,  38  Mo.  53;  Creamer  rill  v.  Ithaca   &c.  E.    Co.,    16  Wend. 

V.  Bates,  49  Mo.  525;  Yeates  ?7.  Ballon-  (N.   Y.)    586;    Shipton    v.   Casson,  5 

tine,   56  Mo.  530;  Cullcu  v.  Sears,  112  Barn.  &  Cres.  378;  Sinclair  «.  Bowles, 

Mass.  299,  308;  Walker  v.  Orange,  16  9  Barn.  &  Cres.  92.     Mr.  Freeman,  the 

Gray  (Mass.),  193;  Cordell  v.  Bridge,  learned  editor  of  the  American  Decis- 

9  Allen  (Mass.),  355;  Powell  t;.  How-  ions,  has   contributed  a  valuable  note- 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVI.]      IMPLIED   PROMISES.  893 

through  the  breach  of  the  express  contract  which  subsisted  be- 
tween the  parties;  i  which  contract,  breach,  and  consequent  dam- 
age, may  be  pleaded  by  B.  as  a  counter-claim  to  the  action  of 
A.2     This  principle  is  extended  in  some  jurisdictions  to  contracts 
to  perform  labor  or  furnish  materials  other  than  buildino-  con- 
tracts,^ and  in  some  jurisdictions  it  is  denied  as  to  building  con- 
tracts.4     It  is  perceived   that,    where   the   rule  as   to   birildincr 
contracts  prevails,  it  results  in  this:   That  the  law  allows  a  party 
to  recover  upon  an  implied  promise  which  did  not  exist  in  fact, 
and  which  is  distinctly  variant  from  the  terms  of  a  written  con- 
tract which  did  exist. 

§  1151.  Commentary  on  the  foregoing  Proposition.  —  Hav- 
ing thus  shown  that  the  proposition  that  a  contract  cannot  be 
implied  contrary  to  the  real  understanding  of  the  parties  is  not 
universally  true,  I  shall  next  show  that  the  proposition  is  not 
true  in  any  case  in  the  full  sense  which  the  words  in  which  it  is 
couched  import.     Indeed,  this  must  be  apparent  from  what  has 


on  the  subject  of  these  contracts  (19 
Am.  Dec.  272,  282)  in  which  he  con- 
cludes that  "  this  doctrine  seems  to  be 
recognized,  or  to  be  growing  in  favor. 
"Where,  under  a  special  contract,  a 
party  has  in  good  faith  bestowed  some 
labor  or  parted  with  some  articles  to 
the  beneflt  of  another,  who  has  as  a 
matter  of  fact  enjoyed  the  beneflt  of 
the  labor  or  the  articles,  whether  vol- 
untarily or  involuntarily,  and  where 
the  incomplete  performance  has  not 
been  the  result  of  the  party's  own  pro- 
voking, or  of  causes  which  he  might, 
with  ordinary  diligence,  have-provided 
against,  tlie  one  receiving  such  bene- 
fit must  pay  therefor." 

1  Sickles  V.  Pattison,  U  Wend, 
(N.  Y.)  257;  s.  c.  28  Am.  Dec.  527; 
Pettee  v.  Tenn.  Manufacturing  Co.,  1 
Sneed  (Tenn.),  38G;  Crouch  v.  Miller,  5 
Humph.  (Tenn.)  586;  Stump  v.  Estill, 
Peck  (Tenn.),  175;  Irwin  v.  Bell,  1 
Tenn.  485;  Yeats  i\  Ballentiue,  5G  Mo. 


530;  Williams  w.  Porter,  51  Mo.  441; 
Eyerman  v.  Mt.  Sinai  Cemetery  Asso.^ 
61  Mo.  489;  Ahern  v.  Boyce,  19  Mo. 
App.  552;  Austin  v.  Keating,  21  Mo. 
App.  30. 

2  Britton  v.  Turner,  6  N.  H.  481; 
s.  c.  26  Am.  Dec.  713.  Compare  Mar- 
shall V.  Jones,  11  Me.  54. 

s  Porter  v.  Woods,  3  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  56;  s.  c.  39  Am.  Dec.  153; 
Eldridge  v.  Rowe,  7  111.  91;  s.  c.  43 
Am.  Dec.  41 ;  Britton  v.  Turner,  6  N. 
H.  481;  s.  c.  26  Am.  Dec.  713;  McClay 
V.  Hedge,  18  la.  66.  Compare  Larkiu 
V.  Buck,  11  Oh.  St.  568. 

*  Smith  V.  Brady,  17  N.  Y.  173 
(compare  Glacius  v.  Black,  50  N.  Y. 
145;  Sinclair  v.  Talmadge,  35  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  602;  Phillip    v.   Gallant,  62  N. 

Y.   256,   264)  ;  Erwin  v.  Ingram,  24  N. 

J.  L.  519;  Haslack  v.  Mayers,  26  N.  J. 

L.   284;    School  Trustees   v.  Bennett, 

27  N.  J.  L.  513;  Brown  v.  Fitch,  33  N. 

J.  L.  418. 


894  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

just  been  said  with  regard  to  building  contracts.  Here  the  par- 
ties have  entered  into  a  contract  in  which  everything  which  is  to 
be  done  is  specified  with  minute  detail.  There  is  no  defect  in 
the  real  understanding  of  the  parties.  The  contract  is  not 
performed  as  made,  and  yet  a  recovery  is  allowed  for  a  partial 
performance.  But  it  does  not  follow  that  the  law  has  allowed  a 
recovery  upon  an  implied  promise  which  is  totally  oj-)posed  to  the 
intention  of  the  parties ;  for  such  contracts  do  not  import  that  if, 
after  a  bona  fide  effort  at  performance,  something  is  left  undone, 
nothing  shall  be  paid  for  what  has  been  done.  This  is  not  what 
the  rule  means.  It  means  that  no  recovery  can  be  had  upon  an 
implied  assumpisit  which  is  entirely  opposed  to  the  understanding 
of  the  parties.  It  means  that,  where  the  parties  have  made  one 
contract  for  themselves,  the  law  cannot  make  a  totally  different 
contract  for  them,  and  one  which  would  lead  to  results  totally 
opposed  to  those  which  they  contemplated.  This  is  well  illus- 
trated by  a  class  of  cases  where  persons  occupy  towards 
each  other,  by  consent,  the  relation  of  pctrent  and  cJiild.  A 
father  is  not  liable  at  law  to  support  his  adult  son  or  daughter, 
nor  entitled  to  his  or  her  services.  The  same  may  be  said  of  a 
step-father  in  respect  of  his  step-child ;  of  an  uncle  in  respect  of 
his  nephew  or  niece,  and  so  on;  and  yet,  if  the  latter  come  to 
live  with  the  former,  and  live  in  his  family  for  years  as  a  child 
lives  with  its  parents,  rendering  services,  and  receiving  in  return 
shelter,  clothing  and  subsistence,  without  any  distinct  contract  as 
to  wages,  the  latter  cannot  hereafter  recover  wages  of  the  for- 
mer, or  of  his  executor  or  administrator,  although  the  value  of 
the  services  rendered  may  have  been  greater  than  the  value  of 
the  shelter,  clothing  and  subsistence  received;  and  the  reason  is 
that,  for  the  law  to  raise  such  a  promise  would  be  to  raise  a 
promise  directly  opposed  to  the  obvious  understanding  of  the 
parties.^     So,  where  a  slave  voluntarily  continues  in  his  master's 

1  Eobinson    v.    Cushmau,    2    Deu.  held  in  Massachusetts  that  a  mau  who 

(N.  Y.)   149;  Guild  r;.  Guild,  15  Pick.  supports   his  wife's  child  by  a  former 

(Mass.)  129;  Fitch  v.  Peckhara,  16  Vt.  husband     may    maintain    an    action 

150;   Andrus   v.  Foster,    17    Vt.  556;  anaiust  such   child,   upon  an  implied 

Williams  v.   Hutchinson,  3  N.  Y.  312.  assumpsit,  for    necessaries   furuished 

Contrary  to  this  principle,  it  has  been  the  latter.     Freto  v.   Brown,  4  Mass, 


Tit.   V,  Ch.   XXXVI.]       IMPLIED    PROMISES. 


895 


service  after  being  entitled  to  his  freedom,  and  renders  services 
and  is  supplied  with  necessaries,  without  an  understanding  that 
he  is  to  receive  wages,  he  cannot  recover  them  on  an  implied 
assumpsit,^  though  it  is  otherwise  w^here  he  is  held  involuntarily. ^ 
So,  it  has  been  held  that,  if  an  apprentice  continue  in  the  service 
of  his  master  under  voidable  indentures,  he  cannot  thereafter 
recover  wages  contrary  to  the  covenants  of  the  indentures.^  But 
this  is  very  doubtful;  for  an  "  understanding"  with  an  infant y 
is  not  the  same  as  an  understanding  with  a  person  who  is  sui  juris. 
It  is  the  privilege  of  infancy  to  avoid  contracts  not  clearly  for 
the  infant's  benefit;  and,  accordingly,  the  better  opinion  seems 
to  be  that  the  infant  may,  in  such  a  case,  disafiirm  the  contract  of 
apprenticeship,  abandon  the  service,  and  sue  for  the  reasonable 
value  of  his  services.^ 

§  1152.  Proposition  2  :  That  a  Moral  Obligation  will  not  of 
itself  Support  an  Implied  Promise.  —  It  must  occur  to  the  phi- 
losophical mind  that,  in  any  correct  system  of  laws,  no  substan- 


G75,  per  Parsons,  C.  J. ;  Worcester  v. 
Marchaut,  14  Tick.  (Mass.)  510.  But 
this  is  denied  in  Missouri.  Gillett  v. 
Camp,  27  Mo.  541.  And  see  Cooper 
V.  Martin,  4  East,  76;  Gay  v.  Ballon, 
4  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  403.  Under  special 
circumstances,  a  widowed  mother 
has  been  allowed  to  maintain  a 
like  action  against  her  daughter  for 
support  during  her  minority.  Wor- 
cester V.  Marchaut,  14  Pick.  (Mass.) 
510. 

1  Griffin  v.  Potter,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
209;  Livingston  v.  Ackeston,  5  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  531 ;  Urie  v.  Johnston,  3  Pa. 
(Peur.  &  W.)  212;  Alfred  v.  Fitzjames, 
3  East,  3. 

2  Peter  v.  Steel,  3  Yeates  (Pa.), 
250. 

3  Maltby  v.  Harwood,  12  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  473;  Harney  v.  Owen,  4  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  337.  Spe,  in  support  of  this 
principle.  Weeks  v.  Leighton,  5  N.  H. 
343;  McCoy  v.  Huffman,  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 


84    (overruled  in    Medbury  v.    Wat- 
rous,  7  Plill  (N.  Y.),  110). 

■>  Ventr.  Osgood,  19  Pick.  (Mass.) 
572;  Moses  V.  Stevens,  2  Pick.  (Mass.) 
332.  See  also  Corpe  v.  Overton,  10 
Bing.  252  (overruling,  it  seems, 
Holmes  v.  Blogg,  8  Taunt.  508;  s.  c. 
2  J.  B.  Moore,  552;  dictum  of  Lord 
Mansfield  in  Drury  v.  Drury,  2  Eden, 
39 ;  s.  c.  Wilmot's  Opinions,  22('>,  note 
rt);  Oluey  V.  Myers,  3  111.  311.  The 
nature  of  implied  promises  is  curiously 
illusti'ated  by  the  rule  that,  while  an 
infant  can,  with  certain  exceptions, 
avoid  his  express  contract,  he  cannot 
avoid  his  implied  promise;  which 
shows  that  an  implied  promise  is  no 
contract  at  all.  Thus,  an  infant's  tort 
can  be  waived  and  assumpsit  main- 
tained against  hira  under  the  same 
circumstances  as  in  case  of  an  adult. 
Elwell  V.  Martin,  32  Vt.  217;  Shaw  «. 
Coffin,  58  Me.  254;  Walker  v.  Davis,  1 
Gray  (Mass.),  500. 


896  PROVINCE   OF.  COURT   AND   JURY.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

tial  distinction  should  exist  between  moral  and  legal  obligations, 
but  that,  whatever  a  man  is  bound  in  conscience,  or  according  to 
o-ood  morals  or  good  usage,  to  do  for  the  "reparation  of  another, 
the  law  ought  to  compel  him  to  do  at  the  suit  of  that  other.  It 
is,  perhaps,  the  greatest  reproach  upon  the  common  law,  which 
was  made  by  our  ancestors  when  they  were  barbarians,  that  it 
exhibits  in  many  instances  a  wide  divergence  between  legal  and 
moral  obligations.  It  traveled  in  narrow  and  unbending  grooves ; 
its  rio-id  technicality  expelled  conscience  from  the  administration 
of  justice,  and  created  the  necessity  for  another  court  and  a  sup- 
plementary system  of  jurisprudence,  which  should  lind  the  means 
to  compel  the  doing  of  right,  where  the  common  law  sanctioned 
or  permitted  the  doing  of  wrong.  The  doctrine  that  a  moral  ob- 
ligation is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  raise  an  implied  promise,  is 
laid  down  aaain  and  aijainin  books  of  the  common  law.  I  recall 
but  one  case  where  it  has  been  distinctly  denied.  A  master  drove 
his  female  slave  from  his  house  half  naked,  shockingly  beaten, 
and  having  an  iron  weighing  fifteen  pounds  attached  to  her  foot. 
The  plaintiff,  from  motives  of  humanity,  took  the  slave  to  his 
house,  clothed,  fed,  cared  for  and  cured  her,  against  the  protests 
of  the  master,  who  declared  that  he  would  not  pay  the  plaintiff 
for  his  services,  but  would  sue  him  for  harboring  his  slave.  Nev- 
ertheless, the  plaintiff  sued  the  master  in  assumpsit  and  recov- 
ered the  value  of  his  services,  on  the  ground  that  the  moral 
obligation  of  the  master  to  provide  for  his  slave  w^as  sufficient  to 
raise  an  implied  promise  to  indemnify  the  plaintiff,  although  con- 
trary to  his  express  declarations.^  This  Avas  a  nisi  prius  decision, 
and  not  of  high  authority.  It  undoubtedly  reached  the  right 
result,  but  gave  an  erroneous  reason  for  it.  The  true  reason 
was,  that  a  master  is  bound  to  furnish  necessaries  for  his  slave, 
just  as  a  father  is  for  his  child,  or  a  master  for  his  apprentice; 
that  this  obligation  is  not  only  a  moral  but  a  legal  obligation  ; 
and  that  it  is  the  legal  obligation  which  raises  the  promise  and  not 
merely  the  moral  obligation.  These  suggestions,  perhaps,  con- 
duct us  to   the  true  rule  ;  it  is,  that  a  moral  obligation  is  not  a 

1  Fail-child   v.  Bell,  2  Brcv.  (S.  C.)  129;  s.  c.  27  Am.  Dec.  702. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVI.]     IMPLIED  PROMISES.  897 

sufficient  ground  in  law  for  implying  a  promise,  except  in  those 
cases  where  the  leo;al  oblio-ation  moves  forward  to  the  line  of  the 
moral  oblio-ation  and  concurs  with  it.  The  rule  then  is,  that  a 
tnoral  obligation  ivhich  is  not  a  legal  obligation  is  not  sufficient 
to  support  an  implied  promise.  This  rule  is  necessarily  and  uni- 
versally true ;  for  the  reason  that  an  implied  promise  is  nothing 
more  nor  less  than  a  leo-al  oblio-ation,  and  therefore  the  moral  ob- 
ligation  which  will  raise  such  a  promise  must  necessarily  also  be 
a  legal  obligation. 

§  1153.  Illustratious. — A  son  is  under  the  strongest  moral 
obligation  to  support  his  infirm  and  indigent  parents,  but  as  he 
is  under  no  leg-al  obligation  to  do  so,  the  law  will  not  raise  a 
promise  on  his  part  to  do  so.^  So,  a  father  may  be  under  the 
strongest  moral  obligation  to  support  his  adult  indigent  child, 
but  clearl}^  a  promise  to  do  so  will  not  be  implied ;  because  this 
moral  obligation  has  been  held  not  sufficient  to  support  an  express 
promise  to  pay  expenses  previously  incurred  on  behalf  of  such  a 
child.'*  So,  parish  officers  may  be  under  a  moral  obligation  to 
support  their  indigent  poor,  who  happen  to  fall  sick  or  receive 
wounds  while  temporarily  sojourning  in  another  parish.  But 
they  are  under  no  legal  obligation  to  do  so ;  and  if  such  a  pauper 
receives  assistance  from  such  other  parish,  no  action  can  be  sus- 
tained against  the  officers  of  the  former  parish  for  reimburse- 
ment.^ 


^  Edwards  v.  Davis,  16  Johns.  (N.  sick  among  strangers,  and,  being  poor 

Y.)  281.    A  son  being  under  no  legal  and  in  distress,  was  relieved  by  the 

obligation  to  pay  debts  contracted  by  plaintiff.     Afterwards  the  father  wrote 

his  indigent  father    for    the  latter's  to  the  plaintiff  promising  to  pay  him 

necessary  support,  his  written  prom-  the  expenses  incurred.     It  was  held 

ise  to  pay  such  debts  is  without  con-  that  tliis  promise  would  not  sustain 

sideration,  and  therefore  iucapal>le  of  an  action.     Mills   v.   Wymau,  3  Pick, 

being  enforced  in  law.     Cook  r.  Brad-  (Mass.)  207. 

ley,   7   Conn.  57;   s.   c.    18  Am.   Dec.  ^  Atkins  v.   Banwell,  2  East,  505; 

79.  Wenuall  v.   Adney,   3  Bos.  &  P.   2i7 

^  Thus,  a  sou  who  was  of  full  age  (overruling   Simmons  v.   Wilmott,   3 

and  had  ceased  to  be  a  member  of  his  Esp.  91,  and  Scarmanv.  Castell,  1  Esp. 

father's  familjj   was   suddenly  taken  270). 


898  PROVINCE    OF   COURT   AND    JURY.        [1  Thomp.   Tl'., 

§  1154.  Proposition  3  :  That  a  Request  is  Necessary  to  Raise 
an  Implied  Promise. — As  a,  general  rule,  a  man  cannot  make 
another  man  his  debtor,  without  the  consent  of  that  other  before 
or  after  the  fact.  If,  therefore,  one  gratuitously  or  officiously 
do  something  which  he  may  regard  as  beneficial  to  another,  the 
law  will  not  impV  a  promise  on  the  part  of  that  other  to  pay 
for  it ;  ^  unless,  having  power  either  to  keep  or  reject  the  benefit 
conferred,  he  elects  to  keep  it ;  in  which  case  he  may  be  held 
liable  to  pay  for  it,  on  a  principle  somewhat  similar  to  that  upon 
which  a  party  is  often  held  to  have  ratified  an  unauthorized  act 
done  professedly  on  his  behalf.  The  general  rule  is  said  to  be 
that  a  request  is  necessary  to  raise  an  implied  promise. ^  It  has 
been  so  held  where  the  plaintiff  rendered  services  necessary  to 
save  the  defendant's  property  from  destruction  by  fire;  ^  where 
the  plaintiff,  a  physician,  administered  medicine  to  the  defend- 
ant's slave,  in  a  case  not  of  pressing  necessity ;  *  where  the  parish 
officer  furnished  surgical  assistance  to  the  defendant's  servant 
.who  had  sustained  an  accident;  ^  where  the  plaintiff  and  defend- 
ant were  tenants  in  common  of  a  building,  and  the  plaintiff  made 
repairs,  but  not  at  the  request  of  the  defendant ;  ^  where  the 
plaintiff  without  the  request  of  the  defendant,  repaired  a  w^ell 
and  pump  situated  on  the  land  of  the  defendant,  which  the 
plaintiff  cUiimed  the  privilege  of  using;  ^  where  the  plaintiff, 
owning  the  upper,  and  the  defendant  the  lower  fioor  of  a  house, 

1  Watkius  V.  Trustees,  41  Mo.  303;  2  Esp.  739;  Brooks  v.  Read,  13  Johus. 
Bailey  v.  Gibbs,  C  Mo.  4.5;  Joues  v.  (N.  Y.)  380;  Everts  v.  Adams,  12 
Wilson,  3  Joliiis.   (N.  Y.)  434;  Beach      Johns.  (N".  Y.)  352. 

V.  Vaudenburg,  10  Johns.  (jST.  Y.)  SGI;  ^  g.^i.ti^oloi^-ie^      u_      .Jackson,     20 

Stokes  V.  Lewis,  1  T.  R.  20;   Child  v.  Johus.  (N.  Y.)  2S. 

Morley,  8  T.  R.G13;  AVinsorw.  Savage,  *  Duubar  v.    Williams,    10    Johns. 

8  T.  R.  290;  Lewis  v.  Lewis,  8  Strobh.  (N.  Y.)  249. 

L.  (S.  C.)  530.  5  Newby  v.  Wiltshire,  2  Esp.  739. 

2  Bartholomew  v.  Jackson,  20  ^  Mumfordv.  Brown,  GCow.  (N.  Y.) 
Johus.  (N.  Y.)  28 ;  Dunbar  v.  Williams,  475.  A  tenant  in  common  at  common 
10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  249;  Rensselaer  law,  may  compel  his  co-tenant  to  join 
Glass  Factory  v.  Reid,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  him  in  making  repairs,  by  writ  cle 
587,  G02, per Colden,  Senator;  76tVZ.  620,  raparatiow,  faciendn,  which  remedy 
per  Spencer,  Senator;  Weuuall  v.  Ad-  prolxiljly  still  survives  in  some  form, 
ney,  3  Bos.  &  P.  247;  Atkins  v.  Ban-  ^  Doane  v.  Badger,  12  Mass.  G5 
w^ell,  2  East,  505;  Newby  v.  AViltshire, 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXVI.]       IMPLIED    PROMISES. 


899 


repaired  the  roof,  after  requesting  the  defendant  to  join  him  in 
it,  whicli  the  latter  refused  to  do;^  where  the  overseers  of  the 
poor  of  one  town  assisted  a  pauper  belonging  to  another  town, 
he  being  so  sick  that  he  could  not  be  removed  to  such  other 
town;*'^  where  a  physician  furnished  medicine  to  a  pauper,  but 
not  at  the  request  of  the  overseers  of  the  poor,  and  then  sued 
them  for  payment ;  ^  and  where  the  plaintiff  rendered  particular 
services  as  a  mere  kindness  to  the  defendant,  without  any  ex- 
pectation of  being  paid  therefor.^  But  where  the  plaintiff  ren- 
dered services  to  the  defendants,  intending  that  they  should  be 
gratuitous,^  or  relying  upon  the  generosity  of  the  latter  for  com- 
pensation ;  ^  or  rendered  services  in  the  mere  expectation  of  being 
compensated  by  a  legacy,^  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  recover 
compensation  for  them. 


1  Loring  v.  Bacou,  4  Mass.  575. 

2  Brooks  V.  Read,  13  ,Tohus.  (N.  Y  ) 
380;  Weuuall  v.  Aduey,  3  Bos.  &  P. 
247  (overruling  Simmous  v.  Wilmott, 
3  Esp.  91,  and  Scarmau  v,  Castell,  1 
Esp.  270) ;  Atkins  v.  Banwell,  2  East, 
505,  Compare  Wing  v.  Mill,  1  Barn.  & 
Aid.  104. 

3  Evertsu.  Adams,  12  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
352.  But  where  a  person  has,  at  the 
request  of  an  overseer  of  the  poor,  and 
on  his  promise  that  he  would  see  him 
paid,  boarded  a  pauper,  he  may  main- 
tain assumpsit  tlierefor  against  the 
overseer,  although  uo  order  has  been 
made  for  the  relief  of  the  pauper. 
Kingv.  Butler,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  281. 
Compare  Palmer  v.  Vandenburg,  3 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)  193;  Fox  t?.  Drake,  8 
Cow.  (N.  Y.)  191;  Minklaer  V.  Rock- 
feller,  6  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  276 ;  Gourley  v. 
Allen,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  644;  Flower  v. 
Allen,  Id.  654;  Olney  v.  Wickes,  18 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  122. 

*  James  V.  O'Driscoll,  2  Bay  (S.  C), 
101;  s.  c.  1  Am.  Dec.  632. 

5  Gore  V.  Summersoll,  5  Monr. 
(Ky.)  513;  Whaley  v.  Peak,  49  Mo.  80; 
Asbury  v.  Flesher,  11  Mo.  610. 


^  Jacob  V.  Ursuline  Nuns,  2  Mart. 
(La.)  2(i9;  s.  c.  5  Am.  Dec.  730. 

'  Little  V.  Dawson,  4  Dall.  (U.  S.) 
Ill;  Osborne  v.  Governors  of  Guy's 
Hospital,  2  Stra.  728;  Le  Sage  v. 
Coussmaker,  '1  Esp.  187;  Plume  v. 
Plume,  7  Ves.  258 ;  Lee  v.  Lee,  6  Gill  & 
J.  (Md.)  316.  Compare  Patterson  v. 
Patterson,  13  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  379;  Gary 
V.  James,  4Desau.  (S.C.)  185;  Roberts 
V.  Swift,  1  Yeates  (Pa.),  209.  But  if, 
in  such  a  case,  both  parties  really  in- 
tended that  the  services  should  be 
compensated  in  some  way,  an  action 
upon  a  quantum  meruit  pro  opere  et 
labore  will  lie ;  and  whether  or  not  they 
so  intended  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a 
juiy  or  other  trier  of  facts.  Osborne 
V.  Governors  of  Guy's  Hospital,  2 
Stra.  728;  Jacobsou  v.  LeGrauge,  3 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  199;  Le  Sage  v.  Couss- 
maker, 3  Esp.  187;  Higginsouv.Fabre, 
3  Desau.  88,  91;  Shakspeare  v.  Mark- 
ham,  10  Hun  (N.  Y.),  322,  326;  s.  c.  in 
Court  of  Appeals,  72  N.  Y.  400,  406; 
Robinson  v.  Raynor,  36  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
131 ;  s.  c.  in  Court  of  Appeals,  28  N.  Y. 
497;  Quackenbush  v.  Ehle,  5  Barb. 
'  (N.  Y.)  472;  Campbell  v.  Campbell,  65 


900  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1  TllOUip.  Tl'., 

§  1155.  Observations  ou  this  Proposition.  — A  request  being 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  an  implied  promise,  it  follows  that, 
in  counting  upon  such  a  promise,  the  pleader  must  allege  a  re- 
quest,* or  at  least,  it  must  appear  that  the  jDarty  promising  was 
under  a  legal  obligation  to  do  the  ;ict  himself,  or  to  procure  it  to 
be  done.^  And  here  again,  we  find  ground  for  the  conclusion 
that  this  rule,  that  a  request  is  necessary  to  support  an  implied 
promise,  is  not  of  universal  api^lication ;  for  we  find  that,  under 
certain  states  of  fact,  the  request  itself  will  be  implied.'^  This, 
however,  is  not  a  presumption  of  law,  but  a  conclusion  of  fact  to 
be  drawn  from  the  evidence  in  particular  cases.  But,  like  most 
other  facts,  it  maybe  proved  by  circumstantial  evidence;  and 
the  beneficial  nature  of  the  services,  though  not  enough  when 
standing  alone,  may  be  very  important  in  a  chain  of  circum- 
stances tending:  to  establish  such  a  conclusion.* 

§1156.  Further  Observations. — It  may  be  added  to  the 
foregoing  that  the  law  will  never  imply  a  promise  contrary  to 
the  manifest  justice  of  the  case.^  Indeed,  this  whole  doctrine 
of  implied  promises  appears  to  have  been  originally  a  fiction  of 
law,  devised  for  the  purpose  of  reaching  substantial  justice.  The 
law^  in  its  development  has  passed  through  the  age  of  fiction,  and 
it  is  submitted  that  it  is  time  to  call  this  doctrine  by  another 
name.  There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  an  implied  promise.  The 
very  term  involves  a  contradiction.  The  particular  i:)romise  either 
was  made  by  the  party  sought  to  be  charged,  or  was  not  made  by 
him.  If  it  was  made  by  him,  it  is  matter  to  be  pleaded  and 
proved,  like  any  other  fact.     I  have  shown  that  the  doctrine  in- 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  ^'-t*;  Martin  w.  "Wright,  3  gee    Fairchild  v.   Bell,    2    Brev. 

13  Wend.   (N.  Y.)    4110;  s.  c.  28  Am.  (S.  C.)  129;  s.  c.  27  Am.  Dec.  702. 

Dec.  4f.8.  ^  Ehle  v.  Judson,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

*  Duruford  r.    Messiter,  5  Maule  &  97,   99;  Hicks  v.   Burlians,  10  Jolms. 

S.  440.  (N.   Y.)    243;  Oatfield  v.    Waring,  14 

2  Comstock    V.     Smitli,    7    Jolms.  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  188;  1  Saund.  Tl.  &  Ev. 

(N.  Y.)  87;  Parker  v.  Crane,  6  Wend.  2G4,  n.  1.,  See  also  Doty  v.  Wilson,  14 

(N.   Y.)    647;  Hicks    v.   Burhaus,   10  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  378. 

Johns.    (N.    Y).    243;    Livingston  v.  ^  W^eir  v.   Weir,  3   B.    Mon.    (Ky.) 

PiOgers,  1  Caines  (N.  Y.),  583.  G45;  Skeen  v.  Johnson,  55  Mo.  24. 


Tit.  V,  Cll.   XXXVI.]       IMPLIED    PROMISES.  901 

volves  the  absurdity  of  creating  a  fictitious  promise  where  no 
promise  whatever  was  made,  where  a  different  promise  was 
made,  and  where  there  was  an  entire  repudiation  of  the  promise 
which  the  Liw  created.  What,  then,  is  the  real  substance  of  this 
doctrine?  It  is  not  that  the  hiw  creates  a  promise  where  none 
existed,  or  where  a  different  one  existed,  for  that  would  be  im- 
possible and  absurd;  but  it  is  that  the  law  raines  a  duty  or 
creates  an  obligation.  Ought  we  not,  then,  to  abolish  this  worn- 
out  nomenclature,  ajid  in  its  stead  to  speak  of  \A\q  duty  or  obli- 
gation which  the  law  creates  and  enforces  in  the  situations  named  ? 
If  the  common  law  should  ever  be  codified,  and  the  words  "  im- 
plied promise  "  or  "  implied  assumpsit  "  should  be  found  in  the 
code,  they  would  be  a  monument  of  reproach  to  its  authors. 

§  1157.  Question  of  Law  or  Fact.  —  Whether  the  law,  under 
given  circumstances,  implies  a  promise  is  for  tJie  courts  and  not 
for  the  jury ;  since  the  jury  are  not  judges  of  the  law ;  ^  but  where 
the  law  does  not  imply  the  promise,  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury  ^ 
what  the  parties  really  intended?  Thus,  a  step-father  is  under 
no  legal  obligation  to  support  a  step-son ;  but  where  the  step- 
son lives  in  the  family  of  the  step-father  and  labors  for  him 
as  his  own  son  would  do,  without  any  express  understand- 
ing as  to  the  terms  upon  which  he  so  resides  and  labors  with 
the  latter,  the  law  implies  neither  a  promise  on  the  part  of  the 
step-father  to  pay  the  step-son  for  his  services,  nor  a  prom- 
ise on  the  part  of  the  step-son  to  pay  the  step-father  for  his  sup- 
port ;  but  it  is  assumed  that  the  parties  intended  that  the  parental 
relation  should  exist  between  them.^  But  in  such  a  case,  it  may 
be  a  question  for  the  jury  upon  the  facts,  whether  the  step-son 
was  living  Avith  the  step-father  upon  his  hospitality,  as  children 
ordinarily  live  with  their  parents.*  In  an  action  of  assumpsit 
against  a  married  ivoman,  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  furnished 
materials  and  labor  on  the  defendant's  house,  held  by  her  in  her 

1  Prickett  v.  Badger,  37  Eug.  L.  &  ^  ^,j^e^  §  1154^  l^igt  ^ote. 

Eq.  428  (overruling,  it  seems,  ou  this  *  Ante,  §  1151. 

point,  De  Eernardy  v.  Harding,  8  Exch.  *  Myers  v.  Malcolm,  20  111.  G21. 

822).     Compai-e  Planch  v.  Colburu,   8 
Biug.  14. 


902  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1  Tboilip.  Tl'., 

own  right,  at  the  request  of  her  husband,  with  no  request  on  her 
part,  but  with  her  knowledge  and  consent,  is  not  conclusive,  in 
law,  of  a  promise  by  her  to  pay  for  such  labor  and  materials,  but 
is  evidence  from  which  the  jury  may  find  such  a  promise. ^  On 
a  similar  theory,  it  has  been  held  that  a  written  acknowledgment 
of  A.,  who  is  in  the  occupation  of  land,  that  he  holds  it  as  the 
tenant  of  B.,  does  not  raise  a  presumption  of  law  that  he  2^'^^'^^'^- 
ises  to  j^ciy  rent,  nor  transfer  from  B.  to  A.  the  burden  of  proof 
on  the  question  of  fact  whether  the  understa^iiding  was  that  rent 
should  be  paid.  "  From  the  defendant's  occupation  and  ac- 
knowledged tenancy,  the  law  does  not  imply  a  }iromise  to  pay 
rent.  The  question  whether  there  was  such  a  promise,  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact."  2 

§  1158.  Instructions  as  to  Implied  Contract  between  Members  of 
Family  to  pat  for  Board,  etc.  —  "If  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence 
that  the  defendant  has  lived  in  the  family  of  the  plaintiff  and  has  had  her 
boarding  and  washing  done  and  furnished  by  the  plaintiff  and  his  family, 
and  that  there  was  no  contract  or  agreement  between  the  plaintiff  and 
defendant,  and  as  to  how  much  defendant  should  pay  plaintiff  for  said 
boarding  and  washing,  then  I  charge  you  that  the  law  is,  that  there  was 
an  implied  contract  that  the  defendant  was  to  pay  plaintiff  what  said 
boarding  and  washing  were  reasonably  worth  for  the  time  said  defend- 
ant so  boarded  at  plaintiff's  house  ;  and  you  will  so  find  for  plaintiff  such 
reasonable  compensation,  not  to  exceed  the  amount  claimed  in  plaintiff's 
petition.  The  rule  above  applies,  unless  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence 
that  defendant  lived  with  her  son  as  a  [)art  of  his  family."  ^  -  -  -  -  "  If 

1  Bickford  v.  Dane,  58  N.  H.  185.  factory  in  a  certain  state  of   society, 

2  Savings  Bank  r.  Getchell,  55  N.  H.  tliey  did  not  hesitate,  by  legal  pre- 
281,  285.  In  giving  the  opinion  of  the  sumptions  and  other  measures,  to  ex- 
court,  Doe,  G.  J.,  also  reasons  thus:  teusively  control  the  jury  iu  the 
"  The  practice  of  shifting  the  burden  decision  of  questions  of  fact.  The 
of  proof  by  a  legal  presumption  is  tendency  iu  this  State  is  toward  a  cor- 
largely  abandoned  iu  this  State.  It  rectiou  of  those  errors,  and  the  es- 
often  materially  encroached  upon  the  tablishment  and  observauce  of  the 
province  of  the  jury,  but  caused  less  true  line  between  law  and  fact,  and 
injustice  when  parties  were  not  al-  between  the  duty  of  the  court  and  the 
lowed  to   testify  than  it  would  now.  duty  of  the  jury." 

"Wlien  courts  assumed  the  power  of  ■"  Approved  in  GreenwcU  v.  Green- 

excluding  the  testimony  of  the  parties,      well,  28  Kans.  pp.  078,  G79. 
for  reasons  allesjed  to  have  been  satis- 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVI.]     IMPLIED  PROMISES.  903 

the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  is  the  mother  of  the 
plaintiff,  and  that,  for  the  time  mentioned  in  plaintiff's  petition,  the  de- 
fendant lived  with  the  plaintiff  as  one  of  his  f amil}-,  assisting  in  perform- 
Ingthe  ordinary  duties  of  the  household,  and  there  was  no  express  contract 
that  the  defendant  was  to  pay  for  her  board  and  washing,  and  no  un- 
derstanding by  either  party  that  such  board  and  washing  were  to  be 
paid  for,  then  I  charge  that,  as  between  mother  and  son,  there  is  no  im- 
plied promise  to  pay  for  such  board  and  washing,  and  the  plaintiff  can- 
not recover  in  this  case."  i "  Usually  when  one  person  performs 

services  or  labor  for  another,  which  is  of  value,  the  law  implies  a  prom- 
ise or  legal  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  person  receiving  the  service 
to  pay  what  such  services  are  reasonably  worth.  Yet  this  is  not  always 
the  case.  When,  from  the  circumstances  and  situation  of  the  parties, 
it  could  not  reasonably  be  expected  that  either  party  could  suppose  or 
apprehend  there  was  anything  to  be  paid  or  received,  and  did  not  so 
understand  at  the  time,  then  the  law  does  not  imply  any  legal  obliga- 
tion to  pay. If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  defendant,  at  the 

request  of  a  friend  of  the  plaintiff,  when  the  plaintiff  was  a  child  of 
five  or  six  years  old,  took  him  into  his  family  and  nurtured  and  cared 
for  him  when  he  was  too  young  to  provide  for  himself,  and  he  remained 
there  as  a  member  of  the  familj^  of  defendant,  and,  when  he  became  of 
suflficient  age,  performed  service  and  labor  for  defendant,  and  continued 
to  receive  his  board  and  clothes,  and  continued  to  make  the  defendant's 
house  his  home,  then,  for  the  time  being,  the  legal  obligations  existing 
between  the  parties  were  the  same  that  they  would  be  between  parent  and 
child,  and  the  law  will  imply  no  legal  obligation  on  the  part  of  defend- 
ant to  pay  him  for  his  services,  nor  could  defendant  maintain  any  action 
against  the  plaintiff  for  his  board  or  clothes,  or  care  in  rearing  him  and 

providing  for  him  a  home."  ^ "If  the  plaintiff,  after  she  arrived 

at  full  age,  continued  to  live  with  her  father,  as  she  had  done  previously, 
with  no  new  duties  or  responsibilities  assumed  in  the  family  by  her,  and 
was  provided  with  necessaries,  etc.,  as  one  of  the  family,  she  would 
not  be  entitled  to  recover  for  such  services,  unless  there  was  an  express 
understanding  between  her  and  her  father,  before  these  services  were 
rendered,  that  she  should  receive  such  compensation  ;  and  if  the  note  was 
given  for  such  past  services,  and  there  was  no  such  understanding  ex- 
isting between  them,  she  cannot  recover.  But  if  the  note  was  given 
for  such  past  services,  the  fact  that  it  was  given,  will  raise  a  presump- 

^  Jhid  ;  citing  Ayres  I".  Hull,  oKaus.  ^  Approved  iu  Boyer  r.    Riley,  41 

419,  Iowa,  14,  15. 


904  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

tionthat  there  had  been  a  previous  understanding  or  agreement  between 
the  plaintiff  and  her  father  that  such  compensation  was  to  be  made,  and 
unless  such  presumption  is  overcome  by  evidence  that  no  such  under- 
standing existed,  the  plaintiff  will  be  entitled  to  recover."  ^ 

^  Approved  iu  Pitt's  Aclm'r  v.  Pitts,  and  then  sued  for  the  value  of  his 

21  Ind.  314.  A  more  elaborate  instruc-  services,  may  be  found   in   Hilbish  v, 

tiou,  in  a  case  where  a  son  resided  Hilbish,  71  Ind.  30.     See  also  Smith  v. 

with  his  father  after  coming  of  age  Denman,  48  Ind.  65. 


Tjt.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.]       SALES    OF   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  905 


CHAPTER     XXXVII. 


SALES  OF  PERSONAL  PEOPERTY. 


Article    I.  —  What  Questions  for  the  Court  and  What  for  the  Jurt. 
Article  II.  — Precedents  op  Instruction  to  Juries. 


Article  I.  —  What  Questions  for  the  Court  and  What  for  the  Jury. 

Section 

1160.  Preliminary. 

1161.  Loosely  said  to  be  a  Question  of  Law. 

1162.  Said  to  be  a  Question  of  Law  where  Facts  proved  or  not  Controverted. 

1163.  Question  for  Jury  where  Facts  in  Doubt. 

1164.  Cases  where  Euled  as  a  Question  of  Law. 

1165.  Question  Drawn  to  the  Jury  where  a  Question  of  Intent. 

1166.  Whether  the  Parties  Intended  that  Title  should  Pass,  although  Some- 

thing remained  to  be  done  to  the  Property. 

1167.  Cases  where  Decided  as  a  Question  of  Fact. 

1168.  Illustrations  of  the  Foregoing. 

1169.  Whether  Delivery  of  Part  a  Delivery  of  the  Whole. 

1170.  Illustration. 

1171.  Bona  Fide  Purchaser  for  Value. 

1172.  Whether  a  Sale  was  Conditional. 

1173.  Instruction  as  to  an  Absolute  Sale  Intended  as  a  Pledge. 

1174.  Whether  a  Sale  and  a  Delivery  of  Collaterals  were  Parts  of  one  Trans- 

action. 

1175.  Delivery  of  Personal  Property  purchased  with  Land. 

1176.  Compliance  with  a  Contract  of  Sale  which   contains  the  words  "More 

or  Less." 

1177.  Under  what  Circumstances  Question  withdrawn  from  the  Jury. 

§  1160.  Preliminary.  — The  subject  of  discussion  in  this  chap- 
ter is  little  more  than  an  illustration  or  amplification  of  a  subject 
already  discussed. i  The  question  whether  a  sale  at  common  law 
exists,  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  the  question  whether  any 

1  Ante,  chap.  XXXV. 


906  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  Thoilip.  Tr., 

other  contract  exists,  and  is  to  be  answered  by  the  court  or  by 
the  jury,  according  to  principles  ah*eady  stated. ^  But  the  statute 
of  frauds  has  introduced  a  special  rule  in  regard  to  this  species 
of  contract.  There  must  be  a  delivery  by  the  vendor,  and  an  ac- 
ceptance by  the  vendee,  of  the  thing  intended  to  be  sold,  where  the 
contract  is  not  in  writing;  and  this  complicates  the  question  of 
sale  or  no  sale  with  the  further  question  whether  or  not  there 
has  been  such  a  delivery  and  acceptance  as  satisfies  the  statute 
of  frauds.  Moreover,  the  law  recognizes  two  kinds  of  contract 
in  respect  of  sales  of  personal  property:  an  agreement  to  make 
a  future  sale,  and  a  present  contract  of  sale.''  These  elements 
sufficiently  differentiate  the  contract  of  sale  of  personal  property 
from  other  contracts,  to  justify  a  separate  inquiry  into  the  ques- 
tion under  what  circumstances  the  existence  of  such  a  contract  is 
to  be  pronounced  as  a  question  of  law  and  under  what  circum- 
stances found  as  a  conclusion  of  fact. 

§  llGl.  Loosely  said  to  be  a  Question  of  Law.  —  It  has  been 
said  that  the  question  of  sale  or  no  sale  is  a  question  of  law,  and 
is  not  to  be  decided  by  the  opinions  of  witnesses.^  Certainly  it 
is  a  sound  conclusion  that  it  is  not  to  be  decided  by  the  opinions 
of  witnesses;  for  whatever  it  may  be,  it  is  not  a  mere  question 
of  private  opinion.  It  is  also  said  to  be  a  question  of  law,  and 
very  often  a  question  extremely  difficult  to  decide,  what  shall  be 
deemed  a  delivery  upon  a  sale  of  goods.*  This  conception  does 
not  carry  us  any  farther  than  the  obvious  conclusion  that  the 
I'ule  of  sale,  like  the  rule  or  measure  of  damages,  is  a  rule  of 
law.  If  it  is  intended  to  convey  the  idea  that  the  application  of 
this  rule  to  doubtful,  complicated  or  equivocal  facts  is  for  the 
judge,  and  not  for  the  jury,  then  it  is  a  palpably  erroneous  con- 
ception. 

§  1162.  Said  to  be  a  Question  of  Law  where  Facts  proved 
or  not  Controverted.  —  Again  it  is  said  that,  where  the  facts  are 

1  Ante,  §§  1112,  IIU.  »  uolt  v.  Marriott,  9  Gill  (Md.),  331, 

2  Beuj.  ou  Sales,  §  309.  33i!. 

*  Belt  V.  Marriott,  supra. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII,]     SALES  of  personal  pkoperty.        907 

proved  or  are  not  controverted,  it  is  a  question  of  law  whether 
they  show  a  sale.^  This  is  no  more  than  a  branch  of  the  general 
rule  which  applies  to  all  questions  arising  in  judicial  administra- 
tion: the  facts  being  ascertained,  the  judge  pronounces  the  con- 
clusion of  law.  But  what  are  the  facts,  within  the  meaning  of 
this  rule?  As  elsewhere  seen,  in  respect  of  various  questions,  ^ 
they  embrace  not  only  what  are  termed  constitutive  facts,  but  they 
embrace  also  those  ulterior  inferences  of  fact  which  the  court,  and 
not  the  jury,  are  to  draw.  One  of  these  ulterior  inferences  of  fact 
is  that  of  intent.  The  question  of  contract  or  no  contract  is  involved 
ultimately  in  this  question  of  intent,  — that  is,  whether  both  par- 
ties intended  that  there  should  be  a  contract,  —  whether  there  was 
an  aggregatio  mentium,  a  meeting  of  minds,  a  concurrence  of  in- 
tent. In  many  cases  the  constitutive  facts,  —  that  is,  all  the 
facts  which  need  be  stated  by  the  pleader  or  deposed  to  by  the 
witnesses,  will  be  indisputably  established;  but  yet  whether  this 
concurrence  of  intent  existed,  — in  other  words,  whether  there 
was  a  sale,  —  will  remain  an  inference  of  fact  to  be  drawn  by 
the  jury.  This,  however,  forms  an  exception  to  the  general 
rule  that  the  judge  pronounces  the  law  upon  conceded  or  estab- 
lished facts;  and  undoubtedly,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases  of 
this  kind,  the  judge,  and  not  the  ]m-y,  will  draw  the  conclusion. 
This  introduces  us  to  another  conception,  which  is,  — ■ 

§  1163.  Question  for  Jury  where  Facts  in  Doubt. — There 
is  no  doubt  whatever  upon  the  proposition  that,  where  the  facts 
are  in  doubt,  the  que.-^tion  is  to  be  resolved  by  the  jury  in  every 
case  where  they  return  a  general  verdict, — the  court  assisting 

1  Fuller    V.   Beau,  34   N.    H.    299;  the  vendor  of  a  ticket  describiug  the 

Houdlette    v.  Tallnaau,    14    Me.    403;  goods  (two  hundred  aud  twenty-three 

Burrows  v.  Stebbius,   26  Vt.  659.     It  bales  of  hay  lying  on  the  Levee  at  St. 

was  so  held  in  Glasgow  ■«.  Nicholson,  Louis),  and  the  price  at  which  they 

25   Mo.  29,  where  a  delivery  of  a  cer-  were  sold,  the  ticivet  authorizing  the 

titicate    of  the    city  weigher  of    the  purchaser  to  take  possession  as  soon 

weight    of    five    hogsheads  of   sugar  as    the   hay    could    be  weighed,  was 

which  lay  on  the  wharf,  together  with  held  sufficient  evidence  to  warrant  the 

a  bill  of  the  price,  was  held  to  consti-  jury  in  finding  that  the  hay  had  been 

tute  a  delivery  of  the  sugar.     In  Bass  delivered. 
V.  Walsh,  39  Mo.  192,  the   delivery  by  2  Ante,  §§  1112,  1114;  post,  §   1333. 


908  PEOVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1   Thomp.  Tv.y 

them  with  instructions  as  to  the  applicatory  principles  of  law, 
based  upon  hypothetical  facts  within  the  scope  of  the  evidence. 
Whenever,  then,  the  material  facts  are  left  in  doubt,  the  question 
is  to  be  decided  by  the  jury,  under  suitable  instructions  as  to  the 
law.^  Or,  to  throw  this  rule  into  contrast  with  the  preceding: 
"  When  the  law  can  pronounce,  upon  a  state  of  facts,  that  there 
is  or  is  not  a  delivery  and  acceptance,  it  is  a  question  of  law,  to 
be  decided  by  the  court.  But  when  there  may  be  uncertainty 
and  difficulty  in  determining  the  true  intent  of  the  parties  respect- 
ing the  delivery  and  acceptance,  from  the  facts  proved,  the  ques- 
tion of  acceptance  is  to  be  decided  by  the  jury."  ^  Again,  it  is 
said:  "  When  there  is  no  dispute  as  to  the  facts,  it  is  a  question 
of  law;  when  the  evidence  is  conflicting,  the  jury  must  decide."^ 
In  such  a  case  the  court  should  leave  it  to  the  jury,  upon  the  evi- 
dence, to  decide  whether  the  facts  which  are  adduced  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  delivery  and  acceptance  were  true,  and 
should  direct  them  hypothetically  that,  if  such  facts  are  true, 
they  do  or  do  not  constitute  a  delivery.^ 

§  11G4.    Cases  where  ruled  as  a  Question  of    Law.  —  The 

last  preceding  statements  undoubtedly  embody  the  general 
rule  ;  and  cases  are  found  where  the  question  has  been  ruled 
as  a  matter  of  law,  as  indeed  it  should  be  Avhere  the  facts 
are  both  settled  and  unequivocal.  Thus,  where  a  sale  of  wdieat 
w^as  made  which  had  been  consigned  to  B.,  and  a  delivery  order 
was  given  to  the  vendee,  and  the  Avheat  was  burned  in  an  elevator 
before  the  vendee  had  time  to  send  the  delivery  order  to  F.,  it 
was  held  that  the  sale  was  incomplete,  because  the  legal  title  was 
in  F.,  through  whose  co-operation  alone  it  could  have  been  vested 
in  the  plaintiff.  The  legal  title  was  hold  to  be  in  F.,  because  of 
the  wdieat  having  been  placed  in  his  elevator  and  mingled  with 
"  his  wheat,  in  conformity  with  a  peculiar  rule  in  regard  to  storage 

1  Fuller  V.  Bean,  34  N.  H.  299;  Rid-  ^  Hoiullette  u.  Tallman,  U  Me.  400; 

die  V.  Vanmin,  20  Pick.   (Mass.)  283;  Glass  r.  Gelvin,  80  Mo.  297,  300. 

George  V.  Stubbs,  20  Me.  250;  Draper  *  Glass  v.  Gelvin,  supra;  Hatch  v. 

V.  Jones,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  2«0;   Smith  Bailey,  12  Cnsh.  (Mass.)  29. 

V.  Denuie,  6  Pick.  (Mass.)  260;  Bishop  *  Williams  v.  Gray,  39  Mo.  201,  20G. 
V.  Shillito,  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  329,  note. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVIL]     sales  of  personal  property.         909 

in  elevators. 1  Indeed,  there  seems  to  be  nothing  in  the  subject 
of  sale  and  delivery  to  take  the  case  out  of  the  general  principle, 
subject  to  the  exception  already  and  hereafter  explained,^  that, 
where  the  facts  are  found  or  conceded,  whether  there  has  been 
a  delivery  to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds  and  constitute  a  sale, 
is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court.  This  in  most  cases  is  neces- 
sarily so ;  for  we  find  that  modern  courts  do  not  submit  the  ques- 
tion to  the  jury  upon  the  whole  evidence  without  instructions, 
but  that  they  instruct  them  hypothetically  whether  a  given  state 
of  facts,  shown  by  the  evidence,  does  or  does  not  constitute  a  sale. 
Thus,  in  a  case  in  Maine,  it  was  held  proper  for  the  judge  to 
charge  the  jury,  under  proper  evidence,  that,  if  they  found  that 
the  defendant  purchased  all  the  logs  charged  in  the  plaintiff's  ac- 
count, and  that  the  logs  were  all  deposited  at  the  same  place,  and 
that  the  defendant,  at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  employed  B.  to 
haul  them  out,  and  he  actually  did  haul  out  a  portion  of  them  on 
the  same  day  in  which  the  bargain  was  made,  and  as  soon  there- 
after as  could  be  conveniently  done,  and  that  they  Avere  received 
and  used  by  the  defendant  under  the  contract,  — this  Avas  such  a 
delivery  and  acceptance  as  the  law  required,  and  that  the  defend- 
ant would  be  chargeable  for  the  whole  property  sold.^  In  this 
case  the  court  did  no  more  than  apply  to  a  hypothetical  state  of 
facts  the  principle  that,  Avhere  there  has  been  a  parol  sale,  a  de- 
livery and  acceptance  of  a  part  is  a  delivery  of  the  whole,  so  as 
to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds  and  transfer  the  title.* 

§  1165.  Question  Drawn  to  the  Jury  where  a  Question  of 
Intent.  —  The  authorities  agree  that  if,  as  between  the  buyer 
and  the  seller,  anything  remains  to  be  done  before  the  goods  are 
to  be  delivered,  the  right  of  propert}'  does  not  pass.^     But  while 

1  Perkins  v.  Dacou,  13  Mich.  81.  336;     Outwater    v.    Dodge,    7    Cow. 

2  Ante,  §  11G2;  post,  §§  11C5,  1333.  (N.  Y.)  87;  Draper  v.  Joues,  11  Barb. 

3  Davis  V.  Moore,  13  Me.  424.  (N.  Y.)  203;  Barrett  v.   Pritchard,   2 

4  Waldron  v.  Chase,  37  Me.  414;  Pick.  (Mass.)  512;  Bishop  v.  Shillito, 
Damon  v.  Osborn,  1  Pick.  (Mass.)  2  Barn.  &  Aid.  329,  note;  Evans  v. 
470;  Riddle  v.  Varnum,  20  Pick.  Harris,  19  Barb.  (X.  Y.)  416;  Tarliug 
(Mass.)  280.  V.  Baxter,  G  Barn.  &  Cres.  360;  White- 

*  "Warren  v.  Buckminstcr,  24  N.  H.      house  v.  Frost,  12  East,  G14;  Hanson 


910 


PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND   JURY.        [1   Thoilip.  Tr.y 


this  is  so,  it  is  conceded  that  the  parties  may  agree,  either  ex- 
pressly or  tacitly,  to  change  this  rule,  and  that  title  to  the  prop- 
erty shall  pass  at  once.^  "  The  question,"  said  Lord  Brougham, 
"  must  always  be,  what  was  the  intention  of  the  parties  in  this 
respect,  and  that  is  of  course  to  be  collected  from  the  terms  of 
the  contract."  ^  Other  authorities  emphasize  the  idea  that  it  is 
a  question  of  intent.^  Intent  being  generally  a  question  for  a 
jury,  except  where  it  is  declared  in  a  written  instrument,*  it 
follows  as  a  necessary  conclusion,  that,  in  many  cases,  whether 
the  title  has  passed  will  be  a  question  of  fact  to  be  submitted 
to  a  jury  upon  all  the  evidence  ;  ^  though  it  has  been  said 
that  wdien  the  facts  are  ascertained,  either  by  the  written  agree- 
ment of  the  parties  or  by  the  findings  of  the  court,  *  *  * 
they    are    questions    of   law.^     This   is   in   accordance  'with  the 


V.  Meyer,  6  East,  6U;  Rugg  v.  Miuett, 
11  Eaqt,  209;  Simmons  v.  Swift,  5 
Baru.  &  Ci'es.  857;  Wallace  v.  Breeds, 
13  East,  522;  Macomber  v.  Parker,  13 
Pick.  (Mass.)  183.  It  is  said  that  a 
contract  of  sale  is  uot  complete  until 
the  happening  of  an  event  expressly 
provided  for,  or  so  long  as  anything 
remains  to  be  done  to  the  thing  sold, 
to  pnt  it  in  a  condition  for  sale,  or  to 
identify  it,  or  discriminate  it  from 
other  things.  McClung  v.  Kelly,  21 
la.  508,  511.  Nor  is  the  sale  complete 
while  anything  remains  to  be  done  to 
determine  the  quality  of  the  goods,  if 
the  price  depends  upon  the  quality,  un- 
less this  is  to  be  done  by  the  buyer 
alone ;  and  even  if  earnest  money,  or  if 
part  of  the  price  be  paid,  the  sale  is 
not  for  that  reason  complete.  It  has 
been  inaccurately  said  that  "  no  sale 
is  complete,  so  as  to  vest  in  the  ven- 
dee an  immediate  right  of  property,  so 
long  as  anything  remains  to  be  done 
between  the  buyer  and  seller  in  rela- 
tion to  the  thing  sold."  McClung  v. 
Kelley,  supra.  See  Story  on  Sales,  § 
296  and  note  2;    Chitty  Contr.   (10th 


Am.   ed.)  396,   397;  Add.    Contr.    (2d 
Am.  ed.)  225,  228. 

1  Alexander  v.  Gardner,  1  Bing.  N. 
Cas.  G71;  Schindler  v.  Houston,  1 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  51;  Mixer  w.  Cook,  31 
Me.  340;  Draper  v.  Jones,' 11  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)   263. 

2  Logan  V.  Le  Mesurier,  6  Moore 
P.  C.  1]6. 

3  Furniss  v.  Hone,  8  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
256;  Smith  v.  Dennie,  6  Pick,  (Mass.) 
266;  Smiths.  Lynes,  4N.  Y.  44;  Elgee 
Cotton  Cases,  22  Wall.  (U.  S.)  180, 187; 
Hatch  V.  Oil  Co.,  100  U.  S.  124,  131; 
Terry  v.  Wheeler,  25  N.  Y.  520,  525; 
Callahan  v.  Myers,  89  HI.  566,  570j 
Sewell  V.  Eaton,  6  Wis.  490;  Fletcher 
V.  Ingram,  46  Wis.  191,  201.  <<  It  is," 
saidBigelow,  C.  J.,  "a  question  of  in- 
tent, arising  on  the  interpretation  of 
the  entire  contract  in  each  case." 
Briggs  V.  A.  Light  Boat,  7  Allen 
(Mass.),  287. 

*  Post,  §  1333,  et  seq. 

5  Fuller  V.  Bean,  34  N.  H.  290,  305. 

6  Terry  v.  Wheeler,  25  N.  Y.  620, 
525. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII. ]     SALES  of  personal  property.        911 

views  of  the  late  Mr.  Benjamin,  who,  after  pointing  out  the 
distinction  between  a  sale  and  a  mere  promise  to  sell,  says: 
"  Both  these  contracts  being  equally  legal  and  valid,  it  is  ob- 
vious that,  whenever  a  dispute  arises  as  to  the  true  character 
of  an  agreement,  the  question  is  one  rather  of  fact  than  of  law. 
The  agreement  is  just  what  the  parties  intended  to  make  it.  If 
that  intention  is  clearly  and  unequivocally  manifested,  cadit 
qucestio.  But  parties  very  frequently  fail  to  express  their  in- 
tentions, or  they  manifest  them  so  imperfectly  as  to  leave  it 
doubtful  what  they  really  mean  ;  and  when  this  is  the  case,  the 
courts  have  applied  certain  rules  of  construction,  which,  in  most 
instances,  furnish  conclusive  tests  for  determining  the  contro- 
versy.^ 

§  1166.  Whether  the  Parties  intended  that  Title  should 
pass,  although  Something  remains  to  be  done  to  the  Prop- 
erty. — Restating  the  rule  of  the  preceding  section,  it  seems  to 
be  that  the  question  whether  a  sale  is  completed  or  only  execu- 
tory, is  usually  one  to  be  determined  from  the  intent  of  the 
parties,  as  gathered  from  their  contract,  and  from  the  situation 
of  the  thing  sold  and  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  sale ; 
that  where  the  goods  sold  are  designated  so  that  no  question  can 
arise  as  to  the  thing  intended  to  be  sold,  it  is  not  absolutely 
essential  that  there  should  be  a  delivery,  or  that  the  goods  should 
be  in  deliverable  condition,  or  that  the  quantity  or  quality, 
when  the  price  depends  upon  either  or  both,  should  be  deter- 
mined,—  these  being  circumstances  indicating  intent,  but  not 
conclusive  ;  but  that,  where  anything  is  to  be  done  by  the  vendor, 
or  by  the  mutual  concurrence  of  both  parties,  for  the  purpose  of 
ascertaining  the  price  of  the  goods,  as  by  weighing,  testing  or 
measuring  them,  where  the  price  is  to  depend  upon  the  quantity 
or  quality  of  the  goods,  the  performance  of  those  tilings,  in  the 
absence  of  anything  indicating  a  contrary  intent,  is  to  be  deemed 
presumptively  a  condition  precedent  to  the  transfer  of  the  prop- 
erty, although  the  individual  goods  be  ascertained,  and  they  ap- 
pear to  be  in  a  state   in  which  they  may  be  and  ought    to   be 

1  Benjamin  on  Sales  (Sd  ed.),  §  309. 


912  PRO.VINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1  Thoilip.    Tl"., 

accepted.^  "Presumptively,"  says  Cooley,  C.  J.,  "the  title 
does  not  pass,  even  though  the  articles  be  designated,  so  long  as 
anything  remains  to  be  done  to  determine  the  sum  to  be  paid ; 
but  this  is  only  a  presumption,  and  is  liable  to  be  overcome  by 
such  facts  and  circumstances  as  indicate  an  intent  in  the  parties 
to  be  controverted."  And  it  was  held  that  the  Circuit  Court 
erred  in  treating  the  question  as  a  question  of  law,  instead  of  de- 
ciding it  as  a  question  of  fact.^ 

§  HG7.  Cases  where  Decided  as  a  Question  of  Fact.  — Upon 
conflicting  or  equivocal  evidence,  the  question  whether  a  sale  of 
property  has  taken  place  is,  then,  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 
It  has  been  ruled,  in  a  good  many  cases,  where  the  contract 
rested  in  parol,  that,  whether  there  has  been  a  complete  sale  or 
not,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.*  On  like  evidence,  it  has 
been  frequently  held  a  question  for  a  jury,  whether  there  has 
been  a  delivery  by  the  seller  and  an  acceptance  by  the  buyer, 
according  to  the  contract  or  intent  of  the  parties,  so  as  to  trans- 
fer title  from  one  to  the  other  and  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds.^ 
It  has  been  held  that,  when  the  facts  and  the  intention  of  the  par- 
ties are  ascertained,  it  is  for  the  court  to  decide  whether  in  law 

1  Lingham  v.  Eggleston,  27  Mich.  608;    Caywood   v.   Timmous,  31   Kan. 

324;  restated  by  Cooley,  J.,  iu  Byles  v.  304. 

Colier,  54  Mich.  1,  4.     Other  cases  iu  2  Byles  v.  Coljer,  54  Mich.  1,  5. 

affirmation  of  the  same  doctrine  are:  ^  Ante,  §  1114.  See, for  illustration, 

Hatch  V.  Fowler,  28  Mich.  205;  Hahn  Globe  National  Bank  v.  lugalls,  130 

u.  Fredericks,  30  Mich.  223;  Wilkinson  Mass.   8.     Compare  National  Bank  r. 

V.   Holiday,  33   Mich.   386;    Grant  v.  Ingalls,  126  Mass.  209.     . 

Merchants   &c.   Bank,  35    Mich.  515;  •*  De  Bidder  ?;.  McKnight,  13  Johns. 

Scotten  V.  Sutter,  37  Mich.  526;  Car-  (N.  Y.)  293;   McCluug  r.  Kelley,  21  la. 

penter  v.  Graham,  42  Mich.  191 ;  Brew-  508,  511 ;  Gatzweiler  r.  Morgan,  51  Mo. 

erv.  Salt  Asso.,  47  Mich.  526;  Kelsea  47. 

V.  Haines,  41  N.  H.  246;  Southwestern  ^  Kelsea  v.   Haines,  41  N.  H.  246, 

Freight  Co.   v.   Stanard,   44  Mo.  71;  253;  Phillips   v.  Bistolli,  2    BarUc    & 

Shelton  ?;.  Franklin,  68  HI.  333;  Straus  Cres.  511;  Chaplin  v.  Rogers,  1  East, 

V.  Minzesheimer,  78  111.  494;    Crofoot  192;  Cunningham  v.  Ashbrook,  20  Mo. 

V.  Bennett,  2  N.  Y.  258;  Groat  v.  Gile,  553;  Bratt??.  Chase,  40  Me.  269:  Jones 

51  N.  Y.  431 ;  Burrows  v.  Wliitaker,  71  r.  Hook,  47  Mo.  329 ;  Rhea  v.  Riner^  21 

N.  Y.  291;  Dennis  v.  Alexander,  3  Pa.  111.  526,  531;  Weld  v.  Came,  98  Mass. 

St.   60;    Galloway   v.    Week,  54   Wis.  152;  Obcr  r.  Carson,  62  Mo  209,  214. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.]     SALES  of  personal  property.        913 

they  constitute  an  acceptance ;  but  if  they  are  disputed  it  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  there  has  been  a  delivery  and  ac- 
ceptance in  point  of  fact,  and  their  finding  that  there  has  been  an 
acceptance  puts  an  end  to  the  question  of  law./  It  has  also  been 
said:  "Whether  the  passing  of  the  sale  note  was  symbolical 
of  a  delivery,  or  whether  the  buyer's  request  that  it  [the 
goods]  should  not  be  weighed  until  the  next  morning,  his  agree- 
ing to  pay  the  charges  and  expenses  from  the  time  of  the  sale, 
and  employing  Hawley  to  see  that  it  was  properly  covered  on 
his  account,  amounted  to  an  acceptance  and  receipt,  were  all 
matters  of  fact  to  be  found  by  the  jury."  ^ 

§  1168.  Illustrations  of  the  Foregoing. — After  a  bargain  and 
sale  of  a  stack  of  hay,  between  parties  on  the  spot,  evidence  tbat  the 
vendee  actually  sold  part  of  it  to  another  person  (by  whom,  though 
against  the  vendee's  approbation,  it  was  taken  away),  was  held  suffi- 
cient to  warrant  the  jury  in  finding  a  delivery  by  the  original  and  an 
acceptance  by  the  vendee,  such  as  to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds.^ .... 
In  an  action  by  an  administrator  to  recover  possession  of  certain  slaves, . 
it  was  shown  that  the  intestate,  some  forty  years  before,  purcliased  one  of 
the  slaves  and  took  a  bill  of  sale  for  her  to  himself ;  that  he  subsequently 
sought  to  divest  himself  of  the  title  and  vest  it  in  his  wife  ;  and  that  to 
that  end,  the  original  bill  of  sale  was  surrendered,  the  vendor  substituting 
in  place  of  it  another  written  transfer  to  the  testator's  wife,  under  whom 
the  defendants  claimed  title.  It  was  held,  on  this  evidence,  that  the 
court  erred  in  directing  a  verdict  for  the  defendant.  The  court  said : 
"The  title  of  Seals  (the  plaintiff's  intestate)  prior  to  March,  1830,  is 
unquestioned.  It  is  equally  clear  that  he  intended  and  attempted  to 
effect  a  valid  legal  transfer  to  Mrs.  Seals.  Whether  he  succeeded  in 
carrying  his  intention  into  effect  is  the  question.  There  being  no  cred- 
itors to  complain,  it  was  his  right  to  deal  with  his  property  as  he 
pleased  —  to  give  it  to  whom  he  thought  proper.  The  intention  to 
part  with  his  title  and  to  vest  that  title  in  his  wife  being  clear,  it  would 
require  but  slight  evidence,  after  the  lapse  of  nearly  forty  years,  to 
satisfy'  the  mmds  of  either  court  or  jury  that  the  intention  of  the  par- 
ties was  effectuated  by  a  proper  delivery,  even  if  it  should  be  consid- 

1  Chaplin  v.  Rogers,  1  East,  192.  *  8  Chaplin  v.   Rogers,  1   East,    192. 

2  Bass  V.  Walsh,  39  Mo.  192,  201. 

58 


914  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOmp.  Tl'.^ 

erecl  that  the  claim  of  the  husband's  representatives  was  not  of  too  stale 
a  nature  to  deserve  consideration  in  a  court  of  justice.  Nevertheless, 
upon  the  issue  of  delivery  or  no  delivery,  title  or  no  title,  the  facts 
should  have  been  submitted  to  the  judgment  and  finding  of  the 
jury."^--  -  -  Where  A.  bought  the  boards  to  be  made  out  of  a  cer- 
tain quantity  of  logs  in  the  possession  of  B.,  to  be  paid  for  at  a  stipu- 
lated price  per  hundred  feet,  when  the  boards  should  be  sawed,  and  the 
boards  were  sawed,  piled,  and  notice  given  to  the  purchaser, —  it  was 
ruled,  seemingly  as  a  matter  of  law,  that,  considering  the  nature  of  the 
articles  sold,  the  delivery  was  sufficient  to  render  the  sale  valid  and  to 

transfer  the  title  to  the  purchaser.- By  the  condition  of  a  sale  at 

auction,  the  purchaser  was  to  pay  30  per  cent,  upon  the  price,  upon 
being  declared  the  highest  bidder,  and  the  residue  before  the  goods 
were  removed.  A  lot  was  knocked  down  to  A.  as  highest  bidder,  and 
delivered  to  him  immediately.  After  it  had  remained  in  his  hands  three 
or  four  minutes,  he  stated  that  he  had  been  mistaken  in  the  price,  and 
refused  to  keep  it.  No  part  of  the  price  had  been  paid.  It  was  held 
that  it  was  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  whether  there  had  been  a 
delivery  by  the  seller  and  an  actual  acceptance  by  the  buyer,  intended 
by  both  parties  to  have  the  effect  of  transferring  the  right  of  posses- 
sion from  one  to  the  other. ^ In  an  action  for  the  purchase  price  of 

lumber,  the  evidence  being  conflicting,  it  was  held  for  the  jury,  not 
for  the  court,  to  determine :  1.  Whether  the  lumber  was  delivered  under 
one  entire  contract,  so  that  the  acceptance  of  a  part  would  operate  as 
an  implied  acceptance  of  the  whole  ;  2.  Whether  the  lumber  delivered 
was  of  the  kind  and  quality  contracted  for ;  and,  if  not,  3.  Whether, 
after  discovering  the  defects  and  notifying  the  plaintiff  thereof,  the 
defendant  kept  the  lumber  in  a  safe  and  suitable  place,  reasonably  con- 
venient for  delivery  to  the  plaintiff  upon  demand  and  the  payment  of 
lawful  charges.^ 

§  1169.   WhetherDeliveryof  Part  a  Delivery  of  the  Whole. — 

A  sale  of  personal  property  and  a  receipt,  acknowledging  pay- 
ment with  delivery  of  a  portion,  do  not  necessarily  transfer  to 
the  vendee  title  in  the  whole  property  sold.     Delivery  of  a  ])art 

1  Jones  V.  Hook,  47  Mo.  329,  opiu-      Cres.    511.     Compare     Bleukiu.sop   v. 
ion  by  Currier,  J.  _         Clayton,  IJ.  B.  Moore,  328;  Carter  v. 

2  Bates    V.     Conklini,',     10    Wen'd.      Toussaint,  oBarn.  &  Aid.  255. 

(N.  Y.)  389.  ^  Rood  v.  Priestly,  58  Wis.  255. 

3  Phillips    V.  Bistolli,    2     Barn.    & 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.]     SALES  of  personal  property.        915 

operates  as  a  constructive  delivery  of  the  whole  only  in  cases 
where  it  is  intended  by  the  parties  that  such  shall  be  the  result.^ 
Whether  delivery  of  a  part  is  a  delivery  of  the  whole  is  there- 
fore a  question  of  fact  to  be  submitted  to  a  jury, "^  and  it  is  error 
to  instruct  them  thilt  "a  sale  of  the  whole  and  receipt  for  payment 
and  delivery  of  part,  as  between  the  vendor  and  vendee,  would 
be  a  delivery  of  the  whole,  which  was  then  manufactured,  toward 
the  contract,"  etc,^ 

§  1170.  Illustration.  —  An  agreement  was  made  between  A.  and 
B.,  by  which  A.  was  to  have  the  right  to  take  possession  of  the  goods 
of  B. ,  and  sell  them  to  pay  a  debt  of  B.  to  A.  At  the  time  when  the 
agreement  was  made,  B.  kept  the  goods  in  a  certain  store,  from  which 
a  portion  was  afterwards  moved  to  a  new  store.  A.  went  to  the  new  store 
and  told  B.  that  he  had  a  right  to  take  possession  and  did  take  posses- 
sion, and  put  B.  in  as  keeper,  and  directed  him  to  sell  the  goods  for  A. 
B.  agreed  to  do  it.  It  was  held  that  this  was  sufficient  evidence  of  a 
taking  possession  of  the  goods  in  both  stores,  to  entitle  A.  to  maintain 
replevin  against  an  officer  who  subsequently  attached  the  goods  in  the 
old  store  as  the  property  of  B.,  and  it  was  for  the  jury  to  determine 
whether  possession  was  taken  of  a  part  for  the  whole.  "^ 

§1171.  Bona  Fide  Purchaser  for  Value.  —  Where  it  is  a 
material  question,  in  an  action  of  replevin  for  a  chattel,  whether 
the  defendant  is  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value,  as  where  the 
defendant  bought  it  from  the  plaintiff's  vendee,  who  had  paid 
counterfeit  money  to  the  plaintiff  for  it,  —  it  has  been  held  that 
the  question  was  oneybr  the  jury. ^  This  is  obviously  so,  it  being 
a  question  of  intent.^ 

§  1172.  Whether  a  Sale  was  Conditional.  —  Whether  a  sale 
of  personal  property  was  an  absolute  or  conditional  one  is  a  ques- 

1  Pratt  V.  Chase,  40  Me.  269,  273;  ard,   19  Pick.  (Mass.)    202.     See  also 
Dixon  V.  Yates,  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  313,  per  Boynton  v.  Vezie,  24:  Me.  286. 
Littledale,  J. ;    Buuuy    v.    Poyutz,    4  »  pratt  v.  Cliase,  40  Me.  269,  273. 
Barn.  &  Ad.  568;  Simmons  v.  Swift,  5  ■*  Wilson  v.  Russell,  136  Mass.  211. 
Barn.  &  Cres.  857.  ^  Green  v.  Humphrey,  50  Pa.  St.  212. 

2  As  was  done  in  Shurtleff  v.  Will-  «  p^gi^  §  1333^  etseq. 


916  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1   Thoilip.  Tl'., 

tion  of  fact /or  the  jury  ?■  In  a  contest  touching  title  to  a  chattel, 
where  the  question  depends  upon  whether  the  sale  of  the  chattel 
was  absolute  or  conditional,  if  the  plaintiff  claims  under  an  ab- 
solute sale,  the  burden  is  upon  him  ;  or,  if  he  claims  under  a 
conditional  sale,  the  burden  is  equally  upon  him,  to  prove  a  com- 
pliance with  the  condition.-  Where  the  evidence  touching  the 
agreement  rests  in  parol,  it  is  to  be  left  to  the  jury,  upon  all  the 
evidence,  to  decide  which  kind  of  a  sale  it  was.^ 

§  1173.  Instruction  as  to  an  Absolute  Sale  Intended  as  a 
Pledge.  —  "  The  court  instructs  the  jury  that,  although  they  may  be- 
lieve that  there  was  a  verbal  sale,  absolute  in  its  terms,  of  the  property 
to  Mudd  (the  defendant),  by  Ingle  (the  plaintiff),  and  a  delivery  of  it 
to  Mudd,  with  a  condition  or  understanding  between  them  that  Ingle 
should  have  his  team  back  upon  complying  with  the  conditions  of  the 
agreement,  —  then  said  sale  is  simply  a  pledge  of  the  property  to  secure 
tlie  indebtedness,  and  the  ownership  of  the  property  is  and  was  all  the 
time  in  plaintiff,  subject  to  the  pa^^ment  of  the  indebtedness  existing 
between  them,  for  the  security  of  which  the  property  was  dehvered  to 
Mudd.'"* 

§  1174.  Whether  a  Sale  and  a  Delivery  of  Chattels  were 
Parts  of  one  Transaction. —  It  has  been  held,  under  circum- 
stances, that,  whether  a  sale  of  personal  property  and  a  delivery 
of  certain  chattels  were  parts  of  the  same  transaction,  or  were 
separate  transactions,  is  a  question /o?*  the  jury  .^ 

§  1175.  Delivery  of  Personal  Property  purchased  with 
Land.  —  Where  one  purchases  land  and  receives  a  conveyance 
therefor,  and  at  the  same  time  buys  personal  property  situated 
on  the  land,  the  question  whether  the  vendee  had  actual  posses- 
sion of  the  land,  is  an  important  one,  in  determining  whether  there 
was  an  actual  delivery  of  possession  of  the  personal  property ; 

1  Richey  v.  Burues,  83  Mo.  362.  ^  Sawyer    v.     Spofford,     4     Cush. 

2  See  Whitwell  ■;;.  Vincent,  4  Pick.      (Mass.)  5!)8. 

(Mass.)  449;  Reed  v.  Upton,  10  Pick.  ^  Approved  in  Ingle  v.   Mudd,   86 

(Mass.)    522;    Heath    v.    Randall,    4      Mo.  216.     The  action  was  replevin  for 
Cush.  (Mass.)  195.  the  property  spoken  of. 

s  Keen  v.  Preston,  24  Ind.  395. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.     SALES  of  personal  property.  917 

which  latter  question  is  to  be  regarded,  it  seems,  a  question  for 
the  jury  ?■ 

§  1176.  Compliance  with  a  Contract  of  Sale  which  contains 
the  Words  "  More  or  Less."  —  "In  sales  of  merchandise,  espec- 
ially in  large  quantities,  where  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain  with 
precise  accuracy  the  number  or  weight  of  the  articles,  before  con- 
cluding the  contract  for  their  purchase,  it  is  necessary  and  usual 
to  insert  the  words  '  more  or  less,'  or  '  about,'  in  connection  with 
the  specific  amount  which  forms  the  subject  of  the  contract,  in 
order  to  cover  any  variation  from  the  estimate,  which  is  likely  to 
arise  from  differences  in  weight,  errors  in  counting,  diminution 
by  shrinkage,  or  other  similar  causes.  But  in  such  cases,  parol 
evidence  is  not  admitted  to  show  that  the  parties  intended  to  buy 
and  sell  a  different  quantity  or  amount  from  that  stated  in  the 
written  agreement.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  hold  to  be  a  contract 
for  the  sale  of  the  quantity  or  amount  specified ;  and  the  effect 
of  the  words  '  more  or  less '  is  only  to  permit  the  vendor  to 
fulfill  his  contract  by  a  delivery  of  so  much  as  may  reasonably 
and  fairly  be  held  to  be  a  compliance  with  the  contract,  after 
making  due  allowance  for  excess  or  short  delivery  arising  from 
the  usual  and  ordinary  causes,  which  prevent  an  accurate  esti- 
mate of  the  weight  or  number  of  the  articles  sold;  or,  as  it  is 
sometimes  briefly  expressed,  it  is  '  an  absolute  contract  for  a 
specific  quantity  within  a  reasonable  limit.'  "What  is  a  reason- 
able limit,  and  a  substantial  compliance  with  such  contract,  if 
the  facts  are  not  in  dispute  between  the  parties,  is  a  question  for 
the  determination  of  the  court.'' ^"^ 


1  Cahoon  v.  Marshall,  25  Cal.  197.  and  reasonable  limit  of  short  delivery; 

2  Cabot  V.  Winsor,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  and  that,  by  proof  of  a  delivery  of  a 
546,  550,  opinion  by  Bigelow,  C.  J.  portion  of  the  475  bundles,  and  a  read- 
See  also  Bourne  v.  Seymour,  16  Com.  inoss  to  deliver  the  residue  of  the  lot. 
Bench,  33<;;  Pemboke  Iron  Co.  v.  Par-  the  plaintiff  proved  a  full  compliance 
sons,  5  Gray  CMass.),  589.  In  the  case  with  the  terms  of  his  contract.  In 
first  cited,  under  the  circumstances,  Cross  v.  Eglin,  2  Barn.  &  Adolph.  106, 
five  per  cent  in  five  hundred  bundles  the  question  was  likewise  ruled  as  a 
of  gunny  bags  was  held  not  to  be  such  question  of  law,  and  it  was  held  that 
a  deficiency  as  to  fall  outside  of  a  fair  where  the  contract  was  for  "  about 


018  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoiup.  Tr., 

§  1111 .  Under  what  Circiunstances  Question  withdrawn 
from  the  Jurj.  —  It  is  said  by  Mr.  Browne  in  his  treatise  on  the 
statute  of  frauds:  ''Whether  there  has  been  a  delivery  and  ac- 
ceptance sufficient  to  satisfy  the  statute  of  frauds  is  a  mixed 
question  of  law  and  fact.  But  it  is  for  the  court  to  withhold  the 
facts  from  the  jury,  when  they  are  not  such  as  can  afford  good 
ground  for  finding  an  acceptance;  and  this  includes  cases  where, 
thouo;h  the  court  mio;ht  admit  that  there  was  a  scintilla  of 
evidence  tending  to  show  an  acceptance,  they  would  still  feel 
bound  to  set  aside  a  verdict  finding  an  acceptance  upon  that  evi- 
dence." ^  Quoting  this  language,  it  was  said  in  a  case  in  Massa- 
chusetts: "  What  this  scintilla  is,  needs  to  be  stated  a  little  more 
definitely ;  otherwise  it  may  be  understood  to"  include  all  cases 
where,  on  a  motion  for  a  new  trial,  a  verdict  would  be  set  aside, 
as  against  the  weight  of  evideijce.  It  would  be  impossible  to 
draw  a  line  theoretically,  because  evidence,  in  its  very  nature, 
varies  from  the  weakest  to  the  strongest,  by  imperceptible  de- 
grees. But  the  practical  line  of  distinction  is  that,  if  the  evi- 
dence is  such  that  the  court  would  set  aside  any  number  of 
verdicts  rendered  upon  it,  toties  quoties,  then  the  cause  should  be 
taken  from  the  jury,  by  instructing  them  to  find  a  verdict  for  the 
defendant.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  evidence  is  such  that, 
though  one  or  two  verdicts  rendered  upon  it  would  be  set  aside 
on  motion,  yet  a  second  or  third  verdict  would  be  suffered  to 
stand,  the  cause  should  not  be  taken  from  the  jury,  but  should 
be  submitted  to  them  under  instructions.  This  rule  throws  upon 
the  court  a  duty  which  may  sometimes  be  very  delicate ;  but  it 


300  quarters  more  or  less,"  and  350  Woodlief, /d.  173,  note;  Hall  v.  Cun- 
quarters  were  tendered,  the  vendee  ningham,  1  Munf.  (Va.)  330;  Twiford 
was  not  bound  to  receive  such  a  large  v.  Wareup,  Finch,  311 ;  Winch  v.  Win- 
excess,  at  least  in  the  absence  of  evi-  Chester,  1  Ves.  &  B.  375;  Smith  v. 
dence  showing  that  an  excess  above  Evans,  6  Binn.  (Pa.)  109;  Boar  v. 
the  quantity  named  was  in  conterapla-  McCormick,  1  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  166; 
tion.  Compare  Moore  v.  Camplx'll,  10  Glenn  v.  Glenn,  4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  488; 
Exch.  323;  Stebbins  v.  Eddy,  4  Mason  Anon.,  2  Freem.  (Miss.)  107;  Joliffe 
(U.  S.),  414;  Thomas  v.  Perry,  4  Pet.  v.  Hite,  1  Call  (Va.),  301. 
C.  C.  (U.  S.)  49;  Nelson  v.  Matthews,  i  Browne  St.  of  Frauds,  chap.  15, 
2  Hen.  &  M.    (Va.)  164;    Quesnel  v.  §  321. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.]     SALES  of  personal  property.       919 

seems  to  be  the  only  practicable  rule   which  the  nature  of  the 
case  admits."  ^ 


Article  II. — Precedents  of  Instruction  to  Juries. 

Section 

1180.  How  a  Jury  Instructed  iu  such  Cases. 

1181.  Precedent  of  au  lustructiou:  When  Sale  Complete  so  as  to  cast  Risk  of 

Ownership  upon  Buyer. 

1182.  Another  Precedent. 

1183.  Delivery  of  Sale  Ticket  a  Symbolical  Delivery. 

1184.  Delivery  of  Sale  Ticket,  Goods  to  be  Subsequently  Weighed. 

1185.  Another  Statement  of  the  Same  Conclusion. 

1186.  Validity  of  Sale  as  Against  Subsequent  Purchaser  in  Action  of  Replevin 

Under  Iowa  Statute. 

1187.  What  Delivery  of  Possession  Necessary  as  against  Attaching  Creditor 

of  Vendor. 

1188.  Another  Precedent. 

1189.  Symbolical  Delivery  by  Delivery  of  Bill  of  Lading. 

§   1180.   How  a   Jury  Instructed   in  such  Cases.  —  It  is  for 

the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  Avhat  would  amount  in  law  to  a  sale ; 
and  W'here  a  custom  of  trade  has  been  proved,  governing  the  par- 
ticular transaction,  it  is  proper  to  refer  them  to  the  custom  as 
the  standard  by  which  to  determine  whether  the  contract  was 
completed  ;  but  the  ultimate  question  whether  a  sale  in  fact  took 
place  is,  where  the  evidence  is  conHicting,  a  question  for  the 
jury.^  It  has  been  held  error  for  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury, 
in  substance,  in  a  case  where  the  question  related  to  a  sale  of 
hogs,  that,  if  the  hogs  were  sold  by  the  net  weight,  to  be  ascer- 
tained by  weighing  after  they  were  slaughtered  and  cleaned,  then 
the  presumption  that  the  sale  was  completed  by  the  delivery  is 
met  and  repelled,  and  the  loss  falls  on  the  plaintiff  as  owner, 
unless  he  shows  that  the  parties  intended  the  sale  to  be  complete 
upon  the  delivery, — there  being  no  such  presumption,  but  the 
circumstance  being  merely  for  the  consideration  of  the  jury,  iu  de- 

*  Denny     v.     Williams,     5    Allen  an  act  of  delivery  and  acceptance,  and 

(Mass.),    1,5.     The   court  then  pro-  that  a  verdict  for  the  defendant  should 

ceeded  to  set  out  a  state  of  facts  on  have  been  directed, 
■which  it  was  held  that  there  was  not  -  Erisman  v.   Walters,  26   Pa.    St. 

even  a   scintilla  of  evidence  to  prove  467. 


920  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND   JURY.       [1   Thomp.  Tl'., 

termining  the  intention  of  the  parties.^  On  the  other  hand, 
proceeding  upon  the  conception  that,  "  what  amounts  to  a  deliv- 
ery of  the  goods  sold,  when  the  facts  are  given,  is  a  question  of 
law,"'  an  instruction  was  approved  which  directed  the  jury  that 
if  a  given  state  of  facts,  presented  by  the  evidence,  was  true, 
they  constituted  a  good  delivery. ^  The  language  of  Chancellor 
Kent  would  seem  to  form  a  good  text  for  a  hypothetical  instruc- 
tion to  a  jury  in  such  a  case:  "  The  good  sense  of  the  doctrine 
on  this  subject  would  seem  to  be  that,  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
statute  [of  frauds],  tliere  must  be  a  delivery  of  the  goods  by  the 
vendor,  with  an  intention  of  vesting  the  right  of  possession  in 
the  vendee,  and  an  actual  acceptance  by  the  vendee,  with  the  in- 
tention of  taking  possession  as  owner."  ^ 

§  1181.  Precedent  op  an  Instruction  —  When  Sale  Co^tplete  so 
AS  TO  CAST  Risk  of  Ownership  upon  Buyer.  —  "  That  when  the  terms 
of  a  sale  are  agreed  upon  and  the  bargain  is  struck,  and  everything 
which  the  seller  has  to  do  about  the  property  is  comjjlete,  the  contract 
of  sale  is  then  perfect  —  the  ownership  of  the  property  vests  at  once  in 
the  buyer,  and  this  he  takes  at  once ;  the  property,  and  all  the  risks  of 
accident  to  the  property  is  upon  the  buyer  who  is  the  owner  thereof."  ^ 

§  1182.  Another  Precedent.  —  "  All  that  is  necessary  to  pass  prop- 
erty is  that  the  buyer  and  seller  agree.  If  one  who  has  a  long  course 
of  dealing  with  another,  have  a  correspondence  in  regard  to  certain 
specific  property,  nearer  to  the  purchaser  than  the  seller,  and  more 
proper!}-,  by  reason  of  their  business  relations,  in  the  control  of  the 
purchaser,  and  they  agree  one  to  buy  and  the  other  to  sell,  the  sale  is 
complete,  just  as  soon  as  they  agree  and  the  seller  charges  the  buyer, 
and  the  buyer  credits  their  respective  books  with  the  price  of  the  prop- 
erty." ^ 

§  1183.  Delivery  of  Sale  Ticket  a  Symbolical  Delivery.  —  "If 
the  court  finds  that  the  plaintiffs,  by  their  agent,  sold  the  hay  in  ques- 

1  Cunningham  v.  Ashbrook,  20  Mo.  3  2  Kent  Com.  504. 

654.  ^  Approved  in  Robinson  v.  Ulil,  0 

2  Williams  v.  Gray,  39  Mo.  202,  20G.  Neb.  328,  331,  332.  See  Gen.  Stat,  of 
So  held  in  Glass  v.  Gelvin,  80  Mo.  297,      Neb.,  chap.  25,  §  11. 

300;  Hatch  v.Bayley,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  ^  Robinson    v.    Uhl,    6    Neb.    328, 

27.  332. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.]     SALES  of  i*ersonal  property.        921 

tion  to  the  defendants  at  $33  per  ton,  and,  at  the  time  delivered  to 
him  a  sale  ticket,  as  described  in  evidence,  and  that  by  custom  said  sale 
ticket  authorized  defendant  to  receive  the  hay  and  place  the  same  under 
his  control,  then  there  was  a  valid  sale  and  delivery  of  the  hay."  ^ 

§  1184.  Delivery  of  Sale  Ticket  —  Goods  to  be  Subsequently 
Weighed.  — "If  it  appear  from  the  evidence  that  plaintiffs,  by  their 
agent,  Hawley,  agreed  to  sell,  and  that  the  defendant  agreed  to  buy  the 
223  bales  of  hay  at  the  price  and  sum  of  S33  per  ton ;  that  Hawley 
thereupon  handed  defendant  a  ticket  showing  the  number  of  bales  of 
hay  and  where  the  same  was,  and  that  by  the  custom  of  merchants  the 
said  ticket  would  authorize  the  hay  to  be  delivered  to  the  defendant  as 
soon  as  the  same  was  weighed,  and  that  defendant  thereupon  stated 
that  he  did  not  want  it  weighed  on  that  day ;  that  plaintiff  assented 
thereto,  upon  condition  that  said  hay  should  be  at  the  charge  of  defend- 
ant, to  which  condition  defendant  assented,  — then  plaintiffs  are  entitled 
to  recover  of  the  defendant  the  price  agreed  on."  ^ 

§  1185.  Another  Statement  of  the  same  Conclusion.  —  "  If  it  ap- 
pear, from  the  evidence  in  this  case,  that,  by  the  contract  between  the 
parties,  the  hay  was  to  be  weighed  merely  for  the  purpose  of  ascertain- 
ing how  much  money  defendant  was  to  pay  at  $33  per  ton,  the  price 
having  been  agreed  upon ;  that  the  hay  was  at  the  levee,  at  the  time  of 
such  contract  of  sale,  separate  from  any  other  hay ;  that  it  was  not  in 
the  actual  possession  of  some  third  party,  nor  in  the  actual  possession 
of  any  one  ;  that  a  ticket,  or  other  badge  of  authority  to  receive  or  take 
the  hay,  either  before  or  after  the  hay  should  be  weighed,  was  given  by 
the  plaintiff's  agent  to  the  defendant,  —  then  the  sale  and  purchase  is 
complete,  and  the  defendant  is  liable  for  the  value  of  the  hay  at  the 
contract  price."  ^ 

§  1186.  Validity  of  Sale  as  Against  Subsequent  Purchaser  in  Ac- 
tion OF  Replevin  Under  Iowa  Statute.  —  "  Under  the  laws,  a  sale  of 
personal  property  is  not  valid  as  against  a  subsequent  purchaser,  for 
value,  without  notice  thereof,  unless  the  same  is  duly  recorded,  when 
the  possession  of  the  property  remains  with  the  vendor.     In  this  case 

1  Approved  in    Bass  v.  AYalsh,   39  ^  Approved    in  Bass  «.  "Walsh,  39 

Mo.  193.  Mo.  193. 

*  Approved  in  Bass    v.   Walsh,  39 
Mo.  193. 


922  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

you  will  notice  that  the  parties  herein  both  claim  title  from  John 
O'Hara.  The  plaintiff  claims  that  O'Harasold  and  delivered  the  cattle 
to  him,  prior  to  the  making  and  recording  of  the  mortgage  to  the  de- 
fendant, but  admits  that  his  sale  was  not  recorded.  Now,  if  it  should 
turn  out,  upon  the  evid'ence  (and  you  therefore  find)  that  the  plaintiff 
did,  in  good  faith,  purchase  the  cattle  in  controversy  of  said  O'Hara, 
and  that,  in  pursuance  of  such  sale,  said  O'Hara  delivered  the  posses- 
sion thereof  to  the  plaintiff  prior  to  the  execution  of  the  mortgage,  and 
the  same  was  still  in  plaintiff's  possession  at  the  time  of  the  execution 
of  defendant's  mortgage,  then  you  should  find  your  verdict  in  favor  of 
the  plaintiff.  In  such  case,  O'Hara  having  made  a  complete  sale  by 
delivery  of  possession,  the  rights  of  the  plaintiff  would  be  perfect,  and 
O'Hara  could  not  impart  any  title  or  right  as  against  the  plaintiff  by  a 
subsequent  mortgage  to  defendant.  If  you  find  a  sale  of  the  cattle  to 
plaintiff  by  contract,  then,  to  make  the  sale  perfect  as  against  a  subse- 
quent mortgage,  taken  in  good  faith  and  without  notice,  there  must 
have  been  an  actual  delivery  or  change  of  the  possession  of  the  cattle 
prior  to  the  making  of  the  mortgage ;  that  is  to  say,  they  should  have 
been  placed  in  the  custody  of  plaintiff  by  setting  the  cattle  apart  to  him, 
or  such  other  act  as  the  nature  of  the  propert}^  would  reasonably  admit 
of,  and  such  custody  or  actual  possession  should  be  continued  down  to 
the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  mortgage.  In  other  words  (to  more 
accurately  state  the  law),  the  actual  possession  of  the  property  should 
not  remain  and  be  in  said  O'Hara,  plaintiff's  vendor."  ^ 

§  1187.  What  Delivery  op  Possession  Necessary  as  Against  At- 
taching Creditor  of  Vendor.  —  "As  between  the  parties,  delivery  of 
possession  is  not  essential  to  the  completion  of  a  sale  of  chattels,  unless 
made  so  by  the  terms  of  the  bargain ;  but  as  against  an  attaching 
creditor,  such  delivery  of  possession,  actual  or  constructive,  is  essential 
to  the  completeness  of  such  a  sale.  The  change  of  possession,  like 
other  parts  of  the  transaction,  must  be  by  the  will  of  both  parties,  and 
with  the  design  of  rendering  the  sale  complete.  If  anything  remains  to 
be  done  by  the  vendor  which  is  material  or  important  before  the  vendee 
can  identify  or  possess  the  thing  sold,  or  before  it  become  deliverable, 

1  Approved  iu  Suttou  v.  Ballon,  46  plicable  to  a  state  of  facts  where  a  bill 

Iowa,  519,  520.  See  also  Adal  v.  Zangs,  of  lading  was  issued  and  negotiated, 

41    Iowa,  541;  Tegler   v.  Shipmau,  33  see  Toledo  &c.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilvin,  81  111. 

Iowa,  194.     For    au    instruction    ap-  513. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVII.]       SALES    OF   PERSONAL   PROPERTY.  923 

the  sale  is  executory  and  incomplete,  and  the  property  does  not  pass 
absolutely  to  the  vendee."  i 

§  1188.  Another  Precedent.  —  1.  "  If  there  was  a  6om/cZe  sale  of 
the  pictures  in  dispute,  by  John  How  to  plaintiff,  and  if,  prior  to  the 
levy  on  them  by  defendant,  there  was  actual,  visible,  continued  change 
of  the  possession  of  the  same,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  the  plaintiff. 
2.  If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  the  plaintiff  did  not  in 
good  faith  purchase  the  said  pictures,  and  that  there  was  no  actual 
visible  and  continued  change  of  possession  of  said  pictures  prior  to  the 
levy  thereon  by  defendant,  they  will  find  for  the  defendant.  3  If  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that,  prior  to  the  levy  by  defendant  on 
the  pictures,  the  plaintiff  notified  and  informed  Mr.  Dyer,  that  he  had 
bought  said  pictures,  and  that  he  was  the  owner  thereof,  then  there  was 
such  change  of  possession,  as  is  contemplated  by  instructions  one  and 
two."  - 

§  1189.  Symbolical  Delivery  by  Delivery  op  Bill  of  Lading.— 
''In  order  to  constitute  a  valid  sale  and  deliverv  of  the  screenin-^s'by 
Slaughter  to  plaintiffs,  Slaughter  must  have  done  everything  whic'h,  by 
the  terms  of  the  bargain,  was  incumbent  on  him  to  do ;  he^must  have 
intended  to  part  with  possession  of  the  screenings,  and  must  have 
actually  parted  with  the  possession  thereof,  and  the  plaintiffs  must  have 
received  said  screenings  with  the  intention  and  for  the  purpose  of  hold- 
ing same  as  owner.  But  the  court  instructs  the  jury  that  a  delivery  of 
the  bill  of  lading  read  in  evidence  to  the  plaintiffs,  if,  in  fact,  there  was 
such  a  delivery,  constitutes  a  sufficient  delivery  of  the  screenino-s  to 
pass  title  thereto."  3  " 

l^el^TZrV^  '^""^'"''  "•  '^'^'"''  ''  '  ^PP^°^^^    "^  How  ..  Taylor,    52 

Texas,  364.     The    court  said:    "The      Mo.  592,  595,  596 

charge  to  the  jury  was   characterized  3  Approved  iu   Kirkpatrick  «.  Kau- 

by  great  clearness  and  logical  precis-      sas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  SG  Mo  341 
lou  iu  espouudiug  the  law." 


924  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  Thomp.  Tl*.^ 


CHAPTER    XXXVIII. 

WARRANTIES  IN  SALES  OF  CHATTELS. 

Section 

1195.  "What  Constitutes  an  Express  Warranty. 

1196.  Court  to  Declare  the  Legal  Effect  of  Written  Warranties. 

1197.  Jury  to  Interpret  Oral  Warranties. 

1198.  Whether  Statement  a  Warranty  or  a  mere  Expression  of  Opinion. 

1199.  Jury  to  Determine  whether  Purchaser  relied  on  Statement. 

1200.  Precedent  of  Instruction  in  such  a  Case. 

1201.  Whether  Quality  equal  to  Warranty. 

1202.  What  Constitutes  "Unsoundness  "  in  an  Animal. 

1203.  Instruction  as  to  what  Disease  will  Constitute  an  Unsoundness. 

1204.  [Continued.]     Instruction  that   "Texas   Itch"  in  a  Horse  i«  such  a 

Disease. 

1205.  Instruction  as  to  Rule  of  Caveat  Emptor, 

120(3.  [Continued.]     What  Constitutes  a  Warranty  in  the  Sale  of  a  Chattel. 

1207.  [Continued.]     Vendor  not  Responsible   for  Representation  of  Honest 

Belief. 

1208.  Instruction  as  to  Effect  of  Warranty  of  Machine,  in  Action  for  Price 

with  Breach  of  Warranty  as  Couuter-Claim. 

1209.  [Continued.]     Instructions  as  to  Measure  of  Damages  in  such  a  Case. 

1210.  [Continued.]     Instructions  as  to  Effect   of  Agreement  to  Rescind  in 

Case  of  Failure  of  Warranty. 

§  1195.  What    constitutes   an   express  Warranty.  —  "It   is 

well  settled  that  neither  the  word  '  warrant,'  nor  any  precise 
form  of  expression,  is  necessary  to  create  an  express  warranty; 
but  it  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  result  from  any  affirma- 
tion of  the  quality  or  condition  of  personal  chattels,  made  by  the 
vendor  at  the  time  of  the  sale.  A  bare  affirmation,  not  intended 
by  the  vendor  to  have  that  effect,  will  not  constitute  a  warranty ; 
and  this,  for  the  plain  reason  that  a  warranty  in  its  nature  is  a 
contract,  and  no  contract  or  agreement  can  be  made  or  entered 
into  without  the  consent  and  co-operation  of  two  contracting  par- 
ties." ^     The  rule  of  law  on  this  subject  has  been  well  said  to  be, 

1  Edwards  v.  Marcy,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  48G,  489,  opinion  of  the  court  by  Merrick,  J. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVIII.]    WARRANTIES  IN  SALES  OF  CHATTELS.    925 

that  "  any  affirmation  of  the  quality  or  condition  of  the  thing 
sold,  made  by  the  seller  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  for  the  purpose 
of  assuring  the  buyer  of  the  truth  of  the  facf  affirmed,  and  in- 
ducing him  to  make  the  purchase,  if  so  received  and  relied  on 
by  the  purchaser,  is  an  express  warranty."  ^  "To  prove,  in 
any  particular  instance,  that  there  was  a  warranty  by  the  vendor, 
it  is  therefore  not  sufficient  to  show  merely  that,  at  the  time  of 
the  sale,  he  affirmed  in  clear  and  definite  language  a  fact  relative 
to  the  essential  qualities  or  condition  of  the  o-oods  or  thino-s 
sold ;  but  to  this  there  must  be  superadded  proof  that  he  intended 
thereby  to  influence  the  mind  of  the  purchaser  and  to  induce 
him  to  buy,  and  that  the  latter  did  buy  upon  the  faith  of  and  in 
reliance  upon  the  affirmation.     This  is   essential    to  show  that 

there  was  in  fact  a  contract  between  the  parties  upon  the  sub- 
ject." ^ 

§  1196.  Court  to  Declare  the  Legal  Effect  of  Written  War- 
ranties. —  "  When  the  contract  is  in  writing,  and  the  affirmation 
is  incorporated  into  or  makes  a  part  of  it,  the  court  is  to  declare 
its  legal  effect ;  the  exposition  of  it  involving  a  mere  question  of 
law.^     *     *     *         But  in  all  oral   contracts,   it   is  within   the 

1  Osgood  V.   Lewis,   2  Harr.   &  G.  Patricks.  Leach  (Neb.),  1  N.  W.  Eep. 

(Md.)  495;  Edwards  v.  Marcy,  2  Allen  853;  Neave  v.  Arutz  (Wis.),  14  N.  W. 

(Mass.),  486,  489.     See   Heusliaw  v.  Rep.  41.     That  the    representation  of 

Robins,    9  Mete.   (Mass.)    83,  where  the  vendor,  to  become    a    warranty, 

the  same  principle  is  asserted  in  sub-  must  have  been  relied  upon  by  the 

stantially  the  same  terras.     Also  Nan-  purchaser:  Halliday  y.  Briggs  (Neb.), 

manv.  Overlee  (Mo.),  3  S.W.  Rep.  380;  18   N.  W.    Rep.  55;  Torkelsou  v.  Jor- 

Dulaney  v.  Rogers,  (i4  Mo.  201 ;  Walsh  genson  (Minn.),  10  N.  W.  Rep.  410. 

V.   Morse,  80  Mo.   568 ;  .Tones  v.  Rail-  2  Edwards  v.  Marcy,  supra. 

road  Co.,  79  Mo.  92;    Blaney  u.  Pelton  ^  Edwards     v.     Marcy,      2      Allen 

(Vt.),  13Atl.  Rep.  564;  McClintock  v.  (Mass.),  486,  490.     This  was  done  iu 

Emick  (Ky.),  7  S.  W.  Rep.  903 ;  Warder  the  following  cases :  Henshaw  v.  Ro- 

V.  Bowen  (Minn.),  17  N.  W.  Rep.  943.  bins,  9  Mete.  (Mass.)  83;  Hastings  v. 

To  constitute  a  warranty,  neither  the  Lovering,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  214;  Rice  v. 

word  "  warrant,"  nor  any  equivalent  Codman,  1  Allen  (Mass.),  377;  Shep- 

word,    is    indispensable.     Warder    v.  herd  v.  Kain,  5  Barn.  &  Aid.  240.     See 

Bowen   (Minn.),  17  N.   W.    Rep.  943.  also  Borrekins  v.  Beviu,  3  Rawle  (Pa.), 

It  is  sufficient  if  the  language  used  by  23;  Batturs  v.    Sellers,  5   Harr.  &  J. 

the  vendor  amounts  to  an  undertaking  (Md.)  117;    and  6   Harr.   &  J.   (Md.) 

that  the  goods    are    as    represented.  249;    Yates    v.   Pym,    6     Taunt.  446; 


926  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND   JURY.       [1  Thoinp.  Tr., 

province  of  the  jury  to  determine,  in  view  of  all  the  circum- 
stances attending  the  transaction,  whether  the  necessary  ingre- 
dients to  constitute  such  warranty,  namely,  the  intention  of  the 
vendor  that  his  affirmation  should  operate  as  an  inducement  to 
the  purchaser  to  buy,  and  the  acceptance  of  or  reliance  to  some 
extent  upon  it  by  the  vendee,  as  one  of  the  grounds,  motives  or 
reasons  for  making  the  purchase,  do  actually  exist."  ^ 

§  1197.  Jury  to  Interpret  Oral  Warranty.  —  In  conformity 
with  the  principles  already  stated,-  the  interpretation  of  oral 
warranties  is  generally  left  to  the  jury.  "  A  warranty  may  be 
verbal  or  written.  When  it  is  reduced  to  writing,  it  is  the 
province  of  the  court  to  expound  it;  but  when  it  is  merely 
verbal,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  interpret  the  words  of  the  witness 
who  testifies  concerning  it.  The  court  may  explain  to  the  jury 
what  constitutes  a  warranty,  when  it  rests  altogether  on  oral 
proof ;  but  as  no  particular  form  of  words  is  essential,  and  it  is 
mostly  a  question  of  intention  on  the  part  of  both  the  vendor 
and  vendee,  that  question,  like  any  other  question  of  fact,  must 
be  left  to  the  jury."  ^ 

§  1198.  Whether  Statement  a  Warranty  or  a  mere  Expres- 
sion of  Opinion.  — The  rule  is  that,  whenever  the  vendor,  at  the 
time  of  the  sale,  makes  an  assertion  or  representation, respecting 
the  kind,  quality  or  condition  of  the  thing  sold,  upon  which  he 
intends  that  the  vendee  shall  rely,  and  upon  which  the  vendee 
does  rely  in  making  the  purchase,  it  amounts  to  a  warranty.*    If, 

Chandelorw.  Lopiis,Cro.  Jac.  4;  Power  *  Ante,  §  1195;  Lamrae  v.  Gregg,  1 

V.  Barham,  i  Ad.  &  El.  573;  Freeman  Mete.  (Ky.)  444.     See  also  as  to  -vvhat 

V.  Baker,  2  Nev.  &  Man.  44G;  Chapman  amounts  to  a  Trarrauty :  Smith  v.  Mil- 

-  V.  Murch,  19  .Johns.  (N.  Y.)  290;  Swett  ler,2  Bibb  (Ky.),  617;  Baconv.  Brown, 

v.   Colgate,  20    Johns.    (N.   Y.)    196;  3  Bibb  (Ky.),  35;  Dickens  u.  Williams, 

Seixas  v.  Woods,  2  Caines  (N.  Y.),  48.  2  B.  Monr.  (Ky.)  374;  Duffee  v.  Mason, 

1  Edwards  v.  Marcy,  2  Allen  8  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  25;  Vernon  i?.  Keys,  12 
(Mass.),  48C,  490.  See  to  the  same  East,  632,  639;  Morrill  v.  Wallace,  9 
effect  Osgood  v.  Lewis,  2  Harr.  &  N.  H.  Ill;  Chapman  v.  Murch,  19 
G.  (Md.)  495.  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  290;  Cook  v.  Moseley, 

2  Ante,  §  1105.  13   Wend.    (N.     Y.)    278;    Foggert    v. 

3  Lindsay  t?.  Davis,  30  Mo.  406,  410,  Blackweller,  4  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  238; 
opinion  by  Napton,  J.  Baum  v.  Stephens,  2  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  411. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVIII.]    WARRANTIES  IN  SALES  OF  CHATTELS.    927 

however,  the  vendor,  by  what  he  says,  merely  intends  to  express 
an  opinion  or  belief  about  the  matter,  and  not  to  make  an  affirm- 
ation of  a  fact,  then  the  statement  will  not  amount  to  a  warranty  ;  ^ 
and  where  doubts  exist  upon  the  evidence  whether,  in  the  case  of 
an  oral  statement,  the  vendor  intended  to  assert  a  fact,  or 
merely  to  express  an  opinion  or  belief,  that  question  must  be 
left  to  the  jury  to  decide.^  Where  the  representation  is  in  writ- 
ing, but  is  not  incorporated  into  or  made  a  part  of  the  contract 
of  sale,  the  question  whether  it  amounted  to  a  contract  of  war- 
ranty, or  whether  it  was  the  mere  expression  of  an  opinion,  not 
accepted  or  acted  upon  by  the  vendee  so  as  to  constitute  a  con- 
tract, has  been  held  equally  a  question  for  the  jury.  Thus,  in 
an  action  upon  an  alleged  warranty  in  the  sale  of  a  horse,  it  ap- 
peared that  the  plaintiff  wrote  to  the  defendant:  "You  will 
remember  that  you  represented  the  horse  to  me  as  five  years 
old,"  etc.,  and  the  defendant  replied:  "  The  horse  is  as  I  repre- 
sented it."  Here  it  was  left  to  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the 
defendant,  at  the  sale,  gave  an  undertaking  to  the  effect  mentioned 
in  the  letter.'^ 

§  1199.  Jury  to* Determine  whether  Purchaser  relied  on 
the  Statement.  —  So,  where  an  action  for  damages  is  predicated 
upon  the  ground  that  a  certain  statement,  made  by  the  vendor 
touching  the  character  or  quality   of  the  thing  sold,  was  a  war- 

1  Heusou  V.  King,  3  Joues  L.  (N.  difference  between  warranties  and  ex- 

C.)  411);  Rogers  u.Aciiermau,  22  Barb,  pressions  of  opinion,  Salmon  t?.  Ward, 

[N.  y.)  134;  Congar  v.  Cliamberlaiu,  2  Carr.  &  P.  211;  Jendwiue  v.  Slade,  1 

14  Wis.  258;  Osgood  v.  Lewis,  2  Harr.  Esp.  572;  Omrod  v.  Hatli,  14  Mees.  & 

&  G.  (Md.)  495;  Bond  v.  Clark,  35  Vt.  W.  (564;  Duulop  v.  Wriglit,  1  Peake  N. 

577;  Foster  v.  Estate  of  Caldwell,  18  P.  123;    Budd  ■;;.  Fairmaner,  5  Carr.  & 

Vt.   17G;   Beeman  v.  Buck,  3  Vt.  53;  P.  78;  Ricliardson  v.  Brown,  8  Moore, 

Tliornton  v.  Tliompsou,  4  Gratt.  (Va.)  338;  s.  c.  1  Bing.  344.     The  statement 

121;    Buswell  v.   Roby,  3  N.   H.  4G7;  must  be  such  as  to  justify  the  vendee 

Tuttle  y.  Brown,  4  Gray  (Mass.),  457,  in  relying  upon  it  as  a  statement  of 

460;  DeSchawuberg    v.   Buchanan,   5  fact,  as  distinguished  from  an  opinion. 

Carr.  &  P.  343;  Power  v.   Barbara,    4  Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Thoraas  (Iowa), 

Ad.  &  El.  473.     At  least,  upon  proper  5  N.  W.  Rep.  737;  Worth  v.  Mc-Connell 

instructions   as  to    the  effect  of  the  (Mich.),  4  N.  W.  Rep.  198. 
language  which  the  jury  may  find  to  -  Lamme   v.  Gregg,  1  Mete.  (Ky.) 

have  been  used.     Denning  v.  Foster,  444. 
42  N.  H.  165,  176.     Compare,  as  to  the  3  Salmon  v.  Ward,  2  Carr.  &  P.  211. 


928  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

ranty,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  whether  the  purchaser 
accepted  and  acted  upon  the  statement  as  such;  since,  as  ah'eady 
seen/  this  acceptance  and  action  are  necessary  to  give  to  the 
statement  the  quality  of  a  contract, —  in  other  words,  to  lift 
it  cut  of  the  character  of  a  mere  representation  and  to  make  it  a 
wai ranty.  Thus,  where  a  railroad  company  issued  and  sold 
bonds  which  bore  on  their  face  a  certificate,  signed  by  persons 
describing  tliemselvo>  as  trustees,  that  the  bonds  were  secured 
by  a  fiirst  mortgage  to  such  persons  in  trust  for  the  bondholders, — 
it  was  held  that  there  was  no  absolute  presumption  that  a  pur- 
chaser of  such  a  bond  relied  upon  the  certificate,  and  that,  in  an 
action  upon  a  note  given  by  him  as  a  part  of  the  consideration 
of  the  purchase,  the  defense  being  a  breach  of  this  assumed  con- 
tract of  warranty,  the  question  should  be  submitted  to  the  jury, 
to  determine  whether  the  defendant  accepted  the  bond  relying 
to  any  extent  on  the  certificate.'^ 

§  1200.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  in  Such  a  Case.  —  "If  dur- 
ing the  negotiation  for  the  sale  of  the  horse,  the  defendant  made  an 
assertion  of  soundness,  which  assertion  was  intended  to  cause  the  sale 
of  the  horse,  and  was  operative  or  effectual  in  oausing  such  sale,  then 
such  assertion  would  constitute  a  warranty.  But  a  mere  expression  of 
an  opinion  is  not  enough  to  constitute  a  warranty."  ^ 

1  Ante,  §  1195.  but  iu  the  seuse  iu  which  the  words 

2  EdAvards  v.  Marcy.  2  Allen  are  used  in  this  connection,  there  is  no 
(Mass.),  4G0.  difference.       Again,  many  cases  make 

2  Approved  in  Little  v,  Woodworth,  a  distinction  between  the  assertion  of 

8  Neb.  283.      The  court  said  (p.  284)  :  a  fact  and  the  expression  of  an  opin- 

*' It  is  well  settled  that  no  particular  ion.   Yv^hether  certain  words,  would  be 

form  or  set  of  words  are  necessary  to  regarded  as  the  affirmation  of  a  fact 

constitute  a  warranty  of  the  character  or  tlic  expression  of  an  opinion  would 

or  soundness  of  chattels,  but  that  any  often  depend  upon  tho  nature   of  the 

form  of   words,   whereby    a    vendor,  article   commended.       Words,   which 

pending  a  negotiation,  makes  aOirma-  might  amount  lo  ;i  warranty  of  sound- 

tion  or  assertion  that  his  article  of  ness  of  a  horse,  might  be  regarded  as 

traffic  is    possessed   of  a    particular  a   mere  expression  of   opinion  wlieu 

character,  for  tlie  purpose  of  inducing  applied  to  tlie  merits  of  a  patent  wash- 

a purchase,  when  such  affirmation  or  ing  machine.     We  see  no  objection  to 

assertion  is  relied  upon  by  the  pur-  the  instruction  given,  as  it  very  fairly 

chaser,    will  constitute    a   warranty,  expresses  the   law  of  the  case,  as  we 

Some  cases  make    a  distinction    be-  understand  it." 
tween  alBrmatiou  and  mere  assertion. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVIIL]  warranties  in  sales  of  chattels.  929 

§  1201.  Whether  Quality  Equal  to  Warranty.  —  In  an  ac- 
tion for  the  purchase  price  of  a  manufactured  article,  sold  with 
warranty,  the  question  of  the  strength  and  capacity  of  the  article 
to  undergo  the  service  for  which  it  was  intended,  is  a  pure  ques- 
tion of  fact.  So  is  the  question  what  is  proper  management  in 
the  use  of  such  an  article.^ 

§  1202.  What  Constitutes  "  Unsoundness  "  in  an  Ani- 
mal. —  On  like  grounds,  in  an  action  for  a  breach  of  warranty 
of  the  soundness  of  an  animal,  it  has  been  laid  down  that  what 
constitutes  an  unsoundness  is  a  matter  for  the  jury.  "  It  is  not 
the  province  of  the  judge  to  determine  the  character  of  diseases. 
When  we  say,  therefore,  that  distemper  would  have  been  an  un- 
.soundness  as  well  as  glanders,  we  mean,  of  course,  if  the  jury 
should  so  consider  it  from  the  evidence  submitted  to  them. 
Whether  glanders  is  an  aggravated  form  of  distemper  or  a  dis- 
tinct disease,  or  whether  either  of  the  diseases  would  constitute  an 
unsoundness,  are  rtuestions  of  fact  with  which  the  court  has  nothins: 
to  do . "  2  So ,  it  has  been  ruled ,  in  an  action  for  a  breach  of  warranty, 
t  hat  the  question  whether  corns  in  a  horse' s  feet  constitute  unsound- 
ness, is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  determined  upon  the  evidence,  and 
the  general  legal  definition  of  unsoundness  „  The  court  say ;  ' '  The 
law  gives  a  general  definition  of  unsoundness,  and  leaves  it  to  the 
trier  of  the  facts  to  find  whether  the  infirmity  of  corns,  in  the  par- 
ticular case,  is  within  the  general  definition  of  unsoundness, — 
whether  that  defect  materially  diminishes  the  value  of  the  horse 
and  his  ability  to  perform  service .  Such  a  diminution  of  value  and 
ability  is  an  unsoundness,  although  it  be  temporary  and  curable."  ^ 

1  Tyson  v.  Tyson,  92  N.  C.  288.  such  an  organic  defect  that  his  stum- 

2  Lindsay  v.  Davis,  30  Mo.  406,  bling  can  only  be  avoided  by  a  peculiar 
412.  A  warranty  of  soundness  of  a  mode  of  shoeing,  which  the  vendee, 
horse,  unless  expressly  restricted,  ex-  using  reasonable  diligence,  cannot 
tends  to  all  manner  of  unsoundness,  discover.  Morse  r.  Pitman  (N,  H.),  4 
whether  known  to  the  vendor  or  not.  Atl.  Rep=  880. 

Van Hoesenv.  Cameron  (Mich.),  20  N.  ^  Alexander  v.    Button,  58  N.   H. 

W.  Rep.  609.     A  warranty  that  a  horse  282.     Compare   Kiddell  v.  Buruard,  9 

is  sure-footed,  and  all  right  in  every  Mees.  &  W.  668;  Roberts  v.  Jenkins, 

way,   excepting   only  stumbling  from  21  N.  H.  116,  119. 
temporary  causes,  is  broken  if  he  has 


930  PEOVINCE    OF    COURT   AND    JURY.       [1   Thoilip.  Tl'., 

§  1203.  Instruction  as  to  what  Disease  will  Constitute  an  Un- 
soundness. —  "The  rule  of  law  as  it  is  laid  down  in  the  books  in  this 
class  of  cases  is,  that  if,  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  an  animal  has  any  dis- 
ease which  actually  does  diminish  the  actual  usefulness  of  the  animal,  so 
as  to  make  it  less  capable  of  work  of  any  description,  or  which,  in  its 
ordinary  progress,  will  diminish  the  natural  usefulness  of  the  animal ; 
or  if  the  animal  has,  either  from  disease  or  accident,  undergone  any  al- 
'  teration  of  structure,  which  either  actually  does  at  the  time  of  sale,  or  in 
its  ordinary  effects  will  diminish  the  usefulness  of  the  animal,  such  ani- 
mal is  unsound."  ^ 

§  1204.  [Continued.]  Instruction  that  "  Texas  Itch,""  in  a 
Horse,  is  Such  a  Disease.  —  "If  it  is  true  that  Briggs  [warrantor] 
himself,  and  also  several  witnesses  for  him,  who  had  in  various  ways 
been  connected  with  the  herd,  neither  knew  nor  had  observed  that  the 
horses  sold  said  Dunbar  were  diseased ;  yet,  if  you  are  satisfied  from 
the  evidence  that  said  horses  were  at  the  time  of  said  sale,  in  fact  in- 
fected with  said  disease,  known  as  the  '  Texas  itch,'  this  will  be  suffi- 
cient to  show  a  breach  of  the  warranty  of  the  soundness  of  said 
horses ;  if  you  believe  from  the  evidence  there  was  in  fact  any  such 
warranty,  made  by  said  Briggs,  as  claimed  by  said  defendant."  ^ 

§  1205.  Instruction  as  to  Rule  of  Caveat  Emptor.  —  "On  the 
sale  of  an  article  of  personal  property,  no  action  can  be  maintained  for 
any  difference  in  quality  between  the  thing  contracted  for  and  the  thing 
delivered,  unless  there  be  an  express  warranty  made  by  the  seller,  or 
there  be  fraud  on  his  part.  Without  an  express  warranty  by  the  seller, 
or  fraud  on  his  part,  the  buyer  must  stand  all  losses."  ^ 

§1206.  [Continued.]  What  Constitutes  a  Warranty  in  the  Sale 
OF  a  Chattel.  —  "In  order  to  constitute  a  warranty,  there  must  be  ai- 
affirmation  as  to  the  quality  or  condition  of  the  thing  sold  (not  asserted 
as  a  matter  of  opinion  or  belief),  made  by  the  seller  at  the  time  of  the 
sale,  for  the  purpose  of  assuring  the  buyer  of  the  truth  of  the  fact 
affirmed,  and  inducing  him  to  make  the  purchase,  which  is  so  received 
and  relied  on  by  the  purchaser,  and  that  the  purchase-money  was  paid 

1  Approved  in  Van  Iloesen  v.  Cam-  ^  Approved  in  Wallace  v.  Wren,  32 
eron,  ot  j\Iich.  filfi,  C.IT.                                111.  148. 

2  Approved  in  Dimbarv.  Briggs,  18 
Neb.  94,  97. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXVIII.]    WARRANTIES  IN  SALES  OF  CHATTELS.    931 

for  the  undertaking  of  the  seller,  that  the  article  sold  was  of  a  particu- 
lar quality."  i 

§  1207.  [CoNTixuED.]  Vendor  not  Responsible  for  Representa- 
tion OF  Honest  Belief.  —  "If  the  seller  of  an  article  of  personal  prop- 
erty represents  what  he  himself  believes  as  to  the  qualities  or  value  of 
an  article,  and  leaves  the  determination  to  the  judgment  of  the  buyer, 
there  is  no  fraud  or  warranty  in  the  case,  and  the  seller  would  not  be 
liable'for  any  defect  in  the  quality  of  the  thing  sold."  ^ 

§  1208.  Instruction  as  to  Effect  op  Warranty  op  Machine,  in 
Action  for  Price  with  Breach  op  Warranty  as  Counter-Claim.  — 
"  The  question  for  you  to  determine  is  this :  Was  the  machine  war- 
ranted as  represented  ?  If  so,  did  it  fail  to  operate  as  it  was  warranted 
to  do?  And  if  it  did  so  fail,  what  was  the  amount  of  damages  sustained 
by  the  defendant?  The  burden  of  proof,  to  establish  these  allegations, 
is  upon  the  defendant,  and  he  must  satisfj''  your  minds  by  a  preponder- 
ance of  evidence  that  the  machine  was  warranted  and  that  it  failed  to 
operate  as  warranted,  or  it  will  be  your  duty  to  return  a  verdict  for 
plaintiffs  for  the  full  amount  due  on  the  note  by  its  terms."  ^ 

§  1209.  [Continued.]  Instruction  as  to  Measure  op  Damages  in 
Such  a  Case.  —  "If  j-ou  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's  agent 
did  warrant  the  machine  as  represented,  and  that  it  failed  to  answer  its 
warranted  character,  then  the  measure  of  defendant's  damages  is  the 
difference  between  the  value  of  the  machine  in  the  condition  in  which  it 
actually  was  at  the  time  of  the  sale,  and  what  it  would  have  been  had  it 
answered  its  warranted  character."  "* 

§1210.  [Continued.]  Instruction  as  to  Effect  op  Agreement  to 
Rescind  in  Case  op  Failure  of  Warranty.  —  "The  defendant  al- 
leges in  his  answer  that  it  was  the  contract  between  the  parties,  that  if 
the  machine,  upon  trial  of  the  same,  did  not  perform  as  it  was  war- 
ranted,  upon    being  notified,   plaintiff  would  receive   back  the  same 

^  Ibid.  Iowa,  477;    Grammar  v.   Borgam,  27 

2  Ihid.  Iowa,  3G9;  Williams  v.  Douaidson,  8 

3  Approved  iu  McCormick  v.  Dun-      Iowa,  108. 

ville,  36  Iowa,  645,  648;  citing  Aultraau  ■*  McCormick  v.  Duuville,  36  Iowa, 

V.  Theirer,  34  Iowa,  272 ;  and  distin-       645,  649. 
guishiug  Bamberger    v.    Grieuer,    18 


932  PROVINCE    OF   COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 

and  return  the  defendant  the  money  paid,  and  that  the  defendant  noti- 
fied plaintiffs  of  the  fact  that  the  machine  would  not  work,  and  requested 
them  to  receive  it  back  and  return  the  money,  which  they  refused  to 
do.  If  3^ou  find  that  this  was  the  contract  between  the  parties,  then 
you  are  instructed  that  defendant  cannot  recover  on  his  counter-claim 
for  damages  without  having  returned  the  machine  to  plaintiffs,  or  with- 
out proving  an  offer  to  return,  and  a  refusal  by  them  to  receive  it,  pro- 
vided the  plaintiffs  or  their  agent  could  be  found.  "  i 

1  Ibid.  649. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  933 


CHAPTER    XXXIX. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS. 
Section 
1215.  Eeasonable  Diligence  in  Presenting  Commercial  Paper. 
1216    In  Presenting  Bill  of  Exchange  for  Acceptance. 
1217.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  in  such  a  Case. 
1218:  In  Presenting  Sight  Drafts  for  Payment. 

1219.  This  Rule,  how  Applied. 

1220.  In  Presenting  a  Demand  Note,  or  a  Note  in  which  Time  of  Payment  Is 

not  fixed. 

1221.  "When  a  Demand  Note  is  Overdue. 

1222.  Reasonable  Hours  for  Presentment  of  Commercial  Paper. 

1223.  Reasonable  Notice  of  Dishonor  of  Commercial  Paper:  View  that  this  is 

a  Question  of  Fact. 

1224.  View  of  Lord  jMansfield  and  his  Associates  th  at  it  is  a  Question  of  Law. 

1225.  This  View  generally  Adopted  in  America. 

1226.  No  Reversal  if  the  Jury  decide  it  Rightly. 

1227.  This  Rule,  how  Applied  in  England. 

1228.  Further  Illustrated. 

1229.  Another  Illustration. 

1230.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  on  this  Point. 

1231.  Another  Precedent:  ludorser  Competent  to  give  Notice  to  Prior  In- 

dorsee 

1232.  Another  Precedent:  Variance  in  Description  in  Notice  of  Dishonor. 

1233.  Whether  the  Circumstances  of  a  Particular  Case  ai-e  Sufficient  to  Dis- 

pense with  Demand  and  Notice. 

1234.  Effect  of  Insolvent  inserting  the  Bill  in  his  Schedule. 

1235.  "Waiver  of  Notice  to  Indorser. 

1236.  Whether  Notice  of  Protest  probably  reached  the  Indorser. 

1237.  "  Second  of  Exchange,  First  Unpaid." 

1238.  Refusal  to  Pay  or  Accept. 

1239.  Whether  the  Holder  took  in   Good  Faith  and  without  Notice  of   Prior 

Equities. 

1240.  Whether  the  Plaintiff  has  Assigned  the  Note  sued  on  to  Another  for  the 

Benefit  of  his  Creditors. 

1241.  Whether  Note  an  Extension  of  Time  or  Collateral  Security. 

1242.  Whether  Notes  are  Renewals  of  Former  Notes. 

1243.  How  the  Jury  Instructed  in  such  a  Case. 

1244-  Instruction  as  to  the  Effect  of  an  Indorsement  in  Blank  in  an  Action  by 

the  Assignee. 
1245    Instruction  as  to  Duty  of  Indorsee  of  Check  to  JIake  Effort  to  Collect 

same  before  suing  Drawer. 


934  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY'     [1  Thomp.  Tr,, 

§  1215.  Reasonable  Diligence  in  Presenihig  Commercial 
Paper. — The  right  of  the  holder  of  a  bill  cf  exchange  which 
has  not  matured,  or  of  a  bill  of  exchange  or  promissory  note 
which  has  matured,  to  hold  the  drawer  in  case  of  a  bill  of  ex- 
change, or  the  maker  in  case  of  a  promissory  note,  for  the 
amount  named  in  the  instrument,  in  the  case  of  non-acceptance 
before  maturity  or  non-payment  after  maturity,  — seems  to  de- 
pend upon  the  exercise  of  reasonable  diligence  upon  the  part  of 
the  holder  in  presenting  the  paper,  for  acceptance  or  payment  as 
the  case  may  be,  and  in  giving  notice  to  the  indorser  of  its  non- 
acceptance  or  non-payment.  Active  diligence,  it  has  been  said, 
is  imposed  upon  the  obligee  in  pursuing  the  obligor,  fcr  a  re- 
covery of  the  sum  due  on  a  bill  assigned  to  him,  so  that  nothing 
shall  be  lost  by  his  laches ;  and  the  question  is  whether  he  did 
use  due  diligence,  which  is  a  question  for  tfie  decision  of  the 
court}  This  measure  of  diligence  is  discharged  by  making  pre- 
sentment within  what  the  law  calls  a  reasonable  time. 

§  1216.   In  presenting  Bill  of  Exchange  for  Acceptance.  — 

A  bill  of  exchange  nuist  be  presented  for  acceptance  within  a 
reasonable  time^  with  reference  to  the  interest  of  the  drawer  to 
put  the  bill  in  circulation,  or  the  interest  of  the  drawee  to  have 
the  bill  speedily  presented;  and  what  constitutes  a  reasonable 
time  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  for  the  determination 
of  the  court  and  jury,^  —  which  means  that  the  question  must  be 
submitted  to  the  jury  under  proper  instructions.^  Where  there 
was  no  evidence  of  a  general  visage,  and  the  testimony  as  to  the 
opinion  of  merchants  on  the  point  was  conflicting,  the  court  re- 
fused to  disturb  a  verdict,  in  which  it  was  found  that  a  delay  of 
five  months,  in  presenting  a  bill  drawn  upon  Rio  de  Janeiro,  was 
not  unreasonable.  In  giving  the  opinion  of  the  court,  Tindal, 
C.  J.,  said:  "  There  is  no  definite  time  prescribed  by  the  law  of 
England,  within  which  such  presentment  for  acceptance  must 

1  Crawford  v.   Berry,   G   Gill  &  J.  ^  Miillick   v.  Kadakisseu,  9    Moore 

(Md.)  63,   70;  Brooks  v.  Elgin,  G  Gill      V.  C.  4G. 

CMd.),  254,  2G0.  ^  Mollish  v.  Rawdon,  9  Bing.  416, 

421;  ante,  §  1031. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  935 

take  place.  lu  some  countries,  as  iu  France,  the  times  within 
which  a  foreign  bill,  payable  at  sight,  or  at  any  certain  time  after, 
must  be  presented  for  acceptance  to  the  drawee,  are  fixed  by 
positive  law,  according  to  the  place  where,  and  the  place  on 
which  the  bill  is  drawn.  Thus,  for  instance,  where  it  is  drawn 
from  the  continent  of  Europe,  or  the  isles  of  Europe,  and  pay- 
able within  the  European  possessions  of  France,  such  present- 
ment for  acceptance  must  be  made  within  six  months  from  the 
date,  in  default  of  which,  the  holder  can  have  no  remedy  against 
the  drawer  or  indorsers.^  But  there  is  no  such  law  in  Eno-land  : 
una,  in  the  absence  of  any  such  positive  regulation,  or  of  any 
general  usage  or  course  of  trade,  no  other  rule,  as  it  appears  to 
us,  can  be  laid  down  as  the  limit  within  which  the  bill  must  be 
forwarded  to  its  destination,  than  that  it  must  take  place  within 
a  reasonable  time,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  and 
that  there  must  be  no  unreasonable  or  improper  delay.  Whether 
there  has  been,  in  any  particular  case,  reasonable  diligence  used, 
or  whether  unreasonable  delay  has  occurred,  is  a  mixed  question 
of  law  and  fact,  to  be  decided  by  the  jury,  acting  under  the 
direction  of  the  judge,  upon  the  particular  circumstances  of  each 
case."  2 

§  1217.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  in  such  a  Case.  — The  jury 
are  to  determine,  on  the  evidence  before  them,  whether  there  had  been 
an  unreasonable  delay  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  holder  of  the  bill, 
in  sending  it  forward  for  acceptance,  or  in  putting  it  into  circulation. 
In  order  to  arrive  at  the  proper  determination  of  this  question,  the  jury 
are  to  take  into  their  consideration  the  situation  and  interests,  not  of 
the  drawer  only,  or  of  the  holder  only,  but  the  situation  and  interests 
of  both  ;  and  to  say  whether,  under  all  the  circumstances,  the  delay  in 
this  case,  was  unreasonable  or  not.-' 

^  Citing  Code  de  Commerce,  liv.   1,  approved    by  the  whole   court.     The 

tit.  8,  §  11.  priuciple  upou  which  this  case  was  de- 

2  Mellish  V.  Eawdon,  9  Biug-.  41G,  cided  had  been  declared  iu  the  Com- 
^-2-  mon  Pleas  as  early  as   1795,   lu  the 

3  This  iustruction,  with  some  case  of  Muilmau  v.  D'Eguiuo,  2  H.  Bl. 
slight  verbal  cliauges,  was  giveu  by  505.  Iu  this  last  case  Mr.  Justice 
Tiudal,  C.  J.,  iu  Mellish  r.  Eawdon,  9  Buller  conceived  that,  "if,  instead  of 
Biug.  410,  and,  after  advisement,  was  putting  the  bill   iuto  circulation,   the 


936  PROVIJ^CE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  TllOIlip.   Tr.^ 

§   1218.     In  presenting  Sight  Drafts  for  Payment. — The 

rule  as  to  bills  of  exchange  drawn  payable  at  sight,  is  that  they 
must  be  presented  for  payment  within  areasonahle  thne.^  It  has 
been  said  in  one  case,^  and  held  in  others,^  that  what  is  a  rea- 
sonable time  for  the  presentment  of  such  a  draft  is  a  question  of 
fact;  but  the  better  opinion,  supported  by  the  decisions  of  the 
best  courts,  and  by  the  opinions  of  the  most  approved  writers  on 
negotiable  paper,  is  that,  where  the  facts  are  clear  and  uncon- 
tradicted, the  question  is  one  oflaio,  to  be  decided  by  the  court.* 
This  view  is  to  be  preferred,  because  it  results  in  giving  the 
mercantile  community  definite  rules  by  which  to  govern  their 
actions,  instead  of  remitting  the  question  to  the  uncertain  discre- 
tion of  juries. 

§  1219.  This  Rule,  how  Applied.  —  In  the  application  of  this 
principle,  it  has  been  held,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that,  where  a  bank 
has  received  a  sight  draft  for  collection,  drawn  upon  a  party  or 
another  bauk,  having  a  place  of  business  in  the  same  city  in  which 
the  collecting  bank  is  situated,  the  collecting  bank  does  not  use 
due  diligence  if  it  fail  to  present  the  draft  to  the  payee  for  pay- 
ment before  the  close  of  the  folloioing  day ;  ^  and  it  has  been 
held  that  a  custom  among  banks,  of  doing  business  among  them- 
selves through   a  clearing  house,  does  not  alter  the  rule  that  a 

hokter  were  to   lock    it    up  for    any  Wend.  (N.  Y.)    137;  Phoenix  Ins.  Co. 

length  of  time,    *     *    *   he  was  gnilty  v.  Allen,  11  Mich.  501,  511. 
of  laches."    This  expression,  thought  •*  Prescott  Banli  v.  Caverly,  7  Gray 

Tindal,  C.  J.,  in   the   case  lirst  cited,  (Mass.),  ^17;  Aymar  v.  Beers,  7  Cow. 

"when  properly  construed,  only  leaves  (N.   Y.)    705;  s.  c.   17  Am.  Dec.    538; 

the    rule    above    laid  down  as    tin-  Mohawk  Banlc  v.  Broderick,  10  Weud. 

certain  and  undefined  in  its  applica-  (N.    Y.)    304 ;    Gough    v.    Staats,  13 

tion    as  it    was   before."     Mellish  v.  Wend.  (N.   Y.)  549;  Dy as  r.  Hanson, 

Rawdou,      !)     Biug.    423.       Compare  14  Mo.  App.  363;  Byles  on  Bills,  IGS; 

Schute    V.    Robins,    Mood.    &    Malk.  Edwards  on  Bills,  §  540;   Dan.   Neg. 

133.  Instr.,  §4(iG.     But  while  it  is  error  to 

1  Salisbury  v.  Renick,  44  Mo.  554;  submit  this  question  to  the  jury,  yet  if 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  ■;;.  Allen,  11  Mich.  the  jury  decide  it  rightly,  there  will  be 
501,  511.  no  ground  for  reversing  the  judgment. 

2  Pugitt    V.    Nixon,    44   Mo.    295,  Dyas  v.  Hanson,  sHpra;  ante,^W2Q. 
opinion  by  Wagner,  J.  ^  Dyas  v.  Hanson,  14  Mo.  App.  363, 

3  Mohawk  Bank  v.   Broderick,  13  370. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  937 

check  must  be  presented  to  the  bank  on  which  it  is  drawn  at 
least  during  banking  hours  on  the  next  succeeding  day.^  And 
although  there  has  been  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  whether 
the  same  measure  of  diligence  is  required  in  the  presentment  of 
sight  bills  of  exchange  as  in  the  presentment  of  bank  checks, 
the  better  opinion  seems  to  be  that  there  is  no  sound  reason  for 
a  distinction.  "  The  fact  that  one  instrument  is  drawn  upon  a 
bank  and  the  other  upon  an  individual,  can  make  no  difference 
in  principle  concerning  the  duty  of  the  holder;  what  will  be 
due  diligence  in  the  one  case  will  be  due  diligence  in  the 
other."  2 

§  1220.  In  presenting  a  Demand  Note,  or  a  Note  in  which 
Time  of  Payment  is  not  fixed.  —  A  bill  or  note  may  be  trans- 
ferred as  well  after,  as  before  it  is  due.'  The  difference  is  said 
to  be  that  if  it  is  transferred  after  due,  as  there  is  no  time  fixed 
for  payment,  the  indorser  undertakes  that  it  will  be  paid  on  de- 
mand, which  means  that  it  will  be  paid  within  a  reasonable  time 
after  demand  of  payment  is  made ;  and  what  is  a  reasonable  time 
is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  under  all  the  circumstances  of 
the  case.*  It  has  been  so  held,  where  the  note  was  drawn  and 
dated  in  New  York,  on  the  4th  of  Augu.'^t,  1857,  by  a  person 
living  in  Pennsylvania,  and  was  presented  about  the  12th  of  Sep- 
tember following.  The  court  held  that,  under  the  circumstances, 
whether  the  delay  of  presentment  for  between  five  and  six 
weeks  was  reasonable  or  not,  ought  to  have  been  submitted  to 
the  jury.  The  court  conceded  the  general  rule  that,  where  all 
the  facts  are  entirely  undisputed,  what  is  a  reasonable  time  is  a 
question  of  law,  but  added:  "  In  a  case  like  the  present,  involv- 
ing various  considerations,  and  particularly  the  laws  of  a  sister 
State,  it  appears  to  us  that  this  question  should  have  been  sub- 

1  Rosenblatt  v.  Haberman,  8  Mo.  son,  J.  See  also  St.  John  v.  Homans, 
App.  486.  See  also  Alexanders.  Burch-  8  Mo.  382,385;  Marker  v.  Anderson, 
field,  1  Carr.  &  M.  75;  s.  c.  7  Man.  &G.      21  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  372. 

1061.  3  story  on  Bills,  §§  220,  223. 

2  Smith  V.  Janes,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  ■«  Union  Bank  v.  Ezell,  10  Humph. 
192;  s.  c  32  Am.  Dec.'527,  per  Bron-      CTenn.)  385. 


938  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1   Thoilip.  Tl., 

mitted  to  the  jury  under  proper  instructions  of  the  court."  ^ 
The  question  whether  demand  has  been  made  upon  the  maker 
^yithin  a  reasonable  time,  so  as  to  charge  an  indorser,  is  reasoned 
upon  the  same  principles.  It  is  said,  that  it  has  never  been  at- 
tempted to  fix  the  time  with  any  degree  of  precision,  except  in 
reference  to  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case;  which  cir- 
cumstances go  merely  to  show  the  intention  of  the  parties  in  re- 
spect to  the  time  of  payment,  and  amount  therefore  to  no  more 
than  evidence  of  their  agreement.  This  being  a  question  of  intent, 
and  the  intent  not  being  expressed  on  the  face  of  the  instrument, 
it  is  a  question,  like  other  questions  of  intent,  to  be  determined 
by  a  jury  under  all  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  trans- 
action. ^ 

§  1221.  When  a  Demand  Note  is  Overdue.  — In  England  "  a 
note  payable  on  demand  is  not  considered  as  overdue  without 
some  evidence  of  payment  having  been  demanded  and  refused  ; 
although  it  be  several  3'ears  old,  and  no  interest  has  been  paid 
on  it."^  "It  has  been  a  question,"  says  Chancellor  Kent, 
' '  when  a  note  payable  on  demand  is  to  be  deemed  a  note  out  of 
time,  so  as  to  subject  the  indorsee,  upon  a  subsequent  negotia- 
tion of  it,  to  the  operation  of  the  rule," — meaning  the  rule 
which  lets  in  proof  of  equities  between  the  original  parties, 
where  the  note  is  negotiated  after  it  becomes  due.  And  he  pro- 
ceeds to   state  that,   "  when   the    facts  and    circumstances    are 

1  Barbour  v.  Fullerton,  36  Pa.  9  Mees.  &  W.  15;  Barough  v.  White,  4 
St.  105,  opiuiou  by  Koacl,  J.  The  Baru.  &  Cress.  325.  But  the  American 
court  added:  "The  distinction  be-  cases  seem  to  hold  that  the  undertak- 
tween  the  two  classes  of  cases  is  often  ing  of  an  indorser  of  such  a  note  is 
a  nice  one,  and  is  carefully  marked  by  that  he  will  be  bound,  provided  the 
Chief  Justice  Shaw  in  Wyman  v.  payee,  without  success,  uses  due  dili- 
Adams,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  210."  geuce  to  collect  the  same    within   a 

2  Tomliuson  Carriage  Co.  v.  Kin-  reasonable  time.  Castle  v.  Candee,  16 
sella,  31  Couu.  269,  273.  In  England  Conn.  221 ;  Lockwood  v.  Crawford,  18 
the  very  sensible  conclusion  has  been  Conn.  361;  Culver  v.  Parish,  21  Conn, 
reached  that  the  word  ^' demand, ^^  in  408. 

such    a    note,    is    synonymous    with  ^  Byles  on  Bills  (7th  ed.),  145,  179, 

"  request  ^^  and    that    the   promise   is  180;  Chitty  on  Bills  (10th  ed.),  155; 

therefore  a  promise  to  pay  when  re-  Brooks  v.  Mitchell,  9  Me'fcs.  &  W.  15, 

quested  to  do  so.    Brooks  v.  Mitchell,  and  American  note. 


J 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  939 

ascertained,  the  reasonableness  of  time  is  a  matter  of  law,  and 
every  case  will  depend  upon  its  special  circumstances."  ^  Amer- 
ican cases  are  found  w^liich  proceed  upon  the  ground  that  it  is  a 
question  which  is  to  be  decided  by  the  court?  A  statute  of 
Massachusetts^  put  the  matter  at  rest  in  that  State,  by  enacting 
that  a  demand  made  at  the  expiration  of  sixty  days  from  the  date 
of  the  note,  without  grace,  is  deemed  to  be  made  within  a  reason- 
able time} 

§   \'2t2Ll.   Reasonable  Hours  for  Presentment  of  Commercial 
Paper.  — Moreover,  it  seems  that  what  are  to  be  deemed  reason- 
able hours,  within  which  a  bill  of  exchange  or  other  commercial 
instrument  may  be  presented  for  payment,  is  a  question  of  law 
for  the  court.     Accordingly,  it  has  been  held   that,  where  the 
bill  is  made  payable  at  a  particular  bank,  the  holder  impliedly 
agrees  to  ascertain  the  usual  hours  within  which  such  banker  does 
business,  and  to  present  it  within  those  hours  ;  and  hence  a  pre- 
sentment after  the  close  of  banhing  hours,  when  the  house  is  shut 
and  the  clerks  are  gone,  is  not  a  sufficient  presentment  to  charge 
the  drawer.^     The  rule  in  regard  to  presentment  at  the  office  of  a 
banker  is  established  with  reference  to  a  well  known  rule  of 
trade  that  a  presentment  out  of  the  hours  of  business  is  not  suffi- 
cient; ^  but  the  English  courts  do  not  apply  this  rule  in  the  case 
of  the  presentment  at  other  places  than  at  banking  houses ;   nor 
in  such  cases  do  they  require  that  the  presentment  should  be 
made  within  business  hoursJ     Where  the  bill  was  presented  at  a 
house  in  London,  where  it  was  made  payable,  at  8  o'clock  in  the 
evening  of  the  day  when  it  fell  due,  it  was  held  that  the  present- 
ment was  sufficient  to  charge  the  drawer,  although  at  that  hour 
the  house  was  shut  up  and  no  person  answered  to  the  bell ;  ^ 

1  3  Kent.  Com.  120,  121.  (Mass.)  400;  Sacket  v.  Loomis,  4  Gray 

2  Thurston  v.  M'Kown,  6  Mass.  428;       (Mass.),  148. 

Wethey  v.  Andrews,  3  Hill   (N.  Y.),  «  Parker  v.   Gordon,   7  East,  385; 

582;  Agawan  Bk.  v.  Strever,  18  N.  Y.  ELford  v.  Teed,  1  Maule  &  S.  28. 

502;  s.  c.  16  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  82.  «  Wilkius    v.    Jadis,    2     Barn.     & 

3  Mass.     Act    of    April    6th,    1839  Adolph.  188. 

(Laws     Mass.     1839,     p.     56,     chap.  '  Jameson    v.    Swinton,    2    Taunt. 

121).  224;  Barclay  v.  Bailey,  2  Camp.  527. 

*  See    Rice    r.    "Wesson,    1 1    Met.  ''  Barclay  v.  Bailey,  2  Camp.  527. 


940 


PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thomp.  TlV 


though  it  was  conceded  that  a  presentment  at  midnight  would 
be  unreasonable,^  But,  although  the  presentment  be  made  at  a 
bank  and  after  hanking  hours,  yet  if  a  person  has  been  stationed 
there  for  the  purpose  of  returning  an  answer  to  the  person 
making  the  presentment,  and  an  answer  that  the  bank  has  "  no 
orders  "  is  returned,  the  presentment  will  be  as  good  as  though 
made  within  banking  hours ;  since  the  purpose  of  presenting  it 
has  been  subserved. - 

§  1223.  Reasonable  Xotice  of  Dislionor  of  Commercial 
Paper  :  View  tliat  this  is  a  Question  of  Fact.  —  Most  of  the 
analogies, "^  which  rehite  to  the  question  whether  what  is  reason- 
able time  is  for  the  decision  of  the  judge  or  of  the  jury, 
would  remit  this  question  to  the  jury  as  a  question  of  fact;  and 
while  the  rule  that  it  is  to  be  decided  as  a  question  of  law  is  un- 
doubtedly more  beneficial  to  commerce  than  the  rule  which  would 
remit  it  to  the  varying  opinions  of  jurors,  yet  it  is  said  that  the 
former  is  not  an  inflexible  rule.  There  are  many  cases  where  it 
w^ill  be  a  fair  question  for  the  jury  or  the  trier  of  the  facts, 
whether  the  holder  or  the  notary  exercised  reasonable  business 
diligence  in  endeavoring  to  find  out  the  proper  address  of  the 
indorser  when  a  non-resident.^  An  examination  of  the  cases 
shows  that  the  courts  are  in  the  frequent  habit  of  putting  this 
question  to  juries  under  proper  instructions.^ 


1  Wilkins  v.  Jadiz,  sripra.  Or  be- 
tween  6  and  7  in  the  evening,  when  no 
one  but  a  girl  Avas  left  to  take  care  of 
the  countiug  house.  Morgan  v.  Davi- 
son, 1  Stark.  11-t. 

2  Garnott  v.  Woodcock,  6  Maule  & 
S.  44;  s.  c.  1  Stark.  475. 

^  Post,  §  1530,  et  seq. 

^  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Chambers, 
14  Mo.  App.  152,  154. 

5  In  Barbishire  v.  Parker,  6  East,  2, 
Lord  Elleuborough,  C.  .T.,  considerhig 
the  question  of  reasonable  notice  as 
corajiouuded  of  laAV  aud  fact,  left  the 
"wiiole  question  to  the  jury;  advising 


them  that  it  was  not  necessary,  in  his 
opinion,  for  a  person  to  leave  all  otlier 
business  and  attend  solely  to  one 
transaction;  but  they  were  to  con- 
sider wlietlicr,  upon  the  whole,  rea- 
sonable dispatch  had  been  used  by  the 
plaintiffs  in  communicating  notice  of 
the  dishonor  of  the  bill  to  the  drawer. 
A  rule  for  a  new  trial  was  made  ab- 
solute, and  two  of  the  judges  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  question 
was  a  question  of  law;  but  llie  de- 
cision seems  not  to  have  turned  upon 
tliat  point. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  941 

§  1224.  View  of  Lord  Mansfield  and  his  Associates  that  it 
is  a  Question  of  Law.  —  It  was  laid  down  by  Lord  Mansfield, 
who  may  be  justly  called  the  father  of  the  English  law  of  com- 
mercial paper,  that  what  is  reasonable  notice  to  an  indorser  of 
non-payment  by  the  maker  of  a  promissory  note,  or  to  the 
drawer  in  case  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  is  a  question  of  law,  which 
for  the  sake  of  certainty  and  uniformity  in  commercial  transac- 
tions, should  be  decided  by  the  court.  "It  is  of  great  conse- 
quence," said  that  eminent  judge,  "  that  this  question  should  be 
settled.  Certainty  and  diligence  are  of  the  utmost  importance 
in  mercantile  transactions.  It  is  extremely  clear  that  the  holder 
of  a  bill,  when  dishonored  by  the  acceptor,  must  give  reasonable 
notice  to  the  drawer  or  indorser.  What  is  reasonable  notice  is 
partlj''  a  question  of  fact,  and  partly  a  question  of  law.  It  may 
depend,  in  some  measure  on  facts;  such  as  the  distance  at  which 
the  parties  live  from  each  other,  the  course  of  the  posts,  etc. 
But  wherever  a  rule  can  be  laid  dowm  with  respect  to  this  reason- 
ableness, that  should  be  decided  by  the  court  and  adhered  to  by 
every  one,  for  the  sake  of  certainty."  Ashurst,  J.,  in  the  same 
case  said:  "  It  is  of  dangerous  consequence  to  lay  it  down  as  a 
general  rule  that  the  jury  should  judge  of  the  reasonableness  of 
time.  It  ought  to  be  settled  as  a  question  of  law.  If  the  jury 
were  to  determine  this  question  in  all  cases,  it  would  be  produc- 
tive of  endless  uncertainty."  Buller,  J.,  added  the  following 
opinion:  "  The  numerous  cases  on  this  subject  reflect  great  dis- 
credit on  the  courts  of  Westminster.  They  do  infinite  mischief  in 
the  mercantile  world,  and  this  evil  can  only  be  remedied  by  doing 
what  the  court  wished  to  do  in  the  case  of  MedcaJfy.  Hall,^ 
by  considering  the  reasonableness  of  time  as  a  question  of  law, 
and  not  of  fact.  Whether  the  post  goes  out  this  or  that  day,  at 
what  time,  etc.,  are  mattersof  fact;  but  when  those  facts  are  estab- 
lished, it  then  becomes  a  question  of  law  on  those  facts, what  no- 
tice shall  be  reasonable. ' '  '^  The  rule  thus  laid  down  seems  finally 
to  have  been  established  as  a  rule  of  the  common  law  of  Ensfland,^ 

1  Triu.  Terra,  22  Geo.  3,  B.  R.  3;  3  Hirschfield  v.  Smith,  Hair.  & 
Douc  113.                                                       Ruth,  284,  288,  per  Erie,  C.  J. 

2  Tindal  v.  Brown,  1  T.  R.  167. 


942  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

and  is  now  codified  by  statute  in  England  in  the  -Bills  of  Ex- 
change Act,  1882.1 

§  1225.  This  View  generally  adopted  in  America.  —  This 
view  has  been  established  by  the  best  judicial  opinion  in  this 
countiy.'^  It  may  be  formulated  in  the  statement  that  the 
question  of  due  diligence  in  giving  notice  of  protest  to  the  drawer 
of  a  bill  of  exchange,  is,  for  commercial  reasons,  a  question  of 
law,  ivhere  the  facts  are  undisputed .^  The  meaning  is  that,  upon 
a  given  state  of  facts  the  court  may  rule  conclusively  that  the 
notice  was  insufficient.^  It  is  a  mere  variation  in  the  expression 
of  this  rule  to  say  that  the  sufficiency  of  demand  and  notice  of 
non-payment,  to  charge  the  indorser  of  a  promissory  note  or  the 
drawer  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,^ 
or  to  say  that  it  is  error  to  submit  to  a  jury  the  question  whether 
the  protest  of  a  dishonored  negotiable  instrument,  and  notice  to 
the  drawer  or  indorser,  were  regular  or  leijal.^  As  the  facts  will 
not  be  specially  found  except  in  those  jurisdictions  where  special 
verdicts  are  in  practice,  or  where  special  interrogatories  are  sub- 
mitted to  juries,  it  will,  under  the  operation  of  this  rule,  be  the 
office  of  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  that  certain  facts  in  evidence 
do  or  do  not,  in  law,  amount  to  sufficient  notice  of  non-payment 
to  charge  the  indorser;  ^  and  the  cases  are  very  numerous  where, 

1  45  and  40  Vict.,  chap.  (!1,  §^9,  sub-  3  Carroll  v.  Upton,  3  N.  Y.  272. 
sec,  12.  Compare  Hunt  v.  Maybee,  7  N.  Y.  2G6. 

2  Brenzer  v.  Weightmau,  7  Watts  &  ^  Etting  v.  Schulkill  Bank,  2  Pa.  St. 
S.  (Pa.)  204;  Bank  of  Columbia  v.  355;  Sherer  w.  Easton  Bank,  33  Pa.  St. 
Lawrence,    1    Pet.    (U.    S.)  578,  583;  134,141. 

Sandersons.  Reinstadler,  31  Mo.  483;  ^  Rickettsu.  Pendleton,  14  Md.  321, 

Stanley  v.  Bank  of  Mobile,  23  Ala.  G52,  330. 

G57;  Rickettsr.  Pendleton,  14  Md.  321  «  Watson  u.  Tarpley,  18  How.  (U. 
330.  "The  sufficiency  of  service  [of  S.)  517.  See  also  Bank  of  Columbia 
notice  to  charge  an  indorser],  upon  «.  Lawrence,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  578;  Dick- 
facts  shown,  is  a  question  of  law;  and  ins  v.  Beale,  10  Id.  572;  Rhett  v.  Poe, 
any  rule  which  leaves  it  Indefinite  2  How.  (U.  S.)  457;  Camden  v.  Do- 
must  always  leave  parties  in  doubt  remus,  3  ZcZ.  515;  Harris  v.  Robinson, 
concerning  their  legal  rights  and  lia-  i  Id.  33G;  Lambert  v.  Ghiselin,  9  Id. 
bilities."  Nevius c.  Bank  of  Lansing-  552;  and  see  the  English  decisions 
burg,  10  INIich.  547,  550,  551,  -per  cited  in  Rhett  v.  Poe,  .swjara. 
Campbell,  J.              ,  '  Sherer  v.  Eastou  Bank,  supra. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    1NSTRU3IENTS.  943" 

upon  conceded  facts  or  upon  hypothetical  instructions,  the  courts 
have  decided  this  question  as  one  of  law.  It  was  well  said 
that  "any  rule  adopted  must  be  in  some  respects  an  arbitrary 
one,"  and  the  courts  proceed  upon  the  idea  that  it  is  better  to 
apply  an  uniform  rule  in  commercial  transactions,  than  to  leave 
each  case  to  the  shifting  discretion  of  juries.^ 

§  122G.  No  Reversal  if  the  Jury  Decide  it  Rightly.  — But,  on  a 
principle  already  stated,-  no  prejudicial  error  will  accrue  to  the  indorser 
from  leaving  this  question  to  the  jury,  where  they  decide  it  rightly.  It 
was  so  held,  where  it  was  shown  that  a  notice,  accompanied  by  a  protest 
of  a  note  for  non-payment,  was  left  at  the  office  of  an  indorser,  who 
was  an  attorney  at  law  and  who  kept  no  clerk,  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
day  on  which,  by  law,  it  was  required  to  be  given.  Here  the  law  pre- 
sumed that  the  indorser  received  the  notice,  and  it  was  hence  sufficient 
to  charge  him  as  matter  of  law ;  and  the  decision  of  the  jury  that  it  did 
so  charge  him  was  therefore  correct  in  point  of  law,  and  the  interme- 
diate steps  by  which  that  decision  was  reached  became  immaterial.  It 
was  a  case  of  error  Avithout  injury,  which  does  not  authorize  a  reversal. ^ 

§  1227.  This  Rule,  how  applied  in  England.  — In  the  application  of 
this  rule,  to  state  the  English  cases  as  they  have  been  collected  and  stated 
by  the  late  Judge  Taylor  in  his  work  on  evidence,  ^  the  reasonable  time 
within  which  such  notice  must  be  given  means,  "  according  as  the  parties 
live  in  tlie  same  or  in  different  places,  either  that  the  letter  containing 
notice  should  be  so  posted  that,  in  due  course  of  delivery,  it  would  ar- 
rive on  the  day  following  that  on  which  the  writer  lias  received  intelli- 
gence of  dishonor ;  ^  or  that  such  letter  should  be  posted  before  the 
departure  of  the  mail  on  the  day  following  receipt  of  intelligence  ;  ^  or, 
if  there  be  no  post  on  that  day,  "  or  if  it  start  at  au  unreasonable  hour  in 

1  Towuseud  ('.  Lorain  Bauk,  2  Oh.  515;  Smith  u.  Mullett,  2  Camp.  208,  per 
St.  345;  Dale  v.  Golds,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  Lord  Elleuborough;  Hiltou  v.  Fair- 
490;  Reamer  v.  Downer,  23  Weud.  clough,  Id.  633,  per  Lawrence,  J.; 
(N.  Y.)  G2G;  Brenzer  v.  Wightmau,  7  Rowe  v.  Tipper,  13  Com.  Bench,  249, 
Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  266;  Bauk  of  Colum-  2oQ,  per  Maule,  J. 

bia  V.  Lawrence,  1  Pet.  (U.  S.)  583.  ^  -\yiiiiaras  v.  Smith,  2  Barn.  &  Aid. 

2  Ante,  §  1020.  496.    Compare  Sheltou  v.  Braithwaite, 

3  Stanley  v.  Bauk  of  Mobile,  26  Ala.      7  Mees.  &  AV.  436. 

652.  1  Geill  v.  Jeremy,  Mood.  &  M.  61, 

•*  1  Tayl  Ev.  (8th  Eug.  ed.)  §  30.  per  Lord  Teuterdeu. 

^  Stockeu  V.  Collin,  7  Mees.  &  W. 


944  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

the  morning,  ^  —  then  the  writer  shall  have  an  additional  day.  If,  too, 
the  bill  be  presented  through  a  banker,  one  day  more  is  allowed  for 
giving  notice  of  dishonor,  than  if  it  were  presented  by  the  party  himself  .^ 
At  one  time  a  donbt  seems  to  have  been  entertained  whether,  in  the 
event  of  there  being  several  indorsers  to  a  bill,  the  holder  would  have  a 
separate  day  allowed  him  for  giving  notice  to  each ;  but  it  is  now  ex- 
pressly decided  that  he  has  in  general  but  one  day  to  give  notice  to  all 
the  parties  against  whom  he  intends  to  enforce  his  remedy,  though  each 
of  the  indorsers  in  turn  has  his  day,^  and  though  the  holder  may  avail 
himself  of  a  notice  duly  given  by  any  other  party  to  the  bill.*  Again, 
the  holder  of  a  cheque,  or  of  a  bill  or  note  payable  on  demand,  must, 
in  general,  present  the  instrument  for  payment  on  or  before  the  day 
following  that  on  which  it  was  received.^  But,  in  these  cases,  the  term 
'  reasonable  time  '  may  sometimes  receive  a  different  construction,  re- 
gard being  had  to  the  nature  of  the  instrument,  the  usage  of  trade,  and 
the  particular  facts.  ^  This  last  rule  applies,  not  only  as  between  the 
parties  to  a  cheque,'''  but  as  between  banker  and  customer,  unless  cir- 
cumstances exist  from  which  a  contract  or  dut}^  on  the  part  of  the  banker 
to  present  at  an  earlier,  or  to  defer  presentation  to  a  later  period,  can 
be  inferred."^  But  the  rule  does  not  apply  to  cases  where  the  action  is 
brought  by  the  holder  of  a  banker's  cheque  against  the  drawer,  unless, 
during  the  delay,  the  fund  has  been  lost,  as  by  the  failure  of  the 
banker, 9  —  the  rule  being  that,  as  between  the  drawer  of  a  cheque  and 

1  Hawkes  v.  Salter,  4  Biug.  715;  s.  BocUliugton  v.  Schlencker,  4  Barn.  & 
c.  1  Moore  &  P.  750;  Bray  v.  Hadweu,      Ad.  752;  Moule  v.  Brown,   4  Biug.  N. 

5  Manle  &  S.  68;  Wright?;.  Slmwcross,  C.  266.  See  Bailey  v.  Bodeuham,  16 
2  Barn.  &  Aid.  501,  note.  Com.    B.  (n.  s.)  288;    s.  c.  33   L.  J. 

2  Alexander  v.  Burchfleld,  7  Man.      (C.  P.)  252. 

6  G.  1061,  1066;  Hayues  v.  Birks,  3  ^  Statute  45  &  46  Vict.,  chap.  61, 
Bos.  &  P.  599;  Scott  v.  Lifford,  9  East,  §  45,  sub-sec.  2;  §  74,  sub-sec.  2;  §  86, 
347;  s.  c.   at  nisi  prius,  1  Camp.  246;       sub-sec.  2. 

Laugdale  v.   Trimmer,  15  East,    291.  ''  Hopkins  v.  Ware,  L.  R.  4  Esch. 

See  also  the  receut  English  statute,  45  268. 

and  46  Vict.,  chap.  61,  sec.  49,  sub-  «  Hare  v.  Henty,  30  L.  J.   (C.  P.) 

sec.  13.  302;  s.   c.  10  Com.  Bench    (n.  s.),  65. 

3  Rowe  V.  Tipper,  13  Com.  Bench,  See  Prideaux  v.  Criddle,  L.  R.  4  Q,  B. 
249;  Dobree  v.  Eastwood,  3  Car.  &  P.  455;  s.  c.  38  L.  J.  (Q.  B.)  232;  s.  c, 
250.  See,  however,  Gladwell  v.  Turner,  10  Best  &  Sm.  515. 

39  L.  J.  Exch.  31 ;  s.  c.  L.  R.  5  Exch.  ^  Robinson  v.  Hawksford,  9  Ad.  & 

59.  El.  (n.  s.)  52;  Serlev.  Norton,  2  Mood. 

^  Chapman  v.    Keaue,  3  Ad   &   El.  &  Rob.   401;  and    see    note  Id.  404; 

193;  .s.  c.  4  Nev.  &  M.  607.  Laws   v.  Rand,  27  L.  J.   (C.  P.)   76; 

*  Kickford  v.  Ridge,  2  Camp.  537;  s.  c.   3  Com.  Bench  (x.  s.),  442.     See 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  945 

the  holder,  any  time  less  than  the  period  of  the  statute  of  limitations  is 
unreasonable  for  presentment  for  payment,  unless  some  loss  is  occa- 
sioned to  the  drawer  b}^  the  dela}-. 

§  1228.  Further  Illustrated.  — The  holder  of  a  bill  of  exchange, 
on  the  day  after  it  became  due,  called  at  the  office  of  the  drawer,  and, 
on  being  told  that  he  was  engaged,  wrote  on  a  scrap  of  paper  and  sent 
to  him  the  following  notice:  "  B.'s  acceptance  to  J.,  500  £.,  due  12th 
Jan.  is  unpaid:  payment  to  R.  &  Co.  is  requested  before  4  o'clock." 
The  clerk  of  J.,  who  took  in  the  notice,  said  that  "  it  should  be  attended 
to."  Upon  these  facts  appearing,  the  court  directed  a  verdict  for  the 
plaintiff  against  the  indorser,  reserving  leave  to  the  defendant  to  move 
to  enter  a  verdict  for  him.     It  was  held  that  this  direction  was  right. ^ 

§  1229.  Another  Illustration.  —  It  has  been  held  error,  in  an  action 
upon  a  bill  of  exchange  for  non-acceptance  and  non-payment,  to  in- 
struct the  jury  "that  the  plaintiff  was  not  entitled  to  recover  on  the 
count  in  the  declaration  on  the  protest  of  the  bill  for  non-acceptance, 
unless  due  and  regular  notice  was  proved  of  the  protest  of  the  bill  for 
non-payment,  though  the  jury  might  be  satisfied  from  the  proof,  that 
the  bill  had  been  regularly  protested  for  non-acceptance,  and  due  notice 
thereof  given  to  the  defendant ;  that,  to  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover, 
notwithstanding  the  proof  of  protest  for  non-acceptance  and  due  notice 

also  Alexander  v.  Burchfleld,  7  Man.  his  opinion  by  saying :  "  It  is  said  that 

&  Gr.  lOGl;  Heywood  v.  Piciiering,  L.  is  a  question  for  a  jury."     Ibid.,  461. 

E.  9  Q.  B.  428;  s.  c.    43  L.  J.  (Q.  B.)  Baron  Bramwell  concluded  his  opinion 

145.  by  saying:   "I  hold,  tlierefore,   that, 

1  Paul  V.  Joel,  3  Hurl.  &  N.  455,  4G0;  in  this  particular  case,  tliere  was  evi- 

qualifyiug  Solarte  v.  Palmer,  7  Bing.  deuce  for  a  jury,  according  to  the  law 

630,  and  following  Bailey  v.  Porter,  14  as  laid  down  in  Solarte  v.  Palmer  (5 

Mees.  &  W.  440,  an  authority  in  point.  Moore  &  P.  475;  7  Bing.  540),  that  the 

The  peculiarity  of  this  decision  is  tliat,  notice  so  given  conveyed  an  intimation 

while  the  question  was  decided  as  a  that  the  bill  had  been  presented  and 

question  of  law,  it  was   held  by  the  was  dislionored.     And  I  am  prepared 

judges  proper  to  leave  it  to  the  jury,  to  go  further,  and  say  tliat  in  every 

Chief  Baron  PoUocls  said:  "  It  would  case  where  the  demand  of  payment  is 

have  been  propei*  to  leave  it  to  the  jury  made  on  a  drawer  or  indorser  by  the 

to  consider  whetlier,  under  all  the  cir-  holder  of  a  bill  on  a  proper  day,  it 

cumstauces,  the  defendant  had  not  rea-  ouglit  to  be  left  to  the  jury  to  say 

sonable  information  that  the  bill  had  whether,    under    the    circumstances, 

been  presented  and    dishonored,  and  there  was  sufficient  notice  of  dishon- 

that  he  was  called  upon  to  pay  it."  or."     Ibid.,  463. 
Ibid.,  460.  Mr.  Baron  Martin  concluded 

60 


946  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   Thoilip.  Tl*., 

thereof,  the  plaintiff  must  prove  protest  for  non-payment  and  due  notice 
thereof,  to  the  defendant ;  and  that  the  jury  were  the  judges  of  the 
testimony,  and  could  give  to  the  witnesses  such  credit  as  they  thought 
them  entitled  to,  looking  to  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case."  ^ 

§  1230.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  on  this  Point.  —  "If  the  jury 
find  from  the  evidence  that  the  notice  of  protest  and  non-payment  of 
the  note  in  question  was  left  by  the  notary  on  a  desk  in  a  second  story 
of  the  building  occupied  by  defendant  Boernstein,  and  that  the  business 
office  of  said  defendant  was  in  the  third  story  of  said  building,  then  the 
jury  ought  to  find  a  verdict  for  said  defendant  Boernstein,  unless  they 
further  find  from  the  evidence  that  defendant  actually  received  said 

notice.- Unless  the  jury  find  from  the  evidence  that  notice  of  the 

non-payment  of  the  note  in  question  was  delivered  to  the  defendant 
Boernstein  personally,  or  to  some  person  in  his  employ,  at  his  usual 
l^lace  of  business,  within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  same  note  became 
due,  then  they  will  find  for  the  said  defendant  Boernstein."  ^ 

§  1231.  Another  Precedent  :  Indorser  Competent  to  give  Notice 
TO  Prior  Indorser,  —  "That  an  indorser  of  a  promissory  note  is  a 
competent  person  to  give  notice  to  any  prior  indorser  of  a  demand,  and 
the  dishonor  of  payment  of  a  promissory  note."  ^ 

§  1232.  Another  Precedent:  Variance  in  Description  in  Notice 
OF  Dishonor.  — "In  the  notice  of  dishonor  of  a  promissory  note,  an 
unintentional  variance  in  the  description  of  the  note  will  not  vitiate  the 
notice,  if,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the  notice  is  not  mis- 
leading and  identifies  the  note  witli  reasonable  certainty."  ^ 

§  1233.  Whether  the  Circumstances  of  a  Particular  Case 
are  Sufficient  to  Dispense  with  Demand  and  Notice.  —  Whether 
the  circumstances  of  a  particular  case  are  sufficient  to  dispense 
with  demand  of  payment,  and  notice  to  the  drawer  or  indorser 
of  non-payment,  is  said  to  be  always  a  question  of  hnv  addressed 
to  the  judgment  of  the  court.     If  the  facts  on  which  this  question 

1  Watsou  V.  Tarpley,  18  How.  *  Townsend  v.  Chas.  H.  Heer  Dry 
(U.  S.)  517.                                                        Goods  Co,,  85  Mo.  503,  508. 

2  Approved  in  Kleinmaii  v.  Bocru-  •'>  Townseud  v.  Chas.  H.  Heer  Dry- 
stein,  32  Mo.  314.                                           Goods  Co.,  85  Mo.  503,  507. 

3  Ibid. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  947 

arises  be  admitted,  or  are  not  denied,  or  are  undeniable,  then  it  is 
said  to  be  exclusively  a  matter  of  law,  to  be  pronounced  upon  by 
the  court;  but  if  the  facts  be  traversed,  or  the  proof  be  equivocal 
or  contradictory,  then  it  is  said  that  the  question  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  upon  hypothetical  instructions,  by  which  the 
court  declares  the  inferences  of  law  which  arise  upon  such  states 
of  fact  as  the  jury  may  find.^ 

§  1234.  Effect  of  Insolvent  Inserting  the  Bill  in  his  Schedule.  — 
Contrary,  it  would  seem,  to  the  foregoing  conceptions,  it  has  been  held 
that,  where  the  drawer  of  a  bill  of  exchange  afterwards  becomes  insolv- 
ent, surrenders  his  property  to  his  creditors  under  a  statute,  and  inserts 
the  bill  in  his  schedule  of  assets,  this  is  evidence  to  go  to  a  jury  upon 
the  fact  of  notice,  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  is  a  question  for 
them  to  decide,  and  is  not  subject  to  review  or  error.^ 

§  1235.  Waiver  of  Notice  to  Indorser.  —  Whether  the  question 
whether  an  indorser  has  waived  his  right  to  notice  of  the  dishonor  of 
the  bill,  is  a  question  of  law  or  of  fact,  seems,  like  many  other  ques- 
tions relating  to  the  law  of  waiver,^  to  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the 
evidence  which  is  adduced  to  support  the  contention  that  there  has  been 
a  waiver.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  law  conclu- 
sively ascribes  to  certain  acts,  by  the  indorser  of  a  note  or  the  drawer 
of  a  bill,  the  effect  of  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  such  notice.  That  a  s?<6- 
sequent  promise  to  pay  the  note  by  an  indorser,  who  has  full  knowledge 
of  all  the  facts,  amounts  to  a  complete  waiver  of  the  want  of  due  notice, 

1  Orear  v.  McDonald,  9  Gill  (Md.),  the  bill,  has  been  held  to  be  competent 
350,  359;  following  Cathell  v.  Good-  evidence  to  go  to  a  jury,  of  a  regular 
win,  1  Harr.  &  G.  (Md.)  470.  notice  of  the  dishonor  of  the  bill,  and 

2  Hyde  v.  Stone,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  to  warrant  a  jury  In  presuming  that  a 
170,175.  In  the  opinion  of  the  court  regular  notice  had  been  given.  Thorn- 
byMr.  Justice  Campl)ell,  it  is  said:  ton  u.  Wynn,  12  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  183; 
"  A  plaintiff  may  prove,  by  admissions  Rogers  v.  Stevens,  2  T.  R.  713 ;  Patter- 
of  a  defendant,  that  all  the  steps  nee-  sou  v.  Beecher,  6  J.  B.  Moore,  319; 
essary  to  charge  him  as  an  indorser  or  Caihpbell  v.  Webster,  2  Man.  G.  &  Sc. 
drawer  of  a  bill  of  exchange  have  been  253;  Union  Bank  v.  Grimshaw,  15  La. 
taken.  Proof  of  a  direct  or  condi-  321.  The  effect  of  such  evidence  in  tlie 
tional  promise  to  pay  after  a  bill  be-  particular  case  must  be  determined  by 
comes  due,  or  of  a  partial  payment,  or  the  jury,  and  their  decision  cannot  be 
of  an  offer  of  a  composition,  or  of  an  reviewed  by  an  appellate  court." 
acknowledgment  of  his  liability  to  pay  ^  Post,  §  1435,  et  seq. 


948  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY,     [l  Thomp.  Tl*., 

is  settled  as  a  matter  of  law.i  So,  of  a  subsequent  part  payment  of  the 
note  by  the  indorser,  with  knowledge  of  the  precedent  facts.  While 
some  of  the  cases  assert  that  it  is  evidence  from  which  a  jury  ma}- infer 
that  demand  was  duly  made  and  notice  given,  many  others  declare  it 
to  be  a  waiver  of  notice  itself.^  So,  a  subsequent  promise^  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  facts,  although  not  founded  on  any  new  considera- 
tion, is  deemed  to  hold  the  indorser  to  his  liability,  on  the  principle  of 
loaiver.^  But  it  must  be  shown  by  the  plaintiff,  affirmatively  and  clearl}-, 
that  the  drawer  or  indorser  knew,  when  he  made  the  subsequent  prom- 
ise, that  he  had  not  received  regular  notice.  This  is  a  fact  to  be 
proved,  and  it  is  not  to  be  inferred,  from  the  mere  fact  of  a  subsequent 
promise,  that  regular  notice  had  been  given,  or  was  intended  to  be 
waived.*  So,  if  the  indorser  agree  to  extend  the  time  of  payment  be- 
yond the  maturity  of  the  note,  such  an  agreement  amounts  to  a  guar- 
anty that  he  will  hold  himself  bound  at  the  expiration  of  that  time,  and 
is  in  law  a  waiver  in  advance  of  his  right  to  notice  ^  So,  where  the 
holder  of  a  negotiable  note,  by  an  agreement  with  the  maker,  and  for  a 
valuable  consideration,  extended  the  time  for  its  payment,  and  after- 
wards indorsed  the  same  to  a  third  person,  without  giving  him  notice  of 
the  agreement  for  such  extension,  it  was  held  that  he  was  liable  to  the 
indorsee  without  demand  of  payment  upon  the  maker,  protest,  or  no- 
tice ;  since,  to  hold  otherwise  would  be  to  allow  him,  by  his  secret  agree- 
ment, to  perpetrate  a  fraud  upon  the  indorsee.  In  other  words,  the 
law,  upon  such  facts,  conclusively  ascribes  a  waiver  of  his  right  of 
notice.*^  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  whether  certain 
conversations  amounted  to  a  waiver  of  the  right  of  demand  and  notice, 

1  Sherer  v.  Easton  Bank,  33  Pa.  St.  109;  Eogers  v.  Stephens,  2  T.  R.  713, 
134,  141,  per  Strong,  J.  Hospes  v.  Alder,  6  East,  16,  u. ;  Luudie 

2  Levy  V.  Peters,  9  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  v.  Robertson,  7  East,  231 ;  Aiison  v. 
125,  128;  Reed  v.  Wilkinson,  MS.,  Bailey,  Bui.  N.  P.  276;  Whittaker  r. 
opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  Washington  at  Morris,  Esp.  Dig.  58;  Wilkes  «.  Jacks, 
Circuit  (cited  in  Whart.  Dig.  87);  Peake  N.  P.  Cas.  203;  Porter  ?;.  Ray - 
Vaughan  v.  Fuller,  2  Strange,  1246;  worth,  13  East,  417;  Haddock  w.  Bury, 
Sherer  v.  Easton  Bank,  33  Pa.  St.  134,  MS.  (cited  7  East,  236).  Compare 
142.  Forster  v.  Jurdisou,  11  East,  104. 

'"  Duryee    v.    Dennisou,    5    Johns.  ^  Trimble    v.    Thome,    16    Johns. 

(N.    Y.)    248;  Trimble  v.    Thome,  16  (N.  Y.)  152. 

Johns.  (N.  Y.)  151;  Miller  t?.  Hackley,  *  Ridgway  v.  Dey,  13  Pa.   St.  208, 

5  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  375,  383;  Grain  v.  Col-  211. 

well,  8   Johns.  (N.   Y.)    384;  Agau  v.  <=  Williams    v.    Brobst,    10    Watts 

McManus,    11    Johns.    (N.    Y.)    180;  (Pa),  111. 
Donaldson  v.  Means,  4   Dall.  (U.  S.) 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  949 

is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury  ;  ^  and  it  was  held  proper  to  refuse  to 
instruct  the  jury  that,  if  the  indorser,  after  knowing  the  fact  of  his  dis- 
charge from  liability  by  reason  of  the  failure  to  make  demand  and  give 
notice,  said  "  that  he  meant  to  pay  the  note,  but  should  take  his  own 
time  for  it,  and  would  not  put  himself  in  the  power  of  the  bank,"  ren- 
dered him  liable  to  pay  the  note.^  Referring  to  this  case,  a  modern 
writer  of  reputation  expresses  the  view  that,  whether  or  not  distinct 
words  used  would  amount  to  a  waiver,  is  a  question  of  law  ;  although 
he  concedes  that,  if  intermixed  with  others  about  which  the  testimony 
is  clear  and  concurrent,  it  would  make  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 
Contrary  to  much  that  is  said  above,  it  was  held  in  Massachusetts  that 
the  statement  by  an  indorser  who  had  received  no  notice  of  non-pay- 
ment, upon  being  asked  what  he  was  going  to  do  about  the  note,  that 
"  the  note  will  be  paid,"  was  not  equivalent  to  a  waiver  of  notice,  — 
the  court  being  of  opinion  that  the  expression  fell  short  of  a  promise 
by  him,  either  to  pay  the  note  or  to  see  it  paid.'' 

§  1236.  Whether  Notice  of  Protest  probably  reached  the  In- 
dorser. —  Although  the  certificate  of  notice  in  a  protest  of  a  notary 
may  be  so  drawn  as  not  to  be  evidence  to  charge  the  indorser,  yet  it 
has  been  held  that  the  court  may,  under  circumstances,  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  may  connect  with  it  the  other  evidence  on  the  part 
of  the  plaintiff,  and  that,  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 
notice  was  left  in  such  a  way  that  in  all  probability  it  reached  the  de- 
fendant, it  was  sufficient  to  charge  him:  "  It  was  for  the  jury  to  say, 
from  the  whole  proof  thus  taken  together,  whether  the  facts  would  justify 
the  conclusion  that  the  defendant  had  received  the  notice  left  at  his 
office."^  This  holding  is  based  upon  a  conception  which  is  not  sup- 
ported by  the  current  of  authority.  The  rule  established  by  judicial 
authority  generally  is  that  the  fact  whether  notice  was  received  is  im- 
material ;  since  it  is  not  a  question  of  actual  notice,  but  a  question  of 
diligence  in  giving  notice.^ 

§  1237.  '*  Second  of  Exchange,  First  Unpaid."  —  The  mean- 
ing of  these  words   iii  a  bill  of    exchange  has  been  held,  under 

1  See  ante,  §  1105,  et  seq.  ^  Stanley  v.  Bank  of  Mobile,  23  Ala. 

^  Union  Bank  v.  Magi'iider,  7 Peters  652,  ()57.     Compare  Rives   v.  Parmley, 

(U.S.),  287,290.  18  Ala.  201;  Caster  v.   Thomason,    1& 

3  2  Dan.  Neg.  Instr.,  §  1100.  Ala.  721. 

^  Creamer  15  Perry,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  «  AiUe,  §§  1223-1225. 

332,  335. 


950  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tbomp.  Tr!, 

certain  circumstances,  a  question  of  law  for  the  court,  and  not  of 
fact  for  the  jury.^ 

§  1238.  Refusal  to  Pay  or  Accept.  — But  the  refusal  to  pay 
or  accept  commercial  paper  is,  of  course,  a  question  of  fact;  and, 
where  this  is  in  doubt  or  dispute,  the  court  errs  in  giving  an  in- 
struction which  assumes  that  there  was  such  a  refusal. ^ 

§  1239.  Whether  the  Holder  took  it  in  Good  Faith  and 
without  Notice  of  Prior  Equities. — On  grounds  of  public 
policy,  with  the  view  of  protecting  those  who  deal  in  commercial 
paper  and  of  upholding  the  cliaracter  of  these  instruments  of 
commerce,  the  courts  in  England  and  in  this  country  have,  after 
some  conflicting  decisions,  united  in  the  conclusion  that,  whoever 
purchases  a  negotiable  security  from  the  holder  before  maturity, 
gets  a  good  title  thereto,  discharged  of  any  equities  which  may 
have  existed  between  the  original  parties  to  the  instrument,  in 
the  absence  of  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  purchaser  of  cir- 
cumstances affecting  tlie  title  of  the  holder,  provided  the  pur- 
chaser acts  in  good  faith.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  destroy  his  title 
that  there  were  circumstances  sufficient  to  put  a  prudent  man 
upon  inquiry,  or  that  he  may  have  been  negligent  in  failing  to  avail 
himself  of  his  means  of  knowledge.  The  test  of  his  liability  is 
not  neo-li^ence  or  diligence,  but  it  is  good  faith  or  bad  faith;  al- 
though  the  fact  of  negligence  may,  under  circumstances,  be  re- 
garded as  evidence  tending  to  show  bad  faith. ^  It  is  obvious 
that,  in  cases  which  call  for  the  application  of  this  rule,  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  purchaser  of  the  paper  had  notice  of  prior 
equities  will,  if  tlie  evidence  is  conflicting,  be  a  question  of  fact 

IBank  of  Pittsburg  v.  Neal,  22  s.  c.  10  Eng.  C.  L.  154;  Goodman  v.  Har- 
How.  (U.S.)  96,  108.  Compare  An-  vey,  4  Ad.  &  EI.  870;  Swift  v.  Tyson* 
drews  v.  Pond,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.)  5 ;  Fow-  16  Pet.  (U.  S.)  1 ;  Goodman  v.  Simonds, 
lerv.  Brantley,  14  Pet.  (U.  S.)  318;  20  IIow.  (U.  S.)  343;  Pringle  v.  Phil- 
Goodman  V.  Simonds,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  ips,  5  Saudf.  S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  157  (wliere 
343.     See  ante,  §  1075,   et  seq.  tlie    decisions     are    ably    reviewed)  ; 

2  Brooks?;.  Elgin,  6  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  Hamilton  v.  Marks,  63  Mo.  178;  Ed- 
254,  259;  Weeton  v.  Ilodd,  26  Eng.  L.  wards  r.  Thomas,  66  Mo.  483;  Mason  v 
&  Eq.  278.  Bank  of  Commerce,  16  Mo.  App.  275. 

3  Gill  V.  Cubit,  3  Barn.  &  Cres.  466;  Compare  Both  v.  Colvin,  32  Vt.  125. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XXXIX.]       NEGOTIABLE   INSTRUMENTS.  951 

for  the  jury;   and,  upon  a  principle  elsewhere  stated,  that  fraud^ 
and  intent^  are  hi  general  questions   of  fact,  it  will  also  follow 
that   the  question  whether  the  purchaser  acquired  title  to  the 
paper  in  good  faith,  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule,  will  gener- 
ally be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.     It  is  said,  in  a  else  in 
Vermont,  that  -the  questions,  whether  the  holder  of  current  ne- 
gotiable paper  has  taken  it  with  or   without  notice  of  defenses 
between  prior  parties, —whether  he  has  exercised  good  faith  in 
the  transaction,  or  has  been  guilty  of  negligence  or  a  want  of 
proper  caution,  — are  always  questions  of  fact  to  be  submitted 
to  and  determined  by  the  jury.     All  the  circumstances  attending 
the  transaction,  the  condition  of  the  several  other  parties,  and  all 
other  facts  that  bear  upon  such  an  issue,  are  onlv  evidence  for  the 
jury  to  weigh  in  deciding  it ;  "  3  and  it  was  held  that,  in  respect 
of  such  an  inquiry,  a /r/eree  stands  in  the  place  of  a  jury.* 

§  1240.  Whether  the  Plaintiff  has  Assigned  the  Note  sued  on  to 
Another  for  the  Benefit  of  his.  Creditors.  —  In  an  action  upon  a 
promissory  note,  it  has  been  held  that  an  answer  averrino- that  plaint- 
iff has  assigned  the  note  to  another  for  the  benefit  of  his  creditors 
raises  an  issue  in  the  nature  of  a  dilatory  plea,  which,  if  found  true,' 
would  not  result  even  in  an  abatement  of  the  action,  but  would  furnish 
ground  for  an  order  of  court  requiring  the  additional  party  to  be  made 
plaintiff,  on  pain  of  a  dismissal  without  prejudice;  that  the  issue  thus 
raised  is  triable  by  the  court,  ^nd  not  by  the  jury;  and  that  the  07ius 
jprobandi  is  on  the  party  making  the  objection.  It  was  added  that 
where  no  other  defense  is  set  up,  and  the  court  finds  for  the  plaintiff  on 
such  an  issue,  the  court  should  render  judgment  on  the  merits,  without 
the  intervention  of  a  juiy.^ 

§  1241.  Whether  Note  an  Extension  of  Time  or  Collateral 
Security.  —This  question  is  closely  allied  to  the  question  of /^ay- 
ment,  which  is  discussed  in  a  future  chapter."  Where  a  new  note 
is  given  to  the  holder  of  an  old  note  part  due,  upon  which  an 

^Pos«,§  1933,  eiseg.  133.     Compare,  as   to  the   nature    of 

Post,  §  1333,  et  seq.  such  a  defense,  Carpenter  v.  Miles,  17 

3  Eoth  V.  Colvin,  32  Vt.  125,  133.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  602. 

I  l^^^\  '  ^ee  especially  §§  1254,  1255,  1257. 

■5  Vanbusliirlj  v.  Levy,  3  Met.  (Ky.) 


952  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

indorse}'  or  surehj  is  liable,  the  question  may  arise  whether  the 
oiving  of  the  new  note  operated  to  extend  the  time  of  payment 
of  the  debt,  and  thereby  to  discharge  the  indorser  or  surety ;  and 
it  has  been  held  that  the  question  should  be  submitted  to  a  jury, 
to  determine  whether  there  w^as  an  agreement  to  extend  the  time 
of  payment  on  the  dishonored  note,  or  whether  the  new  note  was 
given  and  received  as  collateral  security  to  the  old  one.^  The  im- 
portance of  the  rule  is  found  in  the  other  rule  of  law  that  the  re- 
cei})t  of  a  bill  or  note  having  a  time  to  run,  from  the  party  pri- 
marily liable  on  a  bill  or  note  then  overdue,  does  not  discharge 
an  indorser  on  the  bill  or  note  overdue,  unless  there  is  an  agree- 
ment, express  or  implied,  that  the  new  bill  or  draft  is  in  payment 
of  the  former,  or  an  extension  of  the  time  of  payment  of  the 
former,  in  favor  of  some  party  who  is  liable  thereon  prior  to 
such  indorser.'^  Where  it  has  been  expressly  agreed  that  the 
new  note  is  received  as  collateral  security  to  the  overdue  note, 
the  right  of  immediate  action  upon  the  overdue  note  is  not  sus- 
pended, and  the  indorser  or  surety  is  not  discharged.^ 

§   1242.   Whether  Notes  are  Renewals  of  Former  Notes.  — 

Where  it  was  claimed  that  certain  notes  were  reneiuals  of  former 
notes,  and  those  again  of  others,  in  a  continuous  series,  all  for 
the  same  debt,  it  was  held  proper  to  submit  the  question  to  the 
jury  as  a  question  of  fact.  And  it  was  held  that  the  question 
was,  whether  or  not  they  were  renewals,  and  not  what  the  parties 
intended  or  considered.  A  renewal  was  defined  in  the  instruc- 
tions, approved  on  appeal,  to  be  "  a  new  security  given  for  a 
debt  due,  or  falling  due,  —  in  fact,  substituting  one  security  for 
another,  wdiether  it  is  the  same  debt  or  not;  "  and  the  court 
added:  "  If  the  securities  now  held,  are  the  notes  or  securities 
given  for  the  same  debt,  they  are  renewals;  "  and  it  w\as  held 
that  this  was  a  correct  and  comprehensive  view  of  the  law.* 

1  Taylor  v.  Alien,  30  Barb.   (N.  Y.)       (N.  Y.),294;  Huffman  v.   Hulbert,  13 
294.  Wend.    (^N.   Y.)    375;   McLaue  v.    La- 

2  Taylor  v.  Allen,  supra.  fayette  Bank,  3  McLean  (U.  S.),  589. 
^  Myers   v.  Welles,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  ^  Appeal  of  the  Bank  of  Commerce, 

463;     Fellows    v.   Prentiss,    3    Denio      44  Pa.  St.  423,  430. 
(N.  Y.),  512;  Hart  v.  Hudson,  6  Duer 


Tit.   V,  Ch.  XXXIX. J        NEGOTIABLE    INSTRUMENTS.  953 

§  1243.  How  THE  Jury  Instructed  in  such  a  Case.  —  In  such  a 
case  the  following  instruction  was  given  to  the  jury,  and  was  held  as 
liberal  as  the  plaintiffs  could  desire:  "That  it  is  not  necessary,  in  or- 
der to  one  note  being  a  renewal  of  a  former  one,  that  it  should  be  of 
the  same  amount,  or  time  to  run,  or  made  or  indorsed  bj'  the  same 
parties;  nor  that  the  note  given  in  renewal  should  be  given,  or  bear 
date  upon  the  day  of  the  maturity  of  the  former  note ;  and  that  it  need 
not  appear  that  the  identical  proceeds  of  the  new  note  were  actually 
applied  to  take  up  the  note  for  which  it  was  a  renewal.  That  a  new 
note  may  be  a  renewal  of  a  former  one,  although  the  new  note  passes 
through  the  regular  course  of  discount  in  a  bank ;  in  other  words,  that, 
because  a  note  is  discounted,  it  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  it  is 
not  a  renewal  of  a  former  note;  and  that,  if  the  jury  believe  that  the 
several  series  of  notes  testified  to  by  William  H.  Maurice,  formed  one 
continuous  transaction  in  the  loan  of  money  by  the  bank  to  Maurice,  of 
which  loan  the  notes  in  question  are  the  evidence,  the  verdict  must  be 
for  the  plaintiffs,  notwithstanding  any  new  note,  in  any  one  or  more  of 
the  series,  may  have  been  discounted  prior  or  subsequent  to  the  ma- 
turity of  the  preceding  note.  You  are  to  determine  whether  the  notes 
now  held  are  securities  for  the  same  debt."  ^ 

§  1244.  Instruction  as  to  the  Effect  of  an  Indorsement  in  Blank 
IN  an  Action  by  the  Assignee.  —  "  The  jury  are  instructed  that,  where 
a  note  has  been  indorsed  in  blank,  the  holder  of  the  same  may  fill  the 
blank  with  the  name  of  the  indorsee ;  that  the  indorsement  of  the  note 
is  said  to  be  in  blank  when  the  name  of  the  indorser  is  simply  written 
on  the  back  of  the  note,  leavmg  a  blank  over  it  for  the  insertion  of  the 
name  of  the  indorsee,  or  of  any  subsequent  holder ;  and  that  in  such  a 
case,  while  the  indorsement  continues  blank,  the  note  may  be  passed  by 
mere  delivery,  and  the  indorsee  or  other  holder  is  understood  to  have 
full  authority  personally  to  demand  payment  of  it,  or  make  it  payable, 
at  his  pleasure,  to  himself  or  to  another  person."  ^ 

§  1245.  Instruction  as  to  Duty  of  Indorsee  of  Check  to  make 
Effort  to  Collect  Same  before  Suing  Drawer.  —  "  Unless  the  jury 
believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiffs,  when  they  became  the  in- 
dorsees of  the  check  in  the  declai'ation  mentioned,  used  due  diligence 
to  collect  the  same  by  presentation  for  payment  at  the  bank,  and  if 

^  Appeal  of  the  Bank  of  Commerce,  ^  Approved  in  Palmer  v.  Marshall, 

44  Pa.  St.  423,  430.  CO  111.  292. 


954  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

dishonored,  gave  immediate  notice  thereof  to  the  defendant,  then  they 
will  find  for  the  defendant ;  and  the  fact  that  the  effects  of  the  bank 
were  removed  from  the  banking  house,  at  the  time  they  obtained  the 
check,  would  not  excuse  them  from  the  duty  of  presentation  of  the 
check  for  payment,  nor  from  giving  notice  of  its  dishonor,  unless  it  was 
notoriously  known  that  the  effects  had  been  removed ;  then  such  present- 
ation was  not  necessary.  1 

^  Approved  iu  Ford  v.  McClung,  5  W.  Va.  158. 


Tit.  V,  Cb.  XL.]      payment:  accord  and  satisfaction.     955 


CHAPTER    XL 

PAYMENT:    ACCORD  AND  SATISFACTION. 

Section 

1250.  Accord  and  Satisfaction  a  Question  of  Fact. 

1251.  Payment  a  Question  of  Fact. 

1252.  View  tliat  it  is  a  mixed  Question  of  Law  and  Fact. 

1253.  View  that  it  is  a  Question  of  Law. 

125i.  Purpose  for  which  a  Note  is  Delivered  and  Accepted. 

1255.  Payment  or  Purchase  of  a  Note. 

1256.  Cliaracter  in  whicli  a  Person  to  whom  Money  is  Paid  Receives  and 

Holds  it. 

1257.  Order  Delivered  as  Payment  or  for  Collection. 

1258.  As  between  Landlord  and  Tenant. 

1259.  Another  Illustration. 

1260.  What  will  repel  the  Presumption  of  Payment  from  Lapse  of  Time. 

1261.  Whether  a  Payment  was  Voluntary. 

1262.  Instruction  as  to  Conditional  Payment  of  Debt  by  Draft,  in  Action  to 

Recover  for  Goods  sold,  on  Account  of  which  Sale  Draft  was  Given. 

1263.  Precedent  of    an  Instruction  as  to  Payment  of   a  Bond  in  an  Action 

thereon. 

§  1250.  Accord  and  Satisfaction  a  Question  of  Fact. — To 

constitute  an  accord  and  satisfaction,  that  which  is  received  by 
the  creditor  must  be  accepted  by  him  in  satisfaction;  he  must 
intend  to  accept  it  as  a  satisfaction.  Whether  there  was  such 
an  acceptance  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury ;  ^  and  the  conclu- 
sion reached  by  the  jury  in  such  a  case,  upon  conflicting  testi- 
mony, sustained  in  the  trial  court,  will  not  be  disturbed  in  an 
appellate  tribunal.^ 

1  Frick    V.    Algeier,    87    Ind.    255;  16  Pa,  St.  450;  Hearn  v.  Kiehl,  38  Pa. 

Hardmau  v.  Bellhouse,  9  Mees.  e^  W.  St.   147;    State  Bank  v.  Littlejohn,   1 

69G;    Hall    v.  Flockton,  16  Ad.  &  El.  Dev.  &  B.  (N.  C.)  563;  Maze  v.  Miller, 

(N.  s.)    1039;    Jones    v.   Johnson,    3  1  Wash.  (U.  S.)  828;  Western  Union 

Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  276;  Hart  v.  Bailer,  Tel.  Co.  v.  Buchanan,  35  Ind.  429,  442; 

15  Serg    &  R.  (Pa.)    162;  Brenner  v.  s.  c.  9  Am.  Rep.  744. 
Herr,  8  Pa.  St.  106;    Stone  v.  Miller,  2  prick  v.  Algeier,  87  Ind.  255. 


956  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  1251.  Payment  a  Question  of  Fact. — Whether  a  debt  has 
or  has  not  been  paid,  is  generally  a  question  of  fact  for  the 
jury,^  since  it  is  generally  a  question  of  intent?  Thus,  whether 
a  judgment  entered  by  a  wife  against  her  husband  has 
been  paid,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  although  the  wife 
died  seven  years  afterwards,  her  estate  was  not  administered 
upon,  and  a  scire  facias  to  sue  out  execution  was  not  issued  on 
the  judgment  until  twelve  years  after  the  death  of  the  wife.^ 
Where  a  debt  is  to  be  paid  in  kind  —  as  for  instance,  rent  in  cot- 
ton —  and  the  debtor  becomes  liable  to  the  creditor  on  another 
account,  and  goods  of  the  particular  kind  are  delivered  by  the 
debtor  to  the  creditor,  it  will  be  a  question  for  a  jury  to  determine 
to  which  debt  it  was  intended  by  the  parties  that  it  should  be 
applied.* 

§  1252.  View  that  it  is  a  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and 
Fact.  — Payment  has  been  said  to  be  a  mixed  question  of  law  and 
fact.  Accordingly,  it  is  not  proper  for  the  court  to  submit  such 
a  question  to  the  determination  of  a  jury,  in  a  case  in  equity.^ 
But  a  sounder  view  is  that,  upon  a  feigned  issue  to  ascertain 
whether  a  judgment  has  been  paid  or  not,  the  question  of  pa"«'- 
mentis  exclusively  for  the  jury.^ 

§  1253.  View  that  it  is  a  Question  of  Law.  —  All  this  has  been 
regarded  as  compatible  with  the  idea  that  it  is  competent  for  the 
judge  to  say,  as  a  matter  of  law,  whether  a  given  state  of  evi- 
dence, assuming  it  to  be  true,  amounts  to  proof  of  payment;  the 
rule  being  that  the  legal  sufficiency  of  the  evidence,  in  other 
words,  the  conclusion  of  law  to  be  drawn  from  the  evidence,  is, 
in  general,  a  question  for  the  court. ^  It  has  therefore  been  held 
proper  for  the  court  to  decline  to  instruct  the  jury  that,  if  they 

1  Barnes  v.  Brown,  69  N.  C.  439;  ■*  Phillips  v.  McGuire,  73  Ga.  517. 
Germania  Ins.  Co.  w.  Davenport  (Pa.),  Compare  Pritchard  u.  Comer,  71  Ga. 
9  Atl.  Rep.  517;  Union  Bank  u.  Smizer,      18. 

1  Sneed  (Tenn.),  501.  ^  Adams  v.  Helm,  55  Mo.  468. 

2  Post,  §  1333.  ^  Horner  v.  Hower,  49  Pa.  St.  475. 

3  Hess  V.  Frankenfield,  106  Pa.  St.  '  Frost  v.  Martin,  29  N.  H.  307  ;. 
440.                                                                       post,  §  2242,  et  seq. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL.]     payment:  accord  and  satisfaction.      957 

believe  that  a  payment,  which  the  evidence  shows  to  have  been 
made,  was  not  in  hiw  a  payment  of  the  note,  etc.,  the  plaintiff 
might  recover.^  But  the  only  ground  on  which  this  instruction 
could  have  been  properly  refused  was,  that  it  was  not  aptly 
framed,  so  as  to  bring  the  question  to  the  minds  of  the  jurors. 
There  is  no  rule  of  law  as  to  what  is  or  what  is  not  payment. 
Payment  is  simply  the  doing  of  what  a  man  has  agreed  to  do. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  pure  question  of  fact;  and  where  a  man  has 
agreed  to  pay,  and  tenders  what  he  understands  to  be  perform- 
ance of  his  agreement,  and  the  other  party  accepts  it,  it  is  a  naked 
question  of  fact  and  intent,  whether  it  was  accepted  as  perform- 
ance. In  every  such  case  the  ultimate  point  of  inquiry  does  not 
touch  a  rule  of  law,  but  stops  at  a  conclusion  of  fact. 

§  1254.  Purpose  for  wliicli  a  IVote  is  Delivered  and 
Accepted. — This  has  been  held  necessarily  a  question  of  fact 
for  a  jury.^  It  has  been  held,  under  circumstances,  that,  whether 
a  note  was  given  and  accepted  in  satisfaction  of  a  judgment, 
that  is,  in  absolute  payment  of  it,  or  was  merely  given  for  the 
purpose  of  fixing  the  amount  due  and  as  an  additional  or  collat- 
eral security^  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^  So,  it  has  been 
held  that  the  question  whether  a  note,  given  for  the  settlement  of 
a  suit  against  a  third  person,  is  an  extinguishment  of  the  original 
claim,"  or  collateral  to  it,  is  a  question  of  fact.'*  The  taking  of  a 
note  of  an  individual  partner  for  a  partnership  debt,  where  it  is 
agreed  to  be  taken  as  payment,  extinguishes  the /;«r<?iers/n^9  Je6i!,- 
and  the  question  whether  the  note  is  taken  in  payment  of  the 
debt,  or  as  collateral  security  only,  is,  in  an  action  of  assumpsit 
against  the  partnership,  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury. ^  Under 
circumstances,  it  has  been  held  a  question  of  fact  whether  a  sum 
of  money  was  paid  in  satisfaction  and  discharge  ^;ro  tanto  of  a 
note,  to  take  immediate  effect  as  payment,  or  was  merely  ad- 
vanced to  and  deposited  with  the  party  by  way  of  security,  to 
be  applied  in  payment  of  the  note,  only  in  case  the  whole  amount 

»  Ibid.  *  Wilson  v.  Hauson,  20  N.  H.  375. 

2  Sellers  v.  Jones,  22  Pa.  St.  423.  ^  Bouuell  v.  Chamberliu,  2G  Conn. 

3  Schilling  v.  Durst,  42  Pa.  St.  126.      487. 


958  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

of  the  debt  should  not  be  obtained  out  of  the  property,  by  a 
mortgage  by  which  the  note  was  secured,  —  the  question  depend- 
ing upon  the  intention  of  the  parties.^  And,  in  general,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  question  whether  a  note  or  bond  is  given  and 
accepted  in  satisfaction  of  the  original  debt,  is  for  the  jury;  and 
it  is  error  for  the  court  to  decide  it  as  a  matter  of  law.^  This  is 
merely  a  branch  of  the  rule  that,  when  a  matter  is  to  be  deter- 
mined according  to  the  intention  of  parties,  it  is  for  the  jury  to 
determine  what  their  intention  was.^  So,  where  a  person  is 
indebted  to  a  bank,  and  gives  his  promissory  notes  for  the  amount 
of  the  debt,  the  mere  acceptance  of  the  notes  by  the  bank  will 
not  necessarily  operate  as  a  satisfaction  of  the  debt ;  and  whether 
or  not  there  was  an  agreement  at  the  time  to  receive  them  in  sat- 
isfaction,  or  whether  the  circumstances  attending  the  transaction 
warranted  such  an  inference,  are  questions  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 
So,  where  a  firm,  consisting  of  three  persons,  was  sued  upon  an 
account,  for  which  it  appeared  that  two  of  the  firm  had  executed 
to  the  plaintiff  their  note,  and  the  suit  was  dismissed  as  to  these 
two,  and  stood  against  the  third  partner  alone, —  it  was  held  that 
it  was  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  whether  the  note  of  the  other 
two  was  received  by  the  })laintiff  in  extinguishment  and  satisfac- 
tion of  the  debt  of  the  three.  If  it  were,  the  third  partner  would 
be  discharged  from  the  debt ;  otherwise  not.^  So,  payment  and 
satisfaction  of  an  account  or  a  note  may  be  made  by  the  delivery 
an  acceptance  of  an  account  against  a  stranger ;  and  the  question 
whether  payment  w^as  intended  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.® 
Proof  of  the  acceptance  of  a  promissory  note  or  bill  of  a  third 
person,  if  it  appear  to  be  the  voluntary  act  and  choice  of  the 
creditor,  and  not  a  measure  forced  upon  him  by  necessity,  when 
nothing  else  could  be  obtained,  will  support  a  defense  of  pay- 

1  Dean?7.  Toppiu,  130  Mass.  517.  •*  Lyman  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  12  IIow. 

2  Stone   V.   Miller,    16   Pa.  St.  450,       (U.  S.)  225,  243. 

456;  Jones  V.  Johnston,  3  Watts  &  S.  ^  Keerl  v.   Bridgers,  10  Smecles  & 

(Pa.),    276;    Wallace   v.    Pairraan,   4  M.  (Miss.)  612. 

Watts    (Pa.),  379;  Hart  v.   Boiler,  15  «  Willard  v.  Germer,  1  Sandf.  S  C. 

Serg.  &R.  (Pa.)  162.  (N.  Y.)  50. 

3  Post,  §  1333,  et  seq. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL.]     payment:  accord  and  satisfaction.      959 

ment ;  ^  but  whether  it   will  amount  to  payment  is  a  question  of 
fact  for  a  juiy.^ 

§  1255.  Payment  or  Purchase  of  a  Note. — The  question, 
under  many  states  of  fact,  will  be  properly  a  question  for  the 
jury,  whether  a  transaction  by  which  a  note  passed  from  one  party 
to  another  was  a  purchase  of  the  note  by  the  transferee,  such  as 
did  not  extinguish  it,  or  a  payment  such  as  did.^  It  frequently 
becomes  a  material  inquiry,  where  a  third  person  takes  up  a  note 
which  has  matured  in  bank  or  elsewhere,  whether  he  does  it  in 
payment  of  the  note  or  merely  to  purchase  it;  and  this  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact,  for  a  jury,  depending  upon  the  intention  of  the  holder 
and  the  person  thus  taking  it  up.* 

§  1256.  Character  in  which  a  Person  to  whom  Money  is  paid 
receives  and  holds  it.  —  The  character  in  which  a  person  to 
whom  money  is  paid  receives  it,  is  a  question  of  fact,  unless  the 
law  annexes  a  definite  character  to  him  under  the  circumstances, 
as  in  the  case  of  a  public  officer  receiving  and  dealing  with  public 
moneys.  This  seems  to  have  found  an  illustration  in  a  case  in 
Maine,  where  money  was  paid  to  the  person  who  held  the  place 
of  agent  of  a  school  district,  the  same  being  sufficient  to  pay  the 
school  teacher  what  was  due  him,  provided  the  school  teacher 
had  qualified  himself  to  receive  it  and  had  become  entitled  to  it, 
by  obtaining  a  certificate  of  his  qualification  as  a  teacher,  as  re- 
quired by  the  governing  statute.  Here  it  was  held  that,  although 
the  school  teacher  had  performed'his  duty  acceptably,  yet  it  was 
the  pleasure  of  the  town,  under  the  statute,  to  withhold  from 
him  his  salary  until  he  had  procured  the  statutory  certificate,  and 
that  he  could  not  maintain  an  action  against  the  town  therefor; 
yet  if  the  town  elected  not  to  refuse  to  pay  him  his  w^ages  for 
this  reason,  but  paid  the  money  to  the  person  who  held  the  place 
of  agent  of  the  district,  and  it  was  so  received  by  the  latter,  it 

1  2  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  523;  Union  Bank  »  Comstockv.  Savage,  27  Conn.  184. 

»    Smiser,  1  Sneed  (Tenn.),   501,  514.  •*  Runyon  v.  Clark.  4  Jones  L.   (N. 

^  Ibid  ;  Johnson  v.  Weed,  9  Johns.  C  )  52.      Compare  Sherwood   v.    Col 

(N.  Y  )  310-  lier,  3  Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  380. 


960  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

would  be  the  property  of  the  instructor,  and  he  might  maintain 
an  action  against  the  agent  to  recover  it;  and  whether  the  agent 
received  the  money  of  the  town  for  the  use  of  the  teacher  would 
be  a  question  of  fact  rather  than  of  law, — the  inquiry  being  in 
what  character  and  for  what  purpose  he  received  it.^ 

§  1257.  Order  delivered  as  Payment  or  for  Collection.  —  So,  it  is 
for  a  jury  to  decide  whether  an  order  on  a  third  person  was  taken  for 
collection  merely,  by  a  creditor  of  the  person  by  whom  it  was  delivered, 
or  as  payment  when  the  amount  thereof  should  be  collected.  In  other 
words,  whether  or  not  such  an  order  was  accepted  by  a  creditor  from 
his  debtor  in  satisfaction  of  the  debt  and  in  discharge  of  his  debtor, 
should  be  left  to  the  jury.^ 

§  1258.  As  BETWEEN  LANDLORD  AND  TENANT. — A  tenant  being  in- 
debted to  his  landlord  for  rent,  the  agent  of  the  landlord,  without  the 
authority  or  knowledge  of  the  landlord,  took  a  bill  of  exchange  from 
the  tenant  for  the  rent,  and  paid  over  the  amount  of  the  rent  to  the 
landlord  in  his  settlement  of  account.  The  bill  was  afterwards  dis- 
honored whilst  in  the  hands  of  a  third  party,  and  the  rent  was  not 
paid  by  the  tenant,  whereupon  the  landlord  distrained.  It  was  held  to 
be  a  question  for  the  jury,  whether  the  bill  was  discounted  for  the  tenant, 
or  whether  the  money  was  loaned  to  the  tenant  by  the  agent,  or  whether 
it  was  advanced  by  the  agent  to  the  landlord ;  and  that  if  the  bill  was 
discounted  for,  or  the  money  was  loaned  to  the  tenant,  the  landlord 
was  not  entitled  to  distrain ;  otherwise  he  was.^  .  .  .  _  So,  in  another 
case  where,  on  the  rent  becoming  due,  the  agent  of  both  tenant  and  land- 
lord paid  the  amount  of  the  rent  to  the  landlord,  without  any  authority 
from  either  party,  and  the  tenant  afterwards  failed  to  pay  the  rent,  and 
the  landlord  distrained,  —  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  the 
payment  was  made  by  the  agent  on  behalf  of  the  tenant,  or  by  waj"  of 

advance  to  the  landlord."* In  a  case  in  New  York,  the  lessee  of 

a  farm,  on  the  day  after  $65.00  had  become  due  and  payable  for  an 
installment  of  rent,  entered  into  a  written  contract  with  his  lessor  for 
the  surrender  of  his  unexpired  term,  in  consideration  of  which,  and 
other  stipulations,  the  lessor  agreed  to  pay  at  a  subsequent  day,  and 

1  Dore  V.  Billings,  26  Me.  56.  <  Griffltlis  v.  Cliichester,  14  Eng.  L. 

2  Stephens  v.  Tliornton,  26  111.  323.      &  Eq.  372,  note. 

3  Parrott  v.  Anderson,  14  Eng.  L.  & 
Eq.  371. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL.]     PAYiMENT:   accokd  and  satisfaction.      9G1 

actually  did  pa}',  $550.00.  In  an  action  to  recover  tlie  SGo.OO  of  rent 
due  wiien  this  agreement  was  made,  it  was  held:  1.  That  the  contract 
did  not  operate  as  a  release  or  extinguishment  of  the  rent  which  had 
become  due.  2.  That,  from  the  contract  and  a  receipt  thereon  indorsed, 
of  the  subsequent  payment  of  the  $550.00,  no  legal  presumption  arose, 
either  that  the  rent  had  been  previously  paid,  or  that  the  amount  was 
allowed  when  the  receipt  was  executed.  3.  That  these  facts  were 
properly  submitted  to  the  jary^  with  instructions  that  it  was  a  question 
of  fact  for  them  to  determine  whether,  considered  in  connection  with 
all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  they  did  not  warrant  a  presumption  of  the 
payment  of  the  rent.^ 

§  1259.  Another  Illustration.  — In  a  suit  on  a  recognizance,  in  the 
Orphans'  Court  of  Pennsylvania,  by  an  heir  who  took  one  of  three  pur- 
parts at  the  appraisement,  executed  in  favor  of  the  Commonwealth,  for 
the  payment  to  the  other  heirs  of  their  proportional  shares  in  the  pur- 
part, it  was  held  permissible  for  the  recognizor,  the  defendant,  under  a 
plea  of  "  payment  with  leave,"  to  show  that  one  of  the  purparts  not 
taken  at  the  appraisement,  was  sold  by  a  trustee  under  order  of  the 
Orphans'  Court,  that  all  the  balance  of  the  proceeds,  after  payment  of 
the  debts  of  the  intestate,  was  paid  to  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  defend- 
ant in  the  suit  never  made  any  objection ;  and  the  fact  whether  or  not 
it  was  received  in  paj^ment,  depending  upon  a  question  of  intent^  should 
have  been  submitted  to  the  jury. '^ 

§  1260.  What  will  repel  the  Presumption  of  payment  from 
Lapse  of  Time.  — It  has  been  held  that,  what  will  repel  the  ar- 
tificial presumption  of  pa^-ment  arising  from  the  lapse  of  a  great 
length  of  time,  is  a  question  of  laiv,  and  that  it  is  error  to  submit 
it  to  a  jury.^  Contrary  to  this,  and  on  sounder  grounds,  it  has 
been  held  that  the  question  whether  the  presumption  of  payment 
has  been  repelled,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury ;  *  and  the  sound 
rule  seems  to  be  that,  notwithstanding  the  legal  presumption  of 
payment  arising  from  the  lapse  of  time,  the  question  of  payment 
remains  a  pure  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  and  any  evidence 

1  Sperry  v.  Miller,  10  N.  Y.  407.  ^  Grantham  v.  Canaan,  38  N.  H.  268; 

■■  Kidd  V.  Com.,  16  Pa.  St.  426.  McQuesney  v.  Heister,  33  Pa.  St.  435; 

'  Woodbury  v.  Taylor,  3  Jones  L.  Joy  v.  Adams,  2G  Me.  330,  333. 
<N.  C.)  604. 

61 


962  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

tending  to  satisfy  them  that  no  payment  has  actually  been  made,  is 
competent  and  admissible.^  This  is  in  accordance  with  what  is 
said  by  Dr.  Greenleaf :  "  In  all  these  cases,  the  presumption  of 
payment  may  be  repelled  by  any  evidence  of  the  situation  of  the 
parties,  or  other  circumstance,  tending  to  satisfy  the  jury  that 
the  debt  is  still  due."  '^  There  is  possibly  room  for  a  distinction, 
in  respect  of  this  question,  between  the  presumption  of  payment 
which  the  jury  are  authorized  to  draw  from  a  great  lapse  of  time 
less  than  twenty  years,  and  the  presumption  which"  the  law  draws 
where  the  lapse  of  time  is  greater  than  twenty  years.  In  the 
North  Carolina  case  first  cited,  the  lapse  of  time  was  less  than 
twenty  years,  but  a  statute  of,  that  State  had  cut  down  the  time 
wdiich  raises  this  protection  against  stale  demands,  froni  twenty 
to  ten  years,  and  the  demand  had  been  in  existence  for  more 
than  that  length  of  time.-^  In  a  case  in  Pennsylvania,  more  than 
twenty  years  had  elapsed  since  the  creation  of  the  obligation.  It 
was  held  that,  whether  the  facts  were  sufficient  to  rebut  the  pre- 
sumption was  a  question  for  the  court  and  not  for  the  jury. 
"  The  presumption,"  said  Strong,  J.,  "  is  one  drawn  by  the  law 
itself  from  a  given  state  of  facts,  and  whether  it  exists  or  not,  is 
necessarily j'^or  tlte  court.'''  ^ 

§  1261.  Whether  a  Payment  was  Voluntary.  — Where  a  party 
sues  to  recover  money  which  he  has  paid  to  a  sheriff  under  exe- 
cution, and  the  state  of  the  case  is  such  that  he  can  recover  it 
back  if  it  was  paid  under  compulsion,  but  not  if  it  was  paid  vol- 
untarily, the  question  whether  the  payment  was  voluntary  will, 
of  course,  be  a  question  of  fact /"or  the  jury. ^ 

§  3  262.  Precedent  op  an  Instruction  as  to  Conditional  Payment 
OF  Debt  by  Draft,  in  Action  to  recover  for  Goods  Sold,  on  Ac- 
count OF  which  Sale,  Draft  was  Given.  —  "  If  the  jury  believe  from 

1  Grautham  v.  Canaan,  38  N.  H.  ^  "Woodbury  v.  Taylor,  3  Jones  L. 
268.  (N.  C.)  504. 

2  1  Grecnl.  Ev.,  §  39.  See  also  *  Heed  v.  Reed,  46  Pa.  St.  239,  243. 
Cowau  &  Hill's  important  note  to  1  The  learned  judge  cited  Delauy  v. 
Phil.  Ev.,  p.  G7'!,  note  193,  where  many  Hobiusou,  2  Whart.  (Pa.)  503,  as  an 
cases  are  collected.  authority  for  the  proposition. 

5  E^ing  V.  Peck,  26  Ala.  413. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL.l     payment:  accord  and  satisfaction.      963 

the  evidence,  that  the  plaintiff  sold  to  the  defendant  corn,  they  will 
find   for  the  plaintiff,  unless    they  believe  further,  from  the  evidence, 

that  the  defendant  was  paid   for  the   same.^ If  the  jury  believe 

from  the  evidence,  that  the  defendant  gave  a  draft  or  drafts  to  the 
plaintiff,  or  to  any  one  for  him,  in  part  or  full  paj^ment  for  said  corn, 
and  that  said  draft  or  drafts  were  accepted  by  tlie  plaintiff  upon  the 
condition  that  he  could  use  it  or  them  to  pay  his  debts,  then  they  will 
find  for  plaintiff,  unless  they  beheve  the  plaintiff  did  or  could  have 
used  said  draft  or  drafts  in  the  payment  of  his  debts  ;  if  they  further 
believe  that  said  draft  or  drafts  have  been  returned  or  offered  to  be 
returned  to  defendant,  and  that  plaintiff  did  not  receive  any  money  on 
such  draft  or  drafts."  - 

§  1263.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  as  to  Payment  of  a  Bond  in 
AN  Action  Thereon.  — "If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that 
the  plaintiff  and  defendant  accounted  together  as  to  the  indebtedness, 
evidenced  by  the  bond  suet^  on,  and  so  accounted  freely  and  without 
concealment  or  fraud  by  either,  and  that,  as  a  result,  the  bond  was  so 
paid  and  discharged  as  that  the  defendant  was  then  entitled  to  said 
bond,  — then  it  is  not  material  to  inquire  into  the  consideration  so  paid 
and  accepted  in  the  discharge  thereof ;  but  if  they  believe  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  transaction  was  not  so  executed,  final  and  conclusive, 
that  the  defendant  was  then  and  there  entitled  of  right  to  said  bond, 
then  all  pretended  payments  claimed  which  are  shown  to  have  been 
paid  in  Confederate  money,  or  other  illegal  or  unlawful  currenc}',  are 
null  and  void,  and  should  be  totally  disregarded  by  the  jury."  ^ 

1  Approved  in  Hodgen  v.  Latham,  3  Approved  iu  Washington  v.  Bur- 
33  111.  34G.                                                           uett,  4  W.  Va.  85. 

2  Ibid. 


9G4  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Tboiup.  Tr., 


CHAPTER    XLI. 

STATUTE  OF  LIMITATIONS :   BANKRUPTCY :  NEW  PROMISE  AND  PART 
PAYMENT  TO  REVIVE  BARRED  DEBT. 

Section 

1267.  Promise  to  revive  Debt  Discliarged  by  Bankruptcy. 

1268.  Promise  to  revive  Debt  Barred  by  Limitation. 

1269.  Submitted  to  Jury  on  what  Evidence. 

1270.  Wliat  Indebtedness  the  New  Promise  refers  to. 

1271.  Part  Payment  to  take  a  Debt  out  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations. 

1272.  Right  of  Creditor  to  apply  the  Payment. 

1273.  Which  Debt  Intended.     . 

1274.  Instruction  as  to  Revival  of  Debt  Discharged  by  Bankruptcy. 

1275.  Defendant's   Instruction  as  to  New  Promise  where  Debt  is  Barred  by 

Statute  of  Limitations. 
127G.  A  Similar  Instruction  under  a  Statute  Requiring  the  Promise  to  be  in 
Writing. 

§  1267.  Promise  to  revive  Debt  Discbarged  by  Bank- 
ruptcy. —  Where  an  oral  promise  is  relied  upon  to  revive  a 
debt  which  is  discharged  by  bankruptcy ,  the  question  whether 
such  a  promise  is  proved  ^yill  generally  be  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  juiy ;  ^  but  whore  the  words  relied  on  to  take  the  case  out  of 
the  statute  of  limitations  amount  in  law  to  an  express  promise, 
the  meaning  of  the  words  will  not  be  referred  to  the  jury,  but  the 
court  may  instruct  them  as  to  their  legal  effect, — ^  as  where  the  new 
promise  or  acknowledgment  is  in  ivriting,  indorsed  on  the  instru- 
ment which  is  the  evidence  of  the  precedent  indebtedness.^  In  a 
very  elaborate  judgment  upon  this  subject  in  Maryland,  the  tenth 
proposition  ruled  by  the  court  was  :  "What  kind  of  promise 
or  acknoAvledgment  is  sufficient  to  take  a  case  out  of  the  act  of 

'  Bennett  v.   Everett,  3  R.    I.  ir)2,  403.     Compare  Curzon  v.  Edmondson, 

155;    United    Society    v.    Winkley,    7  (i  Mees.  &   W.  2'.t5,  where  it  was  held 

Gray  (Mass.),  460.  that  whether  a  writing  amounts  to  an 

2  Evans  v.  Carey,  29  Ala.  99.  acknowledgment  of  title  within  a  stat- 

3  Beasley  v.  Evans,  35  Miss.  102,  ute  is  a  question  for  the  judge  and  not 
19^"'',"  Morrell  v.   Frith^  3  Mees.  &  W.  for  the  jury  to  decide. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.   XLI.]       STATUTE    OF    LIMITATIONS.  965 

limitations,  is  for  the  court  to  decide;  and  the  evidence  offered 
to  prove  such  promise  or  acknowledgment  is  proper  to  be 
submitted  to  the  jury,  as  in  other  cases,  under  the  direction 
of  the  court."  ^  A  better  statement  of  the  rule  could  not 
be  drawn.  It  is  merely  a  statement  of  the  general  rule  in  re- 
gard to  the  existence  and  interpretation  of  promises,  which  is 
that,  whether  the  promise  to  pay  the  barred  debt  was  made,  is  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury  to  determine,  but  what  is  the  con- 
struction and  effect  of  the  promise,  if  made,  is  a  question  of  law 
to  be  decided  by  the  court;  ^  which  means  that,  where  there  is 
any  dispute  as  to  the  facts  which  go  to  prove  the  making  of  the 
new  promise,  the  question  must  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  upon 
hypothetical  instructions,  framed  so  as  to  apply  the  law  to  a  state 
of  facts  which  the  evidence  tends  to  prove.  But  where  there  is 
no  dispute  as  to  the  facts,  that  is,  as  to  the  character  of  the  prom- 
ise and  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was  made,  and  the  cir- 
cumstances are  such  that  different  inferences  of  fact  could  not 
fairly  be  drawn  from  them,  then  the  court  is  to  declare,  as  mat- 
ter of  law,  whether  the  promise  operated  to  revive  the  barred 
debt. 3 

1  Oliver  v.  Gray,  1  Harr.  &  G.  (Md.)  ise    [to    pay    a    debt    discharged  by 

204,219.  bankruptcy]  need  not  be  to  the  holder 

"^  Clark  V.  Sigoiiruey,  17  Conn.  511 ;  of  the  debt,  but  it  must  refer  to  the 

«H^e,  §§  1105,  HOG.  debt  without  question.     No  particular 

3  This,  somewhat  expanded  by  the  form  of  words  need  be  used  to  cousti- 

author,  is  the   doctrine   of    Clarke  v.  tute   this    promise.     Any    words,   or 

Butcher,    9    Cow.    (N.  Y.)  674,    679;  perhaps  signs  or  actg,  which  signify  a 

Hancock  v.  Bliss,   7   Wend.    (N.  Y.)  present  willingness  to  pay  the  debt, 

267,  and  Miller  v.  Lancaster,  4  Me.  159.  and  which  are  intended  to  convey  that 

Compare     Burghaus    v.     Calhoun,    6  idea  to  the  hearer,  are  sufficient     The 

Watts    (Pa.),   219,   where    it    is    laid  natural  import  of  the  words  used  must 

down  that,  "to  avoid  the  uncertainty  be  a  contract  to  discharge  by  payment 

and  insensible  encroachments  on  the  the    moral   obligation    that    remains, 

statute  that  would  ensue,  did  we   at-  whatever  the  debt  discharged  by   the 

tempt  to  shape  our  course  as  to  this  certificate.     A    bai'e   acknowledgment 

statute  by  former  decisions,  we  may  of  the  justness    of    the   debt,  of    its 

require  the  acknowledgment    of    the  present  existence  as  a  debt  formerly 

demand,  as  a  debt  of  legal  obligation,  contracted  and  now  unpaid,  is  not  suf- 

to  be  so   distinct  and  palpable  in  its  flcient.     Such  statements  as  these  will 

extent  and  form,  as  to  preclude  hesita-  remove  the  bar  of  the  statute  of  limit- 

tion."     It  has  been  said:  "  This  prom-  ations;  for  from  these  the   law  will 


966  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

§  1268.   Promise  to   revive  Debt  Barred  by  Ldmitation. — 

Whether  an  instrument  purporting  to  be  an  acknowledgment  of 
a  debt  is  sufficient  to  take  it  out  of  the  bar  of  the  statute  of  limi- 
tations, is  a  question  for  the  court;  but  whether  the  debt  sued 
for  is  the  one  thus  acknowledged,  is  a  question  for  the  jury.  ^ 

§  1269.  Submitted  to  Jury  on  what  Evidence.  —  But  every 
kind  of  evidence  conducing  to  show  a  recognition  of  the  claim 
or  claims  in  suit,  as  still  subsisting,  and  the  debt  as  one  of  the 
debts  referred  to  and  spoken  of  by  the  defendant  in  his  ac- 
knoAvledcrment  or  promise,  should  be  submitted  to  the  jury.^ 
Thus,  where  two  independent  claims  were  held  by  the  plaintiff 
against  the  defendant  —  one  on  an  account,  and  the  other  on  a 


imply  a  promise  to  pay.  Not  so,  as 
relates  to  the  bar  of  the  bankruptcy 
certificate.  The  bankrupt  must  make 
the  promise,  and  not  leave  it  to  the 
law  to  imply  it.  In  this  sense  the 
promise  must  be  express.  It  must 
also  be  unqualified  and  unconditional, 
or  else  the  party  seeking  to  avail  him- 
self of  it  must  show  the  condition 
performed."  Bennett  v.  Everett,  3  K. 
I.  152,  155.  See  also  Fleming  v.  Lull- 
man,  11  Mo.  App.  104;  Graham  v. 
Hunt,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  7;  Stewart  v. 
Keckless,  24  N.  J.  L.  427;  Field's 
Estate,  2Eawle  (Pa.),  351,  356;  Du- 
seubury  v.  Hoyt,  53  N.  Y.  521;  Eeith 
v.  LuUman,  11  Mo.  App.  254;  Cam- 
bridge Sav.  Inst.  V.  Littlefleld,  0  Cush. 
(Mass.)  213;  Allen  v.  Ferguson,  18 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  13;  Egbert  v.  McMi- 
chael,  9  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  45;  Fleming  v. 
Hayne,  1  Stark.  370;  Mosely  ■!).  Cald- 
well, 59  Tenn.  208;  Shockey  v.  Mills, 
71  Ind.  288,  292;  Randidge  v.  Lyman, 
124  Mass.  361;  Underwood  v.  East- 
man, 18  N.  H.  582,  585;  Bank  v.  Boy- 
kin,  9  Ala.  320,  322;  Huckabee  v.  May, 
14  Ala.  263;  Wynne  v.  llaikes,  5  East, 
515;  Soulden  v.  Van  Kensselaer,  9 
Wend.  (N.    Y.)2!)7;    Besford  r.  Saun- 


ders, 2  H.  Bl.  116;  Edson  v.  Fuller,  22 
N.  H.  183;  Haines  v.  Stauffer,  33  Pa. 
St.  541;  McKiuley  ?7.  O'Keson,  5  Pa. 
St.  369;  Comfort  v.  Eisenbeis,  11 
Pa.  St.  13;  Way  v.  Sperry,  6  Cush. 
(Mass.)  238;  Cogburn  v.  Spence,  15 
Ala.  549;  Herndou  ^-..Givens,  19  Ala. 
313. 

1  Mastin  v.  Branham,  86  Mo.  643, 
648 ;  Warlick  v.  Peterson,  58  Mo.  408 ; 
Dickinson  v.  Lott,  29  Tex.  173,  179; 
Kim))all  v.  Estate  of  Baxter,  27  Vt. 
623,  632;  Dorru.  Swartwout,  1  Blatchf. 
(U.  S.)  179,  184.  Under  the  Missouri 
statute  (R.  S.  Mo.,  §  3248),  such  an 
acknowledgment  must  be  in  writing 
and  signed  by  the  party  making  it; 
and  in  order  to  be  effective  it  must  be 
either  in  the  form  of  an  express  prom- 
ise to  pay,  or  of  an  acknowledgment  of 
an  actual,  subsisting  debt  on  which  the 
law  would  imply  a  promise.  Boyd  v. 
Hurlbut,  41  Mo.  264;  Chambers  v. 
Rubey,  47  Mo.  99;  Mastin  u.  Branham, 
supra.  See,  on  the  subject  generally, 
Smith  V.  Eastman,  3  Cush.  (Mass.) 
355;  Bell  v.  Morrison,  1  Pet,  (U.  S.) 
351,  362. 

2  Cook  V.  Martin,  29  Conn.  63. 


Tit.    V,  Ch.  XLI.]       STATUTE    OF    LIMITATIONS.  967 

note, — a  statement  of  which,  on  a  single  piece  of  paper,  was 
presented  to  the  defendant  soon  after  they  fell  due,  and  admitted 
by  him  as  so  presented,  and,  five  years  afterwards,  the  defendant 
made  a  general  acknowledgment  of  indebtedness  to  the  plaintiff, 
and  promised  to  pay  him  what  he  owed  him,  and  a  suit  was 
thereafter  brought  on  the  note  and  account,  to  Avhich  the  defend- 
ant pleaded  the  statute  of  limitations,  and  in  which  the  plaintiff 
offered  evidence  of  the  new  promise,  —  it  was  held,  that  the  evi- 
dence was  not  to  be  rejected  on  the  ground  that  the  promise  was 
too  general  and  indefinite,  but  that  the  question  of  its  applica- 
tion was  for  the  jury.^ 

§   1270.  What  Indebtedness  the  New  Promise  Refers  to.  — 

The  question  what  particular  indebtedness  is  referred  to  by  the 
new  promise,  is  obviously  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.'^ 

§  1271.  Part  Payment  to  take  a  Debt  out  of  the  Statute 
of  Limitations.  —  The  rule  under  this  head  seems  to  be  that  a 
part  payment  which  will  take  a  debt  out  of  the  operation  of  the 
statute  of  limitations  must  be  made  under  circumstances  such  as 
will  warrant  a  finding,  as  a  question  of  fact,  that  the  debtor  in- 
tended to  recognize  the  debt  in  question  as  a  subsisting  debt,  and 
one  which  he  was  willing  to  pay.  "  Therefore,  the  mere  endorse- 
ment, by  the  creditor,,  of  a  credit  upon  the  note,  without  the 

^  Cook  V.  Martiu,  29  Conu.  (53.  110.     Per    contra,    in  Buckiugliam    v. 

2  Whitney    v.     Bigelow,     4     Pick.  Smith,  23  Conu.  453,  it  was  ruled  tliat 

(Mass.)      110,    112;     Buckiughara    v.  the  burden  was  ou  tlie  plaintiff  to  sliow 

Smith,  23  Conu.  453;  Cook  v.  Martin,  that  the  promise  related  to  notes  in 

29  Conn.  63.     In  Baillie  v.  Inchiquiu,  suit. 

1  Esp.  435,  Lord  Kenyon,  ruled  at  nisi  »  Miller  ?;.  Talcott,  46  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

prins,  that,  where  a  debt  is  established  168, 172.  Compare  Bloodgood  v.  Bruen, 

against  a  defendant  who  relies  on  the  8  N.  Y.  362;  Shoemaker  v.  Benedict, 

statute  of  limitations,  if  the  plaintiff  11    N.    Y.,    176:    Peck   v.   N.    Y.    &c. 

gives  any  general  evidence  of  acknowl-  Steamship   Co.,  5  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  226. 

edgment,  it  shall  be  taken  to  apply  to  See   Bridgetou  v.  Jones,  34  Mo.  411; 

the  debt  in  question;  and  that  it  lies  Callaway  Co.  Court  v.  Craig,  35  Mo. 

on  the  defendant  to  explain  the  prom-  395;    Block   v.  Dormon,    51  Mo.    31; 

ise  so  made  and  to  show  that  it  applies  Vernon  Co.  v.  Stewart,  64  Mo.  408; 

to    some    other    demand.      Compare  Shannon  v.  Austin,  67  Mo.  485. 
Whitney  v.  Bigelow,  4  Pick.  (Mass.) 


968  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

privity  of  the  debtor,  is  not  evidence  of  part  payment  for  this 
purpose.^ 

§  1272.  Right  of    Creditor    to  apply  the   Payment. — But 

this  rule  is  subject  to  the  exception  that,  where  there  are  several 
debts  having  different  periods  of  limitation,  and  the  debtor 
makes  part  payments  without  specifying  to  which  item  of  in- 
debtedness they  are  to  be  applied,  the  creditor  may  apply  them 
to  any  item  which  he  may  choose,  and  the  application  so  made 
will  save  the  bar  of  the  statute. ^  This  conclusion,  though  sanc- 
tioned by  many  authorities,  is  not  supported  by  any  underlying 
basis  of  sense.  The  theory  upon  which  part  payment  takes  the 
case  out  of  the  statute  is,  as  already  seen,^  that  it  is  a  recogni- 
tion by  the  debtor  of  the  obligatory  force  of  the  2)cirticular  debt; 
but  a  payment  not  made  with  reference  to  any  particular  debt  is 
not  in  fact  a  recognition  of  the  obligatory  force  of  any  particu- 
lar debt.  This  rule  is  a  good  illustration  of  the  results  which  are 
reached  by  judges  when  proceeding  according  to  purely  techni- 
cal modes  of  reasoning — which  in  many  cases  are  no  reasoning  at 
all.  This  conclusion  involves  the  solecism  that,  while  statutes  of 
limitation  are  favored  by  the  courts  because  they  are  statutes  of 
repose  (and  this  is  the  doctrine  of  all  courts),  yet  a  creditor 
may,  by  his  mere  volition,  keep  alive  a  particular  indebtedness, 
although  the  debtor  may  regard  it  as  bawed. 

§  1273.  Which  Debt  Intended.  — Where  there  are  two  debts, 
one  of  which  is  barred  by  limitation,  and  there  is  a  part  payment 
not  specifically  appropriated  by  the  debtor  or  creditor,  it  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  the  payment  was  made  generally 
on  account  of  what  might  be  due  from  the  debtor  at  the  time,  or 
on  a  particular  account."* 

1  Phillips  V.  Mahaii,  52  Mo.  197;  Co.,  6  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  226;  Davis  v. 
Loemer  v.  Haug,  20  Mo.  App.  1(;3;  Araey,  2  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  412;  Whip - 
Goddard  V.  Williamson,  72  Mo.  131.  pie    v.    Blackiugton,    97    Mass.    476; 

2  Jackson  v.  Burke,  1  Dill.  C.  C.  Beck  v.  Haas,  30  Mo.  App.  ;  Will- 
(U.  S.)  311;  Wills  V.  Fowkes,  5  Bing.  iams  v.  Griffith,  5  Mees.  &  W.  300. 

N.    C.  455;    Harrison    v.  Davies,    23  ^  ^,j^<,^  §  i271. 

La.  Ann.    210;  Ramsay  v.  Warner,  97  <  Walker  v.  Bntler,  6  El.  &  Bl.  506  j 

Mass.  8;  Peck  v.  N.  Y.  &c.  Steamship      s.c.  37  Eng.  L.  &Eq.  13. 


Tit.  V,  Cll.   XLI.]       STATUTE    OF    LIMITATIONS.  969 

§  1274.  Instruction  AS  to  Revival  of  Debt  Discharged  b-v  Bank- 
ruptcy. —  "  The  promise  by  which  a  discharged  debt  is  reviewed,  must 
be  clear,  distinct  and  unequivocal.  There  must  be  an  expression  by  the 
defendant  of  a  clear  intention  to  bind  himself  to  the  payment  of  the 
debt.  The  new  promise  must  be  distinct,  unambiguous  and  certain. 
The  expression  of  an  intention  to  pay  the  debt  is  not  sufficient.  There 
must  be  a  promise  before  the  debtor  is  bound.  An  intention  is  but  the 
purpose  a  man  forms  in  his  own  mind  ;  a  promise  is  an  express  under- 
taking or  agreement  to  carry  that  purpose  into  effect,  and  must  be 
express,  in  contradistinction  to  a  promise  implied  from  an  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  justness  or  existence  of  the  debt."  ^ 

§  1275.  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  New  Promise  where  Debt 
IS  Barred  by  Statute  of  Lijiitations. —  "  The  court  instructs  the  jury 
that  the  instrument,  dated  June  18,  18G6,  which  has  been  received  in 
evidence,  was  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations  before  this  suit  was 
brought,  and  no  recovery  can  be  had  upon  the  same,  unless  the  defend- 
ant, within  six  years  before  the  bringing  of  this  suit,  made  a  new  prom- 
ise ;  and  the  burden  of  proof  of  that  rests  upon  the  plaintiff,  and  not 
upon  the  defendant.  The  plaintiff  must  recover,  if  at  all,  upon  the  pre- 
ponderance of  testimony.  If  the  plaintiff  claims  the  right  to  recover 
upon  a  new  promise  alleged  to  have  been  made  by  the  defendant,  and 
the  testimony  upon  that  point  is  so  conflicting  that  the  jury  cannot 
determine  whether  such  a  promise  was  made  or  not,  they  must  find  for 
the  defendant."  - 

§  1276.  A  Similar  Instruction  Under  a  Statute  Requiring  the 
Promise  to  be  in  Writing.  —  "  The  jury,  in  order  to  take  the  case  out 
of  the  statute  of  limitations  and  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  recover,  must 
find  from  the  testimony  that  the  defendant  has,  within  the  last  ten  years 
before  the  commencement  of  this  action,  made  his  promise  in  writing  to 
pay  said  note,  or  that  he  has  actually  paid  some  portion  of  the  princi- 
pal or  interest  thereon  within  the  time  aforesaid."  ^ 

i  Approved  iu  Shockeyv.  Mills,  71  2  Substantially     as     approved    in 

Ind.  292;    citing  Blumeustiel  Law  and  Parker  v.  Hawley,  4  Colo.  336. 

Practice  in  Bankruptcy,  pp.  551,  552;  3  Approved  in  Bridgetou  v.  Jones, 

Bump  BanJii-uptcy,  (yth  ed.)  p.  748.  34  Mo.  472. 


970  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tbomp,  Tr 


C  H  A  P  T  E  K     XLII. 

INSURANCE, 

Article      I.  —  Fire  Insurance. 

Article    II,  — Life  and  Accident  Insurance. 

Article  III,  — Marine  Insurance. 


Article  I.  —  Fire  Insurance. 

Section 

1279.  Authority  of  an  Insurance  Company  to  do  Business. 

1280.  Insurable  Interest, 

1281.  Authority  of  Insurance  Agents  to  waive  Conditions. 

1282.  A  Series  of  Instructions  on  this  Subject. 

1283.  Statements  in  Application  Construed  by  the  Court, 

1284.  Materiality  of  Misrepresentation  or  Concealment  for  Jury, 

1285.  Otherwise  in  Case  of  Warranties, 

128(3,  What  if  it  is  Doubtful  whether  the  Words  import  Representations  or 
Warranties. 

1287,  Where  Truth  of  Statements  are  Vouched  for  so  far  as  Known  and  Ma- 

terial. 

1288,  What  if  Statements  not  Responsive  to  an  Inquiry, 

1289,  Instruction  as  to  what  Misrepresentation  or  Fraudulent  Statement  will 

avoid  Policy  and  what  will  not, 

1290,  Whether  Change  of  Circumstances  increases  the  Risk. 

1291,  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  what  Alteration  will  avoid  the  Policy. 

1292,  A  Similar  Instruction  drawn  from  the  Plaintiff's  Standpoint. 

1293,  Whether  Prospective  Warranty  or  Clause  of  Forfeiture  Violated. 

1294,  Instruction  that  Temporary  Vacation  of    Premises  does    not  avoid 

Policy. 

1295,  Reasonable  Time  for  the  Occupation  of  Insured   Premises  by  a  Tenant. 
129(),  Reasoual)le  Time  for  Giving  Notice  of  Loss. 

1297,  Sufficiency  of  Preliminary  Proofs  of  Loss. 

1298,  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  Fraudulent  Proofs  of  Loss. 

1299,  Waiver  of  Preliminary  Proofs  of  Loss, 

1300,  Waiver  of  Limitation  of  Time  within  which  Action  to  be  brought. 

1301,  Waiver  of  a  Condition  against  Transfer  of  Policy. 

1302,  Whether  a  Fishing  Scow  is  a  "  Building." 

1303,  Wliether  a  Certain  Business  is  a  "  Manufactory," 


Tit.  V,  CIX.  XLIL]  FIKE    INSURANCE.  S71 

Section 

1304.  Failure  to  Mention  Specific  Articles  of  Merchandise. 

1305.  Identity  of  the  Articles  Destroyed, 

1306.  Mutual  Insurance  —  Data  for  Correct  Assessment. 

1307.  Plaintiff's  Instructions  as  to  Renewal  of  Policy  by  Oral  Contract. 

1308.  Instructions  on  the  Theory  of  a  Waiver  of  the  Right  of  Forfeiture  by 

Promising  to  Rebuild. 

§  1279.  Authority  of  an  Insurance  Company  to  do  Busi- 
ness. —  The  question  whether  a  foreign  insurance  company  has 
authority  to  do  business  in  the  State  would  ordinarily  depend 
upon  the  power  of  the  company  to  exhibit  the  certificate,  or 
other  evidence  of  authority,  required  by  the  statute.  Where, 
however,  the  company  affirmatively  assumed  proof  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  certificate  required  by  th^  statute,  for  several  years, 
but  omitted  proof  of  it  for  a  particular  year,  it  was  held  that  it 
was  not  error  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  question  whether  it  had 
author  ity.i 

§  1280.  Insurable  Interest.  —  In  an  action  on  a  policy  of  fire 
insurance,  issued  to  another  party  and  assigned  to  the  plaintiff, 
it  has  been  held  proper  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  question  whether 
the  plaintiff  had  an  insurable  interest  in  the  policy.^ 

§  1281.  Authority  of  Insurance  Agents  to  Waive  Condi- 
tions.—  Where,  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  life  insurance,  it 
appeared  that,  following  an  application  of  the  insured  for  a 
policy,  there  was  a  declaration,  signed  by  tho  applicant,  but 
which  was  not  made  a  part  of  the  policy,  stating  that  he  agreed 
that  the  insurance  proposed  should  not  be  binding  until  the  pre- 
mium, which  was  payable  partly  in  cash  and  partly  by  note, 
should  be  received  by  the  defendants,  or  their  accredited  agent,  — 
it  was  held  that  parol  evidence  was  admissible,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  a  waiver  of  such  prepayment,  to  the  effect,  that  the 
defendant's  agent  verbally  agreed  that  the  policy  of  insurance 
should  take  effect  immediately  upon  the  approval  of  the  applica- 

1  American   Ins.    Co.    r.    Smith,  19  -  Mitchell  r.  Home  Ins.   Co.,  32  la. 

Mo.  App.  627.  422,  420. 


972  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl*., 

tion,  and  that  the  premium  note  might  bo  made,  and  the  cash  pre- 
mium paid  at  some  future  time,  at  the  convenience  of  the  parties, 
provided  that  such  agreement  was  made  known  to  and  acquiesced 
in  hy  the  defendants.  And  where,  in  such  an  action,  the  plaintiff 
claimed  that  the  defendant's  general  agent  for  procuring  appli- 
cations for  insurance  had  authority  to  make  such  agreement, 
which  the  defendants  denied,  it  was  held  that,  Avhether  or  not  the 
agent  had  such  authority  was  properly  submitted  to  the  jury} 
So,  where  a  fire  insurance  company  claimed  that  their  agent,  who 
procured  the  insurance,  was  such  for  certain  definite  purposes 
only,  and  that  he  had  no  authority  to  fill  out  applications  for 
parties  applying  for  insurance,  but  it  nevertheless  appeared  that 
they  had  recognized  him  in  other  policies  as  their  agent,  and  there 
was  no  written  evidence  of  the  extent  of  his  authority,  it  was 
held  proper  to  submit  the  question  to  the  jury.'' 

§  1282.  A  Series  OF  Instructions  on  this  Subject.  —  "  A  principal 
is  liable  for  the  acts  of  his  agent,  done  within  the  scope  of  his  employ- 
ment. A  general  agent,  notwithstanding  private  instructions,  may, 
within  tlie  limits  of  his  agency,  bind  his  principal,  unless  the  person 
dealing  with  the  agent  knew  of  the  instructions.  A  particular  agent 
(by  which  is  meant  one  authorized  to  do  one  or  more  special  things) 
binds  his  principal  only  so  far  as  he  pursues  his  authority.  The  rule 
is,  as  to  the  public,  that  the  authority  of  a  general  agent  may  be  re- 
garded by  them  as  measured  by  the  usual  extent  of  his  general  em- 
ployment ;  but  as  to  acts  of  particular  or  special  agents,  the  rule  is 
different;  a  principal  may  well  say  to  one  who  dealt  with  an  agent  for 
a  particular  purpose  (special  agent):  'It  was  your  business  first  to 
ascertain  for  yourself  the  chai'acter  and  extent  of  his  agency.'  -  -  -  - 
By  accepting  the  policy  sued  on,  plaintiffs  are  bound  to  know  of  the 
terms  and  restrictions  therein  contained. The  nature  and  ex- 
tent or  limitations  on  the  authority  of  McKinney  (the  agent),  you 
are  to  find,  from  all  the  evidence  before  you,  taken  together  and  care- 
fully compared.  If,  from  the  evidence,  you  are  satisfied  that  he 
(McKinney)  had  the  authority  to  act  as  the  general  agent  of  the  de- 

1  Sheldon  t?.  Connecticut  M.  F.  Ins.  ^  Hough  v.   City  Fire  Ins.    Co.,   29 

Co.,  25  Conn.   207.     Compare    Plumb      Conn.  10. 
V.  Cattaraugus  &c.  Co.,    18  N.  Y.  392; 
Rowley  v.  Empire  Ins.  Co.,  3G  X.  Y.  550. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIL]        fire  insuranxe.  973 

fendant  company,  and  that,  within  the  scope  of  such  a^encv,  he  Avas 
authorized  to  receive  notice  of  additional  insurance  in  other  companies, 
and  did,  in  fact,  receive  such  notice,  then  such  notice  was  notice  to  the 

defendant. If,  from  the  evidence,   you  find  that  McKinney's 

agency  was  only  to  procure  risks  and  take  premiums,  and  then  deliver 
policies,  his  agency  would,  in  that  event,  be  a  particular,  as  contradis- 
tinguished from  a  general,  agency ;  and,  in  that  case,  his  authority 
would  not  extend  to  waiving  any  of  the  terms  of  the  policy.  -  -  -  -  It 
is  the  duty  of  a  holder  of  a  policy  of  insurance  to  inform  the  company 
or  its  agent  of  any  change  of  the  status  of  the  thing  or  risk ;  in  like 
manner,  it  is  his  duty,  within  a  reasonable  time,  to  dul}--  notify  the 
company  in  which  the  first  policy  was  taken  out,  of  any  additional 
security  by  additional  insurance,  in  order  that  said  company  may  in- 
quire into  the  solvenc}^  and  standing  of  the  companies,  which,  in  case 

of  loss,  must  share  such  loss. Where  it  is  in  evidence  that  the 

insured  obtained  further  insurance  in  other  companies,  contrary  to  the 

stipulations  of  policy  sued  on,  such  policy  is  vitiated. E3'  the 

terms  of  the  policy  sued  on,  consent  in  writing  on  the  policy  itself  is 
requisite ;  but  if  such  consent  in  writing  were  in  fact  given  by  the  de- 
fendant company,  or  by  some  agent  who  had  the  authority  to  give  such 
written  consent,  and  if  plaintiffs,  after  obtaining  additional  insurance 
in  other  companies,  they  having  previously  notified  the  agent  who, 
according  to  the  terms  of  his  agency,  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  re- 
ceiving such  notice, — then  such  written  consent  is  binding  upon  the 
company ;  but  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  plaintiffs,  and  plaintiffs 
must  satisfy  the  jury  by  proof  that  McKinney  did  give  the  written  con- 
sent, after  he  was  informed  of  the  amount  of  additional  insurance,  and 
the  company  in  which  such  additional  insurance  was  so  obtained  ;  and 
furthermore,  plaintiffs  must  prove  that  McKinney  had  the  authority  to 
give  such  consent.  No  presumption  of  such  authority  arises,  but  such 
an  authority  must  be  proved  by  plaintiffs."  - 

§  1283.   Statements  in  Application  Construed  by  the  Court. 

The  answers  to  questions  in  the  application  for  a  policy  of  fire 
insurance  are  to  be  interpreted  by  the  court,  in  conformity  with 
the  general  principle  that  the  interpretation  of  written  instru- 
ments belongs  to  the  court,  and  not  to  the  jury.  So  held,  where 
the  answers  to  a  question  as  to  the  ' '  relative  situation  of  other 

1  Approved  iu  lus.  Co.  v.    Lyous,  38  Texas,  25G,  257, 258. 


974  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Tbomp.  Tr. ^ 

buildings"  specified  two  buildings  "with  fifty  feet."  It  was 
held  that  this  meant  willdn  fifty  feet,  and  that  the  answer  was 
sufllcient,  although  one  of  the  specified  buildings  was  within  two 
feet.i 

§  1284.  Materiality  of  Misrepresentation  or  Concealment 
is  for  Jury.  —  Whether  a  misrepresentation  or  concealment  by 
the  assured,  in  a  i)olicy  of  fire  insurance,  of  the  true  natvire  and 
extent  of  his  interest  in  the  property  insured,  or  any  other  fact 
upon  which  information  is  required  by  the  underwriter  prior  to 
issuing  the  policy,  will  avoid  the  policy,  depends  upon  its  mate- 
riality in  respect  of  the  risk  undertaken;  and,  according  to  the 
weight  of  authority,  this  question  of  materiality  is  for  the  jury.^ 
On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  recently  ruled  in  ^Massachusetts  that, 
if  a  contract  of  insurance  is  sought  to  be  avoided  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  induced  by  false  and  fraudulent  representations,  the 
question  of  the  materiality  of  the  representations  is  for  the 
court,  and  not  for  the  jury.^  This  is  simply  an  application  of  the 
rule  that  the  construction  of  an  oral,  as  well  as  of  a  written 
contract,  is  for  the  court  where  the  terms  of  the  contract  ate 
established.*  This,  it  is  reasoned,  is  quite  distinct  from  the  ques- 
tion whether  facts  concealed  or  misrepresented  increase  the  risk, 

1  Allen  V.  Charleston  Mutual  Fire  540;  Lindsay  v.  Union  Mutual  Ins. 
Ins.  Co.,  5  Gray  (xMass.),  384:.  Co.,  3  R.  I.  157;  Columbia  Ins.  Co.  v. 

2  Mutual  lusurauce  Co.  v.  Deale,  Lawrence,  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  503,  516; 
18  Md.  27,  50;  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sexton  v.  Montgomery  County  Mut. 
Coates,  14  Md.  285,  298;  2  Duer  on  Ins.  Co.,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  191,  202; 
Ins.  889,  §  31;  Clark  v.  Union  Mut.  Masters  u.  Madison  Co.  Mut.  Ins.  Co., 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  40  N.  H.,  333,  338;  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  625,  633;  Gates  v. 
Boardraan  v.  New  Hampshire  &c.  Ins.  Madison  County  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  2  N. 
Co.,  20  N.  H.  551;  Daniels  U.Hudson  Y.  43;  Keeler  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins. 
Elver  Ins.  Co.,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  41(;,  Co.,  16  Wis.  523,  540;  Schenck  ?j.  Mer- 
426;  Elliott  v.  Hamilton  Mut.  Ins.  cer  County  M.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  24  N.  J. 
Co.,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  139,  144;  Flinn  Law,  447. 

V.  Headlam,  9  Barn.  &  Cres.  693;  Hull  3  penn.  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Crane,  134 

V.  Cooper,    14   East,  479;    Mackay   v.  Mass.  56. 

Rhinelander,    1  Johns.    Cas.    (N.  Y.)  *  As  held  in  Short  v.  Woodward, 

408;    Williams   «.  Delafield,  2  Caines  13  Gray  (Mass.),  86;  Globe  Works  u. 

(N.  Y.)  329;  Farmers  &c.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wright,  106  Mass.  207;  ante,  §§  1065, 

Snyder,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  481;  Curry  1106. 

u.  Com.  Ins.  Co.,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  535, 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIL]         fire  insurance.  975 

which,  in  cases  of  fire  insurance,  is  for  the  jury.^  Contrary  to 
the  holdino;  in  the  Massachusetts  court  above  given,  it  was  ruled 
in  Maine,  where  a  seller  of  spectacles  falsely  represented  to  the 
purchaser  that  "  the  spectacles  were  a  new  invention,  that  they 
were  brilliants,  and  that  he  had  never  sold  them  to  any  one  else 
in  Portland,"  — that  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury,  and  not  for 
the  court,  to  determine  whether  this  was  a  representation  of 
material  facts.^ 

§  1285.  How  in  Case  of  Warranties. — This  rule  has  been 
applied  in  some  cases  where  the  statements  would  seem  to  have 
been  warranties,^  and  some  confusion  has  sprung  up  in  conse- 
quence. But  the  sounder  opinion  is  that,  where  it  is  agreed 
that  the  representations  are  warranties,  the  insurer  is  entitled  to 
an  exact  compliance  with  them,  without  regard  to  their  mate- 
rialty,  —  in  which  case  the  question  of  their  materialty  cannot,  of 
course,  be  submitted  to  a  jury.*  More  fully  stated,  where  a 
policy  of  insurance  against  loss  by  fire  declares  in  express  terms 
the  survey,  or  description  of  the  premises,  referred  to  therein, 
to  be  "  a  part  of  the  policy  "  and  "  warranties,"  — such  descrip- 
tion is  to  be  construed  as  a  warranty,  and  not  as  a  representation. 
The  rule  as  to  a  warranty  is  that,  if  broken,  it  defeats  the  policy; 
the  insurer  may  insist  upon  its  exact  truth,  according  to  its  tenor. 
In  a  case  where  the  truth  of  the  description  is  warranted,  it  is 
error  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  question  whether  the  particulars 
in  which,  at  the  time  of  issuing  the  policy,  the  premises  did  not 
correspond  with  the  description,  increased  the  risk  or  not.^ 

§  1286.  AVliat  if  it  is  Doubtful  whether  the  Words  import 
Representations  or  Warranties.  —  If  it  be  doubtful,  from  the 
words  of  a  policy,  whether  certain  statements,  made  by  the  ap- 

1  Lindeuau  v.  Desboroiigh,  8  Barn.  ^  Sexton  v.  Montgomery  County  M. 
&    Cres.  586;    Hugueniu  v.  Rayley,  6  Ins.  Co.,  9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  191. 
Taunt.  186.  *  Gates  v.  Madison  County  M.  Ins. 

2  Sharp  V.  Ponce,  74  Me.  470.    Com-  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  43,  per  .Jones,  J. 

pare    Teague     v.    Irwin,    127    Mass.  '=  Le  Roy   v.  Market  F.  Ins.  Co.,  39 

217.  N.  Y.  90, 


976  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1   Tliomp.   Tl'., 

plicant  relative  to  the  subject  of  the  insurance,  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  warranties  or  as  representations  merely,  they  will  be 
regarded  as  representations.^  A  statement  in  an  application  for 
insurance  is  to  be  considered  a  representation  rather  than  a  Avar- 
ranty,  unless  it  is  clearly  made  a  warranty  by  the  terms  of  the 
policy,  or  by  some  direct  reference  thereto."'^  Where  the  state- 
ments in  the  policy  characterize  the  statements  in  the  applica- 
tion and  survey  as  representations,  that  they  are  such  is  hardly 
a  matter  of  doubt .^  Where  the  evidence  left  it  doubtful  whether 
the  survey,  although  it  declared  that  the  statements  therein  were 
w^arranties,  w-as  delivered  by  the  plaintiff  for  the  purpose  of 
procuring  the  policy,  or  was  received  by  the  agent  as  a  private 
memorandum  only,  and  whether  the  policy  had  not  been  de- 
livered prior  to  the  execution  and  date  of  the  survey,  —  it  was 
held  that  the  defendant  was  not  entitled  to  a  peremptory  charge 
that  the  conditions  of  the  survey  and  policy  had  been  violated,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  could  not  recover ;  but  the  question  should  have 
been  submitted  to  the  jury  under  proper  instructions.* 

§  1287.  Wliei'e  Truth  of  Statements  are  Vouched  for,  so 
far  as  Known  and  Material.  —  Where  the  language  did  not 
amount  to  a  warranty  that  each  answer  was  true,  but  only  that 
the  answers  were  "  a  just,  full  and  true  exposition  of  all  the  facts 
and  circumstances  in  regard  to  the  condition,  situation,  value 
and  risk  of  the  property  to  be  insured,  —  so  far  as  the  same  are 
known  to  the  applicant,  and  are  material  to  the  risk,"  —  it  was 
held  that  the  knowledge  of  the  applicant  and  the  materiality  of 
the  facts  stated,  were  both  questions  which  were  properly  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury.^ 

1  Garcelon  v.  Hampden  F.  Ins.  Co.,  facturers  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  8  Met.  (Mass.) 
60  Me.  580,  583;  Wilson  v.  Conway  F.      114. 

Ins.  Co.,  4  E.  I.  143;  Le   Eoy  v.  Park  ^  i^q   jjoy  „    pai-^  p.    Ins.  Co.,  89 

F.  Ins.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  56.  N.  Y.  5(i. 

2  Garcelon  v.  Hampden  F.  Ins.  Co.,  °  Garcelon  v.  Hampden  Fire  Ins. 
50  Me.  580,  583;  Daniels  v.  Hudson  Co.,  50  Me.  580.  So  held  in  a  similar 
Eiver  Ins.  Co.,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  application  in  Elliot  v.  Hamilton  &c. 
41f;.  Ins.  Co.,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  139.     Cora- 

3  Garcelon V.  Hampden  F.  Ins.  Co.,  pare  Lindsey  v.  Union  Miit.  Five  Ins. 
50  Me.  580,  583;   Houghton  v.   Mauu-  Co.,  3  R.  I.  157. 


Tit.  V,  Cb.  XLIL]        fire  insurance.  977 

§  1288.  What  if  Statements  not  Responsive  to  any  In- 
qnii-y.  —  In  reference  to  statements  in  the  application  or  survey 
which  are  not  responsive  to  any  interrogatory  therein,  the  bur- 
den of  proof  is  on  the  insurance  company  to  show  then*  materi- 
ality and  falsity;  and  these  are  to  be  determined  by  the  jury.^ 

§  1289.  Instructions  as  to  what  'Misrepresentations  or  Fraudu- 
lent Statements  will  avoid  Policy,  and  what  will  not.  —  "  An  un- 
true or  fraudulent  statement,  or  denial,  made  b}'  the  applicant,  of  a  fact 
material  to  the  risk,  to  induce  the  issuance  of  a  policy,  will  prevent 
the  policy  from  taking  effect  as  a  valid  contract,  unless  the  insurer  has 
in  some  way  waived  or  estopped  himself  from  relying  upon  such  mis- 
statement to  avoid  the  policy. If  an  insurance  company  issues  a 

policy  upon  a  greater  risk  than  an  ordinary  one,  with  a  full  knowledge 
of  all  the  facts,  it  cannot  escape  the  binding  obligation  of  its  contract 

by  pleading  such  fact. If  you  find  that  James  A.  Miller  made  an 

untrue  or  fraudulent  statement  of  a  fact  material  to  the  risk,  in  the  ap- 
plication for  the  policy,  then  you  should  find  for  the  defendant,  unless 
you  further  find  that  the  defendant  ^yas  informed  of  and  knew  the  truth 
in  regard  to  such  fact,  and,  after  knowing  such  fact  fully,  received  the 
application,  the  premium  money  and  notes,  and  issued  the  policy ;  in 
which  case  you  should  find  for  the  plaintiff.  >  =  -  -  A  full  knowledge  of 
the  truth  of  the  alleged  misstatements  of  MiKer  in  the  application, 
communicated  to  Thornton  and  Case  (agents),  or  either,  was  a  com- 
munication to  the  company."  2  =  _  _  _  "  Even  if  the  jury  shall  believe 
from  the  evidence  that,  at  the  time  the  insurance  was  applied  for  by  the 
plaintiffs,  or  their  agejit,  of  the  defendant,  the  plaintiffs  or  their  agent, 
represented  that  a  watchman  was  kept  and  would  be  kept  upon  said 
premises  insured,  and  that  no  watchman  was  then  or  afterwards  kept 
thereon,  yet,  unless  the  jury  beheve  that  the  said  representation  was 
one  of  the  causes  why  the  defendant  took  the  risk,  and  without  such 

1  Garcelou  v.  Hampden  Ins.  Co.,  50  Co.,  5  Hill  (N.  Y.),  101 ;  Eowley  ?;.  Ins. 

Me.  580,  583;  Daniels  v.  Hudson  River  Co.,  3  Kej-s  (N.  Y.),  557;  Anson  v.  Ins. 

F.  Ins.  Co.,  12  Cash.  (Mass.)  417.  Co.,  23  la.  84.     Contra,  Vose  v.  Ins. 

^  Approved  in  Miller  i).  Mutual  Ben.  Co.,  G  Cush.  (Mass.)  42;  Smith  v.  Ins. 

Life  Ins.  Co.,  31   Iowa,  216,  222,  223;  Co.,  24  Pa.  St.  320;    Mitchell  w.  Ins. 

citing  Rowley  v.  Insurance  Co.,  3()  N.  Co.,  51  Pa.  St,  402;  Lowell  u. lus.  Co., 

Y.  550;  Masters  v.  Insurance  Co.,  11  8  Cush.  (Mass.)  127;  Forbes  v.  Ins. 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  624;  Sexton  v.  Ins.  Co.,  Co.,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  470;  Lee  v.  Ins. 

9  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  191;  McEwen  v.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  583. 

62 


978 


PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  Thoill[).  Tr., 


watchman  being  then  kept  and  continuing  to  be  kept,  tlie  said  defend- 
ant -svould  not  have  taken  the  risk  or  issued  the  poUcy ;  then,  the  fact 
that  no  watchman  was  kept  proves  no  defense  in  this  action."  i 

§  1290.  Whether  a  Change  of  Circumstances  increases  the 
Risk. — It  is  a  familiar  rule  in  the  law  of  tire  insurance  that  any 
change  in  the  condition  of  the  property  insured,  which  substan- 
tially increases  the  risk,  avoids  the  policy;  but  whether  such  a 
change  has  taken  place  is  always  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 
Whether  the  company,  in  defending  an  action  on  a  polices  relies 
upon  the  falsity  of  the  particular  representation,  or  on  the  fail- 
ure to  comply  with  an  executory  stipulation,  it  is  upon  them  to 
prove  it;  and  it  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  in  either  as- 
pect.^ Thus,  where  the  policy  required  that  notice  should  be 
given  to  the  company  of  any  alterations  which  tend  to  increase 
the  risk,  within  twenty  clays,  or  that  the  insurance  should  be- 
come void,  and  alterations  were  made  and  no  notice  given,  it  w^as 
held  a  cpiestion  of  fact  for  the  jury  whether  such  alterations  did 
tend  to  increase  the  risk.*  So,  where  the  subject  of  the  insurance 
was  a  dwelling-house  in  a  suburban  place,  and,  after  the  insurance 
and  before  the  loss,  it  was  removed  bodily  to  a  position  200  feet 
away,  without,  it  seems,  being  brought  into  proximity  to  any 
other  buildings  or  combustible  materials,  it  was  held  that  the 
court  could  not  say,  as  matter  of  law,  that  the  removal  increased 
the  risk,  but  that  whether  it  did  or  not  was  a  question  for  the 
jury.^ 


^  Approved  iu  Bersche  v.  Globe  Mu- 
tual Tire  lus.  Co.,  31  Mo.  o4G,  551. 

2  Gamwell  v.  Merchants  &c.  Ins. 
Co.,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  1G7;  Clark  v. 
lusimance  Co.,  40  N.  H.  333,  331);  Le 
Eoy  V.  Park  F.  Ins.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  56; 
Grant  v.  Howard  lus.  Co.,  5  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  10;  Townsend  v.  North-western 
Ins.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  108;  North  British 
&c.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Steiger,  13  Bradw. 
(111.)  482;  Schmidts.  Ins.  Co.,  41  III. 
295;  New  Eng.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wetmore, 
32   111.  221;   Wood  on  Fire   Ins.  814; 


Smith  V.  Mechanic's  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  32 
N.  Y.  399;  Shepherd  «.  Union  M.  F. 
Ins.  Co.,  38  N.  H.  232,  240. 

3  Daniels  v.  Hudson  River  &c.  Ins. 
Co.,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  410,  42G.  Com- 
pare Bilbroughv.  Metropolis  Ins.  Co., 
5  Duer  (N.  Y.),  587. 

4  Schucck  V.  Mercer  County  M.  F. 
Ins.  Co.,  24  N.  J.  Law,  447. 

^  Griswoldu.  American  Central  In- 
surance Co.,  1  Mo.  App.  97;  s.c.  af- 
jirmed,  70  Mo.  G54. 


TiU  V,  Cb.  XLII.]  FIRE    INSURANCE.  979 

§  1291.  Defendant's  Ixstkcction  as  to  what  Alteration  will 
Avoid  the  Policy. — "If  au^''  alteration  in  the  building  insured  was 
made  by  plaintiff,  or  under  his  direction,  or  with  his  knowledge  or 
consent,  after  insurance  made  with  defendant,  whereby  said  building- 
was  exposed  to  greater  risk  or  hazard  from  fire  than  when  insured,  the 
policy  became  void,  unless  plaintiff  has  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
jury  that  an  additional  premium  and  deposit,  after  such  alteration, 
was  settled  with  and  paid  to  defendant  or  agent  before  the  fire  hap- 
pened." 1  "  It  is  no  defense  to  a  recovery  in  the  suit  that  the  plaintiffs, 
or  any  of  them,  either  at  the  time  of  obtaining  the  polic3'sued  on,  repre- 
sented the  value  of  the  buildings  on  said  premises  greater  than  their  real 
value,  or  after  the  loss  represented  the  value  of  the  property  insured,  or 
the  extent  and  amount  of  the  loss,  greater  than  it  really  w^as,  unless  the 
same  was  done  knowingly  and  willfully  by  plaintiffs,  and  with  a  fraudu- 
lent design."  ^ 

§  1292.  A  Similar  Instrcction  Drawn  from  the  Plaintiff's  Stand- 
point. —  "  The  jur}'  are  instructed  that  no  alteration  or  repairs,  made  on 
premises  insured  by  plaintiff,  would  avoid  his  policy,  nor  can  his  recov- 
ery be  defeated  by  means  of  alterations  or  repairs,  —  unless  the  same  were 
such  as  to  increase  the  risk  or  hazard  from  fire  to  the  injured  premises. 
If  the  jur}'  find  from  the  evidence  that  defendant  made  the  policy  sued 
on,  and  the  property  insured  was  destroyed  by  fire,  as  stated  in  petition, 
and  plaintiff  complied  wiili  the  agreements  and  conditions  in  the  policy 

to  be  complied  with  on  his  part,  they  will  find  for  the  plaintiff. 

The  jury  are  instructed  that  the  policy  sued  on  could  not  be  made 
void,  nor  can  the  recovery  of  plaintiff  be  defeated  by  the  erection  of 
any  building  immediately  adjacent  or  adjoining  premises  insured, 
unless  such  erection  materially  increased  the  risk  or  hazard  of  fire."  ^ 

§  1293.  Whether  Prospective  Warranty  or  Clause  of  For- 
feiture Violated.  — But  where  the  provision  in  the  policy  is  that 
the  premises  shall  not  be  used  to  cany  on  certain  enumerated 
employments,  or  for  the  storage  or  keeping  of  certain  enumer- 
ated chattels,  without  a  special  provision  to  that  effect,  this  is  a 

^Approved  in   Keru   v.  South   St.  Louis  Mut.  lus.  Co.,  40  Mo.  22:  citiuo- 

Louis  Mut.  lus.   Co.,  40  Mo.  19,   22,  Gardner  v.  Piscataquis  Mut.  F.  lus. 

2  Approved  in  Bersche  v.  Globe  Co.,  38  Me,  439;  Curry  v.  Coinmon- 
Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  CI  Mo,  546,  550.  wealth  Jus,  Co.,  10  Pick.  (Mass.)  535; 

3  Approved  in    Keru   r.  South  St.  Frauds  v.  Somraerville  Mut.  Jus,  Co., 

25  N.  J.  L.  78. 


980  PiiOVIXCE   OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  Tlioiiip.  Tr., 

prospective  warranty,  the  breach  of  which  avoids  the  policy  and 
prevents  any  chiim  for  indemnity  for  a  k)ss,  though  it  ap})ears 
that  the  tire  arose  from  some  cause  Cjuite  unconnected  with  the 
prohibited  employment  or  article.^  In  such  a  case  there  is,  of 
course,  no  question  for  the  jury  as  to  the  materiality  of  the  war- 
ranty, though  there  may  be  a  question  as  to  whether  there  has 
been  a  breach.  Thus,  where  a  policy  of  insurance  stipulated 
that  "  the  work  of  carpenters,  roofers,  tinsmiths,  gas-fitters, 
plumbers  and  other  mechanics,  in  building,  altering  or  repairing 
any  building  or  buildings  covered  by  this  policy,  will  cause  a  for- 
feiture of  all  claim  under  this  policy,  without  the  written  consent 
of  this  company  indorsed  thereon;  — it  was  held,  upon  a  certain 
state  of  evidence,  to  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  whether  or 
not  there  had  been  such  an  alteration  in  the  building  as  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  })arties  to  stipulate  against.^ 

§  1294.  Instruction  that  Temporary  Vacation  of  Premises  does 
NOT  AVOID  Policy.  — "If  a  man  insures  his  dwelling  house  and  lives 
therein  at  the  time,  and  contracts  not  to  let  the  building  become  vacant 
and  unoccupied,  he  cannot,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  vacate  it  absolutely,  leave 
it  in  that  condition,  and  recover  on  the  policy  in  case  of  loss.  But  if 
he  goes  off  temporarily,  on  business  or  matters  for  his  own  benefit  or 
otherwise,  —  temporarily  merely,  with  the  intention  of  coming  back  to 
his  place  and  there  living,  and  with  no  intention  of  abandoning  the 
place,  — the  contract  will  not  he  vitiated  by  that  kind  of  a  transaction  ; 
and  had  the  tenant  in  this  case  gone  away  on  temporary  business  before 
he  surrendered  up  the  premises  to  this  Mrs.  Norton,  and  had  the  fire 
occurred  while  the  tenant  occupied  it,  there  would  be  no  question  but 
that  the  company  would  be  responsible  for  the  loss,  if  the  going  away 
was  merely  temporary,  with  the  intention  of  coming  back  and  making 
it  the  home  of  the  tenant.  I  think  in  this  case,  gentlemen,  if  you  are 
satisfied  by  a  fair  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  or  are  clearly  con- 
vinced, that  Mrs.  Norton  put  her  things  into  that  building  with  the 
intention  of  making  it  her  home  and  her  residence  as  a  matter  of  fact,  — 

1  Mead  v.  Northwestern  Ins.  Co.,  7  such  conditions  in  policies,  compare 
N.  Y.  530;  Westfall  v.  Hudson  River  Franliliu  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chicago  Ice  Co., 
F.  Ins.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  289,  293.  36  Md.  102;  Kami  v.   Home   Ins.  Co., 

2  Macli  V.  Rochester  German  Ins.  69  N.  Y.  387. 

Cu  ,  35  Hun    (N.    Y.),  75,  78.     As  to 


Tit.   V,  Cll.   XLIL]  FIRE    INSURANCE. 


981 


did  not  live  in  it  in  person  before  the  fire,  but,  after  placing  those  things 
in,  she  went  away*on  mere  temporary  business  with  the  intention  in  her 
mind  to  comeback  and  live  there, — that  the  premises  would  not  be 
unoccupied  and  vacant  within  the  meaning  of  this  policy,  and  that  the 
company  would  be  responsible  for  the  loss.  She  must,  of  course,  have 
placed  her  goods  in  that  building  with  the  intention  in  her  mind  to 
make  it  her  residence  —  to  make  it  her  home,  and  must  have  gone  away 
on  business  —  temporarily  gone  away,  simply  for  a  temporary  purpose, 
not  permanently,  — not  with  the  idea  of  abandoning  the  place.  If  she 
went  away  temporarily,  to  be  gone  a  few  weeks  or  a  few  days,  on  busi- 
ness of  her  own,  with  the  intention  of  coming  back  and  living  there,  I 
do  not  think  the  policy  is  vitiated  ;  and  I  think  the  plaintiff  in  this 
cause,  who  sues  as  assignee  of  the  policy,  can  recover,  if  you  so  find."  ^ 


§  1295.  Reasonable  Time  for  the  Occupation  of  Insured 
Premises  by  a  Tenant. — Where,  in  the  survey  upon  which  a. 
policy  of  fire  insurance  is  granted,  the  question  occurs,  "  How 


1  The  above,  which  was  evidently  au 
oral  charge,  takeu  down  l:)y  a  stenog- 
rapher, was  approved  in  Shackleton  v. 
Sun  Fire  Office,  55  Mich.  290,  291. 
Coolcy,  C.  J.,  said:  "  We  have  con- 
chided,  after  some  hesitation,  that  the 
instruction  should  be  sustained.  There 
is  no  doubt,  if  the  insured  had  actually 
begun  living  in  the  house  before  her 
departure  on  business,  the  temporary 
absence  would  not  have  affected  the 
policy;  in  contemplation  of  law,  her 
occupation  of  the  house  would  have 
been  continuous.  Stupetski  v.  Trans- 
atlantic Fire  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mich.  373; 
Cummins  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  67 
N.  Y.  2G0;  Herrmann  v.  Merchants' 
Ins.  Co.,  81  N.  Y.  184;  Phceuix  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Tucker,  92  111.  (U:  Dennison  v.^ 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  52  Iowa,  457.  The 
only  question,  then,  is  whether  the 
fact  that  for  the  few  days  she  remained 
at  home  before  starting  on  the  busi- 
ness trip,  she  did  not  sleep  in  the 
house  or  take  her  meals  there,  should 
make  any  difference.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances we  think  not.    The  insured 


had  taken  possession  of  the  house,  as 
the  jury  must  have  found,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  permanent  occupancy.  She 
had  moved  in  her  liousehold  furniture 
and  other  goods,  and  was  cleaning  and 
doing  other  work  preliiuinary  to  living 
there  in  person.  Nothing,  apparently, 
was  wanting  to  complete  personal 
possession,  except  that  she  lodged  and 
took  her  meals  at  her  father's  a  few 
rods  off.  Those  facts  were  not  con- 
clusive against  her  occupancy.  It 
could  not  be  justly  claimed,  we  think, 
that  if  a  family,  for  the  purposes  of 
cleaning  and  interior  decoration,  were 
thus  to  sleep  and  take  meals  at  a 
neighbor's,  while  busy  in  the  house  in 
working  hours,  they  would  in  doing 
so  vacate  the  house.  But  the  case  of 
such  a  family  would  be  analogous  to 
that  of  the  party  insured  in  this  case." 
Wustum  V.  Ins.  Co.,  15  Wis.  138;  Ash- 
worth  V.  Ins.  Co.,  112  Mass.  422;  Car-r 
rigau  V.  Ins.  Co.,  122  Mass.  298; 
Herrmann  v.  Ins.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  162, 
distinguished. 


982  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AXD    JURY.       [1  TllOllip.  Tl"., 

are  the  several  stories  occupied?  "  to  which  the  answer  is  given, 
"  Unoccupied,  but  to  be  occupied  by  a  tenant,"  the  meaning  of 
this  is  held  to  be  that  the  premises  are  to  be  occupied  by  a  ten- 
ant imtliin  a  reasonable  time;  and  what  will  be  a  reasonable  time 
will  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  —  although  it  is  agreed 
that  the  statements  in  the  survey  are  warranties.^ 

§  1296.  Reasonable  Time  for  giving'  Notice  of  Loss. — 
Where  an  insurance  policy  contained  a  clause  requiring  the  as- 
sured to  give  notice  of  the  loss  '•'■  forthwiili,^''  whether  notice  was 
given  forthwith,  within  the  meaning  of  the  instrument  is,  con- 
trary to  the  general  rule  touching  the  exposition  of  written  in- 
struments, a  qneslion  of  fact  for  the  jury.^  The  process  of 
reasoning  by  which  this  conclusion  is  reached  is  simple  enough. 
The  courts  hold  that  such  a  condition  should  be  construed  liber- 
ally m  favor  of  the  insured,  and  that  he  complies  with  it  when  he 
gives  notice  with  due  diligence,  within  a  reasonable  time,  and 
without  unnecessary  delay,  under  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
case.^  While  the  question  whether  a  party  has  used  due  dili- 
o-ence  or  not  in  g-ivino;  such  notice  has  sometimes  been  held  to  be 
a  question  of  law,  especially  where  the  facts  and  circumstances 
were  admitted,  established,  or,  conceded  by  the  pleadings, — * 
other  courts  have  ruled  that,  upon  a  jury  trial,  where  the  facts 
are  in  issue,  it  should  be  left,  to  the  jury  to  determine  what  is  a 
reasonable  time  as  a  question  of  fact."' 

1  Hough  V.  City  Fire  lus.  Co.,  2i)  ^  Columbian  lus.  Co.  v.  Lawreuco, 
Conu.  11,  24.  10  Pet.  (U.  S.)  507. 

2  Doualiue  v.  Windsor  County  &c.  ^  Doualiue  v.  Windsor  County  &c 
Ins.  Co.,  5G  Vt,  374.  Ins.   Co.,   5G  Vt.  374,    380.     It  is  said 

3  St.  Louis  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kyle,  11  Mo.  that  the  courts  of  Vermont  have  al- 
278;  luraan  v.  'Western  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  ways  adopted  this  rule  in  all  questions 
12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  452;  Peoria &c.  Ins.  of  doubt,  depending  upon  a  general 
Co.  V.  Lewis,  18  111.  553;  Niagara  Fire  inference  from  a  multiplicity  of  par- 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Scammon,  100  111.  ()44:  s.  c.  ticular  facts,  and  where  the  law  has 
11  Ins.  L.  J.  614;  Phillips  t\  Protection  fixed  no  rule,  —  such  as  questions  of 
Ins.  Co.,  14  Mo.  220;  Edwards  v.  Bal-  due  diligence,  reasonable  time,  proba- 
timore  Ins.  Co.,  3  Gill  (Md.),  176.  ble  cause,  etc.  /Wrf.  380,  j^er  Taft,  J. : 
Upon  the  more  general  question  citing  Sessions  v.  Newpoi't,  23  Vt.  H. 
whether  ?-easciHa6Ze  iiHie  is  a  question  of  In  a  case  in  Connecticut  it  is  said: 
law  or  of  fact,  see  jocisf,  §  1530,  e^  itefy.  "Extreme   cases   either  way  may    lie 


Tit.   y,  Ch.   XLII.]  FIRE    INSURANCE.  933 

§  1297.  Sufficieucy  of  Preliminary  Proofs  of  Loss.  —It  has 
been  held  that  the  question  of  the  preliminary  proofs  of  loss  is 
f07'  the  jury,  in  the  sense  that  the  documents  are  to  be  laid  be- 
fore them  for  identification,  leaving  it  to  the  judge  to  say  whether 
they  make  a  prima  facie  case;i  and  that  the  jury  mu^t  de- 
termme  from  the  evidence  the  degree  of  particularity  in  the  ac-' 
count  of  the  loss  sent  to  the  insurance  company,  and  whether  it 
was  as  specific  as  the  nature  of  the  case  admitted  of.-' 

§  1298.  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  Fraudulent  Proofs  of 
Loss.  — "The  jury  are  instructed  that,  if  thev  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence, that  the  poHcy  sued  on  contained  a  provision  that  all  fraud,  or 
attempt  at  fraud,  by  false  swearing  or  otherwise,  shall  cause  a  forfeit- 
ure of  all  claims  under  the  policy,  and  that,  if  they  further  believe  from 
the  evidence  that  plaintiffs  have  fraudulently  offered  to  defendant 
proofs  of  loss  under  the  policy,  containing  material  statements  in  re- 
gard to  their  loss  under  said  policy,  which  the  plaintiffs  knew  to'be 
false  at  the  time  the  same  were  offered,  they  will  find  for  defendant."  3 

§  1299.  Waiver  of  Preliminary  Proofs  of  Loss.  — Where 
the  production  by  the  assured  of  preliminary  proofs  of  loss  is 
required  by  the  policy,  this  is  a  condition  precedent  to  his  rio-ht 
of  action,  unless  waived  by  the  insurer,  expressly  or  impliedfy  ; 
and  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting  as  to  whether  there  has  been 
a  waiver,  of  course  the  question   is  for    the  jury.*     But  it  has 

easily     cleterrah.ed.       Between    them  (Pa.)  325;  Franklm  Ins.  Co   r  Uncle 

there    is    a    wide    belt   of   debatable  graff,  43    Pa.   St.    350.     Compare  the 

ground,  and  cases  falling  within  it  are  case  of  Ward  v.  The  Law  Property  As 

governed  so  much  by  the  peculiar  cir-  surauce    &    Trust    Society     37    En- 

cumstances    of   each  case,  that  it  is  Law  &Eq.  47,  where  the  policy  assure^d 

much  better  to  determine  the  matter  as  the  plaintiff  against  the  criminal  de 

a  question  of  fact."    Lockwood  v.  Ins.  faults  of  a  commercial  traveler  whom 

Co    47  Conn   553  he    employed,   and    provided   that    it 

Klem  V.  I  ranklm  Ins.  Co.,  13  Pa.  should  be  void  if  the  claimant  should 

;:;'■   ,,.     ^  i^eglect  or  omit,  for  six  days  after  mak- 

JjTi    J'-Z  '"'■   ''■'''''''-  ^"^^^^^^i^^overyorreceivingnoticethat 

giaff  43  Pa.  St.  3o0.  a  liability  of  the  traveler  had  been  in- 

3  Approved    in    Schulter    v.   Mer-  curred,  to  forward  a  written  statement 

chant  s  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  C2  Mo.  237.  of  particulars,  -the  question  turning. 

Phffinix    Ins.    Co.    v.   Munday,    5  on  the  interpretation  of  the  policy  au5 

Coldw.    (Tenn.)    547,    551;    Drakes,  not  upon  evidence  of  waiver        "" 
Farmers'  Union  Ins.  Co.,  3  Grant  Cas. 


984  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   ThORip.   Tr., 

been  held  that,  where  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  relating  to 
the  subject  are  admitted,  the  defendant  has  the  right  to  require 
the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  whether  the  evidence  is  suiEcient  to 
establish  a  w^aiver  or  not.^  Where  the  agent  of  the  company 
had  ao-reed  with  the  assured  to  ascertain  the  amount  of  their  loss 
from  their  books,  and,  in  the  answer  sent  by  the  company  in  re- 
ply to  the  statement  of  the  loss,  refusing  payment  "on  account 
of  circumstances  connected  with  the  insurance,"  and  there  was 
no  objection  to  the  statement  sent,  the  evidence  of  loaiver  was 
sufficient  to  justify  a  submission  to  the  jury.^ 

§  1300.  Waiver  of  Limitation  of  Time  within  which  Action 
to  be  Brouglit.  —  Where  the  policy  contains  a  limitation  as  to 
the  time  within  which  an  action  can  be  brought  thereon,  this,  it  is 
held,  can  be  waived;  and  where  there  is  evidence  tending  to 
show  a  waiver,  the  question  becomes  a  question  of  fact  for  the 
jury  .3 

§  1301.  Waiver  of  a  Condition  against  Transfer  of  Policy.  — 

So,  where,  under  a  policy  which,  by  its  terms,  becomes  void 
upon  a  sale  or  transfer  of  the  property  assured,  without  consent 
of  the  company  indorsed  on  the  policy,  and  a  change  in  the  title 
has  taken  place  without  any  transfer  regularly  made,  but  the 
party  in  interest  has  continued  to  pay  premiums  for  a  number  of 
years,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  the  state  of  the 
policy  was  not  known  to  the  company,  there  being  evidence  en- 
titling them  to  draw  such  an  inference.  Consequently  it  was  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  they  had  not  waived  the  forfeiture, 
which  had  taken  place  by  the  alienation  of  the  property  without 
an  assignment  of  the  policy.* 

i  SpriDg   Garden    M.    Ids.    Co.   v.  ative    must     be      supported     by    an 

Evans,  9  Md.  1,  20.  agreement    founded    on    a    valuable 

2  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  y.  Updegraff,  43  consideration,  or  that  the  jact  relied 
Pa.  St.  350.  on  as  a  waiver  must  be  such  as  to 

3  Coursin  v.  Pennsylvania  Ins.  Co.,  estop  the  company  from  insisting  on 
46  Pa.  St.  823,  330.  Compare  Ripley  v.  performance  of  the  contract  or  for- 
^^tna  Ins.  Co.,  30  N.  Y.  13G,  where  it  feiture  of  the  contract. 

is  held  that  such  a  waiver  to  be  oper-  •*  Buckley  v.  Garrett,  47  Pa.  St.  205, 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIL]        fire  insurance.  985 

§  1302.  Whether  a  Fishikg-Scow  is  a  "  Building."  — In  an  action 
on  a  policy  of  fire  insurance,  one  of  the  questions  was  wtiether  the  fisli- 
ing-scow,  which  was  the  suliject  of  the  insurance,  was  included  in  the 
word  "  building  "  in  the  polic}'  of  insurance,  so  as  to  be  thereby  affected 
by  all  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  policy  relating  to  buildings. 
The  defendant  contended  that  it  was  so  included,  and  that  therefore, 
it  being  unoccupied,  both  at  the  time  it  was  insured  and  at  the  time  it 
was  burned,  the  plaintiff  could  not,  under  the  terms  of  the  policy,  re- 
cover. It  was  held  that  it  was  error  to  exclude  evidence  tendered  by 
the  defendant  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  scows  of  the  kind  and 
cliaracter  of  the  one  insured  were  used  and  occupied  as  buildings  by 
the  persons  owning  them  ;  that  in  the  fishing  season,  such  persons  used 
them  as  residences  and  places  of  business,  and  that  when  the  fishing 
season  was  over,  they  used  them  as  residences  on  land ;  that  this  par- 
ticular scow  was  so  used ;  and  tliat,  in  the  same  locality,  other  scows 
were  so  used.  It  was  further  held  that,  upon  such  evidence  and  the 
surrounding  circumstances,  it  would  have  been  proper  to  submit  the 
question  to  the  jury,  whether  or  not  the  parties  to  the  contract  intended 
that  all  the  limitations  and  conditions  thereof  should  apply  to  the  scow 
as  a  building.  1 

§  1303.  Whether  a  Certain  Business  is  a  "  Manufactory.  ' '  —  Where 
a  policy  upon  a  stock  of  merchandise  provided  that  a  manufacturing 
establishment  or  workshop  should  be  considered  as  hazardous  and 
extra  hazardous,  and  that  the  policy  should  be  void  if,  during  its 
term,  the  risk  should  be  increased  by  the  occupation  of  the  premises 
for  more  hazardous  purposes  than  were  permitted  in  the  policy,  and  it 
appeared  that  one  of  the  upper  stories  of  the  building  was  rented  to 
persons  who  carried  on  therein  the  business  of  putting  together  the 
frames  of  chairs  which  had  been  elsewhere  made,  — it  was  held,  but  ap- 
parently without  much  consideration,  that  the  judge  ought  to  have  sub- 
mitted the  question  to  the  jury  whether  this  was  a  manufactorj^  or  not, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  policj'."- 

§  1304.  Failure  to  Mention  Specific  Articles  of  Merchan- 
dise.—  An  insurance  on  ''merchandise,"  such  as  is  usually 
kept  in  country  stores,  is  not  void  because  hardware,  china, 
glass,  looking-glass,  etc.,  are  not  specifically  mentioned  in  the 

J  Euos    V.    Sun  Ins.    Co.,    CZ    Cal.  -  Appleby  v.  Firemen's  Fund   Ins, 

(;21.  Co.,  45  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  454,  457. 


'986  PROVIXCE    OF    COURT    AND    JUKY.        [1   TllOllip.   Tl'., 

application,  if  tlie  articles  are  such  as  are  usually  kept  in  coun- 
try stores;  and  whether  they  are  such  is  a  question  of  fact 
for  the  jury.^ 

§  1305.  Identity  of  the  Articles  Destroyed. — As  already 
seen^  wliere  i\\Q  ambiguity 'n^  on  the  face  of  the  instrument  — 
that  is  where  it  is  a  patent  ambiguity  —  it  is  for  the  judge  to 
explain  it;  but  an  ambiguity  in  the  contract  arising  out  of  ex- 
trinsic evidence,  which  is  necessary  to  be  heard  in  dealing  with 
the  subject  of  the  contract,  must  be  solved  by  the  jury .  It  was 
so  held  where  there  was  a  doubt  as  to  the  house  in  which  the 
goods  insured  were  situated  —  whether  they  were  situated  in  the 
house  which  was  burned,  or  in  another  and  adjacent  house,  which 
fact  could  not  be  determined  by  the  language  of  the  policy.  In 
such  a  case  it  was  said  by  Strong,  J. :  "  There  is  some  ambiguity, 
therefore,  in  the  policy,  arising  from  extrinsic  evidence.  The 
construction  of  written  papers  is  undoubtedly  for  the  court,  and 
it  is  a  question  of  law.  Even  if  there  be  an  ambiguity  on  the 
face  of  a  written  or  printed  document,  it  is  for  the  judge  to  ex- 
plain it.  But  if  the  ambiguity  arise  from  extrinsic  evidence,  as 
it  does  in  this  case,  it  must  be  solved  by  the  jury.^  It  is  for  the 
court  to  decide  what  the  instrument  means ;  but  the  application 
of  the  meaning  nuist  be  a  question  of  fact,  when  it  is  rendered 
doubtful  by  parol  evidence  what  was  the  identical  subject  re- 
specting which  the  parties  contracted.  For  this  reason  we  hold 
there  was  error  in  the  charge  of  the  court.  It  should  have  been 
submitted  to  the  jury  to  find,  not  the  meaning  of  the  written  ap- 
plication, but  whether  the  subject  of  it  was  goods  in  the  Kephart 
House,  or  goods  in  the  Western  House,  retained  by  the  plaintiff 
after  his  sale  of  the  other  to  Kephart."  ^  It  is  obvious  that  the 
question  whether  the  policy  ap})lies  to  particular  articles  will  be 
a  qwstion  of  fact  for  the  jury,^  on  the  general  principle  that 
questions  of   identity  are  for  the  jury,^  and  by  analogy  to  the 

1  Franklin  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  "Updo-  *  Boatty  v.  Ljcomiu;^  County  Ins. 
grafiE,  43  Fa.  St.  350.  Co.,  52  Fa.  St.  456. 

2  Ante,  §  1083.  5  Home  lus.  Co.  v.  Favorite,  4G  111. 

3  Citing  Smith  r.  Thompson,  8  C.  B.  263,  270. 

44.  «  Post,  §  1450,  etscq. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XLIl.]  FIRE    INSURANCE.  987 

rule  that  the  question  what  land  is  embraced  in  the  descrip- 
tive  calls  of  a  deed  is  for  a  jury,^  It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine, 
as  a  question  of  fact  from  the  evidence,  whether  the  merchandise 
insured  was  destroyed  in  the  "  building"  described  in  the  policy; 
but  if  a  building  contain  several  store  rooms,  and  there  be  any 
uncertainty  as  to  whether  all  the  rooms  were  included,  it  is  fatal 
to  the  insurers;  for  the  language  of  the  policy  is  theirs,  and  is  • 
to  be  construed  most  strongly  against  them.^  "Where  the  insur- 
ance company  had  given  permission  to  the  assured  to  "  enlarge 
the  building  "  in  which  the  merchandise  insured  was  then  con- 
tained (the  same  in  which  it  was  subsequently  burned),  and,  in 
the  permission,  had  mentioned  the  goods  as  insured  in  the  build- 
ing, requiring  that  no  goods  should  be  kept  in  the  second  story 
after  the  completion  of  the  addition,  —  this  was  held  such  evi- 
dence that  the  store-rooms  of  the  assured  were  in  the  building 
described  in  the  policy,  as  to  justify  a  submission  of  the  question 
to  the  jury.-^ 

§  130G.   Mutual  Insurance  — Data  for  Correct  Assessment. — 

In  an  action  to  recover  an  assessment  upon  a  de})osit  note,  given  to 
a  mutual  tire  insurance  company,  the  question  whether  the  books 
of  the  company  furnish  sutiicient  data  for  the  making  of  a  correct 
assessment,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.* 

§  1307.  Plaintiff's  Instructions  as  to  Renewal  of  Policy  by  Oral 
Contract.  —  "If  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  the  parties  agreed 
that  the  insurance  should  be  renewed  without  a  i:)ayment  of  premium, 
and  their  minds  met  and  they  fully  understood  the  terms  of  such  renewal 
in  all  respects,  and  notliing  remained  to  be  done  thereafter  except  to 
make  out  the  renewal  receipt  on  the  part  of  the  compan}',  and  the  pav- 
ment  of  the  premium  b}'  the  plaintiff,  notwithstanding  this  was  a  verbal 
agreement,  it  was  nevertheless  a  valid  contract  for  the  renewal  of  the 
policy,  and  the  defendant  is  liable  for  the  loss  to  the  amount  of  the  in- 
surance.   If  you  find  that,  yjrevious  to  January'  15,  1882,  the  de- 
fendant company  had  issued  a  policy  of  insurance  upon  the  building 

1  Post,  §  14C1,  et  seq.  3  /^iVZ. 

2  FninkliiiF.  lus.  Co.  r.  Updegraff,  •*  Marblehead  M.  F.  lus.  Co.  v.  Un- 
43  Pa.  St.  350.                                                    der^Yood,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  210,  214. 


988  PROVINCE   OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thouip.  Tr.,. 

and  stock  in  question,  which  would  expire  on  that  date,  and  that,  about 
the  time  of  its  expiration,  the  agent  of  the  company,  for  and  in  its  behalf 
agreed  with  the  plaintiff,  or  his  authorized  agent,  to  renew  said  policy, 
and  that  he,  the  agent  of  the  company,  would  attend  to  it  right  away  ; 
and  that  their  minds  met  as  to  the  terms  of  such  agreement ;  and  that 
there  was  nothing  further  to  be,  done  between  the  parties,  except  that 
the  agent  of  the  defendant  should  make  out  and  deliver  to  the  plaintiff 
or  his  agent  the  renewal  receipt  or  evidence  of  renewal,  and  that  the 
plaintiff  or  his  agent  should  then,  or  at  some  subsequent  time,  pay  the 
premium,  — then  I  instruct  3'ou  that  such  an  agreement  would  bind  the 
defendant  company  to  renew  the  policy,  and  they  could  only  avoid 
liability  upon  such  contract  by  tendering  the  renewal  and  demanding 
the  premium,  and  the  failure  of  the  plaintiff  to  pay  the  same,  or  by 
giving  the  plaintiff  or  his  agent  notice  that  the  defendant  company  had 
refused  to  carry  the  risk ;  and  such  tender  of  the  renewal  and  demand 
of  the  premium,  or  the  giving  of  the  notice,  as  before  stated,  in  order  to 
relieve  the  defendant  from  liability,  must  be  done  before  the  loss  accrued 
and  before  they  knew  of  the  loss.  "  ^ 

§  1308.  Instructions  on  the  Theory  of  a  Waiver  ob^  the  Right 
OP  Forfeiture  by  Promising  to  Rebuild. —  "If  the  jury  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  gave  to  plaintiffs  the  notice 
of  their  intention  to  rebuild  the  premises  destroyed  by  fire,  given 
in  evidence  by  plaintiffs,  and  that,  at  the  time  of  giving  said  notice,  the 
defendant  knew  that  no  watchman  had  been  kept  upon  said  premises 
from  the  time  .of  the  issuing  of  said  policy  to  the  time  of  the 
happening  of  the  loss,  then  the  jury  may  infer  that  the  defendants 
waived  their  right  to  interpose  that  fact  as  a  defense  to  the  right  of 
plaintiffs  to  recover  under  the  policy,  and  the  burden  of  pooof  is  on  the 
defendant  to  satisfy  the  jury  that,  at  the  time  of  giving  such  notice,  the 
defendant  was  ignorant  of  that  fact. Although  the  jury  may  be- 
lieve that,  at  the  time  of  making  the  application  for  the  policy  sued  on 
by  plaintiffs,  or  their  agents,  it  was  represented  by  them  or  their  agents, 
that  a  watchman  was  and'  would  be  kept  in  charge  of  the  premises  in- 
sured, and  that  that  matter  was  regarded  by  the  agents  of  defendant  as 
material  to  the  risk  —  that  is,  without  such  representations  the  risk 
would  not  have  been  taken,  or  a  higher  rate  of  premium  would  have 
been  charged  therefor ;  and  that  the  building  was  damaged  or  lost  by 
fire,  and  at  the  time  there  was  no  watchman  in  charge  of  the  premises ; 

*  Approved  in    Kiug  v.  Ilekla  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  58  Wis.  514,  515. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLII.J  LIFE    INSURANCE.  ggg 

and  that  the  defendant,  by  its  authorized  officers  and  agents,  knew  these 
lac  s,  and  with  such  knowledge  the  defendant  alone  or  in  confrnction 
wuh  other  companies,  agreed  to  make  good  the  loss  by  rebuilL"  he 
mses,and  notilied  plaintiffs  thereof,  and  failed  or  refnsed  Zl. 
2  no       ,T        °  objections  to  maldnggood  the  loss  on  the  gronnd 

nt  1  ,fl  .f"""  "". '"  "''"■«'  "'  ""^  P'-^"''^^^  »'  ^''^  '™e  of  t^e  fire, 
intil  after  the  insftntion  of  this  snit ;  from  these  circnistanccs  the  jnr; 
a,e  anthonzed  to  infer  that  defendant  waived  the  matter,  and  in  uch 
case  It  constitutes  no  defense  to  this  suit.  "1  no  in  such 

Auticle  II.  _  Life  Insibance. 
Section 
1310.  Whether  Policy  Authorized  by  Statute 

""•  "^::;;;  p:^:;:;::'  "■""^^■■^"  '^"-'^  -  '■'^--"-tiou  t,.„t ,.  „a<i  uo 

ll!?'  PI  l'","»'  ",''"""  """"  "■"'"  '^'■°""»'S  or  from  Natural  Causes 
1314.  Habitual  Intemperance 

""■  Tltll^reT"'™  "^  """""'  "»-'»'  -»>«  >-P--nta.lon 
1310.  DeleiKlaut's  lustructiou  as  to  what  Constitutes  a  Waiver  of  Ki^ht  to 
A,o„l  Policy  by  Kcasou  of  False  Statements  In  Application     ' 

§  1310.  Whether  Policy  Authorized  hy  Statute.  _  It  is    of 

course,  a  question  of  legal  inlerpreuaion,  whether  ti  policy  of  life 

hsuruace comes  within  llio  purview  of  a  statute  which  authorizes 

the  issuing   of  such  iiolicies    ,„■  „b„n,        -t    ■  ""tnoiizes 

poli„,,i  poiiues,  oi    whether   it   is   a   mere  wager 

§  1311.  Whether  the  Insured  Answered  Falsely  in  his  Appli- 
cation that  he  had  no  Family  Physician. -It  is  ciistomaiy    in 

the  pniited  questions  and  answers,  in  applications  for  policie^  of 

dence  of  his  family  ,,hysic,a„,  if  he  lias  one.  MHiere,  in  an  action 
upon  a  policy  of  life  insurance,  the  right  of  recovery  is  c<,n- 
tested,  on  the  ground  that  the  insured  gave  a  false  Answer  to 
tins  question,  it  will  ordinarily  be  a  rjnestion  of  faU  for  the  jury 

'  Approved   in    Bersche    v     Glohp  2  -ir,,,  ,,  ,. 

«ut. Kucfus. CO., 31  MO. .„,.sr"  ancci;::::,: «"Br"S:?^^:-:- 


990  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   ThOHip.  Tr., 

whether  the  insured  had  ii  family  physician  or  not.^  Who  is  to 
be  deemed  a  family  physician,  within  the  meaning  of  such  a 
question,  is,  it  seems,  a  question  of  Icnv;  but  whether  the  as- 
sured had  such  a  physician  is,  of  course,  a  question  of  fact.  A 
family  physician  is  defined  to  be  the  physician  who  usually  at- 
tends and  is  consulted  by  the  members  of  a  family  in  the  capacity 
of  a  physician;  and  where,  in  such  an  application,  the  usual  med- 
ical attendant  is  inquired  for,  the  one  who  has  been  accus'omed 
to  attend,  and  not  one  who  has  occasionally  attended,  should  be 
mentioned."^ 

§  1312.  Whether  a  Death  was  from  Drowning  or  from 
Natnral  Causes. — In  an  English  case,  H.  effected  with  the 
defendants  a  policy  of  assurance,  whereby  they  agreed  that,  if 
he  should  sustain  any  injury  caused  by  accident  or  violence, 
within  the  meaning  of  that  policy  and  the  conditions  thereto, 
and  should  die  from  the  effects  of  such  injury  within  three  cal- 
endar months  from  the  happening  thereof,  then  the  funds  and 
property  of  the  defendants  should  be  subject  and  liable  to  pay 
the  sum  thereby  assured.  The  policy  contained  a  proviso' 
that  no  claim  should  be  made  in  respect  of  any  injury,  unless  the 
same  should  be  caused  by  some  outward  and  visible  means,  of 
which  satisfactory  proof  could  be  furnished  to  the  directors. 
On  a  Saturday  afternoon,  H.  went  from  London  to  Brighton  by 
railroad,  having  a  ticket  which  entitled  him  to  return  by  it  on  the 
followino-  iNIonday.  About  seven  o'clock  on  Monday  evening, 
he  left  his  lodgings,  having  expressed  his  intention  to  bathe 
before  he  returned  to  London.  His  clothes  were  found  on  the 
steps  of  a  bathing  machine,  and  about  six  weeks  afterwards  a 
body  was  washed  ashore  on  the  Essex  coast,  which  his  brother  and 
some  acquaintances  deposed  at  the  inquest  was  his  body,  but 
which  the  jury  found  to  be  the  body  of  a  person  unknown.  It 
was  held,  in  the  Court  of  p]xcliequer  Chamber:  1.  That,  assum- 
ino"  that  H.  died  from  drowning,  that  was  a  death  by  "  accident" 

1  "Rokl  V.  Piedmont  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  58  Co.,  58  Mo.  421,  424.  Consult  also 
Mo.  421,  424;  Gibson  v.  American  &c.  May  on  Insurance,  §  304,  and  cases 
Life  Ins.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  580.  there  cited. 

2  Keid   V.  I'iedmont  &c.    Life    Ins. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIL]        life  ixsuijaxce.  991 

within  the  meaning  of  the  policy.  2.  That  it  was  a  question 
for  the  juiy  whether  H.  died  from  the  action  of  the  water  or 
from  natural  causes.  The  judges  reasoned  that  the  probability, 
upon  such  a  state  of  facts,  was  greater  that  he  died  from  drown- 
ing than  from  natural  causes,  which  was  sufficient  to  turn  the 
balance  and  take  the  case  to  the  jury } 

§  1313.  Plaintiff's  Instruction  as  to  Insurable  Interest  of 
Grandson  in  Life  op  Grandfather.  —  "  I  instruct  you  that  a  grand- 
son with  whom  a  grandfather  resides,  has  an  insurable  interest  in  the 
life  of  the  grandfather ;  and  a  policy  of  insurance  taken  out  by  the 
grandfather  in  favor  of  the  grandson,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  is  valid 
and  binding  on  the^company  issuing  it."  '^ 

§  1314.  Habitual  Intemperance. — The  question  whether  a 
person  whose  life  was  insured  was  habitually  intemperate,  within 
the  meaning  of  a  clause  avoiding  the  policy  on  this  p-round,  has 
been  held  a  question  for  the  jury  on  conflicting  or  doubtful  evi- 
dence.'^ In  such  a  case,  where  the  insured  had  actually  had  an 
attack  of  deUrium  tremens,  it  was  held  proper  to  instruct  the 
jury  that,  if  the  habits  of  the  insured  "  in  the  usual,  ordinary, 
and  every-day  routine  of  his  life  were  temperate,"  the  represen- 
tations made,  as  to  his  habits  being  temperate,  w^ere  not  untrue, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  policy,  although  he  may  have  had  an 
attack  of  delirium  tremens  from  an  exceptional  over-indulgence. 
The  court  reason  that  it  could  not  have  been  contemplated,  from 

1  Trew  v.  Railway  Passengers  As-  22   Am.  Eep.   180;    Campbell  v.  New 

surance  Co.,  6  Hurl.  &  N.  838.  Eng.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  98  Mass.  381; 

^2  Approvediu  Elkhart  Mutual  Aid  Stevens    v.   Warren,    101   Mass.  504; 

Asso.  V.  Haughton,  103  Ind.   28f!,  290.  Olmstedr.  Keyes,  85  N.  Y.  593;  Fair- 

The    court   discuss    tlie    question   at  child  v.  Northeast.  Mut.    Life  Asso., 

length  and  review  the  following  decis-  51  Vt.  613;  Clark  v.  Allen,  11  R.  I.  439; 

ions :  Provident  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baum,  s.  c.  23  Am.  Rep.  49G;  Loomis  v.  Eagle 

29  Ind.  23G;  Franklin  Life  Ins.  Co.  w.  &c.    Ins.    Co.,    6   Gray  (Mass.),  39G; 

Hazzard,    41  Ind.    IIG;    s.    c.    13   Am.  Lemon  v.  Pha?uix  Ins.  Co.,  38   Conu. 

Rep.   313;    Franklin    Life   Ins.    Co.  v.  294;    Conn.    Mut.    Life    Ins.    Co.    v. 

Seftou,  53  Ind.  380;   Continental  Life  Schaefer,  94  U.  S.  457;  ^tnaLife  Ins. 

Ins.  Co.  V.  Volger,  89   Ind.  572;    s.   c.  Co.  v.  France,  94  U.  S.  5G1. 
46  Am.    Rep.   185;    Guardian  Mutual  3  Northwestern    Life    Ihs.    Co.    v. 

Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hogan,  80  111.  35;  s.  c.  Muskegon  Bank,  122  U.  S.  501. 


9^2  PROVI.NCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   Thoilip.  Tl'., 

the  language  used  iu  the  policy,  that  it  vshould  have  become  void 
in  con.'-equence  of  an  occasional  excess  by  the  insured,  but  only 
where  such  excess,  by  frequent  repetitions,  had  become  a  habit. ^ 

§  1315.  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  Effect  of  Material  False 
Representation  by  the  Assured.  —  "A  misrepresentation  or  false 
statement,  made  in  his  application  for  insurance,  by  a  person  whose  life 
is  insured,  respecting  a  material  fact,  avoiJs  the  policy  issued  ui)on  that 
application,  and  this,  whether  the  misrepresentation  was  made  inno- 
cently or  designedly.  If,  therefore,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence 
that  George  Schwarzbach,  in  his  application  for  the  policy  or  certificate 
here  sued  on,  stated  that  he  had  no  serious  illness,  or  stated  that  he 
had  not  had,  during  the  last  seven  years,  any  disease  or  severe  sickness, 
and  that  either  of  those  statements  was  false  in  any  respect,  deemed  by 
the  jury  material, — then,  whether  the  said  Schwarzbach  intended  to 
deceive  or  not,  the  said  policy  or  certificate  is  void,  and  the  jury  should 
find  for  the  defendant ;  unless  they  further  believe  that  the  avoidance 
of  the  policy  or  certificate  has  been  waived  by  the  defendant,  in  the 
manner  elsewhere  explained."  '^ 

§  1316.  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  What  Constitutes  a  Waiver 
of  Right  to  Avoid  Policy  by  Reason  of  False  Statements  in  Appli- 
cation.—  "There  can  be  no  waiver  of  the  avoidance  of  a  policy  by 
reason  of  material  false  statements  or  misrepresentations  in  the  appli- 
cation, unless  the  acts  relied  upon  as  showing  the  waiver  were  done  with 
full  knowledge  of  the  facts.  While,  therefore,  the  receipt  of  premiums 
or  assessments,  with  full  knowledge,  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  of 
facts  working  a  forfeiture  of  the  polic}'',  might  constitute  a  waiver  of 
such  forfeiture,  j^et  the  receipt  of  such  premiums  or  assessments,  in 
ignorance  of  such  facts,  would  not  constitute  a  waiver.  If,  then,  the 
jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  policy  or  certificate  sued  on  was 
forfeited  or  avoided,  by  reason  of  false  statements  respecting  material 
facts  made  by  George  Schwarzbach  in  his  application,  and  that  the  de- 
fendant, when  it  accepted  assessments  from  him,  did  not  know  that 
such  statements  were  false,  —  then  the  acceptance  of  such  assessments 
would  not  constitute  a  waiver  of  such  forfeiture  or  avoidance. ^ 

1  Insurauce  Co.  v.  Foley,  105  U.  S.  Ohio  Valley  Protective  Uuion,  25  W. 
350,354;  reaffirmed   in  Northwestern      Va.  G22,  640,041. 

Life  lus.  Co.  V.  Muskegon  Bank,  122  U.  ^  Approved      in     Schwarzbach    v. 

S.  501,  512.  Ohio  Valley   Protective   Uuiou,  25  W. 

2  Approved     iu      Schwarzbach     v.      Va.  (!40. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLII,]         MARINE    INSURANCE.  993 


Article  III.  —  Marine  Insurance. 

Section 

1318.  Whether  Evidence  overcomes  Presumptiou  of  Seaworthiness. 

1319.  Whether  Circumstances  raise  Presumption  of  Unseaworthiness. 

1320.  Time  vrithin  whicli  a  Voyage  sliould  be  Performed. 

1321.  Termination  of  the  Voyage. 

1322.  Facts  wliich  will  justify  an  Abandonment. 

1323.  Eeasonable  Time  for  Abandoning  a  Cargo  to  the  Underwriters. 

1324.  Eeasonable  Time  for  Ascertaining  whether  Kecovery  and  Repair  Pos- 

sible. 

1325.  Whether  Seizure  of  Vessel  was  an  Act  of  War. 

1326.  Barratry:  Misconduct  in  Doing  an  Act  Proliibited  by  Statute. 

1327.  A  Chai'ge  to  a  Jury  where  the  Defense  was  Barratry. 

1328.  Instructions  as  to  what  Constitutes  Partial  and  what  Total  Loss. 

§  1318.  Whether  Evidence  Overcomes  Presumptiou  of  Sea- 
worthiuess.  —  In  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  marine  insurance, 
the  plaintiff  goes  to  the  jury  with  a presumiUion  of  laiu  in  his 
favor  that  the  vessel  was  seaworth}^,  and  whether  the  evidence 
is  sufficient  to  remove  this  presumption  is  a  question  for  the 
jury,  and  not  for  the  court. ^ 

§  1319.  Whether  Circumstauces  raise  Presumption  of  Un- 
seaworthiness.—  Where  the  inability  of  a  ship  to  perform  its 
voyage  becomes  evident  soon  after  leaving  port,  and  it  founders 
without  stress  of  weather,  or  other  adequate  cause  of  injury,  the 
presumption  is  that  this  inability  existed  before  setting  sail,  and 
that  it  was  due  to  some  latent  defect  which  rendered  the  vessel 
unseaworthy.2  In  such  cases  "  the  law  Avill  intend  a  want  of  sea- 
worthiness, because  no  visible  or  rational  cause,  other  than  a 
latent  and  inherent  defect  in  the  vessel,  can  be  assigned  for  the 
loss ;   and  insurers  do  not  insure  against  latent  defects. ' '  ^  This  pre- 

1  Field  V.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Md.  245,  250.  side  v.  Orplians'  Benefit  Ins.  Co.,  62 

2  Walsh  V.  Washington  M.  Ins.  Mo.  322,  325;  Marcy  v.  Sun  Mut.  Ins. 
Co.,  32N.Y.  427,  436;  Talcottv.  Com-  Co.,  11  La.  Ann.  749;  Marcy  «.  Sun 
merciallns.  Co.,2  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  124;  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  14  Id.  264;  Parker  v. 
Barnewall  v.  Church,  1  Caines  (N.  Y.),  Union  Ins.  Co.,  15  Id.  688. 

217;  Paddock  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  11  ^  Patrick  v.  Hallett,  3  .Johns.  Cas. 

Pick.    (Mass.)    227,   237;    Watson    v.       (X.  Y.)  76;  Walsh  v.  Washington  luSo 
Clarke,  1  Dow  (Pari.  Rep.),  336 ;  Gart-      Co.,  32  N.  Y.  427,  437. 

03 


994  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JUKY.        [1   Thoilip.   Tl'., 

sumption  does  not  belong  to  the  class  of  presumptions  which  are 
termed  presumptions  of  hiw.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  pvp- 
sumptio  juris  et  de  jure.  It  is  a  mere  presumption  of  fact,  which 
shifts  the  onus  probandi,  and  which  prevails  only  where  it  is  un- 
repelled  by  countervailing  proof.  But,  even  to  this  extent,  no 
presumption  of  unseaworthiness  arises,  except  from  facts  which 
exclude  the  rational  inference  of  a  loss  attributable  to  the  perils 
of  the  seas.^  But  where  it  satisfactorily  appears  that  the  vessel 
was  seaworthy  on  leaving  port,  and  that  it  encountered  marine 
perils  which  might  well  disable  a  staunch  and  well  manned  ship, 
no  such  presumption  can  be  invoked,  for  the  purpose  of  over- 
turning a  verdict  and  absolving  the  insurers  from  liability. - 
When,  therefore,  a  ship  sinks  in  port,  very  soon  after  commenc- 
ing her  voyage,  without  having  met  with  any  extraordinary  gale 
of  wind  or  other  disturbing  element,  this  fact  is  a  circumstance 
from  which  the  jury  are  authorized  to  find  that  it  is  unseaworthy, 
or,  as  the  Louisiana  cases  term  it,  not  portwortliy ;  and  whether 
it  is  so  or  not,  in  an  action  on  a  marine  policy,  where  unsea- 
w^orthiness  is  set  up  as  a  defense,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.-^ 

§  1320.   Time  within  which  a  Voyage  sliould  be  Performed. 

In  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  marine  insurance,  the  time  within 
which  a  voyage  should  be  performed  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the 

§  1321.  Termination  of  tiie  Voyage. — It  is  obvious  that, 
where  a  particular  place  is  stated  in  the  policy  as  the  termination 
of  the  voyage,  the  identification  of  the  place  and  the  question 
w'hether  the  ship  had  arrived  at  that  place,  are  questions  of  fact. 
So  held  where  the  voyage  was  described,  "  from  Swan  River  to 

1  Walsh  V.  Washiugtou  lus.  Co.,  sell,  1  Bay  (S.  C),  309;  Parker  v. 
32  N.  Y.  427,  436.  Potts,  3  Dow  (Pari.  Rep.),  23;  Burges 

2  Walsh  V.  Washington    Ins.   Co.,  v.  Wickham,  10  Jur.  (n.  s.)  .)2. 
supra;   1  Marsh.  Ins.  158,  159;   1  Aru.  ^  Gartside     v.     Orphans'      Benefit 
Ins.  f;()2,  §  245;  Sherwood  v.  Ruggles,  Ins.  Co.,  (i2  Mo.  322,  32(5. 

2  Sandf.  S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  55;    Patrick  v.  ^  Charleston  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corner,  2 

Ilallett,  1  Johns.   (N.  Y.)  241;  s.  c.  3      Gill  (Md.),  410,  426;  post,  §  1562. 
Johns.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  76;  Miller  v.  Kus- 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLII.]        MARINE    IXSURANCE.  995 

Mauritius,  and  for  thirty  days  after  arrival,"  and,  according  to 
custom,  the  ship  anchored  at  what  was  known  as  Bell  Buoy, 
which  was  a  buoy  in  the  main  ocean  a  few  miles  from  the  harbor 
itself,  and,  after  having  remained  there  for  fourteen  days  await- 
ing money  to  pay  a  bottomry  bond,  was  wrecked.  It  was  held 
a  question  for  the  jury  whether  she  had  arrived  at  Mauritius. 
More  strictly,  the  question  was  whether  she  had  arrived  at  the 
place  at  which  ships  of  her  character  ordinarily  anchor,  when 
Mauritius  is  the  termination  of  the  voyage.^ 

§  1322.   Facts  which  will  Justify  an  Abandonment. — In  an 

action  on  a  policy  of  marine  insurance,  the  facts  which  will  jus- 
tify an  abandonment  avQ  for  the  jury? 

§  1323.  Reasonable  Time  for  Abandoning  a  Cargo  to  the 
Underwriters. — In  a  case  of  marine  insurance,  where  the  ves- 
sel was  stranded  and  the  cargo  partly  destroyed,  it  was  held  that 
the  owners  must  make  their  election  to  abandon  the  cargo  to  the 
underwriters  within  a  reasonable  time;  and  Lord  Ellenborough 
conceived  that  it  was  the  'province  of  the  judge  to  direct  the  jury  as 
to  what  would  be  a  reasonable  time  under  the  circumstances, ^though 
it  is  doubtful  whether  it  would  be  so  held  at  the  present  time. 

§  1324.  Reasonable  Time  for  Ascertaining"  whether  Re- 
covery and  Repair  possible.  — Where  a  vessel  has  been  wrecked  or 
sunk,  and  the  policy  of  insurance  recites  that,  "  in  no  case  what- 
ever shall  the  assured  have  the  rio-ht  to  abandon,  until  it  shall  be 
ascertained  that  the  recovery  and  repair  of  the  said  schooner  are 
impracticable,"  — the  court  b\\o\x\([  expound  to  the  jury  the  mean- 
ing of  the  clause;  and  it  is  not  error  to  refuse  an  instruction 
which  is  merely  drawn  in  the  language  of  the  clause  itself,  be- 
cause that  is  tantamount  to  submitting  its  meaning  to  the  jury. 
The  meaning  was  held  to  be  that  the  owner  was  not  bound  to 
wait  until  it  was    demonstrated    beyond   any   contingency  that 

1  Lindsay  v.  Jauson,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  ^  Auderson  v.  Royal  Exchange  As- 
699.                                                                   surauce  Co.,  7  East,  38. 

2  Delaware  lus.  Co,  v.  Winter,  38 
Pa.  St=  176,  187. 


996  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [i   TllOmp.   Tl'., 

the  vessel  could  not  possibly  be  got  off  and  repaired ;  else  bis 
right  to  abandon  could  never  arise  until  the  vessel  had  actually 
gone  to  pieces;  for,  until  that  time,  some  fortunate  and  unex- 
pected event  might  deliver  her  from  peril.  The  recovery  and 
repair  of  the  vessel  would  be  ascertained  to  be  imi:)ractiGable, 
when,  in  the  opinion  of  judicious  men,  acquainted  with  the  sub- 
ject, there  was  no  reasonable  probability  that  she  could  be  got 
off  and  repaired;  and  if  the  owner  was  not  bound  to  wait  until 
it  was  absolutely  certain  that  the  vessel  could  not  be  got  off  and 
repaired,  then  he  was  entitled  to  abandon.^  From  this  it  would 
seem  to  follow  that  the  question  is  one  for  a  jury,  under  proper 
instructions  from  the  court  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  language  of 
the  policy. 

§  1325.  Whether  Seizure  of  Vessel  was  an  Act  of  War.  — 

In  an  action  on  a  policy  of  marine  insurance,  Avhere  the  evidence 
showed  that  the  insured  vessel,  while  lying  at  a  wharf  in  the 
port  of  Norfolk,  Virginia,  for  repairs,  was,  on  the  twenty-first 
day  of  April,  1861,  seized  by  a  large  body  of  men,  professing 
to  act  by  authority  of  the  State  of  Virginia,  filled  with  stones, 
towed  out  into  the  channel,  amidst  the  cheers  of  the  populace, 
and  sunk  at  the  mouth  of  the  channel,  to  prevent  the  ingress  or 
egress  of  vessels  of  war ;  and  that  it  was  a  time  of  such  confusion 
and  excitement  that  no  relief  could  be  had  from  the  courts,  and 
that  the  vessel  wasdost,  —  it  was  held,  upon  these  facts,  taken  in 
connection  with  the  history  of  the  times,  which  the  court  would 
notice  judicially,  that  it  should  have  been  left  to  the  jury  as  a 
question  of  fact  ^  whether  the  seizure  of  the  vessel  was  an  act  of 
war,  on  the  part  of  those  then  engaged  in  hostilities  with  the 
United  States,  or  in  aiding  or  carrying  out  existing  or  contem- 
plated acts  of  war  by  the  State  of  Virginia,  or  whether  it  was 
the  act  of  a  mob  simply. ^ 

§  1326.  Barratry  :  Misconduct  in  Doingr  an  Act  Proliibited 
by  Statute.  — Where  the  master  of  a  vessel,  in  order  to  increase 

'  Norton  v.  Lexington  &c.  Ins.  Co.,  ^  Swinnerton  r.  Columbiau  Ins.  Co., 

1  ;  :i!.  236,  249.  37  N.  Y.  174. 


Tit.  V,  Cll.  XLIL]        MARINE    IXSURANCE.  997 

the  head  of  steam  while  racing  with  another  vessel,  brought  a 
barrel  of  turpentine  from  the  hold  to  the  furnace,  whereby  the 
vessel  was  set  on  fire  and  destroyed,  and  there  was  an  act  of 
Congress  providing  that  turpentine  must  be  secured  upon  steam- 
boats in  metallic  safes,  or  in  apartments  lined  with  metal,  at  a 
secure  distance  from  any  tire,  —  it  was  held  that  the  question 
whether  the  wrongful  act  of  the  master,  in  thus  using  the  tur- 
pentine, w'as  misco7iduct,  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  of  law 
that  a  policy  of  insurance  will  not  protect  a  party  against  his 
own  misconduct,  was  a  question  of  laio  for  the  court,  and  not  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury;  for,  though,  ordinarily,  questions 
of  care,  diligence  and  skill  are  to  be  decided  by  a  jury,  it  is 
otherwise  where  the  law  defines  the  very  act  to  be  done  under 
given  circumstances.  In  such  a  case  the  jury  have  only  to  decide 
whether  the  acts  required  or  forbidden  by  the  law  have  been 
done.^ 

§  1327.  A  Charge  to  a  Jury  where  the  Defense  was  Barratry.  — 
"  The  second  defense  is  barratry,  which  may  be  said  to  comprehend  not 
only  every  species  of  fraud  and  knavery  committed  by  the  master  or 
pilot,  with  the  intention  of  benefiting  himself  at  the  expense  of  the 
owners  of  the  boat,  but  every  willful  act  on  his  part  of  known  illegality, 
whereby  the  owners  are  in  fact  injured.  It  consists  of  some  fraudulent 
act  intended  to  injure  them,  or  of  a  willful  violation  of  known  positive 
law,  in  the  navigation  or  management  of  the  vessel,  from  which  the  loss 
resulted.  [The  court  here  read  the  rules  and  the  act  of  Congress  as 
recited  in  the  statement  of  this  case,  and  continued]  :  These  rules  are 
intended  to  avoid  collisions  between  boats  ascending  and  descending 
the  river,  and  they  prescribe  the  course  to  be  pursued  by  the  pilots. 
They  are  made  to  be  observed,  and  are  binding  as  law  upon  the  pilots, 
subject,  however,  to  any  emergencies  by  which  it  may  become  necessary 
to  depart  from  them,  to  escape  or  avoid  immediate  danger  from  collision 
or  other  perils.  It  is  claimed  that  the  pilot  willfully  violated  these 
rules  of  navigation,  established  under  a  law  of  Congress,  by  failing  to 
give  the  signals  required  by  the  rules,  and  by  omitting  to  stop  when  the 
boats  had  come  within  a  distance  of  eight  hundred  yards.  These  rules 
are  in  evidence,  and  the  pilots  are  bound  to  obey  them,  unless  some 
emergency  in  the  course  of  navigation  occurs,  justifying  a  departure 

1  Citizens  Ins.  Co.  v.  Marsh,  -tl  Pa.  St.  387,  393;  post,  §1C72. 


998  PROVINCE    OF    COUKT    AND    JURY.        [iTllOllip.   Tl'., 

from  them,  to  avoid  a  collision  or  other  danger.  The  rules  require  that, 
when  the  boats  have  approached  within  one  mile,  the  pilot  of  the 
ascending  boat  shall  sound  the  whistle  to  notify  the  pilot  of  the  descend- 
ing boat  on  which  side  to  pass  ;  and  that,  if  the  signals  are  not  answered 
and  understood  by  the  time  boats  have  approached  to  the  distance  of 
eight  hundred  yards,  he  shall  stop  his  boat  until  the  signals  are  cor- 
rected and  understood.  Now,  if  the  pilot  of  the  America,  on  approach- 
ing the  United  States,  when  they  had  approached  within  the  mile,  knew 
or  believed  that  they  had  come  within  the  mile,  and  chose  to  omit  to 
give  the  signal  required  by  the  rule;  or  if,  when  lie  knew  or  believed 
that  they  had  approached  within  the  eight  hundred  yards,  without 
satisfactor}^  signals,  he  did  not  stop,  although  he  knew  that  the  rules 
required  that  he  should  stop,  but  chose  to  risk  the  violation  of  the  rule, 
and  the  result  of  such  violation  of  the  rule  was  the  loss,  that  would 
constitute  such  misconduct  of  the  pilot  as  to  prevent  a  recovery,  though 
be  did  not  actually  intend  an  injury  to  the  owners.  He  is  not  at  liberty 
to  prefer  his  own  judgment  to  the  rule  required  by  law,  unless  there  be 
some  emergency  requiring  a  departure  from  the  rule.  But  he  must 
deliberately,  or  voluntarily  and  knowingly  violate  the  rule,  in  order  to 
constitute  such  misconduct  as  to  prevent  a  recoveiy.  Tiie  rules  are 
made  to  be  observed  by  pilots ;  they  are  intended  for  the  safety  of  the 
public  and  for  the  protection  of  the  owners.  Whether  they  are  the  best 
that  can  be  made  or  not,  while  in  force  they  must  be  observed,  and  a 
willful  disregard  of  them  is  misconduct;  and  if  a  loss  is  caused  thereby 
to  the  owners,  it  is  a  loss  by  barratry,  which  is  excepted  from  this 
policy.  But,  in  establishing  this  defense,  the  burden  of  the  proof  is  on 
the  defendants.  They  must  make  it  appear,  by  a  fair  preponderance  of 
evidence,  that  the  pilot  of  the  America  did  violale  the  rules  knowingly, 
and  that  the  loss  was  the  consequence.  -  -  -  -  Mere  error  of  fact  or  of  law 
is  not  sufficient  to  establish  a  defense  on  this  ground.  The  pilot  must 
know  his  duty,  and  decline  to  do  it.  If  he  supposed  that  the  distance 
was  a  mile  when  he  gave  the  first  signal,  and  intended  to  comply  with 
the  rule  by  the  signal  which  he  gave,  the  fact  that  he  may  have  been 
mistaken  in  his  estimate  of  the  distance  is  not  misconduct  which  is  a 
defense.  So,  if  when  the  boats  approached  to  the  distance  of  eight 
hundred  yards,  the  pilot  of  the  America  knew  it,  or  believed  it,  and 
knew  that  the  signals  had  not  been  answered  or  properly  understood, 
and  yet  failed  to  stop  or  back  his  boat  according  to  the  law,  that  would 
be  such  misconduct  as  would  lie  a  defense  against  a  suit  for  a  loss 
caused  by  it.  But  if,  by  reason  of  the  darkness  of  the  night,  or  other 
causes  not  under  his  crintrol,  he  was  mistaken  as  to  the  fact  of  their 


Tit.   V,   Ch.   XLII.]        MAKIXE    INSURANCE.  999 

approach  to  the  distance  of  eight  hundred  yards,  until  they  had  ap- 
proached much  nearer,  such  mistake  would  not  be  misconduct  to  defeat 

a  recover}'. The  pilot  is  not  to  set  up  his  judgment  against  the 

rules,  unless  there  arises  an  emergency  in  which  he  should  honestly  be- 
lieve that  it  was  necessary  to  depart  from  the  rule  to  avoid  a  collision 
or  avoid  danger.  But  if  he,  in  good  faith,  endeavored  to  comply  with 
the  rules  of  navigation  and  to  avoid  a  collision,  though  he  may  have 
erred  in  his  estimate  of  distances,  and  though  he  may  have  been  mis- 
taken  as  to  the  interpretation  of  the  rules,  he   cannot  be  held  to  be 

guilty  of  such  misconduct  as  to  constitute  a  defense. You  will 

limit  your  inquiry  on  this  subject  to  the  conduct  of  the  pilot  in  charge 
of  the  America,  as  the  onl}-  barratry  which  can  defeat  this  suit  must  be 
of  the  officers  or  crew  of  the  boat,  for  the  loss  of  which  this  suit  is 
brought."! 

§  1328.  Instructions  as  to  What  Constitutes  Partial  and  what 
Total  Loss.  —  "  The  question  which  has  been  contested  as  to  the  main 
point  in  this  case  is,  whether  the  amount  of  this  loss  is  to  be  ascertained 
by  the  rules  applying  to  what  is  denominated  a  total  loss,  or  by  the 
rules  applying  to  a  jiartial  loss.  A  total  loss  may  be  actual  or  con- 
structive. A  constructive  total  loss  is  where  the  loss  is  not  actually 
total,  but  is  so  great  as  to  justify  the  insured  in  abandoning  the  subject 
of  insurance  or  what  remains  of  it  to  the  insurers,  and  claiming  a  total 
loss.  It  is  usual  for  insured  parties  in  cases  of  loss,  whether  actual  or 
only  constructively  total  by  abandonment,  to  surrender  what  remains 
of  the  boat  to  the  underwriters.  This  is  a  convenient  way  of  making 
certain  what  in  many  cases  would  otlierwise  be  uncertain.  The  sur- 
render, by  abandonment  of  the  wreck  or  salvage,  is  so  convenient,  and 
so  generally  adopted  in  such  cases,  that  the  question  of  an  actual  total 
loss  without  an  abandonment  arises  comparatively  seldom.  In  the 
present  case  there  has  been  no  abandonment  or  sale  of  the  part  saved 
from  the  boat,  but  it  has  been  used  in  rebuilding  a  new  boat,  or  in  re- 
pairing the  old  one ;  and  one  question  —  perhaps  I  ought  to  say  the 
question,  for  the  jury  to  determine  is,  which  of  these  two  things  has 
been  done.  Has  a  new  boat  been  built,  or  an  old  one  repaired?  As 
there  was  no  abandonment  of  the  property  saved,  no  mere  constructive 
total  loss  can  be  claimed.  But,  if  there  was  an  actual  total  loss,  the 
recovery  may  be  as  for  a  total  loss  without  any  abandonment,  credit- 
ing the  expenses  with  the  value  of  what  was  saved."  ^ 

1  Approved  in  Gerraania  Ins.  Co.  v.  2  Approved  in  Globe  Ins.    Co.   v. 

Sherlock,  25  Oh.  St.  33,  47,  48,  49.  Sherlock,  25  Ohio  St.  50,  65,  66. 


1000  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [I  Thoinp.  Tr., 


CHAPTER  XLIII. 

INTENT. 

Section 

1333.  General  Proposition. 

1334.  Exception:  Presumptions  of  Law. 

1335.  Parol  Gifts. 

1336.  Landlord  and  Tenant  —  Intent  to  Evict. 

1337.  Instructions  as  to  what  constitutes  an  Eviction  and  the  Effect  of  the 

Same. 

1338.  Whether  a  Lease  at  Will  was  Expanded  into  one  from  Year  to  Year. 

1339.  Whether  a  Contract  was  Obtained  by  Duress. 

1340.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction :  What  Duress  will  render  a  Contract  Void- 

able. 

1341.  Another  Precedent:  Action  to  Recover  Money  paid  under  Duress. 

1342.  Another  Precedent:  AVhat  Constitutes  such  Duress   as  will  avoid  a 

Deed. 

1343.  Whether  a  Husband  acted  as  Tenant  or  Servant  of  his  Wife. 

1344.  Whetlier  an  Improvement  was  made  for  Purposes  of  a  Residence. 

1345.  Purpose  for  which  Written  Instruments  were  made. 

1346.  Revocation  of  a  Will. 

1347.  Intent  to  Take  Possession  under  a  Will. 

1348.  Redemption  or  Purchase. 

1349.  Purpose  for  which  Declarations  were  made. 

1350.  Whether  a  Conveyance  was  intended  for  the  Father  or  for  the  Son. 

1351.  Whether  an  Offer  was  by  Way  of  Compromise. 

1352.  Trust  Created  by  Declarations  and  Acts. 

1353.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  under  this  Head. 

1354.  Whether  a  Transfer  was  meant  as  a  Gift  or  as  a  Bequest  for  Masses. 

1355.  Dedication  of  Land  to  Public  Uses. 

1356.  Acceptance  of  Dedication. 

1357.  Whether  Highway  Created  by  Parol  Dedication  and  User. 

1358.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  upon  this  Subject. 

1359.  Domicile  and  Residence. 

13G0.  Occupancy  and  Abandonment  under  Homestead  Laws. 

13G1.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  in  an  Action  to  Recover  a  Homestead. 

1362.  Another  Precedent:  Abandonment  of  Homestead  and  Desertion  of  Wife 

until  after  her  Death. 

1363.  Whether  there  was  an  Intent  to  Arrest. 

§  1333.   General  Proposition. —  Intent  is  alwavs  sl  oiieslion 
for  the  jury  ^  except  where  it  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  terms  or 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIII.]  INTENT.  1001 

an  unambiguous  writing,  and  then,  upon  principles  already  ox- 
plained,^  it  is  a  mere  matter  of  interpretation,  to  be  performed  by 
the  court.  This  principle  has  been  much  illustrated  in  "what  has 
preceded,  and  will  be  much  further  illustrated  in  chapters  in  this 
title  which  are  to  follow.  Some  illustrative  cases  will  also  be  given 
in  this  chapter.  Even  where  the  intent  with  which  an  agreement 
was  made  or  an  act  was  done  is  to  be  gathered  in  part  from  a  writ- 
ing and  in  part  from  oral  speech  or  extrinsic  circumstances,^  the 
well  expressed  conclusion  is:  "  When  the  intention  of  the  writer 
is  to  be  judged  of  by  the  writing,  it  is  a  question  for  the  court. 
But  when  the  meaning  is  to  be  judged  of  by  extrinsic  facts,  or 
when  the  writing  forms  part  of  a  transaction,  the  rest  of  which 
consists  of  words  spoken  or  acts  done;  or  when,  whatever  its 
meaning,  it  is  but  a  circumstance  tending  to  establish  some  other 
fact,  —  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say,  whether  the  language  was  used  in 
the  sense  imputed ;  or  what  is  the  character  of  the  entire  trans- 
action, of  which  the  writing  forms  a  part^  or  what  is  the  truth 
of  the  ultimate  fact  which  it  tends  to  prove.  In  these  cases  the 
writing  must  go  to  the  jury,  to  be  considered  with  the  other  evi- 
dence.^ 

§  1334.  Exception:  Presumptions  of  Law. — To  the  fore- 
going an  exception  arises  in  a  limited  class  of  cases,  generally 
arising  in  the  criminal  law,  where  the  law  conclusively  imputes 
an  intent  to  the  doing  of  a  certain  act, — as,  for  instance,  the 
intent  to  steal,  from  the  recent  unexplained  possession  of  stolen 
goods,  about  which  judicial  authority  is  not  uniform.* 

§  1335.  Parol  Gifts. — What  the  terms  of  a  parol  gift  or 
grant  of  a  chattel  were,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  to  be 
gathered  from  all  that  was  said  and  done,  and  not  a  question  of 
law  for  the  court. ^  In  a  contest  touching  the  title  to  a  chattel, 
whether  it  was  given  or  loaned  to  one  of  the  parties,  is  of  course 

1  Ante,  §  1065,  et  seq.  *  Post,  §  2534,  et  seq. 

^Ante,^^  1083.  108(3,  1098,1113.  ^  Halbert  v.  Halbert,    21    Mo.  277, 

3  Winter  v.  Norton.  1   Ore.  42,  45,  283,  284. 
opiuion  by  Ulney,  o. 


1002  PROVINCE    OF   COURT  AND  JURY.      [  1  Thoiiip    Tr., 

a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury ;  and  in  such  a  case,  the  gift  being  by 
parol  if  it  exist,  the  court  should  instruct  the  jury  as  to  what  in 
law  is  necessary  to  the  parol  gift  of  a  chattel.^     The  title  to 
goods  and  chattels  may  pass  by  gift  inter  vivos,  where  there  is  a 
delivery  of  the  property.     Mere  delivery   of  the  property  will 
not,  in  general,  pass  title.     There  must  be  an  intention  to  give 
accompanying  the  act  of  delivery,  in  order  to   consummate  the 
gift;   or  the  circumstances  authorizing  the  delivery  of  the  goods 
must   be  such  as    ordinarily  accompany   a   gift,    inducing   the 
donee  to  believe  that  a  gift  was  intended.     If  that  be  the  case, 
the  title  to  the  goods  will  pass,  although  it  may  not  be  the  secret 
intention  of  the  donor  to  make  the  gift.^     "When  a  son  or  daugh- 
ter marries  and  is  about  setting  up  a  separate  establishment,  and 
the  father  provides  the  necessary  outfit  for  housekeeping,  such 
as  proper  furniture  for  the  dwelling  house,  and  delivers  the  pos- 
session to  the  son  or  daughter,  without  qualification  or  reservation 
made  at  the  time,  —  the  presumption  arises  that  the  transaction 
is  a  gift,  prompted  by  natural  affection  for  the  daughter,  and  this 
presumption  should  prevail.     But  it  is  a  presumption  of  fact  for 
the  jury,  and  not  one  of  law  for  the  court,  and  is  hence  liable  to 
be  rebutted  by  other  evidence  showing  that  the  donor  did  not  so 
consider  it.     It  is  said  to  be  a  presumption  of  fact,  because  such 
conduct  is  universally  considered  as  denoting  a  gift  of  chattels.^ 
Where  an  intestate  promised  to  pay  the  plaintiff,  who  was  his 
sister,  after  his  death,  a  certain  sum  per  year,  for  the  time  dur- 
ing which  she  should  live  with  him  and  keep  house  for  him,  and 
the  consideration  was  understood  by  the  parties  to  be  in  part  for 
the  services  to  be  rendered  by  her,  and  in  part  a  desire  to  make 
her  a  mortuary  gift  from  motives  of  affection, —  it  was  held  that 
it  was  a  question    for   tlie  jury  what  portion  of  the  stipulated 
sum  vras  to  be  paid  in  consideration  of  her  services,  and  what 
portion  as  a  mere  gratuity ;  that  she  was  entitled  to  recover  the 
former,  but  not  the  latter;   since  the  right  to  the  former  rested 
upon  a  good  consideration,  but  the  recovery  of  the  latter  wou!d 

1  Respassv.  Young,  11  Ga.  114.  »  Ibid.  155. 

2  Belts  V-  Francis,  30   N     J.  L   152, 
154. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIII.]/ 


INTENT. 


1003 


contravene  the  policy  of  the  statute  of  wills;   and  that  the  jury 
should  have  been  specifically  instructed  to  this  effect.^ 

§  1336.  Landlord  and  Tenant — Intent  to  Evict.  — To  con- 
stitute an  eviction  of  a  tenant  by  his  landlord,  such  as  will  create 
a  suspension  of  rent,  it  is  not  necessary  that  there  should  be  an 
actual  physical  expulsion  from  any  part  of  the  premises ;  '  but 
any  act  of  a  permanent  character,  done  by  the  landlord,  or  with 
his  procurement,  with  a  view  of  depriving  the  tenant  of  the  en- 
joyment of  the  premises   demised,  or  any  part  of  them,   will 


1  Frost  V.  Frost,  33  Vt.  G39.  lu 
Kellogg  V.  Adams,  51  W^is.  141,  there 
Is  a  long  series  of  iustructious,  ap- 
plicable to  a  state  of  facts  where  a 
father  gave  a  piauo  to  his  iufaut 
daughter  and  afterwards  mortgaged 
it,  and  subsequently  a  contest  arose 
with  the  mortgagee  as  to  the  title. 

2  Hall  V.  Burgess,  5  Barn.  &  Cres. 
332;  Upton  v.  Townend,  17  C.  B.  30; 
s.  c.  33  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  212;  Morse  v. 
Goddard,  13  Mete.  (Mass.)  177;  Pfund 
V.  Herlinger,  10  Phila.  13;  Royce  v. 
Ouggenheim,  106  Mass.  201;  Skally  v. 
Shute,  132  Mass.  3G7;  Pendleton  v. 
Dyett,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  581 ;  s.  c.  8  Cow. 
(N.  Y.)  727;  Cohen  v.  Dupont,  1  Sandf. 
S.  C.  (N.  Y.)  260;  Rowbotham  v. 
Pearce,  5  Houst.  (Del.)  135.  From 
these  and  other  cases  the  question 
would  seem  to  be.  not  so  much  whether 
the  landlord  has  done  acts  which  de- 
prive the  tenant  of  the  beneficial  enjoy- 
ment of  the  premises,  as  contemplated 
by  the  contract,  and  which  therefore 
constitute,a  breach  of  contract  on  his 
part,  which  is  tantamount  to  an  evic- 
tion,—  as  whether  the  landlord  has 
done  such  acts,  inconsistent  with  the 
contract,  as  will  justify  the  tenant  in 
abandoning  the  premises  and  refusing 
the  payment  of  rent;  for  it  is  conceded 
that,  notwithstanding  the  unfriendly  or 
injurious  acts  of  the  landlord,  so  long 


as  the  tenant  remains  in  possession,  he 
must  continue  to  pay  rent.  See  the 
following  cases :  Elliot  v.  Aiken,  45 
N.  H.  35;  Gilhooly  v.  Washington,  4 
N.  Y.  217;  Wilson  v.  Smith,  5  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  379;  Rogers  v.  Ostrom,  35 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  523;  De  Witt  v.  Pier- 
son,  112  Mass.  8;  Newby  v.  Sharpe,  8 
Ch.  Div.  39;  Burn  v.  Phelps,  1  Stark. 
94;  Levitzky  v.  Canning,  33  Cal.  299; 
Greton  i'.  Smith,  33  N.  Y.  245;  Grab- 
benhorst  v.  Nicodemus,  42  Md.  236; 
Scott  V.  Simons,  54  N.  H.  428;  Boston 
&c.  R.  Co.  V.  Ripley,  13  Allen  (Mass.), 
421;  Jackson  v.  Eddy,  12  Mo.  209; 
Peck  V.  Hiler,  24  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  178; 
Lawrence  v.  French,  25  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
443;  Leadbeter  v.  Roth,  25  111.  587. 
Compare  Halligan  v.  Wade,  21  111. 
470.  It  seems  that  anciently  an  evic- 
tion could  only  result  from  the  judg- 
ment of  a  court  of  law  in  favor  of  the 
party  claiming  under  a  paramount 
title;  but  latterly  the  word  "evic- 
tion "  has  come  .to  be  regarded  as 
substantially  synonymous  with  onster. 
Formerly  the  evidence  was  matter  of 
record;  now  it  may  be  shown  by 
pai'ol.  Hamilton  v.  Cutts,  4  Mass. 
348;  Morse  v.  Goddard,  13  Metc= 
(Mass.)  177.  See  Gore  v.  Brazier,  3 
Mass.  523;  Smith  v.  Shepherd,  15 
Pick.  (Mass:)  147;  Briggs  v.  Hall,  4 
Leigh  tVa«),  484. 


1004  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1   Thoilip.  Tl'.,. 

operate  as  such  an  eviction;  and  it  is  for  tJte  jury  to  say  whether 
the  act  was  done  by  the  hxndlord,  and  whether  it  was  done  with 
the  intention  of  depriving  the  tenant  of  the  enjoyment  of  the 
premises.^ 

§  1337.  Instructions  as  to  what  Constitutes  an  Eviction  and  the 
Effect  of  the  Same.  —  "  Physical  and  forcible  expulsion  is  not  neces- 
sary to  produce  an  eviction ;  but  any  act  on  the  part  of  the  landlord 
which  deprives  the  tenant  of  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  premises, 
amounts  to  an  eviction.     This  is  so,  if  the  act  was  done  in  violation  of 

the  rights  of  the  tenant." "  The  principle  upon  which  a  tenant 

is  required  to  pay  rent,  is  the  beneficial  enjoyment  of  the  premises,  un- 
molested in  any  way  by  the  landlord  ;  any  if  the  jury  believe  from  the 
evidence  in  this  suit,  that  the  plaintiff  took  possession  of  any  part  of 
the  premises  leased  by  her  to  the  defendants,  against  their  consent,  then 
in  law  it  is  an  eviction,  and  releases  the  defendants  from  the  payment 

of  any  more  rent,  and  they  will  find  for  the  defendants, Forcible 

expulsion  is  not  necessary  to  cause  an  eviction  ;  any  act  done  in  viola- 
tion of  the  rights  of  the  tenant,  without  his  consent,  will  amount  to  an 
eviction.  If  the  jury  believe,  in  this  case,  that  the  plaintiff,  after 
making  this  lease,  without  the  consent  of  the  defendants,  took  posses- 
sion of  a  part  of  said  demised  premises,  — then  in  law,  it  is  an  eviction, 

and  they  will  find   for  the  defendants. It  is  an  eviction  to   take 

from  the  tenant  some  part  of  the  demised  premises  of  which  he  was  in 
possession  ;  and  if  the  jury  in  this  case,  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that 
the  plaintiff,  without  the  consent  of  the  defendants,  took  possession  of 
any  material  part  of  the  <lemised  premises,  then  the  defendants  are  re- 
leased from  the  payment  of  all  rent,  and  the  jury  will  find  for  the  de- 
fendants.   If   the  jury   believe,  from  the  evidence  in   this   case, 

that  the  premises  leased  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants,  or  a  part  of 
the  same,  were  enclosed  by  a  fence,  and  had  on  the  same  a  brick  build- 
ing, and  that  the  plaintiff  took  possession  of  said  building  and  used  it  as 
a  stable,  and  took  possession  of  the  yard  and  used  it  as  a  cattle  yard, 
without  the  consent  of  the  defendants,  then,  in  law,  it  is  an  eviction, 
and  releases  the  defendants  from  the  payment  of  any  more  rent ;  and 

1  Upton  V.  Townend,  17  C.  B.  30;  concrete  instruction  on  the  hypothesis 
s.  c.  33  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  212,  221 ;  Hen-  of  an  eviction  by  the  fact  of  a  portion 
derson  v.  Mears,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  636.  of  the  demised  land  being  taken  posses- 

2  Approveil  inPricer.'Railroad  Co.,  sion  of  by  a  railway  company  and  its 
34111.17,18     This  case  also  contains  a  tracli  laid  thereon. 


Tit.   V,  Ch.   XLIII.J  iKTEXT 

de^en,.,., ,_.  a  pan  of  L/";:[:::  izf  H  ^rw^^': 

hastaken  possession  o(  the  same,  a„d  built  a  railroad  over  the  'ale 
then,  mlaw,  this  is  an  eviction,  and  releases  the  defendants  frontTh' 

Z::r'-*"  ""*■  rf  '"■'^•"^  -""  "■^"^ordefelda  s  .  !  it 
thoiign  the  jury  may  believe,  from  the  evi(leii,.p    .l,„t  ti       ,  ,     , 

have  never  been  disturbed  in,  or  evicted  fran    he'n  '=',*"'"'"•"'' 

leased  premises,  and  that  the'/ have  had  th  ,  e  a"d  Joy  t?  o^f"  t 
same  tdl  .f  they  further  believe,  from  the  evidence,  t  at\  "  plaLtffl 
bas  taken  possession  of  any  material  nn.■^nfoo•1  i      ■     Z^' ^"*^  P'^i»tilt 

outtheconsent  Of  thedefeL,an"t  Ci'rtt'i:'?'"^' :.''■'• 
and  the  defendants  are  not  bound  to  pay  any  rent  f„      ,         T'?","' 

::f:rt::t^"-  --"  -  -™'-'  -  -~  i^i'VuTfoi  z 

§1338     Whether  a    Lease  at  Will    was  expanded   into  one 

and  accepted  annually  according  to  its  terms,  _  it  was  held  t     t 

under  proper  mstructions.^  "lejuit/ 

§  1330.   Whether  a    Contract  was  Obtained  by  Duress 

^  Approved    iu   Smith  ».  Wise    ks      qi  r?   o-t     t. 
^1^   U3,  lU.     Citing  Wade  J    HUli        w      ,  f '  r""'"""^  "•  ^"^'  ^^  ^'^-  ^l*; 

21   liL  480;  Anderson  .°Chic;.o  Ma'      2-2      ^^" ''    ^"*^^^^^^'   ^^^  Pa     St. 

r^i^.^^,^;:  ^-f -rL^^:  J --^^  ''•  -^-.s.  ^o  Pa.  s. 


1006  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JurjY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

guage  which  the  evidence  tends  to  show  was  used,  must  be  of   a 
character  which  in  hiw  may  amount  to  duress. 

§  1340.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction:  What  Duress  will  ren- 
der A  Contract  Voidable.  —  "A  contract  made  under  compulsion 
may  be  avoided  by  the  party  by  whom  it  was  executed.  Compulsion, 
hovvever,  to  have  this  effect,  must  amount  to  what  the  law  calls  duress. 
Mere  angry  or  profane  words,  or  strong  earnest  language,  cannot  con- 
stitute such  compulsion  as  will  amount  to  duress,  or  enable  a  party  to 
be  relieved  from  his  contract.  There  may,  however,  be  duress  by 
threats.  Duress  by  threats  does  not  exist,  wherever  a  party  has  entered 
into  a  contract  under  the»influence  of  a  threat,  but  only  where  such 
threat  excites,  or  may  reasonably  excite,  a  fear  of  some  grievous 
wrong,  as  bodily  injury  or  unlawful  imprisonment."  ^ 

§  1341.  Another  Precedent:  Action  to  Eecover  Monet  Paid  Un- 
der Duress.  —  "  The  rule  in  this  class  of  cases  is,  that  where  a  pay- 
ment of  money  is  made  upon  an  illegal  or  unjust  demand,  when  the 
party  is  advised  of  all  the  facts,  it  can  only  be  considered  involuntary 
when  it  is  made  to  procure  the  release  of  the  person  or  property  of  the 
party  from  detention,  or  when  the  other  party  is  armed  with  apparent 
authority  to  seize  upon  either,  and  the  payment  is  made  to  prevent  it. 
But  where  the  person  making  the  payment  can  only  be  reached  by  a 
proceeding  at  law,  he  is  bound  to  make  his  defense  in  the  first  instance, 
and  he  cannot  postpone  the  litigation,  by  paying  the  demand  in  silence 
and  afterwards  suing  to  recover  it  back."  ^ 

§  1342.  Another  Precedent:  What  Constitutes  such  Duress  as 
WILL  Avoid  a  Deed.  —  "To  constitute  duress  which  would  avoid  the 
deed,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the  threats  be  of  physical  injury  alone; 
but  if  the  plaintiff,  the  wife  of  Tapley,  was  induced  to  execute  the  deed 
by  the  threats  of  Tapley,  her  husband,  that  he  would  separate  from  her 
as  her  husband,  and  not  support  her,  it  is  duress  and  would  avoid  the 
deed.     The  threats  must  be  such  as  she  might  reasonably  apprehend 

1  Approved  in  Adams   v.  Strhiger,  2  Approved  in  Licbor  v.  Wciden,  17 

78  Ind.    180,   181;    citing   Bennett   v.  Neb.  584;  citing  Mundy  u.  Whittemore, 

Ford,  47  Ind.   2(i4;    Bush  v.  Brown,  15  Neb.   647;    King  v.    Williams,   21 

49  Ind.   573;  CofCett  v.  Wise,  02  Ind.  N.    W.  Rep.  (la.)   502;  Maxwell's  PI. 

451;  Reynolds    v.  Copeland,  71    Ind.  and  Pr.  (3rd  ed.)  104. 
422;  Tucker  v.  State,  72  Ind.  242. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIII.]  INTENT.  1007 

would  be  carried  into  execution,  and  the  act  must  have  been  induced 
by  the  threats.  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  threats  be  made  at  the 
time,  or  immediately  before  signing,  if  it  was  within  such  time,  and  the 
circumstances  satisfy  you  that  the  threats  or  its  influence  properly  con- 
tinued and  influenced  the  plaintiff."  ^ 

§  1343.  AVhether  a  Husband  Acted  as  Tenant  or  Servant  of 
hisAVife.  —  Whether  a  husband,  carrying  on  a  farm  owned  by 
his  wife  and  held  by  her  to  her  own  use,  occupying  with  her  the 
dwelling  house  thereon,  taking  the  crops  annually,  and  having 
the  general  management  of  the  premises,  is  tenant  or  servant  of 
the  wife,  is  a  question  of  fact,  on  which  there  is  no  presumption 
of  law  changing  the  burden  of  proof  .^ 

§  1344.  Whether  an  Improvement  was  Made  for  the  Pur- 
poses of  a  Residence.  — Under  pre-emption  laws  in  Pennsylvania, 
it  has  been  held  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury,  whether  an  improve- 
ment upon  land  was  made  for  the  purposes  of  a  continued  resi- 
dence, —  the  question  involving  the  intent  of  the  improver.^ 

§  1345.  Purpose  for  which  Written  Instruments  were 
made.  — In  an  action  upon  a  state  of  facts  (which  need  not  be 
set  out),  it  was  held  a  question  for  the  jury  to  decide  the  pur- 
pose for  which  an  agreed  statement  o/y^^c^s  was  made, —  whether 
with  the  view  to  a  reference,  or  as  a  statement  to  be  laid  before 
the  insurers  in  respect  of  a  loss  which  had  happened,^  —  apply- 
ing the  general  rule  that  questions  of  intent  are  for  a  jury.  So, 
where  the  trustee  of  an  insurance  company  made  a  note,  but  not 
for  the  purpose  ostensibly  put  forth,  and  there  was  a  lawful 
purpose  for  which  it  might  have  been  given,  of  the  same  charac- 

1  Approved  in  Tapley  v.  Tapley,  10  Morse  «.  Mason,  103  Mass.  560;  Delano 

Minn.  458;  citing  2  Greeul.  Ev.,  §  301;  v.  Goodwin,  48  N.  H.  203;  Caswell   v. 

5  Denio,  157;  1  Story  Eq.  Jur.,  §  239;  Hill,  47  N.  H.  407;  Houston  v.  Clark, 

1  Pars.  Cout.  395.  50   N.  H.  479.     Similarly,  agency  and 

-  State  V.  Hayes,  59  N.  H.  450,     The  authority  are    generally  questions  of 

court  say :  "  If  the  contrary  rule  is  laid  fact.     Post,  §  1308,  et  seq. 

down  in  Albin  v.  Lord  (39  N.  H.  196,  ^  Jones  v.  Brownfleld,  2  Pa.  St.  55. 

205),  it  cannot  be  sus*;ained."     Cora-  •*  Knight  v.  New  England  Worsted 

pare  Noyes  v.  Hemphill,  58  N.  H.  53G;  Co.,  2  Cush.  (Mass.)  272. 


1008  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

ter  as  that  put  forth,  —  it  was  held  a  question  for  a  jury  whether 
it  was  given  for  the  hiwful  or  for  the  unlawful  and  fraudulent 
purpose.^  So,  where  &  paper  was  given  to  the  common  agent  of 
two  insurance  companies,  on  the  refusal  of  the  agent  to  pay  a 
thousand  dollars,  admitted  to  be  due  on  a  policy  of  one  of  the 
companies,  unless  plaintiff  w  ould  sign  the  paper,  it  was  held  that 
the  jury  must  determine  whether  it  was  supported  by  a  consider- 
ation as  against  the  other  company.'^ 

§  1346.  Revocation  of  a  Will.  —  Revocation  is  a  question  of 
intendoii,  and  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  that  intention,  by 
any  act  done  or  believed  to  have  been  done.  The  act  done  or 
aimed  to  be  done,  as  well  as  the  purpose  at  the  time  at  which 
it  was  done,  are  matters  of  fact  for  a  jury,^  and  may  be  es- 
tablished as  other  facts,  by  one  credible  witness,  or  by  con- 
vincing circumstances.  It  is  also  said,  without  the  question 
being  reasoned,  and,  it  is  suggested,  with  doubtful  propriety, 
that  "  what  facts  amount  to  a  revocation  is  of  course  a  question 
of  law."  ^  From  the  statement  of  the  rule  that  revocation  is  a 
question  of  intention, — that  some  act  must  have  been  done 
clearly  indicating  an  intention  to  revoke  the  existing  will,  suph 
as  cancellation,  destruction,  removal  from  the  hands  of  the  per- 
son with  whom  it  may  have  been  lodged,  or  the  like,  — ^  it  almost 

1  Brouwer  v.  Hill,  1  Sanclf.  S.  C.  Clark,  34  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  140;  Johnson u. 
(N.  Y.)  G30.  Brailsford,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  282; 

2  Western  Massachusetts  Ins.  Co.  Means  v.  Moore,  3McCorcl  (S.  C),  282; 
«.  Duffey,  2  Kan.  348.  Smith   v.  Dolby,  4   Harr.  (Del.)    350; 

3  Burns  v.  Burns,  4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  White  v.  Casten,  1  Jones  L.  (N.  C.) 
295;  Smiley  v.  Gambill,  2  Head  197;  Barker  v.  Bell,  46  Ala.  216;  Timon 
(Tenn.),  164,  168.  v.  Claffey,  45  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  438;  Burns 

4  Smiley  v.  Gambill,  2  Head  v.  Burns,  4  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.)  295; 
(Tenn.),  164,  168.  Cliugau  v.  Mitcheltree,  31  Pa.  St.  25; 

^  1  Jarm.  Wills  (Randolph  &  Tal-  Brown  v.  Thorndike,  15  Pick.  (Mass.) 

cott's   edition),    282;    citing   Marr  v.  388;  Hi.ser.  Fincher,  10  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 

Marr,  2  Head  (Tenn.),  303;  Boy  Ian  v.  139;  Sumner  v.  Sumner,  7  Harr.  &   J. 

Meeker,   28  N.   J.    L.  274;    Mundy  v.  (Md.)  388;  Hollingshead  v.  Sturgis,  21 

Mundy,  15  N.   J.   Eq.   290;  W^right  v.  La.  An.  450;    Belt  v.  Belt,  1   Harr.  & 

Wright,  5  Ind.  389;  Gains  v.  Gains,  2  McH.  (Md.)  409;  Spoonemore  v.  Ca- 

A.    K.  Marsh.    (Ky.)    190;    Overalls.  bles,  66  Mo.  579. 
Overall,   Lit.  Sel.  Cas.  513;  Smith  v. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIIL]  intent.  1009 

conclusively  follows  that,  whether  there  has  been  a  revocation  is 
II  question  of  fact  for  a  jury,  under  proper  instructions.  AVhere 
a  will  was  found,  after  the  death  of  the  testator  and  twenty-five 
years  after  it  was  made,  in  a  barrel  among  waste  paper,  torn  or 
worn  into  pieces,  which  pieces  were  scattered,  — it  was  held  that 
the  questions  whether  the  mutilation  was  done  by  the  testator  or 
by  other  persons,  and  if  by  him,  whether  accidentally  or  inten- 
tionally, and  for  the  purpose  of  revocation,  were  questions  of 
fact  for  the  jury,^  —  a  good  illustration  of  the  general  doctrine 
on  the  subject.  It  may  be  added  that  parol  evidence  of  the  acts 
and  declarations  of  the  testator  is  admissible  to  determine 
whether  the  will,  which  was  found  torn  or  cut,  was  nmtilated  by 
the  testator,  and,  if  so,  with  the  intention  of  revoking  it.^ 

§  1347.  Intent  to  take  Possession  under  a  Will.  —  A  devisee 
who  takes  possession  under  a  will  is  estopped  from  denying  its 
validity;  but,  on  an  issue  of  devisavit  vel  non,  it  is,  for  the  jury  to 
say  whether  the  acts  of  the  devisee  show  an  intention  thus  to 
take  possession.-^ 

§  1348.  Redemption  or  Purchase. — A  purchaser  of  land  at  a 
treasurer's  sale  for  taxes  in  Pennsylvania  may,  after  the  expiration  of 
llie  two  years  prescribed  by  statute,  consent  to  receive  the  redemption 
mone}'',  though  he  is  not  obliged  to  do  so  ;  and  if  he  receives  it  as  such, 
the  transaction  will  be  a  redemption  of  the  land,  and  not  a  purchase  of 
iL;  and  whether  it  is  a  redemption  or  a  purchase  is  a  question  of  fact 
for  a  jury. 4 

§   1349.   Purpose  for  which  Declarations   were  made.  —  It 

has  been  ruled  in  Maine  that,  where  the  title  to  a  chattel  depends 
upon  whether  a  prior  sale  by  one  of  the  })arties  to  a  third  person 
was  absolute  or  conditional,  the  declarations  of  that  person,  made 
against  his  own  interest,  and  before  he  had  dis})osed  of  his  title, 
are  admissible  to  show  the  character  of  the  sale ;  that  a  mort- 

1  Lawyers.  Smith,  8  Mich.  411.  Smith,  8  Mich,  411.     See  also  Diirant 

2  Patterson   v.  Ilickey,  32   Ga.  156;  v.  Ashmore,  2  Rich.  L.  (S.  C.)  184. 
Dan  V.   Brown,  4   Cow.  (N.  Y.)    483;  ^  Lanclis  v.   Laudis,   I   Grant  Gas. 
CoUagan  v.  Burns,  57   Me.  449;    Hur-  (Pa.)  249. 

ring  V.  Allen,  25  Mich.  505;  Lawyer  v.  ♦  Cox  v.  Wolcott,  27  Pa.  St.  154. 

<'4 


1010  PROVINCE    OF    COUKT    AND    JURY.        [1  ThoDip.  Ti'., 

gagor  of  chattels  has  such  an  interest  in  the  mortgaged  property 
that  his  declarations,  disparaging  his  title,  may  be  proved  by  one 
who  claims  title  against  him  and  his  vendee;  and  that,  whether 
the  declarations  of  a  former  owner  were  made  to  prevent  his 
creditors  from  attaching  his  property,  or  in  good  faith,  is  a 
question  entirely  for  the  jury} 

§  1350.  Whether  a  Conveyance  was  Intended  for  the 
Father  or  for  the  Son.  — In  a  recent  case  in  Wisconsin,  a  con- 
veyance of  land,  in  which  Amos  W.  Cross  (then  fifteen  years 
old)  was  named  as  grantee,  was  taken  by  his  father,  Ansel  A. 
Cross,  who  i)aid  for  the  land,  had  the  deed  recorded,  and  there- 
after retained  possession  of  the  instrument  until  his  death, 
twenty-four  years  later.  The  son  did  not  know  of  the  existence 
of  a  deed,  in  which  he  was  named  as  grantee,  until  after  his 
father's  death.  In  an  action  of  ejectment,  upon  evidence  tend- 
ing strongly  to  show  that  the  father  claimed  that  there  was  a 
mistake  in  the  deed,  in  that  he  should  have  been  named  as  the 
grantee,  instead  of  his  son;  that  he  attempted  to  correct  the 
mistake  after  the  deed  was  recorded ;  that  he  took  possession  of 
the  land,  paid  the  taxes,  exercised  many  rights  of  ownership, 
claimed  the  land  as  his  property,  contracted  to  sell  it,  and  finally 
conveyed  it  in  his  own  name  after  having  had  po>^session  for 
more  than  twenty  years;  — it  was  held  that  it  was  a  duestion  for 
the  jury,  whether  the  original  conveyance  was  intended  by  the 
parties  thereto  to  run  to  the  son,  and,  if  so,  whether  it  was  delivered 
to  and  accepted  by  the  father  for  benefit  of  the  son.  Such  evi- 
dence w\as  sufficient  to  overcome  ih.Q  presumption  from  the  record, 
that  the  deed  was  duly  delivered  to  the  grantee  named  therein. ^ 

§  1351.   Whether  an  Offer  was  by  way  of  Compromise. — 

Applying  the  rule  that  jweliminary  questions  of  fact ^  which  are 
involved  in  the  decision  whether  evidence  is  competent,  must  be 
decided  by  the  court, "^  it  has  been  held  that,  in  a  proceed*ing  be- 

J  Beedy  v.  Macomber,  47  Me.  451.        stone,  37  Wis.  032,  and  Allen  v.  .\ileu 
2  Cross   V.   Barnett,    05  Wis.    431;       58  Wis.  202;  post.  §  14o2o 
distinguishing  McPherson  v.  Feather-  3  Ante,  cliap   XIII 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIIL]  intent.  1011 

fore  a  sheriff's  jury  to  assess  damages  for  the  taking  of  land  for 
a  railroad,  the  question  whether  an  offer  of  a  certain  sum  for  the 
land  was  by  way  of  compromise  so  as  to  prevent  evidence  of  such 
offer  being  competent,  was  a  question  for  the  sheriff  to  decide, 
and  not  for  the  jury.  He  was  to  decide  whether  the  offer  w^as 
made  by  way  of  compromise  or  not,  and  to  exclude  or  admit  the 
evidence  accordingly.^ 

§  1352.  Trust  created  by  Declarations  and  Acts.  —  A  trust 
in  personal  property  may  be  created  by  parol?  Whether  cer- 
tain declarations  and  acts,  tending  to  the  conclusion  that  such  a 
trust  was  intended,  did  in  fact  create  such  a  trust,  is,  in  a  case 
triable  by  a  jury,  a  question  of  fact  and  intent,  to  be  decided  by 
them.^ 

§  1353.  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  under  this  Head.  — "Where 
the  subject  of  an  alleged  trust  was  certain  promissory  notes,  which  were 
claimed  by  the  administrator  of  the  alleged  trustor,  he  denying  the  fact 
of  the  trust,  the  following  charge  to  the  jury  (omitting  certain  details 
of  fact)  was  approved  :  "  To  create  a  trust  in  property  of  this  species, 
it  is  essential  that  the  delivery  of  the  propert}^  to  the  alleged  trustee  be 
with  the  purpose  and  intent  of  passing  the  legal  estate  to  thetrustee^ 
and  vesting  in  him  the  absolute  control  over  the  property,  even  as 
against  the  person  creating  the  trust,  subject  onl}^  to  the  declared  pur- 
pose of  the  trust;  and,  if  such  an  original  owner  reserves  to  himself  or 
heirs  the  power  to  control  the  property,  and  has  only  vested  in  the  alleged 
trustee  a  possession,  without  any  intention  of  vesting  the  property  in  him, 
but  simply  for  the  purpose  of  constituting  him  her  agent  to  do  certain 
acts,  and,  at  the  same  time,  of  reserving  the  power  to  dispose  of  the 
property  at  his  or  her  will,  with  or  without  the  concurrence  of  the 
trustee, —  this  would  be  an  imperfect  trust,  and  would  not  vest  title  in  the 
trustee.  Whether  there  was  a  perfect  trust  created  in  this  case,  under 
these  instructions,  is  a  question  of  fact,  for  you  to  determine  from  the 
evidence  in  the  case.  You  are  to  say  from  the  evidence  whether  Mrs. 
White  intended  to  vest  in  Jackson  the  title  to  these  notes  and  their  pro- 
ceeds, and   to  surrender  her  own  control  over  them,  upon  the  trust  that 

1  Davis  I'.  Charles  River  &c.  R.  Co.,      342;  Calder  v.  Morau,   49    Mich. 
11  Cush.  (Mass.)  500.  Day  v.  Roth,  18  N.  Y.  448. 

''■  Bostwick    V.   3Iahaffy,   48    Mich.  3  West  u.  White,  56  Mich.  IJ  :. 


lv)12  puovixcE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

Jackson  should  provide  suitable  maintenance  for  her  during  her  life, 
and  for  other  purposes  specified,  and  reserving  to  herself  no  power  to 
control  them,  other  than  the  benefits  of  her  support,  and  no  legal  title 
to  the  property.  If  she  did,  claimant  has  no  title,  — that  is,  the  ad- 
ministrator would  take  no  title,  and  cannot  recover.  If  she  did  not, 
then  no  title  vested  in  Jackson,  and  the  administrator  is  entitled  to 
maintain  an  action  on  the  notes.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  you  find  that 
the  title  to  these  notes  vested  in  Jackson  as  trustee,  under  the  instruc- 
tions I  have  given  you,  the  complainant  will  not  be  entitled  to  any  sum, 
and  your  verdict  should  be  for  the  contestants."  ^ 

§  1354.  Whether  a  Transfer  was  meant  as  a  Gift  or  as  a 
Bequest  for  Masses.  —  Upon  a  ground  similar  to  that  which 
makes  the  fact  of  a  parol  trust  in  chattels  a  question  for  the  jury  ,2 
it  has  been  ruled,  under  circumstances,  that  the  question  whether, 
by  a  transfer  of  notes,  made  by  a  dying  man  to  a  priest,  at  the 
time  of  executing  a  will  which  was  subsequently  found  to  be  void 
by  reason  of  defective  execution,  in  which  will,  drawn  by  the  priest, 
he  had  described  himself  as  legatee, — the  deceased  intended  to 
make  a  gift  of  the  notes  to  the  priest,  or  to  transfer  them  to  him 
for  the  purpose  of  paying  his  funeral  expenses  and  having  masses 
said  for  the  repose  of  his  soul,  Avas  a  question  of  fact J^ 

§  1355.  Dedication  of  Land  to  Public  Uses.  — To  constitute 
a  valid  common-law  dedication,  there  must  be  an  intention  to 
dedicate^  an  act  of  dedication,  and  an  acceptance  on  the  part  of 
the  public*  Whether  the  owner  of  the  land  intended  to  dedicate 
it,  is,  in  general,  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^  In  passing 
upon  this  point,  the  jury  will  take  into  consideration  the  declara- 
tions as  well  as  the  acts  of  the  owner,  with  the  view  of  determin- 
ino"    his    intention ;     and    it    has    been    held    that   subsequent 

1  West  V.  White,  56  Mich.  126,  128.  Leod,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  98,  104;  Carpenter 

2  Ante,  §  1352.  v.  Gwyuu,  35  Barb.   (N.  Y.)  395;  Os- 

3  Malone  v.  Doyle,  56  Mich.  222.  wego  v.  Oswego   Canal   Co.,  G  N.  Y. 

4  Irwiui:.Dixou,9How.  (U.  S.)  10,  257;  Baker  v.  St.  Paul,  8  Minn.  491, 
30;  Baraclough  v,  Johu.sou,  8  Ad.  &  494;  Wilder  «.  St.  Paul,  12  Minn.  192, 
EI.   99,    101;  Poole  v.  Huskiusou,  11  200. 

Mees.  &W.  827,829;  Green  v.  Chelsea,  •"•  Wilder  v.  St.  Paul,  12  Minn.  192. 

24  Pick.    (Mass.)   71,  80;  Hall  r.  Mc-      209. 


Tit.  V,  Cli.  XLin.l  IVTENT 

declarations  and  acts  are  admissible,  as  tendino-  to  Pvnl  ,•        • 
intent.i     Evidence  in  nn/,  to  ,|,„  ,•       '""S  '°  explain  prior 

t,o      1     .,,    '  -^      '        "°'^-'''''^'''«>"""ofas(reet  shoiiW 

be  submitted  to  a  jury  in  all  cases;  but  the  validity  and t^ 

ecu,   ;   butif  they  depend  upon  cvi.leuce  of  user  and  n,3tlc, 
location,  they  should  be  submitted  to  the  inrv  2     p"  "' 

dedication  is  claimed  under  a  recorded  Jlt.^Ze  con.   lIi  I'l! 

d«  ,;.!         rV"''"""""  °'  ""  '"'"'  "■'-*'^"'  -■  -t  there  .^1\ 
dedication,  but  must  submit  the  question  to  the  jury .» 

§  1356.  Aoccptance  of  Dcdioation         n„  iri.„  ,      . 

held  that  the  question  whether  therLrb^e:    '^ a!::;::;. " V^ 

he  ptjblic,  IS  .«e  of  fact  for  the  jury,  in  determinin.,  Xh  the 

rs!r""  Wllr"  h"  "'f  "™^  '""'""'  "'  ''•■^™'  Dedication  and 

Z  ,  '  ~  f  """■'  ''"'  '""''  "  P^"°'  'le<licatioa  of  land  fmn 
h.ghway  and  such  a  nser  by  the  public  as  creates  a  publ  c  ri<  h"t 
against  the  o«-ner  of  the  fee,  is,  on  conflicting  test  moiiv     , 

rrr  '^^r  ""' ''  ^'"■■^•^     ^o,  in  Pennsylvani:  it  s  hXThat 
whether  a  right  of  >vay  has  been  acquired  or  not    bv  an  ,    i  ,7 
rupted  user  for  twenty-one  years,  is  a  question  foi  I    .r;"^:; 
m.on  for  damages  for  obstructing  a  private  way.-    ad    h, 

adv:::"*,::';';;:  "™^-^^-  ".'«^  -"•  •>«  i-ti^ed  in;;..:::!  • ';^'^ 

obstructing  a  highway,  it  ^as  held  er  f::  Z  c^^rrlrt 

^  Proctor  V.  Lewistou,  25  111,  153  e  ct„« 

2Statei;.Schwiu,  65Wis.207      '  44     ^^'^^  "' ^'''^■P«»ter,  37  Pa.  St.  41, 

.  3  Eastland  ..   Fogo.    58   M^is    274;  Whan'^X  W.TT"  J'n^^^^^^^^'^'   ^ 

citing  Gardiner  v.  Tisdale   2  Wis    1  ~J  J^     I'  ^      ''        '  Campbell  v.  Wilson, 

<  Wilder  ...  St.  Pa,„,"'r^  mL:.'  Ill]      L''^:\Tlsf  %?'"'''  '■  ""=^^''"' 
211.  '      .^;;  ^•^•^^-  ^31 ;  OJ^eson  V.  Patterson, 


^  Daniels  u.  People,  21  IlL  439. 


29  Pa.  St.  22. 


1014  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  Thoiup.,  Tr. , 

the  jury,  at  the  request  of  the  State,  where  the  evidence  of  the 
dedication  was  circumstantial  merely,  that  "the  evidence,  if  true, 
would  authorize  them  to  find  that  the  street  was  a  public  road, 
dedicated  to  a  public  use."  ^  In  such  a  case  it  was  said  by 
Dixon,  C.  J.:  "In  order  to  constitute  a  dedication,  it  should 
clearly  appear  that  the  highway  had  been  used  as  such  by  the 
public  with  the  assent  of  the  owner;  and  when  this  is  shown  the 
dedication  is  established.  Lapse  of  time  and  long  use  by  the 
public  as  such,  are  not  necessary  to  its  existence  ;  though,  in  the 
absence  of  more  direct  proof,  they  are  circumstances  of  more  or 
less  force,  according  to  the  facts  of  each  case,  tending  to  establish 
it.  Acts  of  an  unequivocal  nature  on  the  part  of  both  the  owner 
and  the  public,  may  establish  it  in  a  very  short  space  of  time. 
It  is  always  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  left  to  the  jury,  deciding 
upon  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case."  ^ 

§  1358.  [Continued.]  Precedent  of  an  Instruction  upon  this 
Subject.  —  "The  jury  are  instructed  that  highways  may  be  acquired 
by  dedication.  And  in  this  case,  if  the  jury  beheve,  from  the  evi- 
dence, that,  after  the  highway  in  controversy  was  located,  defendants 
set  their  hedges  back,  leaving  room  for  the  highway,  and  removed  their 
fence  from  said  highwa}^,  and  permitted  the  public  to  use  the  same  for  a 
highway, —  these  facts,  if  proven,  maybe  considered  by  the  jury  in  de- 
termining whether  the  defendants  had  dedicated  this  land  to  the  public 
for  a  highway."  ^ 

§  1359.  Domicile  and  Residence. — Domicile  and  residence 
are  questions  depending  principally  upon  fact  and  intent,  and 
therefore  they  are  generally  questions  of  fact  for  the  jury.^ 
This  principle  applies  in  cases  arising  inactions  for  divorce.^     It 

1  Sultzner  v.  State,  43  Ala.  24.  .Tun.     217,    2()1.        This    charge    was 

2  Counehau  ?;.  Ford,  9  Wis.  240,  244.      made  by  Mr.   Justice   Grier;  aud,  so 
■^  Approved    in    Wragg    v.    Peuu.      far  as  it  embodied  propositious  appli- 

Towuship,  94  111.  11,  24.  cable  to  the  general  subject  of  domi- 

*  Penusylvauia  v.  Ravenel,  21  How.  cile,  it  was  repeated  iu  a  charge  to  the 

(U.  S.  )103,  110.  jury  giveu  by  the  Circuit  Court  of  the 

^  Foss  V.  Foss,  58  N.  H.  283.     For  United  States  for  the  Eastern  District 

au  elaborate  charge  on  the  subject  of  of  Pennsylvania,  iu  the  case  of  Penn- 

domicilej  see  White  v.  Brown,  1  Wall.  sylvauia  v.  Ravenel,  21   How.  (U.  S.) 


Tit.  y,  Ch.  XLIII.l  j,-^^^.^ 

the   State,  so   thTt  the  o"d  1  J""     ''  "'f  ,  P'^-^  ""ode  in 
-0.  «P0..  ...  ,.e.„ted  ITuLCoT.:^  t^ret/"  "^ 

a.i^.  whether  the  p',.e,„.es  Z2;J^:ZT  '^7^ 
.    bolh  a  guestion  of  fad  and  intent,  it  is  supposeTtl'  h  " 

eases,  a  question  for  a  iurv  ■'     A    fi    V  '^'^  '"'' '"  ™°"* 

exempted  fro.n  execL^'i-  .el^; t^i^ L;^  '  '""^ 
so,   m   general,  it  may  be  lost  h,.  o  '1"'"'''  ''•'  o<-c"Pancy, 

though  it  isgen;rallv  hdd  thaUa  t<^n;o!::::r",  '"""''^-"'-'.• 

.^.rtenai,.,n  not  work  a  forflu    ^Tt  e    .Hr*^  Wh"'::'" 
there  has   been  miph  n,.  oK      t  uglit.      V\  hether 

question  of  Tct^ t  ^^ rritrt'  ''■;  ""°^^^^^^'  "^  - 

question  of  intent;  and  so^t-ba.:  i::!  t;;^:  ''  "™'"'' '"  "''' 

scribed  in  the  pet  iL  o,  te ^l  "ff  1^7  7"  ''"'  ""  '"-^"^^^^  "- 
tvife  were  in  (act  used  oceunied  f  ^'.  "''=J'°"<^^t'=»d  of  himself  and 
said  wife  ns  their  homestrd'unto^  "Tl^  '/  '""  '"'"""«  "-'  ^'s 
that  case  the  plaintiffrentiM  t      '  „  '     ""  "'"'  "^  •■"'"  '" 

the  plaintiff  as  to  the  ho,"  estld  •  "f      '"  ""  """'  '""''''  "■'"  "^  '«' 

"•  ^*  you  beheve  from  the 

103,  110,  which  charge  was  annmrpri      r» 

^y    ...e  supreme  Co'urt,   MrTt'     ,''"  wXcV  V'of '  *^'^  ''"""»" 

Daniel  disseutiu^.  at  ^,  '    ^    ^^^-    l^^:    Cook    t? 

'  Tiller  ..  Abernathy,  37  Mo     196       rt.f '''',n'n!   ^'''   '''  ^^^P^^^rd  ^: 

^Seethe     subject '  mscussed     "i      So^etf '  fJ^- '^ '  ^^^-     ^^  ^^^P- 
Thomp.  Homest.,  §  210,  et  sen  ««mest.,  §  2Go  et  seq. 

'  Fyffe   ...   Beers,    18    Iowa,   4     7-      Te.   T'""''"'^ '"^  ''''*°'  ^'-  ^^"^^-'  ^3 
Locke  r.  Rowell,  47  N.  H.  4G;  PotJs  .'  ' 


1016 


PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.   [1  Thonip.  Tl'., 


evidence  that  the  plaintiff  abandoned  his  wife,  and  left  her  to  shift  for 
herself,  and  that  he  failed  to  support  his  wife,  and  that  he  voluntarily 
and  without  cause  left  the  premises  used  and  occupied  as  a  homestead, 
and  that  he  absented  himself  from  said  house  and  continued  said  aban- 
donment up  to  the  death  of  his  said  wife,  —  then  and  in  that  event  3'ou 
will  find  your  verdict  in  favor  of  the  defendant."  ^ 

§    1363.    Whether  there  was    an   intent  to  arrest.  —  It  is 

said*  "  To  constitute  a  legal  arrest,  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
officer  should  touch  the  person  of  the  individual  against  whom  tlie 
jjrecept  is  issued.  It  is  sufficient  if,  upon  being  in  his  presence, 
he  tells  him  he  has  such  precept  against  him,  and  the  person 
says,  "  I  submit  to  your  authority,"  — or  uses  language  expres- 
sive of  such  submission.  But  it  is  not  every  touching  of  the  per- 
son that  will  constitute  an  arrest.  It  must  be  a  touching  wiih 
such  an  inlent.  For  instance,  an  officer  has  a  ca.  sa.  against  a 
defendant,  whom  he  meets  in  company,  and  goes  up  and  shalve 
hands  with  him,  without  a})prising  him  that  he  has  such  a  pre- 
cept,—  this  would  not  amount  to  an  arrest  unless  so  intended 
and  understood  by  the  parties.  So,  if  the  officer  meets  the  de- 
fendant in  a  public  company  or  on  the  highway,  and  notifies  him  of 
his  having  the  precept,  and  directs  him  to  meet  him  at  some  par- 
ticular place,  this  might  be  an  arrest  or  not,  as  the  parties  in- 
tended." ^  This  being  so,  whether  there  was  an  actual  arrest 
will  in  most  cases  be  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 


1  Approved  in  Hector  v.  Knox,  G3 
Texas,  G15. 

2  Jones  u,  Joues,  13  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 
448.  See  also  Joues  v.  Jones,  1  Joues 
L.  (N.  C.)  491.  See  generally,  as  to 
what  words  or  acts  constitute  au  ar- 
rest: Goldt?.  Bissell,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
210,  215;  Huntington  v.  Blaisdell,  2 
N.H.  318;  Huutiugtouw.  Shultz,  Harp. 
(S.  C.)  453;   United  States  v.  Beuner, 


Baldw.  (U.  S.)  234,  239;  Field  v.  Ire- 
laud,  21  Ala.  240;  Emery  v.  Chesley, 
18  N.  H.  198;  Whitehead  v.  Keyes,  3 
Allen  (Mass.),  495;  Strout  v.  Gooch,  8 
Me.  127;  Courtoy  v.  Dozier,  20  Geo. 
3(59;  State  v.  Mahou,  3  Harr.  (Del.) 
568;  Tracy  w.  Whipple,  8  Johns.  (N. 
Y.)     379. 

3  Jones  V.  Jones,  13  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 
448. 


Tit.  V,  Cb.  XLIV.]  AUTHOKiTY :  agency:  ratification.    1017 


CHAPTER    XLIV. 

AUTHORITY:  AGENCY:  RATIFICATION. 
Section 
13(38.  AVhen  Relatiou  of  Principal  ami  Ageut  Exists. 
1309.  Character  iu  Which  a  Persou  holds  Money, 

1370.  Scope  of  Agent's  Anthority. 

1371.  Notice  of  a  Limitation  upon  an  Agent's  Autliority. 

1372.  "Wliether  a  Factor  obeyed  his  Instrnctions. 

1373.  Whether  a  Warehouseman  received  Goods  as  the  Ageut  of  the  Carrier 

or  as  the  Agent  of  the  Vendee. 
137-4.  Authority  to  Give  Notice  on  behalf  of  a  Surety  to  Proceed  against  Prin- 
cipal Debtor. 

1375.  Whether  an  Agent  had  the  Implied  Power  to  boi-row  Money. 

1376.  Act  of  Street  Commissioner  in  maliiug  Repairs. 

1377.  Authority  of  Station  Agent. 

1378.  General  Authority  of  Bauli  Cashier. 

1379.  Authority  of  Husbaud  to  employ  Attorney  for  Wife. 

1380.  Whether  the  Act  of  a  Copartner  is  within  the  Scope  of  the  Business. 

1381.  Ratification  Generally  a  Question  of  Fact. 

1382.  When  a  Question  of  Law  and  when  of  Fact. 

1383.  An  Illustration. 

138i.  Instruction:  Autliority  of  Agent  of  an  Insurance  Company  to  Receive 
Notice  of  Additional  Insurance  in  Action  on  Policy. 

1385.  Instruction:  Authority  of  a  Bi'oker  for  the  Purpose  of  Signing  Bought 

and  Sold  Notes. 

1386.  Instruction:  Want  of  Authority  of  a  Canvassing  Book  Agent  to  Re- 

ceive Payments  from  Subscribers. 

1387.  Instruction:  Notice  to  Agent,  when  Notice  to  Principal. 

§   1368.   When  Relation  of  Principal  and  Agent  exists. 

Whether  the  rehition  of  principal  and  agent  exists  is  a  question 
of  fact  for  a  jury.^  While  this  question  is  not  concluded  by  the 
statement  of  the  alleged  agent, ^  yet  evidence  tending  to  show 

J  Schoelkopf  v.   Leonard,   8    Colo.  App.  2G3;    Schlesinger   v.  Texas   &c. 

159;  Robinson  v.  Walton,  58  Mo.  38;  R.  Co.,  13  Mo.  App.  471;  s.  c.  affirmed, 

Middleton  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R.  Co.,  87  Mo.  146. 

62  Mo.  579,  581;  Barrett  v.  Indiauapo-  '  Barrett  v.  Indianapolis  &c.  R.  Co., 

lis   &c.  R.  Co.,  9  Mo.  App.  220;  Wat-  9  Mo.  App.  226. 
son  V.  Hoosac  Tunnel  Line  Co.,  13  Mo. 


1018  PKOviNCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

that  he  held  himself  out ^  with  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the 
assumed  principal,  as  having  authority  to  act  for  him  in  the 
manner  in  which  he  did  act,  is  sufficient  to  take  the  question  to 
the  jury.^ 

§  1369.   Character  in  which  a  Person  holds  Money. — The 

character  in  which  a  person  holds  money,  whether  for  himself 
or  for  another,  or  for  which  of  two  contending  parties  he  holds 
it,  is  manifestly  a  question  for  a  jury .  This  is  well  illustrated 
by  an  English  case,  where  W.,  being  indebted  to  the  plaintiffs, 
and  unable  to  pay  them,  agreed  with  the  defendants  that  they 
should  discount  bills,  to  be  drawn  by  W.  and  accepted  by  the 
plaintiffs,  tor  £2,500.  The  plaintiffs  handed  the  acceptances  to 
the  defendants.  The  defendants'  manager  asked  the  plaintiffs 
when  they  required  the  money.  The  plaintiffs  said  they  did  not 
want  the  money  until  the  next  day,  but  afterwards  said  they 
would  take  £2,000  that  evening.  The  manager  said  he  would 
not  hand  the  check  for  that  amount  to  the  plaintiffs,  but  would 
give  it  to  W.'s  clerk,  and  that  he  should  require  W.'s  order  for 
the  payment  of  the  balance.  W.'s  clerk  got  the  check  for 
£2,000,  and  handed  it  to  the  plaintiffs,  and  the  plaintiffs,  on  the 
same  evening,  handed  to  the  defendants  an  order  by  W.  for  pay- 
ment of  the  balance  to  the  plaintiffs.  It  was  held  that  it  was  a 
question  for  a  jury  whether,  at  the  time  of  lodging  the  order, 
the  defendants  held  the  money  for  the  plaintiffs  and,  not  for  W.^ 

§  1370.  Scope  of  Agent's  Authority.  — The  scope  of  an  agent's 
authority,  where  such  authority  is  conferred  in  writing,  is  a  ques- 
tion of  lavj  for  the  court. ^  In  like  manner  it  has  been  held  that 
upon  ascertained  facts,  the  'question  whether  authority  to  receive 
notice  is  within  the  scope  of  the  duties  of  an  agent,  is  a  question 
of  law  for  the  court.*     "  If  the  authority  of  an  agent  be  by  at- 

1  Watson  V.  Hoosac  Tuuuel  Line  sidge  v.  Broadbeut,  4  Hurl.  &  N.  002. 
Co.,  13  Mo.  App.  2(]3.  3  Nofsiuger   v.   lliug,    4    Mo.  App. 

2  Xoble  V.  National  Discount  Co.,      oZG. 

5  Hurl.  &  N.  225.     Compare  Lilley  v.  *  Mobile  &c.  K.    Co.   v.  Thomas,  42 

Hays,    5  Ad.   &    El.    548;    Walker   v.      Ala.  G72. 
liostrou,   y    Mees.  &    W.    411;    Liver- 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIV.]  authority:   agency:  ratification.    1019 

torney,  or  other  writing,  the  instrument  itself  must  in  general  be 
produced,  and,  since  the  construction  of  writings  belongs  to  the 
court,  and  not  to  the  jury,  the  fact  and  the  scope  of  the  agency 
are,  in  such  cases,  questions  of  laiv,  and  are  properly  decided  by 
the  judge."  But  '<  in  all  instances  where  the  authority,  whether 
general  or  special,  is  to  be  implied  from  the  conduct  of  the  prin- 
cipal, or  where  the  medium  of  proof  of  agency  is  per  testes,  the 
jury  are  to  judge  of  the  credibility  of  witnesses,  and  of  the  im- 
plications to  be  made  from  their  testimony."  ^  Again,  it  is  said: 
*'  In  most  cases,  if  not  in  all,  the  question  of  agency  is  a  matter 
of  fact  y  which  it  is  the  province  of  a  jury  to  determine  u})on,  un- 
der the  instructions  of  the  court ;  and  if  the  testimony  tends  to 
prove  that  the  person  acting  as  agent  had  authority  from  his 
principal  to  do  the  act,  then  it  is  manifest  that  the  court  cannot 
exclude  from  the  jury  the  act  itself,  without  overstepping  the 
law  of  its  dutv  and  assumino:  to  determine  a  matter  which  belongs 
to  the  jury,  to  wit:  the  authority  of  the  agent  to  do  the  act. 
The  correct  rule  is  this:  If  there  is  no  proof  whatever  tending 
to  prove  the  agency,  the  act  may  be  excluded  from  the  jury  by 
the  court;  but  if  there  is  any  evidence  tending  to  prove  the  au- 
thoritvof  the  ao;ent,  then  the  act  cannot  be  excluded  from  them, 
for  they  are  the  judges  of  the  sufficiency  and  weight  of  the  tes- 
timony." 2 

§   1371.  Notice   of    Liinitatiou  upon  Agent's   Authority.  — 

Where  an  agent  makes  a  contract  within  the  apparent  scope  of 
hiH  authority,  he  binds  his  principal,  although  in  point  of  fact  he 
may  have  exceeded  his  authority,  — that  is,  acted  contrary  to  his 
principal's  instructions.  In  such  a  case,  if  the  principal  w^ould 
escape  liability  upon  the  contract  thus  made  by  the  agent, 
it  is  necessary  for  him  to  show  that  the  other  contracting  party 
knew  of  the  limitation  upon  the  agent's  authority;   and  whether 

1  London  Savings  Fund  Soc.  v.  Ha-  Krebs  v.  O'Grady,  23  Ala.  732;  Thayer 
gerstown Savings  Bank,  36  Pa.  St.  498,  v.  Boston,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  511,  oKi; 
502,  503,  opinion  by  Woodward,  J.  Gilpatrick  v.  Biddeford,  51   Me.  182; 

2  McClung's  Executors  v.  Spotts-  Fislier  v.  Stevens,  10  111.  397;  Hart  u. 
wood,  19  Ala.  li]5,  170,  opinion  l)y  Dar-  Girard,  5G  Pa.  St.  23,  28. 

gou,  C.    J.     To  the  same   effect,  see 


1020  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1    Thomp.  Tl'., 

the  other  contracting  party  had  such  knowledge  or  not,  is  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  for  a  jury,  to  be  submitted  to  them  under  proper 
instructions.^ 

§  1372.  Whether   a   factor  Obeyed   his    Instructions.  —  A 

factor  must  strictly  follow  the  instructions  of  his  principal,  and 
any  departure  from  them  will  be  at  his  own  risk.  If,  with  proper 
care  and  diligence  and  in  good  faith,  he  carries  out  the  orders  of 
his  principal,  and  a  loss  nevertheless  occurs,  it  will  fall  upon  the 
principal ;  and  whether  he  has  obeyed  or  disobeyed  the  instruc- 
tions of  his  principal,  will  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury ;  ^  un- 
less the  instructions  are  embraced  in  a  written  instrument  of 
unequivocal  import,  in  which  case  its  meaning  must  be  declared 
by  the  court. ^ 

§  1373.  Whether  Warehouseman  Received  Goods  as  Agent 
of  the  Carrier  or  as  Agent  of  the  Vendee. — Where  the 
question  at  issue  was  the  right  of  stoppage  in  transitu^  it  was 
held  that  the  jury  should  have  been  left  free  to  determine, 
upon  all  the  evidence,  whether  the  warehouseman,  into  whose 
hands  the  goods  had  come  when  the  vendor  attempted  to  exer- 
cise the  right,  had  received  the  goods  as  the  agent  of  the  carrier 
or  as  the  agent  of  the  vendee.*  The  decision  proceeds  upon  the 
well  understood  ground,  that  the  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the 
vendee  or  to  his  agent  would  put  an  end  to  the  transitus  and  de- 
termine the  right  of  stoppage.^ 

§  1374.  Authority  to  Give  Notice  on  Behalf  of  a  Surety 
to  Proceed  Against  Principal  Debtor.  —  So,  where  there  was 
evidence  that  the  son  of  a  co-surety  gave  notice  to  the  creditor 
to  proceed  against  the  principal  debtor,  it  was  not  error  to  sub- 
mit the  question  of  his  authority  to  give  such  notice,  to  the  jury. ^ 

1  Gelviu  V.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  21  218;  Mottrara  v.  Heyer,  1  Denio  (N. 
Mo.  App.  273,  280.  Y.),   483;    Dodsou    v.   Wentworth,   4 

2  Siegerson  v.  Pomeroy,  13  Mo.  Man.  &  G.  1080;  Sawyer  v.  Joslin,  20 
620.  Vt.  172. 

3  Ante,  §  10G5.  ^  Klingensraitli    v.    Kliugeusmith's 

4  Hoover  v.  Tibbits,  13  Wis.  79,  84.      Ex.,  31  Pa.  St.  4(;0. 
^  Allan  V.  Gripper,  2  Cromp.  &  J. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIV.]   authority:   agexcy:   ratification.    1021 

§  1375.  Whether  an  Agent  had  the  implied  power  to  bor- 
row Money. — Under  coutiictiug  evidence  as  to  the  scope  and 
limits  of  the  power  of  an  agent  appointed  to  build  up  the  busi- 
ness of  his  principal  in  a  distant  city,  it  has  been  thought  proper 
to  submit  to  tJie  jury  the  question  whether  the  agent  had  implied 
power  to  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  his  principal,  — the 
court  saying:  "The  case  was  not  one  which  could  bo  de- 
termined by  the  court.  It  depended  very  much  upon  probabil- 
ities and  inferences,  and  those  were  required  to  be  dis})osed  of 
by  the  jury.  In  both  respects  the  case  was  one  which  could  not 
be  withheld  from  their  consideration;  and  their  verdict  on  this 
disputed  evidence  must  be  accepted  as  a  legal  result,  even  though 
a  different  determination  by  them  might  have  been  regarded  as 
more  consistent  with  the  entire  weightand  effect  of  the  evidence."  * 

§  1376.    Act  of  Street  Commissioner  in  Making  Repairs.  — 

In  an  action  for  damages  for  an  injury  received  ii>  consequence  of 
a  defect  in  the  street  of  a  city,  it  has  been  held  that  the  acts  of 
the  street  commissioner,  within  the  scope  of  the  trust  committed 
to  him,  are  prima  facie  the  acts  of  the  city  ;  and  that,  whether 
they  are  within  the  general  authority  conferred  upon  him,  is  a 
question  for  the  jury.'^  "  "Whether  a  particular  act,"  said 
Shaw,  C.  J.,  "operating  injuriously  to  an  individual,  was  au- 
thorized by  the  city,  by  any  previous  delegation  of  power,  gen- 
eral or  special,  or  by  any  subsequent  adoption  and  ratification  of 
particular  acts,  is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  left  to  a  juiy,  to  be 
decided  by  all  the  evidence  in  the  case."  '^ 

§  1377.  Authority  of  Station  Agent.  —  Following  the  gen- 
eral current  of  authority,  it  has  been  held  that  the  question 
whether  or  not  the  station  agent  of  a  railway  company  has,  as 
such  agent,  authority  to  bind  the  company  by  a  contract  to  fur- 
nish cars  to  a  shipper  at  his  station  at  a  particular  time,  is  one  of 
fact  and  not  of  law ;  and  hence  that  it  is  error  to  reject  testimony 

1  Bickford    v.     Mfuicr,     oC      Huu  3  Thayer    r.     Boston,    19     Pick, 

(N.   Y.),44(;,  449.  (Mass.)  511,  olG. 

'  Gilpatrick  v.   Biddeford,  ol    Me. 
132,  190. 


1022 


PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1    Thoilip.  Tv., 


offered  by  the  railway  company  to  prove  that  its  agents  had  not 
8ueh  authority,  and  to  instruct  the  jury  on  the  theory  that  such 
agents  had  such  authority  as  matter  of  hiw.^ 

§  1378.  General  Authority  of  Bank  Cashier. — The  cashier 
of  a  bank  is,  however,  an  agent  whose  general  duties  are  so  well 
established  by  the  usages  of  commerce,  that  courts  take  judicial 
notice  of  them ;  and  it  is  held  that  the  extent  of  the  general 
powers  of  the  cashier  of  a  bank  is  a  question  of  laio.  ^  In  the 
absence  of  proof  to  the  contrary,  he  will  be  presumed  to  have 
authority  to  turn  out  the  notes  and  assets  of  the  bank  in  pay- 
ment of  its  indebtedness.^  He  binds  the  bank  by  his  statements 
touching  its  ordinary  business  in  hand.  *  Under  circumstances, 
he  binds  the  bank  by  giving  false  information  to  an  inquirer,^ 
though  not  where  the  circumstances  are  such  that  it  is  not  his  of- 
ficial duty  to  give  any  information,^  as  where  he  is  not  at  the  bank 
attending  to  his  ordinary  duties.^  The  law  ascribes  to  him  power 
to  indorse  negotiable  paper  in  the  ordinary  business  of  the  bank ;  ^ 


1  Wood  V.  Chicago  &c.  R.  Co.,  59 
Iowa,  106  (Beck,  J.,  dissenting). 

2  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Troy  City  Bank, 
1  Dougl.  (Midi.)  457;  Peninsular  Bank 
V.  Hanmer,  14  Mich.  208. 

3  Kimball  t7.  Cleveland,  4  Mich.  GOC; 
Peninsular  Bank  v.  Hanmer,  14  Mich. 
208.  The  ordinary  duties  which  the 
law  ascribes  to  him  were  stated  by 
Mr.  Justice  "VVayue  in  United  States  v. 
City  Bank,  21   How.  (U.  S.)  35G,  3114. 

•4  Cochecho  Bank  v.  Haskell,  51  N. 
H.  IIG;  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Eudolf,  5 
Neb.  527;  Grant  v.  Cropsey,  8  Neb. 
205;  State  Bank  v.  Wilson,  1  Dev.  (N. 
C.)  484;  Hickok  v.  Farmers'  &c.  Bank, 
35  Vt.  47G. 

*  Manufacturers'  Bank  v.  Scofield, 
39  Vt.  590.  See,  contra,  Franklin  Bank 
V.  Steward,  87  Me.  519. 

«  Mapes  V.  Second  Nat.  Bank,  80 
Pa.  St.  1(;3;  Swift  v.  .Jewsbury,  L.  II. 
9  Q.  B.  301,  312  (reversing  s.  c.  sub 
nom.  Swift  v.  Winterbotham,  L.  H.  8 


Q.  B.  244).  See  also  Etting  v.  Com- 
mercial Bank,  7  Eob.  (La.)  459.  Com- 
pare Mackay  v.  Commercial  Bank,  L. 
R.  5  P.  C.  394;  s.  c.  43  L.  ,J.  (P.  C.)  31 ; 
Barwick  v.  English  Joint  Stock  Bank, 
L.  E.  2  Exch.  259. 

■^  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Rudolf,  5  Neb. 
527;  Bullard  v.  Randall,  1  Gray 
(Mass.),  605;  Houghton  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank,  26  Wis.  663.  But  see  Merchants' 
Bank  v.  State  Bank,  10  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
G04 ;  Pendleton  v.  Bank  of  Kentucky,  1 
T.  B.  Mour.  (Ky.)  171,  182. 

8  Wild  V.  Bank  of  Passamaquoddy, 
3  Mason  (U.  S.),  505;  Fleckuer  v.  U. 
S.  Bank,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  338;  Folger 
V.  Chase,  18  Pick.  (Mass.)  63;  Hart- 
ford Bank  v.  Barry,  17  Mass. 
93;  Bank  of  Genessee  v.  Patchin 
Bank,  19  N.  Y.  312;  Everett  v. 
United  States,  G  Porter  (Ala.),  1G6; 
Lafayette  Bank  v.  State  Bank,  4  Mc- 
Lean (U.  S.),  208;  Bank  of  U.  S.  v. 
Davis,   4   Cranch   C.  C.  (U.  S.)    533; 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIV.]  authority:   agency:  ratification.    1023 

to  sign  stock  certificates  indorsed  in  blank/  but  not  to  indorse 
strictly  non-negotiable  paper,-  especially  his  own  note;  ^  to  cer- 
tify checks  of  the  bank ;  *  to  accept  bills  drawn  upon  the  bank  ;  ^ 
to  sell  exchange  belonging  to  the  bank,*^  and  to  indorse  the  same 
for  the  purpose  of  passing  title ;  ^  and  to  guarantee  the  paper  so 
sold.^  But  he  has  no  implied  power  to  compromise  debts  due 
the  bank,''  nor  to  give  an  indemnity  to  a  sheriff,^*'  nor  to  release 
indorsers  or  sureties,"  nor  to  indorse  for  accommodation. ^■- 


Elliot  V.  Abbot,  12  N.  H.  549:  Harper 
V.  Calhoun,  7  How.  (Miss.)  203;  West. 
St.  Louis  Sav.  Bauk  v.  Sliawuee  Co. 
Bank,  95  U.  S.  557;  s.  c.  5  Rep.  33;  s.  c. 
2  Cent.  L.  J.  46;  16  Alb.  L.  J.  473; 
Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chauviu,  8  Rob. 
(La  )  49;  Robb  v.  Ross  Co.  Bank,  41 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  586;  Bissell  v.  First  Nat. 
Bauk,  69  Pa.  St.  415;  Maxwell  v. 
Planters'  Bank,  10  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
507;  State  Bank  v.  Fox,  3  Blatch. 
(U.  S.)  431 ;  Farrar  v.  Gilman,  19  Me. 
440;  Crockett  v.  Young,  1  Sraecl.  &  M. 
(Miss  )  241;  Holt  v.  Bacon,  25  Miss. 
567;  Cooper  v.  Curtis,  30  Me.  488;  St. 
Louis  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cohen,  9 
Mo.  421 ;  Kimball  v.  Cleveland,  4  Mich. 
606;  Carey  v.  McDougald,  7  Ga.  84; 
Houghton  V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  26  Wis. 
663;  Bank  of  N.  Y.  v.  Bank  of  Ohio,  29 
N.  Y.  619  (overruling  Bank  of  State  v. 
Farmers'  Branch,  36  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
332)  ;  City  Bank  v.  Perkins,  29  N.Y.  ,554. 

1  Mathews  v.  Mass.  Nat.  Bank,  1 
Holmes  (U   S.),  396. 

2  Barrick  v.  Austin,  21  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
241.  Compare  Elliot  v.  Abbot,  12 
N.  H.  549. 

3  West  St.  Louis  Sav. 
Shawnee  Co.  Bank,  95  U.  S 
5  Rep.  33;  2  Cent.  L.  J.  46; 
J.  473. 

4  Clarke  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  593;  Cooke  v.  State 
Nat.  Bank,  52  N.  Y.  96.  See  also 
Farmers'    Bank    ■;;.    Butchers'    Bauk, 


Bank  r. 
.  557;  s.  c. 
16  Alb.  L. 


Bauk,    52 


16  N.  Y.  125;  .«.  c.  4  Duer  (N.  Y.),  219; 
14  N.Y.  633;  28  N.  Y.  425;  Merchants' 
Bank  v.  State  Bank,  10  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
604. 

5  Farmers'  &c.  Bauk  v.  Troy  City 
Bank,  1  Dougl.  (Mich.)  457.  But  see 
Pendleton  v.  Bank  of  Ky.,  1  T.  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  171,  179. 

"5  Fleckner  v.  United  States  Bank,  8 
Wheat.  (U.  S.)  338,  360. 

'  Wild  V.  Bank  of  Passaraaquoddy, 
3  Mason  (U.  S.),  505;  Farmers'  &c. 
Bank  v.  Troy  City  Bauk,  1  Dougl. 
(Mich.)  457;  Robb  v.  Ross  Co.  Bauk, 
41  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  586;  Lafayette  Bank 
V.  State  Bank,  4  McLean  (U.  S.).  208; 
City  Bank  of  New'  Haven  v.  Perkins,  4 
Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  420. 

8  Sturges  V.  Bank  of  Circleville,  11 
Oh.  St.  153. 

9  Chemical  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kohner,  58 


26; 


c.   8   Daly 


How.   Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
(N.  Y.),  .530. 

"  Watson  V.  Bennett,  12  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  196. 

"  Daviess  Co.  Sav.  Asso.  v.  Sailor, 
63  Mo.  24;  s.  c.  3  Cent.  L.  J.  488;  8 
Chi.  L.  N.  332;  Cochecho  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Haskell,  51  N.  H.  116;  Payne  v.  Com. 
Bank,  6  Sm.  &  M.  (Miss.)  24;  Ryan  v. 
Duulap,  17 '111.  40;  Eastman  v.  Coos 
Bauk,  1  N.  H.  23.  Contra,  Bank  v. 
Klingensmith,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  523. 

^-  Ex  parte  Estabrook,  2  Lowell 
(U.  S.),  547.  Compare  Perkius  v. 
Bradley,  24  Vt.  iiG. 


1024  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1  Thollip,  Tr., 

§  1379.  Authority  of  Husband  to  Employ  Attorney  for 
Wife.  —  On  the  principle  upon  which  it  is  held  that  the  fact  of 
agency  is  a  question  for  a  jury,  it  is  also  ruled  that,  where  a 
husband  employs  an  attorney  to  bring  an  action  in  his  own  name 
and  that  of  his  wife,  in  respect  of  her  separate  property,  the 
question  whether  he  had  authority  so  to  do  for  his  wife,  is  to  be 
tried  in  the  same  manner  as  the  question  of  authority  by  any 
other  person  employing  an  attorney ;  but  the  jury  may  consider 
the  situation  and  relation  of  the  parties,  in  determining  whether 
the  husband  acted  as  agent  for  his  wife  or  for  both,  or  in  his  own 
behalf  alone;  and  this  is  tantamount  to  saying  that  the  question 
is  one  of  fact  for  the  jury.^ 

§  1380.  Whether  the  Act  of  a  Copartner  is  Within  the  Scope 
of  the  Business.  —  A  copartner  is  the  general  agent  of  the 
partnership  for  the  purpose  of  conducting  the  partnership  busi- 
ness in  the  usual  way.^  Whether  the  act  of  the  copartner  is 
w^ithin  the  scope  of  the  business  of  the  partnership,  or  whether, 
in  the  doing  of  a  contested  act,  he  was  conducting  its  business 
in  the  usual  way,  so  as  to  bind  the  other  members,  is  a  question 
of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 

§   1381.  Ratification  generally  a  Question  of    Fact. — The 

question  whether  a  principal  has  ratified  the  unauthorized  act  of 
his  agent,  or  whether  a  person  has  ratified  or  accepted  the  act  of 
one  who  has  assumed,  without  authority,  to  act  as  his  agent,  is 
generally  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^  This  principle  has  been 
applied  to  the  case  where  a  negotiable  instrument  has  been  al- 
tered subsequently  to  its  execution  and  delivery.  The  maker 
may,  by  certain  unequivocal  acts  done  with  a  knowledge  of  the 
alteration,  ratify  the  same,  —  as  where,  with  such  knowledge,  he 
subsequently  makes  a  part  j^aynent;  ^  and  whether  he  has,  by 

1  Comfort  V.  Sprague,  31  Minn.  Hagerstowu  Savings  Bk.,  30  Pa.  St. 
405.  4<t8,  605. 

2  Winship  ('.  Bank  of  U.  S.,5Pet.  ^  Middletou  v.  Kansas  City  &c.  R. 
(U.  S.)  5r,i.  Co.,  r,2  Mo.  579;  Fislicr  v.  Stephens, 

3  Loudon    Savings     Fund    Soc.   v.  16  111.  397. 

s  Evans  v.  Foreman,  (iO  Mo.  449 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIV.]   authority:   agency:  ratification.    1025 

subsequent  conduct,  ratified  the  alteration,  has  been  said  to  be  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  juiy.^ 

§   1382.   When     a  Question  of  Law  and    when  of  Fact.  — 

"  Where  the  evidence  is  doubtful  and  may  admit  of  different  in- 
terpretations, there  it  seems  proper  to  submit  the  question  for 
the  decision  of  the  jury.  But  where  they  can  justly  lead  to  no 
safe  or  satisfactory  conclusion,  a  ratiti cation  ought  not  to  be 
presumed."  ^  In  many  cases  the  acts  will  be  of  such  an  unequivo- 
cal character  that  the  question  maybe  a  mere  question  of  law,  — 
as  where  the  principal,  with  full  knowledge,  accepts  the  fruits  of 
the  misconduct  of  the  agent. ^  The  precautions  which  should  be 
borne  in  mind  in  submitting  this  question  to  the  jury  are  well  il- 
lustrated by  a  leading  case  in  Maryland,  in  which  the  trial 
court  instructed  the  jury  that,  if  the  consideration  for  the 
contract  had  been  received  by  the  agent  and  paid  over  to  the 
principal,  who  retained  the  same,  these  facts  were  in  law  an 
adoption  of  the  contract,  and  as  binding  on  the  principal  as  if 
a  previous  authority  had  been  given  to  an  agent.  This  instruc- 
tion w^as  held  erroneous,  because  the  jury  were  not  required  to 
find  (1)  that  the  defendants ,A;ner(;  on  what  account  the  money 
was  paid  them,  and  (2)  that  they  knew  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract on  which  the  money  was  received.*  Where  the  evidence 
which  speaks  upon  the  subject  whether  the  principal  received 
the  fruits  of  the  misconduct  of  the  agent  with  full  knowledge  of 
all  the  circumstances,  is  equivocal^  the  question  whether  there 
has  been  a  ratification  ought  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury  under 
proper  instructions  as  to  the  law.^ 

§  1383.  An  Illustration.  —  An  illustration  of  the  doctrine  that, 
whether  there  has  been  a  ratification  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury,  is, 
perhaps,  found  iu  a  case  in  New  York,  where  the  defendant,  who  was 

1  Iron  Mountain  Bank  v.  Murdock,  ^  Crooker  v.  Appleton,  25  Me.  131, 
62  Mo.  70,  77.    Compare  German  Bank      135;  Bryant  r.  Moore,  26  Me.  84. 

V.  Dunn,  62  Mo.  79.  *  Pennsylvania    &c.    Co.    v.    Dan- 

2  Story  on  Agency,    §   253;    Com-  dridge,  8  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  249,  311. 
mercial  Bank  v.  Jones,  18  Tex.   812,  5  Hortou  i>.  Townes,  6  Leigh  (Va.), 
828.  47. 

65 


1026  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   ThoiUp.  Tl'., 

sued  as  indorser  of  two  promissory  notes,  had  written  to  the  plaintiffs, 
agreeing  to  an  arrangement  giving  further  time  of  payment  to  the 
makers,  and  that  no  act  of  the  plaintiffs  in  so  doing  should  exonerate 
the  defendant  as  indorser,  and  waiving  notice  of  protest;  upon  which 
facts  it  was  held,  reversing  the  trial  court,  that  the  defendant  was  not 
estopped  by  the  letter  from  setting  up  as  a  defense  that  the  indorse- 
ments were  forgeries,  but  that  the  letter  was  evidence  to  be  submitted 
'to  the  jury  as  to  whether  the  defendant  may  have  ratified  and  affirmed 
the  indorsements,  though  not  his  own.^ 

§  1384:.  Instruction  as  to  Authority  of  Agent  of  an  Insurance 
Company  to  Receive  Notice  op  Additional  Insurance  in  Action  on 
Policy.  — "  That  the  matter  of  McKinney  being  the  agent  of  defend- 
ants, is  a  question  of  fact  for  them  (the  jury)  to  determine  from  the 
testimony ;  and,  in  aid  of  their  investigation,  they  are  instructed  that 
an  agent  may  be  created  by  long  acquiescence  on  the  part  of  the  prin- 
cipal, with  knowledge  of  his  acts  as  agent  for  said  principal,  as  well  as 
by  express  appointment ;  and  that  if,  by  express  agreement,  it  is  so  ar- 
ranged between  parties  that  one  sliall  be  advertised  as  the  agent,  but  that 
another  shall  actually  do  the  business,  and  this  third  person  does  trans- 
act the  liusiness,  and  becomes  known  as  the  agent  of  the  principals  by 
transacting  their  said  business,  then  the  said  third  person  is  tlieir  agent, 
and  the  principal  is  estopped  from  denying  it  as  to  those  who  have  ac- 
quired rights  against  said  principal  because  of  the  acts  of  said  agent. 

A  corporation  cannot  affirm  an  act  of  its  agent  in  part,  and  disaffirm  as 
to  the  residue.  And  the  defendants  herein  are  not  to  be  allowed  to 
avail  themselves  of  the  benefits  of  McKinney's  acts,  wherein  they  en- 
uie  to  their  benefit,  and  to  ignore  and  disaffirm  the  acts  of  said  Mc- 
Kinney  when  they  may   operate  to  their  prejudice,  provided  he  has 

acted  within  the  scope  of  such  agency. When  there  is  no  evidence 

of  the  written  appointment  of  an  agent,  the  fact  and  extent  of  his 
agency  must  be  determined  by  what  he  testifies  and  did,  and  also  by  the 
acts  of  the  company  recognizing  him.     If  either  party  must  suffer  from 

the  mistake  of  an  agent,  it  must  be  the  party  whose  agent  he  is. 

If  the  plaintiffs  procured  the  written  permission  of  the  agent  to  get 
other  insurance,  and  tlie  agent  neglected  to  indorse  the  same  on  the 
policy,  or  inform  the  company,  then  the  plaintiffs  cannot  be  affected  by 

1  Thorn  v.  Bell,  Lalor  Snpp.  (N.  Y.)      tlio  Supremo  Court  iu  this  case  is  very 
430.    It  should  be  added  that  the  i)ro-      doubtful, 
priety  of  the  couclusiou  I'eached  by 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIV.]  authority:  agency:  ratificatiox.     1027 

such  neglect ;  if  such  agent  had  authority  to  give  the  permission,  which 
is  a  fact  for  the  jury."  ^ 

§  1385.  Instruction  as  to  Authority  of  a  Broker  for  the  Purpose 
OF  SIGNING  Bought  and  Sold  Notes.  —  "  The  court  instructs  the  jury 
that  a  broker  for  the  purpose  of  signing  bought  and  sold  notes  is  the 
agent  of  each  and  both  of  the  parties  to  the  contract  which  he  makes ; 
but  in  all  other  respects  he  is  and  remains  the  agent  of  the  party  who 
originally  employs  him.  If,  therefore,  the  jury  find  in  this  case  that 
the  defendant  first  employed  the  broker,  Mr.  Thorne,  or  first  set  him  in 
motion  on  the  business  involved  in  this  controversy,  they  are  instructed 
that  he  was  and  remained  the  agent  of  the  defendant,  so  far  as  any 
agency  resulted  from  the  above  facts,  and  that  any  mistakes  which  he 
may  have  made  in  conveying  to  plaintiffs  the  directions  of  defendants 
as  to  the  manner  of  punching  these  rails,  are  the  mistakes  of  defend- 
ant's own  agent,  and  that  the  plaintiffs  are  not  responsible  therefor."  ^ 

§  1386.  Instruction  as  to  Want  op  Authority  of  a  Canvassing 
Book  Agent  to  Receive  Payments  from  Subscribers.  —  "If  the  court 
find  that  Du  Plainval  was  a  canvassing  agent,  obtaining  subscriptions 
for  the  plaintiff  for  books  published  by  him  and  sold  by  subscription, 
and  that  said  Du  Plainval  was  restricted  by  the  terms  of  his  employ- 
ment from  collecting  for  any  books  or  parts  of  books,  except  such  as 
were  delivered  by  him  —  and  they  further  find  that  said  canvassing 
agent  never  had  possession  of  the  parts  and  works  for  which  this  suit  is 
brought,  and  did  not  deliver  the  same  to  the  defendant,  — then  it  de- 

^  Approved  in  Insurance  Co.  v.  ties.  He  is  accustomed  to  give  tlie 
Lyons,  38  Texas,  258,  259.  In  White  buyer  a  note  called  a  sold  note, 
V.  Leighton,  15  Neb.  420,  there  is  a  and  the  seller  a  like  memorandum 
series  of  instructious  as  to  the  liability  called  a  bought  note.  Story  on 
of  the  proprietor  of  a  country  store  for  Agency  (9th  ed.),  §  28;  Benjamin  on 
purchasesof  goods  made  by  his  maua-  Sales,  §  275.  While  he  represents 
ger  or  clerk  in  charge  of  it,  on  the  both  parties  in  making  the  memoran- 
theory  of  authority  by  being  held  out  as  dum,  he  represents,  in  all  other  mat- 
agent,  ters,  the  party  originally    employing 

2  Approved  m  Schlesinger  u.  Texas  him.     Whart.  Agency,  §  715.     The  iu- 

&c.  R.  Co.,  87  Mo.  149.     In  approving  struction   seems  to  enunciate  correct 

this  nistruction,  the  Supreme  Court  of  priuciples    of    law,    and,   taking    the 

Missouri,  speaking  through  IJlack,  J.,  contract  as  the    parties    made   it,    it 

say:    "For    some    purposes,   as   the  it  seems  that  Thorne  was  acting  as  a 

signmg  of  the  contract,  the  broker  is  negotiator.'' 
regarded  as  the  agent  of  both  par- 


1028 


PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  TllOmp.  Tl'., 


Clares  the  law  to  be  that  his  employment  as  canvassing  agent  gave  him 
no  authority  to  collect  the  money  for  which  this  suit  is  brought,  and  it 
devolves  upon  the  defendant  to  show  that  he  had  such  authority.^ 

§  1387.  Instruction:  Notice  to  Agent  when  Notice  to  Princi- 
pal. —  "  The  jury  are  instructed  that  notice  to  the  general  superintend- 
ent of  a  railroad  company  is  notice  to  the  company."  ^ 


1  In  Chambers  r.  Short,  79  Mo.  204, 
it  was  held  that  the  trial  court  erred 
in  refusing  to  give  the  above  instruc- 
tion,—  the  court  proceeding  ou  the 


authority  of  Butler  v.  Dorman,  68  Mo. 
298. 

2  Approved  inNeilonu.  Kansas  City 
&c.  R.  Co.,  85  Mo.  599,  609. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLV.]       ALTERATION    OF   WRITINGS.  1029 


CHAPTER     XLV. 

ALTERATION  OF  WRITTEN  INSTRUMENTS. 

Section 

1392.  Fact  of  Alteration. 

1393.  Time  of  the  Alteration. 

1394.  lu  the  Case  of  Negotiable  lustrumeuts. 

1395.  Materiality  of  the  Alteration. 

1396.  Authority  for  Making  the  Alteration. 

1397.  By  whom  Made  and  whether  Fraudulent. 

1398.  These  Questions,  how  Settled. 

1399.  Whether  an  Alteration  has  been  Made  in  such   a  Manner  as  to  excite 

Suspicion  and  Provoke  luquiiy. 

1400.  [Continued.]     An  Opposing  View. 

1401.  [Continued.]     An  Instruction  upon  this  Hypothesis. 

1402.  Instructions  as  to  Effect  of  Material  Alteration  of  Note  after  Delivery. 

1403.  Defendant's  Instructions  as  to  Unauthorized  Alteration  of  a  Promis- 

sory Note,  in  an  Action  on  the  Note  by  Indorsee  against  Maker. 

1404.  Instruction  as  to  Effect  of  Alteration  of  Note  by  Aflixiug  a  Seal  thereto 

in  an  Action  on  the  Note. 

§  1392.  Fact  of  Alteration.  —  Whether  there  has  been  in 
fact  an  alteration  in  a  written  instrument  is  a  question  for  a 
jury.^ 

§  1393.  Time  of  the  Alteration. — If  the  Jury  Ji7id  there 
was  an  alteration,  then  it  is  also  for  them  to  determine  whether 
it  was  made  before  the  instrument  passed  from  the  hands  of  the 
maker  or  afterwards ,2  even  when  no  explanatory  evidence  is 
offered.^     On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  held  that,  in  the  ab- 

1  Paramore  ?7.  Liudsey,  63  Mo.  63;  "When  there  are  no  indications  of 
Belfast  Nat.  Bank  v.  Harriman,  68  Me.  falsity  upon  the  paper^  the  plaintiff  is 
522;  Wood??.  Steele,  6  Wall.  (U.  S.)  not  bound  to  go  further,  and  prove 
8C?  Cole  V.  Hills,  44  N.  H.  227.  that  it  was  made  on  the  day  it  purports 

2  Belfast  Nat.  Bank  v.  Harriman,  68  to  be.  Belfast  Nat.  Bank  v.  Harriman, 
Me.  522  supra;   Pullen  v.  Hutchinson,  25  Me. 

s  Crabtree    v.    Clark,    20  Me     337.      249. 


1030  PROVINCE  OF   COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thoni}).  Tr.j 

sence  of  evidence  speaking  directly  or  inferentially  upon  the 
question,  the  law,  following  the  general  presiunption  of  right 
acting,  presumes  that  the  alteration  was  made  either  before  or  at 
the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  instrument. ^  On  the  other  hand, 
it  has  been  held  that  there  is  no  presumption  of  laiv  that  the 
alteration  was  made  either  before  or  after  delivery. ^  *'If  the 
alteration  is  noted  in  the  attestation  clause,  as  having  been  made 
before  the  execution  of  the  instrument,  it  is  sufficiently  ac- 
counted for^  and  the  instrument  is  relieved  from  suspicion;  and 
if  it  appears  in  the  same  handwriting  and  ink  with  the  body  of 
the  instrument,  it  may  suffice.  In  other  words,  if  nothing  ap- 
pear to  the  contrary,  the  alteration  will  be  presumed  to  be  con- 
temporaneous with  the  execution  of  the  instrument.  But  if 
any  ground  of  suspicion  is  apparent  upon  the  face  of  the  in- 
strument, the  law  presumes  nothing,  but  leaves  the  question  of 
the  time  when  it  was  done,  as  well  as  that  of  the  person  by 
whom,  and  the  intent  with  which  the  alteration  was  made,  as 
matters  of  fact,  to  be  ultimately  found  by  the  jury,  upon  proofs 
to  be  adduced  by  the  party  otferingthe  instrument  in  evidence."  ^ 
Restating  the  doctrine,  the  rule  is  said  to  be  that,  "  if  there  be 
suspicious  circumstances  on  the  face  of  the  instrument,  it  is  for 
the  judge  trying  the  case  to  determine,  from  an  inspection, 
whether  it  be  such  as  to  require  the  party  offering  it  to  explain 
the  matter.  When  he  submits  the  question,  with  the  instrument 
itself  and  the  proofs,  to  the  jury,  it  is  a  question  of  fact  for  their 
determination;  and  their  finding,  as  on  any  other  question  of 
fact,  is  conclusive."  *  Where  there  are  no  such  circumstances 
of  suspicion,  the  presumption  in  the  absence  of  proof  to  the 
contrary,  is  that  the  apparent  alteration  was  made  before  the 
final  execution  and  delivery  of  the  instrument.  ^ 

1  Matthews  v.  Coalter,  9  Mo.  705;  been  approved  in  the  following  cases: 
Bailey  v.  Taylor,  11  Conn.  531;  Lub-  Matthews  v.  Coalter,  9  Mo.  705;  Lub- 
bering  v.  Kohlbrecher,  23  Mo.  596;  bering  v.  Kohlbrccher,  22  Mo.  596; 
Paramore  v.  Lindsey,  63  Mo.  63,  66.  Paraniore  v.  Lindsey,  63  Mo.  63. 

2  Ely  V.  Ely,  6  Gray  (Mass.),  439,  *  Holtou  v.  Kemp,  SI  Mo.  661,  665. 
442.  ^  Ibid.;  Matthews  «.  Coalter,  9  Mo. 

8 1  Greenl.  Ev. ,  §  564.  This  statement  705;  Paramore  v.  Lindsey,  63  Mo. 
of    doctrine    by    Prof.    Greenlc;.f   has       63. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLV.]       ALTEEATION   OF   WRITINGS.  1031 

§  1394.  In  the  Case  of  UesotlaMe  Instruments.  -A  holder 
of  a  promissory  note,  the  date  of  which  appears,  upon  inspec- 
o„,  to  have  been  altered,  must  explain  the  deration  and  h^w 
^  o  have  been  lawfully  made,  before  he  eau  recover  upon  it" 
.btnT  f  !\"^g»t'--'ble  instrument  is  always  presumed,  in  the 
absence  of  evidence  to  have  issued  it  clear  of  all  blemishes 
erasures  and  alterations,  whether  in  the  date  or  body  of  the  i,  : 
^^trument;  and  the  burden  of  showing  that  it  was  defective  whn 

hcial  to  the  maker.  Such  evidence,  it  has  been  held,  is  for  the 
jury,  who  are  to  say  whether  the  alteration,  if  any  was  made 
before  or  after  the  defendant  parted  with  the  note.' 

tel*^^"'  "■'"'"•*«»"'  <"  t""  Alteration. -But  whether  an  al- 
teration ,s  material  or  not.  is  a^ueMon  of  la,o  for  the  court  * 
Amaeria  alteration  of  a  written  instrunfent,  made  af  ei  "t  t 
signed  and  del  vered.  without  the  consent  of  an  obligor  her  in 
will  discharge  him  from  its  obligation..  This  rule  holds  good' 
although  the  alteration  may  be  shown  by  evidence  to  have  been 
ni  furtherance  of  the  original  intent  of  the  parties;  since  if  he 
instrument  does  not  express  the  real  intent  of  the  parties   the 

rejmmed.         To  tolerate  an  attempt  to  reform  a  security,  by 

■  Simpson  !>.  Stackhouse,  9  Pa.  St.     8  Ad  «ri  91 «  •>•,,    ^-  u 
I86;Paiue».   Edsell     19  pl    «  ,7b.      "*"•."'•  ^'S,  221 ,  Bishop  „.  Cham- 
MllIer..Eead,27Pa  St.M  '      bre     Mo„d.   4   M.    n,,    CIlBord    ». 

423;Simpson».sIac\hot,e  9P.;  s'        TJT'/i  ""'■ 

iQp      TT         ..u         '''-'^^'""'>«.  y  -t^a.  ht.  ^  Belfast  Nat.  Bank  u  Hirrimon    ao 

ISr,     Upon  the  question  what  altera-  Me    500.    Wood    ^  «;    ,               '  ^ 

tions  will  avoid  a  written  obli<.ation  m   S  ^  ^n    n      /"    ^*''^''   '   ^^'^"• 

see  Bowers  ..  Jewell.   2  N.   H     543:  irk   H7      '  ^"'''"'^  "'   ^^^«hews,  35 

Marshall    v.   Gouo-ler   in  ^^rcr    x-    r>'  /t,     ' 

(Pa.;    104;    Mastef::Min:;4  T.  E       H^lfeH  ^cf™'^'    ''   ^^^  ^^^' 
320,  323;  Getty  v.  Shearer  00  Pa   st       m!  n  ;,  Champion,   30  Mo.     136; 

12;  Miller  ..  Gilleland     9  Pa   sf  lit      IT  V"''"  ''^•'  '  ^^"  ^35;  Mar- 


1032  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1   TllOlIip.  Tl'., 

the  rash,  and  it  may  be  secret  act  of  the  creditor,  would  change 
the  position  of  the  debtor  and  subject  him  to  risk  and  trouble 
which  ought  not  to  be  imposed  on  him.  It  would  compel  him  to 
encounter  the  perils  of  parol  proof,  not  only  to  establish  the  fact 
of  alteration,  but  to  show  what  the  instrument  was;  and  that 
done,  to  meet  the  creditor's  proof  of  bona  fides.' ^  ^  Cases  are 
found  which  support  the  extreme  doctrine  that  the  most  trifling 
alteration  of  a  written  instrument  cannot  be  made  after  its  exe- 
cution and  delivery,  without  the  consent  of  all  parties  toit;  ^  and 
that  it  is  not  at  all  material  whether  the  alteration  was  done  inno- 
cently or  fraudulently,  since  the  effect  upon  the  rights  of  the 
obligor  is  the  same  in  either  case.^  But  this  rule  has  no  just  ap- 
plication to  cases  where  the  alteration  was  immaterial,  that  is, 
where  it  did  not  change  the  legal  effect  of  the  instrument,  but 
merely  added  something  which  the  law  would  imply ;  *  and  whether 
an  alteration  is  or  is  not  material,  within  the  meaning  of  this 
qualification  of  the  rule,  is  a  question  of  law  for  the  court. ^  But 
there  is  a  view  that  the  question  of  the  materiality  of  the  alter- 
ation can  have  little  application  to  a  case  where  the  alteration  has 
been  made  by  a  party  beneficially  interested  in  the  instrument, 
and  who  has  it  in  his  custody ;  it  being  contrary  to  the  policy  of 
the  law  to  permit  the  owner  and  custodian  of  an  instrument  to 
change  it,  and  then,  when  charged  with  the  fact,  to  claim  that 
the  alteration  was  immaterial.^ 

§  1396.  Avithority  for  3Iaking  the  Alteration.  —  The  ques- 
tion whether  there  was  authority  to  alter  a  written  instrument, 
as  to  fill  up  certain  blanks  which  had  been  left  therein  at  the 

1  Miller  v.  Gilleland,  19  Pa.  St.  119.  ern  Building  Asso.  v.  Fitzmaurice,  7 

2  Moore  v.  Bickham,  4  Biuu.  (Pa.)  1.  Mo.  App.  283;  Hunt  v.  Adams,  6  Mass. 

3  Warrington  v.  Early,  2  El.  &  Bl.  519;  Miller  v.  Gilleland,  19  Pa.  St.  119. 
763;  Gardner  v.  Walsh,  5  El.  &  Bl.  82  ^  State  v.  Dean,  supra;  Western 
(overruling  Catton  v.  Simpson,  8  Ad.  Building  Asso.  v.  Fitzmaurice,  supra. 
&  El.  13(i;)  Chappell  v.  Spencer,  23  ^  Hord  v.  Taubman,  79  Mo.  101; 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  584;  Woodworth  v.  First  National  Bank  r.  Fricke,  75  Mo. 
Bank  of  America,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  178;  Haskell  t?.  Champion,  30 Mo.  136; 
391;  Evans  v.  Foreman,  60  Mo.  449.  Moore  v.  Hutchinson,  69  Mo.  429;   1 

*  State  V.  Dean,  40  Mo.  464:  West-      Greeul.  Ev.,  §  565. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XLV.]        ALTERATION    OF    WRITINGS.  1033 

time  of  its  signature,  or  to  alter  it  in  any  manner  which  the  evi- 
dence shows,  is  matter  for  a  jury  to  determine.^  This  question 
frequently  arises  upon  evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  instru- 
ment was  drawn  in  blank,  signed,  and  then  delivered  as  an  escrow. 
It  has  been  ruled  that  if  an  instrument,  —  as  for  instance  a 
promissory  note,  —  is  made  by  A.  for  the  accommodation  of 
B.,  with  the  understanding  that  C.  will  also  join  therein,  a  blank 
being  left  for  the  name  of  the  payee,  and  C.  refuses  to  join,  but 
afterwards  the  instrument,  thus  imperfect,  is  delivered  to  a  third 
person  for  value,  upon  a  representation  that  the  person  so  deliv- 
ering it  has  authority  thus  to  deal  with  it,  and  the  name  of  such 
third  person  is  inserted  therein  as  payee,  he  cannot  recover  upon 
it  as  against  A.^  But  it  is  no  objection  to  the  validity  of  a  bill 
of  exchange  that  the  acceptance  and  indorsement  were  written 
before  the  bill  was  drawn,  notwithstanding  the  indorsement  was 
made  by  a  stranger  to  the  acceptor.^ 

§  1397.  By  whom  made  and  whetlier  Fraudulent. —  Other 
questions  may  likewise  arise  which  will  also  be  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  jury,  —  as  by  whom  the  alteration  was  made,  and 
whether  it  was  fraudulent  or  not.* 

§  1398.  These  Questions,  how  Settled.  —  These  questions 
are  to  be  settled  by  all  the  evidence  in  the  case,  the  surrounding 
circumstances,  and  the  nature,  character  and  appearance  of  the 
alterations.^ 

^  State  u.  Dean,  40   Mo.  464.     See  ment  authorized  or  subsequently  rat- 

also  Stahl  v.   Berger,  10   Serg.   &  R.  ified,  au  unauthorized  alteration  of  it, 

(Pa.)  170;  Smith  v.  Croocker,  5  Mass.  made  after  signing  and  delivering  it, 

538;    Wooley  v.   Constant,   4  Johns.  see  Lammers  v.  AVhite  Sewing  Ma- 

(N.  Y.)  54;  Ex  parte  Kerwin,  8  Cow.  chine  Co., 23  Mo.  App.  471.     As  to  tlie 

(No   Y.)    118.     Belfast  Nat.    Bank  v.  ratification  of  such  an  act  by  a  cor- 

Harriman,  68  Me.  522.  poration,  see  First  National  Bank  v. 

2  Awde  V.  Dixon,  6  Exch.  869.  Fricke,  75  Mo.  178. 

3  Schultz  V.  Astley,   2  Bing.   New  ^  Belfast  Nat.  Bank  v.  Harrlman,  68 
Cas.  544,     As  to  what  will  be  sufficient  Me.  522;  Cole  v.  Hills,  44  N.  H.  227. 
evidence    to    authorize    tlie    court    to  ^  Belfast  Nat.  Bank  v.   Harriman, 
submit     to     the    jury    the    question  68  Me.  522;  Ely  y.  Ely,  6  Gray  (Mass.), 
whether  an  obligor  in  a  written  instru-  439,  442. 


1034  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thomp.  Tl., 

§  1399.  Wliether  an  Alteration  has  been  made  in  such  a 
Manner  as  to  excite  Suspicion  and  provoke  Inquiry. — This 
question  becomes  material  in  respect  of  the  rights  of  an  innocent 
purchaser  for  value,  of  a  negotiable  instrument ;  and  here  the 
general  rule  is  that  any  alteration  in  the  material  part  of  a  bill  of 
exchange  or  promissory  note,  as  in  the  date,  sum,  time  when 
payable,  consideration,  or  place  of  payment,  will  render  the 
same  invalid,  as  against  any  party  thereto  not  consenting  to  such 
alteration,  even  in  the  hands  of  an  innocent  Jiolder .^  ISor  is  the 
application  of  this  principle  affected  by  the  skillfulness  with 
which  the  alteration  is  made,  or  by  the  probability  that  the  clos- 
est observer  will  fail  to  discover  it,^  unless  the  case  falls  within 
an  exception  to  the  rule,  which  will  now  be  stated.  This  excep- 
tion is  that,  if  a  promissory  note  is  so  negligently  drawn,  as  by 
leaving  blank  spaces  unfilled,  as  to  easily  admit  of  a  fraudulent 
alteration,  and  such  an  alteration  is  subsequently  made,  the  loss 
will  fall  upon  the  original  drawer,  or  upon  one  who  indorsed  it 
in  that  condition,  and  not  upon  an  innocent  purchaser;  ^  unless, 
although  the  instrument  was  negligently  drawn,  the  alteration  is 
made  in  such  a  manner  as  to  excite  suspicion  and  put  a  purchaser 
upon  inquiry,  which  in  legal  contemplation  is  tantamount  to 
actual  knowledge  ;  *  and  whether  the  alteration,  although  not  of 
a  glaring  nature,  is  of  a  character  sufficient  to  excite  suspicion 
and  put  a  purchaser  upon  inquiry,  has  been  held  a  question  of 
fact  for  a  jury.^ 

§1400.  [Continued.]  An  Opposing  View.  —  Negotiable 
corporate  bonds,  which  have  been  signed  in  blank  by  the  proper 
officials,  and  thereafter  fraudulently  issued  by  the  ministerial  of- 
ficers or  agents  of  a  corporation,  will,  it  seems,  be  good  in  the 

1  Edwards  on  Bills,  95;  Chitty  on  ^  Capital  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  62  Mo. 
Bills,  182;  Woodworth  v.  Bank  of  60;  (overruliug  Wasliincton  Savings 
America,  19  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  391;  Nazro  Bank  v.  Ecky,  51  Mo.  272)  ;  Trigg  v. 
V.  Fuller,  24  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  374;  Bruce  Taylor,  27  Mo.  245;  Young  v.  Grote,  4 
V.    Westcott,    3    Barb.  (N.  Y.)    374;  Bing.  253. . 

Trigg  V.  Taylor,  27  Mo.  245.  *  Capital  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  supra. 

2  Hall  V.  Fuller,  5  Barn.  &  Cres.  ^  Iron  Mountain  Bank  v.  Murdock, 
750;  Trigg  r.  Taylor,  supra.                        (')2  Mo.  70;  post,  §  1708. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.   XLV.]       ALTERATION    OF    WRITINGS.  1035 

hands  of  a  bona  fide  purchaser  for  value.  And  whether  there  be 
sufficient  evidence  on  the  face  of  the  bonds  to  put  a  purchaser 
upon  inquiry  as  to  their  genuineness,  will,  it  has  been  held  in  a 
particular  instance,  be  a  preliminarij  question  for  the  courts  which 
the  court  will  not  submit  to  a  jury,  where  their  verdict  for  or 
against  the  rights  of  the  purchaser,  would  be  a  verdict  founded 
wholly  upon  conjecture.^  It  is  said  that,  in  an  action  to  recover 
possession  of  suchfraudulent  pieces  of  paper,  by  the  persons  who 
are  really  entitled  to  have  them,  two  facts  must  be  established  b}^ 
the  plaintiffs :  1.  That  the  bonds  belong  to  them.  2.  That  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  defendant  purchased  them  were 
not  such  as  to  protect  his  title.  The  court  proceeded  upon  the 
idea  that  constructive  notice  is  a  legal  inference  from  established 
facts ;  that,  when  the  facts  are  in  controversy,  or  when  the  alleged 
defect  or  infirmity  appears  upon  the  face  of  an  instrument  in 
writing,  and  is  a  matter  of  occular  inspection,  the  question  is  one 
for  the  court;  and  that  whether,  under  a  conceded  state  of  facts, 
the  law  will  impute  notice  of  such  infirmities,  is  not  a  question 
for  the  jury.  Incidentally,  the  court  rule  that  the  purchaser  of 
negotiable  securities,  upon  the  open  market  and  in  the  usual 
course  of  business,  is  not  bound  to  make  a  close  and  careful  ex- 
amination, in  order  to  escape  the  imputation  of  bad  faith  in  the 
purchase ;  that  the  rights  of  the  purchaser  of  such  a  security  are 
not  to  be  affected  by  what  is  called  constructive  notice^  unless  it 
clearly  appears  that  the  inquiry,  suggested  by  the  facts  disclosed 
at  the  time  of  the  purchase,  would,  if  fairly  pursued,  result  in  the 
disclosure  of  the  defect  existing  but  hidden  at  the  time ;  and  that 
there  must  be,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  such  a  connection  be- 
tween the  facts  disclosed  and  the  further  facts  to  be  discovered, 
that  the  former  may  be  said  to  furnish  a  clue,  — a  reasonable  and 
natural  clue,  — to  the  latter. ^ 

§   1401.   [Continued.]    Ax    Instruction   upon  this   Hypothesis. — 
"  Although  the  jury  may  behave  from  the  evidence  that  the  note  at 

^  Birdsall  v.  Russell,  29  N.  Y.  220.  seuted,  aucl  ou  the  -whole,  the  conclu- 

2  Birclsall  t7.  Eussell,  29  N.  Y.  220.  siou  of  the  court  seems  to  be  extremelj 

Opinions    -vrere     delivered      by    two  doubtful. 

judges.    Two  of  the  otlier  judges  dis- 


1036  PROVINCE   OF    COURT   AND   JURY.        [1  Thoilip.  Tl'., 

the  time  it  was  executed  by  the  defendant,  had  the  words,  '  after  the 
sale  of  fourteen  mills,'  and  although  the  jury  may  believe  from  the  evi- 
dence that  said  words  had  been  erased  ;  yet,  if  the  jury  further  believe 
from  the  evidence  that  those  words  were  put  upon  the  paper  with  such 
light  material  that  they  could  be  erased  without  leaving  any  trace  upon 
the  paper  which  could  be  detected  by  a  prudent  and  careful  man  ;  and 
if  they  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that  said  words  were  erased 
from  the  paper  without  leaving  any  traces  behind  them  to  show  that 
they  had  ever  been  upon  the  paper,  and  that  said  erasure  was  made  with- 
out tlie  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff  and  before  he  purchased  the  same,  — 
then  the  law  is  for  the  plaintiff,  and  the  jury  should  so  find."  ^ 

§  1402.  Instruction  as  to  Effect  of  Material  Alteration  of 
Note  After  Delivery.  —  "It  is  claimed  by  Brooks  [defendant],  that, 
after  he  signed  a  note  similar  in  all  respects  to  the  one  sued  on,  ex- 
cepting that  the  written  words,  '  with  interest  at  ten  per  cent.'  were  not 
then  in  the  note,  but  that  the  printed  words, '  with  interest  at  ten  per  cent, 
per  annum  after  maturity,'  were  in  the  note,  and  that,  since  he  signed  the 
note,  without  his  knowledge  or  consent,  the  said  printed  words  were 
stricken  out,  and  the  said  written  words  inserted.  If  such  an  altera- 
tion of  the  note  was  made  by  any  holder  of  the  note,  or  made  with  the 
knowledge  of  any  holder  of  the  note,  without  the  knowledge  of  Brooks, 
it  would  be  a  material  alteration,  and  would  release  him  from  all  liabil- 
ity on  the  note,  and  if  the  defendant  Brooks,  proves  this,  by  a  fair 
preponderance  of  the  evidence,  the  verdict  must  be  in  his  favor ;  and  it 
would  make  no  difference  whether  John  Allen,  the  plaintiff,  was  or  was 
not  the  owner  of  the  note  at  the  time  of  the  alteration,  if  he  made  the 
alteration  after  Brooks  signed  it. "  - 

§  1403.  Defendant's  Instructions  as  to  Unauthorized  Alteration 
OF  A  Promissory  Note,  in  an  Action  on  the  Note  by  Indorsee  Against 
Maker. — "The  court  instructs  the  jury  that,  if  they  believe  from 
the  evidence  in  the  cause,  that  the  promissory  note,  dated  13th  Sep- 
tember, 1873,  read  and  shown  to  the  jury  in  this  case,  was  made  by 
the  defendant,  Murdock,  and  indorsed  by  the  defendant  Armstrong, 
and  delivered  by  him  to  his  co-defendant,  Murdock,  for  the  purpose  of 
enabling  Murdock,  the  maker,  to  raise  money  thereon  for  his  own  use ; 

1  Approved  in  Harvey  v.  Smith,  55  2  Approved  in  Brooks  v.  Allen,  62 

111.    225;    citing   Young   v,    Grote,    4      Ind.  405. 
Bing.  258 ;  13  Eng.  Com.  Law   420. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLV.]       ALTERATION    OF   WRITINGS.  1037 

and  if  tliey  shall  further  believe  from  the  evidence  that,  after  the  de- 
fendant Armstrong,  had  so  indorsed  and  delivered  said  note  to  said 
Murdoek,  the  words  and  figures,  '  with  interest  at  10  per  cent,  per  an- 
num after  maturity,'  now  appearing  in  said  note,  were  written  therein 
without  the  kno^vledge,  consent  or  authority  of  the  defendant  Arm- 
strong, by  said  Murdoek,  or  by  an}'  agent  or  clerk  of  his,  whether  done 
in  the  presence  of  any  officer  or  agent  of  plaintiff,  or  not,  and  whether 
with  or  without  the  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff,  the  verdict  should  be  for 
the  defendant  Armstrong,  on  the  second  count. Tlie  court  in- 
structs the  jury  that,  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  in  this  case,  that 
the  promissory  note,  dated  17th  September,  1873,  read  and  shown  to 
the  jury  in  this  case,  was  made  by  the  defendant  Murdoek,  and  in- 
dorsed by  the  defendant  Armstrong,  and  delivered  by  him  to  his  co- 
defendant  Murdoek,  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  the  maker  to  raise 
money  thereon  for  his  own  use ;  and  if  the}'  shall  further  believe  that, 
after  the  defendant  Armstrong,  had  so  indorsed  and  delivered  said 
note  to  said  Murdoek,  the  words  and  figures,  '  with  interest  at  10  per 
cent,  per  annum  after  maturity,'  now  appearing  in  said  note,  were  writ- 
ten therein,  and  without  the  knowledge,  consent  or  authority  of  the 
defendant  Armstrong,  by  said  Murdoek,  or  by  any  agent  or  clerk  of 
his,  whether  done  in  the  presence  of  any  officer  or  agent  of  the  plaintiff 
or  not,  whether  with  or  without  the  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff,  the  ver- 
dict of  the  jury  should  be  for  the  defendant  Armstrong,  on  the  first 

count. The  court  instructs  the  jury  that,  if  they  believe  from  the 

evidence  that  the  provisions  as  to  interest  now  contained  in  the  notes 
read  in  evidence,  and  now  sued  on,  were  not  contained  in  them  at  the 
time  they  were  made  by  Murdoek  &  Dickson,  and  indorsed  and  deliv- 
ered by  defendant  Murdoek,  but  were  inserted  afterwards, —  then  the 
burden  of  proof  is  not  upon  defendant  Armstrong,  to  prove  that  said 
provisions  were  inserted  without  his  authority ;  but  it  is  upon  the  plaint- 
iff to  prove  that  they  were  so  inserted  with  his  authority ;  and  that, 
therefore,  if  they  believe  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  that  said  pro- 
visions were  not  contained  in  said  notes  at  the  time  of  their  said 
indorsement  and  delivery  by  Armstrong  to  Murdoek,  but  were  inserted 
afterwards,  —  then,  unless  the  plaintiff  has  further  estabhshed  to  their 
satisfaction,  by  a  preponderance  of  tlie  evidence  in  the  case,  that  said 
provisions  were  so  inserted  by  the  direction,  or  with  the  authority  of 
Armstrong,  they  should  find  against  the  plaintiff  and  for  the  defend- 
ant Armstrong."  ^ 

1  Approved  in  Capital  Bank  v.  Armstrong,  G2  Mo.  59,  62,  G3,  64. 


1038  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

§  1404.  Defendant's  Instruction  as  to  effect  of  Alteration  op 
Note  by  Affixing  a  Seal  thereto,  in  Action  on  Note.  —  "  The  burden 
of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff  in  this  case,  and  unless  the  jury  are  satis- 
fied, from  the  evidence,  that  the  seal  in  question  was  added  to  the  note 
since  its  execution,  without  the  knowledge  and  consent  of  the  parties 

thereunto,  then  they  should  find  for  the  defendant. If  the  jury 

believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  seal  to  the  note  in  question  was 
attached  thereto  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  this  case  and  the 
execution  of  the  same,  then  the  jury  will  find  for  the  defendant.  -  -  -  - 
If  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  the  seal  was  attached  to 
the  note  in  question  before  the  commencement  of  this  case,  by  the 
plaintiff,  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  defendant,  then  the 
defendant  is  entitled  to  a  verdict,  and  the  jury  should  find  accord- 
ingly.   The  law  imposes  upon  the  party  offering  a  paper  in  evi- 
dence, the  explanation  of  any  alterations  which  may  appear  therein ; 
and  therefore  if  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence,  that  any  alteration 
has  been  made  in  the  note  in  question,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the 
plaintiff  to  explain  the  same ;  and  unless  the  jury  believe,  from  the 
evidence,  that  such  alteration  has  been  explained  by  the  plaintiff,  the 
presumption  of  the  law  is  that  it  was  made  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
jury  should  find  for  the  defendant.  It  is  of  no  consequence  who 
attached  the  seal  to  the  note  in  question,  if  it  was  done  with  the  knowl- 
edge and  consent  of  the  parties  to  the  note,  before  it  came  into  the 
possession  of  the  plaintiff .  -  -  -  -  If  the  jury  believe,  from  the  evidence, 
that  the  seal  was  appended  to  the  note  in  question  after  its  execution, 
and  before  the  commencement  of  this  suit,  by  and  with  the  consent  of 
the  parties  thereunto,  then  the  plaintifi"  is  not  entitled  to  recover,  and 
the  jury  should  find  for  the  defendant."* 

1  Approved  in  Schwarz  v.  Herrenkind,  26  111.  210,  211. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVI.]  POSSESSION.  1039 


CHAPTER     XLVI. 

POSSESSION.  ■ 

Section 

1407.  Possession,  when  Evidence  of  Title, 

1408.  Long  Possession  Relaxes  strict  Evidence  of  Title. 

1409.  View  that  Possession  a  Question  of  Law. 

1410.  When  a  Question  of  Law  and  when  of  Fact.    . 

1411.  The  Subject  further  Discussed  and  Illustrated. 

1412.  Conclusion  that  it  is  a  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and  Fact. 

1413.  Whether  Actual  or  Constructive. 

1414.  Whether  of  Duration  and  Character  Necessary  to  sustain  a  Prescrip- 

tion. 

1415.  How  Jury  Instructed  in  si;ch  a  Case. 
141G.  Whether  Common,  Mixed  or  Exclusive. 

1417.  Color  of  Title  and  Good  Faith  of  Claimant  under. 

1418.  Territorial  Extent  of  an  Adverse  Possession. 

1419.  Ouster  of  one  Cotenaut  by  the  Other. 

1420.  Abandonment  of  a  Prior  Possession. 

1421.  Surrender  of  Title  to  a  Chattel  acquired  by  Adverse  Possession. 

1422.  Possession  of  Land  sufficient  to  Affect  Strangers  with  Notice. 

1423.  Precedents  of  Instructions  as  to  Adverse  Possession  under  Color  of 

Title. 

1424.  [Continued.]     Successorship  of  Adverse  Possession  under  Color  of 

Title. 

1425.  The  Same  Subject  Continued. 

1426.  Similar  Instructions  under  Missouri  Statute. 

1427.  Instructions  on  Theory  of  Acquisition  of  a  Fee  by  Twenty  Years  Ad- 

verse Possession. 

1428.  Adverse  Possession  of  Personal  Property  —  Instruction  on  the  Theory 

of  Five  Years  Adverse  Possession. 

1429.  [Continued.]     Instruction  on  the  Theory  that  Adverse  Possession  must 

have  been  "  Continuous  and  Unequivocal." 

1430.  Another  Instruction  on  the  Same  Hypothesis. 

§  1407.  Possession,  when  Evidence  of  Title.  —  The  import- 
ance of  the  question  considered  in  this  chapter  lies  in  the  fact 
that  possession  is,  in  certain  circumstances,  evidence  of  title. 
The  bare  possession  of  personal  property,  unexplained  by  sur- 
rounding circumstances,  raises  a  presumption  of  ownership  in 


1040  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tl'., 

the  possessor ;  ^  and  under  some  systems,  in  actions  for  the  re- 
covery of  land,  possession  is  pmna  f  tide  evidence  of  title,  and 
it  has  been  said  that  this  principle  is  firmly  fixed  in  all  common- 
law  jurisprudence.  It  has  been  reasoned  that,  to  depart  from 
this  rule  in  its  directness  and  simplicity,  tends  to  destroy  its 
value,  and  that  the  question  of  possession  and  of  the  identity 
of  the  land  in  dispute,  should  be  left  to  the  jury.^  Again,  un- 
der the  principles  of  the  common  law,  after  the  lapse  of  a  cer- 
tain number  of  years,  a  deed  of  grant  of  title  to  the  possessor  is 
2}resumed.^  Moreover,  statutes  of  limitation  exist,  it  is  pre- 
sumed, in  all  American  jurisdictions,  under  which  a  certain 
length  of  continuous  adverse  possession  either  clothes  the  pos- 
sessor with  immunity  from  ouster  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  by 
analogy  to  the  negative  prescription  of  the  civil  law,  or  vests  in 
him  a  title  which  he  can  transfer  to  another,  by  analogy  to  the 
p)Ositive  prescription  of  that  law.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this 
work  to  consider  these  questions :  they  are  alluded  to  merely  for 
the  purpose  of  show^ing  the  imjiortance  of  the  question  under 
what  circumstances  possession  is  a  question  of  law,  and  under 
what  circumstances  a  question  of  fact. 

§   1408.  Long'  Possession  relaxes  Strict  Evidence  of  Title.  — 

It  has  been  reasoned  that,  where  land  is  sold  by  parol,  the  price 
paid,  the  possession  delivered,  the  assessment  for  taxes  changed, 
the  taxes  paid,  and  the  control  of  the  land  by  fixed  boundaries  held 
by  the  vendee  and  those  claiming  under  him  for  upwards  of  forty 
years, —  the  possessor  is  not  held,  in  ejectment  against  him  by  the 
holder  of  the  legal  title,  to  the  same  strictness  of  proof  of  the  con- 
tract which  is  required  in  the  case  of  a  recent  bargain.  The  rule 
requiring  the  proof  to  bring  the  contracting  parties  face  to  face, 
to  hear  them  make  or  repeat  the  bargain,  and  precisely  state  its 
terms,  must,  after  that  lapse  of  time,  be  relaxed.  Hence,  in 
such  a  case  it  was  held  error  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  defend- 
ant must  prove  the  contract,  clearly  and  satisfactorily  in  all  its 
parts,  by  witnesses  who  knew  it,  by  having  heard  it  made  or  re- 

1  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  34.  M  Greeul.  Ev.,  §§  45,  4G. 

2  Hicks  V.  Davis,  4  Cal.  G7. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL VI.]  POSSESSION.  1041 

peated  in  the  presence  of  both  parties ;  that  it  must  exhibit  loca- 
tion, boundaries,  quantity,  price,  and  manner  of  paj'meut ;  that 
the  description  must  be  so  accurate  that  a  third  person  could  find 
or  run  the  lines ;  that  there  must  be  proof  that  possession  was 
taken  immediately,  or  soon  after  the  contract  was  made,  in  pur- 
suance of  it;  and  that  the  possession  must  have  been  actual, 
notorious,  exclusive,  continuous,  and  accompanied  by  improve- 
ments. It  is  not  necessary,  in  such  a  case,  that  the  defendant's 
possession  should  have  been  the  continued,  actual,  resident,  and 
hostile  i)OSsession  required  of  a  trespasser,  to  sustain  a  claim 
of  title  under  -the  statute  of  limitations;  but  only  that  such  a 
possession  for  such  a  lapse  of  time  should  be  shown,  as  that  the 
law  would  presume  the  release,  satisfaction,  or  abandonment  of 
the  right  or  claim  of  him  who  held  it,  to  the  party  by  whom  any 
duty  under  it  may  htive  been  due.  Such  a  presumption  does 
arise  in  favor  of  a  vendee  in  a  parol  contract  and  those  claiming 
under  him,  after  the  lapse  of  forty  years  from  its  date;  the  pay- 
ment of  purchase-money  coeval  with  it,  and  the  preceding  posses- 
sion delivered  in  pursuance  therewith ;  the  change  in  assessment  for 
taxes  from  vendor  to  vendee;  thepa^^ment  of  taxes,  and  continued 
acts  of  ownership,  evincing  complete  performance  of  the  duty 
owed  to  the  vendor,  and,  as  such,  acknowledged  and  acquiesced  in 
by  him.  In  such  a  case  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  leave  the  jury 
to  find  the  facts  upon  all  the  circumstances  in  the  case  ;  and  if 
satisfied  of  the  fact  of  the  sale,  identity  of  the  land,  extent  of  the 
l)urchase,  payment  of  the  price,  and  delivery  of  possession  in  pur- 
suance of  the  contract,  this  evidence  should  be  held  sufficient  to 
support  the  defense.  ^ 

§   1409.     A'iew    that    Possession    a    Question  of    Law  —  In 

some  jurisdictions  the  view  is  taken  that,  what  state  of  facts, 
wdien  established,  will  amount  to  possession,  is  a  question  of 
law?  Thus,  in  Missouri,  what  acts  of  ownership  will  amount  to 
adverse  possession  is  a  question  of  law,  and  it  is  error  to  submit 

i  Richards    v.   Elwell,  48    Pa.    St.  2  Bowie  v.  Brahe,  3  Duer  (X.  Y.), 

361.  35,  44. 

66 


1042  PROVINCE  OF.  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thom}).  Tv.y 

such  a  question  to  the  decision  of  a  jury.^  Again,  it  has  been 
said:  "  The  question  of  actual  possession  is  a  question  of  fact; 
what  would  constitute  possession,  a  question  of  law."  -  And 
again:  "  It  is  the  province  of  the  court  to  tell  the  jury  what  con- 
stitutes an  adverse  possession,  and  the  jury  must  determine  from 
the  evidence  whether  such  facts  exist,  as,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
court,  constitute  such  adverse  possession."^  Again,  it  is  held 
that,  in  an  action  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer,  the  court  may 
properly  instruct  the  jury  that  a  hypothetical  state  of  facts,  pre- 
sented by  the  evidence,  does  or  does  not  constitute  possession,  and 
it  is  for  the  jury  to  find  whether  such  a  state  of  facts  exists.*  And 
where,  in  an  action  of  trespass  for  cutting  and  carrying  away 
timber,  the  court  declined  to  charge  the  jury  "  that  the  facts 
and  circumstances  proved  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  could  not 
establish  for  him  any  title  by  possession  of  the  lauds  in  contro- 
versy," —  it  was  said  in  the  reviewing  court,  that,  "  what  consti- 
tutes adverse  possession,  is  a  question  of  law;  and  if  the  evidence 
in  the  cause,  admitting  its  truth,  does  not  show  such  possession, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  so  to  declare."  ^  And  the  court,  pro- 
ceedino-  to  examine  what  constitutes  adverse  possession  and  what 
evidence  is  necessary  to  sustain  it,  held  that  the  defendant's  evi- 
dence failed  to  establish  such  possession,  and  that  the  trial  court 
should  so  have  instructed  the  jury.® 

§  1410.   When  a  Question  of  Law  and  When  of  Fact.  —  It  is 

said  that,  what  constitutes  adverse  possession  is  a  question  of  law  ; 
but,  as  the  intention  of  the  possessor  must  always  be  considered  in 
determining  the  question    of  adverse  possession,  that  is  a    fact 

1  Turner  v.  Baker,  (U   Mo.  219,  245.  or,  as  it  is  called  in  the  Civil  Code  of 

-  Blackman  v.   "Welsh,   44:   Mo.   41,  Louisiana,  jactitation,  on  the  ground 

45,  per  Bliss,  J.  that  the  i)laintiff  was  not  in  possession 

3  Macklot  V.   Dubreuil,  9  Mo.  477,  of  the  landj   filed  in   limine  litis,   had 

491,  opinion  by  Napton,  J.  been  dismissed  by  the  court  previous- 

*  DeGraw  v.  Prior,  GO  Mo.  50.  ly  to  the  empaneling   of  the  jury,  —  it 

5  Cornelius  u.  Giberson,  25  N.  J.  L.  was  held  that  the  question  of  posses- 

1,31.  sion  was  not  before  the  jury  for  de- 

^  Ibid.S^.  Where  an  exception  to  the  cision.     Arrowsmith  '•.  Durell,   14  La, 

petition  to  an  action  of  slander  of  title,  Ann.  s49. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVI.]  POSSESSION.  1043 

which  could  be  ascertained  alone  by  a  jury ;  and  in  determining  the 
quo  animo,  the  jury  must  of  course  be  governed  by  their  own  view 
of  the  effect  of  the  evidence.^  Whether  possession  is  adverse  or 
friendly  is  always  a  question  of  intention.  It  is  sufficient  to  pre- 
vent the  possession  being  adverse  that  the  party  taking  posses- 
sion intends  to  occupy  the  lands,  subject  to  the  will  of  the  owner. ^ 
This  intention  will  generally  be  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 
Thus,  where  a  tenant  in  common  morto-aijed  the  whole  estate  and 
remained  in  actual  possession,  it  was  held  that,  if  her  intention 
was  not  to  hold  adversely  to  her  co-tenancy,  the  mortgage  did 
not  operate  as  a  constructive  ouster;  and,  there  being  evidence 
that  her  intention  was  not  to  oust  her  co-tenant,  whether  there 
was  a  constructive  ouster  was  a  cpiestion  for  the  jury.*  It  is 
stated  by  a  modern  writer  of  reputation  that  ' '  the  question 
whether  an  alleged  possession  is  marked  by  the  characteristics 
requisite  to  make  it  adverse,  and  the  foundation  for  a  title  by 
occupancy,  is  not  wholly  a  question  of  law,  and  is  a  question  for 
the  jury,  under  proper  instructions  from  the  court."  ^  Since 
the  celebrated  judgment  of  Lord  ]\Ianstield  in  Taylor  v.  Hords,^ 
it  seems  not  to  have  been  much  doubted  that  disseisin  is  a  fact  to 
be  found  by  a  jury  ;  and  the  general  rule  may  be  stated  that  the 
question  wdiether  a  possession,  under  which  a  defendant  claims,  in 
order  to  perfect  his  title  under  the  statute  of  limitations,  was  an 
open,  notorious  and  adverse  possession,  is  not  exclusively  a  ques- 
tion of  law,  but  one  which  ought  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury 
under  proper  instructions.^  In  many  cases,  in  order  to  tind  this 
ultimate  fact,  it  will  be  necessary  to  determine  whether  the  al- 
leged disseisor  took  or  held  possession  with  the  intent  to  exclude 

1  Magee  r.  Mt\gee,  37  Miss.  138,  154.  the   same  would  exist  over   laud  be- 

-  Criswell     v.     Alteraus,    7  "Watts  lougiug  to  a  public  building.     Putuam 

(Pa.),  581.     So  it  has  been   held  that,  v.  Bowker,  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  54:^. 

whether  the  use  of  a  right  of  loaij  over  ■''  Ante,  §1196,   et  seq. 

laud  attached  to  a  hotel  is  adverse  or  *  Moore  v.  Collishaw,  10  Pa.  St.  225. 

permissive,  is,  in  an  action  of  tort  for  ^  Wood  on  Limitations,  258. 

obstructing  such  a  way,  a  question  of  ^  1  Burr.  GO,  113. 

fact  for  a  jury,  under  proper  instruc-  '  "Webb    v.  Richardsou,  42  Vt.  465, 

tions  from  the  court  as  to  the  nature  472. 

of   adverse  possession,   aud   how  far 


r 


1044 


PKOVIISX'E    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1    ThoUl}).  Tr., 


the  riobts  of  the  prior  owner  or  claimant.  And  it  is  now  invaria- 
bly held  by  American  courts  that  the  question  whether  occupancy 
was  Avitli  an  intent  adverse  to  the  owner,  or  an  intent  to  hold  in 
subordination  to  his  rights,  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury.^ 
"  The  question,"  says  M.  Wood,  "  as  to  what  constitutes  adverse 
possession,  as  well  as  what  evidence  is  necessary  to  establish  it,  is 
for  the  court;  but  the  question  as  to  whether  the  possession  in  a 
<j'iven  case  is  adverse,  or  under  the  owner's  title,  is  for  the  jury; 
and  the  person  setting  up  the  claim  takes  the  burden  of  establish- 
ins;  all  the  requisites  to  make  his  title  by  occupancy  complete. ^ 
But  the  court  may  decline  to  submit  the  question  of  adverse  pos- 
session to  the  jury,  where,  from  the  undisputed  facts,  as  a  matter 
of  law,  no  such  possession  exists."^  In  order  to  bring  a  case 
within  this  definition,  all  the  authorities  concede  that  the  posses- 
sion must  be  so  open,  notorious  and  unequivocal  as  to  impart 
notice  to  the  world  that  it  is  under  an  exclusive  claim  of  right 
made  by  the  possessor,  and  that  the  right  of  the  prior  owner  or 


1  Wood  Lim.,  §  258.    The  following 
cases,  cited  by  Mr.  Wood,  support  the 
doctrine:    Poiguard  v.  Smith,  6  Pick. 
(Mass.)    172;    Hall  v.  Dewey,  10  Vt. 
593;    Jackson  v.  Joy,  9  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
102;  Bradstreet  v.  Huntington,  5  Pet. 
(U.  S.)  402;  Kinsell  v.    Daggett,    11 
Me.    309;     Jackson    v.   Stephens,    13 
Johns.  (N.  Y.)  495;  Coburn  v.  Hollis, 
3  Met.    (Mass.)   125;    Gayette  v.  Be- 
thuue,  14  Mass.  55;  Hopkins  v.  Robin- 
sou,  3  Watts  (Pa.),  205;  Brandt  v.  Og- 
deu,  1  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  ISiJ;  Jackson  ??. 
Sharpe,   9  Id.  1G3;    Jackson  v.  Wheat, 
18  Id.   40;  Jackson  V.  Waters,   12  Id. 
365;     Jackson  v.    Ellis,  13    Id.    118; 
Smith  V.   Burtis,   9  Id.    174;   Jackson 
V.  Newton,    18    Id.    355;    Jackson    v. 
Thomas,  16  Id.  293;  Jones  v.  Porter, 
3  Pen.  &  W.    (Pa.)  132;    McClung  r. 
Koss,   5  Wheat.    (U.  S.)     124;    Cum- 
raings    V.     Wyman,    10    Mass.     464; 
Wallace  v.  Duffield,  2  Serg.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
521;  Schwartz  v.    Kuhn,   10  Me.  274; 
Atherton    r.    .Tolmson,    2    N.    H.  31; 


Muushower  i).  Patton,  10  S.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
334;  Overtield  ^'.  Christie,  lid.  173; 
Boiling  V.  Petersburgh,  3  Rand.  (Ya.) 
563;  Malson  v.  Fry,  1  Watts  (Pa.), 
433;  Bell  y.  Hartley,  4  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.( 
32;  McNairr.  Hunt,  5  Mo.  300;  Rogers 
V.  Madden,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  321;  Bos- 
ton Mill  Corp.  V.  Bulfinch,  6  Mass. 
229;  Bracken  v.  Martin,  3  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  55;  Warren  v.  Childs,  11 
Mass.  222 ;  Read  r.  Goodyear,  17  Serg. 
&R.  (Pa.)  .3.50;  Prayr.  Pierce,  7  Mass. 
383;  Stephens  v.  Dewing,  2  Aik.  (Vt.) 
112. 

2  Herbert  v.  Henrick,  16  Ala.  581; 
Runey  v.  Shoeubergei-,  2  Watts  (Pa.), 
23;  Jones  v.  Porter,  3  Pen.  &  W.  (Pa.) 
132;  Gill  V.  Fauntleroy,  8  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  177;  Baker  w.  Swan,  32 Md.  355; 
Washburn  u.  Cutter,  17  Minn.  361. 

3  Wood  on  Limitations,  §  258 ;  citing 
on  the  last  point:  Argotsinger  v. 
Vines,  82  N.  Y.  308;  Bowie  v.  Bahe,  3 
Duer  (X.  v.),  35:  Nearhoff  r.  Addle- 
man,  31  Pa.  St.  279. 


Tit.  Y,  Ch.  XLVL]  POSSESSION.  1045 

occupier  is  invaded  and  denied  with  an  intention  to  assert  a  claim 
adverse  to  liis.^ 

§  1411.  The  Subject  further  Discussed  and  Illustrated. —  Ex- 
tending, it  would  seem,  this  idea,  it  has  been  ruled  that  if,  by  the 
true  construction  of  a  deed,  a  grant  of  land  extends  beyond  the 
eaves  and  to  the  walls  of  a  house  owned  by  the  grantor,  and  the 
water  is  allowed  for  more  than  20  years  thereafter  to  fall  u})on 
the  granted  land  from  the  ^aves  of  the  house,  —  it  should,  in  an 
action  for  damages  for  a  breach  of  the  covenants  of  warranty  in 
the  deed,  be  submitted  as  a  question  of  fact,  for  the  jury  to  de- 
termine, whether  the  owner  of  the  house  thereby  acquires  a  title 
by  adverse  enjoyment,  or  an  easement,  or  no  riglit  at  all,  in  the 
land  under  the  eaves ;  and  a  verdict  was  set  aside  because  the 
judge  ruled,  as  matter  of  law,  that  the  projection  of  the  eaves  of 
the  ancient  house  over  the  land  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  under 
his  deed  from  the  defendant,  having  continued  over  20  years, 
was  an  adverse  occupation  of  the  land  under  the  eaves,  which 
matured  into  a  right,  so  that  the  land  under  the  eaves  passed  by 
defendant's  deed  to  the  plaintiff.'^  So,  where  the  defendant  in 
ejectment  took  another  person  upon  the  ground  in  dispute, 
rented  the  same  to  him,  and,  after  nailing  up  a  cabin,  which  was 
the  only  building  thereon,  they  retired  together,  charging  a  wit- 
ness who  was  present  not  to  disclose  the  facts,  —  it  was  held  that 
the  question  whether  the  possession  was  changed  should  have 
been  submitted  to  the  jury;  since,  if  the  arrangement  was  color- 
able only,  the  possession  was  not  changed,  and  this  would  be  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^  It  has  been  reasoned  that,  in 
trespass  quare  clausum  with  issue  joined  on  a  plea  of  liberum 
ienemenium,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  ascertain  the  fact  of  adverse  pos- 
session, from  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  applicable  to  that  ques- 
tion, embracing  the  intent  with  which  the  entry  was  made,  the 
nature  of  the  possession,  and  the  acts  of  ownership,  conduct  and 

1  Beatty  v.  Mason,  30  Md.  400 ;  Car-  2  Carbrey  v.  Willis,  7  Allen  (Mass.), 

roll  V.  Gillion,  33  Geo.  539 ;  Thomas  r.  304. 

Babb,  45  Mo.  384;  Soule  v.  Barlow,  49  3  Oliver  v.  Williams,  25  Ga.  217. 

Vt.  329  ;  Paine  v.  Hutchius,  49  Vt.  314. 


1046 


PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND   JURY.       [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 


declarations  of  the  party  under  whom  title  by  possession  ma}'  be 
claimed,^  So,  it  has  been  held  that,  in  ejectment,  where  there 
is  evidence  tending  to  show  some  acts  of  ownership  and  })osses- 
sion,  such  as  a  survey,  a  marking  of  lines  by  blazing  and  felling 
trees,  the  erection  of  buildings,  the  cutting  of  timber,  etc., 
whether  this  is  sufficient  to  establish  possession  is  a  question  for 
the  jury,  and  not  for  the  court. ^  And,  under  any  view  of  the 
question,  it  is  the  province  of  the  jury  to  find,  under  proper  in- 
structions as  to  what  constitutes  possession,  whether  possession 
is  proved;  and  it  has  been  added  that  their  finding  will  not  be 
disturbed  on  error,  unless  manifestly  against  the  evidence.-^ 

§  1412.  Conclusion  that  it  is  a  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and 
Fact.  — It  has  been  said:  "Adverse  possession  is  a  mixed  ques- 
tion of  law  and  fact,  to  be  left  to  the  jury  under  the  instruction 
of  the  court.  Whether  a  given  state  of  facts  exists  which  con- 
stitute adverse  possession,  the  jury  are  to  judge.  But,  assuming 
all  the  facts  proven  to  be  true,  whether  they  amount  to  adverse 
possession,  is  unquestionably  a  matter  of  law  for  the  court  to  de- 
cide." ^ 


1  Keener  v.  Kauffmau,  16  Md.  296, 
307.  The  court  cite  Helms  v.  Howard, 
2  Harr.  &  McH.  (Md.)  76;  Matthews 
V.  Ward,  10  Gill  &  J.  (Md.)  443;  Adams 
Ejectm.  505. 

-  Sharon  v.  Davidson,  4  Nev.  416, 

3  Truesdale  v.  Ford,  37  111.  210. 

■4  Paxson  V.  Bailey,  17  Ga.  GOO. 
For  a  state  of  facts  where  the  court 
refused  to  charge  the  jury  that  a  pos- 
session had  been  proved,  but  submit- 
ted to  them  the  question  on  all  the 
evidence,  see  Gage  v.  Smith,  27 
Conn.  70.  In  an  action  of  ejectment 
in  Pennsylvania,  it  appeared  that  one 
tenant  in  common  was  iudel)ted  to  his 
co-tenants,  and  apparently  insolvent; 
that  the  surviving  owners  and  their 
representatives,  during  nearly  forty 
years,  paid  the  taxes  and  ground  rent 
cf  the  premises,  mortgaged  the  prop- 


erty, and,  at  different  times,  erected 
and  re-erected  buildings  thereon,  suit- 
able for  their  business,  and  received 
the  profits.  It  was  held  that  these 
facts,  though  not  conclusive  evidence 
of  an  ouster  of  the  heirs  of  the  de- 
ceased co-tenant,  should  have  been 
submitted  to  the  jury,  with  the  in- 
struction that,  if  true  and  unexplained, 
they  would  justify  the  finding  of  the 
ouster  which  was  claimed  to  have 
taken  place.  Keyser  v.  Evans,  30  Pa. 
St.  507.  The  court  said:  '•  Considered 
separately,  each  of  these  factt^  may 
have  been  conclusive;  together  they 
bore  powerfully  on  the  result;  for  if 
'  improving  lands,  and  receiving  the 
rents,  issues,  and  profits  thereof,  are 
in  all  cases  the  highest  acts  of  owner- 
ship wliich  can  be  exercised  over 
them,  and  the  exercise  of  these  acts 


Tit.  Y,  Ch.  XLVI.]  possession.  1047 

§  1413.  AVliether  Actual  or  Constructive.  —  It  has  been  said 
that  "what  is  actual,  and  what  is  constructive  possession,  in 
many  cases,  must  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.''''  ^  In  an 
action  of  ejectment,  brought  against  the  defendants  as  trustees  of 
a  church,  it  has  been  held  proper  to  submit  the  question  to  the 
jury,  whether  the  defendants  were  actually  in  possession,  or  only 
constructively  in  possession  as  trustees. ^  So,  in  a  case  where  a 
married  woman,  holding  a  farm  to  her  sole  and  separate  use, 
lived  upon  it  Avith  her  husband  and  family,  he  managing  and  con- 
trolling it  and  taking  the  rents,  profits,  etc.,  for  a  number  of 
years  as  if  he  were  the  absolute  owner,  it  was  held  that  he  must 
be  presumed,  jjrhna  facie,  to  have  had  the  rightful  and  benefi- 
cial possession  of  the  land;  but  if  there  was  doubt  on  the  ques- 
tion, it  was  for  the  jury,  and  not  for  the  court,  to  determine  the 
character  of  his  possession.-^ 

§  1414.  Whether  of  Durjition  and  Character  Necessary  to 
Sustain  a  Prescription.  —  "As  a  general  rule,  the  possession  nec- 
essary to  sustain  a  prescription  is  founded  upon  facts,  which  it 
is  the  province  of  a  jury  to  ascertain."  *  Where  adverse  pos- 
session is  proved  by  parol  testimony  only,  it  is  a  mere  question 
for  the  jury  whether  it  is  continuous.^  The  length  of  time  dur- 
ing which  an  adverse  possession  has  continued,  whether  it  has 
reached  back  beyond  the  date  of  the  possessor's  deed,  and  if  so, 
whether  or  not  he  held  under  such  a  person,  or  by  such  a  claim 

strongly  marks   the  possession  with  cases  where  the  facts  would  be  so  nn- 

exclusiveness    and    hostility  '  (Dike-  equivocal  that  the  judge  in  chargiug 

man  v.  Parrish,  6  Pa.  St.  211),  the  de-  the  jury  could  assume  the  fact  of  pos- 

feudant's    testimony    ought    to    have  session  as  established. 
given  a  preponderance  to  the  scale."  '■'  Lucas  u.  Johnson,  8  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 

Ibid.  510,  opinion  by  Porter,  ,J.  244. 

1  O'Callaghau  v.   Booth,  fi  Cal.  C3,  3  Albiu  v.  Lord,  39  N.  H.  196,  205. 

65.     Under  circumstances,  it  was  held  ■*  Anderson  v.   Bock,    15  How.  (U. 

in  Texas  that,  whether  a  party  was  in  S.)  323;    citing   Ewing   v.  Burnet,    11 

possession  or  not,   could  not  be  as-  Pet.  (U.S.)  41;  Beverly  r.  Burke,  9  Ga. 

sumed  as  a  fact,  by  the  court  in  charg-  440. 

lug  the  jury.     Patrick  v.  Poach,   27  ^  Cunningham  v.  Patton,  6   Pa.  St. 

Tex.   579,   581.      But  this  conclusion  355. 
means  nothing;  since  there  are  many 


1048  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Tliomp.  Tr.,. 

and  color  of  title,  as  to  render  bis  possession  adverse,  —  have 
been  held  questions  for  a  jury.^  -  In  like  manner,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  question  whether  or  not  open  and  exclusive  possession 
by  a  tenant,  continued  for  thirty  years,  Avas  adverse,  is  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury,  on  the  trial  of  a  writ  of  entry,  and  the  judge 
cannot  take  it  from  them  by  directing  a  verdict.'^ 

§  1415.  How  Jury  ixstructed  in  such  a  Case.  — In  such  a  case  it 
has  been  held  proper  to  iastruct  the  jury,  "  that  aright  by  prescription 
could  be  acquired  to  a  way  over  another's  land  by  proof  of  twenty-one 
years'  uninterrupted,  adverse,  or  undisputed  enjoyment  or  use  of  it, 
and  that  this  was  a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine  from  the  evi- 
dence ;  that,  if  the  plaintiff  had  proved  this,  he  was  entitled  to  recover ; 
if  not,  their  verdict  should  be  for  the  defendant."  ^ 

§  1416.  Whether   Common,  Mixed,   or    Exclusive.  —  In    an 

action  of  ejectment,  it  has  been  held  proper  to  submit  all  the 
acts  of  the  party  claiming  possession,  to  the  jury,  under  a  proper 
instruction,  leaving  it  to  them  to  say,  from  the  number,  char- 
acter and  times  of  the  entries  shown  in  evidence,  whether  they 
exhibited  a  common  or  mixed  possession,  and  thus  evidenced  to 
them  that  the  possession  of  the  opposite  party  was  not  exclusive, 
or  whether  they  were  purely  casual  and  accidental,  and  not  done 
in  prosecution  of  his  rights  as  an  owner.  "Any  other  doctrine," 
said  the  court,  "  would  render  the  title  of  adjoining  owners  in- 
secure, and  liable  to  be  divested  by  acts  of  which  the  owner  may 
be  wholly  ignorant.  Where  tracts  are  large  and  woodlands 
extensive,  an  owner  who  sees  an  ax-mark  perhaps  in  the  middle 
of  his  woodland,  may  not  for  an  instant  dream  of  its  being  an 
ear-mark  for  a  survey,  to  be  connected  with  a  distinct  trespass 
by  clearing  upon  the  outskirts  of  his  tract.  If  his  own  ordinary 
use  of  his  woodland,  which  in  such  a  case  may  be  at  very  distant 
intervals,  is  to  be  denominated  a  trespass,  unless  it  carries  with 
it  all  the  solemn  acts  to  characterize  an  entry  to  toll  the  statute 
in  a  case  of  actual  disseisin,  he  may,  at  a  distant  day,  find  him- 

1  Wiggins  V.  Holley,  11  Incl.  2.  ^  gteffy  v.  Carpenter,  37  Pa.  St.  41,, 

2  Eaton  V.  Jacobs,  52  Me.  445,  454.      44. 


Tit.  Y,  Ch.  XL VI.]  possession.  1049 

self  deprived  of  liis  valuable  woodland  by  presumptions  in  favor 
of  a  trespasser,  without  the  benefit  of  the  natural  presumption 
that  flows  from  the  acts  of  an  owner,  never  rightfully  excluded 
from  his  land,  or  prevented  from  thus  using  his  own."  ^ 

§  1417.  Color  of  Title  and  Good  Faith  of  Claimant  there- 
under.— AYliat  constitutes  color  of  title,  within  the  meanino"  of 
statutes  of  limitations,  is  a  question  of  laic;  ^  and,  in  instructing 
the  jury  in  such  a  case,  the  court  should  tell  them  what  constitutes 
color  of  title. '^  Those  claiming  adversely  under  color  of  title  must 
enter  and  occupy  the  land  in  good  failh,  claiming  the  whole  tract, 
and  relying  upon  the  instrument  which  constitutes  color  of  title, 
as  conveying  to  them  the  legal  title.*  And  where  there  is  a  ques- 
tion wdiether  the  deeds  which  are  relied  on  as  constitutins:  color 
of  title  are  taken  in  good  faith,  the  court  should  submit  that 
question  to  the  jiiryJ'  So,  whether  the  claimant  of  land  under 
legislative  grants  was  in  "  occupation  and  actual  possession, 
bona  fide,  and  making  improvements,"  is  a  question  of  fact,  in 
an  action  of  trespass  qnare  dausum.^  But,  color  of  title  being  a 
question  of  law,  it  is  error  to  submit  to  the  jury  the  aggregate 
question  what  is  color  of  title  made  in  good  faith.  Accordingly, 
the  following  instruction  has  been  held  erroneous:  "  That  if  they 
are  satisfied  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant  had  color  of 
title,  made  in  good  faith  to,  and  paid  all  the  taxes  assessed  on, 
the  land  in  controversy,  the  same  being  vacant  and  unoccupied 
for  seven  successive  years  before  the  commencement  of  this 
suit,  he  shall  be  adjudged  the  legal  owner  thereof,  to  the  extent 
and  according  to  the  purport  of  his  paper  title."  ^ 

§   1418.   Territorial    Extent    of    an   Adverse    Possession. — 

Where  there  is  a  deed,  though  the  description  of  the  land  therein 
be  indefinite,  which  purports  to  convey  a  tract  of  land,  and  a 

1  O'Hara  v.  Richardson,  4ii  Pa.  St.  •'  Turner  u.  Hall,  GO  Mo.  271;  Gaines 
385,  391,  opinion  by  Agnew,  J.                    v.   Saunders,  87  Mo.  557;  Woodward 

2  AVoodward  v,  Blanchard,  IG   111,      y.  Blauchard,  IG  III.  42-t. 

424.  6  :MerriIl  v.  Hilliard,  59  N.  H.  481. 

""  Turner  v.  Hall,  60  Mo.  271.  ^  Shackleford  v.  Bailey,  35  111,  387, 

■*  Gaines  v.  Saunders,  87  Mo.  557. 


1050  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  TllOllip.  Tl'., 

survey  made  by  the  grantee  and  a  recorded  plat  describing  the 
exact  tract  claimed  under  the  deed,  and  there  is  some  evidence 
of  constant,  continuous  acts  of  ownership  over  the  whole  tract. — 
the  fact  that  the  recorded  plat  subdivides  the  tract  is  not  conclu- 
sive that  tlie  actual  possession,  maintained  through  one  employed 
to  warn  trespassers  off  the  whole  tract,  is  possession  only  of  the 
subdivision  on  which  the  house  is  situated.  But,  in  such  a  case, 
it  is  for  tlie  jury  to  say  whether  he  took  possession  of  a  part  of 
the  tract,  intending  to  take  possession  of  the  whole,  under  that 
deed,  and  whether  he  exercised  acts  of  ownership,  openly  and 
notoriously,  claiming,  under  that  deed,  the  entire  tract  purporting 
to  be  conveyed  thereby.  ^  It  has  been  ruled,  as  matter  of  law, 
that  the  mere  dumping  of  some  earth,  or  the  piling  and  removing 
of  some  rock,  on  small  fractions  of  a  ten-acre  tract  of  land,  is 
not  a  taking  possession  of  the  entire  tract,  so  as  to  entitle  such  a 
possessor  to  maintain  a  possessory  action  therefor.^ 

§  1419.  Ouster  of   one  Co-tenant   by  the  Other. — Where 
a  co-tenant  has  been  long  in  possession,  receiving  to  his  own  use 

1  McElhiuuey  v.  Kraus,  10  Mo.  App.  ~  Kenuedy  v.  Prueitt,  24  Mo.  App. 
218.  Ill  determiniug  the  question  of  414.  lu  this  case  it  was  said  by  Rom- 
adverse  possession,  the  payment  of  bauer,  J.,  in  giving  the  opinion  of  the 
taxes,  by  the  person  asserting  title  by  court:  "  We  can  clearly  see  the  difR- 
such  possession,  is  a  fact  which  may,  culty  under  w^hich  the  trial  court  la- 
with  other  circumstances,  be  cousid-  l)ored  In  an  attempt  to  distinguish 
ered  by  the  jury.  Draper  v.  Shoot,  25  possession  as  a  matter  of  law,  from 
Mo.  197.  See  also  Turner  v.  Hall,  (lO  possession  as  a  matter  of  fact.  In 
Mo.  271;  Gaines  v.  Saunders,  87  Mo.  many  cases  tlie  boundary  between  the 
557,  504.  That  an  adverse  possession  two  questions  is  so  indistinctthatit  is 
of  apartmay  be  considei'edas  extend-  dilHcult  to  decide,  Avithout  a  close 
ing  to  the  whole  of  a  tract  of  laud,  see  analysis  of  the  testimony,  which  the 
Fugate  V.  Pierce,  49  Mo.  441;  Turner  haste  of  a  jury  trial  does  not  admit  of, 
V.  Hall,  60  Mo.  271;  Long  v.  Higgin-  on  which  side  of  the  boundary  the 
botham,  56  Mo.  245;  St.  Louis  Agri-  case  lies.  That  analysis,  which  we 
cultural  &c.  Association  v.  Reinecke,  were  enabled  to  make  with  care,  has 
21  Mo.  App,  478.  What  acts  of  pos-  satisfied  us,  that  the  plaintiff,  under 
session  will  enable  a  claimant  to  main-  the  evidence,  is  not  entitled  to  judg- 
tain  forcible  entry  and  detainer  against  ment  as  a  matter  of  law."  Ihtd.,  page 
a  subsequent  intruder.  See  St.  Louis  420. 
Agricultural  &c.  Association  v.  Rein- 
ecke, 21  Mo.  App.  478. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVI.]  POSSESSION.  1051 

the  rents  accruing  from  the  property,  and  this  has  been  acquiesced 
in  by  the  other  co-tenant,  it  is  a  question  for  a  jury  under  all 
the  circumstances,  whetier  there  has  been  an  ouster  by  the  one 
co-tenant  of  the  other,  and  a  possession  by  the  former  held  ad- 
versely to  the  latter.^  If  a  tenant  in  common,  being  in  posses- 
sion of  the  land,  conveys  it  with  a  covenant  of  warranty  against 
all  claims  and  demands,  possession  under  the  deed  will  be  adverse 
to  the  title  of  the  co-tenants  of  the  grantor.  In  such  a  case,  if 
the  fact  is  found  that  the  possession  of  the  grantee  is  under  a 
deed,  it  is  the  legal  conclusion  that  his  possession  is  adverse,  and 
the  question  is  not  for  the  jury ? 

§  1420.  Abandonment  of  a  Prior  Possession.  —  In  an  action 
of  unlawful  detainer,  in  which  the  only  question  is  whether  the 
defendant's  conceded  prior  possession  had  been  abandoned  before 
the  plaintiff's  entry  upon  the  land,  the  question  of  abandonment 
is  one  of  fact  ^"^ 

§  1421.  Surrender  of  Title  to  a  Chattel  acquired  by  Adverse 
Possession.  —  On  the  same  principle,  it  has  been  held  that,  if  a 
husband,  having  acquired  title  to  a  chattel  by  adverse  possession 
against  the  true  owner,  verbally  consents  to  the  execution  of  a 
deed  of  gift  by  the  latter,  conveying  the  chattel  to  a  trustee  for 
the  benefit  of  the  husband's  wife  and  children,  it  will  be,  in  an 
action  of  detinue  for  the  chattel,  a  question  for  the  jury  whether 
the  husband's  prescriptive  title  was  thereby  surrendered ;  and 
that  an  instruction,  asserting  that  such  consent  would  not  di- 
vest the  title  acquired  under  the  statute  of  limitations,  was  an 
invasion  ot  the  province  of  the  jury.* 

1  Robidoux    V.    Cassilesi,    10    Mo.  2  Newmarket  Man.  Co.    v.  Peuder- 

App.   51(;,    h-1-1.     As   to   what  will   be  gast,  21  N.  H.  54,  69.     The  court  cite : 

evidence  of  an  ouster  of  oue  co-teuaut  Kittredge    v.    Pi'oprietors,     17    Pick, 

by  another,  sufflcieut  to  take  the  ques-  (Mass.)    246;  Parker  ?;.   Proprietors, 

tion  to  the  jury    whether  there   has  &c.,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  91. 

been  an  ouster  and  an  adverse  posses-  ^  Brown  u.  McCormick,  23  Mo.  App. 

sion,   see   Warfield  v.  Lindell,  30  Mo.  181;  post,  §  1435,  et  seq. 

272;  s.  c.  38  Mo,  561;  Lapeyre  v.  Paul,  ^  Lucas    v.    Daniels,    34   Ala.    188, 

47  Mo  586,  Circurastauceg  ruder  which  the  aues- 


1052  PEOVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  ThoiUp.   Tr., 

§  1422.  Possession  of  Land  Sufficient  to  affect  Strangers 
with  Notice.  —  Where  the  possession  under  a  deed  is  open,  no- 
torious and  unequivocal,  it  will  affect  strangers  to  the  deed  with 
notice  thereof,  in  like  manner  as  would  the  recording  of  the  deed 
under  the  operation  of  the  recording  acts.^  The  reason  of  the 
rule  is  that,  whatever  79i<^s  a  jjerson  upon  inquiry  as  to  a  fact  is 
equivalent  in  law  to  actual  notice.  But  it  is  obvious  that  cases 
may  arise  within  this  rule,  where  the  evidence  as  to  the  character 
of  the  possession  may  be  so  conflicting  and  may  leave  the  con- 
clusion in  so  much  doubt,  that  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
submit  the  question  to  the  jury,  whether  the  possession,  with  its 
surrounding  facts,  is  of  such  a  character  as  to  put  a  prudent  man 
upon  inquiry  as  to  the  title  of  the  alleged  possessor. 

§  1423.  Precedents  op  Instructions  as  to  Adverse  Possession 
UNDER  Color  of  Title.  —  "  That  if  the  tenants,  under  their  respective 
leases  from  Kittredge,  occupied  and  cultivated  to  the  T^'ler  line,  in  such 
a  manner  as  the  owners  of  such  land  would  ordinarily  occupy  and  cul- 
tivate, and  such  an  occupation  had  continued  for  the  period  of  thirty 
years,  it  woukl  constitute  such  an  adverse  possession  as  would  bar  the 
demandant's  right  to  recover."  ^ 

§  1424.  [Continued.]  Successorship  of  Adverse  Possession  under 
Color  of  Title.  —  "  That  the  possession  of  the  premises  by  said  lessees, 

tion   in    whose     possession   personal  ^  Approved  in   Eeed   v.  Proprietors 

property  was  at  the  time   of  the  levy,  &c.,  8  How.  (U.  S  )  274,  291.  In  Peuu- 

was  lield  a  question  of  fact  to  be  left  .sylvania,  a  cliarge  to  the  jury,  inauac- 

to  tlie  jury.     Ohlseu  v.  Mauderfeld,  28  tiou  of  ejectiueut,  that  they  would  de- 

Minu.  390.  termine  whether  or  not  the  tenants  of 

1  Jacques  u.  Weeks,  7  Watts  (Pa.),  the  laud  in  question  were  holding  un- 
261,  27G;  Daniels  v.  Davison,  16  Ves.  der  lawful  authority,  or  as  tenants  un- 
249;  s.  c.  17  Ves.  433;  Kerr  t?.  Day,  der  the  plaintiff,  aud,  if  the  latter,  that 
14  Pa.  St.  112,  117;  Hood  v.  Fahne-  the  actiou  would  uot  lie  if  no  notice 
stock,  1  Pa.  St.  470,  474;  Sailor  v.  to  quit  had  been  given,  or  demand  of 
Hertzog,  4  Whart.  (Pa.)  259;  Krider  possession  made,  is  correct,  and  it  is 
u.  Lafferty,  1  Whart.  (Pa.)  303,  318;  also  proper  in  such  action  to  leave  the 
Green  v.  Drinker,  7  Watts  &  S.  (Pa.)  question  of  possession  to  the  jury. 
440.  Logan    v.    Quigley     (Penu.),    11    Atl. 

2  Hottenstein  v.  Lerch,  104  Pa.    St.  Rep.  92. 
454,  4G3. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL VI.]  POSSESSION.  1053 

under  the  lease,  was  the  possession  of  Kittredge,  the  lessor,  and  his  heirs, 
he  claiming  to  have  a  deed  which  included  them,  and  having  turned  Mel- 
vin  out  of  possession  ;  if  it  was  of  such  a  character  as  amounted  to  a 
disseisin,  it  would  in  law,  inure  to  the  benefit  of  Kittredge  and  his 
heirs,  and  would  be  the  disseisin  and  adverse  possession  of  the 
lessor."  ^ 

§  14:25.  The  same  Subject  Continued. — "If  the  possession  of 
Cheever  and  Thissel,  in  1796,  under  Kittredge,  included  the  demanded 
premises,  and  tlie  same  possession  had  been  continued  by  the  subsequent 
lessees,  as  the  evidence  tended  to  show  it  had  been,  down  to  the  entry 
of  the  heirs  of  Melvia  and  wife,  in  1832,  it  constituted  in  law  such  a 
continuity  of  possession  as  would  bar  the  demandant's  right  to  re- 
cover." ^ 

§  1426.  Similar  Instructions  under  Missouri  Statute.  —  "  If  de- 
fendants, and  those  under  whom  they  claim,  have  had  adverse  posses- 
sion of  so  much  of  the  premises  described  in  the  petition  as  is  covered 
by  the  building  of  defendants,  and  said  possession  was  open,  notorious 
and  hostile,  under  claim  of  title,  and  continuous  for  more  than  ten 
years  prior  to  the  institution  of  this  suit,  on  February  27th,  1864,  then 
the  plaintiffs  cannot  recover  the  portion  of  said  premises  so  covered  by 
said  building."  ^ "  The  court  declares  the  law  to  be,  that,  in  or- 
der to  divest  the  title  to  the  land  in  plaintiff 's  petition  mentioned,  out 
of  the  plaintiff  and  vest  it  in  the  defendant,  by  reason  of  his  adverse 
possession,  that  possession  must  be  actual,  visible,  notorious  and  hos- 
tile, continuous  and  uninterrupted,  under  a  claim  of  title,  for  a  period 

of  ten  years  next  preceding  the  commencement  of  this  suit."  ^ "If 

the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  and  those  through 
whom  he  obtained  possession  of  the  property  sued  for,  had  had  a  con- 
tinuous possession  thereof  for  twenty  years  next  before  the  commence- 
ment of  this  suit,  claiming  the  same  as  their  own, —  then  they  should  find 
for  the  defendant  as  against  each  of  the  plaintiffs,  who  has  not  proved 

1  Approved  in  Keed  v.  Proprietors  St.    Louis,   54   Mo.    lOG.     There  is   a 
«S:c.,  8  How.  (U.  S.)  274,  291.  similar  iustriictiou  iu  the  same  case, 

2  Approved  in  Reed  v.  Proprietors  ou  the  theory  of  a  limitation  of  twenty 
&c.,  8  How.  (U.  S.)    274,   291.     Com-  years. 

pare  Melvia  v.  Proprietors  &c.,  16  Pick.  4  Approved   iu  Dalby  v.  Snuffer,  57 

(Mass.)  IGl;  also  5  Met.  (Mass.)  15.  Mo.  29G. 

3  Approved  iu  Daltou  v.  Bauk   of 


1054  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thoilip.   Tr., 

herself  or  himself  either  under  twenty-one  years  of  age,  or  a  married 
woman,  at  the  commencement  of  such  possession  ;  and  the  burden  of 
l)roofis  upon  each  of  the  plaintiffs  claiming  to  have  been  under  such 
age,  or  a  married  woman  at  the  commencement  of  such  possession,  to 
prove  it  affirmatively  ;  and  until  it  be  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 

jur}',  the  contrary  thereof  should  be  presumed  by  the  jury. If  the 

jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant,  and  those  through 
whom  he  obtained  possession  of  the  land  sued  for,  had  had  such  a 
length  of  possession  thereof  next  before  the  commencement  of  tliis  suit, 
as  described  in  instruction  marked  A,  claiming  the  same  as  their  own, 
after  the  plaintiff,  Emily  Dessaunier  was  at  the  age  of  at  least  twenty- 
one  years  and  unmarried,  they  should  find  for  the  defendant  as  to 

her. If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the  defendant, 

and  those  through  whom  he  obtained  possession  of  the  land  sued  for, 
had  had  sucli  a  length  of  such  a  possession  thereof  next  before  the  com- 
mencement of  this  suit,  as  described  in  instruction  marked  A,  claiming 
the  same  as  their  own,  after  Margaret  Mallet,  mother  of  the  plaintiffs 
named  Mallet,  was  of  the  age  of  at  least  twenty-one  years  and  unmar- 
ried, and  that  neither  she  nor  her  husband  was  ever  in  possession  of 
said  land,  and  that  the  same,  at  and  before  her  death,  was  in  possession 
of  others  claiming  the  same  as  their  own,  —  then  they  should  find  for  the 
defendant."  ^ 

§  1427.  Instructions  on  Theory  of  Acquisition  of  a  Fee  by 
Twenty  Years'  adverse  Possession. — "If  the  jury  find  from  the 
evidence  that  N.  P.  Taylor  took  actual  possession,  fenced  in  the  whole 
of  the  Gcncraux  tract  in  1836,  and  that  he  and  his  heirs  continued  in 
such  actual  possession  for  more  than  twenty  years  thereafter,  and  that 
said  tract  embraced  and  covered  the  premises  in  dispute,  —  such  pos- 
session was  effectual  to  convey  to  said  Taylor  and  his  representatives 
all  the  right  and  title  confirmed  to  Faustin  dit  Parent  or  his  represen- 
tatives, and  such  possession  vested  in  said  Taylor  and  his  representa- 
-  tives  the  documentary  titles  set  up  by  Polk  and  others  under  said 
Parent  or  Faustin   and   given   in  evidence  by  the   defendants  in  this 

case. If  N.   P.  Taylor   and  his   representative  took   the   actual 

possession  of  the  Generaux  tract,  by  fencing  up  the  whole  of  it,  and 
held  such  possession,  claiming  the  tract  in  fee,  for  more  than  twenty 
years  prior  to  the  entry  of   the  defendants,  and  those  under  whom  they 

1  Approved  in  Dessaunier  v.  Murphy,  33  Mo.  IIH,  192. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVI.]  POSSESSION.  1055 

claim,   such   possession   vested  the  fee  iu  said    Taylor's    representa- 
tives." i 

§  1428.  Adverse  Possession  of  Personal  Property  —  Instruction 
ON  the  Theory  of  Five  Years'  Adverse  Possession.  —  "In  order  to 
estabhsh  the  title  of  the  propert}'  in  controversy  in  Charles  W.  Kiel- 
mann,  at  the  time  of  the  execution  and  delivery  of  the  Mertens  mort- 
gage, by  possession,  it  must  appear  from  the  evidence  that  the  said 
Kielraann,  for  at  least  five  years  prior  to  such  execution  and  delivery, 
was  in  actual,  continuous,  exclusive  and  notorious  possession  thereof."  - 

§  1429.  [Continued.]  Instruction  on  the  Theory  that  Adverse 
Possession  must  have  been  "  Continuous  and  Unequivocal."  —  "It 
is  not  sufficient,  to  constitute  the  possession  referred  to  iu  the  preceding 
instruction,  that  the  said  Charles  W.  Kielmann  should  have  occasionally 
used  such  property  for  the  purposes  of  a  printing  oflSce,  during  a  period 
of  time  equal  to  five  j^ears  or  more  ;  but  such  possession,  in  order  to 
bind  the  true  owner,  must  have  been  continuous  and  unequivocal."  ^ 

§  1430.  Another  Instruction  on  the  Same  Hypothesis. — "If  it 
appear  from  the  evidence  that,  at  the  time  of  the  delivery  to  plaintiff's 
vendor  of  the  Kielmann  mortgage,  the  title  to  the  property  so  sold  was 
in  some  person  other  than  the  mortgager  Charles  W.  Kielmann,  then 
the  issues  must  be  found  for  defendant,  unless  it  also  appear  that  the 
said  personal  property  was  placed  in  possession  of  said  mortgager  by 
such  actual  owner,  and  such  possession,  so  acquired,  had  remained  in 

1  Farrar  v.  Heiurich,   86  Mo.    521,  adverse  possession:  for  such   is  the 

527.  Although  this  case  was  decided  in  settled  law  of  this  State."     /6 id.  530. 

favor  of  the  defendants,  yet  the  court  The  court  cite:  Banku.  Evans,  51  Mo. 

approved  the  principle  embodied  iu  the  335;  Shepley  v.   Cowan,  52   Mo.  559; 

two  above  instructions.     Ray,  J.,  iu  Barry  u.  Otto,  5G  Mo.  117;  Ridgeway  r. 

giving  tlie  opinion  of  the  court,  said:  Holliday,  51)   Mo.  144.     The  case  was 

"  It  is  contended  by  the  plaintiffs,  aud  decided  on  the  ground  that  the  younger 

riglitfully    so    contended,     that    the  title    under    which    the     defendants 

actual,  adverse,  open  and  continuous  claimed  was  good, 
possession  of  the  tract  in  question,  by  -  In  Mertens  v.  Kielmann,  79  Mo. 

the  plaintiffs  and  those  under  whom  412,  it  was  held  error  to  refuse  this 

they  claim,  from   1836  to    1860,  under  instruction. 

claim  and  color  of  title,  will  not  only  ^  I^  Mertens  v.  Kielmann,  79  Mo. 

bar  a  recovery    by     those     claiming  412,  it  was  held  error  to  refuse  this 

under  an  older  title,  but  will  also  con-  instruction. 
fer  title   on   those   claiming   by   such 


1056 


PKOVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOmp.   Tl'., 


such  mortgager  for  at  least  the  space  of  five  years,  without  demand, 
made  and  pursued  b}'  due  process  of  law,  on  the  part  of  such  owner."  ^ 


1  lu  Merteus  v.  Kielmanu,  79  Mo. 
412,  41G,  it  was  held  error  to  refuse 
this  instruction.  In  the  course  of  its 
opinion  the  court  say :  "  We  are  aware 
that  it  is  held  in  this  State,  as  else- 
wliere,  that  a  mortgagee  of  chattels, 
after  breach  of  the  condition,  is  en- 
titled to  the  possession  of  the  property. 
Eobinson  v.  Campbell,  8  Mo.  365; 
Bowens  v.  Benson,  57  Mo.  26.  And 
'  a  mortgagee  may  maintain  replevin 
against  the  mortgager  for  the  prop- 
erty before  the  maturity  of  the  mort- 
gage debt,  if  there  be  no  agreement  in 
the  mortgage  that  the  mortgager 
shall  retain  possession.'  Jones  on 
Chattel  Mort.,  §  442.  But,  '  to  sustain 
an  action  by  a  mortgagee  agaiust  a 
mortgagor  for  an  unlawful  detention 
of  the  mortgaged  property,  as  distin- 
guished from  an  unlawful  taking  of 
it,  the  mortgagee  must  show  a  demand 


for  it  and  a  refusal  to  deliver  it.' 
Jones  Chattel  Mort.,  §  443.  From 
the  terms  of  the  mortgage  in  question, 
it  is  fairly  inferal^le  that  the  mort- 
gagor was  to  retain  possession  of  the 
mortgaged  property  until  the  matur- 
ity of  the  note  secured  by  it.  But,  un- 
der the  authorities,  it  is  immaterial 
whether,  by  the  mortgage,  he  was  or 
not  entitled  to  the  possession  of  the 
property  until  breach  of  the  condition 
of  the  mortgage.  No  demand  of  pos- 
session of  the  property  was  made  of 
the  mortgager,  who  died  before  the 
maturity  of  the  note,  or  of  the  de- 
fendant, who  succeeded  to  the  mort- 
gager's possession,  until  after  the 
sale  of  the  mortgaged  property  under 
the  mortgage,  and  the  statute  of  lim- 
itations did  not  begin  to  run  against 
the  mortgagee  until  that  demand  and 
refusal  occurred." 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVIl.j     waiver:  abandonment.  1057 


CHAPTER     XLYII. 

WAIVEE:   ABANDONMENT:   LACHES:   ACQUIESCENCE. 

Section 

1435.  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and  Fact. 

1436.  "Waiver  of  Conditions  in  Contracts. 

1437.  Laches. 

1438.  Waiver  in  Legal  Proceedings  a  Matter  ot  Law. 

1439.  Abaudoumeut  of  a  Contract. 

1440.  Abandonment  of  Eights. 

1441.  Abandonment  of  Pre-emption  or  Claim  of  Public  Lands. 

1442.  The  Same  Subject  Continued. 

1443.  Waiver  of  Vendor's  Lien. 

1444.  Abandonment  of  a  Public  Office. 

1445.  Waiver  by  Administrator  of  Copy  of  Claim  against  an  Estate. 

1446.  Waiver  by  a  Creditor  of  his  Eight  to  Eescind  a  Composition  Agreement. 

1447.  Waiver  cannot  Take  Place  without  Knowledge. 

1448.  Instructions  as  to   What  Constitutes  Abandonment  of  Eeal  Estate  in 

Action  of  Ejectment. 

§  1435.  Mixed  Question  of  Law  and  Fact.  —  It  is  said  that 
the  question  what  amounts  to  a  waiver  is,  in  all  cases,  a  mixed 
question  of  law  and  fact,  to  be  determined  by  the  jury,  under 
proper  instructions  from  the  court ;  ^  but  this  is  not  strictly  true, 
as  will  presently  appear.  Again,  it  is  said:  "If  it  be  conceded 
that  there  may  be  cases  w^here  the  declarations  or  acts  of  the 
parties  to  a  contract  are  so  express  or  unequivocal,  that  it  would 
not  only  be  practical  and  competent,  but  even  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  determine,  as  a  matter  of  law,  that  certain  rights  had 
been  waived  and  could  no  longer  be  insisted  on,  those  cases  are 
very  rare;  because  a  question  of  waiver  is  one  of  intention,  and 
most  usually  depends  on  acts  or  declarations  which,  in  regard  to 
their  character,  are  of  an  inconclusive  or  doubtful  nature,  and 
furnish  only  evidence  of  intention  and  grounds  of  inference  and 

1  Trayuor  i;.  Johnson,  1  Head  (Tenn.),  51,  55. 
67 


1058  PROVINCE  OF  couKT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tl'., 

deduction,  which  it  is  the  proper  province  of  a  jury  to  consider."  ^ 
On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  held  that,  where  all  the  facts  and 
circumstances  upon  which  a  waiver  is  predicated  are  admitted,  a 
party  has  the  right  to  ask  the  court  to  instruct  the  jury  whether 
the  evidence  is  sufBeient  to  establish  a  waiver  or  not.^ 

§  1J:36.  Waiver  of  Conditions  in  Contracts.  —  AVhether  there 
has  been  a  waiver  of  the  conditions  of  a  contract  is,  where  the 
question  depends  upon  declarations  or  conduct,  a  question  of  fact 
for  a  jury.^  But  wdien  the  question  of  waiver  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  an  inspection  of  a  writing,  it  is  a  question  for  the  court. ^ 
Again,  if  the  facts  are  established  and  are  unequivocal  in  their 
character,  the  court  may  say  whether  there  has  been  such  a 
waiver,  as  a  mere  conclusion  of  law.  Thus,  where  one  stipulated,, 
for  a  compensation  to  go  to  another  State  and  take  three  slaves, 
supposed  to  be  in  the  possession  of  some  person  there,  and  deliver 
them  to  their  owner  in  Mobile,  no  time  for  their  delivery  being 
fixed,  it  was  held  it  could  not  be  assumed  as  a  legal  conclusion 
that  the  acceptance  by  the  owner  of  two  of  the  slaves  was  a  waiver 
of  the  entire  fulfillment  of  the  contract,  but  that  it  should  be  left 
to  the  jury  to  determine  whether,  under  the  circumstances,  such 
acceptance  was  intended  as  a  waiver.^  Contrary,  it  would  seem, 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  last  case,  it  has  been  held  in  Illinois,  in  an 
action  upon  a  contract  indorsed  upon  a  lease,  by  which  the  defend- 
ant guaranteed  the  payment  of  rent  reserved  thereunder,  that 
whether  a  new  agreement,  made  during  the  term  of  this  lease, 
between  the  lessor  and  lessee,  regarding  the  terms  of  renting  the 
premises,  constituted  a  waiver  or  surrenderof  the  original  lease, — 
that  is  whether  it  was  so  intended  by  the  parties,  —  was  properly 
left  to  the  jur>/.^ 

1  Fitch  V.  Woodruff  Iron  "Works,  29  Hale  Man.  Co.  v.  American  Saw  Co., 
Conn.  82,  91.     Tliat  i7itent  is  a  qiies-      43  Mich.  250. 

tion  for  the  jury,  see  ante,  §  1333,  et  *  Mowry  v.  Wood,  12  "Wis.  414. 

seq.  5  "Wolfe    V.   Parhuni,    18   Ala.    442, 

2  Spring  Garden  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  v.      450. 

Evans,  9  Md.  1,  20.  6  White    v.    AValker,    31    HI.    422, 

3  Chapman  v.  Colby,  47   Mich.  40 ;      423. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLYIL]     waiver:   abandonment.  -  1059 

§  1437.  Laches.  — This  word  is  employed  by  courts  of  equity 
to  desiguate  that  negligence  in  bringing  an  action  or  otherwise 
asserting  one's  right,  which  will  preclude  him  from  obtaining  the 
aid  of  such  a  court.  As  the  ordinary  procedure  of  such  courts 
takes  place  without  a  jury,  whether  the  party  has  been  guilty  of 
lau^ies  will,  of  course,  be  decided  by  the  chancellor,  subject  to 
review  on  appeal.  In  courts  of  law,  no  delay  in  asserting  one's 
right  by  an  action,  unless  it  reach  the  period  of  the  statute  of 
limitations,  will  operate  as  a  bar  to  his  right  though  such  delay 
may  be  an  evidential  fact  against  the  plaintiff,  where  he  asserts  a 
stale  and  disputed  claim.  In  a  case  in  Michigan,  which  was  an 
action  at  law  for  a  deceit  and  wrongful  conversion,  it  was  said: 
"  Delay  alone,  while  it  may  have  some  bearing  on  the  fraud  as 
affecting  the  plaintiff's  conduct,  cannot  be,  in  a  court  of  law,  a 
bar  to  suit,  unless  coming  within  the  statute  of  limitations  appli- 
cable to  such  cases.  In  all  controversies  not  within  the  statute, 
ivaiver,  if  relied  on,  is  a  question  of  fact  and  not  of  law."  ^ 
Outside  of  cases  calling  for  the  application  of  the  equitable  doc- 
trine in  respect  of  laches,  the  question  whether  a  party  has  lost 
his  rights  by  his  laches,  or  by  acquiescence  in  the  conduct  of 
another,  may,  on  the  principle  first  stated  above,  be  a  question 
of  fact,  the  decision  of  which,  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting, 
will  not  be  a  subject  of  review  on  error  or  appeal.^ 

§   1438.  Waiver  ill  Legal  Proceecling.s  a  Matter  of  Law. — 

There  are  many  cases  where  the  doing  of  certain  acts  are  held 
to  amount  to  a  waiver  as  a  matter  of  law.  A  familiar  illustra- 
tion of  this  is  in  the  case  where  the  defendant  in  an  action,  who 
has  not  been  duly  served  with  process,  appears  and  contests  the 
merits.  Here,  by  his  voluntary  appearance,  he  waives  any  de- 
fect in  the  process  which  was  sued  out  for  the  purpose  of  brino;- 
ing  him  before  the  court  against  his  will.'^     In  many  other  cases 

1  Dayton  ('.  Monroe,  47  Mich.  195,  States,  3  Pet.  (U.  S.)  459;  Gracie  v. 
opiuiou  by  Campbell,  J.  Palmer,  8  Wheat.  (U.  S.)  (399;  Pollard 

2  Combs  V.  Smith,  78  Mo.  32,  40.  v.   Dwight,   4    Crauch    (U.    S.),  421; 

3  Shields  v.  Thomas,  18  How.  (U.  Knox  v.  Summers,  3  Cranch  (U.  S.), 
S.)  253;  United  States  v.  Yates,  6  496;  Leegee  r.  Thomas,  1  Blatchf.  (U. 
How.    (U.    S.)  G05;  Farrar  v.  United  S.)  11 ;  Fields  u.  Gibbs,l  Pet.  C.  C.  (U. 


1060 


rKOVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOllip.    Tl'., 


in  legal  proceedings  the  parties  are  held,  by  particular  conduct  or 
admissions,  conclusively  to  have  waived  rights,  which  otherwise 
they  might  have  insisted  upon.^  In  general,  it  is  said  that,  where 
jurisdiction  or  the  power  to  act  exists,  and  the  only  objection  to 
its  exercise  is  one  intended  for  the  benefit  and  protection  of  the 
party  complaining  thereof,  such  objection  must  be  taken  at  the 
earliest  practicable  opportunity,  after  the  party  or  his  counsel 
is  aware  of  its  existence,  or  it  will  be  regarded  as  waived  by  the 
omission  or  neglect  to  urge  it  as  soon  as  possible. ^  Perhaps  the 
most  frequent  application  of  this  principle  is  that  pleas  in  abate- 
ment must  be  filed  in  limine  or  they  will  be  taken  to  have  been 
waived.  ^  In  general,  an  appearance  and  pleading  to  the  declara- 
tion amounts  to  a  waiver  of  all  precedent  irregularities,  ^  and  the 
defendant  will  not,  under  such  circumstances,  be  heard  to  say  that 
he  was  not  notified  by  service  of  process,^  or  that  irregularities 
existed  in  previous  orders  of  continuance.'' 


S.)  155;  Carringtou  u  Brents,  1  Mc- 
Lean, (U.  S.),  174;  Suydara  w  Pitcher, 
4  Cal.  280;  Payne  v.  Farmers'  Bank, 
29  Conn.  415;  Deputy  v.  Belts,  4  Harr. 
(Del.)  352;  Crull  v.  Keener,  18  111.  (15; 
Abbott  V.  Semple,  25  111.  107;  Cruik- 
shankv.  Coggswell,  26  111.  366;  Rob- 
erts V.  Thompson,  28  111.  79;  Miles  v. 
Goodwin,  35  111.  53;  Eldredge  v.  Fol- 
well,  3  Blackf.  (Ind.)  208;  Brayton  w. 
Freese,  1  Ind.  121;  Little  v.  Vance,  14 
Ind.  22;  Bell  v.  Piersoa,  1  la.  21; 
Lorriner  v.  Bank  of  111.,  1  la.  223; 
Hall  V.  Biever,  1  la.  113;  Harriss  v. 
Guiu,  10  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  563; 
Winchester  v.  Cox,  3  Iowa,  575; 
Chouteau  v.  Eice,  1  Minn.  192;  Lewis 
V.  Nuckols,  26  Mo.  278;  State  v. 
Woolery,  39  Mo.  525;  Fox  v.  Reed,  3 
Grant  (Pa.),  81;  Anderson  u.  Morris, 
12  Wis.  689. 

1  Illustrations  of  this  will  be  found 
in  the  following  cases:  Ransom  v.  City 
of  New  York,   20  How.  (U.  S.)  581: 


Selby  V.  Hutchinson,  0  111.  319;  Gunn 
V.  Gudehus,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  447; 
Gushing  v.  Babcock,  38  Me.  452 ;  Hig- 
ley  V.  Laut,  3  Mich.  612;  Warren  v. 
Glyun,37  N.  H.  340 ;  Dale  v.  Radcliffe,  25 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  333;  Gordon  v.  Inghram, 
1  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.)  152;  Belknap  v. 
Godfrey,  22  Vt.  288;  Pulling  v.  Super- 
visors, 3  Wis.  337. 

2  Warren  v.  Glynu,  37  N.  H.  340. 

3  Hartz  V.  Com.,  1  Grant  Cas.  (Pa.) 
359;  Preston  u.  Simons,  1  Rich.  L.  (S. 
C.)  262;  Morgan  v.  Houston,  6  Yerg. 
(Tenn.)  314;  Pearce  v.  Young,  AValk. 
(Miss.)  259. 

4  Stanley  v.  Bank  of  Mobile,  23  Ala. 
652,  656;  Moore  v.  Phillips,  8  Porter 
(Ala.)  467;  Hobsou  v.  Emanuel,  8 
Porter  (Ala.)  442. 

*  Crawford  v.  Branch  Bank,  7  Ala. 
205. 

«  Stanley  v.  Bank  of  Mobile,  23  Ala. 
652,  655. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVII.]       waiver:    ABANDONMENT.  1O6I 

§  1439.  Abandonment  of  a  Contract. — What  amounts  to  au 
abandonment  of  a  contract  is  a  tuatter  of  law,  and  the  court 
should  instruct  the  jury  as  to  the  legal  effect  of  the  facts  which 
they  may  find,  bearing  upon  the  question,  and  not  leave  it  to 
them  to  say,  without  such  instruction,  whether  a  contract  has 
been  abandoned  or  not.^  In  other  words,  where  an  act,  or  cer- 
tain specific  acts,  are  relied  on  to  show  an  abondonment  of  a 
contract  by  one  of  the  parties  to  it,  it  is  proper  for  the  court  to 
declare  whether  such  act  or  acts  constitute  an  abandonment.^ 
The  principle  is  said  to  be  this:  "  Where  a  contract  is  entire, 
and  not  made  divisible  by  its  terms,  one  of  the  parties  cannot 
take  advantage  of  his  own  default,  either  from  laches  or  willful 
refusal  to  perform  his  part,  for  the  purpose  of  putting  the  con- 
tract out  of  the  way,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  maintain  assumpsit 
on  the  common  counts,  and  therefore  evade  the  rule  that,  while 
the  special  contract  is  in  force,  general  assumpsit  will  not  lie; 
and  the  contract  is  considered  to  remain  in  force  until  it  is  re- 
scinded by  mutual  consent,  or  until  the  opposite  })arty  does  some 
act  inconsistent  with  the  duty  imposed  upon  him  by  the  con- 
tract, which  amounts  to  an  abandonment;"  and  that,  what 
amounts  to  an  abandonment  is  a  question  of  law,  and  it  is  error 
to  submit  such  a  question  to  a  jury.^  In  like  manner,  it  has  been 
said  that  ^'■ihQ  abandonment  of  a  claim  may  become  and  does 
become,  when  the  facts  of  the  cases  are  admitted,  a  conclusion 
of  law  from  the  facts,  to  be  applied  by  the  court,  and  not  left  to 
the  discretion  of  the  jury."  * 

§  1440.  Abandonment  of  Rights.  —  The  subject  of  the  a6a?i- 
donment  of  a  right  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  the  subject  of 

1  Henry  V.  Bassett,  75  Mo.  90,  95.  (N.  C.)  423;  Devereux  v.  Burgoyne,  5 
To  the  same  effect  White  ti.  Wright,  16  Ired.  Eq.  (X.  C.)  351,  — wliere  tlie 
Mo.  App.  551 .  question  was  considered  in  cases  in 

2  Chouteau  v.  Jupiter  Iron  Works,  equity,  where  the  judge  disposed  of 
83  Mo.  73,  82.  the  facts  as  well  as  the  law. 

3  Dulat'.  Cowles,7  Jones  L.  (N.  C.)  *  Thoruburgh  v.  Mastin,  93  X.  C. 
290,  opinion  by  Pearson,  C.  J.  Com-  258;  Headen  u.  Womack,  88  N.  C. 
pare  Blake  v.  Lane,  5  Jones  Eq.  (N.  C.)  lOS. 

412;  Brown  u.  Beckuall,   5  Jones  Eq. 


1062  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   Thoilip.   Tl'., 

the  luaivfv  oi  a  right.  In  fact,  in  most  cases  the  two  words  ex- 
press the  same  idea.  Whether  a  party  has  abandoned  a  right 
once  possessed,  —  as,  for  instance,  a  right  to  an  easement, —  would 
seem  to  be  always  for  the  consideration  of  a  jur}^  as  a  question 
of  fact  and  intention.^  Thus,  in  an  action  of  ejectment  tore- 
cover  a  mining  claim,  it  has  been  held  a  question  for  a  jury, 
whether  a  location,  which  the  evidence  tended  to  show,  was  made 
prior  to  the  time  Avhen  that  attempted  by  the  plaintitf,  had  been 
forfeited  or  abandoned.'^  Where  a  chattel  was  in  the  possession  of 
a  person,  who  made  frequent  declarations  that  he  was  the  ow^ner  of 
it  and  offered  to  sell  it,  and  another  imputed  owner  lived  but  five 
miles  away,  and  he  neither  objected  to  the  use  of  the  property  by 
the  actual  possessor,  nor  made  any  interference  with  his  use  of 
it, — these  circumstances  were  held  evidence  tending  to  show  that 
he  assented  to  the  claim  of  right  of  the  actual  possessor,  and  it  was 
a  question  for  the  jury  to  determine  their  weight,  —  in  other 
words,  whether  such  jH-rson  had  not  waived  any  claim  of  title-^ 

§  1441.  Abandonment  of  Pre-emption  or  claim  of  Public  Lands.  — 
What  will  constitute  an  abandonment,  under  a  statute  securing  an  inter- 
est in  the  public  lands  to  actual  settlers  who  continuously  reside  on  the 
land,  may,  under  some  circumstances,  be  a  question,  of  laiv,  and  under 
others  a  question  of  fact.  It  is  obvious  that  the  question  is  distinctly 
analogous  to  the  question  of  domicile ;  ^  and  the  question  of  the  loss  of 
the  right  of  a  homestead  exemption  in  land  b}'^  ceasing  to  reside  upon  it  as 
a  home.^  A  number  of  decisions  upon  this  question  were  made  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania,  under  the  Act  of  Assembly'  of  that 
State,  of  date  Dec.  30,  1786,  allowing  pre-emptions  of  tlie  public  domain 
of  the  State,  and  defining  what  should  constitute  a  settlement.  It  pro- 
vided among  other  things,  "  that,  by  a  settlement,  shall  be  understood 
an  actual,  personal,  resident  settlement,  with  a  manifest  intention  of 
making  it  a  place  of  abode,  and  the  means  of  supporting  a  family,  and 
continued  from  time  to  time,  unless  interrupted  bv  the  enemy,  or  by 
going  into  the  militarj^  service  of  the  country  during  tlie  war."     The 

'  Parkins  v.     Dunham,    3    Strobh.  ^  Avery  r.  Clenious,  18  Conn.  3flG, 

Law  (S.  C),  224,  228.  310. 

■'  Taylor     v.    Middleton,     C,7     Cal.  *  Ante,  §  1359. 

C5G.  5  Ante,  §  13G0. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVII.]     waiver:  abandonment.  1063 

question  imder  consideration,  so  far  as  it  involved  the  interpretation  of 
this  statute,  turned  upon  the  meaning  of  ihe  words  "  continued  from 
time  to  time."  The  circumstances  which  give  authoritative  value  to  the 
decisions  under  this  statute,  have,  for  the  most  part,  passed  awaj',  and 
they  are  cited  merely  as  having  an  analogous  value  in  cases  where  the 
question  arises  under  Acts  of  Congress,  or  in  Texas  under  Acts  of  the 
State  Legislature,  touching  dispositions  of  the  public  domain.  In  one 
case  it  was  reasoned  as  follows  by  the  court,  speaking  through  Ken- 
nedy, J. :  "Abandonment  is  not  always  a  question  of  intention,  and 
therefore  a  matter  of  fact,  to  be  left  exclusively  to  the  jury  without  any 
controlling  instructions  from  the  court ;  *  *  *  because,  when 
more  than  a  reasonable  time  has  elapsed  for  completing  the  settlement 
without  its  being  done,  after  making  a  proper  allowance  for  all  delay  oc- 
casioned by  what  the  law  ma}'^  deem  a  sufficient  excuse  or  cause  for  it, 
and  the  facts  are  not  controverted,  the  law  will  pronounce  the  neglect  or 
the  failure  of  the  party  to  perfect  his  settlement,  an  abaudoment,  what- 
ever his  intention  in  legard  to  it  may  have  been."  And  therefore,  where 
no  excuse  whatever  was  offered  why  the  claimant  had  not  prosecuted 
and  perfected  his  improvements,  by  personal,  resident  settlement  on  the 
land,  although  more  than  six  years  had  elapsed  from  the  commence- 
ment of  it,  and  this  state  of  facts  was  shown  by  the  evidence  of  both 
parties,  it  was  held  that  the  court  below  would  clearly  have  been  justi- 
fied in  charging  the  jury  that  there  had  been  an  abandonment. ^  This 
decision  seems  opposed  to  tlie  previous  decision  of  the  same  court,  to 
the  effect  that  whenever  a  question  of  abandonment  arose  from  a  lapse 
■of  time  less  than  seven  3'ears,  accompanied  by  circumstances  from 
which  it  might  be  inferred  that  the  party  intended  to  abandon,  it  was  a 
mixed  question  of  law  and  fact,  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury  ;  but  when  the 
question  arose  from  mere  lapse  of  time,  it  was  a  question  of  law,  to  be 
determined  by  the  court  without  regard  to  the  intention  of  the  party  ;  and 
if  the  time  exceeded  seyeH2/ea?*s,  it  was  a  conclusive  abandonment  in  law. '•* 
Still  earlier,  it  was  said  I)y  Tilghman,  C.  J. :  "  Were  the  matter  at  all 
doubtful  it  should  be  left  to  the  jury.  But  abandonment  is  not  in  all 
cases  a  matter  of  fact.  It  may  be  a  conclusion  of  law  from  facts. 
Where  a  man  makes  a  settlement  and  leaves  it  for  a  great  length  of  time, 
it  does  not  signify  for  him  that  he  keeps  up  his  claim.  The  law  de- 
clares that  such  verbal  claims  have  no  avail  as  against  the  act  of  relin- 
quishing the  possession.     And  in  such  case  I  consider  it  as  the  right  of 

1  Atchison   v.  McCulloch,    5   Watts  -  Breutliuger   v.    Hutchinsou,     1 

(Pa.),  13,  15.  Watts  (Pa.),  ^H. 


1064  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND   JURY.       [1  Thoilip,  Tr., 

the  judge  to  declare  the  conclusion  of  law."  i  In  another  case  it  was 
said  by  Duncan,  J.  :  "  Abandonment  is  a  term  very  often  misapplied, 
and  1  know  nothing  more  destructive  of  the  security  of  titles,  than  leav- 
ing it  to  a  jury  to  presume  an  abandonment  of  such  a  title.  *  *  * 
A  man  may  abandon  his  settlement,  and  that  abandonment  may  be  of 
such  a  cast,  as  that  the  court  may  decide  it  as  a  matter  of  law,  inde- 
pendent of  the  statutory  provisions  of  limitation  as  to  seven  years  ;  be- 
cause continuity  of  actual  residence  and  possession  is  the  very  vital 
principle  of  this  right,  and  is  apart  of  its  legal  definition.  Hence,  it  is 
determined  that  settlements  must  not  have  the  smallest  cast  of  aban- 
donment. The  abandonment  then  is  not  constructive,  but  absolute  ;  a 
dereliction  of  the  possession,  which  amounts  to  a  surrender  of  the  pre- 
emption right,  unless  this  dereliction  is  accounted  for  by  some  extraor- 
dinary occurrence,  as  being  dispossessed  by  force,  and  an  immediate 
prosecution  of  the  right,  or  prosecution  within  some  reasonable  time, 
or  being  driven  off  by  the  public  enemy.  Where  a  location  is  not  fol- 
lowed up  by  a  survey  in  a  reasonable  time,  this  is  the  constructive  aban- 
donment, and  may  be  decided  as  matter  of  law  by  the  court ;  and  where 
there  is  an  intervening  right  before  the  survey,  this  imperfect  right  and 
inception  of  title  may  be  considered  as  relinquished,  or  in  other  words, 
abandoned."  And  it  was  held  that  it  was  error  to  leave  it  to  the  jury 
to  decide,  in  the  particular  case,  whether  an  application  on  whicli  a  sur- 
vey had  been  made  had  been  abandoned.^  In  another  case,  where  an 
actual  settler  had  resided  on  land  for  two  years  and  had  then  left  it  un- 
occupied for  five  years,  it  was  held  proper  for  the  court  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  his  absence  for  that  length  of  time  was  a  legal  abandonment 
of  his  rights.  Gibson,  C.  J.,  said:  "  It  is  certain  that  a  question  of 
abandonment  is  not  necessarily  a  question  of  intention.  There  are  in- 
stances where  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the  evidence,  taking  the 
truth  of  it  for  granted,  is  not  one  of  fact  but  law,  and  where  an  ad- 
mitted intent  to  resume  the  settlement  is  immaterial.  To  substitute 
claim  for  residence,  a  convenience  for  prosecution  of  title,  would  sub- 
vert the  whole  doctrine  of  improvement.  An  appropriator  is  not  to  be 
held  off  by  an  improver  who  has  barely  set  his  mark  on  the  land,  by  tlu^ 
commencement  of  a  settlement,  suspended,  but  intended  to  be  resumed 
at  a  more  convenient  season.  In  such  a  case,  the  animus  revertendi 
goes  for  nothing.  It  is  continuance  of  residence,  with  such  occasional 
exceptions  of  temporary  but  indispensable  interruption  of  it,  as  cireuni- 

1  Cluggage  V.  Duncuu,  1  Serg.  &  K.  -  Watson   v.  Gilday,    11  Serg.  &  F,. 

(Pa.)  Ill,  120.  (Pa.)  337,  340. 


Tit.  V,  Cb.  XLVII,]     waiver:  abandoxmext.  1065 

stances  may  require,  and  of  wliich  it  may  be  tlie  province  of  tlie  court 
to  judge,  wliich  is  the  groundwork  of  the  title."  ^  Finally,  the  conclu- 
sion has  been  reached  that,  where  the  question  of  abandonment  de- 
pends upon  mere  lapse  of  time,  not  excused  by  any  circumstance  named 
in  the  statute  or  contemplated  by  it,  and  there  is  no  dispute  as  to  the 
length  of  the  time,  it  is  a  question  oflcav,  to  be  decided  by  the  court  with- 
out regard  to  the  intention  of  the  party  ;  and  it  was  held,  in  such  a  case, 
that  relinquishment  of  actual  residence  for  five  years  and  nine  months, 
without  any  circumstance  to  bring  the  case  within  the  equity  of  the 
statutory  excuses,  was  abandonment  as  matter  of  law,  without  regard 
to  the  intention  of  the  claimant.'^  In  another  case  it  was  ruled  that,  if 
actual  residence  be  discontinued  for  five  years,  and  not  accounted  for,  i1 
is  an  abandonment  in  point  of  law.^ 

§  1442.  The  Same  Subject  Continued.  —  Passing  from  these  to  an- 
other class  of  cases  under  the  same  statute,  we  find  that  it  has  been 
well  decided  that,  in  all  cases  where  the  circumstances  leave  room  for 
doubt  whether  there  was  an  abandonment  or  not,  the  jury  is  the  proper 
tribunal  to  decide.'*  "  Some  cases,"  said  Coulter  J.,  "  may  be  so  strongly 
and  indelil)ly  marked,  either  by  continuous  absence,  and  suffering  the 
improvement  to  return  to  its  wild  state,  or  by  the  declarations  and  acts 
of  the  party,  as  to  justify  the  court  in  deciding  as  a  matter  of  law 
upon  the  question  ;  yet,  in  a  large  majority  of  the  cases  which  occur, 
there  is  such  a  mixture  of  motive,  intent  and  circumstances,  as  to  make 
it  a  matter  properly  referable  to  the  jury.  It  is  not  a  mere  length  of 
absence  for  any  reasonable  time,  which  gives  character  to  the  act  of 
quitting  possession  ;  for  a  man  may  leave  behind  him  unquestionable 
marks  of  the  animus  revertendi,  such  as  grain  growing,  household 
utensils  and  farming  implements.  On  the  other  hand,  short  absence 
may  be  marked  as  unequivocally,  by  acts  and  declarations,  with  an  in- 
tent to  give  up  the  right  of  settlement."  ^  Accordingly,  where  the  court 
submitted  the  question  to  the  jury  upon  the  following  instruction,  it  was 
held  no  error :  "  When  a  single  man  had  an  actual  settlement,  improve- 
ment, and  residence  on  a  tract  of  land,  with  a  cabin  to  live  in,  suitable 
to  his  circumstances  in  his  single  state,  and  married,  his  residing  off  the 

1  McDonald  v.  Mulhollau,  5  Watts  359;  "Wilson  v.  Watterson,  4  Pa.  St. 
(Pa.),  173.  214,219;  Heath   v.    Bicldle,  9   Pa.    St. 

2  Jacobs  V.  Figard,  25  Pa.  St.  45.  273. 

3  Smith  V.  Beck,  25  Pa.  St.  10().  ^  Wilson  v.    Watterson,    4  Pa.  St. 
*  Foster  v.  McDivit,  5  Watts   &  S.      214.  219. 


10(36  rKovixcE  of  coukt  and  jury.      [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

land,  in  a  Louse  of  his  fatber-in-law,  or  with  his  father-in-law  until 
he  could  get  accommodations  for  his  wife  and  expected  increasing  fam- 
ily, for  a  reasonable  time,  during  which  time  he  still  occupies  it,  would 
not  be  an  abandonment.  Whether  the  residence  was  changed  for  such 
temporary  purpose,  and  whether  the  time  of  this  absence  of  personal 
residence  was  a  reasonable  time  to  effect  the  object,  and  prosecuted 
with  due  diligence,  especially  when  there  was  conflicting  and  contradic- 
tory evidence,  would  be  facts  to  be  determined  l)y  the  jury."  ^  Again, 
where  the  court  recapitulated  the  facts,  instructed  the  jury  what 
amounted  to  an  abandonment,  and  gave  them  what  might  perhaps  be 
an  intimation  of  the  court's  opinion  that  there  was  an  abandonment, 
but  left  the  question  to  them,  it  was  held  that,  while  there  might  be 
evidence  suflicientl}' clear  to  warrant  the  court  in  telling  the  jury,  as 
matter  of  law,  that  there  had  been  abandonment,  no  error  was  com- 
mitted in  the  particular  case.^  In  another  case  it  has  been  held  that 
an  interruption  of  occupancy  for  a  period  of  six  months  would  not  of 
itself  amount  to  an  abandonment,  unless  accompanied  by  acts  or  declar- 
utions  indicative  of  an  intention  to  abandon  the  premises;  and,  under 
the  circumstances,  it  was  held  proper  for  the  court  so  to  charge  the 
jury,  —  the  court  conceding  what  is  held  in  decisions  already  quoted, 
that  in  some  cases  it  will  be  a  mere  question  of  law.^  Reviewing  tliese 
decisions,  it  was  held  in  a  later  case  that,  being  so  far  advanced  from 
the  period  and  policy  which  gave  rise  to  the  statutes,  the  court  ought 
not  to  contract  the  rule  in  regard  to  actual  residence  more  than  their 
predecessors  had  done ;  and  where  the  discontinuance  of  the  actual 
resident  possession  was  but  a  few  days  over  two  years  before  the  war- 
rant of  the  subsequent  claimant  was  issued,  it  was  held  that  this  was 
too  short  a  time  to  give  it  the  character  of  an  abandonment  in  law  from 
lapse  of  time,  and  that  the  trial  court  therefore  erred  in  rejecting  evi- 
dence tending  to  prove  the  animiis  revertendi.  The  court  intimated 
that  where  the  interruption  of  the  settler's  residence  is  for  a  less  period 
than./z'ye  years,  it  ought  to  be  left  to  the  jury  to  determine,  under  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case,  whether  there  existed  an  intention  to  abandon.* 

§  1443.  Waiver  of  A^eiidor's  Lien. — It  has  becu  ruled 
that,  Avhethcr  a  vendor  intended  to  waive  liis  lien  by  taking 
a  new  note,  is  a  question  oflaiv,  and  ought  not  to  be  submitted 

1  Heath  v.  Biddlc,  9  Pa.  St.  273,  274.  3  Goodman  ?•.  Losey,  3   AVatts  &  S. 

2  Sampler.   Kol)lj,  1<;    Pa.    St.    305,       (Pa.)  52i;. 

320,  ■•  AVhitfoml)  r.  Ilovt,  20  Pa.  St.  413. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLVII.]     waiver:  abandonment.  1067 

to  a  jury.  It  was  argued,  and  the  court  admitted  the  position, 
that  the  abandonment  of  a  vendor's  lien  is  a  question  of  intention; 
but  Lumpkin,  J.,  nevertheless  said:  "  The  law  is  that  the  waiver 
may  be  actual  or  implied.  But  whether  the  uniting  of  other 
considerations  in  the  same  note  is  an  implied  waiver,  is  a  question 
of  law,  just  as  much  as  whether  taking  other  and  additional 
security  amounts  to  a  waiver.  The  facts  being  admitted,  the 
law  arising  out  of  any  given  state  of  facts  is  to  be  decided  by 
the  courts."  ^ 

§  1444.  Abandonment  of  a  Public  Office.  —  It  has  been  said 
that,  "what  amounts  to  an  abandonment  of  an  office  (if  one 
can  be  vacated  by  abandonment,  otherwise  than  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  the  statute),  is  a  question  of  law,  and  the  special 
facts  should  be  stated,  in  order  that  the  court  may  determine 
whether  those  facts  constitute  an  abandonment  or  not."  ^ 

§  1445.  Waiver  by  Administrator  of  Copy  of  Claim  against 
an  Estate.  —  Under  the  statutes  of  Arkansas,  the  executor  or 
administrator  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  is  entitled  to  a 
copy  of  any  claim  which  is  presented  to  the  probate  court  for 
allowance  against  the  estate,  —  the  object  of  the  statute  being  to 
enable  him  to  act  advisedly  in  allowing  or  refusing  it,  and,  in 
case  of  its  allowance,  to  place  in  his  possession  accurate  data  for 
the  classification  of  claims  against  the  estate.^  This  beinsi;  the 
polic}"  of  the  statute,  where  the  executor  or  administrator  has 
had  a  fair  and  convenient  opportunity  to  examine  the  original 
claim,  no  violence  is  done  to  the  spirit  of  the  statute  by  the  find- 
ing of  a  waiver  of  the  copj^  by  a  jur}^  even  upon  slight  grounds  ; 
and  it  is  held  that,  whether  or  not  the  facts  and  circumstances 
shown  in  evidence  amount  to  a  waiver,  is  a  matter  of  fact  to  be 
determined  by  a  jury.^ 

1  Mims  «.  Lockett,  23  Ga.  237.     The  of  facts;  but  the  general  rule  is  cer- 

writer  may  be  permitted  to  doubt  the  taiuly  otherwise.     Ante,  §  1333,  et  seq. 

conclusion  of  this  case.     "Where  the  2  state  v.  Seay,  64  Mo.  89,  97. 

question  is  one  of  Intention,  tlie  Invr  ^  Borden  r.  Fowler,    H   Arli.  471, 

may  indeed  conclusively  annex  a  par-  474. 

ticular  intention  to  a  particular  state  •*  Grimes  v.  Bush,  10  Arlv.  047. 


1068  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [I  Thomp.  Tr., 

§  1446.  AVaiver  by  a  Creditor  of  his  Riglit  to  Rescind  a 
Composition  Agreement.  —  If  a  composition  takes  place  be- 
tween a  debtor  and  his  creditors,  wliereby  eacli  creditor  is  to  re- 
ceive a  certain  amount,  the  legal  effect  of  the  contract  is  that  it 
is  not  only  a  contract  between  the  debtor  and  each  separate  credi- 
tor, but  it  is  a  contract  among  the  creditors  themselves.^  Hence, 
if  one  creditor  consents  to  sign  the  agreement,  upon  a  secret  un- 
derstandiuo;  with  the  debtor  or  with  an  agent  or  friend  of  the 
debtor,  or  even,  it  is  held,  with  a  mere  volunteer,  that  he  is  to 
set  a  larger  amount  than  the  other  creditors,  the  rest  of  them 
are  cheated,  and,  on  discovering  this  fact,  have  the  right  to  re- 
scind the  contract  and  sue  for  their  full  debt.^  But,  while  this 
and  other  circumstances  which  might  be  supposed,  will  give  the 
rio-ht  to  any  particular  creditor  to  rescind  the  composition  agree- 
ment and  sue  for  his  full  debt,  this  right,  like  any  other,  may  be 
waived;  and  obviously  it  will  be  assumed  in  law  to  have  been 
w^aived,  if  the  creditor,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  circumstances 
which  give  him  the  right  to  rescind  the  agreement,  accepts  per- 
formance of  it  from  the  debtor  according  to  its  terms. ^  But 
where  there  are  facts  from  which  the  contrary  inference  may  be 
drawn,  which  will  control  the  decision  of  this  question,  — ■  as,  for 
instance,  whether  the  creditor  accepted  performance .  from  the 
debtor  with  full  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  which  gave  him 
the  right  of  rescission,  —  the  question  whether  there  has  been  a 
waiver  must  go  to  the  jury.*  Thus,  where  it  appeared  that,  in  the 
state  of  facts  previously  supposed,  the  creditor  refused  to  sur- 
render the  promissory  note  by  which  his  debt  was  evidenced,  ex- 
cept upon  the  promise  of  the  debtor  to  pay  or  secure  the  balance 
in  full,  — under  these  circumstances  the  acceptance  of  part  per- 
formance from  the  debtor,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  conipo- 

1  Solinger  v.  Earle,  82  N.  Y.  393,  Re  Whitney,  U  Nat.  Bank  Reg.  1,  3; 
39(;:  Sage  v.  Valentine,  23  Minn.  102;  Robson  t\  Calze,  Dougl.  21();  Holland 
Breck  v.  Cole,  4  Saudf.  (N.  Y  )  79,  v.  Palmer,  I  Bos.  &Pul.  95;  Re  Sawyer, 
83.  U  Nat.  Bank.  Reg.  241. 

2  Bank  of  Commerce  v.  Hoeber,  11  ^  Cobleigh  v.  Pierce,  32  Vt.  788, 
Mo.    App.  475;  Pulsford   v.  Richardy,  79G. 

22  L.  J,  (Ch.)  559;   s.  r.    UlEng.  L.  &  •*  Ibid. 

Eq.  387;  Knight  v.  Hunt,  5  Biug.  432; 


Tit,  V,  Ch.  XLVll.]     waiver:   abandonment.  1069 

sition  agreement,  would  not  be  conclusive  evidence  of  u  waiver, 
and  the  question  would  remain  a  question  for  the  jury.^ 

§  1447.  Waiver  cannot  take  Place  without  Knowledge.  — 

It  must  in  all  cases  appear  that  the  party  had  a  full  knowledge 
of  his  rights,  in  respect  to  the  matter  of  which  the  waiver  is 
predicated;  for,  if  ignorant  thereof,  of  course  no  intention  to 
waive  anything  can  be  implied.^  In  this  respect  the  doctrine  of 
waiver  rests  upon  very  much  the  same  footing  as  that  of  ratifi- 
cation. Indeed,  the  two  things  are  the  same,  though  one  term  is 
applied  in  one  situation,  and  the  other  in  another.  To  illustrate 
the  foregoing  statement,  take  a  case  where  the  plaintiff  hired  a 
slave  to  the  defendant,  by  an  express  contract,  to  be  employed 
in  a  particular  service.  The  defendant,  disregarding  the  con- 
tract, sub-hired  the  slave,  to  be  employed  in  a  totally  different 
service.  Pending  the  latter  service,  the  slave  was  taken  violently 
ill,  and,  at  the  suggestion  of  a  physician,  was  taken  to  the  house 
of  the  plaintiff  to  be  nursed,  where  he  died.  It  was  held  that 
the  mere  fact  of  the  plaintiff  receiving  the  slave  under  the  cir- 
cumstances was  not  of  itself  a  waiver  of  the  conversion ;  that 
whether  or  not  it  was  such  a  waiver  depended  upon  the  motive 
with  which  it  was  done,  and  that  this  was  a  question  of  fact  for 
a  jury.  If,  with  the  knowledge  of  the  fact  which  in  law  consti- 
tuted the  conversion,  the  plaintiff  took  back  the  slave  as  owner, 
and  as  if  the  outrage  had  not  been  committed,  this  would  be  evi- 
dence of  a  waiver  of  the  conversion.^ 

§  1448.  Instructions  as  to  what  Constitutes  Abandonment  of  Real 
Estate  in  Action  of  Ejectment,  —  "The  question  of  abandonment  is 
one  of  fact  and  intention.  Ceasing  to  cultivate  a  lot  in  the  common 
fields  and  a  removal  elsewhere  do  not  make  an  abandonment ;  but,  to 
constitute  an  abandonment  b^^  a  part}',  it  must  be  shown  that  he  quitted 
the  propert}'^  with  the  intention   of  no  further  claiming  the   same,  and 

'  Ibid.     Compare  Daucliy  v.  Good-  ^  Tryanor  v.  Johusou,  supra.     Com- 

rich,  20  Vt.  127.  pare     Bell    v.     Curamiugs,    3     Sneed 

2  Tryanor     v.    Johnson,    1      Head       (Tenu.),  275. 
(Tenn.),  51,  55;  Cobleigh  r.  Tierce,  32 
Vt.  788,  71.) G. 


1070  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JUUY.   [1  'rilOnip.  Tl'. , 

the  burden  of  showing  the  abandonment  rests  upon  the  one  who  asserts 

it. Although   the   jury  may  believe  from  the  evidence  that  the 

land  in  contest  was  part  of  a  common-field  or  out-lot,  and  the  same 
was  inhabited,  cultivated  or  possessed  by  said  Francis  Bequette  prior 
to  the  20th  of  December,  1803,  yet  if,  from  the  evidence,  they  believe 
that  said  Bequette,  his  heirs  or  legal  representatives,  did  leave  the  said 
common-field  or  out-lot  with  the  intention  not  to  return  and  occupy  the 
same,  as  his  or  their  property  respectively —  such  action  on  his  or  their 
part  is  an  abandonment  of  their  or  his  right,  title  or  claim  to  the  land 
in  contest,  and  the  jury  should  find  accordingly."  ^ 

^  Approved  in  Tayou  v.  Latlew,  33  Mo.  203,  208. 


Tit.  V,  Cb.  XLVIII.]     identity:   resemblance.  1071 


CHAPTER   XLVIII. 

IDENTITY:    RESEMBLANCE. 
Sectiox 
1450.  Question  for  Jury. 
U51.  Where  there  are  two  persons  of  the  same  Name. 

1452.  [Illustrations.]     Whether  Father  or  Son  the  Grantee  in  a  Deed„ 

1453.  Identity  of  Personal  Property. 

1454.  Res  Judicata — Identity  of  the  Issues  in  a  Former  Proceeding. 

1455.  Identity  of  a  Signature  with  the  Name  of  a  Firm. 

1456.  Difference  between  two  Machines. 

1457.  Sufficiency  of  Specification  of  a  Patent —  Informality  —  Abandonment  — 

Identity. 

§  1-450.  Question  for  Jury.  — Identity  is  a  matter  peculiarly 
within  the  province  of  the  jury,  to  be  determined  by  them  in  view 
of  all  the  circumstances  ;  and  the  court  must  not,  in  instructing 
them,  intimate  an  opinion  as  to  what  inferences  should  be  drawn 
by  them  from  the  facts  in  evidence.^ 

§    1451.   Where  there  are  Two  Persons  of  the  same  Name. — 

Where  it  becomes  a  question  which  one  of  two  persons  bearing 
the  same  name  was  intended  to  be  the  grantee  in  a  deed,  the  ques- 
tioii  is  one  of  fact  for  a  jury.  In  so  holding  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Wisconsin  have  lately  said:  "In  a  sense,  as  to  the  real  per- 
son intended,  there  is  a  latent  ambiguity  in  the  deed,  but  more 
properly,  perhaps,  it  is  a  question  of  identity;  as  in  wills,  '  where 
the  words  are  neither  ambiguous  nor  obscure,  and  the  devise  on 
the  face  of  it  is  perfect  and  intelligible,  but,  from  some  of  the 
circumstances  admitted  in  proof,  an  ambiguity  arises  as  to  which 
of  two  or  more  things,  or  which  of  two  or  more  persons  (each 
answering  the  words  in  the  will)  the  testator  intended.'  ^  This 
is  what  Lord  Bacon  called  '  an  equivocation,  that  is,  the  words 
equally  apply  to  two  things  or  two  persons.'     But  it  is  clear  that 

1  Miller  v.  Marks,  20  Mo.  App.  369.  2  Citing  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  289. 


1072  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  ThoilllU  Tl'., 

ill  any  sense  this  question  is  not  one  of  construction  or  of  law,  to 
be  decided  bj^  the  court  in  an  action  at  hiw,  but  one  of  fact, 
pure  and  simple,  to  be  passed  upon  by  the  jury;  as  much  so  as 
the  meaning  of  words  used  in  a  written  instrument,  which  this 
court  held  was  a  question  for  the  jury;  ^  and,  as  the  questions 
in  the  cases  hereafter  cited  in  analogy  to  this  case.'^ 

§  1452.  [Illustrations].  Whether  Father  or  Son  the  Grantee 
IN  A  Deed.  —  A  father  and  son  both  bore  the  name  of  David  Felker. 
They  both  resided  in  the  same  town.  The  father  purchased  a  piece  of 
land,  takingthe  deed  to  "  David  Felker,  junior,"  describing  him  as  of  the 
town  where  they  both  resided.  The  father  executed  notes  for  a  part 
of  the  purchase-money,  and  gave  a  mortgage  of  the  land  to  secure  the 
same,  b}'  the  name  of  "  David  Felker,  junior."  He  said  nothing  at  the 
time  of  his  acting  as  agent  for  his  son,  and  the  grantor  supposed  that 
the  father  was  in  fact  the  purchaser,  that  his  name  was  David  Felker, 
junior,  and  that  he  was  conveying  the  land  to  him.  Some  of  the  evi- 
dence tended  to  prove  that  the  son  had  authorized  the  father  to  buj'' 
the  land  for  him  and  in  his  name,  and  that  he  had  paid  either  directly  or 
indirectly,  the  whole  purchase  price.  Under  this  evidence,  it  was  held 
a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury  whether  the  son  was  or  was  not  the  real 
principal  and  purchaser  of  the  land,  under  an  instruction  that  if  they 
found  he  was,  then  the  title  vested  in  him,  and  not  in  the  father. ^  The 
court  disposed  of  the  inference  to  be  derived  from  the  addition  of 
"junior  "  to  the  name  of  David  Felker  in  the  deed,  by  saying:  "The 
addition  of  'junior '  is  in  law  no  part  of  a  person's  name,  but  it  is  used 
as  merely  descriptive  of  the  person;  and  is  assumed,  applied,  and  dis- 
carded at  will."  *  Another  case  involving  this  curious  question  was  an 
action  of  ejectment  in  New  York ;  where  the  plaintiff  claimed  title  under 
a  sale,  which  had  taken  place  under  an  execution,  issued  upon  a  judg- 
ment   which    had    been  recovered    asfainst   one    David    Brown.     The 


1  Citing   Gausou     v.    Madigau,     15  22  Wis.  132;    Bancroft  v,   Grover,  23 
Wis.  145.  Wis.4()3;  Harding  w.  Colburu,  12  Met. 

2  Begg  V.  Begg,  56  Wis.    534,  537.  (Mass.)  333. 

The  court  cited  the  following  analo-  ^  pj.gutiss    v.    Blake,    34   Vt.  4G0; 

gous  cases  of  parol  evidence  to  explain  ante,  §  1350. 

written    instruments:     Tlioinpsou    v.  ^  Ibid.    405,     citing     Braiuard    v. 

Jones,     4     Wis.    100;      Atwater      v.  Stilphin,  0  Vt.  9;  Blake  «.  Tucker,  12 

Schenck,  9  Wis.   100;   Staak  v.  Sigel-  Vt.  39;    Isaacs  t'.  Wilkey,  12   Vt.  077. 
kow,  12  Wis.  234 ;  Sargeaut  v.  Solberg, 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL VIII.]     identity:   resemblance.  1073 

defendant  claimed  title  by  inheritance  from  her  son,  David  C.  Brown. 
The  premises  in  question  were  conveyed  some  years  before  the  action, 
by  a  deed  duly  executed,  acknowledged  and  recorded,  in  which  the 
name  of  the  grantee  was  stated  to  be  David  C.  Brown.  David  C. 
Brown  was  the  name  of  an  infant  son  of  the  judgment  debtor,  through 
whom  the  plaintiff  claimed,  whose  true  name  was  David  Addison  Brown, 
but  who  was  sometimes  called  David  Brown.  The  plaintiff  claimed  that 
the  father  was  intended  to  be  the  grantee  in  the  deed,  and  gave  evidence 
tending  to  show  that  he  negotiated  the  sale  and  that  at  the  time  of  the 
execution  and  delivery  of  the  deed,  he  delivered  to  the  grantor  a  bond 
for  the  purchase-money,  secured  by  a  mortgage  of  the  premises,  which 
bond  and  mortgage  were,  however,  executed,  in  like  manner  with  the 
deed,  in  the  name  of  David  C.  Brown.  It  was  also  shown  that  the 
father  went  into  possession  of  the  premises  and  so  remained  until  the 
time  of  his  dealli.  There  was  also  evidence  tending  to  show  that,  in 
important  business  transactions,  the  name  of  the  father  was  written 
David  A.  Brown.  It  was  held  that  it  was  for  the  jury  to  say  which  of 
the  persons,  the  father  or  the  son,  was  intended  to  be  the  grantee  in  the 
deed,  and  that  it  was  error  to  direct  a  verdict  for  the  plaintiff.  The 
court  said:  "  The  defendant  has  the  legal  presumption  in  her  favor 
that  her  son  was  intended  as  the  grantee  ;  and  whether  it  has  been 
overcome  by  parol  proof,  we  think  should  have  been  left  for  the  jury 
to  determine."  ^ 

§  1453.  Identity  of  PersoDal  Property.  —  lu  an  action  of 
replevin,  the  identity  of  personal  property  is  peculiarly  for  (he 
jury,  and  they  should  be  left  free  to  make  their  own  deductions 
from  the  evidence.  Upon  the  question  of  identity  the  testimony 
of  witnesses  who  swear  to  the  fact  of  identity  is  necessarily  the 
statement  of  an  opinion  or  conclusion  ;  but  it  is  nevertheless,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  to  go  to  the  jury.^  So,  what  property  is 
embraced  in  a  levy  which  is  described  in  the  return  in  obscure 
terms,  may  be  shown  by  })arol  evidence,  and  it  is  consequently 
a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  a  jury.^  So,  whether 
certain  goods  delivered  were  delivered  in  pursuance  of  an  oral 

1  McDiiffiev.  Clark,  39  Him  (N.  Y),  2  gtate  v.  Babb,  70  Mo.  504;   Com. 

K'.fl;    citiug  Padgett  v.  Lawrence,    10      r.  Cuimiughain,  104  Mass.  545. 
r:iige  (N.  YO,  170.  3  geott  v.  Sheakly,  3  "Watts  (Pa.), 

50. 

OS 


1074  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Tliomp.  Tr., 

contract  of  sale,  was  held  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.^  The 
identity  of  property  in  chattel  mortgage  is  always  a  question  of 
fact  for  tlie  jury.  It  was  so  held  where  the  question  was  whether 
a  certain  engine,  which  had  been  seized  and  sold  by  the  defend- 
ants, w^as  included  in  the  description  of  "  one  portable  saw  mill," 
in  such  a  morto-age.^ 

§  1454.  Res  Judicata  —  Identity  of  the  Issues  in  a  Former 
Proceedinj?.  — In  order  that  a  judgment  may  have  the  effect  of 
barring  a  subsequent  action,  it  must  appear,  either  upon  the  face 
of  the  record  or  by  extrinsic  evidence,  that  the  precise  issu(3 
was  raised  and  determined  in  the  former  suit.  If  this  appears 
from  the  record  of  the  former  suit,  apart  from  extrinsic  evidence, 
then  the  question  is  a  question  of  law,  and  is  not  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  jury.'  But  if  it  appears  that  several  matters  may 
have  been  in  issue,  and  that  the  judgment  may  have  gone  uj^on  one 
or  more,  thus  leaving  the  precise  issue  in  doubt,  this  uncertainty 
should  be  removed  by  exti'insiG  evidenced  If  such  extrinsic  evi- 
dence is  presented  in  the  form  of  parol  testimony,  it  should  bo 
left  to  the  jury ,  under  proper  instructions,  to  say  whether  the  is-- 
sues,  as  defined  by  the  court  \\\  the  case  at  bar,  were  in  point  of 
fact  passed  upon  at  the  previous  trial. ^ 

§  1455.  Identity  of  a  Signature  with  the  name  of  a  Firm.  — 

It  has  been  held  that  the  question  whether  "  Chas.  G.  Ramsey 
&  Co."  signed  to  a  promissory  note  was  the  signature  of  the 
firm  known  as  the  firm  of  "  Charles  G.  Ramsey  &  Co."  was  a 
question  of  fad  for  the  jury.® 

§  145G.  Difference  between  two  Machines. — A  branch  of 
the  rule  that  identity  is  peculiarly  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury, 

1  Stonewall   Man.   Co.  v.   Peek,  (13      (U.  S.)  51J0;  IJus.sell  t;.  Place,  94  U.  S. 
Miss.  342.  COC. 

2  AVc'ber  v.  Tiling,  fiC  Wis,  79.  °  Tutt  v.  Price,  7  Mo.  App.  194,  197; 
■"5  Tuttv.  Price,  7  Mo.  App.  194.               Packet  Co.  v.  Sickles,  supra. 

*  Tutt  r.  Price,   7   Mo.    App.  194;  «  Tilforcl  v.  Ramsey,   37  Mo.  663.. 

Spradliug    v.    Conway,    51     Mo.   51;  ofw;  citing  Kirk  u.  Blurtou,  9  Mccs.  & 

Wright    V.     Salisbury,    46    Mo.    20;  W.  2st;    Kinsman  v.  Dullam,  5  T,  B. 

Packet     Co.      v.     Sickles,     5     Wall.  Mon.  (Ky.)  382. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XL VIII.]     identity:   kesemblance.  1U75 

may  be  found  in  a  holding  which  has  been  made  in  an  action  at 
hiw  to  recover  damages  for  the  infringement  of  letters-})atcnt. 
It  is  ruled  that,  when  the  defendant  in  such  an  action  sets  up  a 
prior  publication  of  a  machine,  anticipating  the  patented  inven- 
tion, and  it  appears  that  there  are  obvious  differences  between 
the  two  machines,  in  the  arrangement  of  the  separate  parts,  in  the 
relation  of  the  parts  to  each  other,  and  in  their  connection  with 
each  other  in  performing  the  functions  for  which  the  machine  is 
intended,  and  experts  differ  upon  the  question  whether  these 
differences  are  material  to  the  result,  and  whether  they  require 
the  faculty  of  invention  —  those  questions  are  questions  of  fact, 
to  be  left  to  the  jury  under  proper  instructions.^ 

§  1457.  Sufficiency  of  Specifications  of  a  Patent — Infor- 
mality—  Abandonment —  Identity.  —  It  seems  that,  in  an  action 
at  law  for  the  infringement  of  a  patent,  it  is  a  question  for  the 
jury,  to  determine  from  the  evidence  in  the  case,  whether  the 
specifications,  including  the  claim,  upon  which  the  patent  was 
granted,  were  so  precise  as  to  enable  any  person  skilled  in  the 
construction  of  machines,  to  make  the  one  described ;  also 
whether  the  patent  was  possessed  of  novelty ;  also  whether  a  re- 
newed patent  was  for  the  same  invention  as  the  original  patent ; 
also  whether  the  invention  had  been  abandoned  to  the  public ;  as 
well  as  the  identity  of  the  machine  used  by  the  defendant  with 
that  of  the  plaintiffs,  or  whether  they  have  been  constructed  and 
operate  upon  the  same  principle.'^ 

1  Keyes  v.  Grant,  118  U.  S.  25,  36;  2  Battiu   v.   Taggert,    17   How.  (U. 

distiuguishiiig    Randall   v.   Baltimore      S.)  74,  85. 
&c.  R,  Co.,  109  U.  S.  478. 


1076  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr. , 


CHAPTER  XLIX. 

PLACE:  LOCALITY:  BOUNDAKY:  IDENTITY  OF  LAND. 

Section 

1-1:61.  Court  to  Construe  a  Deed:  Jury  to  Apply  Description  to  the  Laud, 
14G2.  Whether  the  Courses  and  Distances  Carry  the  Lines  to  a  Certain  Point. 
14fi3.  Whether  a  Grant  Includes  the  Premises  in  Controversy. 
14G4.  How  Jury  Instructed  in  such  a  Case. 

1465.  An  Instruction  on  the  Theory  of  a  Boundary  Line  fixed  by  Agreement. 

1466.  What  Monuments  satisfy  the  Calls  of  a  Deed. 

1467.  No  Presumption  of  Law  in  such  a  Case. 

1468.  Whether  a  Particular  Monument  was  Intended  to  be  Adopted  by  a  Deed. 

1469.  Calls  of  a  Survey. 

1470.  [Illustration.]     Conckisiveness  of  ^Marked  Corners  and  Lines  in  a  Sur- 

vey. 

1471.  Indeflnile  or  Insufficient  Calls  in  a  Deed. 

1472.  Illustration  of  Foregoing. 

1473.  Parol  Evidence  Admissible  in  such  a  Case. 

1474.  Verdict  of  Jury  of  Vicinage  Entitled  to  Great  Weight. 

1475.  Identity  of  Land  and  whether  Assessed  or  Unseated. 

1476.  Questions  of  Locality,  Distance,  etc.,  for  the  Jury. 

1477.  [Illustration.]     Appurtenances. 

1478.  [Continued.]     Curtilage. 

1479.  House-breaking:  Whether  the  Place  of  Entry  was  a  Part  of  the  House. 

1480.  Boundaries  of  Places. 

1481.  Boundaries  of  Counties. 

1482.  Boundaries  of  a  State. 

1483.  Public  Roads:   Instruction  that  Monuments   and  Lines   of   Surveyor 

Prevail. 

1484.  Instructions  as  to  Survey  and  Plat  of  Public  Road  being  Evidence  of 

its  Location,  etc.,  in  Criminal  Prosecution  for  Obstructing  a  Public 
Highway  under  Illinois  Statute. 

§  1461.  Court  to  Construe  a  Deed  —  Jury  to  Applj'  De- 
scription of  the  Land. —  While  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
construe  a  deed,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  apply  its  descrip- 
tive terms,  when  thus  construed,  to  the  land,  and  to  ascertain 
whether  the   premises  in  question  are    within  the  description^ 

»  Reed  v.  Proprietors  &c.,  8  How.  H.  332;  Naglee  v.  Ingersoll,  7  Pa.  St 
(U.  S.)  274;  Bell  v.  Woodward,  46  N.      185,  189. 


Tit.  V,Ch.  XLIX.]  place:  boundary:  identity  of  land.   1077 

Stated  in  another  way,  "  what  are  the  boundaries  of  hind  con- 
veyed by  a  deed,  is  a  question  of  law;  where  the  boundaries  are, 
is  a  question  of  fact.'''  ^  Still  another  way  of  stating  the  same 
principle  is  to  say  that,  while  it  is  the  peculiar  province  of  the 
jury  to  find  facts  and  to  ascertain  the  true  positions  of 
objects  called  for  as  monuments  in  a  deed,  from  the  evi- 
dence submitted  to  them,  it  is  nevertheless  the  duty  of  the 
court  to  determine,  whether,  or  in  what  manner,  a  call  in  a 
deed  or  patent  should  be  gratified?  "  When  there  is  a  latent 
ambiguity  in  the  description  contained  in  the  deed,  all  the  cases 
agree  that  evidence  aliunde  is  admissible.  But  it  is  not  upon 
this  principle  alone  that  the  evidence  is  received.  It  is  admissi- 
ble in  all  cases  where  there  is  a  doubt  as  to  the  true  location  of 
the  survey,  or  a  question  as  to  the  application  of  the  grant  to  its 
proper  subject-matter.  It  must  be  constantly  borne  in  mind  that 
it  is  not  a  question  of  construction,  hut  of  location.  A  question 
of  construction  is  a  pure  question  of  law,  to  be  decided  by  the 
court  upon  the  terms  of  the  instrument  itself,  to  the  exclusion  of 
evidence  aliunde,  Avhere  no  latent  ambiguity  exists.  A  question 
of  location,  or  the  application  of  the  grant  to  its  proper  subject- 
matter,  is  a  question  of  fact  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  by  the 
aid  of  extrinsic  evidence."  ^  "It  cannot  be  denied,"  said  the 
Court  of  Appeals  of  Maryland,  "that  the  jury  are  the  proper 
tribunal  to  decide  whether  any,  and  what,  variation  ought  to  be 
allowed  in  the  location  of  lands.  But  whether  any  and  what  de- 
gree of  allowance  for  variation  ought  to  be  made  are  questions  of 
fact,  to  be  determined  by  the  jury  on  the  testimony  upon  that 
subject,  adduced  to  them  in  the  trial  of  the  cause.     If  no  such 

1    St.  Louis  V.  Meyer,  13  Mo.  App.  (Mass.)    17,  27;  Brown  v.  Willey,  42 

367,  381!;  s.c.  affirmed,  87  Mo.  276.  That  Pa.    St.  205,  209,  opinion  by  Tliorap- 

tlie  location  of   a  disputed  boundary  son,  J.;  Herpel  v.  Malone,  66   Mich, 

line  is  always  a  question  of  fact  for  a  199;  Barry  v.  Otto,  56  Mo.  177. 

jury,  or  for  a  referee  when  actinti;  as  a  ^  Thomas   v.    Godfrey,   3  Qill  &  J. 

jury,  see  the  following  cases:  Tasljer  (Md.)  143;  Friend  v.   Friend,  Gi  Md. 

V.    Cilley,   59  N.  H.    575;    Madden   v.  321,331. 

Tuclier,  46  Me.  367;  Abbott  v.  Abbott,  •'  Opdyke  v.  Stepliens,  28   N.  J.  L. 

51  Me.  575;   Tebbetts  v.  Estes,  52  Me.  83,  90,  opinion  by   Green,  C.  J.     See 

566;     Williston     v.    Morse,    10    Met.  also  Abbott  r.  Abbott,  51  Me.  575,  581, 


1078  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [l   Thomp.   Tl'., 

testimony  be  offered,  the  jury  are  not  authorized  to  depart  from 
the  courses  and  distances  expressed  in  the  conveyances,  by  mak- 
ing any  allowance  for  variation."  ^  "The  identical  monument 
or  boundary  referred  to  in  a  deed  is  always  a  subject  of  parol 
evidence ;  and  when  disputed,  it  is  always  left  to  the  jury  to  say 
which  was  the  actual  monument  intended.  Thus,  there  may  be 
two  trees  of  a  similar  species  and  with  similar  marks  ;  two  simi- 
lar stakes  not  far  distant  from  each  other,  or  two  rivers  of  the 
same  name  ;  and  which  was  intended  by  the  deed  would  be  set- 
tled by  parol  evidence,  on  the  ground  that  it  is  a  latent  am- 
biguity." 2 

§  1462.  Whether  the  Courses  and  Distances  Carry  the  Lines  to 
A  Certain  Point.  — Thus,  in  an  action  at  law,  where  a  boundary  line  is 
in  dispute,  and  the  laud  is  described  in  the  deed  by  which  the  question 
is  governed,  by  courses  and  distances,  but  no  fixed  monuments  or  cor- 
ners are  mentioned,  the  question  whether  the  courses  and  distances 
carry  the  lines  to  certain  points  claimed  by  one  of  the  parties,  is  a 
question  of  fact  for  the  jury,  which  the  judge  cannot  determine  by  an 
instruction  peremptory  in  its  nature. ^ 

§  1463.  Whether  a  Grant  Includes  the  Premises  in  Contro- 
versy,—  AVhether  land  in  controversy  is  included  within  a  par- 
ticular grant,  being  a  question  of  identity,  is  necessarily  a  ques- 
tion of  fact  for  a  jury.^  In  an  action  for  damages  for  the  breach 
of  a  contract  to  convey  land,  where  it  is  objected  that  the  instru- 
ment sued  on  does  not  describe  the  land,  the  question  of  the 
suificiency  of  the  description  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  from 
the  evidence,  unless  it  is  manifest  from  the  instrument  that  it 
cannot  be  located.^  So,  it  is  the  province  of  a  jury  to  say 
whether  a  descriptive  ivarrant  has  been  located  upon  the  land 


»  Wilson  V.  Inloes,  6    Gill  (Md.),  ^  Opdyke  v.  Stephens,  28  N.  J.  L. 

121,    1G3;  Peterkiu  v.  Inloes,    4    Md.  84. 

175.  4  Ferris  v.  Coover,  10  Cal.  690,622; 

2  Claremont  v.  Carlton,  2  N.  II.  3G9,  Bayuard  v.  Eddings,  2   Strobh.   Law 

373,   opinion  by  Woodbury,  , I.     Tiiis  (X.  C),  374;  Barry  v.  Otto,  5^  Mo.  177. 

case  is  a  very  apt  illustration  of   the  ^  White  v.  llermaun,  'A  111.  243, 
rule. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIX.j  place:  boundary:  identity  of  land.  1079 

called  for  in  it,  or  not.  And  whether  a  warrant  has  been  shifted 
or  properly  located,  is  for  them  to  determine.^  Where  it  was 
established,  not  only  as  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  country,  but 
by  evidence  in  a  particular  case,  that  many  of  the  documents, 
relating  to  an  hnpresario  contract  between  the  Mexican  Govern- 
ment and  Martin  de  Leon,  had  been  destroyed  during  the  Texas 
revolution,  it  w'as  held  that  it  was  properly  left  to  the  jury  to 
say  whether  the  land  in  controversy  was  in  this  tract. ^ 

§  1464.  How  Jury  Instructed  in  Such  a  Case. — The  following 
instructions,  given  in  such  a  case,  have  been  explicitly  approved  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States :  "1.  That  if  they  [the  jur}-]  believe 
from  the  evidence,  looking  to  the  monuments,  length  of  lines,  quanti- 
ties, actual  occupation,  etc.,  that  it  is  more  probable  that  the  parties  to 
the  mortgage  of  1782  intended  to  include  therein  the  demanded  prem- 
ises than  otherwise,  they  should  return  their  verdict  for  the  tenants."^ 

The  following  were  approved  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Texas :  ' '  This 
is  an  action  of  trespass  to  try  title,  brought  by  the  plaintiffs  in  the  peti- 
tion against  the  defendants  therein  named.  There  is  no  controversy, 
however,  as  to  the  titles  of  the  parties,  each  claiming  under  the  same 
grantee  from  the  sovereignt}^  of  the  soil,  but  the  dispute  is  as  to  the 

true  boundary  line  between  their  respective  tracts  of  land. The 

general  rules  which  are  to  be  observed  in  ascertaining  the  locality, 
identity,  or  boundary  of  a  particular  tract  of  land  described  in  a  deed 
or  grant,  are  well  settled.  Recourse  must  be  had,,  first,  to  natural 
objects;  second,  to  artificial  marks,  and  third  to  course  and  dis- 
tance.   The  acquiescence  of  the  proprietors  of  adjoining  lands,  in 

a  particular  line,  is  a  circumstance  to  which  the  jury  may  look  in  deter- 
mining the  true  boundary. If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence 

that  the  boundary  line  between  plaintiffs  and  defendants  would  give  the 

disputed  premises  to  plaintiffs,  then  they   will  find  for  plaintiffs. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence  that  said  true 
boundary  line  would  leave  said  disputed  premises  in  defendants'  tract 

of  land,  they  will  find  for  defendants. If  the  jury  believe  from 

the  evidence  that  the  dividing  line  between  the  lands  of  plaintiffs  and 

1  Cassidy  v.  Couway,  25  Pa.  St.  240,  &c.,  8  How.  (U.  S.)  274,  288,  —  the 
244.  court  holding  that  the  instruction  is 

2  White  V.  Buruley,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  not  obnoxious  to  the  objection  that  it 
235;  247.  submits  tlie  interpretation  of  tlie  deed 

^  Approved  in  Reed  v.  Proprietors      to  the  jury. 


1080  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AXD   JURY.       [1  Thoilip.  Tl"., 

defendants  has  been  run,  and  that  the  parties,  or  those  under  whom 
they  claim,  have  acquiesced  in  the  same,  and  recognized  the  said  divid- 
ing line,  they  will  find  for  defendants."  ^ 

§  1465.  An  Instruction  on  the  Theory  of  a  Boundary  Line  Fixed 
BY  Agreement.  —  "  The  jury  are  instructed  that  it  is  perfectly  compe- 
tent for  parties  owning  adjoining  tracts  of  land  to  settle,  by  agreement, 
where  the  division  line  shall  be  ;  and  if  the  jury  shall  believe  from  the 
evidence,  that  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  owned  adjoining  tracts  of 
land,  and  any  question  or  dispute  had  arisen  as  to  where  the  line  now 
in  controversy  was,  and  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  agreed  upon  the 
line  and  established  it,  as  between  themselves,  then,  in  that  case,  it  is 
wholly  immaterial  where  a  survey  would  put  the  line.  Each  party  is 
bound  by  his  agreement;  and,  in  determining  whether  there  was  such 
agreement,  and  fixing  on  the  line,  it  is  competent  for  the  jury  to  take 
into  consideration  acts  and  statements  of  the  parties  at  the  time,  the 
acts  done  by,  each  and  the  fixing  and  adjustment  of  fences  and  im- 
provements by  them,  under  such  agreement,  if  any  ai-e  proven."  2 

§  1466.   What  Monuments  Satisfy  the  Calls  of  a  Deed.  — 

"Where  a  deed  calls  for  a  particular  object,  and  there  is  evidence 
as  to  the  actual  location  of  the  object,  it  is  the  province  of  the 
jury  to  find  where  its  location  was.^  Thus,  where  a  survey  called 
for  two  small  trees  of  a  certain  kind,  as  a  monument  at  the  cor- 
ner of  the  tract  of  land  surveyed,  and  two  small  trees  of  the 
kind  thus  called  for  were  found  in  the  neighborhood,  it  was 
proper  to  refuse  an  instruction  to  the  jury  to  disregard  them,  on 
the  theory  that  it  was  doubtful  whether  they  w'cre  the  trees 
called  for.  The  question  was  one  of  fact  for  the  exclusive  de- 
termination of  the  jury.* 

^  Approved  in  Mc Arthur  v.  Henry,  35  N.  II.  473;  Jackson  v.  Ogdeu,  7  Johns. 

Tex.  804, 80.j;  citing  George  y.  Thomas,  (N.    Y.)    238;    Gilchrist   v.  McGee,  i) 

IG  Texas,  74,  84;  Houston  v.  Sneed,  15  Yergev  (Teuu.),  455;  Nichol  v.  Lytle, 

Texas,  307,   309;  Siugletou  ^7,    AVhite-  4  Yerger  (Teuu.),  450.     See  also  Wil- 

Side,  5Yerger  (Teun.),  18,  34;  Koss  sou  v.  Hudson,  8  Yerg.  (Teuu.)  398. 
V.   Turner,  5    Yerger     (Tenu.),   338;  «  Approved  in  Cutler  u.  CaUisou,  72 

Goodridge  v.  Dustin,  5  Mete.  (Mass.),  111.  IIO. 

3C3;    Adams  v.   Rockwell,   16  Wend.  ^  nawkius  u.  Nye,  59  Tex.  98. 

(N.   Y.)    285;     Dibble    v.  Rogers,   13  *  Ayers  v.  Watson,  113   U.  S.  594, 

Weud.  (X.  Y.)  5.0(!;    Chew  v.  Morton,  (;05. 
10  Watts  (ra.),321;  Gray  v.  Berry,  9 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIX.]  place:  boundary  :  identity  of  land.  1081 

§  1467.  No   Presumption   of   Law  in   such    a    Case.  —  The 

identity  of  a  particular  monument  as  the  one  called  for  in  a  deed, 
involves  a  question  of  fact,  and  there  is  no  presumption  of  law 
in  such  a  case.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  held  proper  to  refuse 
the  following  instruction:  "  If  they  [the  jury]  found  that  there 
was  an  old  stake  standing  at  the  end  of  the  one  hundred  and 
fifty-six  rods,  the  distance  named  in  the  deed,  bearing  upon  it 
surveyor's  marks,  and  other  indications  of  the  character  of  the 
monument  named  in  the  deed,  in  the  absence  of  all  proof  to  the 
contrary,  the  presumption  would  be  that  it  was  the  stake  referred 
to  in  the  deed."  The  court  say:  "  There  was  no  presumption 
of  law  in  the  case.  The  various  facts  bearing  upon  the  stake, 
tending  to  show  the  same  to  be  the  monument,  were  proper  for 
the  consideration  of  the  jury;  but  the  court  could  not,  as  re- 
quested, have  given  the  instruction  that  there  was  any  presump- 
tion of  law  binding  on  them.  The  evidence  was  entirely  for  the 
consideration  of  the  jury."  ^ 

§  146S.  Whether  a  particular  Monument  was  Intended  to  be 
Adopted  by  a  Deed.  —  Closely  allied  to  the  foregoing  is  a  rule 
which  so  far  lets  in  2)(>^'ol  eviCience  to  explain  a  deed,  as  to  show 
that  a  particular  monument,  not  called  for  in  the  deed  by  name, 
was  intended  to  be  adopted  by  it.  This  rule  has  been  declared 
with  reference  to  public  patents  or  grants. ^  And,  though  it  has 
been  conjectured  that  it  may  extend,  px,  necessitate^  to  old  deeds, 
yet  it  has  been  doubted  whether  it  extends  to  private  deeds ; 
and,  as  it  is  a  violation  of  principle,  it  has  been  said  that  it  ought 
not  to  be  extended.^  The  rule  has  been  thus  stated:  "  "Where 
it  can  be  proved  that  there  was  a  line  actually  run  by  the  sur- 
veyor, which  was  marked  and  a  corner  made,  the  party  claiming 
under  the  patent  or  deed  shall  hold  accordingly,  notwithstand- 
ing a  mistaken  description  of  the  land  in  the  i:)atent  or  deed."  * 
"This  rule,"  said  the  same  court  in  a  subsequent  case,  "  pre- 

1  Robiusou  t;.  White,  42  Me.  209,  ^  Safret  i'.  Hartmaii,  5  Joues  L, 
216.  (N.  C),  185. 

2  Cherry  v.  Slade,  3  Murph.  (N.  C.)  ■»  Cherry  v.  Slade,  3  ^Nlurpli.  (N.  C.> 
82.  82, 8(J. 


1082  PROVINCE    OF    COURT   AND    JURY.       []   Thoilip.  Tr., 

supposes  that  the  patent  or  deed  is  made  in  jiursuance  of  the  sur- 
ve}',  and  that  the  line  Avas  marlced,  and  that  the  corner  that  was 
made  in  making  the  survey,  was  adopted  and  acted  upon  in  mak- 
ing the  patent  or  deed  ;  and,  therefore,  permits  such  line  and  cor- 
ner to  control  the  patent  or  deed,  although  they  are  not  called 
for,  and  do  not  make  a  part  of  it.  Parol  evidence  being  thus 
let  in  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the  patent  or  deed,  by  es- 
tablishing a  line  and  corner  not  called  for,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
it  is  also  let  in  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  such  line  and 
corner  were  not  adopted  and  acted  on  in  the  making  of  the 
patent  or  deed  ;  because  the  rule  presupposes  this  to  be  the  fact." '  ^ 
It  necessarily  follows  that,  whelher  the  line  or  corner  was 
adopted  or  acted  upon  in  making  the  deed,  is  a  question  of  fact 
for  a  jury.'- 

§  1469.  Calls  of  a  Survey.  —  "  When  the  calls  of  a  survey  are 
all  ascertained  by  the  grant,  and  there  is  no  necessity  for  refer- 
ence to  external  evidence  to  ascertain  or  identify  them,  their 
construction  is  a  matter  of  taw,  and  belongs  exclusively  to  the 
court ;  but  when  parol  evidence  is  introduced  to  ascertain  or 
identify  the  calls,  then  it  is  a  question  of  ^aw  and  fact,  the  jury 
tindinw  the  fact,  the  court  declaring  the  law.'"^  "In  cases  of 
boundary,  which  depend  upon  the  swearing  of  witnesses,  it  would, 
no  dou))t,  be  incompetent  for  the  court,  by  any  sort  of  instruc- 
tions that  might  be  given,  to  withdraw  from  tlie  jury  a  decision 
upon  the  w^eight  of  the  testimony,  and  the  facts  which  the  testi- 
mony conduces  to  establish.  The  actual  position  and  identity 
of  the  boundary,  in  such  a  case,  would  be  exclusively  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  consideration  and  determination  of  the  jury,  and 
not  the  court."  ^  "  Wiiere  contradictory  evidence  is  given  of 
the  location  of  a  survey,  or  where,  from  the  evidence,  the  true 
location  is  doubtful  and  uncertain,  it  nuist  be  referred  to  the 
jury  to  determine  the  land  included  in  the   survey;    but  where 

'  Safrct  V.  Ilartman,  5   Jones  Law  ■•  CockroU    v.    McQuiun,    4    T.    B. 

(N.  C.),l«5,  18'.».  Mou.   (Ky.)    63,    opiuion   by   OAVslcy, 

2  Ihi'l.  J. 

■^  Ott  V.  Soulard,  '.t  Mo.  581,  COJ. 


Tit.  V,  Cli.  XLIX.]  place:  boundary:  identity  of  land.   1083 

there  is  no  conflict  in  the  evidence,  and  no  room  for  doubt  or 
hesitation  in  regard  to  the  location,  there  is  nothing  to  leave  to 
the  jury,  and  tlie  questions  of  law  are  for  the  court."  ^ 

§  1470.  [Illustration.]  Conclusiveness  of  Marked  Corners  and 
Lines  IN  a  Survey. — Where  the  closing  line  of  a  survey,  starting 
from  an  admitted  corner,  did  not,  as  marked  on  the  ground,  reach  the 
boundary  of  the  tract  which  it  was  intended  to  enclose,  and  there  were 
no  indications  of  a  corner  on  the  ground  at  that  point,  where  it  would 
intersect  said  boundary  if  extended  ;  but  there  was,  near  that  point,  a 
*' marked  corner  "  which  could  be  reached  by  diverging  by  an  angle 
of  45  degrees  from  the  extremity  of  the  marked  line,  — it  was  held  a 
question  of  fact  for  a  jury,  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  whether  the 
"  marked  corner  "  was  or  was  not  the  original  corner,  and  if  so,  whether 
the  partial  line  on  the  ground  had  not  been  abandoned  by  the  surveyor 
and  another  one  adopted,  closing  the  survey  by  a  straight  line,  running 
from  the  admitted  corner  to  the  marked  corner.'-^ 

§  1471.  Indefinite  or  lusuffieieut  Calls  in  a  Deed.  —  Where 
the  calls  in  a  deed  are  so  indetinite  that  the  court  cannot  pro- 
nounce their  meaning,  the  question  what  land  was  intended  by 
the  parties  to  be  embraced  in  the  deed,  is  a  question  depending 
botli  on  law  and  fact,  which  should  be  submitted  to  a  junj  under 
the  direction  of  the  court  as  to  such  rules  of  construction  as  may 
be  found  applicable.^ 

§  1472.  Illustration  of  Foregoing. — It  was  so  held  wliere  land 
was  described  in  different  deeds  as  bounded  "  on  the  mountain,"  "by 
the  mountain,"  and  "  at  the  foot  of  the  mountain."  *  So,  where  a  tes- 
tator, in  devising  land,  laid  down  as  a  line  of  division,  "  a  post"  and 
'a  corner,"  and  there  were  two  such  posts,  and  the  language  of  the 
will  pointed  to  neither  to  the  exclusion  of  the  other,  though  external 
circumstances  might  do  so,  — it  was  held  that  the  question  as  to  which 
of  the  posts  was  intended  was  a  question  of  fact,  which  did  not  de- 


1  Ramage  v.   Peterraau,  25   Pa.  St.  (Mass.)  17,  2():  Murray  r.  Spencer,  88 

349,  opiuiou  by  Kuox,  J.  N.  C.  3.")7. 

-  Huut  V.  McFarlaud,    38  Pa.  St.  ■*  Willistou     v.     Morse,      10     Met. 

(39,  (Mass.)  17,  26. 

■^  Willistou    V.     Morse,     10     ISIetc. 


1084  PROVINCE  OF   COURT  AND  JURY        [1  Thoin[).  Tr., 

pent!  in  any  degree  upon  direction  in  matter  of  law.  "Here,"  said 
Gibson,  C.  J. ,  "  there  was  no  disagreement,  —  the  name  and  the  descrip- 
tion answering  in  the  same  degree  to  each  of  the  corner  posts,  so  that 
nothing  was  to  bo  determined  but  a  pure  question  of  fact."  ^  So,  where 
a  deed  called  for  "an  old  line  down  a  bottom  to  a  given  point,"  and 
there  was  no  evidence  as  to  the  old  line,  but  there  was  conflicting  evi- 
dence as  to  two  bottoms,  extending  from  the  point  reached  to  the  one 
aimed  at,  —  it  was  held  proper  for  the  judge  to  submit  to  the  jury  the 
question  which  of  the  two  bottoms  was  the  one  called  for.'^  So,  where 
a  lease  described  the  demised  premises  as  the  lessor's  "  coal  bank  and 
the  appurtenances  thereunto  belonging,"  and  did  not  otherwise  describe 
them,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  for  the  rent,  in  which  eviction  was  set 
up  as  a  defense,  that  it  was  for  the  jury,  and  not  for  the  court,  to  say 
what  was  the  extent  of  the  demised  premises,  —  it  being  rather  a  latent 
ambiguity  to  be  solved,  than  an  instrument  of  writing  to  be  construed. 
"  The  meaning  of  the  words  used,"  said  the  court,  "  is  pla'u  enough  ; 
but  the  extent  and  scope  of  their  operation  are  where  the  ambiguity 
lurks.  Words  enough  were  not  put  into  the  instrument  to  define  the 
boundaries  of  the  grant,  and  therefore  it  was  for  the  jury  to  define  them 
from  evidence  dehors  the  instrument."  ^  So,  in  an  early  case  in  Cali- 
fornia it  was  held  that,  where  the  boundaries  of  a  lot  of  land  granted 
by  an  alcalde  in  Mexican  times  were  uncertain,  the  true  location  of  the 
lot  was  a  question  of  fact  within  the  peculiar  province  of  a  jury.^  So, 
it  has  been  held  in  Pennsylvania  that,  where  it  is  uncertain  f-ora  the 
language  employed  in  a  sheriff's  return,  what  land  was  in  fact  s  >ld,  the 
question  may,  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  be  submitted  to  the  jury.  The 
court  say:  "The  construction  of  written  instruments  is  undoubtedly 
the  exclusive  province  of  the  court,  and  the  quantum  of  estate  conveyetl 
by  a  deed  is  referable  to  the  judges  alone.  But  where  that  estate  is 
situate,  what  are  its  limits  and  contents,  must  frequently  depend  '-"pon 
evidence  dehors  the  writing;  and  tlius  it  is  often  a' pure  question  of 
fact,  or  of  law  and  fact  compounded,  upon  which  a  jury  must  be  called 
to  pass.  This  is  peculiarly  true  of  loose  written  returns  of  writs  of 
execution,  which  ignorance  and  carelessness  combine  to  divest  of  every 
feature  approacliing  to  certainty.  With  us,  inaccuracy  of  description 
in  these  inceptions  of  title  is  so  often  indulged,  that  it  has  been  found 

1  Brownfield   v.  Browuficld,   Vl  Ta.  »  Tllley  v.  :Moyers,  43  Pa.  St.   40-t, 
St.  130,  144.  '  411,  opinion  l)y  Wocxhvard,  J. 

2  Hill      V.    Mason,      7     Jones   .  I..  *  Eeyuolds    v.    West,    1    Cal.    323, 
(N.  C.),551.  3-28. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIX.]  PI  ..je:  boundary:  identity  of  land.   1085 

necessaiy  to  make  a  liberitl  use  of  assisting  evidence,  documentary  and 
oral,  in  correcting  mistakes,  explaining  ambiguities,  and  appl3ang  in- 
determinate delineations  to  disputed  localities.  Where  a  return  is  in- 
telligible in  itself,  and  ascertains  with  reasonable  precision  the  particular 
tract  taken  in  execution,  no  room  is  afforded  for  the  introduction  of 
explanatory  proof,  and  none  will  be  received  in  contradiction  of  the 
official  act  But  where,  either  from  the  generality  of  the  terms  used, 
uncertainty  of  delineation,  or  seeming  contradiction  of  description,  a 
doubt  is  raised  affecting  the  boundaries  of  the  levy,  its  particular  locality 
or  extent,  recourse  is  necessarily  had  to  evidence  aliunde.  In  man^-, 
l)erhaps  most  of  these  instances,  the  difficulty  proceeds  from  wide  gen- 
eralities of  language,  which  fail  to  indicate  any  precise  locality,  though 
it  also  frequently  springs  from  inability  to  fix  a  described  line  of  division 
or  boundary,  without  invoking  the  local  knowledge  of  those  acquainted 
with  the  subject  of  dispute.  Wliere  this  happens,  while  the  right  of 
construing  the  written  return  must  be  conceded  to  the  court,  the  position 
and  limits  of  the  land  and  the  quantity  intended  to  be  sold,  become  a 
legitimate  object  of  investigation  fur  a  jury.  A  judge  who  evades  to 
declare  the  meaning  of  a  deed  or  other  writing  commits  an  error ;  but 
if  the  instrument  cannot  be  understood  without  reference  to  extraneous 
facts,  the  jury  must  judge  of  the  whole."  ^  AVhere  a  sheriff  advertised 
"  all  that  tract  of  land  and  premises  on  which  said  William  Todd  now 
lives,  situate,"  etc.,  "  and  containing  two  hundred  acres, more  or  less," 
and  made  a  sale,  in  pursuance  of  this  advertisement,  which  was  followed 
by  his  deed  to  the  purchaser,  upon  a  subsequent  controversy  as  to 
whether  a  certain  twenty-nine  acres  of  land  passed  by  the  sale,  the 
question  was  held  to  be  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jur}^  and  it  was  held 
that  the  court  erred  in  directing  a  verdict  for  the  defendant. ^ 

§  1473.  Parol  Evidence  Admissible  in  such  a  Case.  — From 
what  htis  preceded  it  will  follow  that,  in  order  to  enable  the  jur}' 
to  discharge  the  office  of  applying  the  descriptive  words  of  a 
deed  to  the  land,  parol  evidence  must  frequently  be  heard. ^ 
Such  evidence,  it  has  been  said,  is  alwai/s  admissib/e.* 

1  Hoffmau  v.  Banner,  14  Ta.  St.  25,  ^  Abbott  v.  Abbott,  51  Me.  575,  581. 
28,opiuiouby  Bell,  J.    See  ante,  ^  lOSS.  Upon    the    admissibility     of      parol 

2  Todd  V.  Philhower,  24  N.  J.  L.  evidence,  the  court  cited  Waterman  v. 
797,807.  Johnson,  13  Picl:.   (Mass.)2(;i;  AViug 

'*  Nagloe  u.  lugersoll,  7  Pa.  St.  l5d,  r.  Burgis,  13  Me.  111.  "It  some- 
198.  tiun.'S      liappeu.^,"'      says     Davis,     J., 


1086  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.       [1  TllOlup.  Tl'., 

5  14:74.  Verdict  of  Jury  of  Vicinage  entitled  to  Great 
Weight.  —  It  has  been  said,  in  an  action  for  damages  for  cutting 
a  ditch  and  making  a  levy,  whereby  water  has  been  diverted 
from  its  previous  channel  and  cast  upon  the  huid  of  the  phiintiff, 
that  "  the  rehitive  situation  of  the  huids  of  the  phiintiff  and 
defen(huits,  and  the  natural  drainage  of  the  soil,  are  matters 
peculiarly  within  the  cognizance  of  a  jury  of  the  vicinage; 
and  their  verdict  upon  a  subject  so  generally  interesting  to  the 
inhabitants  of  an  alluvial  region,  is  of  the  highest  authority  with 
us."  1 

§  1475.  Identity  of  Land  and  Whether  Assessed  or  Un- 
seated. —  Where,  in  an  action  of  ejectment  by  one  claiming  un- 
der a  treasurer's  tax  deed,  there  is  a  question  about  the  validity 
of  the  deed,  because  of  a  doubt  in  regard  to  the  identity  of  the 
land  described  in  the  writ  and  that  set  out  in  the  deed,  or  because 
it  is  uncertain  whether  the  land  was  really  assessed  as  unseated, 
or  whether  it  was  in  fact  unseated,  —  these  questions,  it  has  been 
held,  'AXQ.  for  the  jury  and  not  for  the  court;  and  this  is  so,  al- 
though the  defendant  is  a  mere  intruder,  not  having  even  color  of 
title.  The  reason  is  that  the  treasurer's  deed  is  good  for  nothins: 
unless  it  is  made  to  appear  that  the  land  therein  described  was 
assessed  and  taxed  ns  unseated,  and  it  is  too  clear  for  dispute  that 
a  question  of  identity  of  land  is  a  question  for  the  jury.^ 

§  147G.  Questions  of  Locality,  Distance,  etc.,  for  the 
Jury. —  The   general  rule,  then,  is  that  questions    of   locality, 

in  this  last  case,  "  tliat  tlie  mon-  450."  That  tlio  acts  aud  declarations 
uraent  found  upon  the  ground  cor-  of  llie  i>raiilor  are  important  in  de- 
responds  Avith  the  description  of  the  terininiug  the  question  of  boundary, 
monument  in  the  deed  in  some  par-  see  Patten  v.  Goldsborough,  9  Seri;. 
ticuiars,  and  differs  from  it  in  others.  &  R.  (Pa.)  47.  That  subsequent  occu- 
In  such  case  the  whole  description  in  pation  by  the  parties  is  generally  de- 
the  deed  is  not  to  be  rejected,  and  cisive,  see  Stone  v.  Clark,  1  Met. 
parol  evidence  is  admissible   to  sliow  (Mass.)  378. 

wliether  the  monument,  partially  but  ^  Williams  u.  Bridge.  U  La.  Ann.  721 

erroneously  described,  was    the  one  opinion  by  liuclianau,  J. 

intended.     Parker  v.  Smith,  17  Mass.  2  Miller  v.  McCullough,  lO-t  Pa.  St. 

413;  f'larkw.  Muuyan,  22 Pick.  (Mass.)  G24,  (J29. 
410;  Slater  v.  Rawson,  1  .Met.  (Mass.) 


Tit.  V,Cli.XLIX.]  place:  boundary:  identity  of  land.   1087 

boundary,  distance,  direction,  identity  of  land  are  questions  of 
fact,  and  not  of  law. 

^1477.  [Illustration.]  Appui'teiiances. — Thus,  it  has  been 
held,  under  circumstances  which  need  not  be  set  out,  that  the 
question  wdiether  lots  of  ground  are  appurtenant  to  a  railway, 
and  indispensably  necessary  to  the  enjoyment  by  the  railway 
company  of  its  franchises,  and,  as  such,  included  in  a  mortgage 
of  the  railway  property,  is  a  question  which  may  properly  be 
submitted  to  a  jury}  So,  under  an  indictment  founded  on  a 
statute  for  selling  liquor  to  be  drunk  in  the  defendant's  out- 
house, yard,  garden  and  appurtenances  thereto  belonging,  it  has 
been  held  a  question  of  fact,  for  the  jury  to  determine,  whether 
the  liquor  was  drunk  upon  the  appurtenances  of  the  premises  of 
the  defendant.'^ 

§  1478.  [Continued.]  Curtilage.  —  So,  it  has  been  held,  in 
a  criminal  prosecution  for  burning  a  barn,  charged  to  be  within 
the  curtilage  of  a  dwelling  house,  that  the  question  wdiether  the 
barn  was  within  the  curtilage  of  the  dwelling  house,  as  alleged  in 
the  indictment,  was  a  question  for  the  jury  upon  the  evidence, 
the  court  detinino;to  them  the  meaninir  of  the  word  "  curtilao'c"  ^ 

§  1479.  Whether  the  Place  of  Entry  was  a  part  of  the 
House.  — In  cases  of  house-breaking,  which  are  analogous  to 
burglaries   at    common    law,    the   question    whether   the    place 

1  Shamokiu  &c.  R.  Co.  V.  Livermore,  Serg.  &.  R.   (Pa.)  210;    Caual  Co.   v. 

47  Pa.  St.  465.  The  court  commeut  upon  Bouham,  9  Watts  &  !S.  (Pa.)  27. 

the  following  cases,  touchiuy;thL'qut\s-  -  Stout  w.  State,  93  lud.  150. 

tion  what  property  is  aj9p!(r<e;ja)i<  to  the  ^  Com.  v.  Baruey,  10  Cusli.  (Mass.) 

property  of  a  railway  company  or  oth-  -180.     The  court   defined  curtilage,  iu 

er  corporation:    Lehigh   Coal   &c.  Co.  law,  as  meaning  a  fence  or  enclosure 

V.  Northampton  County,  8  Watts  &  S.  of  a  small  piece  of    land   around   a 

(Pa.)  334;  Railroad  t?.  Berks  County,  6  dwelling  house,  usually  including  the 

Pa.  St.  70;  Wayne  County  v.  Delaware  buildings  occupied  iu  connection  with 

&c.  R.  Co.,  15  Pa.  St.  351 ;  New  York  &c.  the  house,  which  enclosure  may  con- 

R.  Co,  V.  Sabin  26  Pa.  St.  242;  West-  sist  wholly  of  a  fence,  or  partly  of  a 

Chester  Gas  Co.  v.  County  of  Chester,  30  fence  and  partly  of  the  exterior  side  of 

Pa.  St.  232;  Ammarat  v.  Turnpike,  13  buildings    so  within   tiie    enclosure. 

Ill' I. 


1088  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AXD  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

of  ingress  where  the  breaking  took  phice  was  a  part  of  the 
house  which  is  cliarged  to  have  been  brol^en  into,  lias  been 
held,  upon  doubtful  grounds,  a  question  of  laio  for  the  court, 
and  not  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury.  Thus,  where  the  evi- 
dence showed  that  the  defendant  entered  the  store-house,  by 
removing  a  grate  on  the  street  which  gave  him  entrance  into  the 
cellar  thereunder,  which  connected  with  the  store-house  through 
a  hatchway,  and  the  court  instructed  the  jury  that,  if  they  believed 
from  the  evidence  that  the  grating  removed  by  the  accused  was 
not  a  part  of  the  store-house,  t\yQj  should  acquit, — it  was  held 
that  the  question  was  one  of  law ;  but,  as  the  jury  decided  it 
rightly,  by  convicting  the  defendant,  the  judgment  was  ordered 
to  stand. ^ 

§  1480.  Boundaries  of  Places.  —  In  New  Hampshire  it  is 
laid  down  that  the  court  cannot  determine  what  are  the  limits, 
or  whether  there  are  any  limits,  of  a  place,  not  being  a  public 
corporation,  described  by  its  name  only.  "The  court,"  said 
Bell,  J.,  "  are  in  no  situation  to  decide  that  Fisherville  is  not 
a  good  and  sufficient  description  of  a  place  in  Concord  and  Bos- 
cawen,  as  alleged.  Whether  there  is  a  place  called  by  that  name, 
where  it  is  situated,  what  are  its  limits,  if  it  has  any,  are  matters 
of  fact,  to  be  determined  by  a  jury  upon  such  evidence  as  the 
parties  may  lay  before  them.  It  is  in  no  sense  a  matter  of  law, 
of  which  a  court  can  take  judicial  cognizance.  What  is  included 
in  a  name  descriptive  of  a  place,  not  being  a  public  corporation, 
is  always  matter  for  a  jury  .'^  - 

§  1481.  Boundaries  of  Counties.  —  The  boundaries  of  coun- 
ties, established  by  public  law,  are  to  be  determined  as  matter 
of  law  by  the  court,  unless  in  cases  where  the  meaning  of  the 
statute  is  uncertain,  in  which  easels,  it  has  been  held,  the  courts 
will  not  disturb  a  boundary  fixed  by  common  usage  and  acqui- 
escence. But  where  the  boundary  is  not  uncertain,  the  fact  that 
particular    land  has    been  for    28  years   assessed  in  the  wrong 

1  Com.  r.  Bruce,  7!)  Ky.  500.  2  Blaudiug  v.  Sargcut,  33  N.  II.  239, 

215. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIX.]  place:  boundary  :  identity  of  land.    1089 

county,  will  not  ])e  sufficient  to  authorize  a  court  to  allow  a  jury 
to  say  that  the  land  lies  within  such  count}'.  The  court  must  de- 
cide it  as  a  matter  of  law.^  But  in  a  later  case  in  the  same  court, 
it  was  said:  "Tlie  definition  of  county  lines  is.  of  course,  mat- 
ter of  public  law,  and,  as  such,  must  be  interpreted  by  the  court ; 
but  the  jury  alone  can  find  the  facts  that  give  it  a  practical  ap- 
plication, in  actions  of  ejectment  for  the  trial  of  private  rights." 
When,  therefore,  in  an  action  of  ejectment,  one  of  the  parties 
chiimed  title  to  the  land  through  a  judicial  sale,  the  validity  of 
which  de})ended  upon  the  question  of  fact  whether  tlie  land  lay 
in  one  county  or  in  another,  it  was  held  that  the  court  committed 
no  error,  after  defining  the  county  line  as  established  by  statute, 
in  leaving  the  question  in  controversy  to  the  jury  upon  all  the 
evidence.'*  It  is  added  that,  in  such  a  case,  where  the  meaning 
of  the  law  which  fixed  the  line  was  long  in  doubt,  the  court  was 
not  bound  to  ijive  it  an  inter])retation  derived  from  its  lan2:uao;e 
alone,  without  reference  to  the  actual  interpretation  which  it  had 
received  through  the  acquiescence  of  the  public  during  three 
quarters  of  a  century.  "Long  established  public  regulations,'' 
said  the  court,  "  ought  not  to  be  disturbed  by  the  logical  or 
philological  criticisms  of  original  principles;  The  county  line 
ousiht  to  be  recognized  as  beino;  where  it  was  ffenerallv  under- 
stood  to  be,  and  not  where  we  would  now  place  it,  if  we  had  now 
to  apply  the  law  for  the  first  time.  We  can  best  ascertain  where 
the  true  line  was,  by  looking  to  the  public  practice  relative  to  it, 
in  connection  with  the  levying  of  taxes,  selecting  jurors,  serving 
process  by  the  sheriffs  and  constables,  elections,  official  surveys 
iind  such  like  matters.  More  of  such  evidence  would  have  been 
better  here."  ^ 

§  1482.  Boundary  of  a  State.  —  In  i;.  case  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  it  was  said  by  Mr.  Justice  Nelson, 
in  giving  tlie  opinion  of  the  court:  "  The  boundary  of  a  State, 
when  a  material  fact  in  the  determination  or  the  extent  of  the 

^  Johns  V.  Davidson,  16  Pa.  St.  512.  ^  Ibid.,  opinion  by  Lowrie,  C.  i. 

a  Heckerr.  Sterling,  36  Pa.  St.  423, 
428. 

09 


1090  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JCRY.        [1  TllOIlip.   Tl/, 

jurisdiction  of  a  court,  is  not  a  simple  question  of  law.  The 
description  of  a  boundary  may  be  a  matter  of  construction,  which 
belono:s  to  the  court;  but  the  application  of  the  evidence  in  the 
ascertainment  of  it,  as  thus  described  and  interpreted,  with  a 
view  to  its  location  and  settlement,  belongs  to  the  jur.y.  All  the 
testimony  bearing  upon  this  question,  whether  of  maps,  surveys, 
practical  location  and  the  like,  should  be  submitted  to  them 
under  proper  instructions  to  find  the  fact."  ^ 

§  1483.  Public  Roads  —  Instruction  that  Monuments  and  Lines 
OF  SuKVEYOR  PREVAIL.  —  "The  monuments  observed  and  lines  actually 
run  by  the  surveyor,  in  surveying  the  road,  and  the  laying  out  and  viewing 
the  line  of  road  on  the  ground  where  it  is  laid,  always  prevail  in  de- 
termining the  location  of  the  road,  provided  the  road  is  actually  opened 
on  that  line.  The  notes  of  survey  and  the  plat  returned  by  the  surveyor 
are  matters  of  description,  which  serve  to  assist  in  determining  the 
place  where  the  road  is  laid,  but  they  are  not  conclusive.  *  *  * 
Whenever  you  find  from  the  evidence  that  they  (the  surveyor,  chain- 
man,  viewers,  etc.)  actually  surveyed  and  located  this  road  upon  the 
ground,  if  it  was  afterwards  opened  by  the  road  overseer,  will  be  the 
road  for  the  purposes  of  this  case,  whether  it  was  laid  upon  the  town- 
ship line,  or  not."  - 

§  1484.  Instructions  as  to  Survey  and  Plat  of  Public  Road  being 
Evidence  of  its  Location,  etc.,  in  Criminal  Prosecution  for  Obstruct- 
ing a  Public  Highway  under  Illinois  Statute.  —  "  The  monuments 
or  corner  run  to,  by  the  surveyor  in  surveying  the  road,  and  the  staking 
and  laying  out  of  the  road,  must  always  control  in  determining  the  loca- 
tion of  the  road ;  and  the  field  notes  and  plat  returned  by  the  surveyor 
are  but  matter  of  description  winch  serve  to  assist  in  determining  the 

1  United  States  v.  Jackalow,  1  Rep.  211;  Turubiill  v.  Schroeder, 
Black  (U.  S.),  484,  487.  29    Miun.   49;  Johnson    v.    Preston,  9 

2  Approved  in  Shaffer  ■»,  Weech,  34  Neb.  474;  Penry  v.  Richards,  52  Cal. 
Kans.  598;  citing  Hiner  v.  People,  34  49G;  Pike  v.  Dyke,  2  Me.  213;  Brown 
111.  297;  Beckwith  v.  Beckwith,  22  v.  Gay,  3 /(Z.  120;  Williams  w.  Spauld- 
Ohio  St.  180;  Everett  u.  Lusk,  19  Kans.  ins,  29  Me.  112';  Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  25 
195,199;  McAlpine  u.  Reicheneker,  27  Wis.  706;  Fleischfresser  v.  Schmidt, 
Id.  257;  Tarpenning  V.  Cannon,  28  Id.  41  Id.  22'i\  Jackson  v.  Cole,  U!  Johns. 
r.fiS;      Twogood   v.    Hoyt,    42     Mich.  (N.  Y.)  257. 

G09;  Cullacott  v.    Mining  Co.,  C  Pac. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  XLIX.]    PLACE  :  BOUNDARY  :  IDENTITY  OF  LAND.     1091 

place  where  the  road  was  actually  located. In  determining  the 

boundaries  of  land  in  this  State,  the  original  mounds  or  monuments 
must  govern  as  to  the  location  of  the  line,  although  the  line  may,  by 
following  such  original  mounds,  be  made  a  crooked  or  deflected  line. 
And  if  the  original  mounds  have  once  been  discovered  and  recognized  by 
a  county  surveyor  as  original  corners,  a  county  surveyor  who  might  be 
subsequently  elected,  would  have  no  right  to  disregard  such  original 
corners  and  establish  a   different   line,  though   such  a  line  might  be  a 

straight  one. If  the  jury  believe  from  the  evidence,  that  Berfield 

actually  surveyed  and  located  the  road  on  the  deflected  line,  under 
proper  authority,  that  would  be  the  true  line  of  the  road,  although  the 
true  section  line  might  be  south  of  that.  The  actual  survey  and  stak- 
ing and  viewing  of  the  road,  upon  the  ground  where  it  is  laid,  consti- 
tutes the  location,  and  the  markings  and  lines,  made  by  the  surveyor  and 
viewers  upon  the  plat,  do  not  constitute  the  location  of  the  road,  pro- 
vided the  road  was  actually  opened  upon  such  line."  ^ 

i  Approved   in   Hiuer  v.  People,  34  111.  298,  299. 


1092  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TJlOlUp .   Tl., 


CHAPTER     L. 

NOTICE. 
Section 

1487.  Distinction  between  Actual  and  Constructive  Notice. 

1488.  Actual  Notice  in  Lieu  of  Registration. 

1489.  Subsequent  Purchaser  with  Notice. 

1490.  Notice  of  Non-Liability  for  Negligence. 

1491.  Notice  on  Passage  Tickets  as  to  Limit  of  Baggage. 

1492.  Notice  to  Guest  of  Usage  of  Leaving  Money  or  Valuables  at  the  Bar. 

1493.  Instruction  as  to  Scienter  in  the  Owner  of  a  Vicious  Dog  from  a  Pre- 

vious Bite. 

1494.  Liability  of  Partner  Retiring  without  Notice  of  Dissolution. 

1595.  Rule  applies  only  in  Favor  of  Persons  who  have  had  Previous  Dealings 

with  the  Firm. 
149G.  But  Retiring  Partner  may  become  Liable  to  Strangers  by   a  "  Holding 

out." 

1497.  Rule  does  not  apply  as  against  Dormant  Partners. 

1498.  Rule   does   not  apply   to   a  Partnership  Trading  under   a    Corporate 

Name. 

1499.  Rule  Rests  ouly  on  the  Principle  of  Estoppel. 

1500.  Kind  of  Notice  Required:  Actual  Notice  to  Previous  Customers. 

1501.  Reasonable  Notice  by  Publication  to  the  Public  generally. 

1502.  Not  a  Question  of  Actual  Notice,  but  question  of  Diligence  in  giving 

Notice. 

1503.  General  Notoriety. 

§  1487.  Distinction  between  Actual  and  Constructive  No- 
tice.—  Actual  notice  is  notice  in  fact;  constructive  notice  is  no- 
tice in  law.  Actual  notice  is  purely  a  fact,  and  is  proved  as  a 
fact  and  found  as  a  fact  by  a  jury.^     Constructive  notice  is  the 

1  Muldrow  V.  Robinson,  58  Mo.  332,  party  liable  to  pay  an  account  had  ac- 

350;  Beatie  v.  Butler,  21  Mo.  313,  323;  quired  notice  from  an  interview  which 

Vaughn  v.  Tracy,   22  Mo.  415;  Eyer-  occurred  between  him  and  the  debtor, 

man  v.  Second  National   Bank,  13  Mo.  that  the  account  had  been  transferred 

App.  289;  s.  c.  affirmed,  84  Mo.   408;  to   a  third  person.     In   such  case,  to 

Hill  u.  Tissier,  15  Mo.  App.  299;  Mas-  have  given  an  instruction  which  was 

terson  v.  West  End  Narrow  Gauge  R.  requested,  to  the  effect   that  what  oc- 

Co.,  5  Mo.   App.    (j4.     It  was  so  held,  curred  between   the  parties  to  the  ac- 

where  the  question  was  whether  the  count  did  not  amount  to  notice,  would 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  L.]  NOTICE.  1093 

notice  which  the  kiw  conclusively  ascribes  to  certain  kinds  of 
publications,  such  as  the  recording  of  a  deed  in  the  recording 
office,  or  the  publication  of  a  legal  notice  to  a  non-resident  or  un- 
known party.  From  this  it  follows  that  actual  notice  is  always  a 
question  of  fact  for  a  jury,  and  that  constructive  notice,  upon  the 
fact  of  the  statutory  publication  being  found  or  established,  is 
always  a  question  of  law  for  the  court.  The  only  exception  to 
this  rule  which  is  recalled,  arises  in  cases  governed  by  the  law  mer- 
chant, and  has  been  already  considered. 1  It  is  said:  "  Actual  no- 
tice does  not  require  positive  and  certain  knowledge,  such  as  seeing 
the  deed ;  but  that  is  sufficient  notice,  if  it  be  such  as  men  usually  act 
upon  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life.  When  it  is  shown  that  pur- 
chasers are  affected  with  a  knowledge  of  such  circumstances, 
then  the  foundation  is  laid  from  which  the  inference  of  actual  no- 
tice may  be  drawn,"  ^ 

§  1488.  Actual  Notice  in  Lieu  of  Registration.  —  Actual 
notice  of  an  assignment  preferring  other  creditors,  is  equivalent 
to  registration  ;  and  whether  the  particular  creditor  or  his  attorney 
had  such  actual  notice  is  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury  in  all  cases. ^ 

1489.  Subsequent  Purchaser  with  Notice.  — Whether  or  not 
the  possession  of  a  purchaser  of  real  property,  whose  title  is  not 

have  been  an  invasion  of  the  province  ter  of  law,  although  the  notice  may  have 

of  the  jury,     Saltraarsh  v.  Bower,   22  been  written,    addressed  and  mailed 

Ala,  221,  232.     The  rule  that  notice  of  under  such  circumstances  as,  in  a  case 

dishonor,  if  deposited  at  the   proper  within  the  law  merchant,  would  make 

time    in    the  proper  office  with    the  a  good  notice  to  an  indorser  as  a  mere 

proper  direction,  is  conclusively  pre-  conclusion  of  law.     Walworth  v.  Sea- 

sumed  to  have  reached  the  indorser,  ver,  30  Vt.  728. 
has  been   held  to  apply  only  to  cases  ^  Ante,  §  1223,  et  seq. 

governed   by  the  law  merchant;  and  it  ^  Ji)icl.;   citing  Curtis    v.  Muudy,  3 

has   been  held  that,  in  other  cases,  Met.  (Mass.)  405,     See  also  Pomeroy 

the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  v.    Stephens,    11    Met,    (Mass.)    244; 

notii;e  is  one  of  fact  for  a  jui'y.  There-  Spofford  v.  Weston,  29  Me,  140;  Dejv. 

fore,  it  has  been  held  that  the   suffi-  Dunham,  2  Johns.  (N.Y.)  182;  Jolland 

ciency  of  a  notice,  given  by  the  vendee  v.  Staiubridge,  3  Ves.  478;    Wade  on 

of  a  chattel  to  the  vendor,  of  the  ven-  Notice,  passim;    Speck   v.   Riggin,  40 

dee's  rejection  of  the  chattel  because  of  Mo.  405. 
defectsiuit,  cannot  be  decidedas  mat-  3  van  Hook  v.  Walton,  28  Tex.  59. 


1094  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOmp.  Tl"., 

recorded^  is  of  such  a  character  as  to  affect  a  subsequent  pur- 
chaser with  notice,  is  a  qupt^tion  of  fact  for  a  jury.^  So,  \r 
Pennsylvania,  it  was  heki  that,  whether  or  not  a  purchaser  at 
sheriff's  sale  had  actual  notice  of  an  unrecorded  assignment  of 
contracts  relating  to  the  land  purchased,  was  a  question  of  fad 
for  a  jury."^ 

§  1490.  Notice  of  Non-liability  for  Negligence. — Where  a 
person  or  corporation,  exercising  a  public  employment,  gives  re- 
ceipts to  its  customers  upon  which  is  printed  a  notice  that  such 
person  or  corporation  will  not  be  liable  for  the  negligence  of  its 
employes  in  the  exercise  of  their  employment,  it  is  held  a  question 
for  a  jury  ^  in  an  action  for  damages  for  such  negligence,  whether 
the  receipt  was  a  part  of  the  contract  between  the  parties, 
and  it  is  not  to  be  decided  as  a  question  of  law.^  It  was  so  de- 
cided in  the  f ollowino;  case :  the  master  of  a  steam  tug,  of  which 
the  defendants  were  owners,  was  employed  by  the  plaintiff  to  tow 
his  fishino-  smack  out  of  a  harbor.  In  so  doing,  the  fishing  smack 
was  stranded  throus^h  the  alleged  negligence  of  the  master.  The 
plaintiff  had,  on  previous  occasions,  hired  the  defendant's  steam 
tug  to  tow  his  smack,  and,  on  paying  the  charge,  had  received  re- 
ceipts, on  the  back  of  which  was  printed  a  notice  that  the  defend- 
ants would  not  be  answerable  for  damages  occasioned  by  any  sup- 
posed negligence  of  their  servants.  It  was  held  that  it  was  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  the  contract  in  the  particular  case 
was  made  on  the  terms  printed  on  the  back  of  the  receipts.* 

§  1491.  Notice  on  Passage  Tickets  as  to  Limit  of  Baggage. — 

So,  it  has  been  held  that  a  notice,  printed  on  the  l)ack  of  a  passage 
ticket  of  a  railway  company,  that  the  company  would  not  be  lia- 
ble for  the  baggage  of  passengers  beyond  a  certain  amount,  unless 
freight  on  any  addition  thereto  should  be  paid  in  advance,  the 
notice  stating  that  "  this  forms  part  of  all  contracts  for  trans- 

1  Pontou  ?;.  Billiard,  24  Tex.  619.  Brown   v.    Eastc-ni    K.    Co.,  11   Cusli. 

2  Khiues  v.    Baird,  41  Pa.  St.  250,       (Mas.s.)  97. 

264.  ^  Symouds  V.  Paiu,  G  Hurl.  &  X.  709. 

3  Symouds  v.  Pain,  0  Hurl.  &N.  709;      See  post,  §  1802,  1803. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  L.]  NOTICE.  1095 

portation  of  passengers  and  their  effects, "  —  does  not  raise  a 
legal presamption  that  the  passenger,  at  the  time  of  receiving  the 
ticket  and  before  the  train  leaves  the  station,  has  knowledge  of 
the  limits  and  conditions  which  the  carrier  thus  attaches  to  the 
transportation  of  the  baggage  of  passengers  ;  but,  in  an  action  for 
the  los-^  of  a  passenger's  baggage,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury 
whether  the  plaintiff  knew  of  the  notice  before  commencing  the 
journey.^  In  the  concluding  part  of  the  opinion,  Mr.  Justice 
Dewey  says:  "  I  am  aware  that,  in  reference  to  ordinary  mer- 
chandise transported  by  common  carriers,  it  has  been  held  in 
some  cases  in  the  English  courts,  that  a  ticket  given  to  the  owner 
of  merchandise,  containing  on  the  face  of  it  a  condition  or  limi- 
tation of  the  liability  of  the  carrier,  was  held  to  furnish  evidence 
of  the  special  contract  of  transportation,  sufficient  to  affect  the 
owner  of  the  merchandise,  and  to  limit  the  liability  of  the  car- 
rier.^ These  cases  obviously  differ  with  the  present,  and  fail  to 
satisfy  us  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  notice  in  the  case  before  us."^ 

§  1492.  Notice  to  Guest  of  Usajje  of  Leaving  Money  or 
Valuables  iit  the  Bar.  —  The  liability  of  an  innkeeper  for  the 
loss  of  goods  of  his  guest  is  not  varied  b}"  a  usage  at  the  particu- 
lar inn,  of  guests  to  leave  their  money  or  valuables  at  the  bar,  un- 
less the  guest  has  actual  knowledge  or  notice  of  such  usage,  and 
whether  he  has  such  knowledge  or  notice  is  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  jury.* 

§  1493.  Instruction  as  to  Scienter,  in  the  Owner  of  a  Vicious 
Dog,  from  a  Previous  Bite.  —  In  an  action  for  damages  for  an  injury 
sustained  by  the  plaintiff,  through  the  fact  of  his  minor  son  being 
bitten  by  the  defendant's  dog,  the  court  instructed  the  jury  "  that,  to 
enable  the  plaintiff  to  recover,  he  must  prove  that  the  dog  was  accus- 

1  Browu  V.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  11  Cush.  *  Berkshire  Woolen  Co.  v.  Proctor, 
(Mass.)  «)7;  post,   §  1862,  1879.  7  Cush.  (Mass.)  417,   428.     The  court 

2  Citiug  Austin  v.  Manchester  &c.  R.  instructed  the  jury  that  the  innkeeper 
Co.,  10  Com.  Bench,  454 ;  Shaw  v.  York  would  be  exonerated  if  the  guest  was 
&c.  E.  Co.,  G  Rail.  Cas.  87;  s.  c.  13  Ad.  "willfully  ignorant"  of  the  custom. 
&  El.  (X.  s.)  347.  Ibid. 

■^  Brown  ?;.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  supra. 


109G  PKOVIXCK    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1   TllOmp.  Tr,, 

tomed  to  bite  mankind,  and  that  it  must  also  be  proved  that  the  de- 
fendant had  knowledge  that  he  was  so  accustomed  to  bite ;  that,  if  a 
single  instance  of  biting  mankind  previous  to  the  act  complained  of  in  the 
declaration  was  fully  and  s^itisf  actorily  proved  to  the  jury,  and  a  knowl- 
edge of  such  act  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  was  proved  in  like  man- 
ner, that  had  been  held  sufficient  to  warrant  a  jury  in  finding  a  verdict 
for  the  plaintiff  in  cases  of  this  kind;  but  that  the  force  of  such  testi- 
mony would  depend  much  upon  the  circumstances  attending  tlie  trans- 
action, as,  whether  the}'  indicated  a  disposition  to  bite  without  provo- 
cation, or  the  contrary,"  The  Supreme  Court  held  that,  "  as  a  guide  to 
the  jury  in  applying  and  weighing  the  evidence  before  them,  this  part  of 
the  charge  was  unobjectionable,  and  adapted  to  the  case,  and  fully  sus- 
tained by  the  authorities."  ^ 

§  1494.  Liability  of  Partner  Retiring  without  Notice  of 
Dissolution. — Where  an  ostensible  or  known  partner  retires 
from  the  firm,  he  will  still  be  liable  for  its  debts  and  contracts, 
as  to  all  persons  who  have  previously  dealt  with  the  firm  and 
have  no  notice  of  his  retirement.'^ 

§  1495.  Rule  Applies  only  in  Favor  of  Persons  who  have 
had  Previous  Dealings  with  the  Firm.  —  The  rule  applies  only 
in  favor  of  persons  who  have  had  previous  dealings  with  the 
firm.  The  object  of  requiring  notice  of  the  dissolution  to  be 
given  is  to  remove  the  impression  which  has  been  created  in  the 
minds  of  such  persons,  that  certain  persons  continue  to  compose 
the  partnership.  So  far  as  mere  strangers  are  concerned,  it  is 
obvious  that  no  such  impression  can  exist,  and  that  they  cannot 
be  said  to  give  credit  to,  or  place  reliance  on  a  partner  of  luhom 
they  are  ir/norantJ^  Moreover,  such  persons  must  have  dealt  with 
the  firm  as  customers.  The  rule,  it  has  been  held,  has  no  appli- 
cation to  the  clerks  and  salesmen  of  a  customer  with  whom  the 

1  Arnold  v.  Norton,  25  Conn.  92.  v.  Griffin,  1  Post.  &  Fin.  U5;  Faldo  v. 

*  Story  Part  ,  §  160;  Pope  v.  Risley,  Griffin,  1   Post.  &   Ftu.  U7;  Grady  v. 

23  Mo.  185, 187,  per  Scott,  J.;  Gardner  RoI)iuson,  28  Ala.  289,  300;  Bradley  v. 

V.  Towsey,  3  Littell   (Ky.),  423,  425;  Carap,  Klrby   (Conn.),  77,  8C;  Biixtou 

Kennedy   v.  Boliannon,    11    B.     Mon.  v.  Edwards,  134  Mass.  5(17. 
(Ky.)  118;  AVestcrn  Bank  of  Scotland  ^  Dowzelot  v.  Kawliugs,  58  Mo.  70. 

V.  Needell,  1  Post.  &  Fin.  4(;i ;  Mulford 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  L.]  NOTICE.  lOiH 

firm  had  previous  dealings.  The  benefit  of  the  rule  reaches  the 
customer,  but  it  does  not,  through  him,  reach  his  own  agents  and 
servants.^ 

§  1496.  But  Retiring  Partner  may  Become  Liable  tc 
Strangers  by  a  "  Holding-  out."  —  But  a  retiring  partner  (or  an} 
other  person)  may  become  liable  to  strangers  by  holding  himsell 
out,  or  by  suffering  himself  to  be  held  out,  to  the  public  or  t( 
particular  persons,  as  a  partner.'^  Thus,  if  the  retiring  partnei 
permits  his  name  to  remain  over  the  door  of  the  place  of  busi- 
ness of  the  partnership  after  he  has  retired,  he  may  become  lia- 
ble for  the  firm  debts,  although  a  notice  of  the  dissolution  has 
been  given  by  publication.-^  At  least,  he  will  be  liable  to  any 
one  who  has  been  misled  by  his  conduct  in  this  particular  into 
o-ivino;  credit  to  the  firm.*  It  was  therefore  held,  in  an  action 
where  a  defendant  w^as  sued  upon  a  liability  as  a  partner,  and  he 
was  shown  to  have  been  once  a  partner,  that,  even  though  it  ap- 
peared that  the  partnership  had  been  dissolved,  if  there  had  been 
no  notice  of  the  dissolution,  any  evidence  that  he  had  continued 
to  give  orders  and  bills  in  the  name  of  the  firm,  and  to  act  as  if 
he  were  a  partner  with  the  same  person,  though  in  a  different 
business,  and  notwithstanding  that  it  was  proved  that  he  was  in  fact 
only  a  paid  servant,  —  would  be  sufficient  to  render  him  liable  for 
goods  ordered  by  him  in  the  name  of  the  supposed  firm  J"  In  such  a 
case,  it  will  be  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  the  retiring  part- 
ner has  acted  in  such  a  way  as  woidd  lead  a  reasonable  man  to 
suppose  that  he  was  still  a  partner,  and  Avhether  the  plaintiff  in 
fact  acted  upon  the  faith  that  he  was  so  and  gave  credit  to  the 
firm  as  such.^  It  is  obvious  that,  where  a  party  is  charged  as  a 
partner  on  the  ground  of  his  having  held  himself  out  as  such,  he 
can  only  be  affected  by  acts  of  holding  out^jnor  to  the  contract 

1  Richardson  v.  Snider,  72  Ind..425;  ^  Williams  v.  Keats,  2  Stark.  290. 

s.  c,  37  Am.  Rep.  168.  <  Dowzelot  v.  Rawlings,  58  Mo.  7(5, 

2  Mulford  V.  Griffin,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.      per  Sherwood,  J. 

145;  Guruey  v.  Evans,  27  L.  J.  Exch.  5  Mulford  v.  Griffin,  1  Fost.  &  Fin. 

16G;   M'lver  y.   Humble,  1(5  East,  169,  145. 

174,  176;  Kennedy  v.  Bohannou,  11  B.  "  Faldo  v.  Griffin,  1  Fost.  &  Fin.  147. 

Men.  (Ky.)  118,  120. 


1098  PROVINCE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.     [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

sued  on:   since  any  subsequent  holding  out   could  not   have  in- 
duced the  i)laintiff  to  give  the  credit.^ 

§  14:97.  Rule  does  not  Apply  as  against  Dormant  Part- 
ners. —  A  very  obvious  suggestion  to  the  mind  will  be,  that  the 
rule  does  not  apjdy  so  as  to  charge  a  dormant  partner  who  is 
unknown  as  a  partner  to  creditors,  for  the  reason  that  he  has 
never  been  held  out  as  a  member  of  the  firm,  and  that  credit  has 
presumably  never  been  given  to  the  firm  on  the  faith  of  his  being 
individually  answerable  for  its  debts. ^  But  the  rule  has  been 
extended  to  a  dormant  partner,  where  the  creditor  dealing  with 
the  supposed  firm  had  previously  known  that  such  dormant  part- 
ner was  a  member  of  the  firm.'^  If  the  fact  of  his  being  a  dor- 
mant partner  be  unknown  to  all  the  creditors,  no  notice  what- 
ever of  his  retirement  is  necessary  ;  if  it  be  known  to  a  few, 
notice  to  them  is  necessary.^ 

§  1498.  Rule  does  not  apply  to  a  Partnership  trading 
under  a  Corporate  Name.  — The  rule  which  exonerates  dormant 
partners  who  retire  without  giving  notice  is  held  to  have  no 
a})plication  to  a  partnershij)  which  trades  under  a  name  which 
would  be  appropriate  to  a  corporation,  in  which  the  names  of  none 
of  the  partners  are  given,  such  as  the  "  Titusville  Savings  Bank." 
The  reason  for  this  conclusion  is  thus  stated:  "  When  a  copart- 
nership is  formed  and  an  artificial  name,  such  as  is  usually 
employed  to  designate  a  corporation,  is  adopted,  it  must  be 
regarded  as  an  invitation  to  give  credit,  not  to  the  empty  name, 
but  to  the  individuals  who  compose  the  association  thus  desig- 
nated ;  and  hence  none  of  the  partners  can  properly  claim  to  be 
dormant.  They  are  all,  presumptively  at  least,  known  partners 
and  liable  as  such."  * 


1  Baird  r.  Planque,  1   Fost.  &  Fin.  ■*  Keunedy     v.    Bohanuon,    11    B. 
344.            .  Moil.  (Ky.)  118,  120.     See  also  Doford 

2  Grady  v.  Robinson,   28   Ala.  289,  v.  Reynolds,  3(i  Pa.  St.  32.5;  Shamburg 
300.  V.  Rn!j;<rles,  83  Va.  St.  148.- 

3  Farrar  r.  Defliune,  1   Car.  &   K.  ■'•  Clarke.  Fletcher,   96  Pa.  St   416, 
580;  Park  r.  Wooteu,  3.")  Ala.  242.  417. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  L.]  NOTICE.  1099 

§  1499.   Rule  Rests   only  on  the  Principle  of   Estoppel, — 

Another  obvious  suggestion  to  the  mind  is  that  this  rule  is  noth- 
ing more  than  an  illustration  of  the  general  principle  of  estoppel 
by  conduct.^  The  rule  as  to  such  estoppels,  is  that  where  A.,  by 
acting  or  failing  to  act  in  a  given  way,  induces  B.  to  believe  in 
the  truth  of  a  given  state  of  facts,  upon  the  faith  of  which  B. 
does  something  to  his  injury,  A.  will  thereafter,  as  against  B.,  be 
precluded  from  showing  that  in  truth  such  a  state  of  facts  did 
not  exist.  The  reason  of  the  rule  is  that,  having  by  his  conduct 
or  his  silence  assisted  in  deceiving  B.  as  to  the  truth  of  the  facts, 
it  would  operate  as  a  fraud  upon  B.  to  allow  him  afterwards  to 
prove  the  truth.  It  is  essential  to  the  very  idea  of  such  an  es- 
toppel that  B.  must  have  done  the  act  upon  the  faith  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  state  of  facts,  in  the  existence  of  which  the 
conduct  or  the  silence  of  A.  induced  him  to  believe.  It  is  to  be 
regretted  that  cases  are  found  which,  in  dealing  with  the  subject 
under  consideration,  ignore  this  underlying  principle  and  hold 
that  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  party  seeking  to  hold  such  partner 
to  show  that  he  gave  credit  to  the  firm  on  account  of  such  part- 
ner's financial  ability.^  These  cases  proceed  upon  the  naked 
ground  that  a  person,  who  suffers  himself  to  be  placed  before  the 
world  as  a  partner,  precludes  himself  from  asserting,  against  third 
persons,  that  he  was  not  in  fact  such.-*  In  so  doing,  they  neces- 
sarily raise  the  question  above  the  level  of  a  question  of  estop- 
pel or  of  fraud,  to  that  of  a  question  of  puhlic  'policy .^  They 
forget  that  justice  is  the  highest  public  policy,  and  that  public 
policy  is  not  concerned  in  requiring  a  man  to  i)ay  damages  to  an- 
other, for  doing  or  omitting  to  do  something  which  has  wrought 
no  injury  to  that  other.  They  forget  the  cogent  observation  of 
Chancellor  Walworth,  that"  the  want  of  knowledge  of  the  dis- 
solution of  the  partnership  cannot  benefit  a  customer  who  loses 

1  Lind.  Part.  (4th  ecL),  50;  Love-  ^  Compare  the  language  of  Eyre,  C. 
joy  V.  Spafford,  93  U.  S.  430,  440,  441;  J.,  in  Waugh  v  Carver,  2  H.  Bl.  233, 
Thompson  ■?).  First  Nat.  Bank,  111  U,  246,  with  tlie  observation  thereon  of 
S.  529,  538;  Pratt  v.  Page,  32  Vt.  13;  Sir  N.  Lindley  (Lind.  Part.  (4th  ed.) 
Hefner  v.  Palmer,  67  III.  161.  48),  and  the  reasoning  of   Mr.  Justice 

2  Strecker  v.  Conn.,  90  Ind.  469  Gray  in  Thompson  v.  First  Nat,  Bank, ' 

3  Uhl  V.  Harvey,  78  Ind.  26.  Ill  U.  S.  529,  538. 


1100  PROvrxcE  OF  COURT  AND  JURY.      [1  Thomp.  Tr., 

nothing  by  his  ignorance  of  the  i'act,  and  who  is  only  to  be 
phiced  in  the  same  situation  as  he  would  have  been  if  the  fact  had 
been  communicated  to  hiui  in  season."^  The  ground  of  estop- 
pel is  clearly  that  upon  which  the  English  courts  have  generally 
proceeded.  They  have  ruled  that  the  "  Holding  out  "  of  the  de- 
fendant as  a  partner  must  be  something  more  than  a  holding  out 
"to  the  world,"  for  that  is  a  loose  expression,  —  but  to  the 
plaintiff  himself,  or  under  such  circumstances  of  publicity  as  to 
satisfy  a  jury  that  the  plaintiff  knew  of  it  and  believed  him  to 
be  a  partner.^  "  I  told  the  jury,"  said  an  eminent  English 
judge,^  "  that  the  defendant  would  be  liable  if  the  debt  was  con- 
tracted whilst  he  was  actually  a  partner,  or  upon  a  representa- 
tion by  himself  as  a  partner  to  the  plaintiff,  or  upon  such  a 
representation  of  himself  in  that  character  as  to  lead  the  jury 
to  conclude  that  the  plaintiff,  knowing  of  that  representation, 
and  believing  the  defendant  to  be  a  partner,  gave  him  credit 
under  that  belief."  ^  In  another  case  it  was  held  that  the  per- 
son sought  to  be  charged  as  a  partner  was  not  liable,  because 
there  was  no  evidence  to  show  that  credit  was  in  fact  given  to 
him.^  In  this  country,  as  in  England,  it  has  been  held  necessary 
to  prove  that  the  plaintiff  gave  the  credit  with  a  knowledge  that 
the  defendant  had  so  held  himself  out.  It  is  added  that  this 
knowledge  might  be  easily  inferred,  if  the  defendant  had  thus 
held  himself  out  to  the  community.^  The  English  doctrine  is  thus 
summed  up  by  the  Lord  Justice  Lindley,  in  his  work  on  Partner- 
ship :  "  No  person  can  be  affixed  with  liabilty  on  the  ground  that 
he  has  been  held  out  as  a  partner,  unless  two  things  concur,  viz.  : 
tirst,  the  alleged  act   of  holding  out  must  have  been  done  either 

1  Brisbau  u.  Boyd,  4  Paige  (N.  Y.),      a    case  in  the   same     court,  in    18(!3, 
17,  22.  Chief  Justice  Erie    and     Mr.  Justice 

2  Dickinson  v.   Valpy,  10  Barn.  &.      Willes     express     similar     opinions: 
'  Ores.  128,  140,  per  Mr.  Justice  Parke,      Martyn  v.   Gray,  14  C.  B.  (n.  s.)  824, 

afterwards  Baron  Parke  and  Lord  839,  843.  The  decision  of  the  Court  of 
Wensleydale.  Exchequer  in  Edmundson  v.  Thomp- 

3  Baron    Rolfe,  afterwards     Lord      son,  31  L.  J.  (Exch.)  207;  s.  c.  8  Jur. 
Ci'anworth.  (n.  s.)  235,   is  to  t!ie  like  effect.     See 

^  Ford  V.   Whitmarsii,    Hurl.  &  \Y .      also  Carter  v.  Whalley,  1  Barn.  &  Aid. 
53,  .^5.-).  II. 

5  Pott  V.  Eyton,  3  C.  B.  32,    39.     In  «  Hefner  v.  Palmer,  07  111.  Kil. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  L.]  NOTICE.  1101 

by  him  or  by  his  coDsent,  and,  second,  it  must  have  been  known 
to  the  person  seeking  to  avail  himself  of  it.  In  the  absence  of 
the  first  of  these  requisites,  whatever  may  have  been  done  cannot 
be  imputed  to  the  person  sought  to  be  made  liable;  and,  in  the 
absence  of  the  second,  the  person  seeking  to  make  him  liable  has 
not,  in  any  way,  been  misled."  ^  The  rule  under  this  head  can- 
not be  better  summed  up  than  in  the  following  propositions, 
found  in  an  opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Vermont :  It  is 
necessary  to  show :  1.  That  such  customer  knew,  at  the  time 
when  the  contract  was  made,  that  the  partners  whom  he  seeks  to 
hold  had  been  in  partnership.  2.  That  he  was  ignorant  of  their 
dissolution.  3.  That  he  made  the  contract  supposing  that  he 
was  contracting  with  all  of  them  as  partners,  and  in  reliance  on 
their  joint  liability. - 

§  1500,  Kind  of  Notice  Required  :  Actual  Notice  to  Pre- 
vious Customers.  —  Under  this  head,  there  is  a  distinction  be- 
tween the  kind  of  notice  which  is  required  to  exonerate  the 
retiring  partner  in  respect  of  previous  customers  of  the  firm ,  and 
in  respect  of  strangers  or  the  general  public.  The  principle  is 
that,  as  to  previous  customers,  actual  notice  must  be  given,  that  is, 
specially  communicated  to  them.'^  The  rule  is  well  established 
that  publication  of  notice  of  the  dissolution  of  a  partnership  in 
a  neivspaper,  at  the  place  where  the  business  is  carried  on,  is 
not  sufficient  to  relieve  a  retiring  partner  from  liability  for  sub- 
sequent transactions,  in  the  firm  name,  with  one  having  dealings 
with  the  firm  prior  to  the  dissolution.  In  such  case  notice  must 
be  brought  home  to  the  dealer,  or  it  must  appear  that  facts  came 
to  his  knowledire  sufficient  to  advise  him,  or  to  o-ive  him  reason 
to  believe,  that  a  dissolution  had  taken  place.*     It  has  been  held 

1  Lind.  Part.  (4th  ed.)  50.  ^  Gilchrist  v.  Brande,  58   Wis.  1S4, 

2  Pratt.  V.  Pai>e,  32  Yt.  13.  190;  Austin  v.  Holkuul,  GD  N.  Y.  571; 

3  Gorliara  r.  Thompson,  Peake,  N.  Zollar -y.  Janvrin,  -47  N.  H.  324;  Lyon 
P.  42;  Godfrey  v.  Turnbull,  1  Esp.  v.  Johnson,  28  Conn.  1;  Little  r. 
371;  Graliain  v.  Hope,  Peake,  N.  P.  Clarke,  36  Pa.  St.  114;  Kenney  v. 
154;  Parkin  V.  Carruthers,  3  Esp.  248;  Altvater,  77  Pa.  St.  34;  Johnson  v. 
Minnitt^j.  Whitney,  16  Yin.  Abr.  244,  Totteu,  3  CaL343;  Ennis  v.  Williams, 
pi.  12;  Ketciiam  v.  Clark,  6  Johns.  30  Ga.  691;  Hctchins  v.  Hudson,  8 
CX.  Y.)  144.  Humph.  (Tenn.)  42G;  Prentiss  r.  Sin- 


1102  PROVINCE    OF    COURT    AND    JURY.        [1  Thotlip.   Tr., 

that  publication  in  <i  newspaper  taken  by  the  dealer  at  the  time, 
is  a  fact  fi  om  which  the  jury  may  infer  actual  notice  to  him, 
though  they  are  not  bound  to  draw  such  inference.^  But  where 
there  was  some  evidence  that  the  plaintiff  had  taken  the  paper 
off  and  on,  in  which  the  notice  of  dissolution  was  printed,  but  he 
positively  testified  that  he  had  no  knowledge  of  any  dissolution 
of  the  firm,  and  his  testimony  was  corroborated,  and  the  jury 
found  in  his  favor,  it  was  held  that  their  finding  was  conclusive 
upon  the  question  of  notice.'-^  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to 
exonerate  the  retiring  partner,  that  formal  notice  to  the  previous 
dealer  should  be  shown.  Any  notice  which  reached  him  in  any 
way,  so  as  to  advise  him  of  the  fact  of  dissolution,  or  which  was 
sufficient  to  put  him  upon  his  inquiry,  is  adequate.^  In  all  such 
cases  the  creditor  must,  in  order  to  avail  himself  of  this  rule  and 
hold  the  retiring  partner,  show  that  he  did  not  havQ  actual  notice 
of  the  dissolution  of  the  partnership.  Whether  he  did  have  such 
notice  or  not  is  a  question  of  fact  for  the  jury;  and  the  court 
commits  no  error,  it  has  been  held,  in  declining  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  a  certain  course  of  dealing  with  the  remaining  partner 
is  evidence  from  which  the  jury  ought  to  infer  actual  notice  of 
the  dissolution,  —  especially  where  there  is  some  evidence  of  a 
want  of  notice.* 

§  1501.  Reasonable  Notice  by  Publication  to  the  Public 
Generally.  —  In  order  to  exonerate  himself  from  liability  for 
the  future  debts  of  his  copartners,  the  retiring  partner  should 
see  that  a  reasonable  notice  of  his  withdrawal  from  the  firm  is 
given  to  the  public  in  some  form.  "  One  who  has  been  a  mem- 
ber of  a  partnership  and  has  been  so  advertised  to  the  world, 
owes  it  to  the  community  to  give  notice  of  his  withdrawal  from 
the  firm;  failing  in  this,  he  stands  bound  to  those  who,  in  the 
})elief  that  he  is  still  a  member  of  the  partnership,  give  it  credit. 

clair,  5  Vt.  HO;  Dickinson  v.  Dickiu-  "'  Gilchrist  v.   Brande,  58  Wis.  184, 

son,   25  Gratt     (Va.)    321;    Laird    v.  200;  Young  u.  Tibbitts,  32  Wis.  79. 
Ivens,  45  Tex.  622.  ^  Deford    v.   Reynolds,  36   Pa.    St. 

1  Treadwell  r.  Wells,  4  Cal.  2(;0.  325,  334. 

2  Gilchriste.  Brande,  5S  Wis.  184, 200. 


Tit.  V,   Ch.   L.l  NOTICE. 


1103 


This  duty  to  give  general  notice  is  due  to  the  public;   it  is  not 
confined  solely  to  former  customers  of  the  firm ;  former  customers 
of  the  firm  are  entitled  to  actual  notice."  i     In  what  form  this 
notice  may  be  given  was  thus  stated,  upon  a  view  of  several 
authorities,  by  Mr.  Justice  Hunt:    '^  We  think  it  is  not  an  abso- 
lute inflexible  rule  that  there  must  be  a  publication  in  a  news- 
paper, in  order  to  protect  a  retiring  partner.     That  is  one  of  the 
circumstances  contributing  to,  or  forming  the  general  notice  re- 
quired.    It  is  an  important  one  ;  but  it  is  not  tlie  only  or  indis- 
pensable one.     Any  means  that,  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Beli,^ 
are  fair  means,  to  publish  as  widely  as  possible  the  fact  of  dis'- 
solution;  or  which,  in  the  words  of  Judge  Edmonds,'^  are  public 
or  notorious,  to  put  the  public  on  its  guard;  or,  in  the  words  of 
Judge  Nelson,^  notice  in  any  other  public  or  notorious  manner; 
or,  in  the  language  of  Mr.  Verplanck,^  notice  by  advertisement 
or  otherwise,  or  by  withdrawing  the  external  indications  of  part- 
nership, and  giving  public  notice  in  the  manner  usual  in  the  com- 
unity  where  he  resides,  ->-  are  means  and  circumstances  proper 
to  be  considered  on  the  question  of  notice."  «     It  has  been  held 
that,  where  a  person   has  served  as  a  director  in  a  joint  stock 
partnership  and  his  name  has  been  published  as  such,  the  mere 
fact  of  dropping  his  name  from  the  published  list  of  directors  is 
not  sufficient.^ 

§  1502.  Not  a  Question  of  Actual  Notice,  but  of  Diligence 
in  Giving  Notice.  —  In  the  case  of  those  who  have  not  been  cns- 
tomers  of  the  firm,  the  question  is  not  whether  actual  notice  was 
received,  but,  as  in  the  case  of  the  protest  of  commercial  paper,^ 

^  Strecker  v.  Couu,  90  Ind.  409,  471.  ^  Senator  Verplanck,  in  Veruon  v 

To  the  same  effect  see  Backus  v.  Tay-  Manhattan    Co.,    22    Wend     (N     Y  ) 

lor,   84  Ind.    503;   Uhl   v.   Harvey,   78  183. 

Ind.  26;  Southwick  v.  McGovei:n,  28  «  Lovejoy  v.  Spafford,  93  U    S   430 

Iowa,  533;  Ketchara  v.  Clark,  G  Johns.  440.     See,  for  illustration,  Bradley  v 

^^2  1'^,/i*'  '■  '•  ^  ^'''-  ^''°  ^^^-  ^^""P'   ^^'^'^y   (C«^"-),   77,  83,  where 

Bell  Com.  640,  641.  an  oral  declaration  to  several  persons 

J  Wardwell    v.     Haight,    2    Barb,  was,  under  circumstances,  held  iusuf- 

^N.  1.)  o49,  oo2.  ficient. 

^  Bristol    V.     Sprague,     8     Wend.  v  chirk  v.  Fletcher,  96  Pa.  St    416 

^^•^•)'^-^-  '  Ante,  i  1-2-I-6,  et  seq. 


lie  rnoviNCE  of  coukt  and  jury.      [1  Thonip.  Tr., 

whetl^jfi'  proper  dili<rencc  was  used  in  giviiiu:  notice;  since  it 
uould  be  impossible  for  the  retiring  partner  to  give  actual  notice 
to  evory  man  who  might  by  any  possibility  become  ti  future 
creditor  of  the  remaining  partner,  and  no  man  is  held  to  impos- 
sibilities.^ "  The  question,"  said  Mr.  Justice  Hunt,  "  is  not 
exclusively  whether  the  holders  of  the  paper  did  in  fact  receive 
any  information  of  the  dissolution  ;  if  they  did,  they  certainly 
cannot,  recover  against  a  retiring  partner.  But  if  they  had  no 
actual  notice,  the  question  is  still  one  of  duty  and  diligence  on 
the  pai't  of  the  withdrawing  partner.  If  he  did  all  that  the  law 
requires,  he  is  exempt,  although  the  notice  did  not  reach  the 
holders."  2 

§  1503.  General  Notoriety.  —  That  the  fact  of  the  dissolu- 
tion was  a  matter  of  general  notoriety  is  not,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
equivalent  to  notice,  in  respect  of  the  general  public.^  But,  upon 
the  question  whether  general  notoriety  is  a  fact  from  which,  in 
connection  with  other  facts,  the  jury  may  infer  knowledge,  the 
authorities  seem  to  be  conflicting.  It  should  seem,  upon  princi- 
ple, that  evidence  that  the  fact  of  the  dissolution  of  the  firm  was 
a  matter  of  public  notoriety  is  competent,  for  the  purpose  of 
shoVving  that  the  person  seeking  to  charge  the  retiring  partner 
had  knowledge  of  the  fact.  It  has,  however,  been  held,  by  a 
court  and  judge  of  high  authority,  that  such  evidence  is  not  even 
competent.  "  ]Mere  notoriety,"  said  Chief  Justice  Shaw,  "  may 
exist,  and  yet  the  party  dealing  with  such  firm  may  not  be  ac- 
quainted with  it.  And  where  it  is  in  the  power  of  one  party,  and 
his  duty,  to  give  public  and  explicit  notice  of  a  fact  affecting  the 
rights  of  others,  and  he  does  not  do  it,  it  ought  notto  be  assumed 
upon  doubtful  grounds  of  })resumption."  *  In  like  manner,  it  was 
said  by  ]\Ir.  Justice  Elliott :  "  The  fact  tliat  the  witiidraAval  was 
generally  known  within  the  community  may  jjerhaps  be  consid- 

'  Veruon     v.    Manhattan    Co.,    22  ^  Lovojoy  v.  Spafford,  '.i.'i  U.  S.  430, 

WciHl.  (N.Y.)  183;  Bristol  17,  Spraguc,  441. 

8   Wend.    (N.    Y.)    423;    Ketcliam   v.  ^'  Strecker    v.    Conn,    'JO   Ind.    4G9, 

Clark,  6  Johns.  (N.  T.)  144;  Wardwoll  471. 

V.  Ilaitiht,  2  IJari).   (i\.  Y.)   549,  652;  ■»  Pitcher    r.    Barrows,      17     Pick. 

Lovejoy  v.  Spafford,  W  C.  S.  430.  (Mass.)  3G1. 


Tit.  V,  Ch.  L.]  NOTICE.  '  11Q5 

erecl,  in  conjunction  with  other  evidence,  as  tending  to  char-e 
those  deahng  with  the  partnership  with  notice  of  the  withdrawal- 
but  the  mere  fact  that  the  withdrawal  was  a  matter  of  general 
notoriety  will  not  supply  the  place  of  public  notice,  where  there 
is  no  visible  change  in  the  business,  in  the  title  of  the  firm,  or  in 
its  advertisements."! 

,.;  ^T'^''  ;•  fr'''  ''  '"''•  ''''  '""'  '  ^^=^^^'  ^-  ^-  ^2;  Graham  .. 
4.1.  See  also  Holdaner.Butterworth,  Hope,  1  Peake,  N.  P.  154;  City  Bank 
5  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  1 ;  Gorham  ..  Thomp-      ..  McChesney,  20  N.  Y.  240. 

70 


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